

# OMBATSE ENIGMA AND LESSONS FOR INTELLIGENCE CRIMINOLOGY IN NIGERIA

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
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## Abstract

Alakyo is a small Eggon community that hosts a shrine for the Ombatse worshippers of Nasarawa State, North-Central Nigeria. The community has witnessed several communal clashes, including clashes involving the killing of security agents numbering over a hundred from the Nigeria Police Force and the State Security Service in 2013, making it one of the worst security massacres or ambushes in the history of Nigeria. This study interrogates complexities surrounding the successful attack of over a hundred armed security personnel without a trace of the perpetrators and how that constitutes a lesson for intelligence criminology in the Nigerian security structure. The study relied on secondary sources in reviewing its stated focus. The research outcomes revealed that “*Ombatse*” is an Eggon traditional coinage meaning “the time has come”; a spiritual group linked to the Alakyo attack. The study concludes that failure of the security operatives to trace the immediate cause of that attack and track the whereabouts of the attackers in the aftermaths of the attack instills fear for subsequent attacks either by the same group or other groups in the future. The study recommends that government should ensure that law enforcement is aimed at building public confidence in the administration of criminal justice and carryout an overwhelming reform of the criminal justice institutions in the country in line with global best practice.

**Keywords:** Criminology, intelligence, *Ombatse*, violence, justice, police

## Introduction

Over time, sub-Saharan Africa and indeed the world have faced different forms of security challenges particularly, those related to acts of terrorism and ethno-religious violence. In Nigeria, the emergence of terror groups such as the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'atu wal-Jihad* otherwise known as Boko Haram in the North Eastern region, militancy in the Niger Delta, herdsmen attacks, armed banditry, kidnapping gangs, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) rumpus in Eastern Nigeria and other related conflicts are not in

doubt. The increasing incidences of terror related crimes in the country have begged for the need to carryout thorough interrogation of the situation with a view to devising their prevention strategies and control. These crimes and their fear are affecting the living condition and peaceful conduct of human activities in Nigeria (Ikoh, 2014). According to Onovo (2005), the challenges of national security in Nigeria have been made more complex by a number of factors such as ethnic diversity, plurality of religions, economic down-turn, unemployment and bottled up emotions from years of military bad governance. While successive democratic regimes have advanced efforts in curbing these crimes, there are other kinds of crimes which, in recent revelations are becoming consequentially lethal and capable of seriously compromising the safety and security of the nation. A case in point was the *Ombatse* security inversion which took place in 2013 in *Alakio* community, a small village in Lafia, the capital of Nasarawa State in North-Central Nigeria.

In other to attain good result in crime prevention and strategic control mechanism, there is need for a prudent and well informed security structure and/or law enforcement agencies that should cultivate the habit of intelligence gathering and information management scheme cut across all levels. In the revelation of Onovo (2005), law enforcement agencies are critical in intelligence operations at all levels as they cannot function effectively without collecting, processing, and applying intelligence. Therefore, the need for the art of collecting, evaluating and processing raw data into information for the purpose of decision making either political, economic or security wise is useful for any form of intelligence and intelligence application. This article therefore, addresses basically the *Alakio* security attack by the *Ombatse* group and the lessons that can be drawn for intelligence criminology in Nigeria.

### **History and Origin of Ombatse**

The *Ombatse* according to McGregor (2013) is a cult that claimed to have the same mode of practice just like other existing traditional forms of worship by the *Eggon* ethnic group of Nasarawa State, Nigeria. The *Eggon* people are roughly divided in their religious allegiance to Christianity and Islam, but many see no contradiction in also following more traditional their belief systems. The author further stressed that the *Eggon* speak their own Benue-Congo language (*Eggon*), though traditional oral histories of the group traced their origin to Yemen. Today, they are concentrated in Lafia, Akwanga and Nasarawa-Eggon Local Government Areas of Nasarawa State. The Leadership Newspaper (Monday 17, 2012, Pp. 54) "A letter to the President by *Ombatse* Group" explained that the *Ombatse* group is a spiritual entity with the aim of reviving the well-known and highly respected

norms of the *Eggon* people that was inherited by their ancestors. The group identified itself as a spiritual body just like other existing religions, and tries to equate herself like every other religious body in Nigeria. Section 38(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria recognizes the liberty of an individual or a community in making a choice of religion and its practice, hence the *Ombatse* is presenting itself as one having Alakyo a small community in Nasarawa State as the host of its shrine and Baba Lakio a septuagenarian as the spiritual head.

