

# **IDENTITY, SOCIAL INCLUSION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA**

A Book of Conference Proceedings of 1<sup>st</sup> International Conference of the  
Faculty of Social Sciences, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

*Edited by:*

**Professor Wonotanzokan Nzeda Tagowa  
Professor Johnson Uchechukwu Agbo  
Dr. Godwin Etta Odok**



FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Also, we thank the publishers and editors of the conference papers published in this book of conference proceedings. Your meticulous attention to details, prompt responses, and unwavering support significantly enriched the quality and success of the conference. We appreciate all the faculty conference planning committee members and the entire faculty board members. Your willingness to devote your time and effort to the success of the conference demonstrate your strong commitment to our shared vision as a faculty and university.

Most importantly, we recognize the significance of the contributions of all conference participants and the impacts your research works are having in shaping policies and development outcomes in Taraba State and in Nigeria as a whole. Always know that your contributions are deeply appreciated and will continue to be recognized and valued. We look forward to the opportunity of you participating again in our future conferences and other academic activities of the faculty.

## P R E F A C E

Nigeria in the last few decades has witnessed increasing tensions in its political, economic and social landscapes. Prevailing conditions in the country are progressively complicating social interactions particularly in relation to citizens forging a nation out of disparate nationalities and identities. In reality, Nigeria is a heterogeneous nation with its baggage of mutual suspicion, unhealthy ethno-religious rivalry and competition. With all the political, economic and social challenges that have bedeviled Nigeria since her political independence in 1960, it seems that the ruling elites had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. All through the country's history, the tendency to promote the primacy of national cohesion which ensures social inclusion and sustainable development has remained blatantly unappealing at the centre and other sub-national power centres in Nigeria. In this regard, fundamental questions beckon answers from the social sciences in Nigeria. What is to be done? How do we devise a social structure that promotes sustainable national development open to all citizens devoid of ethno-religious profiling and discrimination? Are the issues that led to corruption, insecurity, underdevelopment in contemporary Nigeria rooted in the country's social structure? How can Nigeria's political, economic and social institutions be strengthened in order not to be manipulated by the party in power? Who are the sponsors and funders of conflicts, social exclusion and underdevelopment in Nigeria? Could a restructured Nigeria through greater autonomy to the local government system defuse inequality, social exclusion and underdevelopment in contemporary Nigeria? These are some of the salient questions agitating the minds of average Nigerians. Thus, this international conference was conceived to improve understandings by providing fresh global and national narratives that move away from already held positions that have not yielded good dividends in social cohesion, sustainable development and political engineering in contemporary Nigeria.

The conference was held at Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria on May 13 -14, 2024. During the opening plenary session on Monday, May 13, 2024, Mr. Jacobs Akenzukupi, who represented the Honourable Commissioner of Health, Taraba State, Dr. Hon. Bordiya Buma, delivered the keynote address on the topic: "Social Inclusivity in Universal Health Coverage: Experiences in Rural Communities of Taraba State"; and Professor Christian C. Ezeibe of the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka delivered the lead paper on the topic: "Restructuring Identities and Social Inclusion for Sustainable Development in Nigeria: The Role of the Social Sciences".

Other dignitaries at the opening plenary session of the conference held at the Prof. Geoffrey Okogbaa Lecture Theatre, Federal University Wukari include: the Vice Chancellor, Federal University Wukari, Professor Jude Rabo, represented by the Deputy Vice Chancellor (Administration), Professor Yebpella Garbunga Gary; the Dean Faculty of Basic Medical Sciences, Federal University Wukari, Professor Ezekiel Iliya; the Dean Management Sciences, Professor Prince Chinedu Agundu, Heads of Departments and Units and students.

In addition to the keynote and lead paper presentations, a total of 83 papers were presented (physically and virtually) at the conference by participants drawn across different parts of Nigeria. The conference papers were presented in five plenary sessions which consist of fifteen panels with the following themes: theoretical and conceptual issues on identity, social inclusion and sustainable development; institutions, victimization and intersectionality of social exclusion;

global cultural change, transitions and sustainable development; identity politics, partisanship and national security; democracy and participatory governance; oil revenue, poverty reduction, education and wealth creation; identity, violence and religion; security, de-radicalization and social integration; environmental sustainability and food security; insecurity, ethnic identities and belonging; law, production, consumption and asset ownership; the fourth industrial revolution (4IR), blue economy and waste management; gender, child protection, sexuality and identity; mainstreaming social inclusion and security among disadvantaged groups; and nationalism, economic growth and sustainable development. These presentations at the conference provided fresh global and national perspectives that move away from already held positions that have not yielded good dividends in social cohesion, sustainable development and political engineering in contemporary Nigeria.

As a highlight, participants at the conference identified the following as crucial challenges that undermine social inclusion and sustainable development in Nigeria, and Taraba State in particular:

- 1) Peculiar problems that have hindered the building of a common Nigerian identity/history relevant for nationhood and sustainable development include: memory loss associated with oral history; deliberate propagation of falsehood by professional liars; local politics; personal weakness; lack of courage; and intellectual dishonesty.
- 2) Identity politics is transactional. It is inextricably linked to resources and rights.
- 3) Identity politics in Nigeria is shaped by factors such as religion, region, ethnicity and native-settler issues.
- 4) One of the major forms of identity politics in Nigeria is ethnicity.
- 5) Hate speech is a major catalyst for election violence and other hate crimes in Nigeria. Political leaders in the country neglect the provocative tendencies of hate speech so long as it enables them to remain in power.
- 6) When different groups with varying identities in Nigeria discuss restructuring they mean different things; and what constitutes the Nigerian identity depends on relations to state power.
- 7) When communities, institutions or the criminal justice system fail to support the victimized individual, victims are vulnerable to secondary victimization. This may explain why the prevalence of violent crime victimization in Nigeria has been on the rise and is plunging the country into a state of unrest with far reaching effect on the social, economic and political development of the Nigerian society.
- 8) Religion and ethnicity cannot be isolated from the political discourse in Nigeria; they hardly exist or function separately.
- 9) Religious intolerance in Nigeria is the inability to recognize and accommodate views and opinions of others which serves as one of the major sources of religious violence in the country. Nigerian religious adherents, especially the Muslims and the Christians have demonstrated intolerant attitudes which result to violence, discrimination, repression, rivalry, and persecution
- 10) Nigeria's global identity as a country is notable for cybercrime, poor human rights record, massive corruption, institutional and infrastructural decay, drug trafficking and terrorism.
- 11) The implementation of FOIA in Nigeria is constrained by high rate of ignorance of the understanding and the content of the Act by the citizens and more specifically, public officials.

- 12) The Nigerian State and Taraba State in particular is confronted with poverty. Taraba State for instance has a poverty incidence rate of 74.7% which is one of the highest in Nigeria (NBS, 2022).
- 13) In Nigeria, young persons aged 15-24 years old still contribute significantly to new HIV infections with the majority of those infections occurring in young women and girls.
- 14) Half of the Nigeria's population, including populations in Taraba State, lacks access to basic health care.
- 15) There are poor information and data management systems to monitor the implementation and progress of universal health coverage (UHC) in Taraba State.
- 16) There is poor capacity for the successful implementation of the health insurance scheme in Nigeria's rural communities.
- 17) Insecurity, inadequate human resources for health (HRH) and insufficient government funding are major hindrances to universal health coverage in Nigeria, including Taraba State.
- 18) Poor waste disposal practices do lead to contamination of edible products thereby increasing the burden of infection and diseases among poor citizens.
- 19) There is a downturn in foreign direct investment (FDI) into Nigeria during the past years, coupled with a drop in oil prices on the global market, and this has slowed Nigeria's oil exports and adversely impacted economic growth in Nigeria. This decline in FDI influx into Nigeria particularly impacts on employment possibilities, consumption levels, investment levels, and employment growth
- 20) The ocean economy has not been given the needed recognition and attention that it deserves in Nigeria.

**In view of the above observations, participants at the conference preferred plausible solutions which include:**

- 1) Social inclusivity in universal health coverage (UHC) in Nigeria's rural communities is crucial for ensuring equitable access to healthcare services. It is recognized here that UHC is an important step towards social inclusion and health equity in Nigeria. UHC here means that all individuals and communities should have access to all categories of basic and effective health services which indicates promotion, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care without suffering financial hardship. Thus, the basic health care provision fund (BHCPF) programme of the federal and state governments should be geared towards achieving UHC's strategies and targets.
- 2) In order to address issues of identity politics in Nigeria, citizens should evolve community-based accountability systems that demand to know how the government manages diversity.
- 3) Community policing initiatives should be supported at all levels of society in Nigeria as community policing holds potentials in building sustainable synergy between the community and law enforcement agencies in tackling insecurity and violent crime victimization as against the traditional policing which is reactive rather than proactive.
- 4) There have to be institutional mechanisms within States of the Federation that promote better inter- ethnic, -religious and regional relations.
- 5) Religious leaders who are found inciting members in the direction of intolerance and conflict should be made to face the wrath of the law; and governments at all levels should establish an inter-religious commission to promote religious harmony in the country.



- 6) It is only political arrangements that recognize, accommodate, and manage ethnic diversity in a heterogeneous society like Nigeria that are relevant to achieve sustainable development goals (SDGs).
- 7) Governments can hardly govern effectively when large parts of the citizenry distrust them; thus, the Nigerian government should tackle major drivers of political distrust which include: poor governance, technical incompetence, poor economy performance, media suppression, mutual suspicions, lack of basic needs, political corruption, general exclusion, government failure to deliver on election promises and ethnic politics.
- 8) The Federal Government of Nigeria should use legally approved means to remove the control and supervision of Local Government Councils, including the conduct of Local Governments' election from state governments through a constitutional amendment to address the problem of structural violence and inequality created by state governments across Nigeria.
- 9) The social sciences in Nigeria have to be sensitive to the historical and contextual conditions of the Nigerian people, and the social sciences in Nigeria should favour the mixed method approach; rather than over-depending on Eurocentric social science with its mathematization and tendency to be blind to the history, context and politics of social issues.
- 10) Greater investment is required in knowledge creation or production if Nigeria is to root out the various manifestations of ethnicity including identity politics arising from institutional engineering and cultural orientation
- 11) Scholars in Nigeria have to adopt indigenous and multidisciplinary methodologies devoid of the limitations imposed by colonial and postcolonial scholarships.
- 12) African scholars have to address the role of culture, especially language, in political development. Language is relevant for African intellectuals to interact with African masses and this is relevant for achieving true education and freedom.
- 13) The major texts of science should be translated to local Nigerian languages for deeper understanding.
- 14) Governments at all levels should provide enabling environment that encourage investments in women empowerment in the form of education, skills acquisition, and employment opportunities.
- 15) For Nigeria to fully harness the potential of the blue economy, the country must strengthen its institutional capacity, enhance inter-agency coordination, and foster regional and international cooperation.
- 16) There is need for government and relevant community-based organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nigeria to develop and implement appropriate environmental education programmes that are culture-specific.
- 17) There is need for adherence to the rule of law while institutions of government should be strengthened for effective service delivery.
- 18) The Nigerian Navy Civil-Military Relation (NN CMR) should avoid compartmentalization and so must be integrative in nature. And this should be embedded into NN capacity building training programmes on maritime security matters and CMR measures should become part

and parcel of institution building and training and stakeholders should be drawn to joint maritime domain awareness training. Since Nigeria's maritime domain and the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) is very strategic because of its importance it will continue to attract extra-continental powers, NN should critically monitor partner and donor arrangements and supplies to avoid disadvantaged position.

- 19) The Nigerian Federal and State Governments should be intentional in incorporating and implementing renewable energy transition paths in their energy policy to promote low-emission energy systems.
- 20) The Federal Government of Nigeria through the ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment in collaboration with the Ministry of Petroleum and Gas should make concerted efforts in attracting and retaining foreign direct investment in the oil and gas sector. This can be done by improving on the investment climate in the country through control of rising insecurity and economic policies that can ensure economic stability. Also, by ensuring full implementation of the Petroleum Industry Bill in Nigeria.
- 21) Attention should be paid in developing productive capacity for the following aspects of the blue economy in Nigeria: fisheries and aquaculture; marine biotechnology; seabed mining; renewable energy; and shipping.

Papers presented here would indeed be helpful to researchers, policy-makers, administrators, teachers, students, the business community and the general public. Papers contained in this book of conference proceedings seek to mobilize the collective conscience of readers to reflect upon the current emptying of emancipatory possibilities in the Nigerian society that have been surviving from the prevalence of undemocratic rule in the shadow of neoliberal policies, transfiguring what liberation struggles set out to do into normative and intellectual politics. We have attempted here to present well researched papers that challenge current and institutionalized attacks on critical thinking and pedagogy as well as the need to qualify the relationship between the social sciences and the production of emancipation, development and freedom.

**Professor Wonotanzokan Nzeda Tagowa**

*Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences  
Federal University Wukari, Nigeria*

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**PART I:**

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES ON IDENTITY, SOCIAL  
INCLUSION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT



# 1

## SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND POVERTY ERADICATION IN TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

Shitta Bebweani<sup>1</sup>, Ajie H. A., Anyanwu Evangelin Emmanuel<sup>2</sup>,  
Zechariah Wanujeh<sup>3</sup>, Damter Nandi Alhassan<sup>4</sup>,  
Ndigefa Ernest Johnson<sup>5</sup>

Department of Economics

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [bebweani@gmail.com](mailto:bebweani@gmail.com)<sup>1</sup>; [ajie.hycenth56@gmail.com](mailto:ajie.hycenth56@gmail.com); [emmanuelevans@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:emmanuelevans@fuwukari.edu.ng)<sup>2</sup>;  
[zechariahwanujeh@gmail.com](mailto:zechariahwanujeh@gmail.com)<sup>3</sup>; [kashnadam@gmail.com](mailto:kashnadam@gmail.com)<sup>4</sup>; [ernestndigefa3@gmail.com](mailto:ernestndigefa3@gmail.com)<sup>5</sup>



### Abstract

This study evaluates the effect of sustainable development goals on poverty eradication in Taraba State. The data used were primary data obtained through purposive sampling techniques and only total of 384 questionnaire were returned in useful form for the analysis. It applied descriptive statistics, frequency distribution tables, Bar chart, components analysis and ordinary least square methods. The results revealed that all the variable studied have positive effect on poverty eradication in Taraba State SDGs farmers empowerment scheme, social economic facilities and service, Vocational training and skills acquisition and constraints militating against SDGs implementation on poverty eradication and the variable were statistical significant except SDGs farmers empowerment scheme which was insignificant in the model. Therefore, the study recommended that the Taraba State government provide more vocational training and skills acquisition centre for the beneficiaries and accord them with soft loans for business start up to improve the livelihood of citizens.

**Keywords:** Poverty, sustainable development goals, Taraba State,

### Introduction

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a follow-up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which reached their expiration in 2015, as stated in the United Nations Annual Report of that year. The term Sustainable Development Goals refers to the collection of seventeen (17) objectives, accompanied by 169 targets, established by the United Nations with the aim of being accomplished by the time period 2030 (United Nations, 2020). Sustainable development refers to a comprehensive approach aimed at enhancing economic, social, and political progress while minimizing adverse impacts on the environment caused by human activities. It entails

adopting a long-term perspective that takes into account the needs and well-being of future generations (United Nations, 2016). These changes include economic, social, and political dimensions in a harmonious equilibrium, while also advocating for modifications in human conduct and materials via the implementation of strategies, processes, and practices within the realm of the economy (UNDP, 2019).

According to Oghiagbephan (2016), Sustainable Development can be defined as a transformative process that seeks to align the utilization of resources, allocation of investments, trajectory of technological advancements, and implementation

of institutional reforms in a manner that is congruent and beneficial to both present and future generations, thereby effectively addressing the diverse range of human needs and aspirations on a global scale.

The primary focus of development is to fulfill human ambitions and requirements. Sustainable development, on the other hand, refers to a kind of development that ensures the satisfaction of current generation's demands without jeopardizing the capacity of subsequent generations to fulfill their own needs.

Furthermore, the first Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) aims to eliminate poverty throughout all its manifestations globally. The goal in question comprised seven distinct targets, encompassing the complete elimination of extreme poverty, a 50% reduction in overall poverty, the establishment of social security systems, the guarantee of universal access to ownership and basic services, technology, and economic resources, as well as the promotion of durability to environmental, economic, and social crises among members of the organization (United Nations, 2017). Aside from a component of the remaining objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals goals include ending world hunger, ensuring good health and well-being, providing quality education, promoting gender equality, ensuring access to clean water and sanitation, providing affordable and clean energy, promoting acceptable work and economic growth, fostering technological advancement and infrastructure, reducing inequality, fostering environmentally friendly towns and cities, practicing responsible consumption and manufacturing, combating climate change, ensuring life below water, ensuring life on land, achieving peace and justice, and establishing powerful institutions and According to the United Nations Report from 2019, these aims were a collection of policies and programs that were initiated by the United Nations for its member states.

Over the course of time, Nigeria has consistently encountered political instability, insecurity, corruption, tribalism, nepotism,

selfishness, and a lack of decent administration. Despite the implementation of different poverty eradication techniques and programs in Nigeria, this phenomenon has resulted in a significant portion of the population being plunged into extreme poverty. According to the National Bureau of statistics (2020), Taraba state, which is located in Northern Nigeria, has a poverty rate that is higher than 87.72% of the population. it was classified as the second-poorest state in the Northern region, only two (2) steps ahead of Sokoto and Jigawa states.

Moreover, the first target of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) presents significant obstacles to achieving sustainable growth in Nigeria. The country's current situation is a cause for concern, as it has recently been identified as the global epicenter of poverty. According to the World Poverty Clock (2022), approximately 44.2% (86.9 million), 47.7% (93.7 millions), 48.4% (85.2 million), 52% (90.0 million), and 39% (83.02 million) of the population lived on less than US\$1.90 per day in the years 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022, respectively.

More than that, the current COVID-19 pandemic epidemic that has been draining the economy of governments worldwide has compounded the world's poverty crisis. The global pandemic of Covid19 is far from over; on the contrary, it is just in its infancy (JHU, 2020; Worldometer, 2020). The current battle between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the COVI-19 problem, have sent global economies into a tailspin. The term "poverty alleviation" refers to a variety of economic strategies aimed at helping those in need. Efforts to alleviate poverty are also part of this process.

Limited research has been conducted on the relationship between sustainable development goals and poverty alleviation in Nigeria, specifically in Taraba state. The existing studies primarily focus on poverty and economic growth (Aigbokhan, 2008; Ijaiya, Ijaiya, Bello & Ajayi, 2011; and Dauda, 2017 & 2019), poverty reduction strategies (Oshewolo 2010), poverty and unemployment (Aiyedogbon & Ohwofasa, 2012), inequality, unemployment, and poverty (Akinbobola & Saibu,

2004), inequality and its consequences (Aigbokhan, 2017), and inequality and economic growth (Oluwatosin, Ogunyomi, Daisi & Oluwashikemi, 2013; and Ifeakachukwu, 2020). Two previous studies conducted by Ewuim et al. (2015) and Deinne & Ajayi (2019) diverge greatly from the present study in terms of their approach and research aim. For example, Ewuim et al. (2015) employ a documentary analysis approach to examine gender inequality within the context of the Rapti Women Empowerment Project in Nepal. In contrast, Deinne and Ajayi (2019) concentrate on Delta State, Nigeria, utilizing survey data obtained through both non-probability and probability sampling techniques to investigate the effectiveness of poverty alleviation efforts.

In addition, Mohammed et al. (2021) conducted research on the effect of the goals for sustainable development (SDGs) on the reduction of poverty among young people and rural women in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, Nigeria. It used a survey and a documentary study approach and came to the conclusion that a favorable association exists between SDGs and the reduction of poverty in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, Nigeria. As a result, it is abundantly evident that such studies have not been carried out to cover the whole of Nigeria, including the state of Taraba in particular, which is not excluded. As a result, the purpose of this research is to analyze the impact that programs designed to achieve the sustainable development objectives have had on efforts to eradicate poverty in the state of Taraba.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study utilizes the evaluation theory. The theory of assessment, as proposed by Sucham (1967), examines the perception of partisan, managerial, social phenomena, governmental agenda, and plans within society. The subject matter pertained to the implementation of a structured approach to gather, analyze, and utilize data in order to address inquiries regarding projects, policies, and programs, with a specific focus on their outcomes, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness. Alternatively, it could refer to a research endeavor devised and executed to aid a

specific audience in evaluating the value and significance of a particular entity within the context of a nation. The idea pertaining to the assessment of public health programs in 1967 was found by Edward Suchman at Columbia University. The proponent asserts that the assessment process should be addressed using the principles of the scientific approach. During the 1960s, his academic pursuits focused on the need of assessing programs with regards to their practical context or objectives. In addition, the individual proposed distinct benchmarks for evaluating the effectiveness of the program with regards to its design, execution, and outcomes. The origins of contemporary evaluation theory can be traced back to the works of Greenberg (1968), Scriven (1991), and Shadish, Cook, and Laviton (1991). These theorists provided a rationale for employing this theory by highlighting its ability to elucidate various aspects of program evaluation, including program implementation, performance efficiency, and program impact. The aforementioned theory is seen suitable for elucidating the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), namely SDG 1, which pertains to the eradication of poverty in all its manifestations. Furthermore, some key components of assessment theory include:

- a. Design:** refers to the manner in which a policy is designed in order to achieve its intended objective.
- b. Performance efficiency:** refers to the level of achievement in carrying out the activities associated with an individual's or organization's employment. The concept of task fulfillment pertains to the assessment of how well a person or organization is meeting the demands and expectations associated with assigned responsibilities.
- c. Implementation:** refers to the process of transforming policy programs or designs into tangible and practical outcomes.

### **Empirical Review**

Numerous studies have been undertaken to examine the influence of sustainable development objectives on the elimination of poverty in various regions around the globe. However, little and

insufficient research has been conducted on the impact of sustainable development objectives on alleviating poverty in Nigeria. Several of the performed research did not focus on the relationship between sustainable development objectives and poverty reduction in Taraba state. Therefore, the present research aims to provide a comprehensive summary of the existing literature in the following sequence:

In their study, Mohammed et al. (2021) conducted an assessment to examine the influence of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on the reduction of poverty among rural women and youth in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, Nigeria. The analysis of this study included a combination of systemic political theory, survey methodology, and documentary research design. The findings of the study indicate a favorable and statistically significant correlation between the Empowerment scheme and soft credit loan offered by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the reduction of poverty among remote women and youth in the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria.

Furthermore, the study conducted by Edward and Joanne (2017) examines the impact of Sustainable Development Goals and the use of a systems approach to sustainability. The research demonstrates how each of the 17 Sustainable Development objectives (SDGs) may be classified as a goal mainly associated with either the environmental, economic, or social system. According to the systems perspective, there may be significant trade-offs in striving to achieve all these objectives concurrently. The research demonstrates the feasibility of quantifying the welfare impacts of a rise in the measure level for one Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) by using established methodologies from the concept of one's choice and welfare within the context of enforced numbers. This approach allows for the identification and analysis of the trade-offs that arise while pursuing the attainment of another goal. The authors provide a quantitative evaluation of the existing state of advancement and trade-offs associated with the 17 Sustainable Development

Goals (SDGs), using an accurate indicator for each individual objective.

Moreover, in a study conducted by Kamruzzaman (2016), the focus was on the Poverty Elimination Target of the Sustainable Development Goals. The findings of the study suggest that the effective implementation of anti-poverty programs requires significant political commitment from all relevant stakeholders in order to successfully eliminate poverty. The study's findings suggest that the achievement of poverty eradication goals may be hindered without the active involvement and firm political commitments of all relevant stakeholders. Additionally, it emphasizes the need for an approach that goes beyond existing models, as merely stating intentions within the framework of global aid architecture may lack significant practical impact.

In addition, Tella et al. (2014) investigated the policy orientations of Nigerians towards the MDGs within the context of the nexus of poverty and corruption as obstacles to the achievement of the MDGs' goals. It obtained data from a number of different sources of information and discovered that corruption and destitution are obstacles to the achievement of the MDGs in the northern region and in Nigeria as a whole. This information was uncovered as a result of the research.


Research conducted by Adebayo (2015) focused on poverty alleviation measures in Nigeria as well as sustainable development. Both the current and the previous administration of Nigeria have implemented these tactics and efforts with the intention of bringing the level of poverty in the country down to an acceptable level. Because efforts to lower the level of poverty over the years have not been effective, Nigeria's current poverty condition has caused the nation to rank as one of those poorest in the world, with its citizens living on a maximum of two dollars per day. This is due to the fact that efforts to decrease the level of poverty over the years have failed.

### **Research Methodology**

The data were subjected to analysis using descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive



statistics included the use of distribution tables of frequencies and percentage tables to address the study inquiries. Subsequently, the inferential statistics data were entered and organized into a computer system for analysis using the Statistical Package for Social Scientific (SPSS, version 23). The multiple regression technique, namely the Ordinary Least Squares Method (OLS), was used for the study. The hypotheses were evaluated using a statistical significance threshold of 5%.



Map of Taraba (**Source:** Ministry of Land and Survey, 2022)

The instruments used in this investigation consist of a questionnaire and a checklist. The questionnaire had a total of twenty-five (25) questions. Section A consisted of demographic information. Section B focused on the empowerment of farmers in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Section C examined the provision of socio-economic facilities and services. Lastly, Section D explored vocational training and skill development initiatives. The questionnaire was designed using a

five-point Likert scale, consisting of the following response options: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Undecided (U), Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree (SD). This choice of scale aligns with the recommendations of Ndiyo (2005) and Sambo (2005), who suggest that a rating scale enables respondents to express their perception of the presence or absence of the items included in the questionnaire.

This is presented below:

**Section B, C, and D**

|         |    |   |   |   |    |
|---------|----|---|---|---|----|
| Options | SA | A | U | D | SD |
| Points  | 5  | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1  |

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**Result and Discussions of Findings**  
**Socio-economic characteristics of the Respondents**

This section elucidates the attributes and dynamics of data in examining the impact of sustainable development on poverty in Taraba state. The provided data presents the first statistical findings of the participants.

**Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Socio-economic Characteristics of the Respondents**

| Variable       | Gender of the Respondent | Age Group of Respondent | Educational Qualifications | How long have you been working in the SDGs? | How long have you been benefitting from SDGs? |
|----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|---|---|
| N Valid        | 362                      | 362                     | 362                        | 362   | 362   |
| Missing        | 3                        | 3                       | 3                          | 3   | 3   |
| Mean           | 1.59                     | 2.44                    | 2.38                       | 2.63  | 1.86  |
| Median         | 2.00                     | 2.00                    | 2.00                       | 3.00  | 2.00  |
| Mode           | 2                        | 2                       | 2                          | 3   | 2   |
| Std. Deviation | .492                     | 1.174                   | .873                       | 1.107                                       | 1.270   |
| Range          | 1                        | 4                       | 4                          | 4   | 21  |
| Minimum        | 1                        | 1                       | 1                          | 1   | 1   |
| Maximum        | 2                        | 5                       | 5                          | 5   | 22  |

**Source:** Author’s Computation Using SPSS, Version 23 on Field survey, 2022-2023.

Table 4.1 displays the valid sample size of 362 individuals, which was used in this research to examine the socio-economic background of the respondents. Furthermore, the mean values for the variables shown in Table 4.1 were 1.59, 2.44, 2.38, 2.63, and 1.86 for the categories of gender, age group, education qualifications, job experience, and benefitting from Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), respectively.

In the given dataset, the median values of the variables were 2.00, 2.00, 2.00, 3.00, and 2.00. These values represent the middle observations within the dataset. Furthermore, the mode of the observations consists of the values 2, 2, 2, 3, and 2, which signify the highest frequency of occurrence among the variables in the field survey. The range values for gender, age group, educational

qualification, job experience, and benefitting from SDGs were 1, 4, 4, 4, and 21, respectively. Furthermore, the variables had minimum values of 1 for each, specifically for gender, marital status, education qualifications, working time, and profiting from SDGs. The maximum values, on the other hand, were 2 for gender, 5 for marital status, education qualifications, and working time, and 21 for benefitting from SDGs.

Moreover, the subsequent examination will focus on the frequency breakdown Tables and Bar Charts pertaining to each of the variables that are used in this research. The research included an overview of the respondents' count and corresponding percentages for each question, as well as a description of the data collection process via a field survey conducted throughout the period of 2022-2023. The succeeding section of the study will include the presentation of data in different tables and bar charts.

**Table 4.2: SDGs has supported farmers with improved seedlings to boost farming production in Taraba state?**

| Variable                | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Strongly Disagree | 34        | 11.4    | 11.4          | 11.4               |
| Disagree                | 50        | 16.8    | 16.8          | 28.3               |
| Neutral                 | 21        | 7.1     | 7.1           | 35.4               |
| Agree                   | 89        | 30.0    | 30.0          | 65.3               |
| Strongly Agree          | 103       | 34.7    | 34.7          | 100.0              |
| Total                   | 365       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |

**Source:** Author’s Computation Using SPSS, Version 23 on Field survey, 2022-2023

Table 4.3.1 presents data indicating that a significant proportion of respondents, namely 89 individuals or 30.0% of the total sample, expressed agreement with the notion that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have played a supportive role in empowering farmers. This finding is corroborated by 103 respondents, accounting for 34.7% of the

total, who expressed significant agreement with the notion that SDGs have effectively empowered farmers via the provision of seedlings, herbicides, and many other services, as shown in this research. In this research, it was found that 21 individuals, accounting for 7.1% of the sample, had a neutral stance about whether the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) effectively benefited farmers in terms of empowerment.

Furthermore, a small proportion of the participants expressed disagreement with these replies. Specifically, 50 respondents, representing 16.8% of the entire sample size, opposed the questionnaire in relation to this aspect. A total of 34 respondents, accounting for 11.4% of the sample, strongly disagreed with the notion that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) fail to empower farmers in Taraba State.

Based on the data shown in Table 4.3.1, it can be inferred that the implementation of SDGs programs has resulted in the empowerment of farmers in the surveyed region. This conclusion is supported by the fact that 64.7% of the respondents acknowledged this outcome. This implies that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Taraba State were current in their efforts to relieve poverty by implementing farmer's empowerment programs that were integrated into the policies and programs of the SDGs.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The economic and social problems facilities and services aimed at reducing poverty in Taraba State have been shown to have a good impact and to be statistically significant after being analyzed. In addition, the impact of acquiring skills and participating in vocational training on the fight against poverty was shown to be favorable throughout the duration of the investigation. Its coefficient indicates that the research region is experiencing positive impacts that are considerable. In a same vein, the limitations and causes that are working against the achievement of the SDGs are having a good impact on the fight against poverty in Taraba State. These limitations, which are preventing the SDGs from being implemented, made a positive contribution that was statistically significant to the research. It seemed that there were a number of obstacles or causes that were preventing greater levels of poverty from being eliminated in the state of Taraba.

Based on the results and conclusion of this study, the following recommendations are made:

The Taraba State Government, in collaboration with the Sustainable Development Goals coordinating office, should enhance the scope of farmers' empowerment initiatives. This can be achieved through the provision of financial assistance in the form of soft loans, fertilizers, extension services, agricultural infrastructure, hybrid seeds, and storage facilities for rural inhabitants within the State. Taraba State Government and Sustainable Development Goals coordinating office in the state should increase the level of farmers' empowerment schemes such as providing soft loans, fertilizers, extension services, agricultural facilities, hybrid seeds and storage facilities for rural dwellers in the State.

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# 2

## INTERSECTIONALITY OF INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN NIGERIA

**Salifu Samuel Edache**

**Baba Andrew Gaiya**

Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *edachesam78@yahoo.com, babaandrew90@gmail.com*



### Abstract

Intersectionality of inequality and poverty in Nigeria represent pressing global challenges with far-reaching socio-economic implications. Inequality manifests across various dimensions, including income, wealth, education, health, and access to basic services. These exacerbate social disparities and hinder equitable opportunities for individuals and communities. Persistent poverty, characterized by inadequate income, limited access to resources, and social exclusion, further perpetuates cycles of deprivation and marginalization. Key drivers of inequality and poverty encompass structural factors such as unequal distribution of resources, discriminatory practices, systemic barriers to social mobility and globalization-induced economic disparities. These dynamics intersect with social identities, including gender, race, ethnicity, and geography, amplifying disparities and deepening social divisions within societies, especially in Nigeria. The methodology or source of data was based on content analysis centred on information derived from secondary sources. The paper revealed that there is a strong correlation between inequality and poverty, indicating that high levels of inequality exacerbate poverty rates within societies in Nigeria. Nigeria have wider income and wealth gaps that is why the country often experience higher levels of poverty, as marginalized individuals and communities face greater barriers to accessing education, healthcare, and economic opportunities. The paper recommends that policymakers should prioritize implementing progressive taxation systems that ensure the wealthy contribute proportionally more to public revenues, while also implementing targeted redistribution policies to support the most vulnerable populations.

**Keywords:** Wealth distribution, marginalization, social-mobility, taxation

### Introduction

In the intricate tapestry of societal dynamics, the intersection of inequality and poverty presents a complex and multifaceted challenge, particularly in the context of Nigeria. This nation, rich in cultural heritage and natural resources, grapples with deeply entrenched disparities that

permeate various aspects of life, from access to education and healthcare to economic opportunities and political representation. It is through the lens of intersectionality that we can unravel the intricate web of overlapping identities and systemic barriers that

perpetuate cycles of deprivation and marginalization. The concept of intersectionality, coined by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw, recognizes that individuals often face compounded forms of discrimination and disadvantage based on the intersection of multiple identities, such as race, gender, class, and disability (Crenshaw, 1989). In Nigeria, this framework proves invaluable in understanding the intricate interplay of factors that contribute to the persistence of poverty and inequality. One of the most glaring intersections is that of gender and poverty. Nigerian women, particularly those in rural areas, face significant obstacles in accessing education, employment, and economic resources (British Council Nigeria 2012). Cultural norms and patriarchal structures often relegate women to subordinate roles, limiting their agency and perpetuating cycles of deprivation. Further-more, gender-based violence, early marriages, and lack of reproductive rights exacerbate these challenges, hindering women's ability to break free from the shackles of poverty (Makama, 2013).

Intersecting with gender is the dimension of ethnicity and religion. Nigeria's diverse ethnic and religious landscape, while a source of cultural richness, has also been a catalyst for conflict and marginalization (Osaghae & Suberu, 2015). Certain ethnic and religious minorities have faced systemic discrimination, limiting their access to resources, education, and economic opportunities. This intersection of identities often create pockets of concentrated poverty, further entrenching inequalities and hampering social mobility. Additionally, the intersection of geographic location and socioeconomic status cannot be overlooked. Nigeria's urban centers often present stark contrasts with rural areas, where access to basic services, infrastructure, and economic opportunities is severely limited (Fawole & Raheem, 2017). This urban-rural divide intersects with other factors, such as ethnicity and gender, creating a complex web

of disadvantages that disproportionately impacts certain segments of the population.

Moreover, the intersection of disability and poverty in Nigeria is a significant concern. Individuals with disabilities face numerous barriers to education, employment, and social inclusion, exacerbating their vulnerability to poverty (Etieyibo, & Omiegbe, 2016). Stigma, discrimination, and lack of accessibility compound these challenges, further marginalizing this population and limiting their ability to participate fully in society. It is important to recognize that these intersections do not exist in isolation; rather, they are intricately intertwined, creating a complex matrix of disadvantages that perpetuate cycles of poverty and inequality. For instance, a woman from a rural area, belonging to an ethnic minority, and living with a disability would face multiple, intersecting barriers that amplify her risk of experiencing poverty and marginalization.

### **Conceptualizing Inequality and Poverty in Nigeria**

Inequality refers to the unequal distribution of resources, opportunities, or privileges within a society or between different groups or individuals. It encompasses disparities in income, wealth, education, healthcare, and social status, among other factors. Inequality can manifest in various forms, including economic inequality, gender inequality, racial inequality, and social inequality. It often results from systemic factors such as discrimination, unequal access to resources, and structural barriers that perpetuate advantage for some groups while marginalizing others. Inequality can have profound implications for social cohesion, economic stability, and overall well-being, leading to diminished opportunities for those at the lower end of the spectrum while concentrating power and privilege among the few (Hankivsky, 2011).

Poverty refers to a condition characterized by the lack of essential resources and

opportunities necessary for a decent standard of living. These resources include but are not limited to income, food, shelter, healthcare, education, and social support. Poverty can manifest in various forms, ranging from absolute poverty, where individuals struggle to meet basic needs for survival, to relative poverty, which denotes a standard of living significantly lower than the average within a particular society. Poverty is often intertwined with systemic factors such as unemployment, inadequate access to education and healthcare, discrimination, and social exclusion. It disproportionately affects marginalized groups, including women, children, the elderly, and minority populations (Hankivsky, 2011).

### **Theoretical Framework**

This paper adopts resource curse theory as its theoretical underpinning to help explain the variables of the subject matter. Resource curse theory, also known as the paradox of plenty or the Dutch disease, posits that countries abundant in natural resources tend to experience slower economic growth, less democracy, and increased corruption compared to countries with fewer natural resources (Osaghae & Suberu, 2015). This phenomenon challenges the conventional wisdom that natural resource abundance should be a boon for economic development. Instead, it suggests that reliance on resource extraction can lead to a variety of economic, social, and political challenges that hinder development. The origins of resource curse theory can be traced back to the mid-20th century, with scholars like Singer (1950) highlighting the potential downsides of resource abundance. However, it gained prominence in the 1990s with studies by Auty (1993) and Sachs and Warner (1995) that provided empirical evidence supporting the existence of a negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth. One of the key mechanisms through which the resource curse operates is the

phenomenon of "Dutch disease." This term originated from the experience of the Netherlands in the 1960s, where the discovery of natural gas led to a significant appreciation of the exchange rate and a decline in manufacturing industries. The influx of revenues from natural resource exports causes currency appreciation, making non-resource sectors less competitive in international markets. As a result, countries become overly dependent on their resource sectors, leading to a lack of diversification and vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005).

Moreover, the presence of abundant natural resources can exacerbate governance challenges and increase the risk of corruption. The "rentier effect" describes how governments of resource-rich countries like Nigeria often rely heavily on revenues from natural resource extraction, leading to a weakened incentive to develop other sectors of the economy or to pursue policies that promote long-term sustainable development (Fawole & Raheem, 2017). This dependence on resource revenues also fosters rent-seeking behavior, where elites compete for control over lucrative resource rents, often at the expense of broader societal interests. Furthermore, the resource curse has been linked to political instability and conflict. The so-called "conflict hypothesis" posits that the presence of valuable natural resources, such as oil or minerals, can fuel internal and external conflicts as groups vie for control over resource wealth. Resource-rich countries are more prone to civil wars, authoritarianism, and state failure, as elites may use resource revenues to finance repression or to buy off potential opposition groups, thereby undermining democratic institutions and processes.

Resource curse theory, a concept that has gained significant attention in the realm of development economics, provides valuable insights into the challenges faced by resource-rich countries like Nigeria. When examining

the intersectionality of inequality and poverty within the context of Nigeria's abundant natural resources, it becomes evident that the resource curse exacerbates existing social disparities and impedes efforts to alleviate poverty. Nigeria, endowed with vast reserves of oil and other natural resources, serves as a compelling case study for exploring the intersection of inequality and poverty within the framework of resource curse theory. Despite its resource wealth, Nigeria struggles with widespread poverty and stark socio-economic disparities. The resource curse in Nigeria manifests through various channels, including corruption, rent-seeking behavior, and economic mismanagement, all of which contribute to exacerbating inequality and perpetuating poverty ((Hankivsky, 2011).

One of the primary mechanisms through which the resource curse exacerbates inequality in Nigeria is through the phenomenon of "elite capture" or "rentierism." The country's oil wealth has historically been controlled and exploited by a small political and economic elite, often at the expense of the broader population. This elite capture of resource rents not only widens the gap between the rich and the poor but also undermines the government's capacity to invest in social services and infrastructure that could benefit the marginalized segments of society (Makama, 2013). Moreover, the concentration of resource wealth in the hands of a few exacerbates regional disparities within Nigeria. The oil-producing regions of the Niger Delta, despite being the source of the country's wealth, continue to grapple with poverty, environmental degradation, and social unrest. The failure to equitably distribute resource revenues exacerbates grievances among marginalized communities, fueling social tensions and perpetuating cycles of poverty and inequality.

The resource curse also intersects with existing patterns of inequality along gender lines in Nigeria. Women, particularly in rural and resource-dependent communities, often

bear the brunt of the adverse impacts of resource extraction, including displacement, environmental pollution, and loss of livelihoods. Gender disparities in access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities further perpetuate poverty among women, exacerbating the overall inequality within the country (Makama, 2013). Furthermore, the resource curse in Nigeria has been associated with weak governance, rampant corruption, and institutional decay, all of which undermine efforts to address poverty and inequality. The mismanagement of resource revenues, characterized by embezzlement, diversion, and lack of transparency, deprives the government of critical resources needed for poverty alleviation programs and social investments (Fawole & Raheem, 2017). This further entrenches the cycle of poverty and inequality, as marginalized communities are denied access to essential services and economic opportunities.

### **Gender and Poverty**

Gender inequality is a significant contributor to poverty, as women face systemic disadvantages in access to education, employment opportunities, and control over resources. Women are more likely to be employed in low-paying and precarious jobs, experience wage discrimination, and bear a disproportionate burden of unpaid care work, limiting their economic opportunities and trapping them in poverty (UN Women, 2018). Additionally, women in poverty often face greater vulnerability to violence, exploitation, and lack of access to essential services, further exacerbating their marginalization (Kabeer, 2015).

Several interconnected factors contribute to gender disparities in poverty in Nigeria. Deep-rooted patriarchal norms and cultural practices perpetuate gender discrimination, limiting women's access to education, employment opportunities, and decision-making roles. Additionally, legal frameworks



often fail to adequately protect women's rights, further exacerbating their vulnerability to poverty. Moreover, the unequal distribution of resources, including land and inheritance rights, systematically disadvantages women, trapping them in cycles of poverty (Pager & Shepherd, 2018).

The consequences of gender disparities in poverty are multifaceted and far-reaching, impacting individuals, communities, and the nation as a whole. Women and girls disproportionately bear the brunt of poverty, facing limited access to healthcare, education, and economic opportunities. This perpetuates a cycle of intergenerational poverty, as children born into impoverished households face diminished prospects for a better future. Furthermore, the economic exclusion of women hinders national development efforts, stifling innovation and economic growth potential.

### **Race, Ethnicity, and Poverty**

Racial and ethnic inequalities intersect with poverty in profound ways, as marginalized groups often face discrimination, limited access to quality education and employment opportunities, and concentrated poverty in segregated neighborhoods (Pager & Shepherd, 2018). The legacy of systemic racism and ongoing discrimination creates barriers to economic mobility and perpetuates intergenerational poverty for communities of color (Seamster & Charron-Chénier, 2017). Indigenous communities, in particular, face unique challenges related to land rights, cultural erosion, and limited access to resources, compounding their experiences of poverty.

The nexus between race, ethnicity, and poverty in Nigeria underscores the intricate web of social inequalities that shape individuals' experiences and opportunities. While Nigeria is often perceived as a racially homogenous society, ethnic diversity is a defining feature, with over 250 ethnic groups. In a similar development Nigeria's colonial legacy and post-independence struggles have profoundly influenced the dynamics of race,

ethnicity, and poverty in the country (Pager & Shepherd, 2018). Colonial policies of divide and rule exacerbated ethnic tensions, creating a legacy of intergroup inequalities that persist to this day. Moreover, the transatlantic slave trade and subsequent waves of migration have contributed to the racial diversity within Nigeria, shaping perceptions of identity and belonging.

Race and ethnicity intersect with poverty in Nigeria through multiple channels, including unequal access to resources, discriminatory practices, and social exclusion. Marginalized ethnic groups often face systemic barriers to education, employment, and political representation, perpetuating cycles of poverty and marginalization. Moreover, racial discrimination, though less overt, manifests in subtle forms within social institutions, limiting opportunities for upward mobility for certain racial and ethnic groups. As well ethnic conflicts, fueled by competition over scarce resources and political power, exacerbate poverty and deepen social divides in Nigeria. Displacement, loss of livelihoods, and destruction of infrastructure resulting from ethnic violence further entrench communities in poverty, hindering efforts for sustainable development (Kabeer, 2015). Addressing ethnic tensions and promoting social cohesion is essential for fostering inclusive growth and mitigating the adverse effects of poverty on affected populations.

### **Disability and Poverty**

Individuals with disabilities are disproportionately represented among the poor, facing numerous barriers to education, employment, and social inclusion. The intersection of disability and poverty is characterized by limited access to assistive technologies, inadequate support services, and discrimination in the labor market, creating significant economic and social disadvantages (Etieyibo & Omiegbe, 2016). Additionally, the added costs associated with disability-related expenses further strain the

limited resources of individuals and households living in poverty.

Disability and poverty are interconnected issues that disproportionately affect millions of individuals worldwide. While poverty is often associated with financial deprivation, disability encompasses a spectrum of physical, cognitive, and sensory impairments that can impact an individual's ability to fully participate in society. Individuals with disabilities as earlier mentioned are more likely to experience poverty due to a multitude of factors, including limited access to education, employment discrimination, inaccessible infrastructure, and inadequate healthcare. Conversely, living in poverty can exacerbate the effects of disability by restricting access to essential services and opportunities for social and economic mobility. This creates a vicious cycle where disability increases the risk of poverty, and poverty exacerbates the challenges associated with disability (Fawole, & Raheem, 2017).

Education is often touted as a pathway out of poverty, yet individuals with disabilities face significant barriers in accessing quality education. Discrimination, lack of accommodations, and inaccessible learning environments limit their educational attainment, perpetuating cycles of poverty. Similarly, employment opportunities for people with disabilities are often limited, with higher rates of unemployment and underemployment compared to their non-disabled counterparts. Discriminatory hiring practices, inaccessible workplaces, and lack of accommodations further marginalize individuals with disabilities, trapping them in poverty (Kabeer, 2015).

The built environment plays a crucial role in shaping the daily lives of individuals with disabilities. However, inaccessible infrastructure and transportation systems create physical barriers that impede mobility and limit access to essential services. Lack of wheelchair ramps, elevators, and accessible public transportation options restricts the ability of people with disabilities to fully participate in society, exacerbating their

marginalization and isolation (Osaghae, & Suberu, 2015). In a related development access to healthcare is a fundamental human right, yet individuals with disabilities often face barriers in accessing quality healthcare services. Limited financial resources, lack of insurance coverage, and discriminatory practices within the healthcare system contribute to disparities in healthcare access and outcomes for people with disabilities (Kabeer, 2015). Furthermore, healthcare providers may lack training and awareness regarding the unique needs of individuals with disabilities, leading to inadequate care and treatment.

Beyond the structural barriers, individuals with disabilities also face social exclusion and stigma, further exacerbating their experience of poverty. Negative attitudes and misconceptions about disability perpetuate stereotypes and discrimination, hindering social inclusion and economic participation. This stigma often leads to social isolation, reduced opportunities for social interaction, and limited access to support networks, all of which contribute to the perpetuation of poverty among individuals with disabilities in Nigeria.

### **Geographic Inequalities and Poverty**

The intersectionality of poverty and inequality is also shaped by geographic factors, such as urban-rural divides, regional disparities, and environmental degradation. Rural communities often lack access to quality education, healthcare, and economic opportunities, trapping generations in cycles of poverty. Similarly, urban slums and informal settlements are characterized by overcrowding, inadequate infrastructure, and limited access to basic services, compounding the experiences of poverty for their residents (Rigg et al., 2020).

One of the primary drivers of geographic inequalities in poverty is the uneven distribution of economic opportunities across states in Nigeria. Urban centers and affluent areas often benefit from greater investment, infrastructure development, and access to

markets, leading to higher incomes and better living standards. In contrast, rural areas and marginalized regions face limited job prospects, underemployment, and lack of access to capital and resources, exacerbating poverty rates and perpetuating cycles of deprivation (Makama, 2013). Geographic inequalities also manifest in disparities in access to essential services, including healthcare, education, and basic infrastructure. Remote and rural areas, as well as marginalized urban neighborhoods, often lack adequate healthcare facilities, schools, and transportation networks, limiting residents' ability to access critical services and opportunities for socio-economic advancement. This lack of infrastructure and services further entrenches poverty and undermines efforts to improve quality of life and well-being in disadvantaged regions (Osaghae, & Suberu, 2015).

Environmental factors, including climate change, natural disasters, and environmental degradation, exacerbate geographic inequalities and contribute to poverty disparities. Marginalized communities, particularly those in low-lying coastal areas, arid regions, and disaster-prone zones, are disproportionately affected by the adverse impacts of climate change, including food insecurity, displacement, and loss of livelihoods. Moreover, inadequate infrastructure and limited resources hinder these communities' ability to adapt and mitigate the effects of environmental hazards, perpetuating cycles of vulnerability and poverty (Rigg et al., 2020). It is noteworthy that political and governance factors also play a significant role in perpetuating geographic inequalities in poverty. Corruption, ineffective governance, and unequal distribution of resources often result in marginalized areas receiving less government investment and attention compared to wealthier areas. Lack of representation and voice in decision-making processes further marginalizes these communities, exacerbating their socio-economic exclusion and perpetuating cycles of poverty and underdevelopment.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Gender disparities in poverty remain a pervasive challenge in Nigeria, undermining efforts to achieve sustainable development and social justice. Addressing these inequities requires a holistic approach that tackles the root causes of gender discrimination while promoting women's empowerment and inclusion. By investing in education, healthcare, and economic opportunities for women and girls, Nigeria can unlock their full potential as agents of change and catalysts for progress. Moreover, concerted efforts to reform legal frameworks and institutional structures are essential for creating an enabling environment for gender equality to thrive. Ultimately, by prioritizing gender-responsive policies and programs, Nigeria can pave the way for a more equitable and prosperous future for all its citizens.

The intersectionality of race, ethnicity, and poverty in Nigeria underscores the complex nature of social inequalities and the imperative for inclusive development. By acknowledging and addressing the systemic challenges that perpetuate racial and ethnic disparities in poverty, Nigeria can move towards a more equitable and just society. Empowering marginalized communities, promoting interethnic dialogue, and implementing inclusive policies are essential steps towards building a future where all Nigerians can thrive, regardless of race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status. The intersection of disability and poverty represents a complex and pervasive issue that requires urgent attention and action. By addressing the structural barriers, social stigma, and systemic inequalities that perpetuate this cycle, Nigeria can create a more equitable and inclusive society where all individuals, regardless of ability, will have the opportunity to reach their full potential. As well policymakers should prioritize implementing progressive taxation systems that ensure the wealthy contribute proportionally more to public revenues, while

also implementing targeted redistribution policies to support the most vulnerable populations. Geographic inequalities in poverty represent a complex and multi-dimensional challenge that requires coordinated action and investment to address. By targeting the root causes of disparities, promoting inclusive and sustainable development, and empowering marginalized communities, Nigeria can work towards building a more equitable and resilient country where all individuals will have the opportunity to thrive, regardless of their geographic location.

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# 3

## DEMOCRATIC FAILURE IN AFRICA AND THE RESURGENCE OF MILITARY COUP IN MALI 2010 – 2023: LESSONS FOR NIGERIA

Johnkennedy T. Ikyase<sup>1</sup>

Jonah Onuoha<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

<sup>2</sup>University of Nigeria Nsukka, Nigeria

Email: [ikyase@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:ikyase@fuwukari.edu.ng)



### Abstract

This work is set to examine democratic failure in Africa and the resurgence of military coup in Mali. The study is predicated on the premise that the drive to transform from military dictator to civilian leadership underlies acceptance of democracy. By 2007, 48 out of 54 African countries had become democratic. However, abysmal performance and leadership failures in many African nations have invalidated the rationale for continuous acceptance of Western democracy in Africa. Incidentally, between 2019 and 2022, six (6) African Nations have relapsed into military rule. This study investigates how decades of abysmal democratic practice in Mali have resulted to rebellious military coups in Mali and how Nigeria can learn from the Malian State. The study utilizes documentary methods of data collection and adopts the Tout theory in explaining contradictions that have stultified democracy in Mali. The study concludes that instead of providing good governance and ensuring strict compliance to rules, effective implementation of agreements entered into with other non-state actors in the state, the ruling elites rather used the agreements to navigate specific periods. The study finally recommends the institutionalization of governance processes against the prevailing personalization of state institutions in Mali.

**Keywords:** Democracy, military, state institutions, coup, development

### Introduction

Africa's political history is replete with abundant evidences of military interventions in governance, despotic rulership and sit-tight regimes in many African states especially in the post-colonial Africa. The ugly events resulted in the death of many, plunged some African states into socio-economic and political quagmire and indeed instigated abuse of human rights and retarded development. As a result, immediate post-colonial Africa faced enormous administrative and leadership

challenges. Essentially, the last three decades especially in the mid-1990s witnessed what is popularly known as the 'third wave' of democracy which tends to have coincided with slow withdrawal and return to the barracks by the military. However, recent events in Africa appeared to have revised this trend.

Mali is a nation in West Africa. It is presently seen as one of the world's most fragile countries with an estimated population of close to 20 million people. Over the last two

decades, Mali's severe fragility is exacerbated by an ongoing conflict in the country's northern region. Few years after independence in 1960, Mali was plunged into military dictatorship. With Mali's return to democracy in 1992, optimism was upbeat that democracy would serve as catalyst to reviving Malian polity, ensure political stability, relaunch her into regional and global acceptability and refocus Mali's socio-economic trajectories on the path of sustainable development. But whether this optimism was well founded remained to be seen. Since Mali's return to democracy in 1992 the nation has remained exceedingly fragile. Mali's over two decades of democratic experience is hampered by increased poverty of the majority, political corruption, brazen electoral fraud and most importantly a growing separatist insurgency by the Tuareg rebels in the Northern region of the country.

World Bank report (2022) explained that Mali's per capita GDP stagnated in 2021 and the national poverty rate remained at 44.4 percent with an additional 50,000 people in extreme poverty. The report further noted that the nation is faced with a situation of increased fragility, complex conflict situation, and violence that is inflicting a growing toll on the economy especially since 2012 when the frequency and lethality of violent events have surged. Obviously, the violence has spread beyond northern region to the agricultural central regions, specifically Mopti and Ségou, and, more recently, to the southern region's main economic centers and it is estimated that the crisis cost the equivalent of 23 percent of GDP between 2012 and 2018, mainly due to depressed confidence and forgone private investments, estimated at US\$5.3 billion, including US\$3.2 billion of FDI (World Bank report 2022).

Indeed, the resurgence of violence especially since 2012 has retarded efforts at democratization and decentralization. Incidentally, both African Union led mission and United Nations peace mission have

grappled to dismantle insurgent groups in Mali. Recent incessant military coups have also hampered peace intervention measures hence, the rising instability and insecurity. In fact, Tull (2022) posited that the political, security, and humanitarian situation in Mali has been steadily deteriorating at least since 2017 despite International intervention. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali is the largest international military element in Mali with the deployment of 12,500 persons, of which 11,200 had been soldiers to take over the African Union led mission (AFISMA), in the fight against rebellion in the Northern part of the country (Cserkits, 2020). As of 2020, the number of troops has grown up to 16,000 and is labelled as being the most dangerous UN mission in the world since its implementation in 2013, while at the same time ranks at 4th place regarding the death toll of all UN-missions (Cserkits, 2020).

Following the increasing spread of violence in Mali, thousands of people have been displaced. The number of internally displaced persons has recently risen to 400,000, almost quadrupling in the last two years (Tull, 2022). He attributed this unfortunate circumstance to the complexities of conflict situation in Mali and the fact that the international approach is simply not working. Also, Axerold & Aning (2020) also explained that between 2016 and 2020 about 1.7 million people have been displaced in Mali by violence.

Thus, Adetuyi (2021) stated that during the period covering 2009 to 2019, Mali had been recognised as being amongst the long-term most worsened countries alongside Syria and Yemen and ranked 108th out of 180 countries in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index and 112th in the Press Index Ranking made by Reporters Without Borders (RSF). It also stood 144th out of 180 in the 2020 Global Peace Index Ranking run by the Institute for Economics and Peace (Adetuyi, 2021). The above figures show very significantly the

extent of volatility and deteriorating insecurity facing Mali.

Evidently, from the dialectics of democratic uncertainties, violent confrontations, coups, conflicts and insurgency in Mali, two major arguments appear discernable. First, is that the misplaced emphasis on strengthening Malian military in the aftermath of the 2012 military coup is implicated in the subsequent 2020 and 2021 military coups in Mali (Marchal, 2013; Bergamaschi, 2013; Klatt, 2020; Gazeley, 2022). Obviously, Mali was in need of external military assistance especially by France after the 2012 coup. Military assistance was inevitably seen as alternative option to assist depleted Malian military and was indeed generally accepted by the government and majority of Malians. However, greater emphasis on improving the military without corresponding response to other state institutions weakened the Malian state. For instance, Klatt (2020) argued that since 2012 at least, if not before, France engagement in Mali and its neighbouring states has been subordinated to the primacy of security policy and the fight against terrorism, as clearly reflected in the budgets. He further noted that many domestic political challenges were often not given sufficient priority, although there is no lack of either programmes or new approaches in this field. But no political pressure was applied to the Malian government, especially in connection with the implementation of the long-planned security sector and territorial reforms and consequently, a lot of opportunities for change were missed (Klatt, 2020).

The second side of the debate focuses on the historical formation and emergence of terrorist groups, militant Islamist groups (eg Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin, JNIM) and rebel groups (eg Tuareg nomads) in the Northern Mali and the extent the continued existence of these terrorist groups have continued to fuel insecurity and instability in Northern Mali and the nation in general (Arieff, 2013; Francis, 2013; Wing, 2013;

Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015; Ibrahim & Zapata, 2018; Axerold & Aning 2020; Adetuyi, 2021). The studies separately explained that the ineffective military response by Mali has deepened state vulnerabilities and persistent security threats.

However, while these extant efforts provide valuable insight into the myriads of crisis arising from military coups in Mali, the formation of dissident groups, resurgence of rebel groups and the increasing insecurity accompanying the tide, the link between democracy and the extent it has engendered development in Mali is yet to be accorded adequate systematic treatment. This study therefore poses to examine democratic failure in Africa and the resurgence of military coup in Mali between 2010-2023 a lesson for Nigeria.

This work takes a pragmatic question thus: Is the failure of democracy to deliver development implicated in the resurgence of military coups in Mali between 2010 and 2023? And is there any lesson to be learnt so as to avert the same situation in Nigeria? These and more are added into the nuance of this work.

### **Conceptualizing Democracy**

Despite the efflorescence and profundity of conceptual stretching in the Social Sciences by scholars, there is no unilateral accepted definitions, attempt to mono-conceptualized it has always ended into intellectual nullity and barefoot prognosis. However, we will make some openings. In the last four decades, especially since the 1990s the concept of democracy has spawned a mammoth amount of literature. Scholars in virtually all over the world also have remained more consensus than divergence in the perceptions and postulations on the capacity of democracy to solve multifarious challenges besieging every nation. Thus, this section of the study is undertaken under purposively chosen thematic order. The themes of the review in the sub-section of the work are essentially selected to dovetail into the major focus of the

research study, relating to democracy and development. There is an attempt to arrive at comprehensiveness in the review, while the least that is targeted is robust representation. In other words, the germane scholarly trajectories of democracy and development were intended to be covered under this conceptual focus. The subdivisions of this section of the study accordingly include the following: A Historical Context of Democracy, Tenets of Modern Democracy, and Variants of Democracy: Typologies and Interrogations, Democratization and Democracy Consolidation, Democracy and Good Governance, and Critiquing Democracy.

In literal terms, democracy means rule by the people. The concept is derived from the Greek *dēmokratia*, which was coined from *dēmos* (people) and *kratos* (rule) in the middle of the 5th century BCE to denote the political systems then existing in some Greek city-states, notably Athens” (Dahl, 2022, p.1). It accordingly appears quite enchanting to suggest that people rule. Under such scenarios there would be no domination by any single individual, individuals or group (even groups). However, even at these times, democracy still had its practical assailants.

### **Development**

Over the years, development has continued change from its originally known characteristics and meaning. The concept has continued to be defined and redefined by scholars. Nwanegbo & Odigbo (2013) explained that the concept of development seems to be in a state of flux since the end of the Second World War. The definition and redefinition is as a result of changing nature of what constitute development. In the immediate post World War II, development was majorly seen as the changes in the nation’s economy or economic growth. Thus, Nwanegbo & Odigbo (2013) explained that in the early 1940s the ideological differences between the Socialist East and the Capitalist West appear to have influenced the meaning

and the conceptualization of the term. At this point, greater emphasis was placed on the economic growth as a major indicator of development. Within this context, development was largely defined as the steady viability and growth of the economy of a nation.

Thus, it is important to note this economic growth appeared to have occurred in many third world countries without corresponding development in the 1950s and 1960s which raised major questions on continuous explanation of development from the angle of economic growth. In fact, lack of corresponding development in societies that have witnessed steady economic growth brings about new thinking about development. Development therefore, could be seen as the process of empowering people to maximise their potentials and the ability to exploit nature to meet daily human needs (Nwanegbo & Odigbo 2013). For them, it can also be seen as a process by which quality of human lives and capacity to surmount daily needs are considerably improved.

In spite of the above, development is still a disputatious issue. It is undoubtedly not straightforward to conceptualize. More fundamentally also development is beneficially a practical matter. However, the linkages between theory and practice in different fields of human engagements are no longer in contention (Broome, 2017; O’Toole, 2004). In this section of the study therefore development is examined from the theoretical angle in exhuming and interrogating what earlier researchers and authors have contributed to the concept of development.

### **The Military**

Military generally encapsulate members of the armed forces. The military has their power through coup d’etat. It could also be seen as a type of dictatorship in which power is held by one or more military officers. Conclusively, I do not know any other definition of the military



than the sum total a government wherein the political power resides with the armed forces.

### **Theoretical Framework**

In this work, we utilized the **Tout theory of politics** otherwise known as Toutocracy: This concept derives its origin derisively from Professor Jonah Onuoha, in his work "Motor Park Democracy: Interrogating Tout Theory of Politics" (2020) in which he describes politics as having all the behavioral semblance or characteristics of a typical motor park "touts" who are lawless, ruthless, and shameless with a touch of impunity in all their dealings with their clients.

These set or crop of leaders in Africa will not hesitate to take chances, yet not loose their individuality in the motley crowd of corrupt politicians. They will be honest in small things as well as big things, they will make no compromise with wrong. No arrangement in refunding stolen money. These men in African politics (tout) will not do it because everybody does it, they do not believe that shrewdness, cunning political manovers are the best qualities of governance. Above all these set of men are our heroes, and, have failed us, in Africa. They don't have all the present arrangement or formula that can take us to the Promised Land. The present crop as described by Onuoha (2020) is what we called a Motor Park democracy, a democracy of touts, a democracy that creates more problems than it solves any, a democracy of the more we see, the less we discern. In a Motor Park democracy, as it is in ,many African countries, the President accuses his Vice, Political parties have three, four factions all laying claim to the followers' mandate which has no link with development.

The practice in Mali and other African nations today, is a system that recognizes one tout amongst other touts, and when there is a fight, it turns into a fracas, a free for all fight and the very institutions that holds them together as a nation. And this in itself is not odd because the arena is the Motor Park,

where drivers contribute money and the Union Officials play hide and seek with the money till it disappears.

Today's leadership in Africa is made up of men that readily will collaborate in a highly complex subterfuge which is predictably heading towards confusion. In the motor park of Malian democracy, we are besieged with men whose antics are allergic to true democratic practice because of a neurotic pursuit for power. The desire for all Africans is the fact that, we do not need this democracy of the Motor park, we need development, because what we are battling in Africa especially in Mali is the crisis of development, low level infrastructure, low GDP, low Per capital income, terrorism and corruption etc .

In this big motor park as opined by Hillary (2020) where we are all confined to by the politics of our leaders and their definition of democracy, we have seen in full doze violent aggression as against persuasion and consensus building, diversity, true competition, freedom and equality. In this democracy, we have not had religious or ethnic clashes because of religious parochialism or ethnic parapoism, access rights, discriminatory treatment but as a result of greed embedded in corruption.

In these circumstances, we possess an elite driven democracy, not a people driven one, so the politics is not necessarily democratic even when theoretically the system of governance supposedly is. Leadership should think about people being the agents, means and the end of development, not the case where Union officials disappear with our money, feast on it in a most despicable manner at the expense of us all.

### **Application of the Theory**

This theory is imperative in this work thus; Mali could be seen generally as an underdeveloped state where democratic failure and impunity flourishes. According to Saul (1974) Mali is known to be the instrument of the colonial power, and having turned

against it to become the mouthpiece of the exploited Malian peasantry, the bureaucracy was gaining (with its access to power) some of the characteristics of a social class: control of the economic infrastructure and use of it as a means of exploitation, control of the means of repression involving a resort to various devices to maintain dominance. Within this context, the local bourgeoisies take advantage of the instrumentalities of state power to primitively accumulate wealth. Corruption became rampant in all civilian and military regimes in Mali.

### Research Methodology

The methodological aspects of this study, is to provide a scientific understanding of issues under investigation. Thus, this study adopted the *ex post facto* research design. While our method of data collection was mixed methods comprising of survey, documentary and experimental methods. We adopted content analysis and descriptive analysis to analyse both primary and secondary data gathered.

### Contextualizing Failure of Democracy in Mali

One of the fundamental characteristics that set African democracy apart from modern democracy is the openness with which citizens' opinions are susceptible to the prejudice of their leaders (Abdulyakeen, 2023). As a result, many are apprehensive and

sometimes very nervous about the growing disconnection or separation between the people or the ruled and the government. This issue explains the loss of civic engagement in African democracies, which has resulted in a general lack of contentment with how well policies have met public expectations. Although most people support democracy, they do not like how the government runs its affairs (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).

Mali has over the years entered into several agreements with either rebels or non-state actors that are threatening peace and stability in the country. One of the yardstick for measuring success of government among Malian therefore become the ability of the government to engage these groups and ensure peace and stability. In fact, at different times in history, the government of Mali has engaged in signing treaties especially with same or different armed rebel groups. The signing of peace agreement has over the years becomes a ritual following the spate of complex violence and the drive by the state authorities to restore peace and stability. Historically, since independence in 1960, Northern Mali has been the hotbed of Jihadist conflict. As a result, government of Mali has signed several notable peace agreements in an effort to ensure stability and serene society especially in the Northern Mali. These agreements are:

Table 1: Major Peace Agreements in Mali between Government and Rebel Groups

| S/N | Peace Agreements in Mali | Year | Nations involved in the Negotiation | Negotiated on Behalf | Armed Groups Involved in Agreement   |
|-----|--------------------------|------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1   | Tamanrasset agreements   | 1991 | Algeria                             | Government of Mali   | 1. Le Mouvement Populaire de l'Azaouad" (The Azaouad Popular Movement)<br>2. "Le Front Islamique Arabe" (the Arabic Islamic Front) |
| 2   | National Pact            | 1992 | Algeria                             | Government of Mali   | Tuareg groups  |

|   |                    |      |         |                    |   |
|---|--------------------|------|---------|--------------------|---|
| 3 | The Algiers accord | 2006 | Algeria | Government of Mali | Tuareg groups   |
| 4 | Sebha agreements   | 2009 | Libya   | Government of Mali | Tuareg groups   |
| 5 | The Algiers accord | 2015 | Algeria | Government of Mali | a. Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Fronts for the Resistance–I (CMFPR–I)<br>b. Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-defence Group (GATIA)<br>c. Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)–splinter<br>d. Coalition of Azawad People (CPA)–splinter |

**Source:** Compiled by the author from (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015; Reeve, 2015; Keita, 2018; Lankoande, 2020)

Among all the above listed agreements, the Tamanrasset Agreement of 1991, the 1992 National Pact and the Algiers accord of 2006 and 2015 have remained very notable. Very importantly to note also is the fact that Algeria is at the centre of virtually all the peace processes of the aforementioned agreements in Mali. The above named peace agreements are essential as they are critical to stability or instability in Mali.

**Tamanrasset Agreement of January 6, 1991**

The 1991 Tamanrasset Agreement is one of the most popular treaties signed by the

government of Mali and two other armed groups in Mali. Although other agreements have been signed after the Tamanrasset deal but it is the Tamanrasset agreement that significantly pointed to the fact that Malian domestic challenges can be dealt with without destructive confrontations or wars. In fact, it promoted confidence in government and among other non-state actors that national issues can be resolved amicably. The 1991 deal was entered into by the government of Mali and two main armed groups in Mali. The signatories to the Tamanrasset agreement are shown below as:

Table 2: Signatories to the Tamanrasset Agreement of 1991

| S/N | Peace Agreements in Mali | Year | Nations involved in Negotiation | Negotiated on Behalf | Armed Groups Involved in Agreement   |
|-----|--------------------------|------|---------------------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1   | Tamanrasset Agreement    | 1991 | Algeria                         | Government of Mali   | 1. “Le Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad otherwise known as “The Azaouad Popular Movement”<br>2. “Le Front Islamique Arabe” otherwise known as the Arabic Islamic Front |

**Source:** Author’s Compilation from (Reeve, 2015, p.18; Keita, 2018, p)

Thus, the Tamanrasset agreement of 1991 becomes the beacon of future reference between government and the “Le Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad” (The Azaouad Popular Movement) and “Le Front Islamique Arabe” (the Arabic Islamic Front) and subsequently becomes acceptable ideal for resolving problems linked to the newly emerged armed groups in Mali (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1991; Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015; Reeve, 2015; Keita, 2018).

### The 1992 National Pact

The failure to implement the 1991 Tamanrasset agreement following the 26<sup>th</sup> March 1991 military coup and the reluctance of Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré led military junta to commit to Tamanrasset agreement necessitated the renegotiation of a new deal called the 1992 National Pact. Obviously, a few days after the military coup of 1991, a new Tuareg group known as Ansar Dine emerged and was led by Iyad ag Ghali. Chauzal & Van Damme, (2015) noted that Iyad ag Ghali had a long and varied role in Mali’s history of rebellions, of particular note is his alleged collusion with the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) movement. Virtually after a month of the coup, rebel groups intensified seemingly devastating attacks and sized some regions in Mali. By the end of April 1991, the northern cities of Aguelhoc, Lere, Tinzaouatene, Tessalit, Kidal, Timbuktu and

Gao were controlled by the rebellion (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015).

Thus, Algeria was crucial to returning the concerned parties back to the negotiation table. Under the leadership of Algeria and with the support of prominent individuals like Edgar Pisani and Baba Miské, marathon discussions with both government and rebel groups led to the signing of National Pact in Bamako on 11<sup>th</sup> April 1992. According to Keita (2018) National Conference was held from 29 July to 12 August 1991 and two technical meetings also held in Segou and Mopti prior to the signing of the National Pact that was concluded on the eve of the second round of the Third Republic’s first democratic and multiparty presidential elections in Mali.

However, while this agreement was targeted at security reforms and restoring peace and stability in Mali, it is important to note that the overarching personal, regional and ethnic interests appeared to have hampered the agreement. For instance, Chauzal & Van Damme (2015) argued that Iyad ag Ghali, who was one of the key negotiators’ in the 1992 National pact, mainly advanced the interests of his own clan. Obviously, preference to ethnic agenda over national plan and inclusiveness of all ethnic nationalities became inimical on the implementation of the agreement. The table below shows the signatories to the National Pact of 1992.

Table 3: Signatories to the National Pact of 1992

| S/N | Peace Agreements in Mali | Year | Nations involved in Negotiation | Negotiated on Behalf               | Armed Groups Involved in Agreement   |
|-----|--------------------------|------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| 1   | National Pact            | 1992 | Algeria                         | Government of Mali Representatives | 1. Unified Fronts and Movements of Azawad (Mouvements et Fronts Unifids de l’Azaouad-MFUA) |

Source: Author’s Compilation from Keita (2018, p.5)

The National Pact 1992 brought high sense of optimism among Malians. It is one of the peace agreements that seemed to be comprehensive and designed to provide mechanisms that would totally address major concerns especially security and structural challenges in governance. In designing the peace framework, the framers took into cognizance the socio-cultural, geographical, economic and ethnic diversities of the nation with special attention on the northern Mali. In doing this, it proposed to restructure governance structures by establishing three levels of local government at the regional level. This in the view of the participants would deepen decentralization of authority that characterized Mali's traditional and contemporary societies.

Incidentally, Malian government failed to adhere to the above resolutions. According to Wee, Lendorfer, Bleck & Yaiche, (2013) Mali rather opted for one integrated model of decentralization across the entire country creating three sub-national levels, with a total of 761 devolved government entities, collectivities, territorials, split into 703 communes, 49 cercles, and eight regions, plus the special district of Bamako.

**Understanding Resurgence of Military Coups and Political Instability in Mali**

Globally, governments of different nations are facing critical socio-economic and political challenges. These challenges tend to have threatened and sometimes even gnarled public confidence in state institutions especially democratic institutions. In many nations and more specifically, many African nations, these challenges have led to increasing incidences of riots, violent protest and sometimes degenerate into conflicts and coups. Earlier, Collier & Hoeffler (2007) have argued that based on the enormous problems facing modern states, the governments of many developing countries face a risk of a coup d'état perpetrated by their own military establishment.

Incidentally, in the last five years, military coups and counter-coups have resurfaced and have been spreading like a wildfire in Africa. In 2020 alone, military officers in five different nations staged coups and seized power in Africa. The year 2021 and 2023 are not exempted from the rampaging military incursions in Africa. In fact, between 2021 and 2023 there were almost nine (9) military coups in Africa. A situation the U.N. Secretary-General, Antonio Gutierrez has termed "an epidemic of coups." The table 5.5.1 below shows the recent incidences of coups in Africa between 2019 to 2023.

Table 4: Recent Coups in Africa between 2019 and 2023

| S/N | Nation                   | Date & Year                   | Successful or failed | Immediate Cause                               | Public Response |
|-----|--------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|---|-----------------|
| 1   | Sudan                    | 25 <sup>th</sup> October 2021 | Successful           | Inability of the putschist to form government | Jubilation      |
| 2   | Ethiopia                 | 23 <sup>rd</sup> June 2019    | Failed Coup          | Not Clear                                     | Not stated      |
| 3   | Central African Republic | 13 <sup>th</sup> January 2021 | Failed Coup          | Not Clear                                     |                 |

|   |               |   |                 |   |                                |
|---|---------------|---|-----------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 4 | Mali          | August 19th , 2020 (first coup); May 24th 2021(second coup) | Successful      | Inability to end insurgency and protest | Jubilation                     |
| 5 | Burkina-Faso  | 30 <sup>th</sup> September 2022                             | Successful      | Deteriorating security situation        | Celebrated first military coup |
| 6 | Guinea-Bissau | 1 <sup>st</sup> February 2022                               | Failed coup     | Not Clear                               | Not stated                     |
| 7 | Gambia        | 21 <sup>st</sup> December 2022                              | Failed coup     | Not Clear                               | Not Stated                     |
| 8 | Niger         | 30 <sup>th</sup> March 2021                                 | Failed coup     | Not Clear                               | Not stated                     |
| 9 | Niger         | 26 <sup>th</sup> July 2023                                  | Successful coup | Insecurity and poor governance          | Mixed reactions                |

**Source:** Compiled by the author

Following from the above, nations like Guinea Bissau, Chad, Niger, Mali, Sudan and Burkina Faso have separately recorded attempted and successful military coups. Gallo (2022) argued that in West and Central Africa these coups have translated into a spate of coup d'états, at a rate unseen since before the adoption of the Lome Declaration in July 2000, which banned

coups and adopted sanctions against regimes that had taken power through a coup. One attribute that seems to connect many of the nations witnessing military coups is the fact that they are all experiencing high rate of balance of payment deficit, unemployment and poverty. For instance, the table below show some development indicators in African nations experiencing coups.

Table 5: Some Development Indicators in African Nations Experiencing Coups

| S/N | Nation                   | Total Population   | Unemployment Rate | Poverty Rate    |
|-----|--------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| 1   | Sudan                    | 45.66 million      | 19.81%            | 55.9%           |
| 2   | Ethiopia                 | 120.3 million      | 3.69%             | 35%             |
| 3   | Central African Republic | 5.457 million      | 6.58%             | 71% (estimated) |
| 4   | Mali                     | 21.9 million       | 7.72%             | 44.4%           |
| 5   | Burkina-Faso             | 21 million         | 7.1%              | 40%             |
| 6   | Guinea-Bissau            | 2.11million        | 11.5%             | 65%             |
| 7   | Gambia                   | 2.64 million       | 11.21%            | 53%             |
| 8   | Niger                    | 26,427,610 million | 0.75%             | 41.8%           |

**Source:** Compiled by the author

Indeed, the above indicators show high rate of unemployment and poverty which have the tendency to trigger violence and lure people to

protest against the government. In societies like Africa, where the military still has a greater stake in the governance systems, the possibility of coups is almost certain.

Obviously, Odigbo, Ezekwelu & Okeke (2023) argued that the abysmal performance of constitutional government and leadership gaps in nations like Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso

disillusionment has deepened hence, the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled and the failure of the state to judiciously perform her constitutional responsibilities resulted to coups.

and many other nations triggered conditions that questioned the rationale for continuous subscription of democracy in these states. In their view, in the last two decades, the level of

The table below shows military coups in Mali since independence in 1960.

**Table 6: Military Coups in Mali**

| S/N | Coup Leader                  | Regime Ousted                    | Year of the Coup                | Year the Regime ended       | Successful or failed |
|-----|------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1   | Lieutenant Moussa Traore     | Former President Modibo Keita    | 19 <sup>th</sup> November, 1968 | 26 <sup>th</sup> March 1991 | Successful Coup      |
| 2   | Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré | Retired Lieutenant Moussa Traore | 26 <sup>th</sup> March 1991     | 8 <sup>th</sup> April 2012  | Successful Coup      |
| 3   | Captain Amadou Sanogo        | Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré     | 22 <sup>nd</sup> March 2012     | 12 <sup>th</sup> April 2012 | Successful Coup      |
| 4   | Colonel Assimi Goïta         | President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta | 18 <sup>th</sup> August, 2020   | Still in Power              | Successful Coup      |
| 5   | Colonel Assimi Goïta         | President Bah N'daw              | 24 <sup>th</sup> May 2021       | Still in Power              | Successful Coup      |

**Source:** Compiled by the Researcher

There is no doubts that the above coups especially Colonel Assimi Goïta coup of August 2020 and May 2021 have severe implications on Mali's development and security especially the Northern Mali. Earlier, Barka & Ncube, (2012) noted that every coup d'état has different origins, causes and effects: in the case of the Mali, it principally reflected soldiers' grievances over the government's weak handling of the Tuareg-led rebellion in the northern part of the country.

democracy in Mali is replicating in Nigeria where there is lack of development as a result of corruption, fuel subsidy challenges, poverty, electoral fraud, terrorist activities, banditry, kidnapping. To avert this scenario for a peaceful Nigeria, our leaders need to provide the needed atmosphere for development to take place rather than primitively accumulating wealth. They also need to tackle security issues for the safety of the citizens, otherwise our security is not guarantee in this nation and this might result to military takeover, they should also improve the standard of living of Nigerians so as to avoid military takeover.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

Nigeria is a Nation in West Africa just like Mali, both nations have been operating similarly on certain parameters, while Mali got her independence in 1960, Nigeria also got her independence in 1960, Military coup interrupted the Malian governance, same happened to Nigeria in the 60st. The implication of this is that, Nigeria is moving at the verge of Military takeover, hence the characteristics undermining the state of

We have to reiterate that we have evaluated the democratic failure in Africa and the resurgence of military coup in Mali between 2010 and 2023 a lesson for Nigeria, To this end, the study found that in Mali instead of providing good governance and ensuring strict compliance to rules, effective implementation of agreements entered into with other non-state actors in the state, the ruling elites rather used the agreements to navigate specific periods. This has given the

rebels and jihadist groups the leverage to continue to terrorise civilians which tend to increase instability and the resurgence of military coup.

In the light of the above findings of this study, we put forward the following recommendations for policy makers or decision makers in both Mali and Nigeria.

First, since the post-independence conflict is predicated on rebellious agitation for independence, reforming governance structures to improve efficiency and justice is essential. This can be enhanced by an inclusive constitutional review process and a reform of the institutions of government. Reforms must be all inclusive. All government sectors and institutions especially security institutions like military should be reformed to focus more on their constitutional duties of protecting the territorial integrity of the Mali State.

Secondly, is the fact that the government of Mali, international community, the regional body and the people of Mali need to show more commitment to peace. Various armed groups, rebels and insurgent groups must realize and accept the power of dialogue and negotiations. Within this context, the drivers of agitations and conflict can be resolved. Thus, to achieve sustainable peace, Malians must stop the fight, embark on a robust national reconciliation and healing process. The most fundamental stage in stabilizing the nation is to anchor everything on social transformation. The way this society is set up and the conditions in which the people live must change, including life of rebellion, service delivery must be an important way of achieving peace. Thus, Mali can build strong and wonderful democratic institutions. The Malian state or government must prove that it exists for the purpose of transforming society.

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# 4

## GOVERNANCE DEFICITS AND DISILLUSIONMENT OF RETURN MIGRATION IN AFRICA: AN EXEGESIS OF NURUDDIN FARAH'S *CROSSBONES*

Ifeoma Cassandra Nebeife

Department of English and Literary Studies,  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State Nigeria

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5033-9182>

Email: [ifeoma@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:ifeoma@fuwukari.edu.ng), [ifycassandra@gmail.com](mailto:ifycassandra@gmail.com)



### Abstract

Overtime, return migration has been viewed through the lens of failure of migrants to accomplish set goals in the Global West which makes home to become for them a place to dislodge frustration and disappointment. However, the missing narrative is the trajectory of return migration where Africans who have already made the Global West their home and are comfortable; but eventually choose to return home, face disillusionments occasioned by governance deficits in their home countries. This manifests in insurgency, humanitarian crises, political instability, economic fragility and limited infrastructure. These seeming reoccurring and exacerbating home situations which instigated migration in the first instance seem not to have improved and so they wonder if they made the right choice in returning home. The paper relies on the abstractions of psychoanalytic theory to do a re-read of Nuruddin Farah's *Crossbones*. This is to explore the issues pertaining to disillusionment of return migration in Africa as opposed to the previous interpretations which scholars have made of the text. The paper argues that there is a specific link between governance deficits and disillusionment of return migration with implications on development of home countries in Africa. Consequently, the paper finds that manifestations of economic underdevelopment, fragile peace, security threats, corruption, human rights abuses, and limited access to basic services in home countries hamper desired successful return migration.

**Keywords:** Governance, migration, economic fragility, psychoanalysis, Nuruddin Farah

### Introduction

African immigrants who find success in the global West often long to return to their homeland. However, upon their return, they discover that 'home' has remained unchanged or has deteriorated. Returnees can face disillusionment and challenges as a result of governance deficit in the areas of insurgency, humanitarian crises, political instability, economic fragility and limited infrastructure. This paper explores the representation of African returnee immigrants in Nuruddin Farah's *Crossbones*, examining how characters

reflect their experiences in the African social setting. The subject of African returnee in the face of governance deficit remains under-explored globally. Factors influencing return migration include political and social stability, economic prospects, and the ability to save in the host country for a new start in the home country. Quality medical care, social entitlements, family bonds, and social expectations also play a role. These are also issues of governance deficit which this paper addresses.

A governance deficit essentially refers to a gap between the desired and actual quality of governance within a specific setting. The major aspects of a governance deficit include lack of trust and legitimacy. This is because citizens might not believe that their government represents their interests or functions effectively. Therefore, the citizens withdraw their cooperation and compliance with policies. Also, is the issue of weak rule of law and accountability. When laws are not consistently enforced, leaders may lack accountability for their actions. This fosters corruption and hinders justice. In addition is limited effectiveness of service delivery. In this instance, the government might struggle to provide essential services like health-care, education, and security, leaving citizens' needs unmet. Exclusion and lack of participation as another aspect of governance deficit refers to situations where certain groups might be excluded from decision-making processes, leading to unfairness and marginalization. Instability and conflict occasioned by poor governance can further contribute to political instability, social unrest, and even violent conflict.

Governance deficits do not happen in a vacuum. Several circumstances can propel governance deficits. For instance, history and legacies of a country can leave lasting scars on institutions and social structures. Also, weak institutions and capacity occasioned by lack of resources, expertise, or infrastructure to function effectively on the part of the government can cause governance deficit. Corruption and misuse of power further undermine good governance practices. When there is poverty and economic inequality, it impedes development and good governance. External influences from foreign powers or regional actors can complicate internal dynamics and weaken sovereignty.

In Somalia, a complex history of migration and political instability has led to prolonged refugee situations. UNHCR reports over 1.1 million internally displaced Somalis and over 1

million refugees in host countries. Stability has been achieved in some regions, like Somaliland, though not recognized internationally.

Various factors compel migrants to make choices, and Farah's *Crossbones* highlights the stark contrast between Somalia's past and present. Farah, a cosmopolitan, draws from global experiences and advocates cosmopolitanism, much like contemporary African diaspora writers.

### **The Concept of Return Migration**

The exact definition of return migration is subject to controversy. It can encompass individuals who temporarily visit their home countries while working abroad or those who return permanently after retirement. These varied definitions create challenges in assessing needs and facilitating reintegration. Additionally, the absence of tools for registering returnees poses another challenge. Despite limited research on return migration, some scholars have laid the groundwork for further study. Frank Bovenkerk compiles literature on return migration systematically. George Gmelch's article, 'Return Migration,' explores the adaptation and readjustment of returnees. Francesco Cerase's work provides a groundbreaking analysis of return migration, with a focus on United States to Italy migration and the motivations behind return.

There are several academic debates on the complex and varied nature of the concept of 'return'. To King and Christou:

What characterizes recent studies of return is a far more variegated and nuanced exploration of the ontology of return, stretching its meaning across time, space, and generations and where the "place" of return and the type of movement can have various expressions—real, virtual, imagined, desired, forced or denied (453).

For Russell King, "return migration is the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration" (7). Adele Galipo in her work uses the instance of the return of Somali skilled and educated

migrants from Western Europe and North America. She casts in a brighter light the “complexities of migrant transnational experiences as situated in global political and economic processes” (1). In expressing the nexus form of the migrants’ position, she concurs that ‘return’ in its multifaceted interpretations is seldom permanent. Roger Brubaker suggests that:

To think of diaspora not in substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim, as a category of practice... used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilise energies, to appeal to loyalties. It is often a category with a strong normative change. It does not so much describe the world as we seek to remake it (12).

Sophia Akhmemokhan suggests that 'return' can encompass various forms, including physical, mental, metaphorical, cultural, or even biological, as seen in the resemblance between children and their parents (125). This paper focuses on the physical return of migrants to their home country, Africa. Jean-Pierre Cassarino argues that a return migrant's success is positively influenced if the return is voluntary and well-prepared (10). Robert Nadler et al. emphasize that economic success is not the sole measure of return migration success. Emotional stability achieved through reuniting with family or feeling at home also contributes to life satisfaction, which is a form of success (370).

H.S. Shryock and J.S. Siegel define a return migrant as someone who returns to their former place of residence (618). The above research shows that many Africans opt to return to their home countries, often after retiring. Nevertheless, in certain situations, the original home may be unidentifiable, as Oladele O. Arowolo points out. This can occur, especially in cases of war or exiles returning home after many years due to the cessation of hostilities (62).

Sin Yih Teo mentions the 'myth of return,' where migrants dream of going back to their

homeland, even when settled (806). Christian Dustman and Yoram Weiss define return migration as migrants returning to their origin countries voluntarily after a significant time abroad (258). Blunt and Dowling see home as a place of comfort, stability, and security, offering a sense of belonging (11). Jennifer Ann Fawcett views home as a representation of acceptance, a secure emotional environment, and a place for the soul and body (2).

According to Eleni Gage, return should be a journey of self-fulfilment, allowing the returnee to piece their life together (14). Evangelia Kindinger defines return as a creation of home through the act of returning (5). Gerhard Stolz sees home as the place of one's initial orientation, nurturing personal identity, belonging, and returning (9). However, return comes with challenges, as noted by Katie Vasey, who states that genuine, uncomplicated return to one's home is a complex concept (32). This idea of home aligns with John McLeod's argument that being at home means occupying a place where one is welcome, surrounded by similar individuals (210).

Return migration, despite its challenges is a matter of choice. People choose to either return or remain in host countries whether or not they achieve success over there. This paper focuses on migrants who eventually return in search of lost family and home visit having achieved success in the West. *Crossbones*, discusses the experiences of returnee Africans in a troubled society. Returnees meet hopes, impediments or both in their homelands. These are experiences of modern societies that cannot be ignored.

### **Perspectives on Nuruddin Farah's *Crossbones*: A Literature Review**

*Crossbones* is ostensibly set in late 2006, shortly before the European invasion of Somalia. It addresses issues and events that remain relevant to present-day Africa. In Nicole Rizzuto's article, it highlights the ongoing challenges faced by the people of

Somaliland and Somalia, such as the exchange of commodities, military equipment, and humanitarian aid on a global scale (393).

Rizzuto interprets *Crossbones* as mediating materiality while filtering noise and recording sound within the context of Somali politics. She argues that the novel challenges politico-economic dialogues that attribute Somalia's exclusion from the world structure solely to failed statehood and critiques literary discussions of world literature based on unrestricted harmonious movement (421). This article relates to the paper in the area of governance deficit but does not address the disillusionments of return migration in the text.

Kamil Naicker's analysis of *Crossbones* sees it as a text that challenges the authority of crime fiction techniques. It highlights the complexity of Somalia, rejecting a single narrative and opposing binary and orientalist media depictions of the country. Naicker points out that the conventions of crime fiction are discarded as Farah refrains from portraying his characters as clear-cut villains or victims. This departure from caricature results in an open-ended and "unfinished" narrative that prioritizes nuance over cohesion (17). The crux of this article defers from the aim of this paper as it does not address return migration to Africa, governance deficit and disillusionment.

Pauline Dodgson-Katiyo's article links Farah's *Crossbones* and *Links* to Somalia's transformation due to a failed dictatorship and the rise of an autonomous state. It vividly portrays the destruction of Mogadishu, once a beautiful city, now allegorically resembling hell (80). This paper explores the disillusionments of return migration complimenting the aspect of governance deficit emphasized in Dodgson-Katiyo's analysis.

Nimo-ilhan Ali suggests that the young Somalis population believe that life's success depends largely on migrating to the West and further returning home having acquired education and a passport. Such returnees are enviously referred to as a *qurbajoog*. This

desire to be called a *qurbajoog* drives the youth to undertake irregular migration (tahriib) through dangerous routes like the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea (6). While the various readings and interpretations of the texts are illuminating, none has done a critical analysis of the text in terms of governance deficit and disillusionment of return migration. Also, not enough scholarly work has been done on *Crossbones*, therefore this paper will contribute significantly by adding to literature on Farah's *Crossbones* as a text and to research on return migration, disillusionment and governance deficit.

### **Theoretical Consideration: Psychoanalytical Theory**

Sigmund Freud, the founder of the psychodynamic approach to psychology, delved into unconscious drives that influence human behavior. Ian Watt suggests that psychoanalysis can illuminate a character's psychology in two ways. It can indirectly reveal personality through actions or directly analyze the character's state of mind. Typically, both methods are combined and integrated into a narrative structure that showcases character development and moral dilemmas, engaging the character's entire personality (121).

Freud divided the human psyche into three parts: the id, the superego, and the ego to describe the conscious and unconscious mind. Lapsley and Stey describe unconsciousness as both a quality attributed to repressed ideas and a region where such ideas are banished (4). The id, residing in the unconscious, operates on the pleasure principle, often illogical and unrestrained.

Freud noted that consciousness is transient, and there are two kinds of the unconscious: latent and repressed (Sigmund Freud *The Ego and The Id* 1). The id houses the libido, seeking pleasure without concern for consequences, including desires like migration or returning home. Ann Dobie writes that, "Obviously the id can be a socially destructive force. Unrestrained, it will aggressively seek

to gratify its desires without any concern for law, customs, or values” (53).

The ego acts as a regulator, working between the inner self and the external world, balancing, and diverting the id's energies into socially acceptable actions. The superego, akin to conscience, enforces moral and ethical standards, derived from family, institutions, and authority figures. It restrains socially unacceptable desires, striving for perfection and moralistic goals. When balanced, it leads to a better individual, but excessive superego control can result in unhappiness and guilt complexes. Superego represents the 'higher nature' of humanity, forming the basis of psychoanalysis used in this paper.

### **Search for Home Belonging and Lost Family as Contexts of Return Migration in Farah's *Crossbones***

In *Crossbones*, Ahl, Jeebleh and Malik who are the major characters in the text are returnees in their own rights. The text reveals their love and commitment to their home country, Somalia although they are thriving well in the West where they live with their families. These characters are bothered about the ugly incidences of corruption, intimidation, insecurity, terrorism, and religious insurgency ravaging their home country. They desire to become a part of their beloved country, despite its volatility by being physically present. Malik, who is returning for the first time has never been to his home country, Somalia previously. Nevertheless, he still views Somalia as home as he does not have any other home country elsewhere and so his experience in Somalia is an account of his own return migration.

Return migration starts with Jeebleh and Malik arriving in Mogadishu from Nairobi, where their flight from the United States lands. Jeebleh, returning after a decade, is accompanied by Malik, a New York-based freelance journalist planning to write about his ancestral homeland, which he's never seen (11). Jeebleh's emotions mirror those of the

returnee narrator in Teju Cole's *Every Day Is for the Thief* reflecting on returning to Lagos, Nigeria, after fifteen years abroad:

I am breathing the air of the city for the first time in a decade and a half, its white smoke and other dust which are as familiar as my own breath. But other things, less visible, have changed. I have taken into myself some of the assumptions of life in a Western democracy—certain ideas about legality, for instance, certain expectations of due process— and in that sense I have returned a stranger (16-17).

Although Malik feels strange being in Somalia especially after Bile questions him about the feeling of one being back in a place which he had never been. He nevertheless describes his status of return as such, “I meant that even though I have never been to Somalia, I know a lot about the country, because my grandparents and my father wished they could visit the country of their ancestors. In fact, my old man is living somewhere in the breakaway Republic of Somalia, tending to his camels... (73). The image of the former country gradually leaves the realm of the unconscious to the conscious, sadly.

Ahl, Malik's elder brother returns from the United States and touches Djibouti from where he arrives Somalia. His mission is to search for his runaway stepson, Taxliil who is rumoured to be somewhere in Somalia serving as a liaison between his religionist mentors and the pirates after he was recruited by an Imam in Minneapolis. Cambara having lived for several years in Toronto also returns home to Mogadishu where she was born and where she grew up. Her love for her homeland takes her back despite the chaos in the region. Fee-Jigan is also a returnee from Cairo having tried his hands at different vocations over there, upon return; he says “I am a stringer for several Arabic wire services. I also report and do the occasional feed for Al Jazeera” (186).

### **Governance Deficits and Disillusionment of Return Migration in *Crossbone's* Portral**

Returnees often face difficulties when reintegrating into the society and culture they left for the West. Despite the potential for hope and positive outcomes in return migration, the concept of home can be less pleasant in this context. William Safran explains that this is because “a homeland may exist, but it might not be a welcoming place for returnees to identify with politically, ideologically, or socially. Alternatively, returning could be too inconvenient, disruptive, or even traumatic to leave behind the diaspora” (91).

Disillusionment of Return migration can be traced all through the gamut of *Crossbones*. First is political instability. Frequent political disputes and delays in elections undermine stability and hinder long-term planning. Tensions regarding term extensions further exacerbate the issue thus hindering effective governance. For instance, the text opens with the returnees; Jeebleh and his son-in-law, Malik being harassed even from the airport in Mogadiscio where their plane lands. They watch as about six bearded men wearing white robes with whips in their hands scream instructions at passengers and porters alike. This situation reminds Jeebleh of his wife’s conclusion of the situation in Somalia. Judith groans about Somalia, “That unfortunate country, cursed with those dreadful clans’ people forever killing one another and everyone around them” (12). Nevertheless, it is still Judith that persuades her husband to travel with their son-in-law, Malik while prevailing on their daughter, Amran to agree to the trip. This means that she still entertains an iota of hope that things will or have changed in their beloved home country, Somalia.

Sadly, things are still as bad as they were when Jeebleh returned the last time. The returnees observe that the crowds on the street are always in a hurry to gather in groups. These gatherings do not hesitate to turn into mobs at the slightest provocation. The working of the psyche of the id drives the youth to

disregard societal restrictions. They go overboard to maim and destroy lives and properties. Dajaal, an old friend of Jeebleh who is also like their host comes to receive the returnees, alongside a religionist-leaning fellow who also claims to be a Journalist. After exchanging pleasantries, Jeebleh takes Dajaal aside to ask him how well he knows Gumaad who will be working closely with his journalist son-in-law, Malik. Dajaal replies, “How well can you know anyone these days?” (17). This is a pointer to the insecurity prevalent in the state. One cannot be too sure of his friend.

Another factor is human rights concerns. Abuses by security forces, limited access to justice, and restrictions on freedom of expression raise concerns about human rights. As the returnees drive towards the apartment that has been prepared for them, they notice that there are several checkpoints mounted and manned by armed militiamen who are loyal to the warlords. This scene is supposed to have been eradicated following the efforts that are being put in place towards the restoration of peace in Somalia and among Somalis. A sect from these militiamen stops their vehicle and insists on searching them even after they introduce themselves as returnees while Dajaal and Gumaad are residents. BigBeard, the leader of the militiamen is not moved by the introduction even when Dajaal implores him to at least respect their guests. BigBeard is not deterred, rather he requests that Malik hands over his laptop for scrutiny. Jeebleh and Malik are shocked and so wonder what right these men have to access their personal property. Bigbeard and his gang are propelled by the id which most times can be socially destructive. This is the desire to carry out destructive activities without any concern for law, customs, or values. When the visitors delay in submitting their properties, BigBeard commands four armed youths to surface, “They raise their gas-operated AK-47s and, standing with their feet apart, push the selector switches to automatic: they are ready

to shoot, if provoked or ordered by BigBeard to do so" (21). With this sort of spectacle, the returnees and their friends are forced to surrender the laptop to Bigbeard who collects it from them and asks them to come back later for it. BigBeard and his militant group consistently employ the tool of repression to forcefully control visitors and Somalis in the city. This experience of harassment from official and unofficial authorities can also be compared to the experience of the protagonist in Okey Ndibe's *Foreign Gods, Inc.* The returnee in the novel is threatened with a demand for a bribe to simplify and speed up the custom's routine. He is asked to "bring money to settle customs" and further if he has something "for the boys" (74).

Jeebleh and Malik have never been this humiliated in their lives especially when they were in the West. They are stunned. Jeebleh remembers how the metropolis used to be referred to as the 'pearl of the Indian Ocean'. He compares that to the destruction which years of civil war have exerted on the city. Malik who grew up partly in Malaysia; an orderly country finds it difficult to come to terms with the harassment, intimidation, and embarrassment which they had just undergone in the hands of BigBeard and his gang of armed youths. Jeebleh failing to bring Malik out of his distraught disposition ruminates in his mind, "There is no hurt worse than the hurt you cannot fully describe" (25).

As they arrive at the apartment, having been intimidated and dispossessed of Malik's laptop, they try to cheer up by settling into the house which Bile, Jeebleh and Dajaal's friend offer the returnees for comfort and security purposes. Jeebleh makes it a point of duty to engage the security locks of the house in case of emergency, "Securing the place is very important. You must be always prepared. Mogadiscio is a very dangerous place, but you can make it less so. Please keep that in mind" (30). Jeebleh ruminates on the dictatorship by the religionist authoritarianists which has taken the city back to the days of dictatorship.

He concludes that nothing much has changed (33).

Somewhere in the other part of the city, Dhoorre, a character in the text is a victim of the Somali situation. He reminisces over the state of things in Somalia following the war and the current fights by religious sects. Reflecting over the sad events in the city, he agrees with himself that, "He knows what he is talking about; he owned several houses, some of which were rented out. He was once an important man in Mogadiscio himself. Today he is a man without property, living in a house that his son himself is renting" (47).

Ahl, Malik's brother returns to Bosaso city of Somalia from the United States of America in search of his runaway stepson. His flight first lands in Djibouti... Ahl spends a few days in Djibouti before leaving for Bosaso. He makes a mental comparison of the development and peace in both cities and concludes that religious intolerance is the bane of the unrest in Mogadiscio.

As Ahl continues to savour the peace and cosmopolitanism which Djibouti affords him as he waits to move to Bosaso, he meets an acquaintance in a club who queries him when he tells her that he is on his way to Somalia, "Why would you go to a place everyone is leaving?" (61). As though to corroborate this, Dhoorre who supposedly feels safe in his son's house is hijacked by YoungThing. YoungThing is sent to prepare a house for an onslaught on the order and supervision of BigBeard. Dhoorre and his son's family are victims. As Dhoorre awaits his death in his own son's invaded home, his pleas fall on deaf ears. He thinks in his mind the evil that has befallen his country, "a country held to ransom, a people subjected to daily humiliation, a nation sadly put to the sword" (68). The Shabaab group is a religious sect, highly intolerant, to which BigBeard and others are recruited and keep recruiting young people into. This religious sect has recruited the missing Taxliil. They feel they have the duty to liberate the country and educate its people in the proper ways of their faith (70).



As Jeebleh and Malik go to visit Bile, whose accommodation they were offered for safety and comfort, Cambara does not hesitate to warn Malik of the danger in the city. This insecurity does not exempt journalists too, “Be on your guard; journalists are under constant threat” (78). Malik on his part notices how dirty, unkempt, and disorderly the city is. This can be attributed to the lack of law and order in the state. Malik is saddened that BigBeard feeds his laptop with a vicious virus such that he is not able to use the laptop again.

Furthermore is the fragile state of the country. The unique case of Somali is that it has lacked a fully functional central government since the early 1990s. The central government's authority is weak outside major cities, with power fragmented among clans, militias, and local administrations. This creates challenges in delivering services, enforcing laws, and promoting national unity. The deliberate effort to frustrate and make life difficult for Somalis by the Shabaab and the warlords is prevalent in the text. This tangible atmosphere of strife is accentuated by the presence of Gumaad and his irritating banter being a member of the religious court. It makes the atmosphere tense and it takes a toll on Dajaal, “Dajaal has lost his cool twice, forfeiting his eloquence for short-term gain, almost resorting to abusive language. This is very uncharacteristic of him, Jeebleh thinks” (87).

Corruption and impunity is another attribute of governance deficit. Corruption is widespread at various levels of government, siphoning resources away from development and public services. Lack of accountability and weak law enforcement further fuel this issue. Corruption is also rampant in the Somalia city of Mogadiscio. This is seen in the display of underdevelopment in the city. The autonomous state collects tax but pockets it in individual coffers. They claim to be constructing an airport but nothing like construction is ongoing, rather like Ahl witnesses, it's- “the heartlessness, the mindlessness of a community failing its responsibility toward itself; a feebleness of

purpose; an inadequacy” (95). Ahl on arriving Bosaso is shocked at how impoverished the city lies. He checks into a hotel and yet does not find hospitality nor privacy despite having paid exorbitantly for his room. Ahl has no choice than to control his temper because, “... he has been warned that one must be circumspect in one's dealings with young Somalis. People out here are a nervy lot, quick to anger and to reach for their guns” (100).

In Mogadiscio, Dajaal continues to caution Malik and Jeebleh to always be conscious of the activities around them as Malik, going by his profession, is a likely candidate for attack by the men of the courts. Jeebleh on arriving Bile's house further notices the high rate of unemployment and ironically the irresponsibility of the privileged few who are engaged. The domestic staff at Bile's engagement does not seem to be good at her job yet she dares anyone to sack her. Bile complains to Jeebleh, “If you have a dispute about the overtime due to her or, God forbid, fire her, a couple of youths bearing guns will turn up to waste you in less time than it takes to stub out a cigarette” (120).

The inhabitants of Mogadiscio are always on edge, they always keep an eye open in case an invasion happens. The activities of the Shabaab are becoming a concern to well-meaning civilians. Qasiir, Dajaal's grandson whom he introduces to the returnees, Malik and Jeebleh is equally concerned like his grandfather, Dajaal about the chaos, destruction and insecurity going on in the city of Mogadiscio. He sees the Shabaab as the perpetrators and funders of the ongoing unrest in the city. In his words, “They concentrate their efforts on recruiting teenagers from broken homes or young boys and girls to whom they can provide a safety net, a guaranteed livelihood after training. They brainwash them, then attach every recruit to a trustworthy insider” (130).

The war situation in Mogadiscio threatens and pushes away the family culture that most homes used to enjoy. The environment is no

longer peaceful. Xalan reminisces, “But these days, loyal as they are to each other, they no longer form a family unit” (146). Warsame, her husband, as is also the ritual of most men in the city, finds solace from the instability in the city in chewing qaat. The feeling they get in chewing is like one getting a fix. Xalan refers to qaat as a, “master disrupter of family normalcy, a costly demolisher of the social fabric” (149). As if the tension in the city is not enough, an attempt is made on Dajaal’s life by unknown persons. They are shocked and do not know what to make of the warning. Cambara is in Mogadiscio but misses Toronto. The religious intolerance is almost stifling. She finds consolation in the fact that she is with her best friend Bile, who, though convalescing, is the best companion she can get in the city. Cambara reiterates the fact that the Shabaab take advantage of the innocence of the orphans and children from broken homes to recruit them while relying on their limitations of being uneducated and ill cared for (174).

Humanitarian crisis as governance deficit is further seen prevailing in city. Somalia faces chronic food insecurity, droughts, and displacement, placing immense strain on resources and governance capacity. There are concrete efforts made by a selected few to retain Somalia in bedlam for their very benefit. In the words of Ma-Gabadeh, a pirate and capitalist, whom Malik interviews in Mogadiscio:

I, too, like many others, contributed to the creation of the crisis and then profited from the turmoil. Turbulence upsets things, sends the dregs to the top. We are enjoying the turmoil and are unfettered by tax laws, a parliament issuing decrees, a dictator passing edicts, a government declaring draconian measures: the ideal situation for growth of capital (188).

The rate of poverty in the city has become deplorable and worse. This is because of the illegal fishing vessels which have taken over the high seas. The people no longer have access to fish which usually serve as food (188). This is despite the fact that Somalia has

a huge fishing potential being the longest coastline in Africa. Malik succeeds in interviewing Ma-Gabadeh although he is yet to publish any article since he arrived home. The Shabaabs and others, who notice the arrangements for these interviews with the high profile individuals, follow him up and so heighten the threat of assassination on his life. Malik, on his part exercises caution while putting in place his own security in the company of the home grown Qasiir and his grandpa, Dajaal.

Ahl on his part, while in Punt land, is equally worried about the deteriorating state of things in the city and of the future of Somalis. He gets acquainted with a pirate, Fidno and has a long discussion with him concerning piracy, rape of the Somalia seas by foreign vessels and so on. Fidno desires to grant an interview to a foreign journalist and Ahl agrees to connect him to Malik. The information which Fidno has is such that should be put to public domain for the sake of preserving the future.

From what Ahl gathers from his discussion with Fidno, “The stark reality, the dire conditions of most Somalis, the absence of food and environmental security, the never-ending conflict: each of these will have an impact on the future” (219). Unfortunately, it is seen that for the purpose of avoiding tax payment, “...many of the big businessmen are keener on war and funding it than they are on peace” (156). Fidno on his part promises to help him locate his missing stepson Taxliil. This interchange is highly risky because in Mogadiscio, the lives of journalists are constantly under attack, and one cannot say for sure who Fidno is and what his real motive is.

Meanwhile, Dajaal is assassinated at close range on his way to the mosque. This is barely hours after Dajaal tries to convince Malik not to grant a face-to-face interview with TheSheikh which Gummad arranges. Dajaal insists that it is too risky, much to Gumaad’s disdain and chagrin. Malik notes the bitterness in Gummad before he leaves. Dajaal’s murder

comes as a rude shock to everyone who knew him. This is the kind of insecurity people are exposed to in Mogadiscio. You can be killed for merely speaking your mind. Malik, “remembering the last altercation between Dajaal and Gumaad, and the sensation he’d had at the time- that Dajaal would pay with his life for what he said about TheSheikh” (242).

In the heat of this, Cambara advises Malik to leave Somalia and move to Nairobi, from where he can be operating. Meanwhile, Malik is depressed and despondent, losing his elderly friend, Dajaal within a twinkle of an eye to assassination. More to this pain is the fact that Dajaal is known to be a man who loves his country but is not given a chance to contribute his quota to its transformation. The situation is hijacked by those who want to benefit from its ruin only. Malik a returnee is astonished by the fact that there in Somalia, there is no sanctity of human life, “Alive one minute, dead the next, and buried in the blink of an eye, no postmortem, not even an entry in a ledger (251).

Governance deficit further manifests in lack of trust in government. Many Somalis view the government as corrupt, ineffective, and unable to provide basic services or security. This leads to low levels of cooperation and compliance, hindering progress. Ahl continues to suffer shock as the hotel staff continues to invade his room given any little opportunity. He complains to the hotel management, and nothing seems to be done about it. He feels unsafe and decides to move in with Xalan and Warsame while he continues to establish contact to locate his missing son, Taxliil. At the hotel reception where he is to check out, he is presented with an outrageous bill. This is because they know that he is a returnee Somali and would be in possession of dollars. Ahl and Xalan are outraged but on a second thought, Ahl deliberates within himself that, “If he refuses to pay and reports the rip-off to the authorities, he stands little chance of success. Later, he’ll be made to pay at gunpoint,

possibly with his life” (275). Limited effectiveness of service delivery is represented here as an aspect of governance deficit

Ahl moves into Xalan’s house and few days later, Xalan’s nephew, Saifullah who has been missing for a long time too, resurfaces from nowhere. The family is happy and Ahl sees it as a sign that he will soon see his stepson since Saifullah agrees to know him in camp. Unfortunately, the boy disappears the same way he appeared and shortly afterwards news of a suicide bomb attack is heard. It happens that this is the mission that brings Saifullah home and he only seized the opportunity to see the family members that he had not seen for a long time before he disappears to accomplish his mission. He succeeds in blowing up himself and ten other people leaving many others wounded.

Cambara and Bile’s relationship continues to be strained by the demands of the civil war even without them knowing it. This is especially so with the way the courts in power see to it that women are suppressed into submissive, veil-wearing beings that should have nothing to contribute to the development of the state. Exclusion of the female gender and lack of participation in governance remains a deficit. In Kala-Saar’s words, “Times were when Somali women were better organized- as members of political movements, as beacons of the nation. Not anymore” (318).

As a result of constant attacks and threats, Malik decides to move in with Cambara and Bile since staying alone exposes him to more danger especially at night. Before he moves, Qasiir escorts him to visit the Bakhaaraha market. On their way to the market, they notice that the city is actually more insecure than they actually think, “they come upon more devastation, houses destroyed by recent bombing and families sitting out in the open or under the shade trees still standing in the rubble” (329). Malik witnesses more panic, nausea and shock as they stumble upon a gyration frenzied group of youths. On getting

closer to find out what the jubilation with songs is and possibly get some snapshots, Malik discovers that they were actually “Stamping on a corpse in uniform” (332). At this point, Malik loses hope in the Somalis being part of the entire human race or at least part of United States or even the nearby Nairobi.

The dead man, an Ethiopian was killed while interviewing an insurgent, “Malik’s sickened heart sicker than ever, he feels as if he is complicit in these terrible doings, because he cannot find a way to stop them” (333). It is alarming and unfortunate that the focus of the killings by these youths is on journalists. They make sure they kill at least one journalist every day or two. Few hours later, another improvised roadside device strikes the van occupied by Malik and other journalists, “He remembers he’d been with others on their way back from the funeral of a journalist” (337). Malik narrowly escapes death. He is rushed to the hospital and luckily his situation is not bad. He notes that roadside bombing is now the insurgents’ most preferred mode of operation.

Malik wonders if he can meet the challenge of writing about the place and the situation knowing that his profession is the target. Well-meaning friends and acquaintances advise Malik to leave Somalia as soon as possible, “The advice from me is this, “leave quickly, quit this accursed country while you can” (344). Malik having seen several deaths especially of people close to him, makes up his mind to leave Somalia after he conducts few more interviews. Even after he is discharged from the hospital, on his way home, news of more deaths continues to pour in, “Nine peacekeepers from the Burundi contingent seconded to the African Union AMISOM died when a suicide bomber drove into their compound” (345).

Ahl on his part is contacted from nowhere by Taxliil and they both reunite. It is a very emotional time for both having been separated for several years. However, Ahl

notices that the amiable, innocent, caring, and agreeable boy he knows is gone. Ahl thinks that “Spending time with the Shabaab has turned him into someone else, a plaintive, fearful youth, full of misgivings about the world and its inhabitants” (351). The superego as a part of the tripartite psyche continues to restrain the id working hard to manifest in Taxliil. In the words of Lapsley and Stey, “The superego is thus a precipitate of family life. It is an agency that seeks to enforce the striving for perfection, as it holds out to the ego idea, standards, and moralistic goals” (6). The superego therefore works against the id by repressing socially unacceptable desires back into the unconscious when the need arises. The superego is heavily represented by Ahl and his wife while trying to rescue Taxliil from the indoctrination of the religious sect in whose custody and training he had been. Preparations are made as to how Ahl will leave Somalia with Taxliil without being caught by the Shabaab. They were lucky enough to leave Somalia without the Shabaab getting them. Unfortunately, they are caught in Djibouti by the immigration officials following Taxliil’s willful upsurge. However, it is better than being in the hands of the Shabaab or Somalis who would have easily slit their throats. The efforts of Ahl and others in rescuing Taxliil from the Shabaab shows the workings of the superego in balancing the desires and attitude of the id through its restrictive means, so that a better human emerges.

Moreover, in Mogadiscio, as Malik prepares to conduct his final interview before he leaves the city having put security measures in place through Qasiir, he notices that, “...three men known to be leading the insurgency can be sitting in a car in the parking lot of a four-star hotel, and the intelligence of the so-called Transitional Federation Government hasn’t the wherewithal to apprehend them, let alone take them into detention” (363). This is the kind of country Somalia is. It is a pity that Malik neglects that as a sign and he refuses to take the interview in Cambara’s house where he

has moved into which also would have been safer. He goes ahead with interviewing two well-known pirates, Il-Qayaxan and Fidno in a public facility.

Unfortunately, after the interview and as Qasiir drives Malik home to Cambara and Bile's house from where he will be leaving the country, a remote-controlled roadside device hits their vehicle. This attack leaves Qasiir dead and Malik badly injured. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that there is no well-equipped hospital in Mogadiscio which can properly take care of his injuries. Cambara quickly arranges for a plane to fly him to Nairobi for further treatment.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper examines how Farah's *Crossbones* explores governance deficits, return migration and disillusionment using Freud's psycho-analytic theory. It focuses on issues of governance deficits such as, economic underdevelopment, fragile peace, security threats, corruption, human rights abuses, and limited access to basic services which shape the disillusionment experienced by returnee characters. The text portrays disillusionment in areas such as insecurity, terrorism, insurgency, corruption, and poverty, impacting returnee characters.

This paper interprets return migration in *Crossbones* as a desire to reunite and represent home country challenges for intervention. The returnees face harassment, extortion, and terrorism. Somalia's path towards overcoming its governance deficit remains long and arduous. Sustained commitment to political inclusivity, transparency, accountability, and justice is crucial. Addressing clan dynamics constructively, strengthening institutions, and fostering economic development are also essential elements in charting the way forward.

The practical and epistemic implications of this study hold that corruption for instance diverts resources hindering economic growth and development. Insurgency and humanitarian crises on the other hand, disrupt

economic activity and infrastructure leading to food insecurity, and reliance on aid. Political instability further discourages investment.

Existing literary theories like post colonialism, marxism, feminism and trauma theory, also further studies on governance innovation, migration and diasporic studies, climate change and environmental degradation will benefit from this paper in the areas of challenging dormant assumptions and informing future solutions

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# 5

## A PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS OF POLITENESS IN NASIR EL-RUFAI'S SPEECH AND SOCIAL MEDIA USERS' RESPONSES

**Adi Shimoudi Jonathan**

Department of English and Literary Studies,  
Faculty of Humanities, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
Email: [shimoudijonathan@gmail.com](mailto:shimoudijonathan@gmail.com)



*“The tongue is a small part of the body, but it makes great boasts. Consider what a great forest is set on fire by small spark. The tongue also is a fire, a world of evil among the parts of the body. It corrupts the whole body, sets the whole course of one’s life on fire, and is itself set on fire by hell”.*

### Abstract

Polite use of Language is a very important phenomenon in facilitating a successful conversation and avoiding conflict among interlocutors. This research paper carried out a pragmatic analysis of politeness in Nasir El-Rufai’s speech and some Social Media Responses. This is essential based on the incessant conflict ravaging the nation, and peace cannot be sustained if our political leaders are not deliberate in their choice and use of language. This research aims at ascertaining whether or not politeness plays a part in his speech. In order to achieve this, excerpts were extracted from videos downloaded via YouTube and comments of responders screened shot from Face book; after careful studying, observation and selection. Also, scholarly journals and books on pragmatics and politeness theories were studied. After subjecting the analysis to Geoffrey Leech’s theory of politeness, the findings revealed that, to some extent, El-Rufai’s Speech violated the politeness principles and impoliteness influences his speech and the responses of Nigerians on social media more than politeness does. This research is significant because of the way in which language is used among interactants; when politeness is not properly utilized, tension and conflict are unavoidable. Theoretically, this research has provided linguistic information in relation to the analysis of politeness principles and practically, the findings of the study are a point of reference and alternative information about how to apply pragmatic theory, especially those that relate to politeness principles.

**Keywords:** Pragmatic, Politeness, cooperative principle, context, and conflict.

### Introduction

Language is a channel of communication and coexistence. Language plays an important role in human communication; it can harmonise or heighten conflicts among interlocutors. We can agree that polite language denotes peaceful coexistence as it shuns speakers to use utterances that might be interpreted as negative (e.g., a desire to have violence or conflict). Such language is capable of

generating a positive environment for people around the world. Every nation of the world wants development and Nigeria is not an exception when it comes to advocating for sustainable development in all aspects of life. Sustainable development is unachievable if impolite use of language dominates any type of conversation. This is because the use of impolite language can cause tension and

conflict among interlocutors, and when conflict surges, destruction of lives and property cannot be avoided thereby setting threat to sustainable development. Language can be used to encourage, discourage, strengthen good communication or even cause conflict between interlocutors, hence, there is need to use polite language for fruitful and successful communication. One of the ways through which language can be used to enhance good communication is through the linguistic phenomenon of politeness principles. The affirmation above collaborates with the view of Leech (1983) who saw politeness as “*strategic conflict avoidance*” which, in his opinion, could be weighed in terms of the degree of effort put into the avoidance of conflict situations. Leech further stresses the significance of politeness in language by saying that “unless you are polite to your neighbor, the channel of communication between you will break down and you will no longer be able to borrow his mower” (82). This explains that, for any meaningful friendship to take place, for a leader and his followers to work together successfully, for citizens of a country to exercise their rights and live peacefully, and for members of a family to live together peacefully and harmoniously, those involved must exhibit politeness in their linguistic interaction. Hence, politeness is a universal linguistic behaviour.