*Ombatse* literally means “Time has come”. According to Baba Lakio, *Ombatse* is the *Azhili* (god) of the *Eggon* people which preaches against all forms of immoralities. It is a known fact that people worship for numerous reasons and there are a number of ways to which they worship depending on the type of religion and the group. Worshipers generally believe in higher power or supernatural power that is able to provide them their basic needs like protection, food, shelter, success, health and even life. Thus, *Ombatse* is an inherited mode of worship where all the *Eggons* be they Christians or Muslims are expected to be worshipers or members, although not all *Eggons* accepted that mode of worship as they already have other forms of worship which may as well stand as a hindrance to indulging in *Ombatse* form of worship. The *Ombatse* worshipers believe in purity and the group aims at purifying the society by maintaining high moral sanctity. As revealed by McGregor (2013), *Ombatse* members are expected to abstain from secret society and cultism, fornication, witchcraft, theft/robbery and all other act that may be labeled as crime in the Nigerian Constitution. A member must not as well look for trouble. Before initiation, one needs to affirm his origin to the *Eggon* lineage and would be given instructions that must not be violated. When violated, the person loses his protections automatically, depending on the extent of violation as some may lead to death.

*Ombatse* members typically wear black clothing (on official occasions) and bundle of charms to provide magical protection from gunfire. There is little place for women in *Ombatse* and they are forbidden from entering the *Ombatse* shrines. Both *Ombatse* leaders and their opponents point out that not all *Eggon* people are members of the traditional cult (McGregor, 2013).

### ***Ombatse* and Political Contestations in Nasarawa State**

Over the years, events have shown that when a social group enjoys a certain level of cohesion among members, it begins to exhibit predictable behaviours, and we may then reasonably speculate about the group in political and strategic terms, estimating its means, ends and its sense of rationality. We may further judge that a group’s attitude towards the future of national intelligence is deeply associated with its collective ethos. As suggested by Le Carré (2003), *Ombatse* (time has come) was meant to unite

the *Eggon* people but making a clear interrogation to the call for unity question, the author asked: Was there any disunity between the *Eggons* in the past? If yes, what brought about the disunity and what is the depth? Not being able to answer these questions may lead to the aspersion that *Ombatse* group has been politically linked. To begin with, there is a view that some *Eggons* claimed to have contributed to the success of Umaru Tanko Al-Makura (a non-Eggon Muslim) as governor of Nasarawa State between 2011 and 2015 by invoking the intervention of the *Ombatse* shrine. Nonetheless, favour seems to have fallen out of Tanko Al-Makura's side for the *Eggons*. The *Ombatse* leaders advanced their accusation against successive Muslim governors of Nasarawa State of attempting to carry out an "ethnic cleansing" of the *Eggons* from all parts of the State (McGregor, 2013). In response to that, many *Eggons* began supporting the candidacy of a fellow *Eggon*, as they felt it is their turn to pilot the affairs of the State as governor, being one of the most dominant ethnic groups in the State.

Ethnic militias have frequently been formed and deployed for intimidation purposes in Nigerian electoral contests and there are some in Lafia the Nasarawa State capital who believe *Ombatse* has a political purpose related to the inability of the *Eggon* to produce a governor from their own group despite their number in the State. The militia may in this sense be part of an effort to rally the frequently disunited *Eggons* behind a single purpose through oath-taking and appeals to traditional norms.

The then Commissioner for Information in Nasarawa State, late Hamza Elayo, opined that some *Eggon* politicians may have recruited *Ombatse* to further their cause: According to him, "It is obvious they are being sponsored by some ambitious politician". An official statement then by Governor Tanko Al-Makura confirmed the administration's view that the *Ombatse* violence was political rather than religious (McGregor, 2013). Explaining further, the governor said the *Ombatse* crisis has no religious dimension as speculated by some sections of the media; some people are just bent on destroying the State because they feel they are not in power. Most fingers are pointed to the two most prominent *Eggon* politicians (Solomon Ewuga and Labaran Maku) whom were alleged to be members and core sponsors of the *Ombatse* group.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The strain theory by Robert K. Merton (1910-2003) was utilized in this study. This theory states that society puts pressure on individuals to achieve socially accepted goals, though they lack the means, this leads to strain which may lead the individuals to commit crimes.

Merton argued that society can encourage deviance to a large degree. Merton believed that socially accepted goals put pressure on people to

conform. People are forced to work within the system or become members of a deviant subculture to achieve the desired goal. Merton's belief became the theory known as Strain theory. He (Merton) continued on to say when individuals are faced with a gap between their goals (usually finances/money related) and their current status but the acceptable means of achieving them became unavailable, strain occurs. When faced with strain, Merton prescribed five ways people use to adapt:

1. Conformity: Pursuing cultural goals through socially approved means.
2. Innovation: Using socially unapproved or unconventional means to obtain culturally approved goals. Example: dealing drugs or stealing to achieve financial security.
3. Ritualism: Using the same socially approved means to achieve less elusive goals (more modest and humble).
4. Retreatism: To reject both the cultural goals and the means to obtain them, then find a way to escape it.
5. Rebellion: To reject the cultural goals and means, then work to replace them with other means.

The general strain theory posits that one of the reasons that lead to strain is the inability to reach a desired goal. Thus, since 1996 after the creation of Nasarawa State, the *Eggons* have been losing the gubernatorial position of the state. The *Ombatse* has arisen in reaction to realize such desired political goal that seems to be unrealistic for the *Eggon* people over the years.

### **Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP)**

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) model was also utilized in the analytical framework of this article. Within the framework of intelligence criminology, intelligence-led policing (ILP) would be influentially adequate in examining the construct or postulations of the issue under study.

ILP is a policing model built around converting data analysis and criminal intelligence into a strategy that co-ordinates strategic risk management of threats with focus on serious recidivist offenders. Intelligence led policing is a term now embodied in the lexicon of policing around the world. From its origin in the new public management ethos of 1990s, Britain and United States recommended ILP adoption in the analysis of 9/11 terrorist attack. Law enforcement agencies have looked into ILP as the contemporary model (carter, 2009) to integrate intelligence functions into the operations of the police service.

The national intelligent shaming plan GIWG (2003) developed for US Department of Justice revealed that Intelligence-led policing focuses on key criminal activities. Once crime problems are identified and quantified through intelligence assessments; key criminals can be targeted for

investigation and prosecution. Criminal intelligence analysis is given more significance in Intelligence-lead Policing than other contemporary policing models. This approach calls for enhanced and sometimes new analytical skills and competencies within the law enforcement. The proactive, forward-looking focus of ILP also relies on law enforcement managers to know how to work with analysts and make use of analytical products in their decision-making and planning. Thus, in adopting and implementing ILP, there must be specific focus on preparing and training high- and middle-level leadership and management within the law enforcement. Thus, Intelligence-led policing is the application of criminal intelligence analysis as an objective decision-making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects drawn from an evident based study (Ratcliffe, 2003).

In light of the foregoing, ILP becomes reviewable in this work as its basic tennets put criminal intelligence analysis at the core of intelligence gathering and law enforcement which appeared weak or not properly utilized in the *Ombatse-Alakyo* attack incident. It also moves criminal analysis and decision-making closer together than other contemporary policing models, calling for new skills and competencies of law enforcement analysts and managers. Research has shown that if ILP is to be implemented to its full potential, political support and high- and middle-level management awareness and commitment are vital OSCE (2017). Intelligence-led policing can be closely associated with problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990) in that they are both tactics that can support a broader policing paradigm such as community policing which may have sufficed in the *Ombatse* massacre. Some intelligence units use a problem-solving methodology, such as SARA — scan, analyze, respond and assess (Eck & Spelman 1987, Ratcliffe 2003).

### **The Role of the *Ombatse* Group in *Eggon* Community Clashes**

Within a frame of time, the *Ombatse* group was said to have been linked to a number of clashes that are violet in nature, which lead to the loss of lives and property around the affected areas in Nasarawa State. The study of McGregor (2013) was able to summarize violence in the *Eggon* community in Nasarawa State thus:

- June 2012, communal violence erupted between the *Eggon* and the *Alago* ethnic group. The latter took the worst of it, complaining that local security forces were unwilling to intervene against the *Ombatse* militia.
- Mid-October, 2012, several clashes erupted between *Eggon* and *Fulani*. Many of the casualties were reported mutilated by machetes.