Words are so powerful that when they are not properly used in a particular context, they will generate conflict and when conflict evolves as a result of impolite utterances, especially those of our leaders, sustainable development is impossible. Politeness is a form of respect (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Holmes, 1995) and functions to reduce or avoid conflicts (Lakoff, 1973, Siffianou, 1992) and to create balance (Leech, 1983) in communication. Hence, the impolite language of El-Rufai that gives the hearers the feeling that they are socially excluded from the political affairs of the nation Nigeria; a country

in which its citizens are advocating for social inclusion and he is, in turn, sowing the seed of religious discord between Christians and Muslims. This is why it is expedient for this research to be carried out in order to address the problem of impolite use of language by leaders which its consequences cannot be easily curtailed.

Nasir El-Rufai is a former governor of Kaduna State whose speech is the focus of this research paper. El-Rufai’s speech with some Islamic clerics in Kaduna state, shortly after the just concluded 2023 presidential election in Nigeria sparked wider reactions among Nigerians who disagreed with some of his utterances during that meeting and see it as a strategy for instigating religious conflict in Kaduna state and the nation as a whole. Moreover, as a political figure and a leader, El-Rufai must use politeness strategy in his speech to show leadership competence in uniting the nation, thereby, ensuring sustainable development. This paper focuses on a pragmatic analysis of politeness in El-Rufai’s speech and the responses of social media users against or for his speech and ascertains how politeness plays a vital role in conflict avoidance which is the bedrock of sustainable development. To access data for this analysis, excerpts were extracted from videos downloaded via some mainstream media houses websites and Facebook, after a careful observation, 14 excerpts were selected and subjected to Leech’s (1983) theory of politeness.

### **Conceptual Review**

**Social Inclusion:** Preserved in the 2030 Agenda is the proposition that every person should gain the benefits of prosperity and enjoy minimum standards of well-being. This is drafted in the 17 Sustainable Development Goals that are aimed at eradicating all nations and people and all segments of society from poverty and hunger and to ensure healthy lives and access to education, modern energy and information, among other things. Accepting



the fact that these goals are not easy to achieve without making institutions work for those who are deepest in poverty and most vulnerable, the Agenda envelops broad targets aimed at promoting the rule of law, establishing equal access to justice and extensively promoting inclusive and participatory decision-making. However, social inclusion embodies a deeper set of concerns than those reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals. No single universal, goal-setting agenda can sufficiently address the multiple dimensions of exclusion or comprehensively promote inclusion, particularly given the diversity of circumstances around the globe.

Social inclusion can also be seen as a process which ensures that “those at risk of poverty and social exclusion gain the opportunities and resources necessary to participate fully in economic, social, political and cultural life and to enjoy a standard of living that is considered normal in the society in which they live. It ensures that they have greater participation in decision making which affects their lives and access to their fundamental rights”, (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 9). In the policy discourse, efforts to promote social inclusion have arisen from concerns over social exclusion. For the purpose of the present research paper, social inclusion is defined as the process of improving the terms of participation in society for people who are disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or economic or other status, through enhanced opportunities, access to resources, voice and respect for rights. Thus, social inclusion is both a process and a goal. Therefore, it can be argued that promoting social inclusion requires tackling social exclusion by removing barriers to people’s participation in society, as well as by taking active inclusionary steps to facilitate such participation. As a political response to the exclusion challenge, social inclusion is thus a more deliberate process of

encompassing and welcoming all persons and embracing greater equality and tolerance.

### **Sustainable Development**

The term sustainability belongs originally to the field of ecology, referring to an ecosystem’s potential for subsisting over time, with almost no alteration. When the idea of development was added, the concept would no longer be looked at from the point of view of the environment, but from that of society (Reboratti, 1999, pp. 207– 209) and the capital economy.

The concept of “sustainable development was first widely publicized by the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN, 1980). It has since become central to thinking on environment and development, and is espoused by many leaders of world stature. Notable definition is the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987 – the “Brundtland Report”) which says: “sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs”. The concept of sustainable development is situated on the concept of development (socio-economic development in line with ecological constraints); the concept of needs (redistribution of resources to ensure the quality of life for all) and the concept of future generations (the possibility of long-term usage of resources to ensure the necessary quality of life for future generations). The essence of the concept of sustainable development derives from the *Triple bottom line concept*, which implies the balance between three pillars of sustainability – *environmental sustainability* focused on maintaining the quality of the environment which is necessary for conducting the economic activities and quality of life of people, *social sustainability* which strives to ensure human rights and equality, preservation of cultural identity, respect for cultural diversity, race and religion, and

*economic sustainability* necessary to maintain the natural, social and human capital required for income and living standards. Complete sustainable development is achieved through a balance between all these pillars; however, the required condition is not easy to achieve, because in the process of achieving its goals each pillar of sustainability must respect the interests of other pillars not to bring them into imbalance.

### **Pragmatics**

Pragmatics is the branch of linguistics which studies how speakers use language to achieve their goals and how hearers interpret the meaning the speaker wishes to convey (Aitchison 104). This was developed by other researchers after Austin's (1962) death. A conversation depends not only on the speaker, who is trying to deliver a message, but also on the hearer, who draws a conclusion from the implication of the utterance, depending on the context in which it occurs. In contrast to syntax and semantics, pragmatics focuses on human cooperation and knowledge instead of on linguistic meaning and structure only. Semantics, which concentrates on the study of meaning of the lexical item and lexical structure, is the precursor to pragmatics, which focuses on the intended meaning dependent on the context (Aitchison 88-104). The various definitions of pragmatics available in the literature point at its emphasis on the primacy of context for a meaningful interpretation of language in use. Interactional meaning specifically in inaugural speeches has been the focus of many studies, but the current study will focus solely on utterance and response.

### **Context**

Since pragmatics deals with speaker meaning or what is communicated, and how the hearer works this out, context is central to pragmatics. The context of an utterance is often thought of as everything that is available to be brought to bear on the utterance's

interpretation, except the form and content of the phrase or sentence uttered (and any conventional meaning attached to gestures used). The notion of context remains hard to pin down. So the context must include both information about the physical environment and information about the prior discourse (and in some cases, particularly interpretation of literary texts, subsequent discourse must also be taken into account). Sometimes the notion of context is divided into (physical) context and 'co-text' to mark the distinction between the two sources of information. Sperber and Wilson (1995) defined context as a "psychological construct, a subset of hearer's assumptions about the world". It involves "expectation about the future, scientific hypothesis or religious beliefs, anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the speaker" (15-16). This means that context is not limited to immediately preceding discourse and the physical environment of the interlocutors. According to Embugushiki and Upev (2020), "context will include any encyclopedic knowledge that may be necessary to process the utterance, including scientific knowledge, religious attitudes and cultural knowledge; in fact, anything which may affect an individual's interpretation of an utterance" (4). This classification of context is very appropriate to the pragmatic analysis of politeness.

### **Cooperative Principle**

Grice's (1975) most influential contribution to linguistics is his theory of implicatures. He describes communication as adhering to what he calls the Cooperative Principle (CP) and argues that a basic underlying assumption we make when we speak to one another is that we are trying to cooperate to construct meaningful conversation. Grice's Cooperative Principle has been a central and controversial theme in pragmatics. The Cooperative Principle (CP) was first proposed by H.P. Grice in a series of lectures given in 1967. It runs as follows: "Make your contribution such as is

required, at the state at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (48). In order to explain the processes underlying implication, Grice developed the following maxims: **Quantity Maxim:** this relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and under it fall the following maxims:

- a. Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
- b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

**Quality Maxim:** ‘Try to make your contribution one that is true’.

- a. Do not say what you believe to be false.
- b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

**Relation Maxim:** ‘Be relevant’

**Manner Maxim:** ‘Be perspicuous’.

- a. Avoid obscurity of expression
- b. Avoid ambiguity
- c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
- d. Be orderly.

### Politeness Principle

The concept of politeness is an important one in pragmatics. In the words of Green, politeness is “whatever means are employed to display consideration for one’s addressee’s feelings (or face) regardless of the social distance between the speaker and the addressee” (151). Grundy writes that, “Politeness is the term we use to describe the relationship between how something is said to an addressee and that addressee’s judgment as to how it should be said” (164). Denham and Lobeck (346) reveal that, politeness “expresses concern for others but also carries the intention of having this concern reciprocated; we’re polite because we want to make others feel at ease, and this in turn makes us more comfortable too.”

Lakoff’s (1973) work on politeness proposed the rules: do not impose, give options and make the other person feel good,

as reasons why participants in a communicative exchange may flout the Gricean maxims. Politeness is a feature of language use that is acquired through the process of socialisation.

We can think of politeness in general terms as having to do with ideas like being tactful, modest and nice to other people. In the study of linguistic politeness, the most relevant concept is “face.” Your face, in pragmatics, is your public self-image. The most prominent work in the context of interlanguage pragmatic research, which was widely used, was the theory of politeness proposed by Brown and Levinson (Brunet, Cowie, Donnan, & Douglas-Cowie, 2012: 2). The theory mainly focused on how politeness is expressed to protect participants’ face. More so, the term politeness means to take hearers’ feelings and desires into consideration when speaking and acting. This means that politeness could be expressed verbally and non-verbally in actions (Leech 1983: 140). According to Leech’s *Grand Strategy of Politeness*, for a speaker to be polite he should take into consideration two constraints while communicating with others: 1) the major constraint which involved the speaker to “place a high value on what relates to the other persons,” and 2) the minor constraint which also involved the speaker to “place a low value on what relates to him” (2005:1). Leech’s theory might be applied and adopted to explain politeness in any act of communicative interaction in “Eastern languages such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, as well as in Western languages such as English” (1). Although considered not universal, Leech’s *Grand Strategy of Politeness* remains workable among people from different cultures and languages (4). He reformulated the politeness maxims proposed earlier and modified them into ten new maxims, paying attention to their applicability to all cultures. Despite these modifications, it is a fact that politeness is not constant in all situations.

Uroko (2018), in *Readdressing the ethno-religious conflicts in Southern Kaduna* asserts that, the southern Kaduna crises are driven by religion and ethnicity. These reoccurring conflicts have led to the sad state of southern Kaduna –economically, politically and culturally. Many lives and property have been destroyed as a result of the religious conflicts between Christians and Muslims in southern Kaduna. The December 2016 Massacre of defenceless women, children and the elderly men in southern Kaduna demand condemnation from spirited individuals and the government. Dialogue should be used as a way of settling disputes rather than resorting to violence. The government should make sure that all those involved in any act of religious conflicts should be made to bear the full weight of the law.

### Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of this current research paper, Leech’s (1983) Theory of Politeness is adopted as the main theory. Also, Grice’s Cooperative Principle theory shall equally be referred to where applicable. These theories of politeness capture the essence of the current research paper since the data to be analysed are speech of Nasir El-Rufai and the responses of some social media users which have already been committed to the written form.

Leech (1983: 132) identifies seven politeness maxims and their sub-maxims thus:

1. Tact maxim: (a) Minimize cost to other (b) Maximize benefit to other.
2. Generosity maxim: (a) minimize benefit to self (b) maximize cost to self.
3. Approbation maxim: (a) minimize dispraise of other (b) maximize praise of other.
4. Modesty maxim: (a) minimize praise of self (b) maximize dispraise of self.
5. Agreement maxim: (a) minimize disagreement between self and other (b) maximize agreement between self and other.

6. Sympathy maxim: (a) minimize antipathy between self and other (b) maximize sympathy between self and other.

“Tact maxim” has been simply explained by Ogwuche as “the ability to be tactful or wise in one’s utterance, that is, ability to avoid offensive utterance” (123). The “Generosity maxim” centres on the belief that *others* should be put first instead of the *self* as it concerns directive and commissive acts. For “Approbation maxim”, Leech (135) writes that this maxim could be further explained or simplified to mean “avoid saying unpleasant things about others and more particularly about hearer”. The two sub-maxims of “Modesty maxim” which say that “minimize praise of self” and “maximize dispraise of self” agree with Ogwuche’s explanation that the maxim “involves humility and sometimes a sense of condescension, i.e., not being vainglorious or boastful”. Agreement maxim means that people should express agreement more directly in conversation and that disagreement should be expressed by regret or partial agreement. Odebunmi (2005:5) writes that “agreement maxim does not mean that disagreement should not be expressed, but rather that they should be expressed in an indirect manner”. Sympathy maxim means that people must congratulate others on their achievement, and condole with them when calamity happens to them or befalls them.

### Analysis and Discussion

#### Excerpt 1

*“... I tell them that, I did a thorough calculation; most of those that are not Muslims don’t vote for our party (APC). Most of them! So, why should I give them the deputy (governor) position? I did my calculation and I knew we could win the election without giving them. That’s first. This is politics”.*

The above excerpt was extracted from a video that has gone viral on social media and mainstream media houses, where Nasir El-Rufai, a former governor of Kaduna state was

seen and heard speaking to a group of Imams and was thanking them for the help they have provided, specifically in Kaduna state for ensuring a Muslim – Muslim ticket and at the national level for replicating same. He further clarified why he chose a Muslim as his deputy without giving the position to a Christian as expected. It can be deduced from his speech that, with the use of several personal pronouns “I” to show that he has achieved his political agenda in Kaduna state against the Christians, El-Rufai has violated the politeness principle, particularly the modesty maxim which stipulates that the speaker in a conversation should “minimize praise of self and maximize dispraise of self”. His statement sounds pompous. In other words, the idea behind this maxim involves humility and sometimes a sense of condescension, which is, not being vainglorious or boastful. Therefore, El-Rufai has flouted the politeness strategy by not putting the feelings and desires of the hearer into consideration, thereby threatening the face of the hearer. Also, with his use of the plural pronoun “them”, he is, by implication, referring to Christians who have not voted for their party (APC). In a country where every group or individual is advocating for social inclusion and El-Rufai is saying that he won’t include Christians in political positions that should be duly theirs, this would stir up conflict, thereby making sustainable development impossible.

#### **Excerpt 2**

*“what we have proven for the past four years, what we’ve proven is, government that the governor is a Muslim, the deputy governor is a Muslim, SSG, a Muslim, Chief of Staff, a Muslim, Commissioner of finance, a Muslim; he will not cheat Christians in Kaduna state ... The top government hierarchies in Kaduna state are Muslims. But is there any Christian in this state that will prove we’ve oppressed them?”*

This excerpt is also gotten from El-Rufai’s speech with the Imams in which he was recounting and reminding them of successes

he made during his tenure; how he was able to put Muslims in all the top government positions in the state. He went further to mention all the positions that the Muslims occupied in Kaduna state during his tenure as the governor. It can be deduced here that, El-Rufai has violated the politeness principle, specifically the tact maxim which stipulates that in a conversation, the speaker should avoid offensive utterance and be considerate in his use of language in order not to hurt the feelings of the hearer. More so, considering the context at which these utterances are uttered, one can say his statements are contradictory. This is because after boasting that all the top government positions were occupied by Muslims without consideration for Christians, he contradicts himself by saying that, *“He will not cheat Christians in Kaduna state”* or *“but is there any Christian in this state that will prove we’ve oppressed them?”*, when they were already feeling cheated and oppressed.

#### **Excerpt 3**

*“... I replied, ‘yes, we’re looking for those who can deliver, we’re not looking at your religion’. Of course, we consider the religious aspect but I can’t say that (laughter). But what I am asking is who is being oppressed? Open up and tell us if this government has treated you unjustly. No answer. Unless you are just used to being engaging in criminal activities, used to killing people and we’ve stopped that. Or you we’re used to blocking roads and we said if you do it again, there will be consequences”.*

This excerpt is still the part of speech where El-Rufai was addressing Islamic clerics. He said that when people complain about his choice of a Muslim deputy and those who occupied the “hierarchical position”, his replied is that, he is looking for “those who can deliver”. Here, he has flouted the tact maxim which stipulates that in a conversation, the speaker should “minimize cost to other and maximize benefit to other. In other words, the idea behind tact maxim is that, the speaker should exhibit the

ability to void offence utterance, specifically to the hearer. El-Rufai's utterance here connotes that none of the Christian living in Kaduna state "can deliver". That is to say, only Muslims can deliver when it comes to leadership or holding political offices. This is an insult to the intelligence of other religions in Kaduna state which in this case, the hearers. Secondly, it can be deduced from the above statement that, El-Rufai's utterance violated the approbation maxim which states that, in a conversation; the speaker should "avoid saying unpleasant things about others and more particularly about the hearer. This is seen in the second part of his statement in this excerpt where he asserts that, *"Unless you are just used to being engaging in criminal activities, used to killing people and we've stopped that. Or you we're used to blocking roads and we said if you do it again, there will be consequences"*. This is just a baseless accusation, and by implication, he is referring to other religions, particularly, Christianity; which it is a known fact that a Christian is supposed to be the deputy governor which he denied that opportunity.

#### **Excerpt 4**

*"And that's what we've proven again, since Senator Uba Sani and Dr Hadiza Sabuwa Balarabe still won the election, even with the religious gang ups against us. And you the Imams and Ulamas that are here, you were the ones who did the work not even the politicians because even the politicians betrayed us (Wallahi)"*.

This excerpt was also extracted from El-Rufai's speech, where he was seen and heard, "boasting" before the Imams about their Muslim – Muslim ticket's victory in Kaduna state; in spite of the believed "religious gang ups" against them. It can therefore be deduced here that, El-Rufai has violated the modesty maxim which stipulates that, in a conversation; the speaker should "minimize praise of self" and "maximize dispraise of self". In other words, the idea involves humility and sometimes a sense of condescension, which is,

not being vainglorious or boastful. Furthermore, the use of the pronouns "we, us, you" as employed in the above excerpt, by implication, are referred to Muslims and their Imams; since other religions and the politicians were also excluded from the list of his voters.

#### **Excerpt 5**

*"We're aware of those who collected money, on Election Day they switched off their phones, slept off and didn't even bother to come out to vote. Those we paid to go and vote didn't come out, and only the volunteer group members did"*.

The above excerpt is another utterance made by El-Rufai during his courtesy visits to the Imams and the Ulamas in Kaduna state. He was heard telling the Imams that they paid some voters but they failed to turn up on the Election Day. Therefore, it can be inferred that, by his utterance, he has violated the generosity maxim which specify that the speaker should "minimize benefit to self" and "maximize cost to self". In other words, the idea is that is more polite, in an offer, to make appear that the offerer makes no sacrifice, so that in turn it can become easier for hearer to accept the offer. The speaker made an offer of money to the voters but when they failed to turn up because of reasons best known to them, that offer made to them now poses a threat to them. This is because El-Rufai made it look as if there is a consequence for their actions when he said, "We are aware of those who collected money..." and "those we paid..." but did not turn up. From this excerpt, it also inferred that the election was not a free and fair one; since the voters were presumably bought with money.

#### **Excerpt 6**

*"I beg you in the name of God and the Prophet, to support Senator Uba Sani, when he finishes these four years, he should be re-elected, then we can continue to prove to people that Islamic leadership doesn't discriminate but doesn't condone indignity. That's the only thing we*

*want to prove ... but this is not the end; we will have to do it for at least twenty years and that will make everyone understand. After Uba finishes his tenure and gets re-elected again, that will be sixteen, right? Then we'll have another tenure which will make it 24 years.*

In the excerpt above, El-Rufai is urging the Islamic clerics to continue to support APC and its candidate Senator Uba Sani for the next four years tenure and possibly another four years as governor of Kaduna state. The former governor's speech here shows that he has flouted the politeness principle, particularly the tact maxim which the idea is, the ability of the speaker to be tactful or wise in his utterance, that is, the ability to avoid offensive utterance. His speech is offensive to the hearer, specifically the Christians in the sense that, El-Rufai was first and foremost addressing the Islamic clerics, boasting about their (Muslims) victory, and soliciting for the continuous support for a Muslim – Muslim leadership in all the political offices in the state. More so, he violated the modesty maxim which says that a speaker in a conversation should have a sense of condescension, which is, not being vainglorious or boastful. El-Rufai in his speech even went ahead to say that they will sustain an Islamic regime in the state and that, *"this is not the end, we will have to do it for at least for 20 years"* poses a threat to the hearers, which in this case, the Christians.

#### **Excerpt 7**

*"I swear to God, this has been our plan from the first day we started APC in the state and God has been helping us. What we successfully did in Kaduna state (Muslim - Muslim ticket) has now been replicated all over the country. No liar will ever come out to play politics of Christianity and win election ever again. Peter Obi did and look where he is. We've solved that problem. He is silenced by forced. Since Asiwaju won the election, CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria) has been very silent. That's the only way there will be peace in this nation. By the time we do it over and over*

*again (Muslim – Muslim ticket), everywhere will be calmed"*.

The above excerpt contains El-Rufai speech where he was seen and heard praising themselves (Muslims) of what they have done in winning the Muslim – Muslim ticket in Kaduna state and the country at large before the Imams. His utterance in this excerpt has therefore, violated the modesty maxim which stipulates that a speaker should minimize praise of self and maximizes dispraise of self. In other words, avoid being boastful because it poses a threat to the self image of the hearer. Again, he violated the approbation maxim which states that a speaker in a conversation should avoid saying unpleasant things about others and more particularly about hearer. What El-Rufai said in this excerpt about Peter Obi and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) is impolite and therefore, a threat to their faces or self image. Furthermore, looking at the context of situation, his utterance *"That's the only way there will be peace in this nation"* sounds contradictory. This is because Nigeria is a multicultural and has different religion in it that are advocating for social inclusion and El-Rufai is also boasting of Muslim – Muslim democratic government and things that peace will ensure? And everywhere will be calmed?

#### **Excerpt 8**

*"It is really disappointing for El-Rufai to brag about religion in a country that is trying to heal. What is the point of the speech? What point is he trying to prove in an election that was clearly questionable? APC tell your man not to sow seed of discord in this country"*.

The excerpt above contains a response to El-Rufai's speech by a social media user. The responder is reacting against his speech and he is calling out for APC as a party to call its candidate to order. The utterance can be said to have violated the politeness maxim which specifies that in a conversation, the speaker should put the feelings and desires of the hearer into consideration. By saying that El-

Rufai's speech is pointless and that the election is questionable threatens his self image and therefore, impolite. Even though the responder violated the politeness principle, he upholds the cooperative principle, particularly the quality maxim which stipulates that, in a conversation, 'Try to make your contribution one that is true'. In other words, "Do not say what you believe to be false" and "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence". The responder is actually saying what is true based on the speech of El-Rufai which depicts sowing "seed of discord" among Nigerians, specifically between Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, El-Rufai's speech confirms the allegation of the responder which stipulates that the "election was questionable"; where El-Rufai, in excerpt 6 said that, "*We're aware of those who collected money, ... those we paid to go and vote didn't come out, and only the volunteer group members did*" confirms the responder's questioning of free and fair of the election.

#### **Excerpt 9**

*"I'm just praying 'please God, let Mallam Nasiru come out and say no, this was doctored, that this is not him'. And I'm hoping he'll still come out and say he was misinterpreted or that's not what he said. But if this is what he has said, this is condemnable, is despicable, it's not acceptable for anybody in public office, anybody outside the public office ... and he has to be condemned by everyone and I hope that he'll come out and take those words back and say he is sorry".*

The above excerpt was extracted from a conversation on *Arise News* channel in a program tagged: "*The Morning Show*" where the responder was seen and heard expressing his disappointment over El-Rufai's speech on Muslim – Muslim ticket in Nigeria just after the 2023 election. The responder claimed he has known El-Rufai and they've been close associate for some reasonable period now. But hearing such things coming from El-Rufai, is unbelievable, disappointing and condemn-

able. His utterance therefore, violated the politeness principle, particularly the agreement maxim which stipulates that people should express agreement more directly in conversation and that disagreement should be expressed by regret or partial disagreement. According to Leech (1983), partial disagreement is often preferable to complete disagreement. By saying that El-Rufai's speech is "despicable", he has violated the agreement maxim. Contrary to the politeness principle that this utterance violated, the responder upholds the cooperative principle, specifically the quality maxim which stipulates that "Try to make your contribution one that is true". In other words, do not say what you believe to be false and do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. The evidence to his truth condition is El-Rufai's speech.

#### **Excerpt 10**

*"... A political figure, a leadership figure is using religion ... and he got carried away and got to the extent of saying that, look, a Muslim – Muslim leader should be imposed both in Kaduna state and also at the national level in Nigeria for the next 20 years. That thing he said is sensitive, provocative, it doesn't show enough intelligence. I think what he has done here is really disappointing ... I hope that he will come around later and say that perhaps, this is an artificial intelligence induced robotic representation of whatever it was that he said".*

This excerpt is gotten also from a television channel "Arise News" programme tagged "The Morning Show" where another responder who was interviewed on the same issue of Muslim – Muslim ticket bragged about by El-Rufai. The responder was also expressing his disappointment over what El-Rufai's speech depicts. This can therefore be said that, his utterance violated the politeness principle; which was also sparked up by the impolite speech of the *speaker*, particularly the agreement maxim which states that



agreement should be expressed more directly in conversation and that disagreement should be expressed by regret or partial agreement. More so, by saying that "... it doesn't show enough intelligence" connotes that the hearer does not have enough intelligence and therefore violated the politeness principle, particularly the approbation maxim which specifies that in a conversation; the speaker should "avoid saying unpleasant things about others and more particularly about hearer".

**Excerpt 11**

*"well, if you know El-Rufai very well, the former governor of Kaduna state, then you'll have to guess one million meanings to whatever he said ... he is playing the card, preparing himself so that the Muslims will say, 'this is our religious champion, this is the man who will defend our religion'... he is not consistent, he is so slippery that sometimes you hardly can tell. This man is trying to stir up a serious problem for the new administration, and that's why the new administration must watch out. I am not going to suggest to them what to do but they must watch out. But you see, it's easy for such statement to stir up sentiment among Muslims and also stir up anger among Christians who do not understand. El-Rufai is known for this crafty and this terrible way of dealing with people".*

The above excerpt is from another responder who was also a Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) representative in Kaduna State. He expressed his disappointment over what El-Rufai said in his speech that the Muslim – Muslim ticket must be sustained beyond 20 years. By saying that El-Rufai is inconsistent, slippery, crafty and responsible for stirring up conflict in Kaduna state violated the politeness principle particularly the tact maxim; which states that the speaker must display the ability to be tactful or wise in his or her utterance. That is, the ability to avoid offensive utterance. Again, this utterance violated the approbation maxim which stipulates that a speaker should avoid saying

unpleasant things about others and more particularly about hearer. This responder also violated the agreement maxim which states that people should express agreement more directly in conversation and that disagreement should be expressed by regret or partial agreement. Therefore, it can be deduced here that the speaker violated the politeness principles and upholds the cooperative principle, particularly the quality maxim which stipulates that in a conversation, "Try to make your contribution one that is true". In other words, do not say what you believe to be false and do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

**Excerpt 12**

*"... People come into leadership without us as a nation having a provision that will require that we check the mental capability of the people we handover leadership to them. That's why we have terrible people in leadership positions ... and from this video; it shows that he (El-Rufai) had a hand in all the killings that happened, just because he wanted to exonerate the people, create fear in the people, and set confusion in the state. Well, whatever that has a beginning must have an end".*

Again, this excerpt contains an utterance by the CAN representative in Kaduna state, expressing his disagreement to the Muslim – Muslim ticket that is said to be sustained beyond 20 years in Kaduna state and the nation at large. By implying that El-Rufai lacks mental capability to lead, he is a terrible person, and had a hand in all the killings that happened in Kaduna state violated the politeness principle, particularly the tact maxim which states that one should exhibit the ability to be tactful or wise in his or her utterance, that is, ability to avoid offensive utterance. In other words, the speaker should be considerate in his or her use of language in order not to offend somebody or hurt one's feelings. Furthermore, the responder flouted the politeness principle, specifically the

approbation maxim which states that, in a conversation, the speaker should avoid saying unpleasant things about others and more particularly about hearer. The hearer (responder) also disagrees with the speaker's (El-Rufai's) claim of sustaining the Muslim – Muslim ticket beyond 20 years and expressed his disagreement directly. Therefore, he flouted the agreement maxim. It can be deduced therefore, that the responder flouted the politeness principle and upholds the cooperative principle.

### **Excerpt 13**

*“Confections will still continue with more hidden agenders this man helped kill Kaduna Christians, burn their churches and destroy APC Buhari led government”.*

This excerpt is extracted from a Facebook comment section when the video of El-Rufai's speech was posted there. The responder is saying that the speaker has more confession to make as he believes that the speaker has more hidden agenda. By implication, he accused El-Rufai of being responsible for killing Christians, burning churches and destroying APC in Kaduna state. This impolite allegation came as a result of El-Rufai's utterance and claim of sustaining Muslim – Muslim ticket beyond 20 years in the state and the nation at large. This utterance has therefore violated the politeness principle, particularly the Pollyanna principle which stipulates that people should prefer to look on the bright side rather than the glooming side of life. It also means that interactants should prefer pleasant topic to unpleasant ones. Again, the utterance violated the approbation maxim which stipulates that a speaker should avoid saying unpleasant things about others and more particularly about the hearer. The tact maxim is also violated by the responder.

### **Excerpt 14**

*“If you like start fighting each other again and not use senses. This man is trying to incite war through religion. Please Nigerians use your*

*wisdom. Christian, Muslim, traditionalist, WE ARE ONE”.*

This is another excerpt extracted from facebook comment section where the responder is expressing his disappointment over the speaker's speech and at the same time, implying that the speaker is the inciter of conflict in the state and that the masses should not buy into his gimmicks. The utterance therefore has violated the tact maxim which states that the speaker should display the ability to be tactful or wise in his utterance, that is, the ability to avoid offensive utterance. He also flouted the agreement maxim by expressing his disagreement directly instead of with regret or partial agreement. It can therefore be said that, this utterance violated the politeness principle and upholds the cooperative principle, particularly the quality maxim which emphasises truthfulness in a conversation.

### **Discussion of the Findings**

1. The finding reveals that El-Rufai was consistently impolite in his linguistic choice, thereby attracting impolite responses from the responders (in this case, the hearers). Therefore, when impolite utterances ensued between the speaker and the hearer or among interlocutors, the conversation is said to be unsuccessful. When a conversation is termed unsuccessful, conflict or tension becomes the order of the day, which also makes sustainable development impossible.
2. The finding reveals that the speech of El-Rufai on sustaining a Muslim – Muslim political leadership in Kaduna state and the country at large poses a threat to the identity of Christian community in Nigeria and thereby excluding them from participating in politics of the day. Nigeria is a multicultural and multiethnic country with a diverse religious group and as such everyone seeks for social inclusion but when such rights are denied, then conflicts

ensure and when conflicts are fully grown, the possibility of a sustainable development will be an illusion.

3. From the analysis done in this research paper, the finding reveals that impolite use of language can result to impolite response from the hearer, and when impolite utterances ensured, it can lead to conflict, when conflicts surge, it can result in destruction of lives and properties thereby making sustainable development impossible.
4. Social inclusion pertains to the ability to “participate in the key activities in the society in which they live” (Saunders, Naidoo, & Griffiths, 2007, p. 17). The finding also reveals that when inclusive politics is practiced in a democratic nation like Nigeria, it can ease tension and conflict that might emerge as a result of exclusion, and thereby making sustainable development in any sphere of life a reality.
5. The finding also shows that leaders, especially the political leaders and the religious leaders should be mindful of their linguistic choices. In other words, their language should be carefully and intentionally chosen in other to avoid stirring up anger and sentiment between individuals or among groups and instigating insurrection in the country. And when this is done, peace will be the order of the day in the country, thereby achieving sustainable development in all aspects of life. More so, since context is important in drawing meaning from utterances in pragmatics, it can therefore be deduced that Ei-Rufai’s utterance denotes religious segregation because he was in the midst of Islamic clerics when the impolite words were uttered.

### Conclusion and Recommendation

This research paper recommends that, in order to achieve the sustainable development goal, political figures or actors and religious leaders

in this country should embrace polite use of language in their speech deliveries at campaign rallies or in any type of conversation among them that concerns the future of this nation, which will also bring about the sense of inclusion and national unity. In pragmatics, a conversation depends not only on the speaker, who is trying to deliver a message, but also on the hearer, who draws a conclusion from the implication of the utterance, depending on the context in which it occurs. It is also concerned with how humans use language, what the speaker means and how the hearer interprets the words uttered. Politeness as an aspect of pragmatics plays a vital role in every successful conversation. In trying to be blunt or truthful in a successful conversation, the speaker should employ the principle of politeness by being tactful, modest, nice and considerate in his or her utterance; that way, there will be a balance between cooperative principle and politeness principle for a tension-free and conflict free interaction, thereby ensuring a sustainable development in the country.

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# 6

## CULTURAL DIVERSITY AS AN ELIXIR FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

**Dada Adebusola O.**

**Yiolokun Babatunde Isaac**

Department of History and Diplomatic Studies,  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State – Nigeria

Email: *bchrisdada@gmail.com, tundeyiolokun@gmail.com*



### Abstract

Culture can be viewed as the way of life of a social group and their environment including all the material and non-material products of such group which are transmitted from one generation to the other. Cultural diversity on the other hand refers to the existence of a myriad of cultural or ethnic groups within a society. Cultural diversity can be a multi-faceted concept that can make or maim any society or group depending on how well diversity can be managed and translated to foster development. In Nigeria, there are about 371 ethnic groups and over 500 languages spoken across the country which makes Nigeria one of the culturally diverse nations in the world. Cultural diversity in Nigeria has been more of a bane to sustainable development and a constant source of conflict, chaos and crises than a source of development. This paper examines the cultural diversity in Nigeria and how it can be used as an elixir to achieve sustainable development. This can be achieved through the instrumentality of tolerance, protection of minorities rights, promotion of inclusive narratives and socialization mechanisms, institutionalization of federal character, Justice and fairness in formal and informal institutions among others. The paper concluded that Nigeria should take a cue from other culturally diverse nations like the United State and Canada that had risen above cultural differences and able to translate their diversity to foster sustainable development.

**Keywords:** Identity, culture, socialization, sustainable development

### Introduction

Nigeria derived its name from the River Niger is the most populous country in Africa and also the most populous Black race. It lies between latitude 4° N and 14° N of the equator, it covers a total land mass of 356,667 sq miles (923,768 sq km) and have an estimated population of about 170 million people. Nigeria is situated in the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa. Its neighbours are Benin, Niger, Cameroun and Chad. Swamps and mangrove forest borders the southern coast; inlands are hardwood forest (Bako & Dada, 2015: 192).

The culture of Nigeria is shaped by Nigeria's multiple ethnic groups. The nation is home to more than 1150 ethnic groups, more than 521 languages, and dialects. The four main ethnic groups are the Yoruba, who are concentrated in the southwest, the Igbo, who are

concentrated in the southeast, and the Hausa and Fulani, who are concentrated in the north. The majority population in the area between Yorubaland and Igboland is Edo. The Ibibio/Annang/Efik people of coastal southern Nigeria and the Ijaw people of the Niger Delta follow this group. The remaining ethnic groups in Nigeria, which are frequently referred to as "minorities," are concentrated in the middle belt and north of the nation and include, among others, the Jukun, Tiv, Iggede, and Idoma. The Fulani are a primarily Muslim people who live a nomadic lifestyle throughout West and Central Africa. While the Igbo are predominately Christian, the Hausa are likewise Muslim. The majority of the Efik, Ibibio, and Annang people are Christian. There is a healthy mix of Christians and Muslims

among the Yoruba people. All of Nigeria's ethnic groups continue to value their indigenous religious customs, which are frequently combined with Christian doctrine (Scouts, 2024). Nigeria is a multicultural nation-state with a diverse population, and it is important to recognise the contribution that these differences in language, culture, and ethnicity have made to the country's sustainable growth. If societal growth ignores the significance that linguistic and cultural diversity have in each person's life, it cannot be sustainable and is most definitely not progressive. The primary means of communication are languages. Through tolerance and understanding, they encourage cross-cultural communication and foster a sense of unity. Cultural and linguistic diversity is strategically important to advance social integration and social justice for all Nigerians; to preserve their cultural heritage and historical memories, their sense of identity in a globalised world, and they are crucial in expediting the vision of a peaceful and secure society. Using, or not using, a language can open doors, or close them, to numerous communities in Nigeria (Nwankwo, et al, 2016: 1-8).

It is crucial to promote peaceful coexistence between individuals and groups with multiple, diverse, and dynamic cultural identities in any multicultural community, like Nigeria. The truth of our variety should be expressed in policy by first and foremost accepting our humanity. Social cohesiveness can be ensured by policies that are created to allow all citizens, regardless of differences, to participate and be included. Well-crafted measures like this can counteract the divisive strategies of divide and conquer sometimes utilised by political figures. Diversity is an asset in any democratic environment because it fosters cultural exchanges that support the development of creative capacities that are necessary to maintain national unity and progress.

Any type of group identification, including social, religious, ethnic, and other types, has

the potential to incite violent confrontations, particularly when it is used as a tool for manipulation and mobilisation. Therefore, it is not appropriate to force homogeneity on any group in the sake of nation-building. It is not desirable or even possible to let one group rule over the other. Considering Canada as a model, a country that values cultural diversity and has moved to establish a self-concept as a civic society devoid of any racialized superiority complex. This crucial knowledge contains all of its policy approaches. Divergent political, religious, and cultural groups frequently produce conflict in Nigeria, a trend that can be reversed by ongoing communication. Any form of dialogue is essential to our unity, peace, and growth, whether it be intercultural, religious, political, or social. To promote a faster integration of socioeconomic relationships between communities, we must persistently advocate for increased communication among individuals who share a common humanity and a deeper comprehension of other cultures. Additionally, dialogue will assist us in concentrating on the true nature of our adversary and their plans to keep us impoverished and helpless forever (Kolawole, 2009).

### **Conceptual Clarification**

In a bid to have a better understanding of the subject matter, it is imperative to attempt to clarify key concepts employed in the research to avoid ambiguity in their use and application throughout the body of this work, such as; Culture, Diversity and Cultural Diversity. Culture is the characteristics and knowledge of a particular group of people encompassing language, religion, cuisine, social habits, music and arts. Culture can be defined as shared interactions, behavioural patterns, and understandings that are acquired through socialisation. Therefore, it can be understood as the development of a group identity supported by social norms particular to the group. The word "culture"

derived from the Latin word “colere” which means to tend to the earth and grow, or cultivate and nurture (Zimmermann, 2017).

Diversity is the totality of positive socially transmitted behavior, patterns, beliefs, institutions and other aspects of our humanity, which generates positive thoughts and actions for the benefit of the general good of our community. Cultural diversity is a common heritage of our humanity. Culture takes diverse forms across time and space. This diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making up our Nigeria nation. As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, our diversity defines the uniqueness of our nationhood. In this sense, it is for the common heritage of our humanity and collective good that diversity should be recognized and affirmed for the positive development of the present and future generations of Nigerians (Kolawole,2009).

Culture has the capacity to change entire societies, promote inclusivity, and help people of all ages develop a feeling of identity and belonging. The range of human societies or cultures within a certain area or globally is known as cultural diversity. It is essential for fostering peace and inclusive, sustainable development for present and future generations as a vector for youth development. If future generations are to sow and tend the seeds of peace, it is imperative that the values of intercultural understanding, cultural variety, and building a sustainable environment be passed down from one

generation to the next. Culture itself is usually defined in two perspectives: a narrow viewpoint, which focuses on cultural products and expressions, such as traditional dance, theatre, sculptures or buildings, and a broader definition, which views culture as “the way we live”. Culture is an artificial construct that emerged from human attempts to modify the natural world and its surroundings for the purpose of preserving and enhancing life. Because humans are social creatures, certain lifestyle choices help to shape culture. Human connection is the means by which culture is passed down from generation to generation (e.g. through family and ethnic group) to inter-group ones (cultural interaction). In this transfer process, culture is often adapted to new circumstances or restructured, for example, to address new beliefs, opportunities, a crisis or a threat. As a construct, culture is continuously re-affirmed and/or redefined. One typical use of culture in mobilization of support is in its combination with the concept of human “identity”. Cultural identity then defines people’s cultural bonding, the group to which they belong. Within mobilization tactics, cultural identity is usually portrayed as a fixed characteristic, which must be defended against “others” who are generally viewed as competing for the same resources, power or status (Kaufman, 2006).

Therefore, cultural diversity can be viewed as the totality of several human interaction through the mirror of religion, belief systems, art, music, traditions transmitted from one generation to another within a specific region.

**Table showing the Ethnic Groups in Nigeria**

| S/N | NAME OF ETHNIC GROUPS | STATE LOCATED     |
|-----|-----------------------|-------------------|
| 1   | Abayon                | Cross River State |
| 2   | Abua (Odua)           | Rivers State      |
| 3   | Achipa (Achipawa)     | Kebbi             |
| 4   | Adara (Kadara)        | Kaduna, Niger     |
| 5   | Affade                | Yobe              |
| 6   | Afizere               | Plateau           |
| 7   | Afo (Eloyi)           | Nasarawa          |
| 8   | Agbo                  | Cross River       |

|    |  |                              |
|----|--|------------------------------|
| 9  | Akaju-Ndem (Akajuk)  | Cross River                  |
| 10 | Akweya-Yachi   | Benue                        |
| 11 | Alago (Arago)  | Nasarawa                     |
| 12 | Amo  | Plateau                      |
| 13 | Anaguta  | Plateau                      |
| 14 | Anang  | Akwa Ibom, Cross River       |
| 15 | Andoni   | Akwa Ibom, Rivers            |
| 16 | Ankwei   | Plateau                      |
| 17 | Anyima   | Cross River                  |
| 18 | Atyap (Kataf/Katab, Attakar, Kagoro, Kafanchan, Marwa/Manchok) | Kaduna                       |
| 19 | Auyoka (Sub Hausa)   | Jigawa                       |
| 20 | Awori  | Lagos, Ogun                  |
| 21 | Ayu  | Kaduna                       |
| 22 | Bura-Pabir   | Adamawa, Borno, Yobe         |
| 23 | Bachama  | Adamawa                      |
| 24 | Bachere  | Cross River                  |
| 25 | Bada   | Plateau                      |
| 26 | Bade   | Yobe                         |
| 27 | Bahumono   | Cross River                  |
| 28 | Bakulung   | Taraba                       |
| 29 | Bali   | Taraba                       |
| 30 | Bambora (Bambarawa)  | Bauchi                       |
| 31 | Bambuko  | Taraba                       |
| 32 | Bajju (Kaje, Kajji)  | Kaduna                       |
| 33 | Banda (Bandawa)  | Taraba                       |
| 34 | Banka (Bankalawa)  | Bauchi                       |
| 35 | Banka (Bankalawa)  | Adamawa                      |
| 36 | Bara (Barawa)  | Bauchi                       |
| 37 | Barke  | Bauchi                       |
| 38 | Baruba (Batonu)  | Kawar, Niger                 |
| 39 | Bashiri (Bashirawa)  | Plateau                      |
| 40 | Bassa  | Kaduna, Kogi, Niger, Plateau |
| 41 | Batta  | Adamawa                      |
| 42 | Baushi   | Niger                        |
| 43 | Baya   | Adamawa                      |
| 44 | Bekwarra   | Cross River                  |
| 45 | Bele (Buli, Belewa)  | Bauchi                       |
| 46 | Berom (Biom)   | Plateau                      |
| 47 | Betso (Bette)  | Taraba                       |
| 48 | Bette  | Cross River                  |
| 49 | Bilei  | Adamawa                      |
| 50 | Bille  | Cross River                  |
| 51 | Bina (Binawa)  | Kaduna                       |
| 52 | Bini (Edo)   | Edo                          |
| 53 | Bobua  | Taraba                       |
| 54 | Boki (Nki)   | Cross River                  |
| 55 | Bokkos   | Plateau                      |
| 56 | Boko (Bussawa, Bargawa)  | Niger                        |
| 57 | Bole (Bolewa)  | Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe          |



|     |                         |                      |
|-----|-------------------------|----------------------|
| 58  | Botlere                 | Adamawa              |
| 59  | Boma (Bomawa, Burmano)  | Bauchi               |
| 60  | Bomboro                 | Bauchi               |
| 61  | Buduma                  | Borno                |
| 62  | Buji                    | Plateau              |
| 63  | Buli                    | Bauchi               |
| 64  | Bunu                    | Kogi                 |
| 65  | Bura-Pabir              | Adamawa, Borno, Yobe |
| 66  | Burak                   | Bauchi               |
| 67  | Burma (Burmawa)         | Plateau              |
| 68  | Buru                    | Yobe                 |
| 69  | Buta (Butawa)           | Bauchi               |
| 70  | Bwall                   | Plateau              |
| 71  | Bwatiye                 | Adamawa              |
| 72  | Bwazza                  | Adamawa              |
| 73  | Challa                  | Plateau              |
| 74  | Chama (Chamawa Fitilai) | Bauchi               |
| 75  | Chamba                  | Taraba               |
| 76  | Chamo                   | Bauchi               |
| 77  | Chibok (Kibaku people)  | Borno, Yobe          |
| 78  | Chinine                 | Borno                |
| 79  | Chip                    | Plateau              |
| 80  | Chokobo                 | Plateau              |
| 81  | Chukkol                 | Taraba               |
| 82  | Daba                    | Adamawa              |
| 83  | Dadiya                  | Bauchi               |
| 84  | Daka                    | Adamawa              |
| 85  | Dakarkari               | Kebbi, Niger         |
| 86  | Danda (Dandawa)         | Kebbi                |
| 87  | Dangsa                  | Taraba               |
| 88  | Daza (Dere, Derewa)     | Bauchi               |
| 89  | Deno (Denawa)           | Bauchi               |
| 90  | Dghwede                 | Borno                |
| 91  | Diba                    | Taraba               |
| 92  | Doemak (Dumuk)          | Plateau              |
| 93  | Ouguri                  | Bauchi               |
| 94  | Duka (Dukawa)           | Kebbi                |
| 95  | Dundudun (Dunka)        | Taraba               |
| 96  | Duma (Dumawa)           | Bauchi               |
| 97  | Ebana (Ebani)           | Rivers               |
| 98  | Ebira                   | Edo, Kogi, Ondo      |
| 99  | Ebu                     | Edo, Kogi            |
| 100 | Efik                    | Cross River          |
| 101 | Egede (Igede)           | Benue, Cross River   |
| 102 | Eggon                   | Nasarawa             |
| 103 | Egun (Gu)               | Lagos, Ogun          |
| 104 | Ejagham                 | Cross River          |
| 105 | Ekajuk                  | Cross River          |
| 106 | Eket                    | Akwa Ibom            |
| 107 | Ekoi                    | Cross River          |

|     |                     |   |
|-----|---------------------|---|
| 108 | Engenni (Ngene)     | Rivers  |
| 109 | Epie                | Bayelsa   |
| 110 | Esan (Ishan)        | Edo   |
| 111 | Esit Ekid           | Akwa Ibom   |
| 112 | Etolu (Etilo)       | Benue   |
| 113 | Etsako              | Edo   |
| 114 | Etung               | Cross River   |
| 115 | Etuno               | Edo   |
| 116 | Palli               | Adamawa   |
| 117 | Fulani (Fulbe)      | Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kwara, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara |
| 118 | Fyam (Fyem)         | Plateau   |
| 119 | Fyer (fer)          | Plateau   |
| 120 | Ga'anda             | Adamawa   |
| 121 | Gade                | Niger, nasarawa   |
| 122 | Galambi             | Bauchi  |
| 123 | Gamergu-Mulgwa      | Borno   |
| 124 | Ganawuri            | Plateau   |
| 125 | Gavako              | Borno   |
| 126 | Gbedde              | Kogi  |
| 127 | Gengle              | Taraba  |
| 128 | Geji                | Bauchi  |
| 129 | Gera (Gere, Gerawa) | Bauchi  |
| 130 | Geruma (Gerumawa)   | Plateau   |
| 131 | Gingwak             | Bauchi  |
| 132 | Gira                | Adamawa   |
| 133 | Gizigz              | Adamawa   |
| 134 | Goemai              | Plateau   |
| 135 | Gokana (kana)       | Rivers  |
| 136 | Gombi               | Adamawa   |
| 137 | Gornun (Gmun)       | Taraba  |
| 138 | Gonia               | Taraba  |
| 139 | Gubi (Gubawa)       | Bauchi  |
| 140 | Gude                | Adamawa State   |
| 141 | Gudu                | Adamawa State   |
| 142 | Gure                | Kaduna  |
| 143 | Gurmana             | Niger   |
| 144 | Gururntum           | Bauchi  |
| 145 | Gusu                | Plateau   |
| 146 | Gwa (Gurawa)        | Adamawa   |
| 147 | Gwamba              | Adamawa   |
| 148 | Gwandara            | Kaduna, Niger, Abuja (Federal Capital Territory), Nasarawa  |
| 149 | Gwari (Gbagyi)      | Kaduna, Niger, Abuja (Federal Capital Territory), Nasarawa, Niger, Kogi   |
| 150 | Gwong (Kagoma)      | Kaduna  |

|     |                                 |  |
|-----|---------------------------------|--|
| 151 | Gwom                            | Taraba   |
| 152 | Gwom (Waha)                     | Borno  |
| 153 | Gyem                            | Bauchi   |
| 154 | Ham (Hyam, Jaba, Jabba)         | Kaduna   |
| 155 | Hausa                           | Bauchi, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Taraba, Gombe, Yobe, Zamfara |
| 156 | Holma                           | Adamawa  |
| 157 | Hona                            | Adamawa  |
| 158 | Ibani                           | Rivers   |
| 159 | Ibeno                           | Akwa Ibom  |
| 160 | Ibibio                          | Akwa Ibom, Cross River   |
| 161 | Ichen                           | Taraba   |
| 162 | Idoma                           | Benue, Cross River, Kogi, Nasarawa   |
| 163 | Igala                           | Kogi   |
| 164 | Igbo                            | Abia, Anambra, Delta, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Rivers                                   |
| 165 | Ijumu                           | Kogi   |
| 166 | Ika                             | Delta, Edo   |
| 167 | Ikom                            | Cross River  |
| 168 | Iriggwe                         | Plateau  |
| 169 | Iman                            | Akwa Ibom  |
| 170 | Isoko                           | Delta, Bayelsa   |
| 171 | Itsekiri (Isekiri)              | Delata   |
| 172 | Itu                             | Akwa Ibom  |
| 173 | Itu Mbio Uso                    | Akwa Ibom  |
| 174 | Iyala (Iyalla)                  | Cross River  |
| 175 | Izon (Ijaw)                     | Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers, Ondo   |
| 176 | Jahuna (Jahunawa)               | Taraba   |
| 177 | Jaku                            | Bauchi   |
| 178 | Jara (Jaar Jarawa Jarawa-Dutse) | Bauchi   |
| 179 | Jere (Jare, Jera, Jera, Jerawa) | Bauchi, Plateau  |
| 180 | Jero                            | Taraba   |
| 181 | Jibu                            | Adamawa  |
| 182 | Jidda-Abu                       | Plateau  |
| 183 | Jimbin (Jimbinawa)              | Bauchi   |
| 184 | Jipal                           | Plateau  |
| 185 | Jirai                           | Adamawa  |
| 186 | Joinkrama                       | Rivers   |
| 187 | Jonjo (Jenjo)                   | Taraba   |
| 188 | Jukun                           | Bauchi, Benue, Plateau, Taraba   |
| 189 | Kaba (Kabawa)                   | Taraba   |
| 190 | Kalabari                        | Rivers   |
| 191 | Kajuru (Kajurawa)               | Kaduna   |
| 192 | Kaka                            | Adamawa  |
| 193 | Kamaku (Karnukawa)              | Kaduna, Kebbi, Niger   |
| 194 | Kambari                         | Kebbi, Niger   |

|     |                        |  |
|-----|------------------------|--|
| 195 | Kambu                  | Adamawa                                |
| 196 | Kanwe                  | Adamawa, Borno, Republic of Cameroon   |
| 197 | Kanakuru (Dera)        | Adamawa, Borno                         |
| 198 | Kanembu                | Borno                                  |
| 199 | Kanikon                | Kaduna                                 |
| 200 | Kantana                | Plateau                                |
| 201 | Kanuri                 | Adamawa, Borno, Taraba, Yobe, Nasarawa |
| 202 | Karai-Karai (Karekare) | Bauchi, Yobe                           |
| 203 | Karimjo                | Taraba                                 |
| 204 | Kariya                 | Bauchi                                 |
| 205 | Ke                     | Rivers                                 |
| 206 | Kenern (Koenem)        | Plateau                                |
| 207 | Kenton                 | Tarab                                  |
| 208 | Kiballo (Kiwollo)      | Kaduna                                 |
| 209 | Kilba                  | Adamawa                                |
| 210 | Kirfi (Kirfawa)        | Bauchi                                 |
| 211 | Kodei                  | Taraba                                 |
| 212 | Kona                   | Taraba                                 |
| 213 | Kono                   | Kaduna                                 |
| 214 | Koro (Kwaro)           | Kaduna, Niger                          |
| 215 | Kubi (Kubawa)          | Kaduna                                 |
| 216 | Kudachano (Kudawa)     | Bauchi                                 |
| 217 | Kugama                 | Taraba                                 |
| 218 | Kugbo                  | Rivers                                 |
| 219 | Kulere (Kaler)         | Plateau                                |
| 220 | Kunini                 | Taraba                                 |
| 221 | Kurama (Akurmi)        | Kaduna, Jigawa                         |
| 222 | Kurdul                 | Adamawa                                |
| 223 | Kushi                  | Bauchi                                 |
| 224 | Kuteb                  | Taraba                                 |
| 225 | Kutin                  | Taraba                                 |
| 225 | Kwalla                 | Plateau                                |
| 227 | Kwale                  | Delta                                  |
| 228 | Kwami (Kwom)           | Bauchi                                 |
| 229 | Kwanchi                | Taraba                                 |
| 230 | Kadung                 | Bauchi, Plateau                        |
| 231 | Kwaro                  | Plateau                                |
| 232 | Kwato                  | Plateau                                |
| 233 | Kyenga (Kengawa)       | Kebbi                                  |
| 234 | Laaru (Larawa)         | Niger                                  |
| 235 | Lakka                  | Adamawa                                |
| 236 | Lala                   | Adamawa                                |
| 237 | Lama                   | Taraba                                 |
| 238 | Lamja                  | Taraba                                 |
| 239 | Lau                    | Taraba                                 |
| 240 | Limono                 | Bauchi, Plateau                        |
| 241 | Lopa (Lupa, Lopawa)    | Niger                                  |
| 242 | Longuda (Lunguda)      | Adamawa, Bauchi                        |

|     |                                |                        |
|-----|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| 243 | Mabo                           | Plateau                |
| 244 | Mada                           | Kaduna, Plateau        |
| 245 | Mama                           | Plateau                |
| 246 | Mambila                        | Adamawa                |
| 247 | Mandara (Wandala)              | Borno                  |
| 248 | Manga (Mangawa)                | Yobe                   |
| 249 | Margi (Marghi)                 | Adamawa, Borno         |
| 250 | Mafa (Mofa)                    | Adamawa, Borno         |
| 251 | Mbembe                         | Cross River, Enugu     |
| 252 | Mbol                           | Adamawa                |
| 253 | Mbube                          | Cross River            |
| 254 | Mbula                          | Adamawa                |
| 255 | Mbum                           | Taraba                 |
| 256 | Memyang (Meryan)               | Plateau                |
| 257 | Milighili (Mighili)            | Plateau                |
| 258 | Miya (Miyawa)                  | Bauchi                 |
| 259 | Mobber                         | Borno State            |
| 260 | Montol                         | Plateau                |
| 261 | Moruwa (Moro'a, Morwa)         | Kaduna                 |
| 262 | Muchaila                       | Adamawa                |
| 263 | Mummye                         | Taraba                 |
| 264 | Mundang                        | Adamawa                |
| 265 | Munga (Lelau)                  | Taraba                 |
| 266 | Munga (Mupang)                 | Plateau                |
| 267 | Mupun                          | Plateau                |
| 268 | Mushere                        | Plateau                |
| 269 | Mwahavul (Mwaghavul)           | Plateau                |
| 270 | Ndoro                          | Taraba                 |
| 271 | Ngas (Angas)                   | Plateau, Bauchi        |
| 272 | Ngizim                         | Yobe                   |
| 273 | Ngweshe (Ndhang.Ngoshe-Ndhang) | Adamawa, Borno         |
| 274 | Nyiffon                        | Benue                  |
| 275 | Ngweshe (Ndhang.Ngoshe-Ndhang) | Bauchi                 |
| 276 | Ninzam (Ninzo)                 | Kaduna, Plateau        |
| 277 | Njayi                          | Adamawa                |
| 278 | Nkim                           | Cross River            |
| 279 | Nkum                           | Cross River            |
| 280 | Nokere (Nakere)                | Plateau                |
| 281 | Nunku                          | Kaduna, Plateau        |
| 282 | Nupe                           | Kogi, Kwara, Niger     |
| 283 | Nyam                           | Taraba                 |
| 284 | Nyandang                       | Taraba                 |
| 285 | Obolo                          | akwa Ibom, Rivers      |
| 286 | Ododop                         | Cross River            |
| 287 | Ogori                          | Cross River            |
| 288 | Ododop                         | Akwa Ibom              |
| 289 | Okirika                        | Rivers                 |
| 290 | Okpamheri                      | Edo                    |
| 291 | Olukumi                        | Delta                  |
| 292 | Oron                           | Akwa Ibom, Cross River |

|     |                          |                              |
|-----|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| 293 | Ososo                    | Edo                          |
| 294 | Owan                     | Edo                          |
| 295 | Owe                      | Kogi                         |
| 296 | Oworo                    | Kogi                         |
| 297 | Pa'a (Pa'awa Afawa)      | Bauchi                       |
| 298 | Pai                      | Plateau                      |
| 299 | Panyam                   | Taraba                       |
| 300 | Pero                     | Bauchi                       |
| 301 | Pire                     | Adamawa                      |
| 302 | Pkanzom                  | Taraba                       |
| 303 | Poll                     | Taraba                       |
| 304 | Polchi Habe              | Bauchi                       |
| 305 | Pongo (Pongu)            | Niger                        |
| 306 | Potopo                   | Taraba                       |
| 307 | Pyapun (Piapung)         | Plateau                      |
| 308 | Qua                      | Cross River                  |
| 309 | Rebina (Rebinawa)        | Bauchi                       |
| 310 | Reshe                    | Kebbi, Niger                 |
| 311 | Rindire (Rendre)         | Plateau                      |
| 312 | Rishuwa                  | Kaduna                       |
| 313 | Ron                      | Plateau                      |
| 314 | Rubu                     | Niger                        |
| 315 | Rukuba                   | Plateau                      |
| 316 | Rumada                   | Kaduna                       |
| 317 | Rumaya                   | Kaduna                       |
| 318 | Sakbe                    | Taraba                       |
| 319 | Sanga                    | Bauchi                       |
| 320 | Sate                     | Taraba                       |
| 321 | Saya (Sayawa Za'ar)      | Bauchi, Kaduna, Plateau      |
| 322 | Segidi (Sigidawa)        | Bauchi                       |
| 323 | Shanga (Shangawa)        | Kebbi                        |
| 324 | Shangawa (ShanKadunagau) | Plateau                      |
| 325 | Shan-Shan                | Plateau                      |
| 326 | Shira (Shira )           | Bauchi                       |
| 327 | Shomo                    | Taraba                       |
| 328 | Shuwa (Baggara Arabs)    | Adamawa, Borno, Kaduna, Yobe |
| 329 | Sikdi                    | Plateau                      |
| 330 | Siri (Sirawa)            | Bauchi                       |
| 332 | Srubu (Surubu)           | Kaduna                       |
| 332 | Sukur                    | Adamawa                      |
| 333 | Sura                     | Plateau                      |
| 334 | Tangale                  | Gombe                        |
| 335 | Tarok (Yergam)           | Plateau, Taraba, Nasarawa    |
| 336 | Teme                     | Adamawa                      |
| 337 | Tera (Terawa)            | Bauchi, Borno                |
| 338 | Teshena (Teshenawa)      | Kano                         |
| 339 | Tigon                    | Taraba                       |
| 340 | Tikar                    | Taraba                       |

|     |                      |  |
|-----|----------------------|--|
| 341 | Tiv                  | Benue, FCT, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Tarawa     |
| 342 | Tula                 | Gombe  |
| 343 | Tur                  | Adamawa  |
| 344 | Ubbo                 | Adamawa  |
| 345 | Udekeama             | Rivers   |
| 346 | Ufia                 | Benue  |
| 347 | Ukelle               | Cross River, Ebonyi, Benue                       |
| 348 | Uncinda              | Kaduna, Kebbi, Niger                             |
| 349 | Uneme (Ineme)        | Edo  |
| 350 | Ura (Ula)            | Niger  |
| 351 | Urhobo               | Delat, Edo, Bayelsa                              |
| 352 | Utonkong             | Benue  |
| 353 | Uwanno (Weppa-Wanno) | Edo  |
| 354 | Uyanga               | Cross River                                      |
| 355 | Vemgo                | Adamawa  |
| 356 | Verre                | Adamawa  |
| 357 | Vommi                | Taraba   |
| 358 | Wagga                | Adamawa  |
| 359 | Waja                 | Bauchi   |
| 360 | Waka                 | Taraba   |
| 361 | Warja (Warja)        | Bauchi   |
| 362 | Warji                | Bauchi   |
| 364 | Wurbo                | Adamawa  |
| 364 | Wurkun               | Taraba   |
| 365 | Yache                | Cross River                                      |
| 366 | Yagba                | Kogi   |
| 367 | Yakurr (Yako)        | Cross River                                      |
| 368 | Yalla                | Benue  |
| 369 | Yandang              | Adamawa, Tarawa                                  |
| 370 | Yoruba               | Ekiti, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo |
| 371 | Yott                 | Taraba   |
| 372 | Yumu                 | Niger  |
| 373 | Yungur               | Adamawa  |
| 374 | Yuom                 | Plateau  |
| 375 | Zabara               | Niger  |
| 376 | Zaranda              | Bauchi   |
| 377 | Zarma (Zarmawa)      | Kebbi  |
| 378 | Zayam (Zeam)         | Bauchi   |
| 379 | Zul (Zulawa)         | Bauchi   |

**Source:** “Full list of all 371 tribes in Nigeria, states where they originate”. Vanguard News. 10 May 2017

### **Cultural Diversity and Sustainable Development**

Justification for cultural diversity comes first from the incontrovertible facts of linguistic and cultural diversity. However,

there are separate arguments in favour of maintaining each language and culture that currently exists within the nation-state rather than eradicating multiculturalism and multilingualism through the use of linguistic,

also known as linguistic genocide, and ideological cultural assimilation (Chumbow, 1987). The languages of a nation are its natural resources on the same level as cocoa, coffee, gold, diamond or petroleum. Like all natural resources, they have to be exploited (planned, developed) and used for national development. However, if care is not taken to plan, multilingualism like its twin, multi-ethnicity, may become a source of tension and conflict within the nation-state (Nwankwo et al, 2016).