- November 17, 2012 – An attempt by Nigerian security forces to raid the *Allogani* cult centre in the Nasarawa-Eggon district to arrest the *Ombatse* chairman and secretary while they were conducting an initiation and oath-taking ceremony resulted in a gunfight in which three soldiers were shot. Hours later, cult members set up a barricade on the Lafia-Akwanga road and smashed cars that attempted to evade the barricade. Security forces endured abuse from the drivers of long lines of halted vehicles for their failure to remove the barricades. The raid consequently brought *Ombatse* into conflict with the State. According to the *Ombatse* spokesman, Barr. Zachary Zamani Allumaga: “What happened that day at the *Azhili* shrine when the security operatives invaded us was reminiscent of what terrorists would do by using a suicide bomber to bomb a church.
- November 21, 2012 – Violence erupted in Agyaragu, a suburb of the state capital of Lafia, when *Ombatse* killed at least ten people of the Christian and animist *Koro* ethnic group popularly known as Migili with firearms, machetes and axes. Some 50 homes were also burnt down. Following the incident, *Ombatse* chairman Haruna Musa Zico Kigbu denied his group had anything to do with the communal violence: “As far as we are concerned, our rules forbid members from starting a fight and killing, and as such, we cannot be connected with violence.
- January 9-14, 2013 – Seven *Fulani* were killed by *Ombatse* members in a pair of remote villages in Nasarawa State. The *Ombatse* members also killed a large number of *Fulani*-owned cattle, which they leave behind in accordance with their beliefs. Dozens may have been killed in the retaliatory fighting that followed.
- January 13, 2013 – Five *Ombatse* members were killed by security forces when they tried to prevent the seizure of a large quantity of arms and ammunition.
- February 7, 2013 – Four villages and towns in Nasarawa State experienced *Fulani* vs. *Eggon* violence. Both *Eggon* and *Fulani* blamed the other ethnic groups for initiating the fight.

### **Intelligence Gathering in Nigeria**

The concept of intelligence in this work was exclusively used for security purpose. Thus, Free Dictionary defines intelligence as information especially secret information gathered about an actual or potential enemy or adversary. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis or understanding is what could be referred to as intelligence. A broader view of intelligence could incorporate

the view that intelligence is a structure, a process and a product. In most police operations, the intelligence unit is a recognized internal organization with people, skills, methods and with an organizational structure. Intelligence is also a process, incorporating a continuous cycle of tasking, data collection, collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback prior to the next task (Ratcliffe, 2003).

In light of the above, intelligence generally has a national security connotation and therefore, exists in an aura of secrecy. Hence, criminal intelligence in a more decisive form is the compiled, analyzed and /or disseminated information in a quest to prevent or monitor criminal activity. In June, 1992 the international group of twelve European Interpol members were able to define criminal intelligence as the identification of and provision of insight into the relationship between crime data and other potentially relevant data with a view to police and enforce judicial practice (Ratcliffe, 2003).

The central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States has its foremost responsibility of gathering secret information on national security, process this information and disseminate to the appropriate quarter for necessary action. In similar manner, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has counter-espionage as its core objective within the United State, which synchronizes responsibilities alongside the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other relevant security agencies. Consequently, in Nigeria, agencies like the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Department of State Security Service (DSS), Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) of the Nigeria Police and several of others constitute parts or sections of the existing security agencies which all have a primary role of intelligence gathering and information sharing within the security agencies. The study of Onovo (2005) argued that each of these agencies has an assorted means of operation designed to ensure the overall security of the nation in their own sphere of responsibilities. Regrettably, there seems to be little or no cooperation among these agencies as each jealously defends its alone. Inter-agency cooperation should be predicated on the understanding that statutory responsibilities of the sub-units of the intelligence gathering agencies is key to policing crime. The lack of clarity and of a common understanding of criminal intelligence terminology and processes hampers information sharing between the agencies. International Association of Chiefs of Police IACP (2002) opined that security agencies should carry out their functions and complement each other's efforts. The efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence gathered as regards to *Ombatse* attack cannot be fathomed as loopholes that affect the structure of intelligence gathering and sharing within and outside the security agencies seem overwhelmed. The classification of information into Top Secret,



Secret, Confidential and Restricted, who needs to know, who needs to take and who needs to hold the information, the hierarchical structure of information sharing, discrepancy in intelligence analysis and the lack of good technologies to support intelligence gathering and sharing are what seem challenging in the current security structure of the Nigerian State. These may have resulted to the *Ombatse* attack and barriers that reduced the capacity for intelligence gathering and sharing within the security agencies in Nigeria.

### **Lessons from *Ombatse* for Intelligence Criminology**

The September 11 attack on the United State in 2001 can be considered an organized terrorist attack that left no fewer than 3,000 casualties. The attack has witnessed both national and international criticisms, as the failure of preventing such attack was loudly attributed to a glitch in the security and intelligence agencies of the United States. The October 10<sup>th</sup> 2023, Hamas attack on Israel was also another security fracture on intelligence gathering and lessons that could be generated in intelligence criminology. After the tragic events in the US, Ige (2005) averred that nations across the world were alerted to the urgent need for concerted action towards criminal intelligence sharing in order to forestall a recurrence of the sad experience. More specifically, there is need for improved intelligence exchange between national crime control agencies. It was discovered that effective criminal intelligence data generation and sharing is critical to the protection of the safety of lives and property against terrorism and other criminal acts.

In like manner, the *Alakyo* incident has in a manner remained an incident in international history, the world and Nigeria as a nation. Thus, the May, 9 2013 incident on the road to *Alakyo* can equally be attributed to the failure of the security agencies particularly the police and the State Security Service in carrying out intelligence gathering and sharing. If *Ombatse* had escaped national attention so far by being classed as yet another ethnic militia clashing with its neighbours in a relatively obscured part of the country, the movement seized national and even international headlines with a massive and deadly ambush of state security forces on their way to raid the *Ombatse* shrine in *Alakyo* (six miles outside Lafia, the capital of Nasarawa State). The May 9 raid was launched to arrest the movement's leader after local people had complained that the religious movement was carrying out forced conversions and oath-taking in regional churches and mosques (McGregor, 2013).

In this quest, about 100 men of the security agencies which comprise of the police and the State Security Service were reported to have lost their lives and others sustained various injuries. In other words, the road to *Alakyo* has succeeded in sustaining a world record of attack against the security

agencies, and with such experience in the years to come, individuals and groups coming across the same path will always be left with questions to answer. How possible can a group in a community succeed in attacking over a hundred armed security operatives without a trace? Does that not portend a possibility of such re-occurrence in the future? What kind of crime is so unique that it will take over a hundred officers to go and apprehend just a man? In the view of ILP, the questions above can be summarized thus: failure in intelligence gathering and management by the security agencies.

It is indeed, pertinent to mention that before partaking on an arrest, there must be first a suspect of which must either be on the run or someone with the likelihood to committing crime or cause public unrest or any other act that may be classified to be harmful to another person or the society. Secondly, the security agent or agency must be informed about the gravity and strength of the actor they intend to carry out arrest, including the actor's environment should be put into consideration. It is when with the available intelligence, methods and strategies for arrest are analyzed and drawn that arrest can be effected. This is done not just to conduct a successful arrest of criminals but to ensure maximum security of the security system. Failure to which will amount to an elusive danger or security risk similar to that of the road to *Alakyo*. In considering a nominal structure for intelligence gathering, intelligence criminology in the submission of McGregor (2013) may choose to consider the following:

- a. Background of the security problem: What is the security threat (*Ombatse*) and what is it identified for? What are the category and calibre of individuals associated with such group and what are the opinions of the leadership about the group and how can intelligence contribute?
- b. Security structure: What is the composition of the intelligence or security agencies? Is it subordinate within a political structure or are they independent agencies? To whom are they subordinate to? What kind of legal and administrative structure forms the basis for the legitimate operation of intelligence services?
- c. Organizational cohesion: Are the authorities and responsibilities of intelligence concentrated within one agency or a group of organizations? Is there a hierarchy within a group of intelligence agencies? Is competition or collaboration encouraged among them?
- d. Management and oversight: What kind of internal management structures exist to oversee intelligence? What boundaries or limitations exist on the collection and analysis of intelligence? What kind of external oversight exists, and how does it enforce its authority? With what regularity and intrusiveness does it oversee intelligence?