Another medium of ensuring societal development through cultural diversity is by protecting cultural, religious, and language rights of minorities. In Nigeria, there are more than 200 ethnic groups and multiple religious denominations. It is typical to witness these diverse communities lobbying for appropriate representation. Based on this premise, it is noticed that identity ties among heterogeneous people can be poisoned or healed by cultural, ethnic, and linguistic recognition narratives. As a result, it is critical that the Nigerian government support inclusive narratives about minorities through the media and educational systems. However, in order to effectively address the concerns of both majorities and minorities, the government must also make a genuine commitment to these efforts. Thus, safeguarding minorities' language, culture, and religion enables them to renounce their allegiance to the state, which is crucial for regulating ethnic and cultural diversity in any multi-cultural society. In Nigeria, the three major ethnic groups; that is, the Igbo, Hausa/Fulani, and Yoruba have for a long time been accused of marginalization and negligence despite their economic contributions. For instance, Niger Delta is a region with over forty (40) ethnic groups determines Nigeria's earnings from the oil sector to national revenue which stood at 89.1% as of 2008. In 2014, the National Bureau of Statistics also reported that oil and gas sector contribution in the third quarter of 2015 amounted to ₦1.944 trillion. That these

positive economic improvements are made possible by huge oil and gas deposition in the region and the paradox is that marginalization and negligence by successive governments has been attributed to the recent militancy and kidnapping in the zone (Adediran et al, 2021: 39-54).

The creation of an interreligious council has become essential due to Nigeria's delicate religious climate, which has repeatedly thrown the nation into various conflicts driven by religion. More harm than good has come to the nation from religious bigotry. Therefore, it is important to vigorously seek the creation of an interreligious council in order to promote understanding among various religious groups. For instance, in order to foster better trust and communication between the two major religious groups in the state, the Plateau State, which has recently had constant religious crises, established an Inter-religious Council in 2008. As per its mandate, the council was tasked with cultivating and advocating for discourse with the objective of resolving the complaints of diverse societal segments. Considerable headway was achieved in involving community and religious leaders on the religious front. Thus, the dire need for the government and well-meaning stakeholders to establish an inter-ethnic council to provide the platform for different ethnic groups to use to foster communication and promote dialogue (Adediran et al, 2021).

The promotion of inclusive narratives and socialization mechanisms especially in a multi-cultural society such as Nigeria needs all-inclusive narratives which play a major role in poisoning or mending identity relations among different groups. Therefore, the government must use their educational systems and mass media to promote inclusive narratives. However, advocating that such effort needs to be accompanied by real commitment and effort on governments and all stakeholders to address grievances (Adediran et al, 2021).

The main purpose of the 1999 constitution is the institutionalisation of the federal



character which was to guarantee social concord across states, tribes, and geopolitical zones. Consequently, this idea has been around since the constitution of 1979, but it has been used incorrectly in several authority rulings. Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president of Nigeria, once declared that merit should not be forfeited in favour of federal character principles. Therefore, federal character principles should operate in a way that ensures competence, merit, equity, and fair play without detracting from the original intent behind their establishment. When not put to judicious use, federal character should be a tool for managing Nigeria's ethnic and cultural diversity. Anyebe (2015: 15-24) claims that true federalism is a response to Nigeria's cultural variety and that federalism is viewed as a cure-all for the ethno-religious conflicts in the country. Minorities won't feel left out of the primary political and economic conversation because of federalism

There is no iota of doubt that Institutionalization of democratic tenets and the development of democratic institutions are essential for cultural, ethnic, and all forms of diversity management. Notable strides have been made in diversity management by African nations including South Africa, Ghana, Botswana, and Benin, who have demonstrated progress in democratising their political systems. With Africa's low nation-state-building levels and fragmented institutional systems, liberal democracy is crucial for managing ethnic and cultural diversity. It is also necessary for the continent to establish democratic institutions.

Similar to this, the establishment of consensus-based mechanisms for making important decisions ensures economic diversity, and the growth of civil society forges social identities that serve to connect disparate fundamental identities. According to academics from a variety of disciplines, democracy in Nigeria is the only option for effective government, and democratic

carelessness is to blame for the nation's lack of progress (Adediran et al, 2021).

Justice and fairness in formal and informal institutions would go a long way to address the ethnic, religious, and communal groups that feel marginalized by the major ethnic groups. The primary reason for violent identity conflicts in Nigeria is that the majority of minority groups have remained the permanent majority while the majority groups have become the minority. This trend has significant ramifications for relations between the various ethnic and religious identities in the country. As a result, there are less incentives for compromise, cooperation, and consensus-building. This presents a significant obstacle for the work of peacebuilding since it forces different ethnic groups to coexist in an atmosphere of mistrust, apathy, and suspicion. However, apathy, mistrust, and suspicion will be avoided by upholding the values of justice and fairness (Adediran et al, 2021).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Nigeria is a diverse nation home to a wide range of peoples, cultures, and religions, all of which have contributed to ongoing instability, discord, and issues since the country has not been able to handle them well enough to promote growth. It should be noted that Nigeria is not the only nation with a diverse population. In fact, developed nations like the United States of America and Canada both boast populations that are multiracial and represent a variety of cultures and religions. These nations have managed to effectively manage and utilise their diverse populations to foster development while also encouraging an increased influx of immigrants focused on societal and economic advancement. According to Aristotle, all things have several parts, and that the whole is different from its parts and these parts are inter-connected. In the same view, cultural diversity is like different parts of the body, take for instance, the eyes and the nose or the mouth and the

tongue whereby one part cannot say to the other part, "I have no need of you" but all must work together for the overall wellbeing of the body. Although conflict is a natural element of human existence and interactions, it does not have the power to completely destroy relationships. We must see one other as members of the same body, regardless of our cultural differences, much as the mouth and tongue in the tale cannot survive without one another and must cooperate for the stomach's and the body's overall health. Then, among other things, tolerance, justice and fairness, and true federalism would become useful instruments to promote harmony and societal growth in Nigeria.

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**PART II:  
INSTITUTIONS, VICTIMIZATION AND INTERSECTIONALITY OF  
SOCIAL EXCLUSION**

# 7

## SOCIAL FACTORS IMPACTING ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN NIGERIAN CLASSROOMS

Ijem Blessing Ugo<sup>1</sup>

Abah James Akogwu<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of English and Literary Studies  
Federal University, Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

<sup>2</sup>Department of English and Literary Studies

University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria

Email: [akogwu.abah@unn.edu.ng](mailto:akogwu.abah@unn.edu.ng)

Email: [blessingginikanwa@ymail.com](mailto:blessingginikanwa@ymail.com)



### Abstract

This study examines that role of organization and administration of the English language in Nigerian classrooms. The study also employed the qualitative research approach which utilizes secondary data sources to address the issue raised in this paper. The scientific management theory was employed to guide and provide the lens for the analysis of the study. The study identified too much work load, poor teacher's welfare, inadequate facilities, lack of proficient teachers, poor school management, overcrowded classrooms, poverty/poor background, peer pressure, social disapproval of the English language learning, the lack of facilities, technological constraints, time, limited exposure and skills in ICT use as main challenges militating against the teaching and learning of the English language in Nigerian classrooms. The study therefore concludes that training of teachers should be done regularly. The study recommends that only qualified teachers should be employed for the teaching task; there should be provision of infrastructures that should aid the teaching and learning of the course; students should be prepared for the learning tasks; both students and the teachers should be motivated towards learning the course.

**Keywords:** Organisation, management, English Language, classrooms, learners

### Introduction

Communicating information on how to organize and administrate the teaching and learning of the English language in the Nigerian classrooms is a vital strategy in managing effective English language pedagogy in Africa at large and Nigeria in particular. It is important to note that the Nigerian education system occupies a vintage position in the growth and development of all the sectors of the country. Education is the springboard for the development of any society of the world, the English language instruction, especially at the Anglophone speaking countries is a sine qua non for human capacity development and

improvement on the general wellbeing of the society.

The Nigerian system of education according to Abah (2018) operates the 6-3-3-4 system. This implies that one is expected to spend six years in the primary school; three years in the junior secondary school; three years in the senior secondary school and four years in the university. It is important to add that there are some courses in the Nigerian universities like Law, Medicine and Surgery, Engineering, etc. that the students are expected to spend five years.

It is however, important to note that throughout the different stages of learning,

students are expected to study the English language. Proficiency in the English language is an indispensable criterion for graduation from the different levels of education in Nigeria. The relevance of the English language for both academic and career success cannot be underscored. However, it is worrisome to note that in recent times, the performances of students in the English language are not something to write home about. Despite that the English language has been made a compulsory subject at all levels of education, taught at least, three times a week unlike the other subjects, it is expected that the mastery of the subject should have received an appreciable performance, but, the rate of failure in both internal and external/public examinations in the English language has witnessed a tremendous failure, this, therefore, become a source of concern to parents and government.

This assertion finds a justification in the findings of Olanipekun (2015), who maintains that the academic performance of students in the General English had been awfully poor. In a related development, Timothy (2018) equally laments that the performance of students in the English language examinations in Nigeria has uninterruptedly continued to be less than what is desired. Tom-Lawyer (2014) corroborates Timothy (2018) by lamenting with strong concern about students' poor performances in public examinations. He added that the ugly situation has been a source of worry not only to the parents, institutions, but also to the government and the general public at large. In short, this ugly situation has ridiculed the Nigerian education system before her foreign counterparts, it is against this situation that this paper seeks to explore or assess the roles of organization and management of the English language course in the Nigerian classrooms.

### **Method**

This study employed qualitative research approach. This study makes use of the

secondary data to address the issue raised in this paper. Existing conceptual and empirical studies were employed to gather the data for this study. The scientific management theory was employed to guide and provide the lens for the analysis of the study. The theory was propounded by Fredrick Winslow Taylor in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (1890-1940), from his text *Principles of Scientific Management* (1911) (Gordon, 2024). The major pre-occupation of the Scientific Management Theory is to help in the improvement of the efficiency and productivity of work processes through systematic measurement, analysis, and control. This theory is applicable to this study because it will help to design and implement standardized curricula, tests, and methods of instruction, as well as to monitor and evaluate the performance of teachers and students in the teaching and learning of English language in the Nigerian classrooms.

### **Literature**

Educational management is the process of planning, organizing, leading, and evaluating the activities and resources of an educational institution or system. It involves applying different theories and models of management to suit the goals, needs, and contexts of education. In this article, you will learn about some of the most common educational management theories and how they can help you improve your practice as an educational leader or administrator

Gordon (2024) adds that Scientific Management Theory (SMT) which was mentioned earlier has helped many organizations to stand out in the society. In his perceptions, he states that SMT functions in the following ways:

the use of SMT in planning activities helps to replace any existing practices or rules of thumb; Separate the planning function from the actual work activity; Standardize the process, time, equipment, and costs across all processes; Workers must be selected and

appropriately trained for his/her respective role; Time, motion and fatigue figures should be employed to determine the allocation of effort between workers; Cooperate with or facilitate workers in the execution of their responsibilities; Work must have functional supervisors who have the knowledge to oversee the respective field of work; Responsibilities should be specifically allocated between workers and managers, and provide financing incentives as motivation for employee productivity increases. It is worth noting that if these aforesaid objectives as Gordon acknowledged are employed in the teaching and learning of the English language in the Nigerian classrooms, the performances of students in the course will witness an appreciable result.

Course organization and management are two inseparable concepts; they refer to the art of planning, arranging/organizing, facilitating and supervising both human and non-human activities which will bring about productive results leading to growth and development. As there are different levels of education, it is also important for the proper organization of the English language course text that will meet the needs of different learners.

Abah (2020) asserts that the organisation and management of any course of study must be dependent on the age of the learner. This implies that age is a major determinant of the English language course design. It is expected that a pupil in primary one should not study or be exposed to a junior secondary one textbook or course contents, this will not only confused the pupil, but also damage or abuse the sequence, the study objective and the outcome of the course. Many parents in Nigeria always push their children from primary five to junior secondary one in the name of "my child is very brilliant".

Hussain, Salam, & Farid (2020) maintain that lack of an environment conducive for English language learning and social disapproval of the English language learning are some of the challenges militating against

the learning and teaching of the English language in Saudi Arabian classrooms.

There are six approaches to teaching literature that may be applied by the ESL teachers in their classroom, which are the information-based, paraphrastic, stylistic, language-based, reader response and moral philosophical approach. Meanwhile, previous research shows that the challenges to implement appropriate literature teaching approaches are the examination-oriented system, large class size, time constraint, learners' attitude, poor language competence, and inappropriate texts selection.

On the contrary, Egitim (2021) identifies the pedagogical and class management strategies which are facilitated via the participants' collaborative leadership identity as one of the ways in which classroom management can be enhanced. The study further added that this new learning environment could help to nurture learning habits in students which will further provide effectiveness in their communicative language competence.

Learners perceived the free online resources as valuable tools for learning English in relation to reading, conversation, and vocabulary and also free online resources help promote free learning norms in learning the English language (Krishnan, Ching, Ramalingam, Maruthai, Kandasamy, Mello, Munian, and Ling, 2020).

#### **Result:**

The study identified too much work load, poor teacher's welfare, inadequate facilities, lack of proficient teachers, poor school management, overcrowded classrooms, poverty /poor background, peer pressure, social disapproval of the English language learning, the lack of facilities and technological constraints, time, limited exposure and skills in ICT use, and teacher readiness were the main challenges they encountered

English learners must be extensive readers; teachers must reward efforts of learners so as to motivate their struggle to acquire the

English language skills in the classrooms; government as a matter of priority should make available necessary facilities that will empower teaching and learning of English language. Government should endeavour to employ specialist teachers for the teaching of English language in the Nigerian classrooms.

### Conclusion and Recommendation

The study has been able to explore the organization and management of the English language in the Nigerian classrooms and concludes that the success or failure of the English language in the Nigerian classrooms is dependent on the activities of the students, teachers, policy makers, government and the institutions of learning.

The study therefore recommends that training of teachers should be done regularly; only qualified teachers should be employed for the teaching task; there should be provision of infrastructures that should aid the teaching and learning of the course; students should be prepared for the learning tasks; both students and the teachers should be motivated towards learning the course and many others.

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# 8

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS AND ACCESSIBILITY OF PRIMARY HEALTHCARE SERVICES ON CHILD HEALTH MANAGEMENT AMONG RURAL DWELLERS IN CENTRAL SENATORIAL ZONE OF TARABA, NIGERIA

John Wajim<sup>1</sup>

Andeskebtso Yohanna Adaki<sup>2</sup>

Shimfe Grace Harry<sup>3</sup>

Yaweh Filibus<sup>4</sup>

Samuel Ruth Agbu<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1&3</sup>Department of Sociology

Federal University, Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *wajimjohn@gmail.com, graceshimfe@gmail.com*

<sup>2</sup>Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences,

Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria

Email: *lordadaki@gmail.com*

<sup>4&5</sup>Department of History and Diplomatic Studies

Faculty of Humanities, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *yaweh@fuwukari.edu.ng, samuelr@fuwukari.edu.ng*



### Abstract

In Nigeria, despite advancements in healthcare, rural communities contend with significant obstacles in accessing essential primary healthcare services. Rural dwellers mostly encounter restricted access to primary healthcare services, leading to delays in diagnosis and treatment. This limited accessibility contributes to preventable child health issues, resulting in elevated mortality rates for children under five years old. This study investigated socio-economic factors and accessibility of primary healthcare services on child health management among rural dwellers in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State, Nigeria. Social Determinants of Health (SDH) Theory was employed for the study. The study adopted cross sectional survey design, and Taro Yamane was employed to generate the sample size of 1,111 from the population of 1,135,100. The study employed both quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (Key Informant Interview) methods of data collection. Findings of the study revealed that socio-economic factors have significant influence on the accessibility of primary healthcare services on child health management in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State with the P-value of 0.000. This indicated that rural dwellers with higher levels of education, income, better jobs and those close to primary healthcare facilities easily access primary healthcare services compared to the majority with lower levels of education, income, occupation, and those far from primary healthcare facilities. Based on the findings of the study, it was recommended among others that, government should increase the provision of primary healthcare facilities that can be accessible to all rural dwellers in order to protect children from preventable diseases and curtail the rates of child mortality in rural areas.

**Keywords:** Accessibility, Child health, primary healthcare, rural dwellers, socio-economic

### Introduction

Globally, despite advancements in healthcare, rural communities contend with significant obstacles in accessing essential primary healthcare services. The World Health



Organization (WHO) reports that nearly half of the global population lacks access to vital healthcare services, with rural areas bearing a disproportionate burden (WHO, 2019). This limited accessibility contributes to preventable child health issues, resulting in elevated mortality rates for children under five years old (UNICEF, 2019). Even in regions with well-established healthcare infrastructure like Europe and America, rural areas confront hurdles in healthcare accessibility. Residents in these locales often encounter restricted access to primary care services, leading to delays in diagnosis and treatment (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2019). In the United States, rural populations face disparities in healthcare access, influencing child health outcomes and widening health disparities (Rural Health Information Hub, 2021).

Asia, characterized by a diverse healthcare landscape, presents distinct challenges in ensuring rural healthcare accessibility. Factors such as geographical remoteness, economic considerations, and insufficient infrastructure contribute to the complexities of accessing primary healthcare services (World Bank, 2021). Children in remote Asian regions are particularly vulnerable to preventable diseases due to the inadequacies in healthcare accessibility (World Bank, 2021). In Africa, where healthcare disparities are stark, rural areas contend with substantial challenges in accessing primary healthcare. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, exhibits the highest under-five mortality rate globally, with preventable diseases constituting a significant proportion of child deaths (UNICEF, 2020). Limited healthcare infrastructure, a scarcity of healthcare professionals, and economic constraints characterize healthcare in rural African communities.

Within Nigeria, a nation marked by diverse healthcare dynamics, rural-urban disparities persist. The Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS, 2018) underscores higher child mortality rates in rural areas compared to urban centers, accentuating the impact of

accessibility challenges on child health outcomes. Turning attention to Taraba State, the challenges in healthcare are exacerbated by constraints in income level, limited educational and occupational levels, and infrastructure, including challenging terrain. State-specific data from the Taraba State Ministry of Health further emphasizes disparities in child health outcomes (Taraba State Ministry of Health, 2021).

It is following from here that this study seeks to explore socio-economic factors and accessibility of primary healthcare services on child health management among rural dwellers in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State.

#### **Socio-economic Factors and Accessibility of Primary Healthcare Services on Child Health Management among Rural Dwellers**

Child health in rural areas is knottily related with socio-economic factors, emphasizing the need to comprehend how these elements shape health outcomes for children. Globally, socio-economic factors play a fundamental role in molding child health outcomes. Recognizing the intricate interplay between socio-economic status and child health, the World Health Organization (WHO) emphasizes the necessity for targeted interventions to address disparities (World Health Organization, 2017). In Europe, socio-economic factors contribute to health disparities among rural children. Studies indicate that regions with higher socio-economic status exhibit better child health outcomes, underscoring the need to address economic inequalities for enhanced child health management (Penchansky & Thomas, 1981).

In North America, including the United States and Canada, socio-economic factors, notably income disparities, significantly impact child health management. Research reveals that children from low-income families in rural areas often encounter challenges in accessing essential healthcare services, leading to disparities in health outcomes (Currie &

Stabile, 2003). In South America, socio-economic factors such as economic challenges and disparities affect child health outcomes in rural regions. Initiatives aimed at poverty reduction and improving access to healthcare services are crucial to mitigate the impact of socio-economic factors on child health (Cunningham & Shah, 2019). Asia contends with socio-economic factors, particularly rural poverty, influencing child health. Efforts to address these challenges involve implementing comprehensive social and health policies to uplift the socio-economic status of rural communities and enhance child health outcomes (Bhatia & Cleland, 2002). In Africa, socio-economic factors, primarily poverty, are critical determinants of child health in rural areas. Economic empowerment programs, coupled with targeted healthcare interventions, are essential for improving child health management and breaking the cycle of poverty-related health disparities (Fotso et al., 2018). In Nigeria, a nation with diverse socio-economic landscapes, addressing child health in rural areas requires targeted interventions. Socio-economic factors, including poverty and limited access to healthcare, pose challenges. The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and other poverty-alleviation programs aim to improve child health outcomes by addressing these socio-economic determinants (National Health Insurance Scheme, 2021).

Poverty, a pervasive socio-economic factor, significantly shapes child health in rural settings. Insufficient financial resources contribute to inadequate nutrition, limited access to healthcare, and substandard living conditions. Research consistently indicates that children from impoverished backgrounds face increased risks of health challenges, including malnutrition, higher rates of infectious diseases, and developmental delays (Currie & Stabile, 2011). Parental education levels play a pivotal role in child health management. Low educational attainment is often linked to reduced health literacy, hindering parents' ability to make informed

decisions about their child's well-being. Studies suggest that higher maternal education is associated with improved child health outcomes, as educated parents are more likely to adopt preventive health practices and seek timely medical care (Grossman, 2006).

Limited access to healthcare services poses a significant challenge in rural areas, impacting child health management. Scarcity of healthcare facilities, lengthy distances to medical centers, and financial constraints can result in delayed or inadequate healthcare for children. Enhancing healthcare access through initiatives like community clinics, mobile health units, and telemedicine services is essential for addressing this issue (Probst et al., 2019). The nature of employment and work conditions in rural areas can influence child health outcomes. Parents engaged in agriculture or informal sectors may struggle to balance work responsibilities with childcare, exposing children to potentially hazardous environmental conditions. Policies supporting family-friendly work environments and social safety nets can positively impact child health in rural settings (Huffman, Rizov, & Uzun, 2014).

### **Theoretical Framework: Social Determinants of Health (SDH) Theory**

The Social Determinants of Health theory stresses that health outcomes are not solely influenced by individual behaviors but also by broader social, economic, and environmental conditions in which individuals reside. This theory underscores the impact of social factors such as income, education, employment, and social support on health disparities. In the phase of healthcare accessibility and child health, SDH theory emphasizes the role of socio-economic factors in shaping health outcomes. In addition, the theory of Social Determinants of Health (SDH) further added that health outcomes are shaped not only by individual behaviors and biological factors but also by broader societal, economic, and environmental conditions. This framework

underscores the influence of structural and systemic factors on health disparities

**Components of the theory**

- i. **Economic Stability:** Socioeconomic status, income, employment, and access to resources significantly impact health outcomes.
- ii. **Education:** The level of educational attainment plays a critical role in health, affecting knowledge, behaviors, and access to resources.
- iii. **Social and Community Context:** Factors such as social support, community engagement, and cohesion are critical determinants of health outcomes.
- iv. **Healthcare System:** Access to quality healthcare services, including affordability and cultural competence, is a determinant of health outcomes.
- v. **Neighborhood and Physical Environment:** Environmental aspects, such as housing conditions, access to nutritious foods, and exposure to pollutants, have an impact on health.

**Application of the theory to the Study**

Applying the SDH theory to the study involves examining how social and economic factors influence healthcare accessibility and

child health management in rural areas. For example, investigating how poverty, distance, educational and occupational levels influence the accessibility of primary healthcare services for the purpose of child health management in rural areas.

**Research Methodology**

The study adopted cross sectional survey design in so as to enable the researcher to generate relevant data in a short period of time from a sample as well as make generalization of the research result to the entire study’s population. Taro Yamane formula was employed to generate the sample size of 1,111 from the population of 1,135,100 of Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State. Both quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (Key Informant Interview) techniques of data collection were employed for the study.

**Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion of Findings**

A total number of one thousand, one hundred and eleven (1,111) copies of questionnaire were administered to respondents. However, a total of one thousand and seventy-five (1,075) copies were returned as summarized in table 4.1:

**Table 4.1: Administration and Retrieval of Questionnaire**

| Gender | Number administered | Number returned | Percentage returned |
|--------|---------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Male   | 507                 | 494             |                     |
| Female | 604                 | 581             |                     |
| Total  | 1,111               | 1,075           | 97%                 |

Source: Field Survey, 2023

Analysis of the study was based on 1,075(97%) copies of questionnaire that were returned from the field. The returned percentage was considered adequate for analysis.

**Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents**

The data on table 4.2 below, presented the relevant socio-demographic characteristics of

respondents covered in the study. This was necessary in understanding the nature of respondents and their relevance in providing useful information necessary in addressing the study’s objectives. It also had implications on the findings of the study and its generalizations. Analysis of these

characteristics indicated the suitability of the respondents and validity of findings.

Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents showed that a majority of them were within the youthful ages of 18 to 49 years. Majority of the respondents were married which indicated that the study was actually anchored on the subject of discourse. The educational level of the respondents showed that, a majority of them have primary and secondary education, while a few proportion of the people were having tertiary education and others have no formal education. It was also revealed that most of the respondents were Christians. The occupational status of respondents revealed that 47.4% of the respondents were farmers while 23.2% were unemployed.

Data on the annual estimated income of the respondents revealed that a majority of them earned less than the approved Nigerian national minimum wage of N360, 000 per annum. This revealed that a majority of the respondents had relatively low financial status which possibly contributed to their difficulty in accessing primary healthcare facilities for the management of their children’s health. The location of the respondents showed that, most of them (80.7%) were rural dwellers, which indicated that the study was actually anchored on the targeted study area. It was also revealed from the study’s findings that most of the rural dwellers (66.2%) have no access to primary healthcare facilities for child’s health management. The data is summarized in table 4.2.

**Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondents by Demographic Characteristics**

| Variable               | Categories                | Frequency(N=1,075) | Percent |
|------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|---------|
| Sex                    | Male                      | 494                | 46.9    |
|                        | Female                    | 581                | 54.0    |
| Age                    | 18-30                     | 625                | 58.1    |
|                        | 31-49                     | 398                | 37.0    |
|                        | 50 and Above              | 52                 | 4.8     |
| Marital status         | Single                    | 298                | 27.7    |
|                        | Married                   | 755                | 70.2    |
|                        | Divorce/Separated/Widowed | 22                 | 2.0     |
| Educational attainment | No formal                 | 214                | 19.9    |
|                        | Primary                   | 389                | 36.2    |
|                        | Secondary                 | 295                | 27.4    |
|                        | Tertiary                  | 171                | 15.9    |
| Occupation             | Student                   | 119                | 11.0    |
|                        | Unemployed                | 250                | 23.2    |
|                        | House wife                | 66                 | 6.1     |
|                        | Farming                   | 510                | 47.4    |
|                        | Civil servants            | 56                 | 5.2     |
|                        | Petty trading             | 74                 | 6.9     |
| Annual income          | 50,000                    | 505                | 46.9    |
|                        | 51-100,000                | 146                | 13.5    |
|                        | 101-200,000               | 165                | 15.3    |
|                        | 201-300,000               | 163                | 15.1    |
|                        | 300,000 and above         | 96                 | 8.9     |

|  |                      |     |      |
|--|----------------------|-----|------|
| Religion   | Christians           | 670 | 62.3 |
|  | Muslims              | 317 | 29.5 |
|  | Traditional religion | 50  | 4.6  |
|  | Free thinkers        | 38  | 3.5  |
| Location   | Rural                | 867 | 80.7 |
|  | Urban                | 208 | 19.3 |
| Access to Primary<br>Healthcare Facilities for<br>Child's health<br>Management | Yes                  | 250 | 23.2 |
|  | I don't Know         | 113 | 10.5 |
|  | No                   | 712 | 66.2 |

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

### **Socio-economic factors and accessibility of primary healthcare services on child's health management among rural dwellers in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State**

Findings on socio-economic factors and child's health management among rural dwellers showed acceptance of all the statements by revealing the mean value of

more than 2.50. The results indicated that income levels, educational levels, cost of primary healthcare facilities, occupational level, and the distance to primary healthcare facilities were responsible for child's health management among rural dwellers in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State. The findings were presented in table 4.2:

**Table 4.3 Ratings on socio-economic factors and the accessibility of primary healthcare services on child's health management among rural dwellers Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State**

| Statements  | Strongly Agree | Agree | Undecided | Disagree | Strongly Disagree | Mean | Std   |
|---|----------------|-------|-----------|----------|-------------------|------|-------|
| My present income/financial level does not allow me to access primary healthcare facilities.  | 502            | 70    | 126       | 345      | 32                | 3.88 | 0.987 |
| My educational level does not permit me to seek for more awareness on the accessibility of primary healthcare facilities and child health management due to language barrier.   | 284            | 330   | 180       | 186      | 95                | 3.59 | 0.743 |
| The cost of child health management at the primary healthcare facilities can't allow me to access any of the facilities.  | 665            | 386   | 10        | 11       | 3                 | 4.59 | 0.692 |
| My occupational level as a farmer does not allow my accessibility to any of the healthcare facilities because I only get money during harvest, so accessing any of the primary healthcare facilities is always difficult. | 253            | 412   | 210       | 189      | 11                | 3.61 | 0.825 |
| The distance to where primary healthcare facility is located cannot allow me to access it.  | 415            | 477   | 87        | 96       | 60                | 3.78 | 0.883 |

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

The ratings on table 4.3 showed how socio-economic status of rural dwellers affect the accessibility of primary healthcare facilities for the management of child health in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State. All the statements had the means score of above 2.50,

which indicated their acceptance, and the table had the standard deviation value which range from 0.692 to 0.987. This indicated that, the opinion of the respondents on each variable converged closely around the mean. Disagreements, therefore, were minimal.

**Table 4:4 Correlation Constructs between Income levels, Educational levels, Cost of Services, Occupational levels, and Distance/Location and the Accessibility of Primary Healthcare Services on Child Health Management among Rural Dwellers in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State**

|                            |                     | Income Levels | Educational Levels | Cost of Services | Occupational Levels | Distance/Location |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Income levels</b>       | Pearson Correlation | 1             | .632**             | .644**           | .699**              | .629**            |
|                            | Sig.(2-tailed)      | .000          | .000               | .000             | .000                | .000              |
|                            | N                   | 1,075         | 1,075              | 1,075            | 1,075               | 1,075             |
| <b>Education</b>           | Pearson Correlation | .632**        | 1                  | .510**           | .611**              | .720**            |
|                            | Sig.(2-tailed)      | .000          | .000               | .000             | .000                | .000              |
|                            | N                   | 1,075         | 1,075              | 1,075            | 1,075               | 1,075             |
| <b>Cost of services</b>    | Pearson Correlation | .644**        | .510**             | 1                | .619**              | .722**            |
|                            | Sig.(2-tailed)      | .000          | .000               | .000             | .000                | .000              |
|                            | N                   | 1,075         | 1,075              | 1,075            | 1,075               | 1,075             |
| <b>Occupational levels</b> | Pearson Correlation | .699**        | .611**             | .619**           | 1                   | .703**            |
|                            | Sig.(2-tailed)      | .000          | .000               | .000             | .000                | .000              |
|                            | N                   | 1,075         | 1,075              | 1,075            | 1,075               | 1,075             |
| <b>Distance/Location</b>   | Pearson Correlation | .629**        | .720**             | .722**           | .703**              | 1                 |
|                            | Sig.(2-tailed)      | .000          | .000               | .000             | .000                | .000              |
|                            | N                   | 1,075         | 1,075              | 1,075            | 1,075               | 1,075             |

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The Table above presents the correlation coefficients of socio-economic factors and accessibility of primary healthcare services on child's health management among rural dwellers in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State. Income levels, educational levels, cost of health services, occupational levels, and distance to primary healthcare centers. The Table also provides Pearson correlation coefficients, which measure the strength and direction of the linear relationship between the variables. The correlation coefficients range from -1 to 1, where -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation, 1 indicates a perfect positive correlation, and 0 indicates no correlation.

Findings showed that higher income levels correlate strongly with improved accessibility to primary healthcare services for child health management while lower income levels implies difficulty in accessing primary healthcare services for child's health management with Pearson correlation

coefficient of 0.699\*\*. Areas with higher educational levels demonstrate a strong positive correlation with better accessibility to primary healthcare services for children while areas with lower educational levels indicate less accessibility to primary healthcare services for child's health management with Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.720\*\*. There is a positive correlation between the cost of health services and accessibility to primary healthcare, suggesting that increased service costs reduces accessibility while decreased cost of service increases accessibility to primary healthcare facilities with Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.644\*\*. Higher occupational levels are positively correlated with better accessibility to primary healthcare services for child health management with Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.703\*\*. This implies that since most rural dwellers have less occupational levels, they find it so hard to access primary healthcare facilities. Under distance, the study indicated that proximity to

primary healthcare facilities shows a strong positive correlation with accessibility to primary healthcare services, indicating that closer locations have better accessibility than far locations with the coefficient of 0.629\*\*. This implies that rural dwellers who live far away from primary healthcare centers hardly access the facilities for child's health management within Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State. All the variables were tested at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), with the P-value of 0.000.

The results from Key Informant Interviews (KII) corroborated the findings from the quantitative data.

A 46-year-old rural dweller in Gassol LGA of Central Taraba had this to say:

Let me sincere to you, we have primary healthcare center but distance and financial challenges cannot allow most of us to access the healthcare center. Due to that some of our children are dying from preventable diseases (KII, B1, Age 46, Gassol LGA).

Another respondent from Bali LGA stated that:

The distance to primary healthcare facilities in the rural areas within our Senatorial Zone is serious affecting the health and well-being of our children (KII, B2, Age 49, Bali LGA).

A 35-year-old Key respondent opined that:

What has not been encouraging us in visiting any of the primary healthcare centres within our Zone is as a result of lack of awareness on the benefits of orthodox medicine on the treatment of child's health condition. In addition to that, we feel traditional medicine work faster than foreign medicine, including the fact that most of us are farmers and not government workers who have more money than us. (KII, B3, Age 35, Kurmi LGA).

A 41 year old Key informant stated that:

The truth of the matter is that the distance to where most of the primary healthcare facilities are located cannot allow us to

access them for the management of our children's health (KII, B4, Age 41, Gashaka LGA).

According to a 49-year-old Key respondent, she had this to say:

Visiting healthcare facilities for check-up and treatment of our children's health has been a difficult task couples with our bad roads, and financial levels. Secondly, there are no provisions of vehicles particularly for emergency purposes by governments in rural areas within our Zone which will help in the quick response of child's health condition. These actually demotivate us in accessing any primary healthcare centres but visiting nearby traditional healers for our children health conditions (KII, B5, Age 49, Sarduna LGA).

The above expression demonstrated that socio-economic factors play significant role in the accessibility of primary healthcare centers on child health management among rural dwellers in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State.

Findings of the study were in line with Curie and Stabile (2003), who stated that insufficient financial resources contribute to inadequate nutrition, limited access to healthcare, and substandard living conditions. Research consistently indicates that children from impoverished backgrounds face increased risks of health challenges, including malnutrition, higher rates of infectious diseases, and developmental delays. Grossman (2006), opined that parental educational levels play a significant role in child health management. Low educational attainment is often linked to reduced health literacy, hindering parents' ability to make informed decisions about their child's well-being. Studies suggest that higher maternal education is associated with improved child health outcomes, as educated parents are more likely to adopt preventive health practices and seek timely medical care.

Probst et al. (2019), revealed that scarcity of healthcare facilities, lengthy distances to

medical centers, and financial constraints can result in delayed or inadequate healthcare for children. Enhancing healthcare access through initiatives like community clinics, mobile health units, and telemedicine services is essential for addressing this issue. Huffman, Rizov, and Uzun (2014), asserted that the nature of employment and work conditions in rural areas can influence child health outcomes. They further stated that parents who engaged in agriculture or informal sectors may struggle to balance work responsibilities with childcare, exposing children to potentially hazardous environmental conditions.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

Findings of the study revealed that socio-economic factors have significant influence on the accessibility of primary healthcare services on child health management in Central Senatorial Zone of Taraba State. This indicated that rural dwellers with higher levels of education, income, better jobs and those close to primary healthcare facilities easily access primary healthcare services compared to the majority with lower levels of education, income, occupation, and those far from primary healthcare facilities. All the variables were tested at the significant level of 0.01 (2-tailed), with the P-value of 0.000.

Based on the findings of the study, it was recommended among that, government should increase the provision of primary healthcare facilities that can be accessible to all rural dwellers in order to protect children from preventable diseases and curtail the rates of child mortality in rural areas. In addition, government should empower rural dwellers through entrepreneurial skills, and also provide emergency vehicles to primary healthcare centers within rural areas.

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# 9

## NIGERIA POLICE AND CRIME PREVENTION IN AWKA SOUTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, ANAMBRA STATE, NIGERIA

**Celestine Ogechukwu Okafor**  
**Woyinmo Timi Amakoromo**

Department of Political Science  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria



### Abstract

The Nigeria Police Force is usually the most visible and accessible agency to the citizens, but there are other agencies in Nigeria that contribute to policing of the Nigerian State. The study examined some empirical indicators of police and policing on crime prevention in Awka South local government area of Anambra State. It argued that inadequacies and inefficient policing is implicated in the wrong perception of police in Awka South local government area of Anambra State. The study adopted structural functional approach in the discourses of structural failures that culminated in poor policing in Awka South local government area of Anambra State and generally in Nigeria. It also relied on survey and documentary methods of data collection while utilizing qualitative analytical technique in its analysis. It is also the position of the study that the police as an institution induced the prevailing unfriendly relationship between the police and the public in the areas of crime prevention in Awka South local government area of Anambra State. The study concluded that there is poor awareness of people on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South local government area of Anambra State. It therefore recommended that there is need for re-orientation and public enlightenment to further educate the populace on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South local government area of Anambra State.

**Keywords:** Nigeria police, crime, public enlightenment, crime prevention

### Introduction

The origin of the word 'police' has been derived from the Greek word 'Polis', which means that part of non ecclesiastical administration having to do with the safety, health and order of the state (Ehinder, 1998). Historical facts showed that the origin the "police force" is a recent development, but "policing" is not, because the latter was a necessary societal collective measure to protect themselves (individually or collectively) or to control the wrongdoing tendency of some members; thus has been in existence for ages (Reiner, 2000; Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005; Oluwaniyi, 2011). In Nigeria, volunteers for traditional policing formed themselves into what was referred to as 'yan banga' or 'ode adugbo' (street vigilante group), which still exists in most parts of the

country today. But the emergence of the state vis-à-vis the need to protect the state (political elites) during colonial rule necessitated the establishment of the police force (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

Thus, police force is the most powerful constitutional organ among law enforcement agencies in Nigeria. The overall operational control of the Nigeria Police Force is vested in the President in accordance with the 1999 Constitution and the Police Act (Rauch & Spuy, 2006). As stated in the Section 214 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria:

There shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part

thereof". The Police Act (2009) also states that, the Nigeria Police Force is vested with such responsibilities as: the protection of life and property; detection and prevention of crime; apprehension of offenders; preservation of law and order; the due enforcement of law regulations with which they are directly charged; and performance of such other military duties within and without Nigeria as may be required of them by or under the authority of any other Act.

The Nigeria Police Force is usually the most visible and accessible agency to the citizens, but there are other agencies in Nigeria that police the affairs of citizens and even foreigners within the country's territorial boundary. These agencies include National Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Custom Service (NCS), States Security Services (SSS), National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).

Globally, Police is faced with a daunting task. This is because the act of policing in a continually changing contemporary global system is becoming more difficult even with the use of technological implements. Although, it could be noted that the developed societies appeared to have reduced several forms of crimes to its lowest minimum with full or almost full reliance on sophisticated gazettes and consistent training of Police officers, such may not be said of their developing counterparts. For instance, the value orientation, availability of equipments, motivation and the degree of personalization, external influence on day to day policing activities of the agency differ so much when compared policing in developed and developing societies.

Thus, in Nigeria, Police is confronted with many challenges. Chief among them is that the police in Nigeria are yet to overcome its perception by the generality of the people as unfriendly and untrustworthy. Other problems

facing the police include its image as a corrupt, brutal and ineffective organization and "going dark". Going dark" is a term used to signify the decreasing ability of the police to lawfully access and examine digital evidence at rest and evidence in motion due to technical and non-technical barriers (Otu & Elechi, 2018). Undoubtedly, policing under the best of circumstances is still a big challenge. Policing a country such as Nigeria that is going through enormous political, economic, and social problems, including entrenched poverty, massive rural to urban migration, high level of unemployment and wide income disparities, it is a different matter.

Nigeria has a major crime problem. In fact, the perception both within and outside the country is that Nigeria is a dangerous place. For example, kidnapping, armed robbery, murder, terrorism, inter-communal conflicts, religious conflict, advance fee fraud, human trafficking, drug trafficking, farmers-herders conflict, banditry among others are some of the major problems that are facing the nation and indeed the police (Dambazau, 2007; Civil Society Panel on Police Reforms in Nigeria report, 2012; Alemika & Chukwuma, 2003; Odekunle, 2010; Odekunle, 2014; Onyeozili, 2005; Rotimi & Ikuteyijo, 2012). Incidentally, Anambra State appears to have been affected by these nation-wide woes. For instance, the Nigeria's crime statistics report (2016) stated that Anambra State recorded (1,817) one thousand, eight hundred and seventeen crime situations in 2016. Nwanegbo, Odigbo & Ngara (2014) argued that over one hundred (100) people were killed and about 300 kidnapped in the state between 2013/2014.

Thus, the above did not only display the level of lawlessness in Nigeria and Awka South Local Government Area specifically, it also portrays the state of decay and the frustration of a police that appears grossly under-equipped. Implicitly, the Nigerian Police in the modern age seems to be handicapped in the face of current realities. Perhaps, there have been situations in which the police complain of

shortage of staff, lack of modern gazettes for crime prevention when issues are reported to them.

Evidently, earlier studies on Nigerian police force focused more on community policing in Nigeria with emphasis on challenges and prospects impeded in it (Okeshola & Mudiare, 2013; Olusegun, 2016; Adegoyega & Odetola, 2016; Gbenemene & Adishi, 2017; Ordu & Nnam, 2017). For instance, Gbenemene & Adishi, (2017) argued that while the Nigeria Police Force is used to the traditional model of policing where authorities are centralized and police only respond to call for service, in contrast, community policing believes that powers and responsibility of policing the neighbourhood should be shared between the police and the community. For them, it is a paradigm shift from the traditional policing of receiving orders from above to that of making decisions as situations arises in the community. Therefore, slow development of community policing in Nigeria is due largely to the police history that is built on a semi-military command structure, and where the police are used to the use of force and brutality (Gbenemene & Adishi, 2017).

Other studies such as (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2003; Eze, 2014) focused on State policing and police efficiency in Nigeria. According to Eze (2014) the inability of the police to efficiently perform its constitutional duties, among others factors, is now blamed on the over-centralization of the force in Nigeria. He argued that this situation has brought about the increasing demand for the decentralization of the force, while many are stressing on the need to maintain the status-quo. However, while these extant efforts provide valuable insights into the myriads of security crisis as a result of poor policing in Nigeria, the link between public perception of police and the extent it has scaled down violence, enhanced crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area is yet to be accorded adequate systematic treatment.

### **Research Methodology**

Awka South Local Government Area (LGA) is made up of nine towns, namely, Amawbia, Awka, Ezinato, Isiagu, Mbaukwu, Nibo, Okpuno and Umuawulu. Awka is a town in Awka south local government area, It is the seat of government, And has a lot of prominent people both home and abroad while Amawbia is home to the state house i.e. Governor's lodge and the State Prisons. The study adopted the times series research design and also, in this study we relied on both survey and documentary methods of data collection. More specifically, survey method used in this study involves the use of primary sources of gathering data and administering of questionnaires to specific number of respondents as determined with our sample technique. Our questionnaire is close-ended. Thus, the documentary methods are generally drawn from the secondary sources from textbooks, journal articles, conference papers, internet materials, newspapers/magazines.

Thus, having determined the sample size to be 400, this study will administer 400 questionnaires to the respondents. In this case, since Awka South Local Government Area is made up of ten (10) political wards, we shall purposively administer 30 questionnaires to each of the wards in Awka South Local Government Area. Our target audience or focus while administrating the 30 questionnaires to the wards is on traditional rulers, religious leaders, youth leaders and other adults inhabitants in the various wards. The essence of this is to have mixture or variety of opinions or information from every segment. The remaining twenty (100) questionnaires will be administered specifically to road users in Awka. Awka has major parks; we administered 50 questionnaires to Keke Napep and 50 questionnaires to bus drivers in Awka. These groups are important as they have more interactions with the police and their perceptions on how the police treat them and

the ability of the police to policing roads for safety can add substantially to our analysis.

In these ten wards, we shall also involve random selection of members of the wards. However, the target will be community leaders, the youths and women. The utility of this design is that the questions would give us harmonized responses from both the participants on public perception of police and policing on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. This will allow for extensive analysis of the level of similarities, divergence and especially on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. We adopted both quantitative analysis and qualitative descriptive method for analyzing the data generated from both primary and secondary sources.

### **Conceptual Analysis**

Dambazau (2007) conceptualizes the police as the biggest, most visible and important sub-system of the criminal justice system. In his view, the police provide the entry point into the criminal justice system either through crime reports from the public or its own discovery. Reiner (2000) refers to the police as the body of men (and women) recruited and paid by the state to enforce law and maintain order in a state. This expression considers the police as agents created by states specifically for enforcement of law and maintenance of order and nothing more. Bierce cited in Kenneth (1999, p.14) described the police as “an armed force for protection and participation”. This expression seems not plausible hence it hides itself within the ambiance of protection and participation. Button (2002) sees the police as the body of men and women employed by the state who patrol the streets, deal with crime, and ensure order and who undertake a range of other social service-type functions. The expression of Button seems to be ambiguous in defining the police. Hence, there are many bodies that are in the services of rendering social functions which are not police because every police

institution must be established by law to perform policing functions.

For Imobighe (2003) police is seen as the main constitutional body charged with the preservation of law and order as well as the protection of the individual in the enjoyment of his legal rights within the society. By this definition, the police are agents of the law or the end users of the law to ensure compliance as well as ensuring that the fundamental rights of the citizens are preserved. Alemika (2004) defines police as a socio-political and quasi-legal institution charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order. In this sense, the police are seen as agents of the state and agents of the law. The foregoing conceptualizations of the police identified some important roles of the police, most notably law enforcement, maintenance of social order, protection, participation, prevention, detection and investigation of criminal activities, guarantor of safety and prosecution of offenders to the criminal justice system.

Policing is securing compliance with existing laws and conformity with precepts of social order. But the police are not the only agency involved in policing, in the broad sense of the term. Reiner (1994) refers to policing as those activities aimed at ensuring the security of a particular social order and that these activities are designed to achieve these aims. According to Button (2002), policing is essentially a function of society that contributes to a particular social order that is carried out by a variety of different bodies and agents. This expression by Button (2002) does not identify those functions that will guarantee social order. The definition seems to be deficit by not highlighting the conditions that will guarantee the maintenance of social order.

Thus, Alemika (2013) refers to policing as activities and measures purposively designed and introduced to guarantee public peace, order and security as well as personal safety and security. Bayley and Shearing cited in Omotola (2007) opined that any meaningful

discussion about policing should transcend its conception in amorphous terms of social control and focus on the self-conscious process whereby societies designate and authorize people to create public safety. Policing is thus an aspect of social control, encompassing systems of surveillance combined with the threat of sanctions for the breach of a particular order with the ultimate aim of maintaining the security of that particular order.

Incidentally, in many developing countries including Nigeria, policing is a big challenge. Perhaps, community policing seems practically impossible because of excessive elitist interest and indeed the frosty relationship between the police and the people they suppose to protect. For instance, Rotimi (2001) explained that the relationship between police and civil community in Nigeria has been considered by many as unfriendly such that the men and officers of the police institution are often perceived by the public as those without any sense of responsibility, integrity and commitment to duties. From the evolution and functions of Nigeria Police, the public police are often considered as stooges of the state whose loyalties wholly lie with the political elites and their cronies (see Alemika, 2003; 1993).

In a strict legal sense, crime is the breaking of rules or laws for which some governing authority (via mechanisms such as legal systems) can ultimately prescribe a conviction (Adebayo, 2013). For him, crime in the social and legal framework is the set of facts or assumptions that are part of a case in which there were committed acts punishable under criminal law, and the application of which depends on the agent of a sentence or security measure criminal. He further stated that in criminal law, crime is an act of omission which attracts sanctions such as fines, imprisonment or even death.

Dambazau (1994), rightly posited that crime is “an act or omission against public interest, and which is prescribed by law

enacted by the legislature in the overall interests of the society, and to which prescribed punishment is attached in the event of violation and it involves four major principles which are public wrong, moral wrong, law and punishment for the criminal. For him, crime is also seen as a violation of the rules agreed to be respected by all members of the society, and upon which the rest members of the society mete sanction upon those guilty of the violation. It is therefore for the same reason that the legal system views crime as a public and moral wrong.

Thus, for Mathews (1993), crimes are the outcome of social changes, which is brought about by social developments and exposure of Nigerians to the Western culture and their life style. Crime is in an important sense, a socially constructed phenomenon. Its meaning is profoundly influenced by considerations of time and space while construction is based upon the interaction of four key elements – victims, offenders, the state and the public.

Slovenia (Meško & Klemenčič, 2007) explained that crime prevention and control policies contain more than mere technologies, practices, and strategies. According to Okunola (2002), crime prevention basically involves the disruption of mechanisms, which cause crime events. In other words, the central question to crime prevention is how to disrupt the causes of crime. Therefore, crime prevention is a pattern of attitudes and behaviours directed at both reducing the threat of crime and enhancing the sense of safety and security to positively influence the quality of life and to develop environments where crime cannot flourish. Also, crime prevention can be seen as “the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it. Crime prevention and control are, however, closely related and their elements overlap (Adebayo, 2013). Crime prevention involves the community, government as well as individuals; crime control involves the whole of the criminal justice system, that is,

the police, courts and prisons. In Nigeria, crime prevention is loosely applied and sometimes lacks concrete mechanisms for performing the needed responsibility. Nigeria is among the developing countries of the world that is experiencing a prevalence of rising crime waves, criminal intentions and varying degree of delinquencies. Nigeria has been on the global crime map since 1980s. The nature of these crimes includes armed robbery, murder, rape, car theft, burglary, fraud, banditry, bribery and corruption, food and drug adulteration, gambling, smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping, drug trafficking, money laundering, internet scam, advanced fee fraud and other illegal activities.

Incidentally, the establishment of agencies like State Security Service (SSS), Independent Corrupt Practices and other offences Commission (ICPC), and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is a laudable effort towards crime prevention and control, however, their narrow focus and few personnel inhibits them from functioning in a broad day to day manner like the police. Some of them apart from the State Security Service that is consigned to the gathering of intelligence reports don't exist even at the Local Government levels. This leaves the day to day policing of the entire country more at the door-steps of the police. The capacity of the police and other security agencies in Nigeria to effectively prevent and control crime is often been called to question. As a matter of fact, many have lost faith in the security agencies going by the incessant increase in the crime rate.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study we adopted functionalist approach. The functionalist or consensus approach is a model upheld tenaciously by orthodox western social scientists. It posits that behavior in society is structured. This means that relationships between members of society are organized in terms of rules. Social relationships are therefore patterned and

recurrent (Harlambos & Holborn, 2005). Functionalists believe that there is value consensus in every social reality. They believe that there is general agreement by members of a society on what is desirable, *worthwhile*, and worthless. People share consensus on the values, norms, and beliefs of a society. A high degree of consensus in a society whether it is democratic or communist, binds members together to form an integrated and cohesive unit. Functionalists also assume that societies and phenomena are pervaded by stability. The theory assumes that a certain degree of order and stability is necessary for the survival of social system. Functionalists downplay the conflict in society between classes and believe that once norms and values are maintained, the society would be conflict free.

Thus, Emile Durkheim is the most influential of the early functionalists and is viewed as the originator of functionalism. The theory was developed by Talcott Parsons in the twentieth century. Durkheim's concept looks at society as a set of interrelated parts which together form a whole (Adebayo, 2013). It considers society as a structural system made up of interrelated parts. The social system has certain basic needs that must be met if it is to survive. These needs are known as functional prerequisites. This means that each part, will in some way, affect every other part and the system as a whole. It also follows that the survival of the system depends on the compatibility of the various parts.

Since the Nigeria Police is an integral part of the Nigeria social system, its effectiveness or ineffectiveness and overall job performance has implication on the overall security of the society. Unfortunately, the breakdown of family values, high unemployment rate, the prevalence of the twin evils of bribery and corruption, and the inability of the police to function effectively in the prevention and control of crime due to inadequate equipment and demoralized personnel, have all contributed significantly to the breakdown of law and order. As a result, crime prevention

becomes a herculean task. It is a fact that there is a reign of chaos and terror in the polity and citizens sleep with virtually one eye open. On the highways and in the homes, every minute is lived on the edge as criminals may strike anytime. Criminal activities such as murder, rape, theft etc are on the increase and these have thrown the system into greater confusion and fear.

Wide spread corruption in the Nigeria police force is fuelling abuses against ordinary citizens and severely undermining the rule of law in Nigeria on a daily basis. Countless ordinary Nigerians are accosted by armed police officers who demand bribes and commit human rights abuses against them as a means of extorting money. These abuses range from ordinary arrest and unlawful detention to threats and acts of violence, including sexual assault, torture, and even extrajudicial killings (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Police is not unique. Corruption exists in the Nigeria police force much the same as it does in any other police organisation the world over, except perhaps, in terms of its extent and the organization's reaction to it.

However, the issue of corruption in the Nigeria police as noted above cannot be treated in isolation of the larger society. Police routinely extort money from victims of crimes to initiate investigations and demand bribes from suspects to drop investigations. Corruption in the police is so endemic that it has eroded public trust and confidence they have in the police (Okeshola & Madiare, 2013). As a result, public perception of police and the entire business of policing the Nigerian state and more specifically Awka Local Government of Anambra State regressed over the years from bad condition to a worrisome state.

In Nigeria, the police force is facing many challenges ranging from negative public image, corruption, low morale, lack of equipment/facilities to rapidly changing social values which tend to encourage increase in crime rates (Aremu, 2009; Effiong, 2004). These factors show that the police in Nigeria is

working in a very harsh and hostile environment which is inimical to effective security of lives and property, (Guardian, 2009). This trend is equally worsened by the high rate of ignorance many Nigerians exhibit on basic security issues Akintunde (2009). Thus, it is argued that with the support of Policing citizens will receive some necessary security trainings and in the process ensure effective community participation in security (Sunday Nation, 2009). Policing is critical to effective security and political participation in a democracy. This is evident in USA, Britain and South Africa where promotion of policing assisted tremendously in creating consciousness and awareness among members of the police force especially in public relations. Indeed, Police-public relations in Nigeria have been very poor and it is envisaged in this study that effective policing can improve the situation.

The current bad public image of the police as rightly observed by Akintunde (2009) could be attributed to the engagement of some of the officers and men of the force in extra-judicial killing of innocent and defenseless citizens, corrupt practices and even connivance with criminals against citizens they are expected to protect. This state of affair could further be attributed to the colonial origin of the force which made it para-military in nature and repressive in character. It has over the years become an oppressive instrument used by the state to promote certain selfish interests (Imobighe, 2003).

Another issue which probably necessitated the need for policing is the manpower need of the police force. The shortage is largely in terms of number and quality. Thus, given the country's rapid population, growth and the slow rate of recruitment into the force, Nigeria, seem to be grossly under policed. This situation is further aggravated by the regular use of the police for other duties other than "combating crime, law enforcement and maintenance of public order" (Imobigbe, 2005).



### Data Presentation and Analysis

There is total number of 400 questionnaires that has being administered to the respondents of the selected Primary, Secondary, Tertiary schools and others in

Awka South Local Government Area. Only 347 of these administered questionnaires were retrieved from the field while 53 were not retrieved.

**Table 1.1: Respondent Distribution on the public perception can help to determine the performance of police on crime prevention in Awka South LGA.**

| Responses |                   | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1         | Strongly Agree    | 139       | 40.1    | 40.6          | 40.6               |
| 2         | Agree             | 166       | 47.8    | 48.5          | 89.2               |
| 3         | Strongly Disagree | 13        | 3.7     | 3.8           | 93.0               |
| 4         | Disagree          | 20        | 5.8     | 5.8           | 98.8               |
|           | Don't know        | 4         | 1.2     | 1.2           | 100.0              |
|           | Total             | 342       | 98.6    | 100.0         |                    |
|           | Unanswered        | 5         | 1.4     |               |                    |
| Total     |                   | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

#### Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.1 above captures the respondents' opinion on how public perception can help to determine the performance of police on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. 139 or 40.1 percent of the respondents Strongly agree that the Distribution on the public perception can help to determine the performance of police on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, 166 or 47.8 percent of the respondents agree, 13 or 3.7 percent of the respondents Strongly

Disagree, 20 or 5.8 percent of the respondents disagree, 4 or 1.2 percent of the respondents don't know and 5 or 1.4 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on the public perception can help to determine the performance of police on crime prevention in Awka, which is indicated by a sum number of 166 respondents who are in, agree with the statement.