- e. Information / Data gathering structure: What are the overall structure to collection and management of information? How are collected information / data processed? What are the strategies and stages of processing information / data?
- f. Analytic emphasis: What are the sociological, cultural, and psychological underpinnings of the way people think within this society and by extension its intelligence service? To what extent does the service pursue “truth” and “objectivity” as overall goals in portraying the world to their political masters and relevant decision makers?
- g. Intelligence-decision making relationship: To what extent are intelligence officials integrated into the policy-making and decision-making structures? How well trained are decision makers on the strengths and uncertainties of intelligence? To what extent is intelligence used throughout the security structure, or to what extent is its dissemination limited to a selected few leaders? To what extent are raw data and/or analysis shared outside intelligence circles?
- h. Operational emphasis: To what extent, if at all, are intelligence organizations involved in covert or other operations? If they are, are there limits to the roles that they perform? What special authorities are required for such involvement?
- i. Pendant for cooperation: To what extent does a service cooperate internally with other diplomatic and security organizations? To what extent do they cooperate with other services? How do they assess the value of cooperation, and what role does it provide?
- j. Counter-intelligence emphasis: Where does counter-intelligence fit within the overall fabric of intelligence? What policies, practices, and procedures are designed to mitigate the influence of foreign intelligence against a service, either directly or indirectly?

Not until the aforementioned interrogations are well addressed by intelligence criminology, situations like that of ‘road to *Alakyo*’ may not be avoided. The finding of O’Connel (2004) argues that the answers to these questions are not without real world implications. While the size and budget are often looked to as a measure of importance, an intelligence organization of any size can have a keen analytic understanding of a specific problem, or be the lead to a unique human intelligence source. He further argued that failure to recognize important differences in institutional responsibilities like those between British Foreign Intelligence (MI-6) and the Foreign Commonwealth Office, or even the role of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the larger State Department, may lose the context of the intelligence those organizations provide. More so, from the road to *Alakyo* experience, the police top management has in her own part

denied being in the know of such mission. Thus, further interrogation by intelligence criminology in regards to the security and intelligence management could be inferential here. This indicates that along the line, the police management lost its power or failed in its power to assign responsibility and to hold a particular level accountable for misplacement of functions.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This article established that *Ombatse* meaning “time has come” is a spiritual group that has been linked with a number of conflicts against neighboring communities including security agencies in two separate occasions that lead to the loss of lives and property of which about 100 of the lives lost were recorded to be armed security personnel. The Israel 10/23, US 9/11 and road to Alakyo 9/13 incidences have made an analogous history that neither research nor history has been able to record exhaustively. On the road to *Alakyo*, armed security men were massacred by a group in a State that claimed to be religious. The whereabouts of arms belonging to the slain security men is nowhere to be found and no substantive effort has been in place to recover them. The families of the massacred security personnel are still in search of justice to no avail. This is to say neighboring communities are no doubt living in phobia or are left at the mercies of the armed men. The inability of the security operatives to regain confidence of the populace by taking adequate steps in the aftermaths of the attack will hence build fear for subsequent attacks either by the same group or other groups. And so the spade of kidnapping and armed banditry in Nasarawa State today is a case in point.

In light of the above, it is necessary to recommend some policy prospects at overcoming the deficiencies and inadequacies highlighted above. These will include that the following are ensured. Government needs an overwhelming reform of the security institutions in the country to be in line with global best practice. This is necessary because security plays a pivotal role in ensuring development in any society. Government should ensure that law enforcement is aimed at building public confidence in the criminal justice apparatus. That is to say some form of community intervention guards should be formed to ensure that justice is seen and felt as given, not minding whoever is involved. Statutory government agencies, religious leaders, families and community leaders in the country should carry out massive awareness campaigns and enlightenment programmes on security and safety issues. This will further elevate the course of public knowledge on law enforcement. Government and spirited individuals should rekindle the spirit of patriotic consciousness and professionalism in public authorities so that each citizen will have the obligation to obey the law. Government

should provide good governance by putting in place the basic infrastructural facilities for the people. Effective law enforcement as it were would require a fundamental activation of this approach.

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