**Table 1.2: Respondent Distribution on the level of awareness of people on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area?**

| Responses |            | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1         | Very Low   | 88        | 25.4    | 25.6          | 25.6               |
| 2         | Low        | 165       | 47.6    | 48.0          | 73.5               |
| 3         | Very High  | 39        | 11.2    | 11.3          | 84.9               |
| 4         | High       | 40        | 11.5    | 11.6          | 96.5               |
|           | Don't know | 12        | 3.5     | 3.5           | 100.0              |
|           | Total      | 344       | 99.1    | 100.0         |                    |
|           | Unanswered | 3         | .9      |               |                    |
| Total     |            | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

#### Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.2 above captures the respondents' opinion on the level of awareness of people on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. 88 or 25.4 percent of the respondents said that the

distribution on the level of awareness of people on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area is Very low, 165 or 47.6 percent of the respondents said it Low, 39 or 11.2 percent of

the respondents said it Very High, 40 or 11.5 percent of the respondents said it High, 12 or 3.5 percent of the respondents don't know and 3 or 0.9 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on the level of

awareness of people on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, which is indicated by a sum number of 165 respondents who are in Low with the statement.

**Table 1.3: Respondent Distribution on the reforms and retraining of the police force can assist them to improve on policing on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area**

| Responses |                   | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1         | Strongly Agree    | 177       | 51.0    | 51.5          | 51.5               |
| 2         | Agree             | 124       | 35.7    | 36.0          | 87.5               |
| 3         | Strongly Disagree | 11        | 3.2     | 3.2           | 90.7               |
| 4         | Disagree          | 17        | 4.9     | 4.9           | 95.6               |
|           | Don't know        | 15        | 4.3     | 4.4           | 100.0              |
|           | Total             | 344       | 99.1    | 100.0         |                    |
|           | Unanswered        | 3         | .9      |               |                    |
| Total     |                   | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.3 above captures the respondents' opinion on how the reforms and retraining of the police force can assist them to improve on policing on crime prevention in Awka. 177 or 51.0 percent of the respondents Strongly agree that the Distribution on the reforms and retraining of the police force can assist them to improve on policing on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, 124 or 35.7 percent of the respondents agree, 11 or 3.2 percent of the respondents Strongly

Disagree, 17 or 4.9 percent of the respondents disagree, 15 or 4.3 percent of the respondents don't know and 3 or 0.9 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on the reforms and retraining of the police force can assist them to improve on policing on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, which is indicated by a sum number of 124 respondents who are in agree with the statement.

**Table 1.4: Respondent Distribution on the nature of relationship between the police and public in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area**

| Responses |                      | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1         | Unfriendly relations | 149       | 42.9    | 43.3          | 43.3               |
| 2         | Cordial relations    | 98        | 28.2    | 28.5          | 71.8               |
| 3         | Unfortunate          | 62        | 17.9    | 18.0          | 89.8               |
| 4         | Enhanced             | 15        | 4.3     | 4.4           | 94.2               |
|           | Don't know           | 20        | 5.8     | 5.8           | 100.0              |
|           | Total                | 344       | 99.1    | 100.0         |                    |
|           | Unanswered           | 3         | .9      |               |                    |
| Total     |                      | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.4 above captures the respondents' opinion on the nature of relationship between the police and public in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. 149 or 42.9 percent of the respondents Unfriendly

relation that the Distribution on the nature of relationship between the police and public in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, 98 or 28.2 percent of the respondents Cordial relation, 62 or 17.9

percent of the respondents Unfortunate, 15 or 4.3 percent of the respondents Enhanced, 20 or 5.8 percent of the respondents don't know and 3 or 0.9 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on the

nature of relationship between the police and public in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, which is indicated by a sum number of 149 respondents who are in Unfriendly relations with the statement.

**Table 1.5: Respondent Distribution on the with the current security challenges in the North East, do you think that government has the capacity to equip the police for effective policing in Awka South Local Government Area?**

| Responses |                   | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1         | Strongly Agree    | 137       | 39.5    | 40.2          | 40.2               |
| 2         | Agree             | 118       | 34.0    | 34.6          | 74.8               |
| 3         | Strongly Disagree | 23        | 6.6     | 6.7           | 81.5               |
| 4         | Disagree          | 38        | 11.0    | 11.1          | 92.7               |
|           | Don't know        | 25        | 7.2     | 7.3           | 100.0              |
|           | Total             | 341       | 98.3    | 100.0         |                    |
|           | Unanswered        | 6         | 1.7     |               |                    |
| Total     |                   | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.5 above captures the respondents' opinion on how the current security challenges in the North East, do you think that government has the capacity to equip the police for effective policing in Awka South Local Government Area. 137 or 39.5 percent of the respondents Strongly agree that the Distribution on how the current security challenges in the North East, do you think that government has the capacity to equip the police for effective policing in Awka South Local Government Area, 188 or 34.0 percent of the respondents agree, 23 or 6.6 percent of

the respondents Strongly Disagree, 38 or 11.0 percent of the respondents disagree, 25 or 7.2 percent of the respondents don't know and 6 or 1.7 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that how the current security challenges in the North East, do you think that government has the capacity to equip the police for effective policing in Awka South Local Government Area, which is indicated by a sum number of 118 respondents who are in agree with the statement.

**Table 1.6: Respondent Distribution on what are the likely problems associated with the police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area?**

| Responses |                 | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1         | Corruption      | 144       | 41.5    | 42.5          | 42.5               |
| 2         | Negligence      | 106       | 30.5    | 31.3          | 73.7               |
| 3         | Insubordination | 23        | 6.6     | 6.8           | 80.5               |
| 4         | Conspiracy      | 60        | 17.3    | 17.7          | 98.2               |
|           | Don't know      | 6         | 1.7     | 1.8           | 100.0              |
|           | Total           | 339       | 97.7    | 100.0         |                    |
|           | Unanswered      | 8         | 2.3     |               |                    |
| Total     |                 | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.6 above captures the respondents' opinion on what are the likely problems

associated with the police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. 144 or

41.5 percent of the respondents said that the likely problems associated with the police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area is corruption, 106 or 30.5 percent of the respondents said is negligence, 23 or 6.6 percent of the said is insubordination, 60 or 17.3 percent of the respondents said is conspiracy, 6 or 1.7 percent of the respondents don't know and 8

or 2.3 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on what the likely problems are associated with the police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, which is indicated by a sum number of 106 respondents who are in agree on corruption with the statement.

**Table 1.7: Respondent Distribution on how effective are the police on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area?**

| Responses  |                  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------|------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1          | Very Effective   | 36        | 10.4    | 10.5          | 10.5               |
| 2          | Effective        | 154       | 44.4    | 45.0          | 55.6               |
| 3          | Ineffective      | 105       | 30.3    | 30.7          | 86.3               |
| 4          | Very Ineffective | 32        | 9.2     | 9.4           | 95.6               |
|            | Don't know       | 15        | 4.3     | 4.4           | 100.0              |
| Total      |                  | 342       | 98.6    | 100.0         |                    |
| Unanswered |                  | 5         | 1.4     |               |                    |
| Total      |                  | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.7 above captures the respondents' opinion on how effective are the police on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. 36 or 10.4 percent of the respondents Very Effective that the Distribution on how effective are the police on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, 154 or 44.4 percent of the respondents Effective, 105 or 30.3 percent of the respondents Ineffective, 32 or 9.2 percent

of the respondents Very Ineffective, 15 or 4.3 percent of the respondents don't know and 5 or 1.4 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on how effective are the police on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, which is indicated by a sum number of 154 respondents who are in Effective with the statement.

**Table 1.8: Respondent Distribution on level of satisfaction of the general public on the role police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area?**

| Responses  |                      | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1          | Strongly satisfied   | 50        | 14.4    | 14.6          | 14.6               |
| 2          | Satisfactory         | 119       | 34.3    | 34.8          | 49.4               |
| 3          | Strongly unsatisfied | 51        | 14.7    | 14.9          | 64.3               |
| 4          | Not Satisfactory     | 100       | 28.8    | 29.2          | 93.6               |
|            | Don't Know           | 22        | 6.3     | 6.4           | 100.0              |
| Total      |                      | 342       | 98.6    | 100.0         |                    |
| Unanswered |                      | 5         | 1.4     |               |                    |
| Total      |                      | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.8 above captures the respondents' opinion on level of satisfaction of the general public on the role police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. 50 or 14.4 percent of the respondents Strongly satisfied that the Distribution on level of satisfaction of the general public on the role police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, 119

or 34.3 percent of the respondents Satisfactory, 51 or 14.7 percent of the respondents Strongly unsatisfied, 100 or 28.8 percent of the respondents Not Satisfactory, 22 or 6.3 percent of the respondents don't know and 5 or 1.4 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on level of satisfaction of the general public on the role police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, which is indicated by a sum number of 199 respondents who are in Satisfactory with the statement.

**Table 1.9: Respondent Distribution on government has engaged proactive responses towards professionalizing police for efficiency in Awka South LGA?**

| Responses           | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1 Strongly Agree    | 42        | 12.1    | 12.4          | 12.4               |
| 2 Agree             | 99        | 28.5    | 29.1          | 41.5               |
| 3 Strongly Disagree | 73        | 21.0    | 21.5          | 62.9               |
| 4 Disagree          | 89        | 25.6    | 26.2          | 89.1               |
| Don't know          | 37        | 10.7    | 10.9          | 100.0              |
| Total               | 340       | 98.0    | 100.0         |                    |
| Unanswered          | 7         | 2.0     |               |                    |
| Total               | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.9 above captures the respondents' opinion on how government has engaged proactive responses towards professionalizing police for efficiency in Awka South Local Government Area. 42 or 12.1 percent of the respondents Strongly agree that the Distribution on government has engaged proactive responses towards professionalizing police for efficiency in Awka South Local Government Area, 99 or 28.5 percent of the respondents agree, 73 or 21.0 percent of the

respondents Strongly Disagree, 89 or 25.6 percent of the respondents disagree, 37 or 10.7 percent of the respondents don't know and 7 or 2.0 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on government has engaged proactive responses towards professionalizing police for efficiency in Awka South Local Government Area, which is indicated by a sum number of 99 respondents, agree with the statement.

**Table 1.10: Respondent Distribution on, do you think that local Initiatives of some stakeholders in Awka can enhance policing on crime in Awka?**

| Responses           | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1 Strongly Agree    | 90        | 25.9    | 26.4          | 26.4               |
| 2 Agree             | 178       | 51.3    | 52.2          | 78.6               |
| 3 Strongly Disagree | 26        | 7.5     | 7.6           | 86.2               |
| 4 Disagree          | 30        | 8.6     | 8.8           | 95.0               |
| Don't know          | 17        | 4.9     | 5.0           | 100.0              |
| Total               | 341       | 98.3    | 100.0         |                    |
| Unanswered          | 6         | 1.7     |               |                    |
| Total               | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.10 above captures the respondents' opinion on how local Initiatives of some stakeholders in Awka can enhance policing on crime in Awka. 90 or 25.9 percent of the respondents Strongly agree that the

Distribution on how local Initiatives of some stakeholders in Awka can enhance policing on crime in Awka, 178 or 51.3 percent of the respondents agree, 26 or 7.5 percent of the respondents Strongly Disagree, 30 or 8.6

percent of the respondents disagree, 17 or 4.6 percent of the respondents don't know and 6 or 1.7 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on how local

Initiatives of some stakeholders in Awka can enhance policing on crime in Awka, which is indicated by a sum number of 178 respondents who are in agree with the statement

**Table 1.11: Respondent Distribution on only government driven initiative an help to improve policing on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area.**

| Responses |                   | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 1         | Strongly Agree    | 37        | 10.7    | 10.9          | 10.9               |
| 2         | Agree             | 69        | 19.9    | 20.4          | 31.4               |
| 3         | Strongly Disagree | 89        | 25.6    | 26.3          | 57.7               |
| 4         | Disagree          | 122       | 35.2    | 36.1          | 93.8               |
|           | Don't know        | 21        | 6.1     | 6.2           | 100.0              |
|           | Total             | 338       | 97.4    | 100.0         |                    |
|           | Unanswered        | 9         | 2.6     |               |                    |
|           | Total             | 347       | 100.0   |               |                    |

Research Survey, 2023

The table 1.11 above captures the respondents' opinion on how only government driven initiative can help to improve policing on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. 37 or 10.7 percent of the respondents Strongly agree that the Distribution on only government driven initiative can help to improve policing on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, 69 or 19.9 percent of the respondents agree, 89 or 25.6 percent of the respondents Strongly Disagree, 122 or 35.2 percent of the respondents disagree, 21 or 6.1 percent of the respondents don't know and 9 or 2.6 percent of the respondents indicates their neutrality. However, this result indicates to a very large extent that on only government driven initiative can help to improve policing on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area, which is indicated by a sum number of 122 respondents who are in don't agree with the statement.

#### Discussion of Findings

In line with our objectives in this research studies which aim to find out the Public Perception of Police and Policing on Crime Prevention in Awka South, Local Government Area, Anambra State.

The following are the findings that were identified:

- i. The level of awareness of people on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area was Low, which is revealed by table 1.2 were 165 of the respondents which almost form the average of the sample population depict that on the level of awareness of people on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area was low.
- ii. From table 1.4 were 149 of the respondents which almost form the average of the sample population depict that on the nature of relationship between the police and public in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area is unfriendly relations. However, the nature of relationship between the police and public in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area is unfriendly Relations.
- iii. From table 1.7 were 154 of the respondents which almost form the average of the sample population depict that police on crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area are Effective.

- iv. From table 1.8 were 119 of the respondents which almost form the average of the sample population depicting that the level of satisfaction of the general public on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area are satisfactory.
- v. From table 1.6 were 144 of the respondents which almost form average of the sample population depict that the likely problems associated with the police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area is Corruption.

That there is need for the police in Awka South Local Government Area to adopted new measures and approaches to revive their relationship with the people in the area. In this regard, practical steps should be taken to demonstrate that the police in the area have turned a new live. The police have to rebrand both in their behaviour and modus-operand. There is need to tackle head-on the growing trend of corruption among police personnel in Awka South Local Government Area. This will help to restore confidence of the people and increase cooperate relationship among the police and the public.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The study evaluated public perception of police and policing on crime prevention in Awka South local government area of Anambra State, and at this end the study found that instead of improvement on the security situation in the area, the perception of police and security condition have continuously remained poor especially since 1999 when the country return to democratic governance. This has given rise to the prevailing security failures, attacks on police formations and increasing poor police/ public intercourse. Unsurprisingly, functionalist approach demonstrated how Nigeria Police becomes an integral part of the Nigeria social system, therefore, its effectiveness or ineffectiveness and overall job performance has implication on the overall security of the society. In the light of the above findings of this study, we put forward the following recommendations for policy makers or decision makers, stakeholders and indeed government:

There is need for re-orientation and public enlightenment to further educate the populace on the role of police in crime prevention in Awka South Local Government Area. This will improve the awareness of the people in this Local Government Area and enhances the police capacity to interface and partner with the people in the discharge of their constitutional duties.

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# 10

## IMPLICATIONS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR IN WUKARI COMMUNITY, TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

**Madugu Doris Lami**

**Daniel Rosemary Onchi**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [lamidoris1@gmail.com](mailto:lamidoris1@gmail.com); [rosemaryonchidaniel@gmail.com](mailto:rosemaryonchidaniel@gmail.com)



### Abstract

One major significant social problem and its implications is the link between prescription drug abuse and drug-related crimes, including drug trafficking, distribution, and possession. This study aims to investigate the impact of prescription drug abuse on criminal behavior among youths in Wukari, Nigeria. The research objectives include determining the prevalence of prescription drug abuse among youths in Wukari, exploring the relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior, identifying the socio-demographic factors associated with prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior, and assessing the effectiveness of existing prevention and intervention strategies. The theoretical framework for this study is based on Social Learning Theory and Routine Activity Theory. Social Learning Theory suggests that individuals learn behaviors, including criminal behavior, through observation, modeling, and reinforcement, while Routine Activity Theory posits that crime occurs when three elements converge in time and space: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian. The study adopts a quantitative research approach, utilizing a sample size of 400 youths selected through a simple random sampling and purposive sampling technique. The major findings of the study reveal a high prevalence of prescription drug abuse among youths in Wukari, with a significant association between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior. In conclusion, the study emphasized the need for targeted interventions to address prescription drug abuse among youths in Wukari, including education programs, stricter regulation of prescription drugs, and improved access to mental health services. Recommendations include collaboration between healthcare providers, law enforcement agencies, and schools to address the problem effectively.

**Keynotes:** Criminal behaviour, distribution, drug abuse, prescription drug, social problem

### Introduction

"The historical background of prescription drug abuse and its implications on criminal behavior in Nigeria can be traced back to the late 20th century, with significant increases observed in recent decades (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2021). While data specifically focusing on Nigeria may be limited, trends in other countries and global reports provide insights into the issue. The United States has experienced a significant increase in prescription drug abuse over the past few decades. According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the misuse of

prescription drugs, particularly opioids, has become a major public health concern, leading to a rise in overdose deaths and other negative health outcomes (NIDA, 2021). In Canada, prescription drug abuse has also been on the rise. According to a report by the Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction (CCSA), the misuse of prescription opioids is a growing problem, with significant implications for public health and safety (CCSA, 2020). In Europe, the misuse of prescription drugs is a significant issue as well. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug

Addiction (EMCDDA) reports that the misuse of prescription opioids, benzodiazepines, and other medications is a growing concern, with implications for drug-related harm and mortality (EMCDDA, 2021). Australia has also seen an increase in prescription drug abuse. The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) reports that the misuse of prescription opioids is a major concern, with implications for both individual health and societal well-being (AIHW, 2020). Global reports, such as the World Drug Report published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), provide a comprehensive overview of drug use trends worldwide, including prescription drug abuse. These reports highlight the global nature of the issue and the need for coordinated efforts to address it (UNODC, 2021).

Historically, prescription drug abuse in Nigeria was not a prominent issue. However, with increased globalization and access to pharmaceuticals, particularly since the late 20th century, there has been a noticeable rise in prescription drug abuse (UNODC, 2021). This trend has been fueled by various factors, including the availability of prescription drugs without proper regulation, inadequate healthcare infrastructure, and limited awareness of the dangers of misuse. The implications of prescription drug abuse on criminal behavior in Nigeria are multifaceted. One of the most significant implications is the rise in drug-related crimes, such as trafficking, distribution, and possession (UNODC, 2021). This has not only contributed to an increase in criminal activity but has also strained the country's healthcare and criminal justice systems. Additionally, the association between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior can lead to negative societal impacts, including increased violence and social unrest.

In the early stages, prescription drug abuse in Nigeria was largely limited to certain segments of the population, such as healthcare professionals and individuals with legitimate medical needs. However, over time,

the problem has become more widespread, affecting a larger number of youths and contributing to an increase in drug-related crimes. The implications of prescription drug abuse on criminal behavior in Nigeria are profound. A study by Onifade, Somoye, and Bello (2018) highlighted the link between prescription drug abuse and various forms of criminal activity, including drug trafficking, distribution, and possession. This has not only led to an increase in crime rates but has also placed a strain on the country's healthcare and criminal justice systems. Prescription drug abuse among youths in Nigeria is a growing public health concern with significant social and health implications. It involves the misuse of prescription medications, including opioids, benzodiazepines, and stimulants, without a prescription or outside the prescribed dosage (Oshodi, Aina, & Onajole, 2019; Oshodi, Aina, & Onajole, 2020).

Recent studies have highlighted the prevalence and impact of this issue on Nigerian youths. And particularly in Wukari, has become a growing concern due to its association with increased drug-related crimes. Studies have indicated that the abuse of prescription drugs, such as opioids, benzodiazepines, and stimulants, has led to a rise in criminal activities, including drug trafficking, distribution, and possession. Oshodi et al. (2019) found that the prevalence of prescription drug misuse among youths in Nigeria is on the rise. Factors contributing to this trend include easy access to prescription drugs, peer pressure, and a lack of awareness about the risks associated with misuse. This trend has serious social implications, including health risks, increased criminal activity, and strain on healthcare and criminal justice systems (Oshodi et al., 2020). Additionally, socio-economic factors such as poverty and unemployment can contribute to the problem, as youths may turn to drug abuse as a coping mechanism (Oshodi et al., 2019).

The implications of prescription drug abuse on criminal behavior among youths in Nigeria

are significant. Apart from the direct health risks associated with drug abuse, such as addiction and overdose, there are also broader social implications. Drug-related crimes can lead to violence, property crimes, and other forms of criminal activity, which can have a detrimental impact on the community (Oshodi et al., 2020). Moreover, the strain on healthcare and criminal justice systems can divert resources away from other important areas, further exacerbating the problem. Despite efforts to address the issue of prescription drug abuse among youths in Wukari, there is still a lack of comprehensive understanding of the specific impact of this phenomenon on criminal behavior. Therefore, this study aims to fill this gap by investigating the link between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior among youths in Wukari. By understanding the extent of the problem, the underlying factors contributing to it, and the potential implications for public health and safety, this study hopes to inform policy and intervention strategies to address this pressing issue.

### **Prevalence of Drug Abuse in Nigeria**

Prescription drug abuse is a growing concern in Nigeria, particularly among youths. A study by Aina and Oyesoji (2019) found that the prevalence of prescription drug abuse among Nigerian youths has been on the rise, with opioids, sedatives, and stimulants being the most commonly abused drugs. Prescription drug abuse is a significant problem in Nigeria, with a higher rate of drug use compared to the global average (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). A 2018 survey by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) found that the past-year prevalence of any drug use in Nigeria was estimated at 14.4%, translating to roughly 14.3 million people aged 15-64 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). This is considerably higher than the 2016 global annual prevalence of 5.6% (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019). Among these drugs, prescription opioids, particularly

tramadol and to a lesser extent codeine and morphine, are commonly abused (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Cough syrups containing codeine or dextromethorphan are also misused for their psychoactive effects (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Interestingly, the gender gap is less pronounced for prescription opioids, tranquilizers, and cough syrups compared to other drugs like cannabis (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019). There are also regional variations within Nigeria. The southern zones (South-East, South-West, and South-South) have a higher prevalence of drug use compared to the northern regions (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). The following statistics highlight the seriousness of prescription drug abuse in Nigeria:

**Commonly Abused Drugs:** Tramadol, codeine, morphine, and cough syrups containing codeine or dextromethorphan are the most commonly abused prescription drugs (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018; UNODC, 2019).

**Regional Variations:** The prevalence of drug use is higher in the southern zones of Nigeria compared to the north (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018).

**Gender and Age:** While overall drug use is more common among men, the gender gap is less pronounced for prescription opioids, tranquilizers, and cough syrups (UNODC, 2019). The age group of 25-39 shows the highest rates of past-year use (UNODC, 2019).

**Injection Drug Use:** A concerning aspect is that a sizeable portion of high-risk drug users in Nigeria inject drugs, with pharmaceutical opioids being the most common (UNODC, 2019).

In a nutshell, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Centre for Research and Information on Substance Abuse (CRISA), the prevalence of prescription drug abuse in Nigeria increased from 11.4% in 2016 to 14.4% in 2018 (NBS & CRISA, 2018). One of the major contributors to the increase in prescription drug abuse is the easy access to these drugs without proper medical supervision. A study

by Adejumo et al. (2020) found that many pharmacies in Nigeria dispense prescription drugs without requiring a valid prescription, making it easier for individuals to abuse these drugs. Additionally, the lack of awareness about the dangers of prescription drug abuse among both healthcare providers and the general population has contributed to the problem (Adejumo et al., 2020).

Oshodi et al. (2019) investigated the prevalence and correlates of prescription drug misuse among youths in Nigeria. The study found that a substantial number of youths reported engaging in non-medical use of prescription drugs, with opioids being the most commonly misused type of medication. Factors such as easy access to prescription drugs, peer pressure, and lack of awareness about the risks associated with misuse were identified as contributing to this trend. Similarly, Oshodi et al. (2020) highlighted the hidden danger of non-medical use of prescription drugs among youths in Nigeria. The study reported a significant increase in the prevalence of prescription drug abuse in recent years, with serious implications for public health and safety. The high prevalence of prescription drug abuse in Nigeria underscores the need for urgent intervention measures. Efforts to address this issue should focus on increasing awareness about the dangers of prescription drug misuse, improving access to healthcare services for substance abuse treatment, and strengthening regulations around the prescribing and dispensing of prescription medications.

Prescription drug abuse is indeed a growing problem in Nigeria, especially among youths and young adults. It is important to note that the prevalence of prescription drug abuse in Nigeria may vary across different regions and population groups. The studies conducted in Nigeria in 2017 and 2018 shed light on the concerning prevalence of prescription drug abuse among secondary school students and medical students, respectively. The findings underscore the urgent need for targeted

interventions to address this issue among young people in Nigeria. A study by Adekeye, Adegboyega, and Ogunwale, (2018) revealed that approximately 15.1% of secondary school students in Nigeria engage in prescription drug abuse. This finding is alarming as it indicates that a significant proportion of young people in secondary schools are involved in the misuse of prescription drugs. Factors such as easy access to prescription drugs and a lack of awareness about the risks associated with misuse may contribute to this high prevalence rate. A study by James, Omoaregba, Okogbenin, and Olotu (2017) found that 18.4% of medical students in Nigeria reported engaging in prescription drug abuse. This finding is particularly concerning given that medical students are expected to have a good understanding of the potential dangers of prescription drug abuse. The high prevalence rate among medical students suggests that there may be underlying factors contributing to prescription drug abuse that are not being adequately addressed. These studies highlight the significant burden of prescription drug abuse in Nigeria and emphasize the need for targeted interventions to address this issue. Factors contributing to the high prevalence of prescription drug abuse in Nigeria include easy access to prescription drugs, lack of awareness about the dangers of misuse, and cultural acceptance of self-medication.

### **Relationship between Prescription Drug Abuse and Criminal Behavior**

Prescription drug abuse has emerged as a significant issue in Nigeria, with implications for criminal behavior among its populace, particularly youths. A study by Wilkins and Croom (2020) explored the relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior among young adults in the United States. The study found that individuals who engaged in prescription drug abuse were more likely to report involvement in criminal activities, such as theft, drug trafficking, and violent behavior. This suggests that there is a

direct relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior. Similarly, a study by Webster et al. (2019) examined the relationship between prescription opioid misuse and criminal behavior among individuals with chronic pain. The study found that those who misused prescription opioids were more likely to engage in criminal activities to obtain drugs, such as stealing or selling drugs. This highlights the potential for prescription drug abuse to lead to criminal behavior due to the illegal acquisition and distribution of prescription medications. Furthermore, a study by Compton et al. (2018) investigated the relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior among individuals with opioid use disorder. The study found that those who abused prescription opioids were more likely to engage in criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and theft, to support their drug use. This indicates a cyclical relationship where prescription drug abuse can lead to criminal behavior, which, in turn, can exacerbate drug abuse.

A study in 2019 highlighted a notable association between prescription drug abuse and criminal activities among Nigerian youths. The study revealed that individuals who abused prescription drugs were more inclined to engage in criminal behaviors such as theft, robbery, and drug trafficking (Aina & Oyesoji, 2019). The study conducted by Oshodi et al. (2018) provides significant arguments into the relationship between prescription drug abuse and violent behavior among psychiatric patients in Nigeria. The researchers aimed to investigate the prevalence of prescription drug abuse among psychiatric patients and its association with violent behavior.

The study utilized a cross-sectional design, involving psychiatric patients receiving treatment at a tertiary hospital in Nigeria. Participants were assessed using standardized tools to determine the prevalence of prescription drug abuse and the presence of violent behavior. The study found a significant

association between prescription drug abuse and violent behavior among psychiatric patients. Patients who abused prescription drugs were more likely to exhibit violent behavior compared to those who did not engage in drug abuse. This study has important implications for the management of psychiatric patients in Nigeria. It highlights the need for healthcare providers to screen for prescription drug abuse among psychiatric patients, as it may be a contributing factor to violent behavior. Additionally, it underscores the importance of addressing prescription drug abuse as part of comprehensive treatment plans for psychiatric patients. These findings emphasize the complex nexus between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior in Nigeria. Factors such as the easy availability of prescription drugs without stringent controls, insufficient awareness about the risks associated with drug misuse, and a cultural inclination towards self-medication may all contribute to this nexus (Adejumo et al., 2020).

The relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior is complex and multifaceted. Studies have shown that individuals who abuse prescription drugs are more likely to engage in criminal activities compared to those who do not abuse drugs. According to a study by McCabe, West, Veliz, McCabe, Stoddard, and Boyd, (2017), individuals who abuse prescription drugs are significantly more likely to report involvement in criminal behavior, including theft, violence, and drug-related offenses. One of the key factors contributing to the link between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior is the pharmacological effects of the drugs themselves. Many prescription drugs, such as opioids and stimulants, can alter brain chemistry and impair judgment, leading to an increased likelihood of impulsive and reckless behavior (McCabe et al., 2017). This can manifest in criminal activities such as theft, fraud, and violence.

Another contributing factor is the illegal nature of obtaining prescription drugs without a valid prescription. A study by Green, Dauria, Bratberg, Davis, Walley, and Opioid Recovery Engagement Network (2019) found that individuals who obtain prescription drugs illegally are more likely to engage in criminal behavior to support their drug habit. This can include activities such as theft, burglary, and drug trafficking. Furthermore, the social and environmental factors associated with prescription drug abuse can also contribute to criminal behavior. For example, individuals who abuse prescription drugs may be more likely to associate with peers who engage in criminal activities, leading to increased exposure to criminal behavior and potential involvement (Green et al., 2019).

The relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior is multifaceted, involving several interconnected factors. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2021), there's a well-established association between substance abuse and criminal activity, and prescription drug abuse is no exception. However, the relationship is complex and not always a case of direct causation (BJS, 2021). Prescription drug abuse is associated with various factors that can contribute to criminal behavior. One key factor is impaired judgment, which can result from the use of opioids and certain sedatives. According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA, 2023), these drugs can impair decision-making abilities and increase the likelihood of engaging in risky or impulsive behaviors. This impaired judgment can lead individuals to commit criminal acts, such as theft or violence, to obtain or use drugs. Additionally, the financial strain of maintaining a prescription drug addiction can also drive criminal behavior. The cost of feeding an addiction to prescription drugs can be high, and individuals who struggle to afford their habit may turn to theft, fraud, or other criminal activities to obtain money for drugs (NIDA, 2023).

Furthermore, prescription drug abuse often co-occurs with mental health conditions such as depression or anxiety (NIDA, 2023). These underlying issues can independently contribute to criminal behavior, making it challenging to isolate the role of drug abuse. Individuals with mental health conditions may be more susceptible to substance abuse as a way to self-medicate, which can further exacerbate their risk of engaging in criminal activities. The complex interplay between mental health issues and drug abuse underscores the need for comprehensive treatment approaches that address both issues simultaneously. In some cases, individuals struggling with prescription drug addiction may become involved in the illegal sale or distribution of drugs to support their habit. This involvement in the drug market directly increases their association with criminal activity (Bureau of Justice Statistics: BJS, 2021). The illegal sale or distribution of prescription drugs not only perpetuates drug abuse but also exposes individuals to a criminal lifestyle that can lead to further criminal behavior.

The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) has highlighted the link between prescription drug abuse and impaired cognitive function, emphasizing its potential contribution to criminal behavior. According to NIDA (2023), the abuse of prescription drugs can impair cognitive abilities, such as decision-making and impulse control, which are essential for lawful behavior. Individuals under the influence of prescription drugs may be more likely to engage in risky or impulsive behaviors, increasing their likelihood of committing crimes. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) has also recognized the complex relationship between drugs, including prescription drugs, and criminal behavior. In their report, BJS (2021) acknowledges that drug abuse can lead to criminal activity through various mechanisms. One key factor is the involvement of drug markets, where individuals may engage in illegal activities to

obtain or distribute drugs. Additionally, the financial strain of supporting a drug addiction can lead individuals to commit crimes, such as theft or fraud, to obtain money for drugs. The BJS report highlights the multifaceted nature of the relationship between drug abuse and crime, indicating that it is influenced by various social, economic, and psychological factors.

While there is a clear association between drug abuse, including prescription drug abuse, and criminal behavior, it is crucial to avoid generalizations. Not all crimes are drug-related. Many crimes are committed by individuals who are not under the influence of drugs (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2023). This highlights the importance of considering individual circumstances and underlying factors when examining the relationship between drug abuse and criminal behavior. The direction of causality between drug abuse and criminal behavior is also a complex issue. The question of which comes first – drug abuse or criminal behavior – is a subject of ongoing research. Some individuals may turn to drugs to cope with the stress of their criminal lifestyle, using substances as a way to self-medicate or alleviate psychological distress (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2023). On the other hand, others may engage in criminal behavior to support their drug addiction, such as theft or drug trafficking to obtain money for drugs. Understanding the direction of causality is essential for developing effective prevention and intervention strategies. In conclusion, while there is a significant association between drug abuse and criminal behavior, it is essential to recognize that not all crimes are drug-related. The relationship between drug abuse and criminal behavior is complex and influenced by various factors. Further research is needed to better understand the underlying mechanisms and to develop targeted interventions that address both drug abuse and criminal behavior effectively.

### **Identifying Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Prescription Drug Abuse in Nigeria**

Prescription drug abuse in Nigeria is influenced by various socio-demographic factors. Several socio-demographic factors have been found to be associated with prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior in Nigeria. A study in 2017 found that factors such as age, gender, and educational level were significantly associated with prescription drug abuse among psychiatric patients in Nigeria (Ibrahim et al., 2017). The study reported that younger age groups and lower educational levels were more likely to abuse prescription drugs. Understanding these factors is crucial for developing effective prevention and intervention strategies. Several recent studies have shed light on the socio-demographic characteristics associated with prescription drug abuse in Nigeria. A study in 2018, conducted by Oshodi et al., focused on exploring the socio-demographic correlates of criminal behavior among drug users in Nigeria. The findings of this study revealed several key factors that were associated with an increased likelihood of engaging in criminal activities among drug users.

One of the significant findings of the study was the association between unemployment and criminal behavior among drug users. Unemployed individuals were more likely to engage in criminal activities, possibly due to financial strain and the need to obtain money for drugs or basic needs. The study also found that low income was a significant factor associated with criminal behavior among drug users. Individuals with low income may be more susceptible to engaging in criminal activities as a means of financial survival. Urban residence was another socio-demographic factor associated with an increased likelihood of engaging in criminal activities among drug users. Urban areas may present more opportunities for criminal behavior, and individuals living in urban areas

may face additional challenges such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of social support, which can contribute to criminal behavior.

A study by Adejumo et al. (2020) examined the availability and dispensing practices of prescription opioids in selected community pharmacies in Nigeria. The study found that socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, and education level were associated with the abuse of prescription opioids. Younger individuals, particularly those between the ages of 18 and 35, were more likely to abuse prescription opioids. Additionally, males were more likely than females to abuse these drugs, and individuals with lower levels of education were also at higher risk. Another study by Aina and Oyesoji (2019) focused on prescription drug abuse among adolescents in a rural setting in Nigeria. The study identified several socio-demographic factors associated with prescription drug abuse, including family structure, parental education, and peer influence. Adolescents from single-parent households or with parents with lower levels of education were more likely to abuse prescription drugs. Peer influence also played a significant role, with adolescents who had friends who abused drugs being more likely to engage in drug abuse themselves.

The studies by Adekeye et al. (2018), James et al. (2017), and Oshodi et al. (2019) also provide significant arguments on the socio-demographic factors associated with prescription drug abuse among different populations in Nigeria. These factors play a crucial role in understanding the underlying causes and risk factors for prescription drug abuse, which can inform targeted interventions and prevention strategies. Adekeye et al. (2018) found that age, gender, and socioeconomic status were significant factors associated with prescription drug abuse among secondary school students in Nigeria. Younger students were more likely to engage in prescription drug misuse, which

could be attributed to factors such as peer pressure and curiosity. Additionally, students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds may be more vulnerable to prescription drug abuse due to limited access to healthcare and education about the risks associated with drug misuse. Similarly, James et al. (2017) identified age, gender, and academic performance as factors associated with prescription drug abuse among medical students in Nigeria. Female students and those with lower academic performance were more likely to misuse prescription drugs, possibly due to coping mechanisms for stress or academic pressure. Oshodi et al. (2019) highlighted the role of peer influence, family history of substance abuse, and access to prescription drugs as significant predictors of prescription drug abuse among youths in Nigeria. These findings suggest that social and environmental factors play a crucial role in shaping individuals' attitudes and behaviors towards prescription drug use.

It has been widely argued that socio-demographic factors play a significant role in the prevalence and patterns of prescription drug abuse, highlighting the importance of considering these factors in prevention and intervention efforts.

**Age:** This is a significant factor in prescription drug abuse, with different age groups showing varying prevalence rates. While prescription drug abuse can occur across all age groups, research suggests a higher prevalence among adolescents and young adults (18-25 years old) and adults aged 45-64 (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration: SAMHSA, 2023). Adolescents and young adults may be more susceptible to prescription drug abuse due to factors like increased peer pressure, curiosity, and a desire for experimentation with substances. The college environment, in particular, can be a high-risk setting for prescription drug abuse, with students sometimes using stimulants like Adderall to enhance academic performance or manage stress. On the other end of the



spectrum, adults aged 45-64 may be more prone to prescription drug abuse due to issues related to managing chronic pain. As individuals age, they are more likely to experience chronic health conditions that require pain management, leading to increased exposure to prescription medications. This age group may also be more likely to receive multiple prescriptions from different healthcare providers, increasing the risk of polypharmacy and potential misuse of medications.

**Gender:** While traditionally considered a male issue, prescription drug abuse is increasingly affecting women as well. Recent studies haven't found significant gender differences in abusing certain prescription drugs like opioids, tranquilizers, and cough syrups (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2019). However, there might be variations depending on the specific drug and geographical location (Azadfard et al., 2020). Women may be more likely to abuse certain types of prescription drugs, such as sedatives or anti-anxiety medications, which are often prescribed to women at higher rates than men. Additionally, societal expectations and gender roles may play a role in shaping patterns of prescription drug abuse among men and women.

**Socioeconomic Status:** Individuals with lower socioeconomic status (SES) are more likely to experience prescription drug abuse. Factors like poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to healthcare can contribute to this vulnerability (El-Bassel et al., 2016). People with lower SES may be more likely to use prescription drugs as a way to cope with stress or emotional difficulties, as they may have fewer resources to access other forms of treatment or support. Additionally, financial strain can lead to a lack of access to healthcare, making it more difficult for individuals to obtain legitimate prescriptions for necessary medications.

**Education Level:** Lower educational attainment is associated with a higher risk of

prescription drug abuse. This may be linked to limited employment opportunities, financial strain, and a lack of awareness about the dangers of these medications (SAMHSA, 2023). Individuals with lower levels of education may be less likely to receive education about the risks of prescription drug abuse or may have less access to accurate information about these medications. Additionally, lower levels of education may be associated with lower income and greater financial strain, which can contribute to the risk of prescription drug abuse.

**Geographic Location:** Prescription drug abuse rates can vary geographically. Studies suggest higher prevalence in urban areas compared to rural settings, possibly due to easier access to prescription drugs and a faster pace of life (Becker et al., 2018). Urban areas may have higher rates of prescription drug abuse due to factors such as greater availability of healthcare providers who prescribe these medications and higher levels of stress or social isolation, which can contribute to substance abuse.

**Marital Status:** Being divorced or separated has been linked to a higher risk of prescription drug abuse, potentially due to increased stress and social isolation (Compton et al., 2016). Individuals who are divorced or separated may use prescription drugs as a way to cope with feelings of loneliness or sadness associated with the end of a relationship. Additionally, the stress of a divorce or separation may lead individuals to seek relief through prescription medications, increasing their risk of abuse.

### **Assessing Prevention and Intervention Strategies for Prescription Drug Abuse**

Prescription drug abuse remains a significant public health concern. To effectively combat this issue, a multi-pronged approach that combines prevention and intervention strategies is crucial. Prevention and intervention strategies for prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior in Nigeria are crucial to address these complex issues. A

study in 2018 highlighted the importance of community-based prevention programs in reducing prescription drug abuse among youths in Nigeria. The study found that programs focusing on education, awareness, and alternative coping strategies were effective in preventing prescription drug abuse (Oshodi et al., 2018). Another study in 2019 evaluated the effectiveness of a school-based intervention program in reducing drug abuse and criminal behavior among secondary school students in Nigeria. The study reported positive outcomes, including a reduction in drug abuse and criminal activities among students who participated in the program (Adelekan et al., 2019). These findings suggest that prevention and intervention strategies that target youths and communities can be effective in addressing prescription drug abuse and its associated criminal behavior in Nigeria. However, more research is needed to evaluate the long-term effectiveness of these programs and to identify the most effective approaches for different populations and settings.

Similarly, a study by Adekeye et al. (2019) assessed the impact of a community-based intervention on prescription drug abuse among youths in Nigeria. The intervention involved community education programs, increased access to mental health services, and stricter regulations on the sale of prescription drugs. The study found that the intervention was successful in reducing the prevalence of prescription drug abuse and improving access to treatment services for affected individuals. A study by Oshodi et al. (2020) evaluated the effectiveness of a school-based prevention program in reducing prescription drug abuse among secondary school students in Nigeria. The program included educational sessions on the risks of prescription drug abuse and strategies for responsible medication use. The study found that the program was effective in increasing students' knowledge about prescription drug abuse and reducing their intentions to misuse prescription drugs. Some strategies that have

been implemented or proposed to address prescription drug abuse, supported by recent research and evidence includes:

**Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs):** PDMPs are state-based electronic databases that track the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances. These programs help healthcare providers and pharmacists identify and prevent prescription drug abuse by providing them with access to patients' prescription histories. Research has shown that PDMPs can be effective in reducing opioid prescribing and overdose deaths (McDonald et al., 2020).

**Provider Education and Training:** Educating healthcare providers about the risks of prescription drug abuse and the importance of responsible prescribing practices is crucial. Training programs can help providers identify patients at risk of abuse and provide alternative treatments or referrals to addiction specialists. Studies have shown that provider education can lead to reductions in opioid prescribing and overdose deaths (Chou et al., 2019).

**Public Education Campaigns:** Public education campaigns can help raise awareness about the dangers of prescription drug abuse and promote safe storage and disposal practices. These campaigns can also help reduce the stigma associated with seeking treatment for substance abuse. Research has shown that public education campaigns can be effective in changing attitudes and behaviors related to prescription drug abuse (Chapman et al., 2019).

**Access to Treatment and Recovery Support Services:** Ensuring access to evidence-based treatment for substance abuse, including medication-assisted treatment (MAT) and behavioral therapies, is essential. Recovery support services, such as peer support groups and counseling, can also help individuals recover from addiction and prevent relapse. Research has shown that MAT can be effective in reducing opioid use and improving outcomes for individuals with opioid use disorder (Volkow et al., 2018).

**Regulatory and Policy Interventions:** Implementing policies to regulate the

prescribing and dispensing of prescription drugs can help prevent abuse. These policies may include limiting the duration and dosage of prescriptions, requiring prescribers to check PDMPs before prescribing controlled substances, and implementing prescription drug take-back programs. Research has shown that these policies can be effective in reducing prescription drug abuse and overdose deaths (Rudd, Seth, David, & Scholl, 2016).

### **Theoretical Framework**

The study employed Social Learning Theory and Routine Activity Theory to explain the implication of prescription drug abuse on criminal behaviour in Wukari community.

**Social Learning Theory** (SLT) emerged in the mid-20th century as a response to behaviorist theories that dominated psychology at the time. Behaviorism focused on observable behaviors and the role of reinforcement and punishment in shaping them. However, SLT argued that learning could occur through more than just direct experience. The Social Learning Theory emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, building on the work of behaviorists like B.F. Skinner and cognitive theorists like Jean Piaget. Bandura's work was influenced by his observations of children's behavior and his dissatisfaction with behaviorist explanations of learning, which often ignored the role of cognition. Albert Bandura (1925-2018) is widely considered the founding father of Social Learning Theory. His famous Bobo doll experiment demonstrated that children could learn aggressive behaviors by observing and imitating adults (Bandura, 1965). Robert Rosenthal (1925-2009) is another significant contributor. He, along with Lenore Jacobson, proposed the Pygmalion effect, which suggests that teachers' expectations can influence student performance (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). Joseph Wolpe (1915-1997) is known for his work on modeling and observational learning in therapy. He developed Systematic Desensitization, a technique that uses

relaxation paired with gradually increasing exposure to anxiety-provoking stimuli (Wolpe, 1958). SLT is based on the following core assumptions:

**Learning through Observation:** People can learn new behaviors and knowledge by watching others, without necessarily experiencing the consequences themselves.

**Importance of Models:** The behaviors and characteristics of others (models) significantly influence an individual's learning. Factors like the model's status, competence, and the perceived consequences of their actions all play a role.

**Cognitive Processes:** SLT emphasizes the role of mental processes in learning. People don't passively imitate what they see; they consider the potential consequences of a behavior before adopting it.

**Role of Reinforcement and Punishment:** While not the sole drivers of learning as in behaviorism, reinforcement and punishment can influence the likelihood of a learned behavior being repeated.

**Reciprocal Determinism:** SLT emphasizes the reciprocal interaction between person (cognitive factors), environment (social influences), and behavior.

According to Social Learning Theory, individuals learn through observing others. In the context of prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior, youths in the Wukari community may observe peers or community members who engage in such behaviors and learn to mimic them. This highlights the importance of positive role models and the need for interventions that promote healthy behaviors. Individuals are more likely to imitate behaviors that they perceive as rewarding or socially acceptable. In the case of prescription drug abuse, if youths witness others experiencing positive outcomes from abusing drugs, such as temporary relief from stress or enhanced social status, they may be more inclined to engage in similar behavior. This emphasizes the need to address misconceptions about the benefits of drug abuse through educational programs and awareness campaigns. Social Learning Theory

suggests that behaviors are reinforced through rewards and punishments. In the context of prescription drug abuse, youths who engage in such behavior may receive positive reinforcement from peers or social groups, which can further perpetuate the behavior. Conversely, interventions that provide alternative, positive reinforcement for healthy behaviors can help deter drug abuse. Social Learning Theory emphasizes the importance of social context in shaping behavior. In the Wukari community, social norms and peer pressure may influence youths' attitudes towards prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior. Interventions that target social norms and promote positive peer influences can help reduce the prevalence of drug abuse and associated criminal behavior.

**Routine Activity Theory (RAT)** emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a response to the limitations of traditional criminological theories in explaining the causes of crime. It was developed by Marcus Felson and Lawrence Cohen and was influenced by the works of environmental criminologists such as Brantingham and Brantingham. RAT was a departure from traditional criminological theories that focused on individual characteristics and instead emphasized the role of the environment in shaping criminal behavior. Marcus Felson and Lawrence Cohen are the primary proponents of Routine Activity Theory. They introduced the theory in their seminal work "Routine Activity and Rational Choice," published in 1979. Since then, RAT has been widely adopted and expanded upon by various criminologists and researchers in the field of criminology. RAT built upon earlier victimization studies that highlighted the importance of opportunity in crime (Victim: The Integrated Victimology, von Hentig, 1948). The theory is anchored on the following assumptions:

**Motivated Offenders:** RAT assumes that there are individuals who are motivated to commit crimes. These offenders may have

various motivations, such as financial gain, thrill-seeking, or revenge.

**Suitable Targets:** Criminals are drawn to targets that are easily accessible, valuable, and offer minimal resistance. The attractiveness of a target can influence the offender's decision-making. The theory posits that for a crime to occur, there must be suitable targets available. Suitable targets are objects or individuals that are attractive to offenders, such as unattended property or vulnerable individuals.

**Absence of Guardians:** The presence of capable guardians, such as security personnel, vigilant neighbors, or even potential witnesses, can deter crime by increasing the perceived risk of getting caught. RAT suggests that crimes are more likely to occur in the absence of capable guardians. Guardians can be formal (e.g., police officers, security guards) or informal (e.g., neighbors, friends) and play a crucial role in preventing crimes by deterring potential offenders.

**Rational Choice:** Offenders are rational actors who weigh risks and rewards before committing a crime. They are opportunistic and will target the most suitable victims with the weakest guardianship.

**Routine Activities:** Everyday activities like work, school, and leisure create predictable routines for both offenders and potential victims. Crimes are more likely to occur when the routines of offenders and victims intersect, creating opportunities. The theory emphasizes the role of routine activities in facilitating or preventing crime. Changes in routine activities, such as changes in work schedules or leisure patterns, can create opportunities for crime to occur.

**Spatial and Temporal Factors:** RAT considers the spatial and temporal distribution of routine activities in explaining crime patterns. It suggests that crimes are more likely to occur in areas and at times where routine activities converge, making it easier for offenders to find suitable targets and avoid capable guardians.

In the Wukari community, individuals may be motivated to engage in prescription drug

abuse and related criminal behavior due to factors such as peer pressure, economic hardship, psychological issues, seeking euphoria, coping with stress, or fitting in with peer groups.. The availability of prescription drugs and the perceived benefits of their misuse may further motivate individuals to engage in this behavior. RAT suggests that crimes occur when suitable targets are available. In the case of prescription drug abuse, youths in the Wukari community may perceive prescription drugs as suitable targets due to easy access or lack of effective controls over their distribution. Interventions aimed at limiting access to prescription drugs or increasing awareness of their dangers can help reduce the availability of suitable targets. The absence of capable guardians, such as law enforcement, healthcare providers, or community members, can create opportunities for prescription drug abuse and related criminal behavior to occur. In the Wukari community, limited access to healthcare and law enforcement resources may contribute to the absence of capable guardians, allowing these activities to go unchecked. The routine activities of individuals in the Wukari community, such as attending social gatherings, visiting healthcare facilities, or interacting with peers, may create opportunities for prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior to occur. For example, social gatherings may provide opportunities for individuals to obtain prescription drugs from others, while interactions with peers may normalize or encourage drug abuse. Changes in routine activities can create opportunities for crime. For instance, disruptions in daily routines due to factors like unemployment, school closures, or social unrest may increase the likelihood of drug abuse and associated criminal behavior. The theory focuses on rationality and opportunity, neglecting the complex psychological and social factors that might drive criminal behavior. Critics argue that RAT primarily explains property crimes

and may not fully address violent crime or white-collar crime.

### Research Methodology

The study adopts a quantitative research approach which involves the collection and analysis of numerical data to understand phenomena. It is suitable for this study as it allows for the measurement of the prevalence and factors associated with prescription drug abuse among youths in a more structured and statistical format. The study arrived at a sample size of 400 youths.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where,  $n$  = Sample size  
 (?),  $N$  = population  
 size (374,800),  $e$  = level of  
 precision (0.05),  $1$  = constant

That is,

$$n = \frac{374,800}{1 + 374,800(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{374,800}{374,800(0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{374,800}{1 + 937}$$

$$n = \frac{374,800}{938}$$

$n = 399,57$  - approximated to 400.

This sample size is chosen based on statistical determination by utilizing the Taro Yamane formula to ensure the study has sufficient power to detect any significant relationships or differences in the variables being studied. The study involved administering questionnaires to the selected youths to gather data on their demographics, prescription drug use behaviors, and other relevant factors. The study utilized the simple random sampling for the selection of wards and purposive sampling techniques for the selection of respondents. The use of simple random sampling and purposive sampling techniques in this study adds depth and specificity to the sampling

strategy, enhancing the study's ability to capture a diverse range of perspectives and experiences related to prescription drug abuse among youth.

**Simple Random Sampling:** This technique involves selecting a subset of individuals from a larger population in a way that each individual has an equal probability of being chosen. By using simple random sampling, the study ensures that the sample is representative of the larger population of youths in Nigeria, increasing the generalizability of the findings.

**Purposive Sampling:** Purposive sampling involves selecting individuals based on specific criteria that are relevant to the research question. In this study, purposive sampling may have been used to select participants who have a history of prescription drug abuse or who belong to certain demographic groups that are of interest to the researchers. This allows the study to focus on particular subgroups that are more likely to provide valuable insights into prescription drug abuse among youths in Nigeria.

### Data Presentation and Analysis

**Table 4.1 Distribution of Socio-demographic Characteristics of Respondents**

| <b>Sex</b>               | <b>Frequency</b> | <b>Percentages</b> |
|--------------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Male                     | 219              | 54.75              |
| Female                   | 181              | 45.25              |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>400</b>       | <b>100</b>         |
| <b>Age</b>               |                  |                    |
| 15-24                    | 126              | 31.5               |
| 25-34                    | 135              | 33.75              |
| 35-44                    | 58               | 14.5               |
| 45-54                    | 50               | 12.5               |
| 55 and above             | 31               | 7.75               |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>400</b>       | <b>100</b>         |
| <b>Marital Status</b>    |                  |                    |
| Single                   | 281              | 70.25              |
| Married                  | 92               | 23.0               |
| Divorced/Separated       | 27               | 6.75               |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>400</b>       | <b>100</b>         |
| <b>Educational level</b> |                  |                    |
| No Formal Education      | 18               | 4.5                |
| Primary                  | 53               | 13.25              |
| Secondary                | 102              | 25.5               |
| NCE/Diploma              | 72               | 18.0               |
| Tertiary                 | 155              | 38.75              |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>400</b>       | <b>100</b>         |
| <b>Employment Status</b> |                  |                    |
| Employed                 | 21               | 5.25               |
| Unemployed               | 157              | 39.25              |
| Student                  | 176              | 44.0               |
| Business                 | 46               | 11.5               |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>400</b>       | <b>100</b>         |
| <b>Area of Residence</b> |                  |                    |
| Urban                    | 309              | 77.25              |
| Rural                    | 91               | 22.75              |
| <b>Total</b>             | <b>400</b>       | <b>100</b>         |

Source: Field Survey, 2024

These figures presented on Table 4.1 displays the distribution of socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents in the study on prescription drug abuse among youths in Nigeria

**Sex:** The majority of respondents were male 219 (54.75%), while 181 (45.25%) were female. This distribution indicates a slightly higher representation of males in the study.

**Age:** The age distribution shows that the largest proportion of respondents were in the 25-34 age group 135 (33.75%), followed by the 15-24 age group 126 (31.5%). Other categories are as follows, 35-44 displayed 58 (14.5), 45-54 reflected 50 (12.5) and the least was the category for 55 and above 31 (7.75). This suggests that the study included a relatively young population, which is appropriate given that youths were the focus of the research.

**Marital Status:** The majority of respondents were single 281 (70.25%), while 92 (23.0%) were married, and 27 (6.75%) were divorced or separated. This distribution reflects the

predominantly single status of the youth population.

**Educational Level:** The educational distribution shows that the largest proportion of respondents had tertiary education 155 (38.75%), followed by secondary education 102 (25.5%), NCE/Diploma 72 (18.0). This indicates a relatively high level of education among the respondents.

**Employment Status:** The majority of respondents were either students 176 (44.0%) or unemployed 157 (39.25%), with a smaller proportion being employed 21 (5.25%) or engaged in business 46 (11.5%). This distribution reflects the youthfulness of the sample, with many still in school or seeking employment.

**Area of Residence:** The majority of respondents lived in urban areas 309 (77.25%), while 91 (22.75%) lived in rural areas. This distribution reflects the urban-rural divide in Nigeria, with a higher proportion of youths residing in urban areas.

**Table 4.2: 5-point Likert Questionnaire based on the Provided Research Objectives (400).**

| Variable   | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Strongly Agree | Agree | Mean | S.D.   |
|--|-------------------|----------|---------|----------------|-------|------|--------|
| I use prescription drugs such as antibiotics, painkillers: tramadol, hydrocodone, morphine, valium, Ativan, antidepressants etc without a doctor's prescription. | 43                | 7        | 0       | 188            | 162   | 4.05 | 0.9593 |
| I believe there is a relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior.   | 11                | 24       | 0       | 193            | 172   | 4.23 | 1.0191 |
| Socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, and education level influence prescription drug abuse.  | 8                 | 17       | 5       | 202            | 168   | 4.26 | 0.6729 |
| Societal attitudes towards prescription drug abuse influence its prevalence.   | 11                | 6        | 0       | 194            | 189   | 4.36 | 0.7215 |
| Are you aware of the risks associated with prescription drug abuse.  | 214               | 103      | 3       | 68             | 12    | 1.90 | 1.2698 |
| Prevention programs can help reduce prescription drug abuse among youths.  | 3                 | 5        | 18      | 170            | 204   | 4.42 | 0.6759 |

|   |     |     |    |     |     |      |        |
|---|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|------|--------|
| Have you ever received education or information about the dangers of prescription drug abuse. | 113 | 142 | 17 | 53  | 75  | 2.59 | 1.5737 |
| Stricter regulations on the sale of prescription drugs can reduce abuse.                      | 67  | 58  | 0  | 153 | 122 | 3.51 | 1.5176 |

**Source: Field Survey, 2024.**

The figures provided on Table 4.2 above represent responses to a survey questionnaire regarding prescription drug abuse and related issues. The variables include attitudes, beliefs, awareness, and perceptions related to prescription drug abuse and its prevention. Here is an analysis of the figures:

Use of Prescription Drugs without a Doctor's Prescription: The mean score of 4.05 indicates that, on average, respondents somewhat agree that they use prescription drugs without a doctor's prescription. However, the standard deviation of 0.9593 suggests some variability in responses, indicating that some respondents strongly disagree while others strongly agree. The high mean score for using prescription drugs without a doctor's prescription (4.05) indicates a concerning trend of self-medication or misuse of prescription drugs among respondents. This suggests a need for increased awareness and education about the proper use of prescription drugs.

Belief in the Relationship between Prescription Drug Abuse and Criminal Behavior: The mean score of 4.23 indicates that, on average, respondents agree that there is a relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior. The standard deviation of 1.0191 suggests some variability in responses, with some strongly disagreeing and others strongly agreeing. The high mean score (4.23) suggests that there is a strong belief among respondents that there is a relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior. This indicates a recognition of the potential negative consequences of prescription drug abuse on criminal behavior. Policymakers and healthcare professionals can use this

information to emphasize the importance of addressing prescription drug abuse as a public health and safety issue.

Influence of Socio-demographic Factors on Prescription Drug Abuse: The mean score of 4.26 indicates that, on average, respondents agree that socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, and education level influence prescription drug abuse. The standard deviation of 0.6729 suggests relatively consistent agreement among respondents. The high mean score (4.26) indicates that respondents believe that socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, and education level influence prescription drug abuse. This suggests an awareness of the complex interplay between individual characteristics and prescription drug abuse. Policymakers and healthcare professionals can use this information to tailor interventions and prevention efforts to specific demographic groups that may be at higher risk.

Influence of Societal Attitudes on Prescription Drug Abuse: The mean score of 4.36 indicates that, on average, respondents agree that societal attitudes influence the prevalence of prescription drug abuse. The standard deviation of 0.7215 suggests relatively consistent agreement among respondents. The high mean score (4.36) suggests that respondents believe that societal attitudes influence the prevalence of prescription drug abuse. This indicates an understanding of the role that societal norms and perceptions play in shaping behaviors related to prescription drug abuse. Policymakers and healthcare professionals can use this information to develop targeted campaigns to change societal attitudes



towards prescription drug abuse and promote healthier behaviors.

**Awareness of Risks Associated with Prescription Drug Abuse:** The mean score of 1.90 indicates that, on average, respondents are somewhat aware of the risks associated with prescription drug abuse. The standard deviation of 1.2698 suggests variability in awareness levels among respondents. While the mean score for awareness of risks associated with prescription drug abuse (1.90) is relatively low, the standard deviation indicates variability in awareness levels among respondents. This suggests a need for targeted education campaigns to increase awareness of the dangers of prescription drug abuse.

**Belief in the Effectiveness of Prevention Programs:** The mean score of 4.42 indicates that, on average, respondents agree that prevention programs can help reduce prescription drug abuse among youths. The standard deviation of 0.6759 suggests relatively consistent agreement among respondents. The high mean score for belief in the effectiveness of prevention programs (4.42) suggests that respondents are supportive of interventions aimed at reducing prescription drug abuse among youths. This highlights an opportunity for policymakers and healthcare professionals to implement targeted prevention programs.

**Receipt of Education or Information about Dangers of Prescription Drug Abuse:** The mean score of 2.59 indicates that, on average, respondents have received some education or information about the dangers of prescription drug abuse. The standard deviation of 1.5737 suggests variability in the level of education or information received among respondents. The relatively low mean score for receipt of education or information about the dangers of prescription drug abuse (2.59) suggests a need for improved education efforts. This could include school-based programs, community outreach initiatives, and public awareness campaigns.

**Belief in the Role of Stricter Regulations:** The mean score of 3.51 indicates that, on average, respondents somewhat agree that stricter regulations on the sale of prescription drugs can reduce abuse. The standard deviation of 1.5176 suggests some variability in responses, with some strongly agreeing and others strongly disagreeing. The moderate mean score for belief in the role of stricter regulations (3.51) indicates that respondents are somewhat supportive of regulatory measures to reduce prescription drug abuse. This suggests a potential need for policymakers to consider implementing or strengthening regulations related to the sale and distribution of prescription drugs.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The implications of prescription drug abuse on criminal behavior in the Wukari community are significant and complex. The findings suggest a strong connection between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior, influenced by various socio-demographic factors and societal attitudes. While there is a general awareness of the relationship between prescription drug abuse and criminal behavior, there is also a lack of understanding of the risks associated with such abuse. Prevention and intervention strategies play a crucial role in addressing these issues, with a strong belief in the effectiveness of prevention programs among youths. However, there is a need for more targeted education and awareness campaigns to improve knowledge about the dangers of prescription drug abuse. Stricter regulations on the sale of prescription drugs may also be necessary to reduce abuse, although further research is needed to understand the full impact of such measures. Overall, collaboration between stakeholders is essential to address prescription drug abuse and its implications on criminal behavior effectively in the Wukari community.

Based on the study findings, recommendations includes:

**Education and Awareness Campaigns:** To effectively combat prescription drug abuse in the Wukari community, it is crucial to develop and implement comprehensive education and awareness campaigns. These campaigns should aim to inform the public about the risks associated with prescription drug abuse and emphasize the importance of responsible use. By increasing knowledge and awareness, individuals can make informed decisions about their health and avoid the dangers of drug abuse.

**Prevention Programs:** Strengthening and expanding prevention programs targeting youths is essential in reducing prescription drug abuse. These programs should focus on education, teaching alternative coping strategies, and raising awareness about the dangers of abuse. By equipping youths with the necessary information and skills, they can make healthier choices and avoid falling into the trap of drug abuse.

**Regulatory Measures:** Considering the implementation of stricter regulations on the sale and distribution of prescription drugs can help curb abuse. These regulations should aim to restrict access to prescription drugs for non-medical purposes while ensuring that those who genuinely need these medications have access to them. Striking a balance between accessibility and control is key to addressing prescription drug abuse effectively.

**Further Research:** Conducting further research is crucial to understand the specific socio-demographic factors influencing prescription drug abuse in Nigeria. This research can help tailor prevention and intervention strategies to address the unique challenges faced by different populations. Additionally, evaluating the long-term effectiveness of these strategies is essential to ensure their sustainability and impact.

**Collaboration:** Foster collaboration between government agencies, healthcare providers, community organizations, and the pharmaceutical industry is paramount in addressing prescription drug abuse

comprehensively. By working together, stakeholders can pool their resources, expertise, and knowledge to develop and implement effective strategies to combat prescription drug abuse in the Wukari community.

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**PART III:  
GLOBAL CULTURAL CHANGE, TRANSITIONS AND SUSTAINABLE  
DEVELOPMENT**

# 11

## CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

**Usman Danlami Saleh**

**Sunday Emmanuel Dakama**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [usmandsaleh@gmail.com](mailto:usmandsaleh@gmail.com), [sdakama@gmail.com](mailto:sdakama@gmail.com)



### Abstract

Climate change refers to long-term shifts in temperature and weather patterns on earth. It is a global issue affecting both the developed, developing and the underdeveloped nations of the third world countries. Its effects in Nigeria is translating to shortage of arable land for agriculture thus forcing farmers/herders to migrate and resettle in a more fertile location with likelihood of crime and clashes between indigene and settlers leading to loss of lives and properties. The study adopts Securitization and the Tragedy of the Commons Theories to explain the menace of climate change and rural crime. Data for this study was based on secondary sources and the findings revealed that climate change reduces social control, contributes to characteristics conducive to crime and criminality, increases certain opportunities for crime, and creates social conflict. Therefore, it is recommended that Forest, bushes and rural farms should be properly guarded by the security operatives to adequately prevent it from the occupation of criminal elements like bandits, kidnappers and other terrorist groups. Establishment of cattle colony, ranching and the RUGA will also help in managing the effects of climate change induced crime and criminality in rural Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Climate change, crime, migration, banditry, cattle colony

### Introduction

Climate change is a global issue affecting both the developed, developing and the underdeveloped nations of the third world countries. Nwaonicha, (2018) identified China, United States, Brazil, Indonesia and Japan as the top five most polluting countries globally; he further argued that African countries tend to bear the brunt of the environmental pollutants emitted by these countries on a daily basis, and Nigeria is known to be hardest hit. For example, flooding and heat waves in Nigeria in the recent time are caused by global warming and climate change.

Climate change refers to long-term shifts in temperature and weather patterns on earth. It is primarily caused by human activities that release greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, into the atmosphere. These gases trap heat from the sun and cause the planet to warm up, leading to various impacts like rising

sea levels, extreme weather events, melting glaciers, and changes in ecosystems that causes largescale, deadly, humanitarian consequences in terms of human migrations fleeing flooded seacoast and push riverside or coastal peoples who depend on rainfall or irrigated agriculture to, in search of access to water and land, engage in fierce conflict with the host communities, consequently leaving behind tales of deaths among different families (Messer, 2010).

The effects of climate change in the form of desertification, flooding etc. in Nigeria, particularly the Northern part, is translating to shortage of arable land for agricultural thus forcing farmers/herders to migrate and resettle in a more fertile location with likelihood of crime and clashes between indigene and settlers leading to loss of lives and properties.

Available literature have indicated that the effect of climate change is felt more in developing countries of Africa, including Nigeria, because of inadequate coping capabilities. According to Odjugo (2010), Nigeria currently is bedeviled with varied ecological challenges driven by the ongoing climate change; and these challenges caused by climate change are concentrated more in the North-Eastern parts of the country. Odjugo (2010) further observed that Northern Nigeria is worst heat by the effect of climate change evidenced in the prevalence of desertification in States of Yobe, Borno, Sokoto, Zamfara, Jigawa, Kaduna, Niger, Nasarawa, Kogi, Kebbi, Kwara, Benue, and Katsina. The resultant effect is shortage of arable land for agriculture thus leading also to emigration and resettlement of people to an alien land with accompanied crimes and likelihood of communal clashes among herders and farmers that result in loss of lives and property. It is alleged that the migration of herdsmen from Zamfara to Taraba particularly the central zone looking for favorable weather and adequate pasture for the grazing of their cattle has a direct connection with most of the kidnappings going on in the area.

Also, the vegetation, wideness and climatic nature of the Birnin-gwari forest that covers parts of Kaduna, Niger, Kebbi and Zamfara States are both the determinant and the promoter of the insecurity in the the area. And this criminality is perpetuated mostly by the emigrants that transform into bandits, rustslers, kidnappers and even terrorists who migrated from the desert encroached and conflicts affected communities of Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

The study is justified because the northern communities are the most affected by crimes and conflicts associated with climate change looking at its position as a center of agriculture in the country. In addition, there is little effort and accurate crime statistics that reflect the reality of climate change related crimes and conflicts in northern Nigeria. This study

therefore, examined the nexus between climate change and security challenges in Northern Nigeria, with a view to identify the forms of crimes prevalent and how they affect security therein.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study adopts Securitization and the tragedy of the commons Theories as the theoretical framework to explain the menace of climate change and security challenges in northern Nigeria. Securitization theory is a concept in international relations that focuses on the process through which certain issues or threats are constructed as matter of security. It was developed by scholars like Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in the 1990s. According to Securitization theory, security is not an objective condition but a social construct. It suggests that actors with sufficient power can frame certain issues as existential threats to society, thereby justifying extraordinary measures and policies to address them.

According to them, both the political, social, economic, environmental and human needs are vital aspects of human security which also constitute potential risk to insecurity (Buzan & Hensen, 2009). According to Bala, Jeffrey & Mahmood, (2020) political issues such as ethnic, politics, lack of social cohesion, political violence, subversion of democratic process and national question can threaten the peace and security of a community or a state at large. Economic issues including underdevelopment, inflation, mismanagement, low level of industrialization, and low productivity are economic threats that can leads to insecurity in the society. Social problems are another dimension to non-traditional security threats such as corruption, unemployment, poverty, diseases, hunger, malnutrition, inequality and gender violence can constitute potential risk and threat to peace and security in the affected societies. Environmental hazards which include man-made and natural disasters can cause a serious security dilemma like pollution, overcrowding,

over population, flood, draught, desert encroachment, deforestation, and other related. All these can cause a security crisis just like the traditional/military threats (Bala et, al 2020). Buzan (1983) concluded that the security discourse should be divergent and must be looked into from dual perspective. Any attempt to narrow security threats to military is a suicide in contemporary world in which the non-military threats are more dominant.

This theory is fundamental in explaining the role of climate change (non-military threat) in causing insecurity in the form of kidnapping, banditry, cattle rustling, farmer/herder conflicts in Nigeria. As argued by the theory, Environmental hazards which include man-made and natural disasters can cause a serious security dilemma like pollution, overcrowding, over population, flood, draught, desert encroachment, deforestation, and other related. All these can cause a security crisis just like the traditional/military threats. For example, the effects of climate change in the form of desertification, flooding etc. in Nigeria, is translating to shortage of arable land for agriculture thus making it necessary for migration of not only the herders but also the farmers and resettle in an alien fertile location with likelihood of crime and clashes between indigene and settlers causing serious security and economic consequences.

The pastoralist herdsmen who are the prime suspects of kidnapping, cattle rustling and other forms of rural criminality, are in constant move searching for better climatic condition to feed and sustain their cattle, therefore, this movement and resettlement (non-traditional military threats) is characterized with series of criminal dispositions that compound to security challenges not only in the northern parts but Nigeria at large. The tragedy of the commons is a theory propounded by Garrett Hardin in (1968) according to him finite resources like forests, fisheries, clean air and clean water used in common will inevitably decline into

ruin so long as their use is unregulated. To him, that is possible because naturally, human individual are motivated to seek and increase their own benefits without any regards for the aggregate consequences or implications of their actions. Where users are free to exploit a common resource at will, they will inevitably increase their consumption of it until the resource is entirely depleted (Hardin, 1968). This theory is fundamental in explaining the human activities (anthropogenic) that contributed to the problem of climate change. For example the release of greenhouse gasses such as carbon monoxide into the atmosphere making planet to warm up leading to various impacts like rising sea level, extreme weather event that resulted to various environmental problems that induces migration and its attendants consequences – conflicts and crimes.

Another example as posited by Hardin, is deforestation of the rain forests, he argued that while the clear-cutting trees for grazing pasture or development may directly benefit those who own and use the land, the cost of losing that rainforest land is more widely distributed and as a consequence, the inhabitants of the affected area have no option that to start searching for better climatic condition elsewhere, hence migration and insecurity.

### **Conceptualizing Climate Change and Insecurity**

Climate change refers to long-term shifts in temperature and weather patterns on earth. It is primarily caused by human activities that release greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, into the atmosphere. These gases trap heat from the sun and cause the planet to warm up, leading to various impacts like rising sea levels, extreme weather events, melting glaciers, and changes in ecosystems that causes largescale, deadly, humanitarian consequences in terms of human migrations fleeing flooded seacoast and push riverside or coastal peoples who depend on rainfall or



irrigated agriculture to, in search of access to water and land, engage in fierce conflict with the host communities, consequently leaving behind tales of deaths among different families (Messer, 2010).

Global climate change, according to Odjugo (2010) is responsible by two major factors that includes- natural processes referred to as biogeographical and human activities referred to as anthropogenic. The biogeographical processes are the astronomical and the extraterrestrial forces which include changes in the orbital procession, that is the earth's trajectory movement, while the anthropogenic factor is the climate change which pertains to human activities with either of two consequences: emission of large amount of green-house gases into the atmosphere thereby depleting the ozone layer or activities that reduce the amount of carbons absorbed from the atmosphere. In concrete terms, the human activities that result in the former consequence include industrialization, burning of fossil fuel, gas flaring, urbanization and agriculture, while the latter include deforestation, alterations in land use, water pollution and agricultural practices. However, human factor is mainly to blame for the present and ongoing climate change and global warming (Odjugo, 2010). Five countries, viz: China, United States, Brazil, Indonesia and Japan have been identified as top five most polluting countries globally; African countries tend to bear the brunt of the environmental pollutants emitted by these countries on a daily basis, and Nigeria is known be hardest hit. For example, flooding and heat waves in Nigeria in the recent time are caused by global warming and climate change (Nwaonicha, 2018).

Further studies establishing the linkage between criminality and climate has long been postulated by scholars such as Dagaci, (2012) he opined that significant ecological changes would lead to water wars over increasing scarcity, land conflict over decreased arable and livable land. The consequences of climate

change have in a long while been concentrated in conflict and crime prone regions of the world that continue to experience high insecurity and underdevelopment. Additionally, population explosion and urbanization couple with inequitable access to and shortage of land, and resource depletion have been generally predicted to worsen, thereby posing precarious challenge to the stability of rural and urban living (Conroy, 2006).

Studies by (Yugunda, 2002; Yaqub, 2007; Adjugo, 2010) reveal that conflict between herders and farmers claimed over 196 lives in six northeastern states of the country between 1998 and 2006. Rural-Urban migrations of destitute because of drought and desertification have further compounded the problem. All this in addition to other climate propelled crimes or conflicts such as the Boko Haram insurgency, kidnapping, armed banditry, amongst others, have continued to ravage the Nigerian nation with unprecedented consequences of enormous quantum of crime and criminality, which has continued to exacerbate poverty, homelessness, diseases, bad governance and absence of social justice.

### **Research Methodology**

This study is built on documentary approach. Therefore, secondary sources of data from online publications such as journals and agency reports, textbook, which were then content analysed, because of the paper's reliance on secondary source data.

### **Climate Induced Crimes and Criminality in Rural Nigeria**

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2016) reported that while Africa is the lowest contributor of global emissions, it is the most vulnerable continent to climate change living majority of its population relying on the land for subsistence and economic activity. Thus, according to the 2015 UN Environmental Programme's

Adaptation Gap Report, Africa would require between US\$20 – 30 billion dollars annually over a period of 10 – 20 years to meet its climate change adaptation needs (UNDP, 13 Climate Action, 2019). Studies have shown that climate change promotes strain, reduces social control, weakens social support, contributes to characteristics conducive to crime and criminality, increases certain opportunities for crime, and creates social conflict as consequence (Messer, 2010).

Dagaci, (2012) opined that significant ecological changes would lead to water wars over increasing scarcity, land conflict over decreased arable and livable land. The consequences of climate change have in a long while been concentrated in conflict and crime prone regions of the world that continue to experience high insecurity and underdevelopment. Additionally, population explosion and urbanization couple with inequitable access to and shortage of land, and resource depletion have been generally predicted to worsen, thereby posing precarious challenge to the stability of rural and urban living (Conroy, 2006).

The connection between climate change and criminality in Nigeria, typified in criminal activities involving clashes between herders and farmers in the middle belt in particular and other regions of the country generally, terrorism in the northeast, armed banditry in the northwest, the spate of kidnapping across the nation, among others, show the extent to which changes in climate has directly and/or indirectly precipitated crime and criminality and threatened social cohesion, peaceful and harmonious living within the country (Dagaci & Anthony, 2019). The common crimes in a the northern Nigeria are mainly agriculture related like farmer/herder's conflicts, cattle rustling, banditry & kidnapping etc., (California Casualty, 2017).

*i) Armed Banditry and Cattle Rustling-* Cheserek, Omondi, and Odenyo (2012) have defined cattle rustling as “the act of

forceful raiding of livestock from one community by another often leaving behind destruction of property and loss of lives” (cited in Dagaci & Anthony, 2019). Banditry involving cattle rustling has occupied a central place in the Nigerian crime lexicon especially in the last decade. The phenomenon has posed serious threat to public safety and security in the country, leading to loss of lives, human injury, population displacements, and loss of many cattle, that does not augur well for the collective wellbeing of the herding communities (Shehu, Victor & Binta, 2017 cited in Dagaci & Anthony 2019). Cattle rustling as an age-old and deeply entrenched feature of pastoralist livelihoods, which fostered competition between groups that found themselves in harsh, delicate environments, and served as a means of primitive accumulation of a cowhead in the context of subsistence and commercial pastoralism, is an ancient practice dating back over seven thousand years (Blench, 2004; Rangers and Osborne, 2006, cited in Egwu, 2016). They stated that cattle rustling is generally a large scale theft of cattle through violent means and often involves the use of weapons. Thus, cattle rustling is regarded as a form of armed banditry, which is wider in scope and including different forms of crimes such as highway robbery and gang-like invasion of settlements to confiscate wealth and properties (Cheserek et al 2012).

Rural banditry associated with cattle rustling driven by different needs and factors among which is climate change, currently poses serious concern for public policy formulation in Nigeria. It is a phenomenon that involves the practice or habit of stealing cattle and animals from herders, or the raiding of cattle from the ranches. It has increasingly become an economically-based form of criminality

perpetuated by informal networks (Egwu, 2016). A study on “The Menace of Cattle Rustling and Banditry in North-West Nigeria”: A Case Study of Katsina State, by Shehu, Victor, and Binta (2017), revealed that frequent drought and famine in the area accounted for the menace of cattle rustling and banditry. The study also found that among the several implications of the criminal activities of cattle rustling and banditry were, deaths, immigration, internal displacements, sexual assault and rape, poverty resulting from destruction of source of livelihood, early marriage and polygamy made possible by earnings from rustled cattle or raided livestock by youths. This corroborates the findings by Egwu (2016), which indicated that rural banditry is accompanied by rape, kidnapping, organized attacks on villages and communities, and looting.

**ii) Herder/Farmer Crisis-** Changes in the global climate induces serious conflicts between indigenous people and settlers in Nigeria. The migratory habits of the Fulani Cattle breeders, who move in search of fresh water and pasture for their livestock by encroaching into people’s farmlands, have often resulted in clashes between them and the community land owners (Dagaci & Anthony 2019). They further argued that the herders who even though do not move of their own volition, but forced to do so by climatic effects such as deforestation, desertification and lack of water, often come into contact with the locals who see the herders as invaders and therefore unwelcome. Asueni and Godknows, (2019) observed that climate change in Northeastern Nigeria has forced migration of Fulani Herdsmen from up North to down South, where they could access fresh water bodies and other resources needed to sustain their cattle. The migration out of their habitual residence or grazing area to other parts of Nigeria has often led to

violent conflict and the death of thousands of people in its wake. Climate change has unequivocally been linked to increased insecurity in terms of crime and criminality as evidenced in conflicts and killings involving herders and farmers, in most parts of Nigeria (Asueni and Godknows, 2019). This trend has prompted several agitations such as cattle colony, ranching and the RUGA (Rural Urban Grazing Area) scheme in recent times, notably by the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), which advocates for the social, political, economic, and cultural integration of Fulani in communities where they settle (Awogbade 1987, cited in Dagaci & Anthony 2019).

**iii) Terrorism/Insurgency-** A Study by Lytle (2017) on “Climate Change as a Contributor to Terrorism: A Case Study in Nigeria and Pakistan,” revealed that in Nigeria, climate trends and agriculture influence terrorism trends in the country, particularly the Boko Haram insurgency. It shows that climate change creates the platform for terrorism generally to thrive. The finding of the study agrees with a report commissioned by the German government which showed that some 30 million people across Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon are competing over a shrinking water resource, and reiterated that chronic drought around Lake Chad in particular, is reinforcing terrorist group, Boko Haram’s grip on the region. This report further confirms the belief that climate change feeds global terrorism. Further, as climate change around Lake Chad contributes to resource scarcities thereby increasing local competition for land and water, three conditions are favourable to Boko Haram’s expansion in the area: 1) the group can operate more easily in these

fragile areas where the State has little authority and suffers from lack of legitimacy; 2) affected population is more vulnerable not only to negative climate impacts but also to recruitment by Boko Haram; and 3) Boko Haram use natural resources such as water as a weapon of war or inhibit access to natural resources (David, 2017 cited in Dagaci & Anthony 2019).

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The findings of this study revealed that climate change is responsible for most of the conflicts and crimes taking place especially in the Nigeria's northern communities. The study affirms that climate change promotes strain, reduces social control, weakens social support, contributes to characteristics conducive to crime and criminality, increases certain opportunities for crime, and creates social conflict as consequence, therefore, government must increase its efforts in providing policies and programs that would manage and control climatic changes so as to curtail climate change induced migration and consequent insecurity not only in the north but Nigeria at large. Effort should also be made in promoting peace and security across cities within the country. The adverse effects of illiteracy, unemployment and poverty among the youths are the major causes of crime and insecurity particularly in Nigeria's north therefore, provision of more educational institutions, employment opportunities, basic and infrastructural facilities will significantly help in providing healthy and sound population. Generally, there is usually low police presence in terms of police size and patrol in Nigeria. This makes it possible for insecurity to thrive because the prevention, management and control of crime requires more capable and committed hands. Forest, bushes and rural farms should be properly guarded by the security operatives to

adequately prevent it from the occupation of criminal elements like bandits, kidnappers and other terrorist groups. To address the farmer/herder's conflicts, establishment of cattle colony, ranching and the RUGA will not only avert conflict between farmers and herders but also facilitate a synergy or an interdependent relationship that will foster social cohesion, peace and development

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# 12

## HUMAN DETECTION TECHNOLOGY AND JAILBREAKS IN NIGERIA

**Tukura Tino Nashuka**

**Ibrahim Nuaimu Danbala**

**Tukura Daudu Fwaje**

Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [tukura.tino88@gmail.com](mailto:tukura.tino88@gmail.com), [ndanbala223@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:ndanbala223@fuwukari.edu.ng), [fwajetukura@gmail.com](mailto:fwajetukura@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The nature of the Nigerian state, shaped by the British colonial legacy has generated conflicts and insecurity in Nigeria. This has stalled the development of long-term policies and investments in correctional systems. Scholars and security analysts have enumerated causes of jailbreaks resulting in the escape of Prisoners in Nigeria to include poor welfare of inmates, abuse of the basics rights of inmates, corruption, delays in the criminal justice system, poor infrastructural facilities in correctional centres, understaffed and congested prisons, and poor remunerations of correctional staff. Therefore, this paper seeks to explain how the lack of investment in science and technology accounts for the Nigerian government's poor deployment of human detection apparatus in the management of correctional facilities, resulting in the frequent attacks on correctional facilities, leading to escape of prisoners in Nigeria that has stifled the nation's security. The paper employs the theory of the post-colonial states as its analytical framework. This paper depends on the documentary method of data collection, utilizing secondary sources of generating data, and uses content analysis for analyzing generated data. The paper found that the lack of investment in science and technology is the explanatory variable to the Nigerian state's poor deployment of human detection apparatus in the management of correctional facilities, leading to the attack and escape of prisoners in Nigeria. The paper recommended an upsurge investment in research and development by the Nigerian state to develop ground-breaking and advanced human detection apparatuses that help in the good management of correctional facilities and avert attacks on the facilities, leading to the escapes of prisoners.

**Keywords:** Prisoners, correctional facilities, jailbreak, human detection, corruption

### Introduction

Nigeria is a deeply polarized nation with over 250 diverse ethnic groups, resulting in challenges in governance (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The legacy of British colonial domination, which amalgamated diverse groups into a single political entity, has generated lasting hostilities, conflicts, and insecurity in Nigeria, thwarting the growth of long-standing policies and investments in correctional structures (Nnoli, 2008). This is because Nigerian leaders are often nervous about maintaining their grasp on power rather than focusing on organizational reform.

Similarly, the complex and heterogeneous nature of the Nigerian state plays a significant role in the poor management of the country's correctional facilities. This diversity is reflected in the distribution of resources, access to power, and allocation of public services, including correctional facilities. This character of the Nigerian state, shaped by historical, political, and socioeconomic factors, has a direct and destructive influence on the management of correctional facilities (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The poor state of Nigerian correctional facilities, characterized by

overcrowding, human rights abuses, and a lack of rehabilitation and reforms, reflects a broader governance and institutional crisis in Nigeria (Ofoegbu, 2013). Even more so, the neo-patrimonial and prebendal nature of the Nigerian state, which manifests in the country's history of corruption and weak governance, characterized by a lack of transparency and accountability, permeate various levels of government, leading to misallocation of resources and poor management of public institutions, including correctional facilities (Joseph, 1983). Also, a lack of political will worsens this to prevent or curtail corruption and build strong institutions that can drive Nigeria as an emergent nation-state into a strong nation (Salisu & Adejumo, 2017). Consequently, rehabilitation programs and reforms within correctional facilities receive inadequate attention due to the Nigerian state's political instability and short-term focus (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2014). This results in a lack of opportunities for prisoners to acquire skills and education to help them reintegrate into society upon freedom. Therefore, the rates of re-offence remain high, spreading the cycle of crime and insecurity (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2014). The lack of accountability and transparency within the Nigerian justice system propagates prevalent human rights abuses within Nigerian correctional facilities, contributing to a cycle of criminality and a breakdown of the justice system (Amnesty International, 2018).

The global practice has shown that terror suspects are always kept in well-fortified and isolated places such as the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp, where the United States government keeps high-risk suspects in a military facility that is located away from the people to minimize anxiety and fear (Kupoluyi, 2015). However, in Nigeria, the relocation of detained Boko Haram suspects from the northern part of the country to Ekwulobia Correctional facility in Anambra State not only ignited dispute, fright, and demonstrations in the commercial city of Onitsha, as many

businesses and markets were closed down, but also exposed the gross infrastructural insufficiencies of government's correctional facilities even in warehousing hardened criminals and terrorists, as evidence abounds that high-risk criminals could be taken anywhere without recourse to correctional facilities' security vulnerability, high possibility of radicalization, and proven panic or fear communicable among the people (Afuzie, 2022). According to the Nigeria Correctional Service (2018), there are currently 240 correctional facilities in Nigeria, and the official capacity of the centres is put at 50, 1530 prisoners (Abiodun et al., 2021).

Persistent escapes of prisoners have characterized Nigerian Correctional facilities since the return to democratic rule in May 1999 due to the poor management of the facilities, (Ripples Nigeria Report, 2017). However, the period between 2015 and 2022, shows growing rates of attacks on Nigerian correctional facilities leading to the escapes of over 6,611 prisoners from various correctional facilities across the nation's 36 states, including the Federal Capital Territory, which has increased insecurity in the country (Afuzie, 2022). The July 2022 attack on the Kuje Medium Custodial facility in Abuja, where about 879 prisoners were freed, including 68 Boko Haram terrorists, was the greatest notable incidence and worrisome in Nigeria and Africa at large. This and other incidences of attacks on correctional facilities, leading to escapes of prisoners in Nigeria have provoked scholars and security experts like Matazu (2022) to argue that the Nigerian state is not proactive in averting criminality and fighting insecurity because intelligence on impending attacks on correctional facilities is often provided to the relevant authorities before the attack with little or no action was taken by the Nigerian government or security operatives to prevent the incidence. Consequently, the neglect of intelligence and the non-deployment of monitoring devices by the Nigerian state in averting criminality and

fighting insecurity has resulted in frequent attacks on correctional facilities, leading to the escape of prisoners across the country's correctional facilities. This has not only exposed the poor management of the nation's correctional facilities but has also demonstrated the failure of the Nigerian state to keep to its part of the social contract by providing security of lives and property for its citizens.

Scholars and security analysts have argued that attacks arising from the poor management of Nigerian correctional facilities are the starring factors, leading to the escape of prisoners across the country's correctional facilities that deepened insecurity in Nigeria. Scholars such as Balsamo and Sisak (2021), Abiodun et al. (2021), Oyedeji (2022), Omale (2013), Falayi and Ajaja (2018), Imam and Langa (2019), Onah et al. (2019), Ojo (2021), and Ajitogo (2021) among others, tend to explain the nexus between the management of the Nigerian correctional facilities and escapes of prisoners based on the factors such as overcrowded jails, lack of cordial relations between staff and prisoners, corruption, delayed in criminal justice system, lack of intelligence, poor welfare of prisoners, abuse of the basics rights of prisoners, poor infrastructures in correctional facilities, understaffed and inadequate remunerations of correctional staff and dilapidated structures. Therefore, it is not out of place to argue from the above viewpoints that what one should consider as the cause of frequent attacks on Nigerian correctional facilities is the lack of investment in science and technology, leading to poor deployment of human detection apparatus by the Nigerian state in the management of correctional facilities, resulting in the escape of prisoners across the country's correctional facilities.

### Conceptualization of Key Terms

**Management:** Management is defined as the process of planning, organizing, leading, and

controlling the efforts of organization members to achieve specific goals (Stoner et al., 1995, p. 9).

**Correctional Facilities:** A correctional facility, also known as a prison, jail, gaol, penitentiary, detention centre, or remand centre, is an institution where people are confined against their will and denied a variety of freedoms under the authority of the state, generally as punishment for various crimes (Feinberg, 2015)

**Escapes:** is a crime of leaving lawful custody without permission by inmates or prisoners distinct from the original offence that led to their confinement.

**Prisoners:** Prisoners are individuals deprived of their liberty and physically restrained under the authority of the state as a result of criminal conviction and sentencing to incarceration.

**Jailbreak:** This term typically refers to a more elaborate or violent escape attempt, often involving breaching security measures or harming others.

### Literature Review

In this paper, the review of the extant literature was based on issues surrounding investment in science and technology and the deployment of human detection apparatus by the Nigerian government in the management of correctional facilities that induce attacks on the country's correctional facilities, leading to the escape of prisoners that have increased insecurity in Nigeria.

### Human Detection Equipment and Jailbreak

The crucial role of human detection technology in averting criminality and fighting insecurity in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century cannot be over-emphasized. Human detection technology guarantees a forward-looking and proactive approach to managing insecurity and curbing crime, such as terrorism, armed banditry, insurgency, and other organized transnational threats that have pushed intelligence and surveillance from concepts to strategies to address many national security issues.



Therefore, the non-deployment of human detection devices by developing nations, especially Nigeria in averting criminality and combating insecurity has not only overstretched the country's security architecture but has also worsened insecurity in the nation.

Scholars such as Imam and Langa (2019) identified poor welfare of inmates, including inadequate medical care, overcrowded correctional institutions, and lack of electricity, as causes of frequent jailbreaks. However, Imam and Langa (2019) did not see corruption in the administration of correctional centres as an explanatory variable for the escape of prisoners. Onah et al. (2019) argued that corruption is one crucial factor responsible for jailbreak. But they pay no attention to explaining how poor medical care of prisoners could induce jailbreak. Corroborating this line of argument, Falayi and Ajaja (2018) also argued that corruption and antiquated correctional facilities are reasons for the escape of prisoners.

Notwithstanding their near-excellent argument, Falayi and Ajaja (2018) failed to establish a connection between overcrowded correctional facilities and the escape of prisoners. In the same vein, Ojo (2021) posits that poor living conditions of inmates due to lack of sanitation and corruption trigger jailbreaks. Nonetheless, Ojo (2021) did not make an effort to analyze the link between delays in the criminal justice system and the escape of prisoners. Omale (2013) enumerated overcrowded jails, deprivation of certain perceived rights and privileges of inmates, inadequate medical care, lack of infrastructural facilities, understaffed correctional facilities, poor staff emolument, trafficking by staff and inmates, and lack of cordial relationship among staff as causes of escape of prisoners. Nevertheless, Omale (2013) did not attempt to establish a nexus between lack of technology and jailbreak. Abiodun et al. (2021) asserted that degraded or absence of security dynamic, corruption, connivance between prisoners and

correctional staff, neglect of some fundamental rights of prisoners, deplorable state of jail facilities, and poor welfare of prisoners are motivators for the escape of prisoners. Abiodun et al. (2021) did not consider waiting for a trial brainteaser as a factor that could induce the escape of prisoners.

Oyedeji (2022) highlighted corruption, overcrowded jails, and prolonged detention of suspects awaiting trial as reasons for frequent incidences of escaping prisoners. However, Oyedeji (2022) does not explain how the collusion between prisoners and staff of correctional facilities could trigger the escape of prisoners. Ajitogo (2021) attributed the repeated incidence of prisoners' escapes to a lack of infrastructural facilities, overcrowded jails, prolonged detention of suspects without trial, inadequate staff to manage correctional centres, poor instrumentality and staff compensation, outdated technology, bribery, and corruption. All the same, Ajitogo (2021) does not see the low or degraded dynamic of security as a factor responsible for the escape of prisoners. Balsamo and Sisak (2021) submit that poor administration of correctional centres, friable security arrangements, understaffed correctional facilities, misconduct, and poor infrastructures induce the escape of prisoners. Yet, Balsamo and Sisak (2021) failed to establish a connection between poor staff motivation and compensation capable of causing corruption leading to the escape of prisoners.

According to Tsuwa and Okoh (2016), the population of awaiting trial persons is a significant challenge to realizing the goals of correction due to the punishment of the wrong people for a long time. Bateman (2003 in Emeka et al., 2016) avers that accused persons in developing countries suffer the snag of legal service accessibility. This problem does not mean that there is a scarcity of lawyers in the countries concerned but simply a question of affordability and society needs to be hastier in prosecuting cases involving political office-

holders and other privileged citizens. Emeka et al. (2016) posit that the criminal justice system has reneged in this constitutional provision, which mandates the Ministry of Justice to provide indigent accused persons with defence counsel in trial evident in the number of prisoners awaiting trial in correctional facilities.

The delayed trial or prosecution of the accused prisoners is not only caused by their inability to access legal officials whose exorbitant charges hinder the prosecution of people facing different counts charges, making the prisoners feel hopeless for years, prompting them to escape (Aluko and Okolie-Osemene, 2019). Imam and Langa (2019) identified poor restriction fencing, hostile relationships between correctional officials and prisoners, poor welfare and living conditions of prisoners, prison congestion, and lack of court appearance as causes of escape of prisoners. This position is accurate because when congestion is a problem, prisoners can easily use it to plan their escape. Consequently, prison congestion indirectly encourages prisoners to become partners in another crime, whether victimless or organized in prison. For example, the Nsukka correctional facility, where an escape occurred in August 2016, was constructed to accommodate only 180 prisoners but now has over 500 prisoners in the facility.

Also, the Enugu correctional facility, built for 638 prisoners, now has about 1,800 prisoners. The KotonKarfe custodial facility, known for incessant cases of escapes, was initially designed for 180 prisoners; however, it now houses almost double this number. Also, the Okaka custodial facility in Yenogoa, Bayelsa State, with 300 prisoners, presently holds 600 prisoners. In the last three years, suspects awaiting trial have escaped prison vans, conveying them to court (Folaranmi, 2017). This has prompted security beef-up at the prisons, including the deployment of soldiers and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) to prevent attacks leading to the escapes

of prisoners. A recent security report by Eze (2016) indicated that the Abakaliki correctional facility was built in 1946 to accommodate only 387 prisoners but now accommodates 920 prisoners, with about 811 awaiting trial. The problem with the awaiting trial prisoners is that the majority have been incarcerated for more than five years. Some have even been in custody for decades without trial or conclusion of their cases. This is a threat to security because there is the probability that most of them will not be re-arrested, meaning a miscarriage of justice either in clearing allegations against them or bringing them to justice if they committed the crimes that led to their arrest.

From the review of the extant literature on the management of correctional facilities and the escape of prisoners in Nigeria, it is clear that scholars did not satisfactorily analyze how the poor deployment of human detection apparatus by the Nigerian state in the management of correctional facilities, arising from the lack of investment in science and technology, resulted in the frequent incidence of attacks on Nigerian correctional facilities, leading to the escape of numerous prisoners that intensified insecurity in the country. This constitutes our point of departure and contribution to knowledge.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This paper is anchored on the theory of the post-colonial state developed by Hamza Alavi in 1972. The post-colonial state theory is a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the political, economic, and social challenges faced by countries that have gained independence from colonial rule. It argues that the legacy of colonialism has had a profound impact on these countries, shaping their institutions, cultures, and economies in ways that continue to disadvantage them today. As a post-colonial state, Nigeria was a British colony for over 60 years, and the colonial experience profoundly impacted the country's institutions and culture (Falola & Heaton,

2008). One of the most significant legacies of colonialism is the Nigerian state itself. Falola and Heaton (2008) argued that the colonial state was designed to be extractive and exploitative, and it was not interested in investing in public services or the well-being of the Nigerian people.

In straightforward terms, the theory of the post-colonial state is a post-modern discourse that consists of reactions to and analysis of the cultural legacy of colonialism (Mbah, 2011). The theory was popularized by Third World scholars like Ake (1981), Ekekwe (1986), Ibeanu (1988), Nnoli (1986), Idode (1989) and Mbah (2011). An outstanding tenet of this theory is its assumption that the nature, character, and institutional framework that has informed and characterized the post-colonial state have its foundation in colonialism and its associated concept-imperialism. The theory argues that the post-colonial state is characterized by weak, minimal autonomy, corrupt, and unproductive tendencies, leading to a high level of underdevelopment and dependence on external forces.

The theory further posited that the class that emerged during the colonial period had a fragile economic base with overdeveloped state power, further manifested in the post-colonial period. And because of the weak economic base of the class that inherited the post-colonial state, the state invariably became a significant instrument of capital acquisition, investment, and development. Hence, the acquisition and exercise of state power serve as a means of investment for those who control the state (Ake, 1981 & Mbah, 2011). Ake (1981, p.2) further argues that the minimal autonomy character of the post-colonial state means that the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys little independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic class and, therefore, is engrossed in the class struggle that goes on in the society. Mbah (2011) argues that the post-colonial state is primitive,

parasitic, absolute, and arbitrary and cannot provide any form of good governance that can affect its very nature. For him, post-colonial states' very nature and character cannot foster good governance.

The theory also assumes that governance in post-colonial states is marred by corruption, nepotism, and tribalism (Ibeanu, 1988). Ake (1981) also argues that the lack of relative autonomy is one reason the post-colonial state cannot uphold the rule of law and protect the rights of citizens. The theory further posited that colonialism is a powerful and destructive historical force characterized by the subjugation of one people by another, and it often involves violence, exploitation, and the destruction of indigenous cultures (Mamdani, 1996). Exponents of this theory argued that the institutions, economies, and social structures of post-colonial states are often legacies of colonialism. For example, many post-colonial states have artificial borders drawn by colonial powers, and they have economies dependent on exporting raw materials to former colonial powers (Cooper, 1996).

The post-colonial state theory emphasizes that post-colonial societies are often characterized by deep divisions based on ethnicity, race, class, and gender. These divisions can lead to conflict and violence, but they can also be a source of resistance to the legacies of colonialism (Chatterjee, 1993). Young (1990) avers that the post-colonial state is not simply a replica of the Western state. For him, post-colonial states are often characterized by unique political and economic systems that reflect their histories and cultures. This theory postulated that the powerful class usually writes the post-colonial judicial framework (law) to ensure their perpetual control and domination of state power, with numerous parts comprising non-convergent expressions and sections that make managing correctional facilities challenging for the Nigerian state. The post-colonial state, as a result of its fruitless, feeble,

restricted liberty and corruptible attribute, did small or nothing to alter the exploitative inclination of colonialism regardless of the decolonization struggles of the nationalist petite-bourgeoisie because the main aim of the post-colonial state was to create a pleasing situation that will advance and maintain the perpetual accumulation of wealth by the corrupted, weak and unproductive governing elite (Ibeanu, 1988).

### **Theory Application**

The relationship between the Nigerian state and poor management of the Nigerian correctional facilities is explained in this study in light of the theory of the post-colonial state. This framework unravels the hidden dynamics that analyze how the neo-patrimonial, prebendalism, weak, limited autonomous, corrupt, and unproductive nature of Nigeria as a post-colonial state is responsible for the lack of investment in science and technology, accounting for the poor deployment of human detection equipment in the management of Nation's correctional facilities, leading to the frequent attacks on the correctional facilities. This is fundamentally so because the money that is supposed to be invested in the development of science and technology is diverted and embezzled by the political elite in a form of primitive accumulation. This consequently, led to the poor management of the correctional system in Nigeria, which was inherited from the British colonial government.

Similarly, since the British colonial government was designed to be extractive and exploitative, and not interested in investing in public services or the well-being of the Nigerian people, the political class of post-colonial Nigeria embraced this corrupt and exploitative tendencies of the British colonial government. Therefore, the colonial legacy of underinvestment and neglect has had a devastating impact on correctional facilities in Nigeria, leading to the poor management of the facilities.

In line with the basic tenets of the post-colonial state theory, the Nigerian post-colonial state is characterized by high levels of corruption and clientelism. This has led to the misallocation of resources and the appointment of unqualified individuals to positions of power in the prison system. As a result, correctional facilities in Nigeria are often poorly managed and underfunded. Similarly, the Nigerian post-colonial state is characterized by weak institutions and a lack of accountability, making it difficult to hold the prison system accountable for its shortcomings. In addition, the Nigerian public often has a negative perception of prisons and prisoners, which makes it challenging to advocate for reforms.

### **Research Methodology**

This paper adopted the documentary of data collection, utilizing secondary sources. Data generated for this paper were analyzed using content analysis. Therefore, the paper is a qualitative research.

### **Non-Deployment of Human Detection Devices and Jailbreaks in Nigeria**

The Nigerian State has a long history of underinvesting in science and technology. This is evident in the country's low spending on research and development (R&D). For instance, in 2021, the Nigerian government spent only 0.2% of its GDP on research and development (R&D), which is one of the lowest rates in the world (Abiodun et al. 2021). This lack of investment in science and technology has hampered the development of new and innovative human detection apparatus that could be used in the management of the nation's correctional facilities, and prevent the attacks on the facilities. Consequently, the lack of investment in science and technology by the Nigerian state has significantly impacted the poor deployment of human detection apparatus, leading to frequent attacks on Nigerian correctional facilities and the escape of prisoners or inmates. This is because human

detection apparatus is a critical tool for preventing attacks on correctional facilities. It can be used to detect and track intruders, as well as to identify potential threats. However, human detection apparatus is expensive and requires specialized training to operate. As a result, many correctional facilities in Nigeria lack the necessary resources to deploy and use human detection apparatus effectively. Similarly, the lack of investment in science and technology has made it difficult for Nigeria to acquire and maintain human detection apparatus from other countries which are very expensive to purchase. Again, due to the lack of investment in science and technology, many correctional facilities in Nigeria rely on outdated and ineffective human detection apparatus, making it easier for intruders to infiltrate correctional facilities and carry out attacks, leading to the escape of prisoners or inmates.

In addition to the lack of investment in science and technology, several other factors such as corruption, poor maintenance and lack of training of correctional facilities staff also contributed to the poor deployment of human detection apparatus in Nigerian correctional facilities, leading to the frequent attacks on correctional facilities and the escape of prisoners. Therefore, the most critical dimensions of the factors that accounted for the frequent attacks on Nigerian correctional facilities, leading to the escape of inmates or prisoners are the lack of a security surveillance system, non-installation of an intruder detection system, absence of viewing and recording hardware and the poor remote web security management.

Therefore, the non-deployment of security surveillance systems, such as surveillance towers, close-circuit television, and alarm monitoring devices by the Nigerian state in the management of correctional facilities has resulted in several attacks on Nigerian correctional centres, leading to numerous incidences of jail escapes. Similarly, the lack of intruder detection systems and the lack of

viewing and recording hardware such as body-scanner, behaviour video analytics, closed-circuit television and fence-mounted sensors in the management of Nigerian correctional facilities led to several cases of prison breaks across Nigerian correctional facilities, leading to the escape of many inmates as well as injuries and death. This is made possible by smuggling numerous illicit items or objects such as small arms, and light weapons into correctional facilities during the various social visits that find their way to the hands of inmates who use the same to carry out coordinated and planned attacks on correctional facilities leading to prisons break and consequent escape of several inmates.

For instance, between September 2015 and July 2022, Nigeria has experienced twenty-one (21) incidences of attacks on correctional facilities in several states such as Abia, Kogi, Ekiti, Ondo, Niger, Bauchi, Yobe, Delta, Ebonyi, Plateau, Akwa Ibom, Oyo, Edo, Imo, Enugu and FCT leading to the escaped of about 6,711 inmates. Out of the twenty-one (21) incidences of prison breaks across Nigerian correctional facilities, thirteen (13) were successful, while eight (8) were unsuccessful (Chioma, 2022). Similarly, states like Edo, where the attack on the Benin and Oko custodial facilities occurred on 19 October 2020, recorded the highest number of escaped inmates, totalling 1,993, followed by the attack on Owerri custodial facility in Imo state on 4 April 2021 with a total of 1,844 escapees (Afuzie, 2022). The invasion of Abolongo Correctional Facility in Oyo State took place on 22<sup>nd</sup> October 2021 with 907 escapees, and the attack on Kuje Correctional Facility in Abuja, which took place on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2022, had a total of 879 escapees (Chioma, 2022). At the same time, the attack on Jos correctional facility in Plateau state happened twice on different occasions, 19<sup>th</sup> July 2021 and 28<sup>th</sup> November 2021, respectively, with a total of 524 escapees (Afuzie, 2022). Recently, on the 24<sup>th</sup> April, 2024 over 118 inmates took advantage of a heavy rainstorm, resulting in the damaged

of the Medium Security Custodial Centre in Suleja, Niger State and escaped. These and other incidences of jailbreak across Nigerian correctional facilities, leading to the escape of several inmates have intensified insecurity and increased other forms of social vices due to their forceful reintegration into the society.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The nature of the Nigerian state, shaped by historical, political, and socioeconomic factors, has a direct and detrimental impact on the management of correctional facilities. The poor condition of these facilities, characterized by overcrowding, human rights abuses, and a lack of rehabilitation efforts, reflects a broader governance and institutional crisis in Nigeria. Addressing these issues necessitates systemic reforms within the correctional system and a more overall commitment to combating corruption, improving management, and managing the socioeconomic disparities that underlie crime in the country. This paper found that the lack of investment in science and technology accounted for the Nigerian state's poor deployment of human detection apparatus in the management of correctional facilities, leading to the recurring incidence of prisoners' escape in Nigeria. The paper concludes that the poor management of correctional facilities reflects the nature and character of the Nigerian state inherent in colonial legacies. On the strength of the findings, this paper recommended that the Nigerian government should increase investment in research and development (R&D) to develop new and innovative human detection technology, encouraging the deployment of human detection apparatuses such as surveillance towers, body scanners, close circuit television (CCTV), double perimeter walls, fence-mounted sensors, and behaviour video analytics in the management of the nation's correctional facilities, and prevent attacks on correctional facilities,

leading to escape of prisoners that have stifled insecurity in Nigeria.

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# 13

## GLOBALIZATION AND PEDAGOGICAL REFORMS IN NIGERIA

**Audu Godwin Ankeli**

Department of Science Education  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
Email: *gankegodwin40@gmail.com*



### Abstract

Great changes are occurring in the global world, and the educational system must respond to these changes or become obsolete and irrelevant. There is evidence in Nigeria which over the years has shown that government investment in education has not achieved the desired results, goals and objectives. The failure of the educational sector has increased the incidence of poverty and deprivation of the vulnerable groups. Education in Nigeria is said to be an instrument “par excellence” for effecting national development. The country’s educational goals should be clearly set out in terms of their relevance to the needs of the individual and those of the society, in consonance with the realities of our environment and the modern world. For the educational system in Nigeria therefore to be relevant to the needs of individual and the society, there must be radical changes in our educational system in terms of curricular content, methodology and instructional materials. It is only through educational reform strategy that Nigeria as a nation can keep pace with the accelerated technological changes in the modern world. This paper therefore looks at the individual (Learner) and the society as beneficiaries of pedagogical reforms. The paper seeks to know why they need reforms, which are the target groups and policy options for effectiveness of educational system reforms at any levels. The paper equally sees ICT as a veritable strategy for such radical reforms at the classroom and society levels; it discusses the role of the teacher as the implementer of the reforms at the classroom level. It equally looks at the problems confronting the implementation of IT reform strategy. It also highlights on the prospects of ICT at these levels. Therefore, the research paper will fill the gaps that have been yet addressed by the researchers in a study related to Educational reforms in Nigeria and this will also help in improving the methodology and selection of instructional materials for Educational system in Nigeria. The paper concludes with recommendations on how this giant stride technology can improve teacher effectiveness so as to meet the needs of learners and society.

**Keywords:** Pedagogical reforms, learners, ICT, teacher effectiveness, educational goals

### Introduction

The colonial system of education inherited from the British pattern of education was structured along with their values and beliefs. It was oblivious of the educational yearning and aspirations of Nigeria. Education is a service provided in all countries of the world with many objectives in mind. These objectives include the skills required for a more rapid growth of the economy and the provision of basic knowledge to the citizens. Knowledge has become the most important factor for economic development in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Through its capacity to augment productivity,

it increasingly constitutes the foundation of a country’s competitive advantage (Olayiwola, 2012). Fafunwa (2004) explained that the educational system was only functional to the colonialists. The grammar school curricular could only train students in literary subjects and produced only white collar job seekers. The grooming of the learners in science and technology that are much needed for technical take off and development were either not done or done perfunctorily. Employment orientation had been completely absent from the grammar schools and the economy

suffered in consequence. Nigerians therefore saw the urgent need to restructure and reform the educational system in order to make education relevant and equip the school leavers with necessary skills needed in industry. So, after independence in 1960, the urge became stronger to fashion out an educational system that would satisfy the nation's desire for united, strong and self-reliant members of the society. This desire and agitations led to several curriculum conferences that culminated in radical reforms in the history of Nigeria at the classrooms and society levels.

### **Beneficiaries of Pedagogical Reforms in Nigeria**

In the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as Indira (2007) asserted, society has witnessed unprecedented technological advancements and these economic, political and socio-cultural changes must be reflected in the school. Education is a process of human enlightenment and empowerment for the achievement of a better and a higher quality of life; a sound and effective system of education results in the continuous development of learner's potentialities, the strengthening of their skills and the fostering of positive interests, attitudes and values. All progressive societies have recognized the enormous potential of education and have committed themselves to the universalisation of education with its explicit aim of providing quality education for all. Education as opined by Mkpa (1987), is supposed to be a problem-solving instrument for the learner and the society. Since society's problems change so must educational system. National Policy on Education - NPE (2004) asserts that education fosters the worth and development of the individual, for each individual's sake, and for the general development of the society. There is need for functional education for the promotion of a progressive, united Nigeria, to this end, school programs need to be relevant, practical and comprehensive, while interest

and ability should determine the individual's direction in education. Nigeria's philosophy of education is based on:

1. The development of the individual into a sound and effective citizen;
2. The full integration of the individual into the community and;
3. The provision of equal access to educational opportunities for all citizens of the country at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels both inside and outside the formal school system.

For the philosophy to be in harmony with Nigeria's national goals, education has to be geared towards self-realization, better human relationship, individual and national efficiency, effective citizenship, national consciousness, national unity, as well as towards social, cultural, economic, political, scientific and technological progress. Therefore, the quality of instruction at all levels has to be oriented towards inculcating respect for the worth and dignity of the individual, faith in man's ability to make rational decisions; shared responsibility for the common good of society; acquisition of competencies necessary for self-reliance (NPE, 2004). In order to achieve or realize the above statements for the learner and society through education, radical reform is the way out.

### **Pedagogical Reforms in a Changing World**

Educational reform is the key to participation in the global economy of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, based on technological revolution in communication and transfer of information as well as major changes in production, distribution and the economic value of knowledge. Education as Achuonye and Ajoku (2003) in Achuonye (2007) put it functions as an agent for the maintenance of social status quo in the society through the transmission of modern ideas, modern strategies of doing things. In an effort to better meet the diverse needs of learners and ultimately of the society, there have been numerous curricular reforms and the introduction of a range of new

approaches and strategies in the class room environment. Every child, youth and adult should be able to benefit from educational opportunities designed to meet their basic learning and personal needs. Achuonye (2007). Obanya (2004) said such needs comprise both essential learning tools (such as literacy, numeracy, oral expression and problem solving) and the basic learning content (such as knowledge, skills, values and attitudes) required by human beings to be able to survive, to develop their full capacities, to live and work in dignity, to participate fully in development to improve the quality of their lives and to make informed decisions. He expressed that the basic learning needs of youths and adults are diverse and should be met through a variety of educational reform programs.

Husain (2004) went further to say that the learner and society need educational reform because it helps to build human potentials, builds upon responsibility, active participation, reflection and flexibility which creates competences that develop active citizens and further democratic behaviour. It gives quality learning that enables the learners to function in various roles as individuals as well as part of the work force which takes place in the school and outside. It is a driving force that helps individuals and society to move from the practice of educational mono culture to a system which recognizes that human beings have a wide range of variety of socially useful talents, all of which should be developed through educational reforms. Dike (1999) and Husain (2004) agreed that we are presently going through phase of transition where one tradition of teaching is giving way to another. They totally condemn the traditional method where the teacher is looked upon as a dispenser of information, a repository of knowledge and data bank, where the learner is only a passive receiver. They opined that the 21<sup>st</sup> century learners no longer require such traditional mode of learning. Achuonye (2007) declared that different theories abound about

the way individuals learn and about how to motivate and manage a class for effective instruction. With the invention of sophisticated equipment and new discoveries that are made every day especially in the field of science, this calls for educational system to make available to learners up-to-date information in any field through scientific instructional materials. And since teaching is an attempt to help the learner acquire a change of attitude, knowledge, idea, a process of helping someone to acquire the problem solving skill, ability to think for themselves, helping the individual learn how to learn so that he not only knows how and where to obtain needed information, but to develop the habit of enquiry and be a lifelong learner. Since the concept of teaching has changed, the aim of teaching has equally changed. There is obvious need to refocus our instructional objectives particularly in this era of unprecedented development in Science and Technology; a period of sporadic information explosion.

#### **ICT as a Veritable Strategy for Pedagogical Reform in Nigeria**

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has become a global phenomenon of great importance and concern in all spheres of human endeavour including education, governance, banking, business, agriculture, commerce, insurance and many others. Globalization in essence has changed the old or traditional ways of doing business especially in the worlds of work and learning. For instance, the introduction of computer Assisted Instruction (CAI) in Nigeria educational system some years back has been rendering tremendous assistance to learners. This is because the learners do not necessarily need the services of a human teacher. The program is designed in such a way as to arouse and maintain the attention and interest of the learner who, to a large extent, works on his/her own. Such learner's interest and attention are aroused and sustained

throughout the lesson through appropriate programming and the stimulus-response chain of activities that characterized the system. CAI packages are such ICT programs that motivate students to learn better and faster.

For education to be effective, it is essential that there be more opportunities for student participation in the learning process, more team work, more self-study, self-evaluation as well as more peer-evaluation and less examination-oriented teaching and learning. At the classroom, the computer affects how we view teaching and learning. It is reflected in students' use of a variety of technological and information resources (e.g. data base, computer networks, videos etc) to gather and synthesize information and to create communication knowledge. Strudler (1991) in Owhotu (2006) has shown that ICT is an essential innovation that should be clearly visible in judgments, and finally to draw together, disparate information into a whole in order to solve problems. It has been stated that for students to foster and supply critical thinking and reasoning, they should be given opportunities in the classroom to use technology. Technology fosters and supports constructivist approach to learning when used as a tool in the process of making meaning and supporting inquiring. As classroom access to information and communication technologies increases and as various amounts of information become available in digital format, students will need to be literate across a variety of communication technologies. Information technology has a critical role in enhancing the learning process at all levels and across a broad range of activities.

Sharma and Sharma (2008) believed that the computer can have a revolutionary effect on all of education, from increasing the occurrence of self-directed learning through computer in the home for changing the relationship of student to teacher in the classroom. Computer exercises according to them, can be developed that bring the learner "into a relationship with his own initiative

knowledge structures" multimedia as explained by Indira (2007) is becoming the principal way of presenting information, allowing information to be presented in different forms and take up less space. In the classroom for instance, two main tasks may be identified in the use of these technologies. The use of ICTs in education can permit both pupils and teachers to acquire skill in the uses of these technologies, particularly in exploiting the computer, because they have become essential everyday tools in contemporary societies. Pupils need to remain in close touch with the reality around them, they need to touch, manipulate, build and experiment with the natural world. Indira (2007) explained that the new technology have enough potential to revolutionize education because it dramatically transforms schools. As he puts it; "for the first time in the history of education, students are proving more adept at mastering delivery systems than their teacher", it is obvious that the monopolies enjoyed by schools as formal education provides will diminish with a lot of educational exposure and experience being provided by ICT. The scope of the new technologies for transforming existing educational provision is enormous and includes the globalization of education, the adaptation of curricular, new teaching materials and the networking of schools". The development of the internet has already had a very significant impact on the structure of higher education provision:

- i. Technological developments are leading to accelerating convergence between education and industry and between formal and non-formal education.
- ii. Business organizations are becoming learning organizations,
- iii. Life-education and training will become increasing the norm,
- iv. Through technology, education is becoming more closely linked to entertainment.

On the part of the teachers, ICTs offer many new possibilities for teacher education. Teachers may learn new forms of

communication through regular use of these technologies. Owhotu (2006) said that ICT can further:

- (i) Improve motivation: promote perseverance and develop self-esteem;
- (ii) Improve the presentation of work: enable pupils to take a greater responsibility for their own learning - enable pupils to explore abstract ideas - encourage the development of problem-solving approaches to learning - facilitate individualized and collaborative approaches;
- (iii) Encourage more emphasis on higher level skills.

With these technologies, the traditional way of organizing teaching/learning activities may change, with many forms being used in different combinations: Individual or whole class work, small group research, out-of-class room activities, such as research in libraries. This leads to change in the organization of the class, the duration of lesson even in the architecture of the school. Indira (2007) believed that this evolution of the teaching/learning process will eventually lead to a transformation of the teaching profession, with new teacher profiles emerging. On the part of the society, there is evidence that the global market is shifting its dependence from a manufacturing economy to an information economy that relies heavily upon quick and efficient communication. Lue (2000) in Owhotu (2006), has highlighted that for any employer to compete for any higher skilled jobs which tend to demand higher pay than blue-collar occupation, employees need to know how to use technologies including the internet to work efficiently in the work environment. In the present day world of work, more emphasis is put on collaborative work team to gather information and make decisions that directly affect job responsibilities and the internet has become the vehicle that most fosters the collaborative atmosphere necessary by making communication among workers more accessible.

Bruce (1997) in Owhotu (2006) explained that today's workers need the skill to gather information from diverse resources, including both traditional and electronic means, and to merge that information to make common connections. To work effectively, Lue and Kinser (2000) explain that employees must be able to communicate. Corporations are thus increasingly using alternative means of communication such as electronic mail and video conferencing, to conduct business with clients around the world. A great majority of job vacancies advertised specify computer/ICT competency as a basic requirement for prospective employees. Employees have therefore made good opportunities provided by ICT to prepare them and make them more competent in the global market. Proper automation and networking in a business environment brings about effective communication among staff and reduces cost in terms of stationery which, in turn, encourages practice of paperless office which most Nigerian business establishments and organizations are striving hard to achieve. Other gains include societal productivity and improved government revenue. ICT has made the world of work more meaningful, much easier, much efficient, and much faster. For instance, in the Banking sector, the splendour and grace of ICT use being displayed has really taken many by surprise. The overwhelming wonders of the internet and e-mail services, as well as the practical networking system has made it possible for ICT complaint banks to offer unprecedented smooth, sophisticated and highly efficient banking services. Bank clientele are now beginning to have more faith in a hitherto unreliable, manually operated banking service. One can now send and receive money from any part of the world in minutes. Technology has made it possible for one to carry all his wealth in a simple smart card (value card).

The introduction of global system of mobile communication (GSM) a few years back had tremendous psychological and economic relief

to Nigerians. This is because Nigerians, especially individual workers and parastatals, pass through various stresses due to poor communication system; people travel the length and breadth of cities to keep business appointments, a situation which simple telephone calls would have solved. The impact of ICT will be felt in all facets of a nation's economy; better education, a competent and creative work force, better products, lower costs, more job opportunities, smarter and low energy consumption, better security equipment among others. Sharma and Sharma (2008) agreed that technology influences all of society in ways greater than most people know. For example "in the coming century, the emergence of a new social frame-work based on telecommunications may be decisive for the way in which economic and social exchanges are conducted, the way knowledge is created and retrieved and the character of the occupation and work in which (people) engage".

### **Role of the Teacher as Implementer of Pedagogical Reforms**

Teachers are said to be the pivot of teaching and learning process. The whole idea of principles and practice of education as opined by Iwuagwu (2006) are firmly anchored on the role of the teacher. Therefore, the contemporary teachers must be adequately equipped with more didactic competences so as to assume their new role as experts in the learning process. In essence the teachers' abilities to exhibit competence that should aim at the development of learners' competencies and qualities at school are anchored on their expertise knowledge and use of technologies. The full benefits of ITC in education will be fully realized at the classroom only when teachers at all levels and in every subject wish to exploit it to help them meet their curriculum objectives and are in a position to do so. This will require all teachers to have a clear understanding of what IT can offer them; the capability to make effective use of it; suitable

curriculum support materials and advice, and sufficient access to appropriate equipment and technical support.

### **Challenges of Implementing ICT Reforms Strategy in Nigeria**

#### ***Availability/accessibility***

Many schools at the primary and secondary levels in Nigeria do not have computer education in their curriculum because the computers are not available to the schools. Even some schools that have it in their curriculum, the students merely undergo a theoretical course without actually having any opportunity to undertake practical training on the ICT equipment. Quality of Teacher Education Program: The quality of teacher education remains the cornerstone of any educational system. Yet, teacher education institutions in Nigeria have not yet effectively responded to the need to integrate information technology throughout the teacher preparation program. Most teacher training institutions in Nigeria lack computer hardware for training purposes: Teachers are only exposed to introductory courses in instructional technology and basic computer knowledge but not on courses that integrate ICT into the teaching of their various subjects.

#### ***Environment***

Micro-electric products like computers thrive best in cool and dust free environment. Many schools do not have enough buildings and classrooms, let alone libraries and laboratories where these computers can be kept and utilized.

#### ***Infrastructural facilities***

For the computer to be fully operational, it would need regular supply of power. This is lacking in so many schools, with the result that installed computers may be idle for most of the time because of power cuts, while frequent fluctuations in power voltage can lead to mechanical breakdown and cause

damage to gadgets. People may resort to power generation or plants but they have to frequently buy diesel or petrol as well as to maintain them. This is an expensive alternative; as a result, many schools may not indulge in ICT.

### ***Cost of computer hardware***

ICT components like computers, photocopiers, fax machines, telephone, etc, are quite expensive to procure. At this stage of the nation's IT development, Nigerians generally do not care which computer they use or what configuration it is made of.

### ***Inertia***

Some teachers are afraid of the ICT innovation. They fear that computers may sooner or later take over their jobs. So, they shy away from them, hence the technophobia syndrome.

### **Prospects of ICT as a Reform Strategy at the Classroom and the Society**

The aforementioned problems do not in any way detract from the potentials role value of ICT in schools and the world of work. Owhotu (2006) pointed out that in the last decades, information communication and technology has become a reality that the whole world has lived with and will definitely live within the future. It has also developed into a think-tank mechanism for networking. In particular, the use of computers and the internet for promoting learning and maximum productivity in any organization will be very significant in the years ahead. Online education and distance learning are already in Nigeria, but the prospects of their use should greatly increase in the years to come. People will learn new skills and knowledge to enrich their lives with more flexibility in terms of location, time committed. Education will simply "travel" to people.

The optimal mobilization of available human resource is a vital factor if ICT is to remain sustainable in Nigeria. It is believed

that nearly all sector of the economy have realized this, especially Education. In most private sector establishments, employment is given to only those who are computer literate since new technologies are closely related to productivity levels of various industries and companies. Many youths have also realized this and have gone ahead to undertake computer education courses at their own expense.

There is likely to be a move from rigid one-time, fulltime, on campus education to diverse programs of lifelong learning. The content of courses will need to assume a more global dimension, with cross-cultural variations becoming more evident. The new educational enterprise will be developed around student outcomes. These changes are likely to lead to the development of outcomes-based education where each learning outcome will be defined, assessment criteria for each outcome will be clearly stated and guidelines for generating evidence of learning achievements will be laid down. Teaching methods and strategies as well as accreditation and certification, will have to change, significantly to meet these new demands. The professor/teacher will no longer dominate the teaching/learning process. Students will assume greater autonomy and responsibility for their learning. The teacher will become more of a coach, animator and co-explorer with his/her pupils. The process of learning will be emphasized more than specific detailed subject content, while learning will become more flexible and interactive.

Nigeria needs and deserves to have education that is functionally productive, politically constructive, philosophically relevant and culturally sensitive. An appropriate mix of education provision in Nigeria will be a combination of private and public actions while at the same time the government and private individuals as well as business organization bear a proportion of the cost of providing education. Therefore, there is the need to consider the idea of charging

certain level of fees to relieve the government of heavy financial burdens, thus shifting part of the costs to the students, their parents, and sponsors. This is particularly so when we consider the fact that demand for education will continue to increase as government financial responsibilities also will forever continue to rise.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The provision which has been made to introduce computer education into the curriculum of secondary and tertiary education in Nigeria as a reform strategy have been seen in the right direction, but it remains for government to do more than it had already done to be able to reap effectively from the inexhaustible prospects offered by ICT. Invariably, for Nigeria as a nation to meet the current challenges and the future expectations of building a strong develop nation through the use of ICT as a reform strategy, a lot is required to be done. Because of need for reform in our educational sector and for a better living for Nigerians through ICT, the Federal Government has declared that a Network of Educational Services Centres in Nigeria (NESCO) Educational System Interactive network should be introduced so that it will close the educational system gaps at all levels that shall be set up to provide a forum for exchange of ideas on the development and use of innovative materials for improvements of education. All States, Teachers Resource Centres, University Institutes of Education, and other professional bodies shall belong to the network of Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

Environment must be created within institutions of learning such that the needed academic staff would be encouraged of stay in the trade of developing the needed manpower for the nation's development. This can be done by way of establishing welfare schemes and adequate remuneration for staff, grants for

research and other academic work, and providing soft loans and bursaries for students. Teacher education shall continue to take cognizance of changes in methodology and in the curriculum. Teachers should be regularly exposed to innovations in their profession (NPE, 2004:40-54). Teachers as suggested by Achuoye (2007) should brace-up, face the challenges of the era by adopting the innovative teaching methods which emphasizes problem solving skill and the ability to think; learning how to learn, cultivating the habit of enquiry and being a life-long learner. State Ministries of Education and the NERDC shall ensure the operation of the network and encourage teachers to participate and develop innovative instructional materials. Fund generating activities by the various institutions, the Education Trust Fund (ETF) intervention programme as well as other special grants released to institutions of learning from both local and external sources have not adequately solved the problem of gross under-funding.

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# 14

## IMPACT OF RAINFALL TRENDS AND VARIATION ON FARMING ACTIVITIES IN YOLA, ADAMAWA STATE, NIGERIA

**Abel Jacob**

Department of Pure and Applied Physics  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
Email: [j.abel@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:j.abel@fuwukari.edu.ng)



### Abstract

Risks associated with rainfall variability are one of the most visible concerns for rain-fed agricultural production in underdeveloped nations. Exploring the trends and variations of rainfall and the risks connected with them is important for developing offsetting strategies. The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of rainfall trends and variation on farming activities in Yola. Daily rainfall and temperature data for Yola were collected from the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) for the period 2008–2018. Man-Kendall's trends test was used to assess the trend of rainfall and temperature in the area. The result revealed that rainfall is increasing in trend with Kendall's tau value of 0.491 and a PValue of 0.043, which is less than the significance level of 0.05. Farmers are therefore advised to avoid farming in waterways and low-lying areas to mitigate flooding and crop destruction.

**Keywords:** Rainfall, Variability, Temperature, Flooding.

### Introduction

Agriculture plays a central role in the lives of the people of Yola. About 90% of the rural population is engaged in agriculture, which is largely subsistent and comes from numerous small farms. The small farm holdings depend on the amount of water received during the rainy season. Ati (2005) observes that one of the two limiting factors to agricultural production next to soil fertility is the insufficiency of water supply. Adebayo and Adebayo (1997) stated that, precipitation effectiveness indices are major control of crop yield in West Africa Savannah region. It is not only the total amount of rainfall that matters, but how effective the rain in terms of its time of occurrence, spread, intensity, frequency and availability as soil moisture (Binbol and Zemba, 2007)

Rainfall usually determines the type of crop to be grown in different environment as well as the type of agricultural system to be practiced in different localities. Thus, it directly affect crop production and can alter the

distribution of agro-ecological zones. Rainfall variability impacts the soil's water availability to crops, causing reduced crop production. In particular, annual and seasonal rainfall information is important to overcome the social and economic problems for farmers who entirely depend on rainfall. The amount and distribution of rainfall have a significant impact on the environment and a variety of socioeconomic activities. Crop development and yield are highly dependent on the amount of rainfall experienced during the growing season (Umar, 2010; Odjugo, 2010; Mawunya et al., 2011; Sobowale et al., 2016). Due to high rate of rain-fed agriculture, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, food insecurity is a problem as the population grows. Any change in the climate over time, whether brought on by human action or natural variability, is referred to as climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, 2001a; 2001b). Climate change lowers crop yields and net farm profits and jeopardises food security in

low-income economies, particularly those in Africa, through increasing temperatures, decreased rainfall, and increased rainfall unpredictability (FAO, 2007). The world was forewarned at the just finished 10th IPCC WG II and 38th IPCC Sessions in Yokohama, Japan, that the effects of climate change are causing changes in rainfall and temperature. The variations in indices of daily temperature and rainfall extremes for the years 1971 - 2010 were examined by Abdussalam, (2015), using climate records from 6 locations in northwest Nigeria. It showed that warm days have increased significantly while cold days have decreased significantly. Compared to the declines in the number of cold days, the rising trends in warm days are far more pronounced. On the other hand, the total amount of precipitation has increased. Increased global warming can cause large-scale climatic disturbances, which could ultimately have a significant impact on rainfall in the Sahel (Biasutti and Giannini, 2006).

Rain fed crop production is adversely affected by rainfall variability with its associated risks such as delay in onset, early cessation, and dry spells over the growing season (Bahiru et al., 2020; Mugalavai et al., 2008). Early onset of the rainy season gives the chance of early planting and crop germination. However, there is risk of total seedling failure (false start) if it is followed by long dry spells (Kipkorir et al., 2007). Similarly, delay onset and early cessation of a rainy season shorten the crop growing period resulting in low crop yield and affecting the food security of subsistence farmers (Mugalavai et al., 2008). Furthermore, dry spells appearing during crop growing periods especially at sensitive growth stage affect growth and productivity of crops (Muluneh et al., 2017). This study therefore investigated the impact of rainfall trends and variation on farming activities in Yola with a view to proffering advice and solutions

### **Study Area**

Yola is the capital of Adamawa state. The city is located at a height of 190.5m and has the coordinates 09°14'N and 12°28'W. On the upper Benue trough is where Yola is situated. Yola has a tropical wet climate, often known as a tropical hinterland climate; locally, the high plateau climate is used to describe the climate in Yola. The climate conforms to Koppen's categorization system. Moderate temperatures are present. The average temperature is 30.5 C. During some months' especially those that fall within the dry season, the temperature ranges from roughly 27.0°C to 42.8°C. Yola experiences about 2954 mean sunlight hours annually. The yearly rainfall ranges from 450 to 1500 mm, and the relative humidity is modest. Every year, the wet seasons last for around six months. Thick vegetation grows on the windward sides, whereas sparse small trees and tiny grasses grow on the leeward sides (Budnuk, 2015). Yola has 336648 residents (NPC, 2010) and farmers make up the majority of this population

### **Materials and Methods**

The materials used for this research work are the data on maximum and minimum monthly temperature and annual rainfall. These data were obtained from the archive of Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet)

### **Mann-Kendall Test**

The Mann-Kendall test is a non-parametric test for identifying trends in time series data. The test compares the relative magnitudes of sample data rather than the data values themselves (Gilbert, 1987). One benefit of this test is that the data need not conform to any particular distribution. Moreover, data reported as non-detects can be included by assigning them a common value that is smaller than the smallest measured value in the data set. The procedure that will be described in the subsequent paragraphs assumes that there exists only one data value per time period.

When multiple data points exist for a single time period, the median value is used. The non-parametric Mann-Kendall test is commonly employed to detect monotonic trends in series of environmental data, climate data. Mann Kendall test is a statistical test widely used for the analysis of trend in climatology time series. There are two

advantages of using this test. First, it is a nonparametric test and does not require the data to be normally distributed. Second, the test has low sensitivity to abrupt breaks due to inhomogeneous time series. The data values are evaluated as an ordered time series. Each data value is compared to all subsequent data value.

### Result and Discussions

Table 1. Annual value of Rainfall, mean maximum temperature and mean minimum temperature

| YEAR | ANNUAL RAINFALL (mm) | Mean Annual Maximum Temp (°C) | Mean Annual Minimum Temp (°C) |
|------|----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|      |                      | 2008                          | 468.5                         |
| 2009 | 718.1                | 35.3                          | 23.3                          |
| 2010 | 857.3                | 35.7                          | 23.4                          |
| 2011 | 566.9                | 35.3                          | 23.5                          |
| 2012 | 910.0                | 35.0                          | 23.1                          |
| 2013 | 653.9                | 36.0                          | 23.3                          |
| 2014 | 804.0                | 35.1                          | 22.9                          |
| 2015 | 691.2                | 35.7                          | 22.4                          |
| 2016 | 1079.9               | 35.2                          | 25.0                          |
| 2017 | 909.7                | 35.7                          | 23.8                          |
| 2018 | 939.7                | 34.6                          | 24.0                          |

### Analysis of temperature:

The man Kendall’s trend test analysis of maximum temperature within the period of investigation 1908 - 2018 is shown below.

The trend test show that maximum temperature with Kendall’s tau value of –

0.17.0 was decreasing though the decrease was not significant because the computed PValue of 0.528 is greater than the confidence level of 0.05

### Summary statistics

| Variable | Observations | Obs. with missing data | Obs. without missing data | Minimum | Maximum | Mean   | Std. deviation |
|----------|--------------|------------------------|---------------------------|---------|---------|--------|----------------|
| MAX TEMP | 11           | 0                      | 11                        | 34.600  | 36.000  | 35.364 | 0.396          |

### Mann-Kendall trend test / Two-tailed test (MAX TEMP)

|                      |         |
|----------------------|---------|
| Kendall's tau        | -0.170  |
| S                    | -9      |
| Var(S)               | 160.333 |
| p-value (Two-tailed) | 0.528   |
| alpha                | 0.05    |

An approximation has been used to compute the p-value.




Fig 1: Graphical illustration of maximum temperature variation

The summary statistics for minimum temperature within the period of study (1908 - 2018), shows that the minimum temperature with Kendall's tau value of 0.073 was

increasing though the increase was not significant because the computed PValue of 0.815 is greater than the confidence level value of 0.05

### Summary statistics

| Variable | Observations | Obs. with missing data | Obs. without missing data | Minimum | Maximum | Mean   | Std. deviation |
|----------|--------------|------------------------|---------------------------|---------|---------|--------|----------------|
| MIN TEMP | 11           | 0                      | 11                        | 22.400  | 25.000  | 23.491 | 0.667          |

### Mann-Kendall trend test / Two-tailed test (MIN TEMP)

|                      |         |
|----------------------|---------|
| Kendall's tau        | 0.073   |
| S                    | 4       |
| Var(S)               | 164.000 |
| p-value (Two-tailed) | 0.815   |
| Alpha                | 0.05    |




Fig 2: Graphical illustration of minimum temperature variation

### Analysis of rainfall

The Man Kendall’s trend test analysis of rainfall within the study period (2008 - 2018) is shown below. The trend test shows that rainfall increased within the period under

investigation with Kendall’s tau value of 0.0491 since the computed Pvalue of 0.043 is smaller than the confidence level value of 0.05.

### Summary statistics

| Variable | Observations | Obs. with missing data | Obs. without missing data | Minimum | Maximum  | Mean    | Std. deviation |
|----------|--------------|------------------------|---------------------------|---------|----------|---------|----------------|
| RAINFALL | 11           | 0                      | 11                        | 468.500 | 1079.900 | 781.745 | 180.484        |

### Mann-Kendall trend test / Two-tailed test (RAINFALL)

|                      |              |
|----------------------|--------------|
| Kendall's tau        | 0.491        |
| S                    | 27           |
| Var(S)               | 165.000      |
| p-value (Two-tailed) | <b>0.043</b> |
| alpha                | 0.05         |

An approximation has been used to compute the p-value.




Fig 3: Graphical illustration of Rainfall Variation

### Discussion of Results

The minimum and maximum temperatures did not show any significant increase or decrease within the period of investigation. However, they maintained their high values, which are prevalent in the study area. In 2016, the highest amount of annual rainfall of 1079.9mm was recorded. The same year, the maximum mean annual value of the minimum temperature of 25°C was recorded. Similarly, the year 2018 recorded the next highest amount of 939.7mm of annual rainfall. The same year, the next highest amount of 24°C of minimum annual mean temperature was also recorded (Table 1). Therefore, a conclusion is drawn that the warmer the year, the higher the rainfall (IPCC, 2013).

Analysis of rainfall trends and variation show that rainfall increased within the period under investigation with Kendall's tau value of 0.491 and computed Pvalue of 0.043 which is less than the confidence level value of 0.05. These results indicates that as the region is becoming warmer, rainfall is likely to be on the increase. Therefore, farmers are advised

against farming on water ways and low lying areas to mitigate flooding and destruction of crops to ensure food security in the area. Another finding of this work is that there is no significant change in the period of onset and cessation of rainfall within the years investigated. In this regard, farmers are advised to maintain the farming season in the area.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The temporal trend, characteristics, and variability of rainfall and temperature over Yola have been investigated in this research using eleven-year period data. Significant variations and trends in rainfall and temperature for every year during the eleven-year period were found. It was concluded that both maximum and minimum temperatures did not continue to increase, remain constant, or decrease but varied with time; however, there was a net increase in the amount of annual rainfall within the period despite the variation in the amount of annual rainfall.

There is also no significant change in the period of onset and cessation of rainfall within the period of the study. In this regard, farmers in this region are advised to maintain their normal period of farming activities, i.e., their planting, and harvesting periods.

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# 15

## ENTREPRENEURIAL INTENTION AND CYBERLOAFING BEHAVIOUR AMONG FEDERAL UNIVERSITY WUKARI STAFF

**Kelly Osariemen Okpamen**

**Akissani Leviticus Apayiwu**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *kellyokpamen@gmail.com*



### Abstract

The introduction of internet into work operation is one of the hallmarks of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR), as this innovation is globally celebrated, it also come with its own challenges of workers distraction and counterproductive work behaviour. This study examined the predicting role of Entrepreneurial intention on Cyberloafing behaviour among staff of Federal University Wukari. The study employ a Cross Sectional survey design and a total of 307 participants consisting of 192 (62.6%) males and 115 (37.4%) females with ages ranging from 18-58 years (Mean age =21.97, SD=15.30) were used for the study. The Entrepreneurial intention scale, and Cyberloafing Scale were used for data collection. Linear Regression Statistical analysis was used to analyse the data. Findings showed that, Entrepreneurial intention had a significant positive influence on cyberloafing behaviour among staff of Federal University Wukari. The study therefore recommend that, the university management should seek technological solutions and encourage employees to use their entrepreneurial drive in a more productive and beneficial ways which include things like offering employees opportunities to work on creative projects or new initiatives, and creating an internal “incubator” program where staff can develop, and pitch new ideas.

**Keywords:** Entrepreneurship, cyberloafing, Fourth Industrial Revolution, gender

### Introduction

The Fourth Industrial Revolution, or 4IR, is the next stage in the digitization of the industrial sector, driven by transformative developments such as increased data and connectivity, analytics, human-machine interaction, and robotics advancements. The introduction of internet into work operation is a globally celebrated invention that also comes with some worrisome challenges of cyberloafing on a job. Cyberloafing is the term used to described accessing the internet while at work to perform none work-related activities. These activities include browsing none work related site, receiving and sending non-work related emails, interacting on social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, watching and downloading of movies or even searching

for appliances, shopping online, visiting betting sites, adult sites, and online window shopping, reading news, and following political trends (Ayebi-Arthur, Arhin, & Aidoo, 2021). Cyberloafing is a slang phrase that originated in the 1990s during the technological revolution. While there are some advantages to positive aspects of internet usage among employees, especially those working in the Educational sector, many organisations spend time, money, and effort monitoring computer usage, policing what employees do online, and developing policies for employees on acceptable internet behaviour. The act of cyberloafing on the job has been further increased in this 4IR by the introduction of affordable and sophisticated features of smart phones and tablets capable of performing any

online activity. As a result, what was formerly a conscious and dedicated effort has become an unconscious trend in the workplace with everyone having access to a mobile device (Abubakar, Abubakar, & Yusuf, 2019; Umokoro et al., 2019).

The questions of while will people engaged in cyberloafing at work can be determine by numerous factors that may be situational or a personality factor. One of this factor could also be a future desire and ambition, which could be entrepreneurial intention of employees. Entrepreneurial intention is the process of conceiving an idea to create something new with value by devoting the necessary time and effort, assuming the accompanying financial, psychic, and social risks, and receiving the resulting rewards of monetary and personal satisfaction and independence (Hensel & Kacprzak, 2020). Entrepreneurial intention is a strong indicator of entrepreneurship (DeLara, 2017) and can be influenced by circumstantial reasons, personal interests, and environmental factors that shape and control a person's thoughts and behaviour (Aku, 2017).

Entrepreneurial intention is about people, their choices, actions, and attitude in starting a new business, creating wealth, which is the major source of generating employment opportunities, economic growth, innovation, promotion of products, services, quality, competition, and economic flexibility in today's society (Harju, Schaufeli, & Hakanen, 2018). In other words, entrepreneurial intention is a mental state that directs a person's attention, experience, and behaviour towards a specific object or method of behaving. It is also seen as a state of mind that directs individual acts in the creation and development of a new business or entrepreneurial activity. It is a valid technique for anticipating individual entrepreneurial behaviours and might be interpreted as individuals' purpose to engage in a planned hazardous behaviour that would result in a positive outcome when establishing a new

firm (Huniksri, 2012; Wu & Ugrin, 2018). Many employees are natural entrepreneurs, and this burning ambition can drive them to move towards accomplishing such goals, regardless of when or where the possibilities present themselves.

However, cyberloafing on the job can cause insecurity to life and property, as well as psychological trauma that may be directly or indirectly linked to danger associated with the activities of surfing the internet at work, such as identity theft, loss of classified information, students database hacking, information for kidnappers, fraud stars, and many more, which could have a direct or indirect impact on the FUW University staff productivity if not address. Researchers (Aku, 2017; Ezeh, Etotide, & Chukura, 2018; Umukoro et al., 2019) investigated the various explanations of this trending counterproductive behaviour from both a personality and a situational standpoint. This study therefore examine this behaviour from a personality standpoint, such as staff entrepreneurial intention. This study therefore aim to investigate entrepreneurial intention as a predictor of cyberloafing behaviour among staff of Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria. And therefore, recommend actionable solutions.

### **Literature Review**

Entrepreneurial intention is the desire to start one's own business, which is influenced by both personal and environmental circumstances (Adamu, 2017). According to Ajzen (1991), the choice to found a new company is typically preceded by an intention to do so and is therefore presumed to have been planned for some time. This purpose, however, may not always be developed prior to the final decision, and it may also never result in the behaviour intended. Therefore, it is believed that entrepreneurial inclinations can predict a person's decision to start their own business. According to psychological studies, intention has a key role in predicting future intended behaviour (Bakker &

Demerouti,2007). A choice to start a new company venture that is planned rather than conditioned is therefore said to have entrepreneurial ambition, this ambition in most cases will lead to engaging in cyberloafing behaviour irrespective of where one find his or selves. Again, because of one's own competence and self-efficacy, a person may have the capacity to become an entrepreneur, but they may not do so due to a lack of intention (Isiwa & Onwuka, 2017).

According to Remeikiene and Startiene (2013), entrepreneurial intention is the growing conscious state of mind that a person has when they want to create a new firm or build new core values inside an existing organization. As a result, theories dealing with "human intention" are the appropriate theories to employ while developing the conceptual underpinning for this thesis. Isiwa and Onwuka, (2017) defined entrepreneurial intention as the point at which a person intends to establish a firm or venture, making it a more significant predictor of future entrepreneurial activity than characteristic and demographic models. The actual behaviour that is engaged in is influenced by intention. Being entrepreneurial is largely dependent on one's intentions (Fischer & Antonakis, 2017). That is to say that, engaging in cyberloafing can be fuel by the intention especially if what the employee is loafing on has connection with the future business intention. According to Bird (1988), intention is a mental state that directs a person's attention, experiences, and behaviour toward a certain thing or way of acting, which at times explain staff reasons for loafing. This further shows that entrepreneurial intention serves as a perceptual screen for observing connections, resources, and exchanges and guides key strategic thinking and decisions.

Entrepreneurial intention is defined as the conscious state of mind that directs personal attention, experience, and behaviour toward planned entrepreneurial behaviour which can be seen as the strongest proximal factor of

entrepreneurial activity (Bird, 1988: Adamu, 2017).

Individual's entrepreneurial intention is the important variable that fuel the entrepreneurial behaviour. Goldstein (2011) see entrepreneurial intention as a mental orientation such as desire, wish and hope influencing their choice of entrepreneurship. Thompson (2009) posited that, entrepreneurial intention as self-acknowledged conviction by a person that intends to set up a new business venture and consciously plans and do things that can lead to actualization of this plan, this may include cyberloafing. The strong influence of intention to behaviour cannot be underestimated, the more personal and specific our intentions are the more likely they are to influence our behaviour. In this regard, entrepreneurial intention can be determined based on the degree of willingness and ability of individual or group of persons to set up business in future, this drive and zeal pushes people to engage in activities like cyberloafing even though it un-ethical (Isiwa & Onwuka, 2017).

Entrepreneurial intention may alternatively be defined as the cognitive representation of the actions that individuals intend to take in order to build new independent ventures or to create new value inside current businesses. Perhaps no one would start a firm in a vacuum or by mistake; he or she would have had an intention first (Isiwa & Onwuka, 2017: Adamu, 2017). Entrepreneurial intention, according to Duckworth, and Seligman, (2005), entrepreneurial intention is a conscious state of mind that directs human attention, experience, and behaviour toward intended entrepreneurial behaviour. According to Adamu (2017), entrepreneurial intention is an individual's propensity to engage in entrepreneurial activities in the three primary factors that eventually determine intentions and behaviour: a person's attitude toward behaviour, social pressure/influence, and perceived control. When all of these qualities are favorable, an individual is more likely to

want to engage in entrepreneurial activity, work for themselves, or start a new firm (Dicke, Stebner., Linninger, 2018). It typically entails interior thought or cognitive processes, ambition, and the desire to stand on one's own (Zain, Akram, & Ghani, 2010). An individual may have the ability to become an entrepreneur, but unless they have such aspirations, they will not make any serious efforts that can lead to entrepreneurship.

Entrepreneurial intention, according to Guerrero, Rialp, and Urbano (2008), is a state of mind in which people aspire to establish a new firm or a new value driver within existing organizations. A number of researchers have defined the construct to represent their perspective of entrepreneurial intention as a driving driver of entrepreneurial action. According to Dicke, Stebner, Linninger, (2018), entrepreneurial intention is defined as the quest for information that can be used to help achieve the goal of venture development. It is characterized as perceived desirability and feasibility, as well as the proclivity to act on possibilities (Peterman & Kennedy, 2003). Delle and Amadu (2015) see entrepreneurial intention as an individual's willingness, desire, and aptitude to engage in entrepreneurial behaviours or build a firm that is relevant to the individual, others, and society as a whole. Individuals' inclination to engage in entrepreneurial behaviour, engage in entrepreneurial action, be self-employed, or develop new businesses (Dell, 2008; Dhose & Walter, 2010). FUW Staff may have nurse an ambition to become an entrepreneur before joining the organisation but lack capital to start. This ambition don't just go away because one is working somewhere. For such individual, the availability of free internet can fuel his entrepreneurial goal by engaging in cyberloafing behaviour during work.

Cyberloafing is the act of using organisational provided internet resource for personal used (Umukoro *et al.*, 2019). La Rose (2010) see the internet being a major source of entertainment, is used to make life easier.

Spending time on the internet, or personal usage of the internet is called cyberloafing. The concept of cyberloafing was associated with professional life for the first time. The fact that employees devote time to reading, sending and receiving personal e-mail activities during their working hours, social networking activities such as Instagram, Facebook.

Twitter, downloading or opening music files are counted as factors of cyberloafing behaviour. According to Blanchard and Henle (2008), they distinguish two types of cyberloafing: minor and major. Minor cyberloafing is defined as "sending and receiving private email at work, as well as surfing mainstream news and financial websites and shopping online" (Blanchard & Henle, 2008). Serious cyberloafing entails "visiting adult-oriented web sites, maintaining one's own web site, and interacting with others online through chat rooms, blogs, and personal ads, gambling online, and downloading music" (Blanchard & Henle, 2008). Minor Cyberloafers' behaviour is influenced by their colleagues' attitudes toward Cyberloafing. In other words, the amount of minor Cyberloafing is proportional to how other employees perceive it. Serious cyberloafing, on the other hand, is less influenced by their colleagues' opinions because these employees are already aware of their Mis-behaviour.

For a better understanding of the study, the study is founded on the principle of social exchange theory of Homans, (1958). Social exchange theory (Roeckelein, 2018) is a sociological and psychological theory that investigates social behaviour in the interplay of two settings or circumstances that use a cost-benefit analysis to discover reasons for engaging in behaviour. The main premise of social exchange theory is that people make decisions by consciously or unconsciously weighing the costs and benefits of an action, with the goal of maximizing their return. This rational thinking of weighing cost and benefit

can determined human action and fuel a cyberloafing behaviour.

#### Entrepreneurial Intention and Cyberloafing

The effects of cyberloafing on entrepreneurship and organizational identification in tourism firms are investigated by Kaptangil, Asan, and Kinay (2021). Field research was undertaken on hotel management workers in the Turkish cities. The questionnaire data was examined using factor analysis and Partial Least Squares Structural Modeling (PLS). According to the findings, cyberloafing has a limited and relatively minor impact on entrepreneurship and organizational identification. The study's findings contribute to the literature on organizational behaviour in the context of cyberloafing and make recommendations to hotel managers. This current study differs from this because the variable cyberloafing was used as a predictor variable.

Chavan, Galperin, Ostle, and Behl (2021) investigates 'Millennials' perspectives of cyberloafing as a type of workplace misbehaviour and entrepreneurship purpose. A total of 90 semi-structured interviews were performed using a qualitative research approach. According to the findings, Millennials consider cyberloafing to be a minor type of professional misbehaviour and a social and cultural norm among their generation. Cyberloafing was viewed as a strategy for accelerating productivity and increasing long-term entrepreneurship ambition. Other themes that emerged included cyberloafing as a stress reliever and an escape from boredom. Many respondents excused their behaviour by claiming that cyberloafing has become an ingrained habit and is a smart requirement in today's competitive environment, as well as beneficial to business. Our findings show that firms will need to adopt policies in conjunction with Millennials to strike a balance between deterrent and laissez-faire policies in order to combat this threat, which is losing

organizations millions of dollars in productivity.

Yeh, Lin, Wang, Wang, and Lo (2021) investigate the effects of Internet entrepreneurial self-efficacy on the relationships between entrepreneurial education and entrepreneurial work industriousness in the context of Internet entrepreneurship and use the four dimensions of the Balanced Scorecard to determine entrepreneurial work industriousness. The Partial Least Squares Structural Equation technique was used to evaluate data from a sample of 160 current entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial education was discovered to positively promote Internet entrepreneurial self-efficacy, hence contributing to the four Internet entrepreneurial work industriousness metrics (financial, customer, internal, and learning and growth). According to the findings of the mediation studies, Internet entrepreneurial self-efficacy completely mediates the association between entrepreneurial education and the four aspects of Internet entrepreneurial work industriousness. However, no direct effect of entrepreneurial education on the four dimensions of Internet entrepreneurial zeal was discovered. This research is a ground-breaking effort to establish the nomological validity of the Internet entrepreneurial self-efficacy scale and to lay the theoretical groundwork for Internet entrepreneurship in terms of Internet entrepreneurial self-efficacy. The findings have several major theoretical and practical implications for the management and education of Internet entrepreneurs.

Based on the review of literature, the below assumption share be tested;

Entrepreneurial intension will significantly influence cyberloafing behaviour among staff of Federal University Wukari.

#### **Research Methodology**

The researcher employed a cross-sectional survey to investigate entrepreneurial intention and cyberloafing among staff of Federal

University Wukari. A cross-sectional study is a type of research design in which information is gathered from a large number of people all at once. Variables are monitored without being modified in cross-sectional research.

The research was conducted with some selected staff of Federal University Wukari. Federal University is one of the nine Federal Universities established in 2011. The university is located in Wukari town, Wukari Local Government area of Taraba State, Nigeria. The University currently has thirteen (13) Faculties with 54 academic programmes.

The population of the study comprised all the 3458 employees of Federal University Wukari, Taraba, Nigeria. A sample size of 307 were determined using Krejcie and Morgan's (1970) sample size table.

The participants for the study are three hundred and seven (307) Federal University Wukari staff randomly selected across faculties of the University. They consist of staff of varying ages, sex, ethnic nationalities and religion. They included: 192 (62.6%) males and 115 (37.4%) females with ages ranging from 18-48 years. Their ranks shows 197(64.2%) were Senior Staff and 110(36.8%) Junior staff. 206(67.4%) Christians and 90(40.4%) Muslims and 11(3.1%) Others. For their marital status 182(59.3.1%) Married, 123(38.6%) Single and 2(0.6%) divorced. Finally, for their educational qualification 34(11.1%) O level, 123(40.2%) First Degree and 150(48.7%) had second degrees and above respectively.

### Instruments

**Entrepreneurial Intention Scale:** Linan and Chen (2006) created an 11-item scale to assess entrepreneurial intention. The items were anchored on a five-point Likert scale with response patterns such as (5) completely agree; (4) slightly agree; (3) Neutral; (2) Partially agree; (1) Completely disagree. The scale assesses entrepreneurial purpose as a single concept. However, the reliability of this scale for the study population was pilot tested with 50 Federal University Wukari IT

professionals. A factor loading analysis evaluates its fitness with all components loading greater than 0.50.

**Cyberloafing Scale:** this is a self-developed scale that is designed to measure Cyberloafing activities in the context of Fintech Organizations. The instrument was developed and validated through an exploratory study using a sample of ICT staff with internet access in the Universities. The scale has 20 items that measure two domains of Fintech staff Cyberloafing activities (none work related general browsing and interactive media). 14 items with items total correlated value above .30 with eigenvalue above 1.0 were retained for this subscale. The instrument yielded a high Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .69 for interactive media indicating that it is highly reliable. For now-work related general browsing subscale, 6 items with items total correlated value above 0.30 with eigenvalue above 1.0 were retained for this subscale, the Cronbach's alpha value is 0.79 indicating that the subscale is reliable. For the overall Cyberloafing scale, a Cronbach's alpha reliability of 0.84 was obtained. The scale outlines various cyber activities with respondents expected to indicate the extent to which they are involved in such activities during work periods. The Items are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from "not at all = 1" to "a great deal = 5." For the purpose of this study, the scale was pilot tested and .82 alpha value were reported.

### Procedures

The researcher got approval from the University management for the study as well as permission from the various respondents through consent letters. For the purpose of data collection, two standardized instruments were utilized, they are: The Organizational Justice Scale, and Cyberloafing Scale. The researcher send the link of E-copies of the questionnaire to staff social media platform. The participants who responded and the responses were sent back to the researcher

online via Google form; the Google form was design in such a way that, it can only give access to respondents who have internet connection at work and their job role does not involve using the social media. Although, the response rate of 100% were exceeded, therefore the first 100% responses were extracted and inputted into SPSS for the analysis. Furthermore, the researcher adequately trains two research assistants who are MSc graduates with the proficiency skills in data extraction and entry into the SPSS, they extract the responses from the Google forms

and impute it into SPSS for the purpose of data analysis.

### Data Analysis

First, descriptive statistics was conducted for the socio demographic variables, furthermore, correlation matrix were used to test the inter-correlations of the study variables. And finally, Standard Linear Regression Analysis was used to examine the influence of entrepreneurial intension on cyberloafing among Federal University Wukari staff.

## Result

**Table 1: showing the inter-correlations of study variables**

| S/N | Variable     | X       | Sd    | 1     | 2    | 3      | 4      | 5     | 6     | 7     | 8 |
|-----|--------------|---------|-------|-------|------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|---|
| 1   | Sex          | 1.374   | .484  | -     |      |        |        |       |       |       |   |
| 2   | Age          | 32.5    | 6.73  | .068  | -    |        |        |       |       |       |   |
| 3   | Rank         | 55.51   | 13.51 | -.19  | .077 | -      |        |       |       |       |   |
| 4   | Religion     | 78.90   | 30.35 | -.13  | .066 | .341*  | -      |       |       |       |   |
| 5   | Enterpren    | 71.29   | 19.03 | .052  | .046 | .105*  | .114*  | -     |       |       |   |
| 6   | IM           | 63.55   | 17.04 | .86   | .66  | .322** | .334** | .543  | -     |       |   |
| 7   | NWRB         | 72.22   | 22.13 | .44   | .445 | .324*  | .543** | .342* | .233* | -     |   |
| 8   | Cyberloafing | 60.94** | 16.70 | -.007 | .050 | .234   | .177** | .249* | .032  | .321* | - |

Source: outcome of field work 202

### Hypothesis

The hypothesis state that, Entrepreneurial intension will significantly influence cyberloafing behaviour among staff of Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria.

Table 2: Showing summary of Regression analysis of the influence of entrepreneurial intension on Cyberloafing behaviour (non-work related browsing and interactive media) among staff of Federal University Wukari

| DV   | Predictor                 | R    | R <sup>2</sup> | F      | $\beta$ | T      | Sig  | P    |
|------|---------------------------|------|----------------|--------|---------|--------|------|------|
| NWRB | Constant                  | .171 | .029           | 10.696 |         | 11.519 | .000 | <.05 |
|      | Entrepreneurial Intention |      |                |        | .171    | 3.270  | .000 | <.05 |
| IM   | Constant                  | .144 | .021           | 7.580  |         | 11.519 | .000 | <.05 |
|      | Entrepreneurial Intention |      |                |        | .144    | 2.753  | .006 | <.05 |
| CYB  | Constant                  | .270 | .073           | 27.976 |         | 40.664 | .000 | <.05 |
|      | Entrepreneurial Intention |      |                |        | .270    | 5.289  | .000 | <.05 |

Source: 2023 fieldwork

The results in Table 2 revealed that entrepreneurial intension positively and significantly has influence on non-work-

related general browsing dimension of cyberloafing among staff of Federal University Wukari ( $\beta = .171$ ;  $t = 3.270$ ;  $p < .01$ ).

Entrepreneurial intention positively accounted for 17.1% of the total variance observed in non-work-related general browsing (NWRB) dimension of cyberloafing among staff of selected Federal University Wukari. This means that staff who nursed entrepreneurial intention will be more likely to engage in non-work-related general browsing during work hours in pursuit of their dream.

Furthermore, the results in Table 2 also revealed that entrepreneurial intention has a significantly influence on interactive media dimension of cyberloafing among staff of Federal University Wukari ( $\beta = .144$ ;  $t = 2.753$ ;  $p < .05$ ). Entrepreneurial intention positively accounted for 14.4% of the total variance observed in interactive media dimension of cyberloafing among staff of Federal University Wukari. This implies that Federal University Wukari staff who nursed entrepreneurial intention will be more likely to engage in interactive media (social media) during work hours in pursuit of their entrepreneurial goal.

Above all, the results in Table 2 shows that entrepreneurial intention has a positively significantly influence on cyberloafing among staff of Federal University Wukari ( $\beta = .270$ ;  $t = 5.289$ ;  $p < .01$ ). Entrepreneurial intention positively accounted for 27% of the total variance observed in cyberloafing (NWRB & interactive media) among staff of Federal University Wukari. This means that FUW staff who nursed entrepreneurial intention will be likely to engage in non-work-related general browsing and interactive media (social media) during work hours in pursuant of their entrepreneurial goal. Based on this result therefore, the hypothesis is hereby confirmed.

### **Discussion of Results**

The hypothesis states that there will be a significant influence of entrepreneurial intentions on Cyberloafing behaviour (non-work related and interactive media) among staff of Federal University Wukari, the hypothesis was tested with simple linear regression, and the findings shows that first,

entrepreneurial intention has a significant influence on now work-related general browsing dimension of cyberloafing among staff of Federal University Wukari. This means that an FUW staff that has a future plan of going into business will likely seize every opportunity available to him to cyberloaf, most especially if the content he surfs the internet about has a direct link to the intended business. On the other hand, FUW staff without entrepreneurial intention was found to less cyberloaf. That is FUW staff without an entrepreneurial intention may less likely to cyberloaf because, reason be that they're simply not interested in starting their own business, so they're not motivated to use work time for personal entrepreneurial purposes. Another reason could be that they have a strong sense of loyalty to their current employer and don't want to take advantage of their work time. Another reason why FUW staff without an entrepreneurial intention might be less likely to cyberloaf could be that they're more focused on their current job and less interested in exploring other opportunities. They may feel satisfied with their current job and don't feel the need to look for other options. Another reason could be that they're more concerned about the consequences of getting caught cyberloafing, and so they choose not to engage in the behaviour.

Reasons why FUW Staff with entrepreneur intension may cybeloaf on their job is that, this category of employees might feel a greater sense of urgency to explore other opportunities. They may feel that their current job is not providing them with the growth or challenges they're looking for, and so they're more likely to take advantage of any opportunity to explore other options. Another reason could be that they're more willing to take risks, and so they're more likely to engage in behaviours that could potentially get them in trouble, such as cyberloafing, one other reason could be that they're looking for new ideas or inspiration for their business. For



example, they may be surfing the internet for information about new business models, new products, or new marketing strategies. This finding is supported by the finding of Samadi-Miarkolaei and Samadi-Miarkolaei (2020) where they establish an adverse link between entrepreneurial intention and cyberloafing.

However, for a staff with business intention, there are a few potential implications. One is that surfing the internet for new ideas could actually be beneficial for the employee's job performance. For example, they may be able to bring new ideas back to their job and make a positive contribution to the institution. Moreover, it's also possible that surfing the internet could be distracting and reduce the staff productivity and exposed them to danger that may cost the staff or the institution a great deal, other positive implications will depend on the employee's level of job satisfaction and the extent to which they're using the internet productively. For example, if the employee is highly satisfied with their job and is using the internet to find new ideas on how to improve on his job, the institution could benefit from it. However, if the employee is highly entrepreneurial in nature and dissatisfied with his current job, he may use the internet to pass time during work, and that way the institution will suffer a great loss in productivity and efficiency. This finding can further be buttressed with the social exchange theory (SET) which says employee behaviour in accordance with their expectation, by weighing their input to their organisation against the output they received. An entrepreneurial staff may cyberloafing if he feels his pay does not worth his time.

In addition, the finding also shows that entrepreneurial intention also has a significant connection with a FUW staff involving in interactive media (IM) dimension of cyberloafing, such as chatting during work hours, facebooking, gaming and making video calls during work hour. This implies that, a staff whose intentions is to go into business in future may engage in cyberloafing during work hour

even with the knowledge of the fact that is unethical. This zeal and passion to become an entrepreneur can be so pushing that a staff may ignore the ethical implications of cyberloafing on a job. This finding also tallies with the finding of Kaptangil, Asan and Kinay (2021) and similar with Yeh, Lin, Wang, Wang and Lo (2021) where both studies established the link between entrepreneurial intention and the act of cyberloafing at work, though in different work settings.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Based on the findings of this study, it can be concluded that entrepreneurial intention is an important promoter of cyberloafing act. Because of the burning desire to pursue one's dream, by surfing the internet for information and resources that can lead to actualization of this entrepreneurial dream nursed by staff of Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria.

The Management of FUW should seek a technological solutions, such as building firewalls and restriction against any site other than the University site during work hours.

The management of FUW should encourage staff with entrepreneurial intention to use their entrepreneurial drive in more productive and beneficial ways. This could include things like offering staff opportunities to work on creative projects or new initiatives, or even creating an internal "incubator:" a program where staff can develop and pitch new ideas. In addition, creating a culture that celebrates and rewards innovation and risk-taking that could channel staff entrepreneurial drive in a positive and productive way.

Management of FUW should pay keen attention to formulating and ensuring strict implementation of internet use policy among staff during working hours.

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# 16

## GENTRIFICATION AND PERCEPTION OF SAFETY IN WUKARI, TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

**Daniel Rosemary Onchi**

**Saheed Rahman Olanrewaju**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [rosemaryonchidaniel@gmail.com](mailto:rosemaryonchidaniel@gmail.com), [lanreandrahman@gmail.com](mailto:lanreandrahman@gmail.com)



### Abstract

Gentrification, a complex urban process involving the influx of affluent residents into previously marginalized neighborhoods, is often associated with changes in perceptions of safety among residents. This study investigates the impact of gentrification on the perception of safety in Wukari, Nigeria. The primary objective is to examine how the process of gentrification influences residents' perceptions of safety, utilizing Social Disorganization Theory and Broken Windows Theory as theoretical frameworks. The study employs a quantitative approach, with a sample size of 400 residents selected through a stratified random sampling technique. Data collection is conducted through structured interviews and surveys. Chi-square analysis is used to test the hypothesis that gentrification has a significant impact on residents' perceptions of safety in Wukari. The major findings of the study reveal that gentrification is associated with changes in perceptions of safety among residents. Specifically, the influx of affluent residents and improvements in physical infrastructure are linked to increased feelings of safety, while concerns about displacement and changes in neighborhood dynamics contribute to heightened fear of crime. These findings highlight the complex relationship between gentrification and perceptions of safety, indicating a need for nuanced approaches to urban development in Wukari. In conclusion, this study contributes to the understanding of the social impacts of gentrification in Wukari and provides valuable points for policymakers and urban planners. Recommendations include the implementation of community engagement strategies to address concerns about safety and displacement, as well as the development of policies that promote social cohesion and inclusivity in gentrifying neighborhoods.

**Keywords:** Safety, gentrification, social disorganization, residents, urbanization

### Introduction

Gentrification, a process that involves the transformation of urban neighborhoods through the influx of more affluent residents and the development of upscale amenities, has been a topic of significant interest and debate globally. The term "gentrification" was first introduced by Ruth Glass in 1964, a pioneering figure in urban sociology in Europe. Glass used the term to describe the changes occurring in the inner city of London, which was traditionally inhabited by the working class. The process of middle-class individuals moving into working-class neighborhoods in

London. Since then, gentrification has become a global phenomenon, occurring in cities around the world. She observed a process where the local lower-class residents were displaced from the inner city due to urban strategies and housing purchases by wealthier population groups. This led to the rehabilitation of the physical and economic aspects of the area, creating a more affluent and desirable neighborhood (Glass, 1964). Glass's concept of gentrification has since become known as "classic gentrification" in scholarly literature (Lees et al., 2008; Nedučín

et al., 2009). This classic model of gentrification involves the influx of more affluent residents into a previously working-class or deteriorated urban area, leading to changes in the social fabric, economy, and physical landscape of the neighborhood.

The process of gentrification is intricate and diverse, involving a range of economic, social, and political factors. It often results in the displacement of long-term residents, changes in the built environment, and shifts in the cultural and social dynamics of a neighborhood. While gentrification can bring about positive changes, such as economic revitalization and improved living conditions, it can also have negative effects, including the marginalization of lower-income residents and the loss of community cohesion. In recent years, gentrification has become a topic of significant debate and research, with scholars and policymakers seeking to understand its impacts and develop strategies to mitigate its negative effects. The concept of gentrification has also evolved to encompass a broader range of processes and contexts, reflecting the diverse experiences of urban change around the world.

One key aspect of this debate revolves around the perception of safety in gentrifying neighborhoods and how it is influenced by various factors. The relationship between gentrification and safety perception is complex. While gentrification can lead to improvements in certain aspects of safety, such as reductions in crime rates and improvements in the physical environment, it can also result in negative consequences such as displacement and social dislocation, which can impact how safe residents feel. Recent studies have highlighted the complexities of the relationship between gentrification and safety perception., a study by Sampson and Raudenbush (2020) in the United States found that while gentrification was associated with a decrease in certain types of crime, such as property crime, it also led to increased displacement and social dislocation among

long-term residents, which could contribute to feelings of insecurity and fear.

In Europe, research on gentrification and safety perception has also yielded interesting insights. A study by Atkinson and Kintrea (2019) in the UK found that while gentrification often led to improvements in the physical environment and a reduction in certain types of crime, such as vandalism, it also resulted in the displacement of lower-income residents and changes in the social fabric of neighborhoods, which could impact how safe residents feel. In Asia, gentrification has been studied in the context of rapidly growing cities such as Shanghai and Mumbai. A study by Huang and Ye (2018) in Shanghai found that while gentrification led to improvements in the built environment and access to amenities, it also resulted in the displacement of long-term residents and changes in social networks, which could affect perceptions of safety and security.

Gentrification, while often associated with urban revitalization, economic growth, and improved living conditions, has a dark side that cannot be ignored. Historically, gentrification has been linked to discrimination against vulnerable populations, including racial minorities, women and children, the poor, and older adults (Lees et al., 2016). This discrimination can manifest in various forms, such as higher rents, limited access to affordable housing, and exclusion from social and community networks. One of the most significant consequences of gentrification is displacement. As neighborhoods undergo gentrification, long-time residents, particularly those from marginalized communities, are often forced to leave due to rising housing costs (Smith, 2021). This displacement can have serious health implications, as it can lead to increased stress levels and decreased mental health among affected individuals (Korosi et al., 2019).

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has identified vulnerable populations as being at increased risk for

negative health effects of gentrification. These effects can include shorter life expectancies and increased rates of chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease (CDC, 2020). Displacement can also result in the loss of social and community ties, which are important for mental and emotional well-being (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). Furthermore, gentrification can lead to the exclusion of original residents, particularly people of color, from the benefits of urban development. This exclusion can result in a lack of access to government support, such as low-income housing assistance, as well as limited opportunities for economic advancement (Wyly et al., 2019). Additionally, gentrification can weaken social and community ties, further isolating vulnerable populations and exacerbating health disparities (Slater, 2019). According to Bhavsar, Kumar, Richman (2020), in gentrifying settings, various factors can undergo significant changes in factors such as access to food, greenspace, affordable housing, social support, cohesion, and feelings of safety, prejudice, or discrimination can have significant implications for health, impacting the well-being and experiences of residents. These changes can affect access to essential resources, social dynamics, and perceptions of safety and inclusion as well as affecting health through their impact on healthcare utilization, health-related behaviors, and biological responses.

**Access to Food:** Gentrification can bring about changes in the availability and affordability of food options in a neighborhood. As more affluent residents move in, there may be an increase in the number of trendy restaurants and cafes offering diverse cuisines. However, this can also lead to the displacement of existing, often more affordable, food establishments, reducing access to affordable and culturally familiar food options for long-term residents (Smith & Cummins, 2009).

**Greenspace:** Gentrification can impact access to greenspaces, such as parks and recreational areas. While improvements to parks and the creation of new greenspaces may occur as part of gentrification efforts, there is a risk of these spaces becoming less accessible to lower-income residents due to increased costs or changes in park management practices (Rigolon & Németh, 2018).

**Affordable Housing:** One of the most significant impacts of gentrification is the transformation of the housing market. As wealthier residents move in, property values and rents tend to increase, leading to the displacement of lower-income residents who can no longer afford to live in the neighborhood. This can result in housing insecurity and a loss of social ties for displaced residents (Lees et al., 2008).

**Social Support and Networks:** Gentrification can alter the social fabric of a neighborhood. While new residents may bring in new social networks and opportunities for collaboration, the displacement of existing residents can lead to a loss of social support and cohesion among long-term residents. This can have negative impacts on mental health and community resilience (Smith, 1996).

**Feelings of Safety, Prejudice, or Discrimination:**

Gentrification can also influence residents' perceptions of safety, prejudice, and discrimination. While improvements in the physical environment and increased economic investment may lead to a perceived increase in safety, displacement and changes in community demographics can also result in increased feelings of vulnerability and exclusion among marginalized groups (Ley, 1996).

### **Impact of Gentrification on the Perception of Safety**

Gentrification, while often associated with economic revitalization and urban renewal, can have complex effects on the perception of

safety in urban neighborhoods. Gentrification, the process of urban renewal often characterized by the influx of affluent residents into previously deteriorating neighborhoods, has a complex impact on the perception of safety. While it can lead to improvements in infrastructure, housing quality, and economic opportunities, it can also contribute to the displacement of lower-income residents and changes in the social fabric of communities. Recent research has highlighted both positive and negative impacts of gentrification on safety perception, which can vary depending on the context and the experiences of different residents.

**Positive Impact:** Some studies suggest that gentrification can lead to improvements in the perception of safety among residents. For example, a study by van Ham and Manley (2021) in the UK found that residents of gentrifying neighborhoods reported feeling safer due to improvements in the physical environment, increased police presence, and a reduction in crime rates. Similarly, a study by Chen and Lei (2018) in China found that gentrification was associated with a decrease in perceived crime rates and an increase in feelings of safety among residents.

**Negative Impact:** Gentrification, while often associated with positive changes such as economic revitalization and improved urban infrastructure, can also have significant negative effects on communities, particularly for marginalized groups. Some of these negative effects include: **Increased Tensions Between New and Long-Term Residents:**

Gentrification often leads to increased tensions between new and long-term residents. Newcomers may not understand or appreciate the existing social dynamics and cultural practices of the neighborhood, leading to conflicts with long-time residents. This can result in a sense of loss of identity and community for long-term residents (Anguelovski, 2015).

**Reduced Levels of Social Cohesion:** The process of gentrification can disrupt social

networks and relationships that have been built over time in a neighborhood. As new residents move in, social ties among long-term residents may weaken, leading to a sense of isolation and disconnection. This can also impact community resilience in the face of challenges (Curran, 2004).

**Loss of Cultural Establishments and Small Businesses:** Gentrification often results in the displacement of local cultural establishments and small businesses that cater to the needs and preferences of long-term residents. This can erode the unique character of the neighborhood and contribute to a sense of cultural loss and displacement among residents (Fullilove & Wallace, 2011).

**Increase in Cost of Living and Housing:** One of the most significant impacts of gentrification is the increase in the cost of living and housing. As property values rise, so do rents and property taxes, making it increasingly difficult for lower-income residents to afford to stay in the neighborhood. This can lead to forced displacement and a loss of community ties (Iyanda & Lu, 2021).

**Magnified Impact on Vulnerable Populations:** People facing housing instability, racialized communities, and those historically marginalized in urban planning processes are disproportionately affected by gentrification. These groups often have fewer resources and less access to affordable housing, making them more vulnerable to displacement and its associated negative impacts (Oscilowicz et al., 2020).

**Effects on Historically Absent Voices in Urban Planning:** Historically, certain groups, such as low-income communities and racialized groups, have had their voices marginalized in urban planning processes. Gentrification can exacerbate this marginalization by displacing these groups and further reducing their ability to participate in decision-making processes that affect their communities (Cole et al., 2017).

**Loss of Community Identity and Social Capital:** Gentrification can lead to a loss of community identity and social capital as longstanding residents are displaced and the social fabric of the neighborhood changes. This can have long-lasting effects on the well-being and resilience of the community (Gibbons, 2019).

**Impact on Mental Health:** The negative consequences of gentrification, such as displacement and loss of community, can have significant impacts on mental health. Studies have shown that gentrification can contribute to increased levels of stress, anxiety, and depression among affected residents (Tran et al., 2020).

**Healthcare Utilization:** Changes in access to healthcare services can affect healthcare utilization patterns. Gentrification may result in the improvement or establishment of healthcare facilities in a neighborhood, which can increase access to care for residents. However, if these changes lead to the displacement of lower-income residents, access to healthcare services may become more limited, leading to decreased healthcare utilization among vulnerable populations (Truong et al., 2019).

**Health-Related Behaviors:** Changes in access to food and greenspace can influence health-related behaviors such as diet and physical activity. For example, an increase in the availability of healthy food options and greenspaces may encourage residents to engage in healthier behaviors, which can have positive effects on health outcomes. Conversely, if access to affordable and healthy food options decreases, or if greenspaces become less accessible, residents may be more likely to engage in unhealthy behaviors, such as poor diet and sedentary lifestyle, which can increase the risk of chronic diseases (Curtis et al., 2013).

**Biological Responses:** The stress of displacement and changes in social networks and support systems can have biological effects on health. Chronic stress can lead to

dysregulation of the body's stress response system, which can contribute to the development of chronic diseases such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and depression (Luo et al., 2012). Additionally, experiences of discrimination and prejudice can contribute to stress and have negative effects on mental health, which in turn can impact physical health (Williams & Mohammed, 2009).

However, gentrification can also have negative effects on safety perception, particularly among long-term residents who may feel marginalized or displaced by the process. Research by Atkinson and Kintrea (2019) in the UK found that while gentrification led to improvements in the physical environment, it also resulted in increased feelings of insecurity and fear among some residents, particularly those from lower-income backgrounds. Similarly, a study by Lao and Ye (2021) in Hong Kong found that gentrification was associated with displacement and social dislocation, which could contribute to feelings of insecurity and fear among long-term residents.

**Mixed Impact:** Some studies suggest that the impact of gentrification on safety perception is mixed and can vary depending on individual experiences and neighborhood characteristics. For example, a study by Ma and Wei (2020) in China found that while gentrification was associated with improvements in safety perception among some residents, others reported feeling less safe due to increased social isolation and changes in community dynamics.

The following are some impact of gentrification on the perception of safety:

**Changes in Demographics:** Gentrification often brings in new residents with higher incomes, leading to changes in the demographic composition of the neighborhood. Research suggests that these changes can alter the social dynamics and sense of community, potentially affecting how safe residents feel. (Smith, 2021)



**Increased Policing and Security Measures:** Gentrifying neighborhoods may experience increased policing and security measures, aimed at both addressing existing crime and providing a sense of safety to the new, often more affluent residents. However, these measures can also lead to concerns about over-policing and racial profiling (Harvey, (2012).

**Perception vs. Reality of Crime:** Gentrification can lead to a change in the perception of safety, even if crime rates do not significantly decrease. This is because newcomers may perceive the neighborhood as safer due to improvements in physical infrastructure and increased surveillance. (Smith, 2021).

**Displacement and Social Cohesion:** Gentrification often results in the displacement of lower-income residents, disrupting social networks and community cohesion. This can lead to feelings of insecurity among those who are forced to leave their homes and communities (Lees, Slater, & Wyly, 2008).

**Community Policing and Engagement:** Some studies suggest that gentrification can lead to increased community policing and engagement, which can positively impact the perception of safety by fostering trust between residents and law enforcement. However, this is not always the case, as some residents may feel alienated or targeted by increased policing efforts (Atkinson, & Blandy, 2005).

**Cultural Changes and Social Control:** Gentrification can also result in cultural changes in a neighborhood, as new residents may bring different norms and expectations regarding behavior and social interactions. This can lead to tensions and conflicts, impacting the perception of safety among long-time residents (Hackworth, 2007).

Gentrification can have varied impacts on different residents within a neighborhood, leading to differing experiences based on socio-economic status and other factors.

While some residents may benefit from increased access to resources and amenities, others may experience increased economic pressure and displacement, which can have negative effects on mental health.

**Benefits for Middle-Income Residents:** Middle-income residents in gentrifying neighborhoods may experience benefits such as increased access to groceries, restaurants, and other amenities that come with urban revitalization. These residents may also see improvements in the physical environment and a reduction in crime rates, leading to a perceived increase in safety (Schnake-Mahl et al., 2020). In a gentrifying neighborhood, middle-income residents may benefit from increased access to resources such as grocery stores, restaurants, and other amenities that cater to their preferences. This can enhance their quality of life and contribute to a sense of neighborhood improvement. However, lower-income residents may not be able to afford these new amenities, leading to feelings of exclusion and marginalization (Oscilowicz et al., 2020).

**Challenges for Lower-Income Residents:** On the other hand, lower-income residents may face increasing economic pressure as the cost of living rises due to gentrification. Rising rents and property prices can make it difficult for these residents to afford to remain in the neighborhood, leading to displacement and a loss of community ties. This can contribute to feelings of stress, anxiety, and depression (Smith et al., 2020). As the cost of living increases in a gentrifying neighborhood, lower-income residents may face increasing economic pressure. Rising rents and property taxes can make it difficult for them to afford to stay in the neighborhood, forcing some to move to more affordable areas. This can disrupt social networks and support systems that have been built over time (Schnake-Mahl et al., 2020).

**Mixed Effects on Mental Health:** Research on the effects of gentrification on mental health has shown mixed results. While some

studies have found positive effects, such as reductions in psychological distress and improvements in well-being (Steinmetz-Wood et al., 2017), others have found negative effects, particularly for vulnerable populations facing displacement and economic hardship (Oscilowicz et al., 2020). The differing experiences of gentrification can have mixed effects on the mental health of residents. While some middle-income residents may experience improvements in their mental well-being due to enhanced neighborhood amenities and a sense of community improvement, lower-income residents may experience increased stress and anxiety due to economic pressures and feelings of displacement. This highlights the complex and nuanced nature of the relationship between gentrification and mental health (Smith et al., 2020; Steinmetz-Wood et al., 2017).

**Sense of Belonging and Community:** Gentrification can also affect residents' sense of belonging and community. Middle-income residents may feel a stronger sense of belonging as the neighborhood improves and becomes more desirable, while lower-income residents may feel increasingly marginalized and disconnected from their community. This can impact social cohesion and community resilience (Oscilowicz et al., 2020).

**Implications for Social Inclusion and Equity:** The differential impacts of gentrification highlight broader issues of social inclusion and equity. Gentrification can exacerbate existing inequalities by disproportionately benefiting certain groups while marginalizing others. This can have long-term implications for the social fabric of a neighborhood and the well-being of its residents (Schnake-Mahl et al., 2020).

### **Nexus between Gentrification and Crime**

The relationship between gentrification and crime is a complex and multi-layered issue that has been the subject of much debate and research in urban studies. While some studies suggest that gentrification may lead to a reduction in certain types of crime, such as

property crime, others argue that it can also have negative effects, such as increased displacement and social dislocation among long-term residents, which could contribute to feelings of insecurity and fear. One perspective suggests that gentrification may lead to a decrease in crime rates due to several factors. As more affluent residents move into a neighborhood, they may invest in improving the physical environment and increasing security measures, which can deter criminal activity (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2020). Additionally, the presence of higher-income residents may lead to increased community engagement and social control, which can further reduce crime rates (Zukin et al., 2017). However, critics argue that the benefits of gentrification in reducing crime are often outweighed by its negative impacts. For example, the process of gentrification can lead to the displacement of long-term residents, particularly those from low-income and minority communities. This displacement can disrupt social networks and support systems, leading to increased feelings of isolation and vulnerability among displaced residents (Huang & Ye, 2018). Moreover, the influx of higher-income residents into a neighborhood can also result in changes in policing practices, which may disproportionately target and criminalize existing residents, leading to increased tensions and mistrust between the police and the community (Lees et al., 2008). Some visible the relationship between gentrification and crime are:

**Crime Displacement:** One of the main concerns associated with gentrification is the potential for crime displacement, where criminal activities simply shift to neighboring areas rather than being reduced overall. This can occur as a result of increased police presence and enforcement in gentrifying neighborhoods, pushing criminal activities into adjacent areas that may be less equipped to handle them (Chakraborty & Mukherjee, 2019; Hipp, 2015). **Changes in Crime Patterns:** Gentrification can also lead to changes in

crime patterns within a neighborhood. For example, as the socioeconomic composition of a neighborhood changes, so too may the types of crimes that occur. Some research suggests that while overall crime rates may decrease, certain types of crime, such as white-collar crime or property crime, may increase in gentrifying neighborhoods (Becker et al., 2018; Chakraborty & Mukherjee, 2019).

**Social Disorganization and Crime:** Gentrification can disrupt social networks and community cohesion, which are important factors in preventing crime. As neighborhoods undergo rapid demographic changes, social ties may weaken, leading to an increase in social disorganization and potentially higher crime rates (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Morenoff & Sampson, 1997).

**Perceptions of Safety:** Gentrification can also influence perceptions of safety among residents. While some may feel safer due to improvements in the physical environment and increased surveillance, others may feel less safe due to changes in the social dynamics of the neighborhood or concerns about displacement. These perceptions can impact community engagement and willingness to report crimes (Chakraborty & Mukherjee, 2019; Ellen & O'Regan, 2008).

In conclusion, the relationship between gentrification and crime is complex and context-dependent. While some studies suggest that gentrification may lead to a reduction in crime rates, others argue that it can have negative effects, such as increased displacement and social dislocation, which can contribute to feelings of insecurity and fear among long-term residents.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The study adopted both social disorganization theory and broken window theory to explain the interplay between

#### **Social Disorganization Theory**

Social Disorganization Theory emerged in the early 20th century as sociologists sought to understand the causes of crime and

delinquency in urban areas. The theory was first developed by researchers at the University of Chicago, including Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, who conducted studies on juvenile delinquency in Chicago neighborhoods. They observed that certain neighborhoods had higher rates of crime and delinquency, which they attributed to the breakdown of social institutions and the weakening of social bonds. Social Disorganization Theory has been developed and expanded upon by various sociologists and criminologists over the years. Some of the key proponents include Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Robert Sampson. The theory was first articulated by researchers at the University of Chicago, including Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, in the 1920s and 1930s. Shaw and McKay conducted extensive research in Chicago, examining the spatial distribution of crime and delinquency. They found that certain neighborhoods, characterized by high levels of poverty, ethnic diversity, and residential instability, were more likely to experience high rates of crime and delinquency. These findings laid the foundation for Social Disorganization Theory, which has since been expanded and refined by subsequent researchers. These researchers have further refined the theory and applied it to different contexts, such as urban redevelopment and community policing. Social Disorganization Theory is based on several key assumptions, including:

**Neighborhood Influence:** The theory assumes that neighborhoods have a significant influence on individual behavior, including criminal behavior. It suggests that the social and physical characteristics of a neighborhood can either promote or inhibit criminal activity.

**Collective Efficacy:** Social Disorganization Theory posits that neighborhoods with strong social ties and a sense of collective efficacy are better able to control crime. Collective efficacy refers to the ability of residents to work together to achieve common goals, such as maintaining public order and preventing crime.

**Structural Factors:** The theory emphasizes the role of structural factors, such as poverty, residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity, in shaping neighborhood dynamics. It suggests that these structural factors can create conditions that are conducive to crime.

**Community Characteristics:** The theory assumes that certain community characteristics, such as poverty, residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity, can lead to social disorganization. These characteristics weaken social bonds and make it more difficult for communities to control crime and delinquency.

**Breakdown of Social Institutions:** Social Disorganization Theory posits that the breakdown of social institutions, such as family, schools, and religious organizations, can contribute to crime and delinquency. When these institutions fail to provide adequate social control, individuals are more likely to engage in deviant behavior.

**Environmental Influences:** The theory also emphasizes the importance of environmental influences on behavior. It suggests that certain neighborhoods or areas may have characteristics that make them more prone to social disorganization, such as high levels of poverty or unemployment.

Gentrification can have profound effects on residents' perceptions of safety, shaping their sense of security and well-being in their neighborhoods. These effects are intricately linked to the processes outlined in Social Disorganization Theory:

Gentrification often leads to the displacement of long-term residents, along with social institutions such as schools, churches, and community centers. This can weaken social bonds and reduce the ability of residents to control crime and maintain social order. As gentrification leads to the displacement of long-term residents and social institutions, it disrupts established social networks and support systems. The loss of familiar institutions like schools, churches, and community centers can weaken social bonds and reduce residents'

ability to organize and address safety concerns collectively. This can create a sense of disconnection and vulnerability among remaining residents, impacting their perceptions of safety.

Gentrification can also lead to changes in community characteristics, such as increased wealth and homogeneity. While these changes may lead to improvements in some areas, they can also disrupt existing social networks and increase feelings of isolation and mistrust among residents. Gentrification often brings changes in the demographic and socio-economic composition of a neighborhood. While an influx of more affluent residents may contribute to economic revitalization and improved infrastructure, it can also lead to the marginalization of existing residents, particularly those from lower-income or minority backgrounds. In other words, gentrification often results in the displacement of low-income residents, who may be forced to move to less desirable neighborhoods. This can disrupt social ties and community bonds, leading to feelings of isolation and insecurity among those who remain. This shift in community dynamics can breed feelings of exclusion and mistrust, as well as perceptions of heightened social tensions or conflicts, which can influence residents' perceptions of safety. This can disrupt existing social networks and weaken the sense of collective efficacy, which can impact residents' perceptions of safety.

Gentrification can change the physical environment of a neighborhood, with new developments and changes in infrastructure. These changes can alter the social dynamics of a neighborhood and impact residents' perceptions of safety and security. The physical transformation of a neighborhood through gentrification, including new developments, improved amenities, and changes in infrastructure, can alter the perceived safety of an area. While these changes may enhance the aesthetic appeal and functionality of the neighborhood, they can also displace existing residents and disrupt familiar surroundings, leading to feelings of insecurity or unfamiliarity. Additionally, gentrification can attract new

types of businesses and activities to an area, which may not align with the preferences or values of long-term residents, further impacting their sense of safety and belonging.

### **Broken Window Theory**

This theory was first introduced by social scientists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in a 1982 article in *The Atlantic Monthly* titled "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety." The theory gained prominence in the 1990s as a key component of the "quality of life" policing strategies implemented in cities like New York City under Mayor Rudy Giuliani.

James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling are the primary proponents of Broken Window Theory. Wilson was a political scientist known for his work in public policy, while Kelling was a criminologist who worked as a consultant for law enforcement agencies. Broken Window Theory is based on several key assumptions:

**Disorder Breeds Crime:** The theory posits that visible signs of disorder, such as broken windows, graffiti, and litter, signal to potential offenders that an area is not well-maintained and is therefore more likely to be a target for criminal activity. This creates a sense of impunity for offenders and leads to an increase in crime.

**Environment Shapes Behavior:** Broken Window Theory suggests that the physical and social environment in which people live shapes their behavior. A disorderly environment can lead to a breakdown of social norms and an increase in criminal behavior.

**Focus on Minor Offenses:** The theory emphasizes the importance of addressing minor offenses, such as vandalism and public intoxication, as a means of preventing more serious crimes. By addressing these minor offenses, law enforcement agencies can create an environment of order and deter potential offenders.

The process of gentrification can influence residents' perceptions of safety in several ways, in line with Broken Window Theory:

Gentrification often involves physical improvements to a neighborhood, such as repairing broken windows, cleaning up graffiti, and improving infrastructure. These improvements can signal to residents that the neighborhood is being cared for and can lead to an increased sense of safety. Gentrification can result in improvements to the physical environment of a neighborhood, such as better lighting, improved infrastructure, and renovated public spaces. These improvements can make the neighborhood more attractive and inviting, leading to a perception of safety among residents.

**Perception of Order and Control:** Gentrification can create a perception of order and control in a neighborhood. As new, more affluent residents move in, they may be more likely to take an active role in maintaining public spaces and enforcing social norms. This can create a sense of security among residents. Gentrification can lead to an increase in social control in neighborhoods, as new residents may be more invested in maintaining order and preventing crime. This increased social control can create a sense of community cohesion and cooperation, which can contribute to a safer environment for residents.

**Reduction in Disorderly Behavior:** Gentrification can lead to a reduction in disorderly behavior, such as loitering, public intoxication, and vandalism. This can create a more orderly environment that is less conducive to criminal activity, in line with the assumptions of Broken Window Theory. Gentrification often involves the revitalization and improvement of neighborhoods, which can include efforts to address visible signs of disorder such as graffiti, litter, and abandoned buildings. These efforts can create a sense of order and cleanliness in the neighborhood, which may contribute to residents' feelings of safety and security.

**Increased Police Presence:** Gentrification can lead to an increase in police presence in a neighborhood, as law enforcement agencies respond to the concerns of new residents. This increased police presence can

help deter criminal activity and create a sense of safety among residents.

of gentrification on residents' perceptions of safety in Wukari. The sample size was determined. The study arrived at a sample size of 400 youths.

### Research Methodology

The study employs a quantitative approach, aiming to systematically investigate the impact

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where,

n = Sample size (?),  
 N = population size (374,800),  
 e = level of precision (0.05),  
 1 = constant

That is,

$$n = \frac{374,800}{1 + 374,800(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{374,800}{374,800(0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{374,800}{1 + 937}$$

$$n = \frac{374,800}{938}$$

n = 399.6 - approximated to 400.

A sample size of 400 residents is selected using a stratified random sampling technique, which ensures that different segments of the population are represented proportionally in the sample. This approach helps to improve the generalizability of the findings to the wider population of Wukari. Data collection is conducted through structured interviews and surveys, allowing the researchers to collect standardized information from participants. Structured interviews ensure that all participants are asked the same set of questions in the same manner, reducing the potential for bias in data collection. Surveys include questions related to residents' perceptions of safety, their experiences with gentrification, and demographic information. Chi-square analysis is used to test the hypothesis that gentrification has a significant impact on residents' perceptions of safety in Wukari. Chi-square analysis is a statistical method used to determine whether there is a significant association between two categorical variables. In this case, the chi-

square test will be used to examine the relationship between the process of gentrification (categorized as present or not present) and residents' perceptions of safety (categorized as feeling safe or not feeling safe). The results of the chi-square test indicate whether there is a statistically significant association between these variables, providing insights into the impact of gentrification on residents' perceptions of safety in Wukari.

### Discussion of Results

The complexities of gentrification and its impact on perceptions of safety among residents were presented with a specific focus on how these factors influence perceptions of safety in gentrifying neighborhoods. This section will also critically analyze data on gentrification and safety perceptions, highlighting the nuances and contradictions in the literature. Additionally, examined the implications of these findings for urban planning, policy-making, and community development.

**Table 4.1: 5-point Likert Questionnaire based on the Objectives of the Study (400).**

| Variable  | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Strongly Agree | Agree | Mean | S.D. |
|---|-------------------|----------|---------|----------------|-------|------|------|
| I now feel safe in my neighbourhood   | 14                | 38       | 6       | 164            | 178   | 3.96 | 0.82 |
| The transformation of a neighborhood from a low-income, from a deteriorated area into a more affluent and upscale area has made my neighborhood safer | 6                 | 9        | 11      | 214            | 160   | 4.21 | 0.97 |
| I am concerned about crime in my neighborhood due to the recent developments  | 12                | 4        | 0       | 189            | 195   | 3.69 | 1.14 |
| I believe that gentrification has increased safety measures in my neighbourhood   | 163               | 22       | 9       | 141            | 65    | 3.34 | 1.33 |
| I believe that gentrification has increased crime in various forms in my neighbourhood  | 103               | 17       | 3       | 168            | 109   | 3.72 | 1.41 |
| The presence of new businesses and residents due to gentrification has positively impacted safety in my neighborhood.                                 | 8                 | 16       | 3       | 156            | 217   | 4.26 | 0.94 |
| The perception of safety in my neighborhood has changed positively due to gentrification  | 13                | 42       | 17      | 153            | 175   | 4.04 | 0.97 |

**Source: Field Survey, 2024.**

The figures presented on Table 4.1 displays the following:

**Feeling of Safety:** The majority of respondents either agree or strongly agree that they now feel safe in their neighborhood, with a mean score of 3.96 and a standard deviation of 0.82. This indicates a generally positive perception of safety among residents. Overall, residents seem to feel safe in their neighborhoods, with a majority either agreeing or strongly agreeing with this statement. This indicates that gentrification may have had a positive impact on safety perceptions for many residents.

**Impact of Transformation:** Residents are more likely to agree or strongly agree that the

transformation of their neighborhood has made it safer, as indicated by a mean score of 4.21 and a standard deviation of 0.97. This suggests that the changes brought about by gentrification are perceived positively in terms of safety.

**Concern about Crime:** While the mean score of 3.69 suggests a moderate level of concern about crime, the standard deviation of 1.14 indicates a significant variation in responses. This suggests that there is some diversity in residents' levels of concern about crime due to recent developments. Despite the generally positive perception of safety, there is a moderate level of concern about crime due to recent developments. This

indicates that while residents may feel safe, they are still aware of and concerned about potential crime in their neighborhoods.

**Impact on Safety Measures:** Residents are somewhat neutral or disagree that gentrification has increased safety measures in their neighborhood, as indicated by a mean score of 3.34 and a high standard deviation of 1.33. This suggests that there is uncertainty or disagreement among residents regarding the impact of gentrification on safety measures.

**Impact on Crime:** The mean score of 3.72 and the high standard deviation of 1.41 suggest that there is no clear consensus among residents regarding whether gentrification has increased crime in various forms in their neighborhood. This indicates a range of opinions on this issue. There is no clear consensus among residents regarding whether gentrification has increased crime in various forms. This suggests that perceptions of crime rates may vary widely among residents, and the relationship between gentrification and crime is complex.

**Impact of New Businesses and Residents:** Residents tend to agree or strongly agree that the presence of new businesses and residents due to gentrification has positively impacted safety in their neighborhood, as indicated by a mean score of 4.26 and a standard deviation of 0.94. This suggests that residents perceive a positive impact of gentrification in this regard.

**Change in Perception of Safety:** Residents generally agree or strongly agree that their perception of safety has changed positively due to gentrification, as indicated by a mean score of 4.04 and a standard deviation of 0.97. This suggests that residents perceive an improvement in safety perception as a result of gentrification.

The data suggests that while there are some concerns about crime and safety measures, residents generally perceive gentrification as having a positive impact on safety in their neighborhood. This indicates that residents may view gentrification as a positive force for improving safety and

changing perceptions of safety in their neighborhood. The high mean scores for feeling safe in the neighborhood and the belief that the transformation of the neighborhood has made it safer suggest that gentrification is generally perceived positively in terms of safety. This indicates that residents may view gentrification as a positive force for improving safety in their neighborhood.

While the data shows some concerns about crime due to recent developments, the neutral mean score suggests that residents' views on this issue are mixed. This indicates that while some residents may be concerned about crime, others may not see it as a significant issue. The neutral mean scores for the belief that gentrification has increased safety measures and crime in various forms suggest that residents have mixed views on these issues. This indicates that while some residents may perceive improvements in safety measures, others may not see a significant change. Similarly, while some residents may perceive an increase in crime, others may not see a noticeable difference.

The high mean score for the belief that the presence of new businesses and residents due to gentrification has positively impacted safety suggests that residents generally view these changes positively. This indicates that residents see the influx of new businesses and residents as a positive change for safety in their neighborhood. The high mean score for the belief that the perception of safety has changed positively due to gentrification suggests that residents see gentrification as a positive force for changing perceptions of safety. This indicates that residents may feel more positive about safety in their neighborhood as a result of gentrification.

**Null Hypothesis (H0):** There is no significant relationship between the process of gentrification and residents' perceptions of safety.

**Alternative Hypothesis (H1):** There is a significant relationship between the process of



gentrification and residents' perceptions of safety.

To calculate the hypothesis test for the relationship between the process of gentrification and residents' perceptions of safety, the study used chi-square test for independence.

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(O-E)^2}{E}$$

Where:

$\chi^2$  is the chi-square statistic,  
 O is the observed frequency,  
 E is the expected frequency.

**Table 4.2: A Cross-Tabulation Table**

| Variables                  | Feeling Safe | Not Feeling Safe | Total      |
|----------------------------|--------------|------------------|------------|
| Gentrification Present     | 204          | 46               | 250        |
| Gentrification Not Present | 52           | 98               | 150        |
| <b>Total</b>               | <b>256</b>   | <b>144</b>       | <b>400</b> |

**Source: Field Survey, 2024.**

For this contingency Table, the degrees of freedom will be (Number of rows - 1) x (Number of columns - 1) = (2 - 1) x (2 - 1) = 1 x 1 = 1

$$\chi^2 = 12.1 + 21.51 + 20.17 + 35.85 = 89.63$$

Since the calculated chi-square value (89.63) is greater than the critical value (3.841) for 1 degree of freedom at a significance level of 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis. The study concludes that there is a significant relationship between the process of gentrification and residents' perceptions of safety based on the chi-square test results.

### Conclusion and Recommendation

This study adds to the growing body of research on the social impacts of gentrification in Wukari, Nigeria. By examining the relationship between gentrification and residents' perceptions of safety, the study sheds light on an important aspect of community well-being in gentrifying neighborhoods. The findings highlight the need for policymakers and urban planners to consider the social consequences of gentrification, particularly in terms of how it affects residents' feelings of safety and security. The study's results suggest that gentrification is associated with changes in residents' perceptions of safety, indicating a complex interplay between urban

development and community dynamics. These findings have implications for policy and planning efforts aimed at promoting sustainable and inclusive urban development. By understanding the social impacts of gentrification, policymakers and planners can better address the needs and concerns of residents in gentrifying neighborhoods, ultimately leading to more equitable and sustainable urban environments. Future research could further explore the mechanisms through which gentrification influences perceptions of safety, as well as the broader social, economic, and cultural impacts of gentrification in Wukari. Based on the findings of this study on the relationship between gentrification and residents' perceptions of safety in Wukari, several recommendations were made for policymakers, urban planners, and community stakeholders:

**Community Engagement:** Encourage community engagement and participation in the urban planning process to ensure that the voices of residents, especially those most affected by gentrification, are heard and considered in decision-making processes.

**Affordable Housing:** Ensure that affordable housing options are available for residents, including those at risk of displacement due to

gentrification. This can help maintain community cohesion and prevent the negative impacts of displacement.

**Safety Measures:** Implement safety measures, such as improved street lighting, increased police presence, and community policing initiatives, to address residents' concerns about safety in gentrifying neighborhoods.

**Cultural Preservation:** Support initiatives that preserve the cultural heritage and identity of neighborhoods undergoing gentrification to maintain a sense of community and belonging among residents.

**Education and Awareness:** Provide education and awareness programs to residents about the impacts of gentrification and strategies to mitigate its negative effects, such as tenant rights and housing assistance programs.

**Mixed-Use Development:** Encourage mixed-use development that integrates affordable housing with commercial and retail spaces to create a more diverse and vibrant neighborhood.

**Monitoring and Evaluation:** Establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the social impacts of gentrification over time to ensure that policies and interventions are effective and responsive to changing community needs.

**Collaboration:** Foster collaboration between government agencies, non-profit organizations, community groups, and private developers to develop holistic and sustainable solutions to the challenges posed by gentrification.

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**PART IV:**  
**IDENTITY POLITICS, PARTISANSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

# 17

## IDENTITY POLITICS AND ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

**Faruk Abdullahi**

**Ishaya Kate Gani**

**Ishaya Samaila Atobauka**

Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [abdullahifaruk25@gmail.com](mailto:abdullahifaruk25@gmail.com), [ganikate0@gmail.com](mailto:ganikate0@gmail.com), [ishayas@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:ishayas@fuwukari.edu.ng)



### Abstract

This paper argues that while identity-based mobilization may provide short-term electoral gains for some politicians in the land, it also undermines the principles of inclusivity and diversity that are essential for a thriving democracy. This paper draws on Social Identity Theory (SIT), as theoretical framework which posits that individuals derive a sense of identity and self-esteem from their membership in social groups, to explain how group membership shapes attitudes and behaviors in the electoral process. The study relied on secondary data sources to examine the effects of identity politics on the electoral processes in Nigeria. The study reveal that in the 2023 Presidential Election in Nigeria, religious and ethnic identities played a significant role in determining voting patterns. The study also found that voters were more likely to support candidates whom they perceived as representing their group's interests. These findings are consistent with the predictions of SIT, which posits that group membership plays a crucial role in shaping attitudes and behaviors. The study concludes by reiterating the need for political parties and candidates in Nigeria to focus on critical issues such as security and socio-economic development, rather than relying on ethnic and religious identities to mobilize voters; as this is essential in promoting intergroup dialogue and cooperation to foster National unity and social cohesion. The study recommends the promotion of justice, equity and fairness in governance to ameliorate the chances of identity dissension and identity-based conflicts.

**Keywords:** Conflict, diversity, ethnicity, politics religion, election

### Introduction

Nigeria is a multicultural Nation with diversities in ethnic, religious, cultural and even lingual identity. The Nation is bedeviled by recurring ethnic and religious conflicts that have led to the wanton destruction of lives and properties. Therefore, the political elites in a bid to capture power, have reconstructed these identity-groups to promote antagonism. And the result of this political remodeling has been an ingrained ethnic identification that makes peaceful politics almost impossible in the land. Resource allocation – among other issues – engenders violent contestation according to identity formation. The issues

that create the most savage contentions are those viewed as fundamental to the legitimacy and continued existence of the state, over which contending groups espouse a winner-take-all strategy in their political relations (Osaghae & Suberu 2005). Canci & Odukoya (2016) observe that ethnic and religious conflict makes up the most constructed difference in identity in Africa. Akinyetun & Bakare (2020) corroborates that the spate of post-independence conflicts in African countries like DR Congo, Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone; attests to the differences of the various

identity groups that makes up most African states. The conflicts arising from ethnic identification are centered on power contestation, unequal allocation of resources, economic decline, ethno-religious differences and citizenship issues. The result is weak National cohesion, instability and under-development. Uzodike & Whetho (2011) note that ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria has been incessant and permeates almost all the regions in the country, especially, the Middle belt, North west and the Niger Delta. Following the incidence of over five hundred cases of communal clashes, more than 25,000 lives were lost between 1999 and 2023. Multiculturalism does not necessarily engender conflict. Instead, it is the fanaticism of identity groups that exasperate distress. Fearon & Laiton (2003) and Kwaja (2009) aver that identity-based conflicts are coterminous with preexisting conditions of communal clashes, uprising, widespread poverty, persistent unemployment, a weak economy, territorial disputes, electoral rivalry and the inability to manage diversity. Turaki (2013) opines that the nature of Nigerian politics, social crises, clashes and ethno-religious riots is occasioned principally by Nigeria's primordial orientation and sentiments. Nigerians have reconstructed tribal/ethnic myths to project their views, esteem and feelings about their origin, belief and value.

Nigerians have utilized tribalism/ethnicity, culture religion and land; which are the essential human values, as instruments and weapons of conflict, violence and viciousness in the course of relating with one another. Thus, it is the utilization of primordial identities and structures to promote personal interest, sustain an unfairly advantageous position, or maintain a negative political position that comprises a faulty logic. Turaki (2013) further observes that the pattern of relationship between the major ethnic groups in Nigeria is evident in one or more of the following: (1) there is a pattern of superiority-inferiority relationship between the groups as a result of

ethnicity, culture and religion; (2) there is a configuration of the politics of disparity, domination or exclusion between the groups. However, religion and ethnicity cannot be isolated from the political discourse in Nigeria; they mostly exist or function *pari-passu*. And this informs the adoption of the term "ethno-religious identity" to capture the borderline between ethnicity and religion, especially as it influences violence and conflict in Nigeria (Egwu 2001). Despite the positive relevance that religion holds in fostering development in a country, it has destructive tendencies when not cooperatively managed. The major religious groups in Nigeria; Islam and Christianity, have been used to influence politics negatively – while creating a history filled with struggle as well as viciousness. This encompasses the war of words and doctrinal correctness engaged in by the various religious practitioners (Falola 2001). Violence often starts with criticism, dehumanization and denigration of others. It happens in groups, which (Falola 2001) categorizes as sidelined and self-reproachful groups. Which are the Islamic majority, Christian minority, Christian Intelligentsia, Southern Northern Muslim scholars, Inter-religious groups and State establishments. These groups are fairly permanent, and their fierceness could be of importance to the emancipation from oppression or perceived endangerment of their sociopolitical disposition (Falola 2001). This form of variation, stigmatization and dehumanization of one group by another, are insidiously capable of entrenching fragility and instability. Bongmba (2006) and Caleb & Danjuma (2018) note that plurality in identity evidenced in a diverse ethnic, religious, cultural and lingual group increases the chances of conflict due to the internal contradictions among these groups. The consequent internal wrangling and conflicts arising from the hostile relationship between and among these groups are attributable to the heterogeneous formation of the country and the characterization of diversity as the

currency of politics. It is thus impracticable to engage in any sociopolitical discourse bothering Nigerian politics and the corollary of violence without a recourse to the identity-based components that ignite it. It is on this premise that this paper work explores the Identity Politics and Elections in Nigeria. Using a descriptive method and relying on secondary sources of data, the paper appraises primordialism as the theoretical framework and further reflects on identity politics and its effects on electoral processes. It also assesses the various indicators of identity politics in Nigeria. The paper also suggests practicable solutions that will help douse the tension and scourge of identity politics and elections in Nigeria.

Identity politics refers to the political mobilization and activism based on characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and other social identities (Oluwole 2019). The emergence of identity politics has had a significant impact on political discourse and election outcomes in various parts of the world, which of course Nigeria is not an exception. Identity politics has become an increasingly salient issue in the Nigerian electoral process in the last few years. In the 2023 general election, ethnicity, religion, and regionalism played a significant role in shaping voters' preferences and electoral outcomes. Similarly, as the country gears up for the 2027 general election, the role of identity politics in shaping the electoral landscape cannot be overemphasized. Identity politics refers to political behavior that is motivated by a group's shared identity, such as race, ethnicity, religion, or gender (Macedo, 2005). In Nigeria, identity politics has been used to mobilize voters along ethnic, religious, and regional lines, often leading to polarization and exclusion of certain groups. This phenomenon has been observed in the past elections, where politicians have used ethno-religious sentiments to secure votes from their respective constituencies. The implication of identity politics on the Nigerian Elections is far-

reaching. It can lead to the neglect of critical issues, such as economic development and security, in favor of identity-based concerns. It can also fuel inter-group tensions and violence, as seen in past electoral cycles. Moreover, identity politics can impede the formation of a national identity and weaken social cohesion. Which is why this article examines the identity politics and elections in Nigeria, with a strong focus on the 2023 general elections. The study will further examine the ways in which identity-based mobilization has influenced electoral outcomes and the challenges it poses to the Nigeria's democratic development. Ultimately, it is argued that while identity politics may provide short-term electoral gains for some political actors, it also undermines the principles of inclusivity and diversity that are essential for a thriving democracy such as Nigeria.

#### **Conceptual Clarification:**

Identity politics is a political approach that focuses on the interests and perspectives of groups that share a common identity, such as race, gender, ethnicity, or religion. According to a scholar Francis Fukuyama, identity politics "is a form of politics in which groups of people having a particular characteristic or identity, such as race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation, form exclusive political alliances, move away from mainstream political parties and create their own political institutions." (Fukuyama, 2018). The emergence of identity politics is often attributed to the rise of postmodernism and the rejection of universalism, which posits that all individuals are equal and should be treated as such (Lyotard, 1984).

Identity politics refers to a form of political engagement that is rooted in a particular social identity or experience, such as race, gender, sexuality, or nationality (Crenshaw, 1991). This approach to politics emerged in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s as a response to the exclusion of historically



marginalized groups from mainstream political and social institutions (Crenshaw, 1991). At its core, identity politics seeks to empower these groups by acknowledging and addressing the ways in which social identities shape people's experiences, opportunities, and life chances.

Regarding the idea that identity politics helps to understand the impact of social identities on individuals, Collins (2000) writes that "identities are created within social structures and are historically and culturally specific". Crenshaw (1989) argues that "because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take inter-sectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women are subordinated". The goal of identity politics to create more equitable systems is also reflected in the work of other scholars, such as hooks (1981), who wrote that "the transformative power of cultural criticism lies in its ability to demystify the workings of domination and to make them visible". Critics of identity politics on the other hand, argues that it promotes a form of tribalism that pits different groups against one another and undermines the broader goals of liberal democracy (Lilla, 2018). They argued that identity politics encourages individuals to focus on their own particular social identities rather than on shared values and goals, and that this leads to a fragmentation of political and social life. Additionally, critics argued that identity politics often leads to a stifling of free speech and the suppression of dissenting voices, as individuals and groups seek to silence those who do not share their particular perspective.

Nonetheless, despite these debates, identity politics continues to play a prominent role in contemporary politics and social movements. For example, The Black Lives Matters Movement, have been widely credited with bringing issues of racial inequality and police violence to the forefront of public discourse (Cobb, 2016). Identity politics is a complex and multifaceted concept

that has generated significant debate in academic and political circles. While proponents argue that it provides a necessary framework for understanding and addressing the experiences of historically marginalized groups, critics argue that it promotes a divisive form of tribalism that undermines the broader goals of liberal democracy.

#### **Theoretical Framework:**

The theoretical framework for identity politics draws on a range of disciplines, including political theory, sociology, international relations and cultural studies. In political theory, identity politics is often linked to the concept of recognition, which emphasizes the importance of recognition and respect for cultural and group identities (Taylor, 1992). Social identity theory (SIT) posits that individuals derives a sense of identity and self-esteem from their membership in social groups, and that group membership plays a crucial role in shaping attitudes, behaviors, and intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the context of Nigerian politics, identity politics has emerged as a powerful force that mobilizes voters and often shapes political outcomes. This paper will use SIT to explain the effects of identity politics on the Nigerian electoral processes. Identity politics refers to political mobilization based on group identity, such as ethnicity, religion, or gender. In Nigeria, where there are nearly 300 ethnic groups and a history of interethnic conflicts, identity politics has played a significant role in electoral processes. Political parties and candidates have often relied on ethnic and religious identities to mobilize voters, and electoral outcomes have often been determined along these lines.

According to SIT, individuals derive a sense of identity and self-esteem from their membership in social groups. In the context of Nigerian politics, voters identify with their ethnic or religious group, and their sense of self-esteem and pride is tied to the success of their group in the electoral process. As a result,

voters may be more likely to support candidates and parties that they perceived as representing their group's interests. SIT also posits that group membership plays a crucial role in shaping attitudes, behaviors, and intergroup relations. In the context of Nigerian politics, identity politics has led to the formation of political parties and interest groups that are based on ethnic and religious identities. These groups often promote the interests of their respective members and may be more likely to engage in intergroup conflict or even competition.

The impact of identity politics on the Nigerian electoral process can be seen in the 2015, 2019 and the 2023 presidential elections. In 2015, Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim from the north, won the presidential election with strong support from northern Muslim voters. His opponent, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a Christian from the south, received overwhelming support from southern Christian voters. The election was largely viewed as a context between the Muslim north and the Christian south. Similarly, in the 2019 presidential election, Buhari again won a second term with strong support from northern Muslim voters, while his opponent, Atiku Abubakar, a Muslim from the north as well, and received strong support from North and Southern Christian voters. The election was once again viewed as a context between the Muslim north and the Christian north. In both cases, identity politics played a significant role in shaping electoral outcomes. Candidates and parties relied on ethnic and religious identities to mobilize voters, and voters identified with their respective groups and supported candidates whom they perceived as representing their group's interests.

However, the impact of identity politics on the Nigerian elections is not always positive. SIT also predicts that group membership can lead to intergroup conflict and competition, and this has been the case in Nigeria. Ethnic and religious identities have often been used to mobilize violence and undermine the

democratic process. For example, in the 2023 presidential election, there were reports of violence and electoral malpractices in some parts of the country. Oyedele and Adeyemi (2018) provides further support for the role of identity politics in shaping electoral outcomes in Nigeria. The study found that in the 2019 presidential election, ethnic and religious identities played a significant role in determining voting patterns. These findings are consistent with the predictions of SIT, which posits that group membership shapes attitudes and behaviors. Adebani and Obadare (2013) highlights the negative effects of identity politics on Nigerian democracy. The study argues that ethnic and religious identities have been used to mobilize violence and undermine the democratic process in Nigeria. The study also notes that identity politics has led to the formation of patronage networks that perpetuate corruption and inequality. These studies illustrate the complex and multifaceted nature of identity politics in Nigeria. While identity politics has played a significant role in shaping electoral outcomes, it has also contributed to intergroup conflict and undermined democratic institutions in the land. It is therefore important for political actors and civil society organizations to work towards promoting inclusive politics and reducing the influence of identity politics on the electoral processes.

Social identity theory (SIT) provides a useful framework for understanding the impact of identity politics on the Nigerian electoral process. Identity politics has played a significant role in shaping electoral outcomes, as candidates and parties have relied on ethnic and religious identities to mobilize voters. However, the impact of identity politics on the Nigerian electoral process is not always positive, as it can lead to intergroup conflict and undermine the democratic process.

### **History of Identity Politics in Nigeria**

Identity politics has a long history in Nigeria, dating back to the colonial era. During this

period, the British colonial administration divided the country into separate regions based on ethnic and religious lines, creating a system of indirect rule that relied on the cooperation of traditional rulers (Ekeh, 1975). This system of governance reinforced the importance of ethnic and religious identity in Nigeria over the years and has helped to create a sense of division between different groups. The effect of identity politics was felt most strongly during the country's post-independence period, which was marked by political instability and violence. In the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria experienced a series of military coups and counter coups, which were often driven by ethnic and regional tensions (Ogundiya, 2014). The coups were followed by a civil war in 1967 to 1970, in which the predominantly Christian Igbo ethnic group attempted to secede from the rest of the country and thereby established the independent state of Biafra. The war resulted in the deaths of at least one million people, the majority of whom were civilians (Adebanwi, 2018). Following the civil war, Nigeria experienced a period of military rule that lasted until 1999. During this period, identity politics continued to play a significant role in the country's political landscape, with military rulers often relying on support from their own ethnic and regional groups to maintain power (Adewale, 2018). However, in the years following the transition to civilian rule, Nigeria's political parties began to shift towards a more nationalistic discourse, with parties like the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All-Progressives Congress (APC) emphasizing their commitment to a united and inclusive Nigeria.

### **Effects of Identity Consciousness**

Identity or its changes can either be constructive or broken. Concerning the resurgence of negative types of identity politics, Kofi Annan (cited by Jega, 2000: 11) opined that: "This particularistic and exclusionary form of identity politics has

intensified in recent years within and among nations... It is responsible for some of the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law and, in several instances, of elementary standards of humanity... Negative forms of identity politics are a potent and potentially explosive force. Great care must be taken to recognize, confront and restrain them lest they destroy the potential for peace and progress that the new era holds at heart."

However, identity consciousness can likewise be positive. Osaghae (1995) gives insight into the positive role of identity mobilization as used by the state to create a surplus that is never adequate to fulfil the needs of its citizens particularly the disregarded rural part. Alger (2002) submitted that the scholarship on ethno-religious identity has underlined the constructive role of religion in peace-building. Meanwhile, its utilization has shown that many groups have used religion to create strife while religious scholars are being recruited to provide unprecedented legitimacy for conflict, violence, war and insurgency. Commenting on this pattern, the Tanenbaum Center for Inter-Religious Understanding Program on Religion and Conflict Resolution (2007) referred to Kofi Annan's 2002 report on the counter-active action of armed conflict wherein he confirmed that religious assemblies can assume a role in forestalling armed conflict due to the ethical influence they wield in their numerous communities.

### **Implications of Identity Politics on Nigerian Elections and Electoral Processes**

The 2023 general election in Nigeria witnessed an increased level of identity politics, particularly along ethnic and religious lines. The two major political parties in Nigeria, the All-Progressives Congress (APC) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP), both employed identity politics to appeal to voters. The APC, for instance, focused on its support base in the southwestern part of the country (the Yorubas), where the current President

Bola Ahmed Tinubu hails from, while the PDP concentrated on the northern part of the country, where its presidential candidate, Atiku Abubakar, came from (Okafor, 2019).

One of the implications of identity politics on the Nigerian elections, in the 2023 general elections; was the polarization of the country along ethnic and religious lines. The APC's focus on the south and the PDP's concentration on the north led to a sharp divide in the country, with each region voting predominantly for its preferred candidate. This division was particularly evident in the presidential election, where President Tinubu won a majority of votes in the Southern states while Atiku Abubakar won the majority of votes in the Northern and Eastern states (Okafor, 2019).

Another implication of identity politics in the Nigerian elections and electoral process in the 2023 general election was the use of ethno-religious sentiments to sway voters. Politicians played on the fears and insecurities of voters by emphasizing the importance of voting for a candidate who shared their ethnic or religious background. Furthermore, identity politics in the 2023 general elections resulted in voter apathy among some groups. Some voters, particularly those who did not identify strongly with any of the major political parties, felt alienated by the emphasis on identity politics and chose not to participate in the electoral process. This apathy was particularly evident in the south-western part of the country, where some voters felt that their votes would not make a difference due to the dominance of the APC in the region.

In addition to the later implications, identity politics in the 2023 general elections also fostered a culture of political patronage and favoritism, where politicians rewarded supporters of their ethnic or religious group with political appointments, contracts, and other benefits. This led to a situation where merit and competence were often overlooked in favor of loyalty to a particular identity group, and thereby undermining the quality of

governance and public service delivery in the country (Akinola, 2020). Furthermore, identity politics in the 2023 general elections also fueled violent-conflicts and tensions in some parts of the country. This was particularly evident in states such as Kaduna, Plateau, and Benue, where ethnic and religious tensions were already high, and politicians used identity politics to incite violence and deepen divisions for their political gain (Okafor, 2019). The resulting conflicts led to loss of lives and property, displacement of people internally, and a general breakdown of law and order in affected communities.

Moreover, identity politics has fueled violent conflicts and tensions in some parts of the country, particularly in states where ethnic and religious tensions were already high as aforesaid. This has undermined the stability and security of the country and threatens its longterm prospects for peace and development (Okafor, 2019). Lastly, the prevalence of identity politics in the 2023 general elections highlighted the need for more inclusive politics and a redefinition of national identity in Nigeria. The dominance of ethnic and religious identities in the electoral process underscores the failure of the country to build a common national identity that transcends these differences. There is a need for a concerted effort by political leaders, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders to promote a more inclusive and nationalistic political discourse that emphasizes commonalities rather than differences (Faruk A. Ishaya K.G. & Bala I.S. 2024).

### **Implications of Identity Politics on the Future of Nigeria**

The implications of identity politics for the Nigerian future are significant, with scholars and policymakers alike expressing concern about the impact of continued polarization and division on the country's long-term stability and development. One major concern is that identity politics will continue to fuel violence and conflict, particularly in the

country's northern region, where ethnic and religious tensions are largely high (Ogundiya, 2014). Another concern is that identity politics will hinder the country's ability to address pressing social and economic challenges, such as poverty, corruption, kidnapping and underdevelopment. As Adebani (2018) notes, "the preoccupation with identity has often undermined the pursuit of development, as resources are channeled towards satisfying the demands of specific groups rather than towards the broader goal of national progress."

To address these challenges, scholars and policymakers have called for a shift towards a more inclusive and nationalistic political discourse, one that emphasizes the importance of unity and cooperation over division and polarization (Jega, 2018). This will require a concerted effort by political leaders, civil society organizations, and the media to promote a shared sense of national identity and to build bridges across the country's many ethnic and religious divides. Identity politics is a phenomenon that has gained increasing prominence in recent times, with implications for the Nigerian future. According to Sani and Nasiru (2020), identity politics involves the mobilization of individuals based on their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual orientation to achieve political or social objectives.

In Nigeria, identity politics has played a significant role in shaping the country's political landscape, with various groups using it to advance their interests. For example, ethnic and religious identities have been used to garner support for political parties and candidates, leading to a polarized society with deep-seated divisions. The implications of identity politics for the Nigerian future are vast and varied. On the one hand, it could foster a sense of inclusivity and diversity, where people are allowed to express their cultural and religious identities without fear of discrimination. On the other hand, it could lead to the balkanization of the country, where

ethnic and religious groups retreat into their enclaves, leading to a fractured society. This could lead to further conflicts, as groups struggle to assert their dominance and protect their interests. Furthermore, identity politics could hinder the development of the country by creating a situation where meritocracy is sacrificed in favor of identity-based quotas. This could lead to a situation where individuals are appointed to positions based on their identity, rather than their qualifications or capabilities, leading to a lack of expertise and competence in key positions. This, in turn, could lead to a decline in the quality of governance and public services. In conclusion, while identity politics has the potential to foster inclusivity and diversity, its implications for the Nigerian future are complex and varied. The country's leaders must find ways to manage and address identity-based tensions to ensure that the country remains united and cohesive. (Sani & Nasiru, 2020).

#### **Rising above the Identity Politics in Nigeria:**

Given the devastating effect of identity politics in Nigeria, this paper hereby proposes the following as practical solutions to mitigate the effects of the indicators. Since the fear of being continually deprived and marginalized is a major factor that drives groups to engage in violent conflicts, it is thus imperative that a visionary leader with the acumen to place the citizens at the centre of the Nigerian political project without a penchant for ethnic chauvinism is advocated for. The country needs a leader who will not capitalize on the differences of the people for political gains. One who will not fan the embers of diversity to serve sectional interests, but to serve collective interest without ethnic or religious inclination. This will not only quell accusations, counter-accusations and mutual suspicion of one ethnic group against another but will also raise national consciousness in the people to transform their ethnic cum religious and loyalty to the advancement of national interest.

Needless to say that doing this, will lead to a reduction in ethnic conflicts and a quest for ethnic and religious domination. Beyond this, it is also pertinent to note that the entrenchment of justice, equity and fairness in governance will further ameliorate the chances of identity dissension and identity-based conflicts in Nigeria. Indeed, the government should not only preach fairness or romanticize democratic values, rather, but this should also be vigorously accentuated and pursued through equitable distribution of resources and broad-based, all-inclusive governance. Sectional appointments should be discontinued and the recommendations of the Federal Character Commission should be duly followed. The representation of all sub-nationalities – of course, based on merit – irrespective of ethnic, religious or cultural affiliation in governance will no doubt, spur a sense of belonging in the various groups, and thus, see the need to work assiduously towards achieving developing Nigerian project. It is further proposed that the Federal Government of Nigeria should move to integrate the 'National Identity Management Commission NIMC'. So that the commission will be saddled with the responsibility of making research into the underlying challenges faced by the several identities in their bid to live and coexist peacefully in the country. The commission could also be subdivided into several units i.e. Ethnic, Cultural, Religious and Lingual Identity Departments, with the aim of recommending to the government, positive steps to be taken to synthesize the inherent diversity of the various groups in Nigeria, towards forming a unified national identity.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The foregoing narrative buttresses the fact that identity consciousness in Nigeria has spiraled in the past years and has undoubtedly become a front-burner issue in practically almost all the political discourse identifying

with the country. To be very sure, Nigerians have turned out to be progressively mindful of whom they are or not, particularly as it identified with ethnic, religious, cultural and lingual identities. Identity politics has had a significant impact on the Nigerian elections, with candidates often mobilizing around issues related to religion, ethnicity, and regional diversity. While identity politics has its roots in the country's colonial and post-independence history, its impact on the Nigerian future is significant, with continued polarization and division posing a threat to the country's longterm stability and development. To address these challenges, scholars and policymakers have called for a shift towards a more inclusive and nationalistic political discourse, one that emphasizes the importance of unity and cooperation over division and polarization. Only through such efforts can Nigeria hope to overcome the challenges posed by identity politics and build a more prosperous and united future for its citizens.

Based on the above analysis, there are several policy implications for addressing the effects of identity politics on the Nigerian elections.

Firstly, it is important to promote a shared sense of national identity that transcends ethnic, religious, and regional differences in order to overcome the challenges posed by identity politics. This can be achieved through various means such as national education campaigns, cultural exchange programs, and the promotion of national symbols and traditions (Ogunyemi, 2020). Secondly, political leaders, civil society organizations, and the media should encourage an inclusive political discourse that emphasizes the importance of unity and cooperation over division and polarization. This can be achieved through measures such as promoting positive intergroup contact, fostering mutual understanding and respect, and reframing political debates to focus on issues of common concern (Eze, 2020).

Thirdly, strengthening institutions at all levels of government, including the judiciary, law enforcement, and public service, is critical for addressing the root causes of identity politics such as poverty, corruption, and underdevelopment. Policymakers can achieve this through measures such as institutional reform, capacity building, and anti-corruption measures (Ugbah&Ugwumba, 2020).

In addition to the above recommendations, it is important to address the issue of electoral violence, which is often fueled by identity politics. Policymakers should focus on promoting peaceful and credible electoral processes, which can be achieved through measures such as the deployment of neutral and competent electoral officials, the use of technology to enhance the transparency of the electoral process, and the promotion of voter education (Ugbah & Ugwumba, 2020).

Another important recommendation is to address the issue of political party polarization, which often reflects and reinforces identity politics. Policymakers should encourage the emergence of political parties that are inclusive and representative of different social groups, as well as discourage political parties that are based solely on identity-based mobilization. This can be achieved through measures such as campaign finance reform, electoral reforms, and the promotion of intra-party democracy (Eze, 2020).

It is important to recognize that identity politics is often driven by economic and social inequalities. Policymakers should therefore focus on promoting inclusive economic growth, social welfare programs, and strengthening the provision of basic services such as health and education, in order to reduce the sense of marginalization and exclusion that often leads to identity-based mobilization (Ogunyemi, 2020).

Finally, policymakers should focus on empowering marginalized groups such as women, youth, and ethnic and religious minorities, through measures such as

affirmative action programs, access to education and skills/vocational training, and the promotion of political participation and representation. This will address the sense of marginalization and exclusion that often leads to identity politics in the first place (Eze, 2020).

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# 18

## IMPACTS OF IDENTITY POLITICS AND PARTISANSHIP ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

**Bako Kefas**

**Samuila Tibwa Abwage**

Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [kefasdanborbo@gmail.com](mailto:kefasdanborbo@gmail.com), [abwagetibwa@gmail.com](mailto:abwagetibwa@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The intersection of identity politics and power dynamics, particularly concerning religion and ethnicity has deeply influenced the social landscape of Taraba State, Nigeria. Hence, this paper aim to analyze the impact of identified identities, such as religion and ethnicity on sustainable development in Taraba State. Consequently, ethno-religious conflicts in the various parts of the State, past and present, have been the major cause of lack of Sustainable development. This paper, gathered data via the secondary sources and Elite theory is used as the theoretical lens of analysis. The paper discovered that the predominant political challenge in Taraba State is the parochial mobilization for political engagement based on geographical zones, religious affiliations and tribal allegiances. The paper concludes that achieving political development in the State necessitates visionary leadership and an informed followership. The paper recommends that there is need to create room for interethnic and interfaith dialogues, these will promote and protect the rights of all citizens in Taraba State irrespective of race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic class and age.

**Keywords:** Identity, politics, partisanship, sustainable development, leadership

### Introduction

Party politics in Nigeria traces its origins to the elective principle introduced by the Clifford constitution of 1922. Additionally, regions and regionalism emerged as a result of the Macpherson constitution of 1945. However, the deliberate promotion of ethnicity and religious politics can be attributed to Nigerian political elites. Ethnic identities are define mainly by descent rules of group membership and content typically composed of cultural attributes such as; language, custom, religion and shared historical myths (Fearon & Laitin, 200) in (Yusuf,2014). Electioneering activities as noted earlier, started in Nigeria during the Clifford constitution of 1922, but during this period, politics and politicking were not executed because of or regional interest. At the turn of 1941 however, Ikoli Akinsanya crisis within NYM had laid the firm foundation for ethnic and regional politics in the country. As

Azikiwe, the leader of the movement subsequently left with his Igbo supporters (Yusuf, 2014). However, the early 1950's saw the emergence of the major political parties that had their strong hold in the major ethnic groups and regions of the country. The NCNC had its base among the Igbo speaking Nigerians of the South eastern region, the AG among the Yorubas speaking Nigerians of the western extraction, while the NPC in the northern region and among the Hausa- Fulani. These parties were ostensibly used by the elites of those regions and ethnicity to define political activities and as political machines for the acquisitions and consolidation of political power (Ibodje & Dode, 2007). Nigeria is a multicultural nation with diversities in ethnic, religious, cultural and lingual identity. The nation has been challenged by recurring ethnic and religious conflicts that have led to the

wanton destruction of life and properties. The political elites in a bid to capture power has reconstructed these identity groups to promote antagonism (Akinyetun, 2021). The result of this political re-modeling has been an ingrained ethnic identification that makes peaceful politics all but impossible. Resource allocation among other issues engenders violent contestation according to identity formation. The conflicts arising from ethnic identification are centered on power contestation, unequal allocation of resources, economic decline, ethno-religious differences and citizenship issues. The result is weak national cohesion, instability and under-development.

Religion and ethnicity cannot be isolated from the political discourse in Nigeria; they hardly exist or function separately. Instead, they function with each other in a multifaceted, yet opposing way. This informs the adoption of the term ethno-religious identity to capture the borderline between ethnicity and religion, especially as it influences violence and conflict in Nigeria (Egwu 2001). Despite the positive relevance that religion holds in fostering sustainable development in a country, it has destructive tendencies when not cooperatively managed. The major religious groups in Nigeria; Christianity and Islam, have been used to influence politics negatively creating a history filled with struggle as well as viciousness. This encompasses the war of words and doctrinal correctness engaged in by the various religious practitioners (Falola, 2001).

There have been other important developments in the domain of ethnic politics. The creation of more states and local government areas has led to an expansion in the domain of salient identities, but at the same time, there has been a concentration of contestations and conflicts around local issues. This has provided the impetus for the sharpening of communal identities and conflicts, which have manifested in conflicts between 'indigenes' and 'non-indigenes',

'sons-of-the-soil' and 'migrants' and 'settlers'. The resultant system of discriminatory citizenship has deep historical roots. However, the phenomenal rise of communal conflicts beginning from the 1990s can be partly attributed to: shrinking state resources and the attendant recourse by groups to communal resources. Ranking next to ethnicity is religious identity. In fact, in parts of the North commonly referred to as the 'core' or 'Hausa-Fulani North', religious identity is more critical than ethnic identity and in fact serves to activate ethnicity. Thus, among Nigeria's "two largest ethnic groupings, the [southern] Yoruba were considerably more prone to define themselves ethnically... than were the [northern] Hausa-Fulani ...who rather opted for a religious [Muslim] identity" (Lewis & Bratton 2000: 25).

Religious identities in Nigeria are usually classified into three; Christianity, Islam and Traditional, of the three, traditional religions is the least politically active; numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and subgroups, villages, clans and kin groups; and, involving the worship of different gods and goddesses. However, in parts of the Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa and Taraba states, masquerade activities associated with traditional religion have been a major source of conflicts. In effect, Christian and Muslim identities have been the mainstay of religious differentiation and conflict, with Nigerian Muslims much more likely to evince or articulate a religious identity than Christians (Lewis & Bratton 2000: 5). Turaki (2013) in Akinyetun, (2021) opines that the nature of Nigerian politics, social crises, clashes and ethno-religious riots is occasioned principally by Nigeria's primordial orientation and sentiments. Tarabans to be specific have reconstructed tribal/ethnic myths to project their views, esteem and feelings about their origin, fate and value. Tarabans have utilized:

1. tribalism/ethnicity,
2. culture
3. religion and

4. land, which are the essential human values, as an instruments and weapons of conflict, violence and viciousness in the course of relating with one another.

Thus, it is the utilization of primordial identities and structures to promote personal interest, sustain an unfairly advantageous position, or maintain a negative political position that comprises a faulty logic. Turaki further observes that the pattern of relationship between the major ethnic groups in Nigeria is evidenced in one or more of the following:

1. There is a pattern of superiority-inferiority relationship between the groups as a result of ethnicity, culture and religion;
2. There is a configuration of the politics of disparity, domination or exclusion between the groups.

Ethnic and religion consciousness has been the common problem since Nigerian gained independence, and it continued to threaten the development, continued co-existence, peace and unity of Nigeria as members of one sovereign democratic state. In recent history, there are only few states in Nigeria that have not in one way or another witnessed one form of ethnic or religious crises. The persistent incidence of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria, especially in Taraba state in north east geo-political zone has been a concerned among intellectuals across the nation.

With different developmental plans by the government targeted towards sustainable development, little or no results seem to be forthcoming because of persistent ethno religious crises in the State. Taraba state, however, does not have the monopoly of being the flashpoint or theater of ethno-religious tensions and crises. These crises often trigger the sense of hostile behavior between Muslims and Christians and thereafter inculcate a deep consciousness of religion sentiment which often creates adverse effects on the socio-economic development of Taraba State. It is very important therefore to examine ethno-religious crises and it

implication on sustainable development in Taraba State (Agbade & Adesanyan, 2022)

Ethno-religious conflict has a devastating effect on Taraba's socio-economic structures and infrastructures such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment. Burning of schools, churches and mosque, destruction of community projects are problems that do not only affect the community involved but compiled the national problem of Nigeria underdevelopment. In the agriculture sector, farmers desert their farm lands to safety zones like the case in Takum and Ussa local government areas of Taraba, which there is no probability of getting new farmland, food insecurity and prices increases as a result of farmer inability to farm. This has a great deal of influence on Taraba's agricultural sector, which has been the mainstay of the economy.

Ethno-religious conflict also leads to psychological problems. Victims of ethno-religious conflict suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSS) (Dogara, 2010). Also, Onwomah (2014) further asserts that conflict periods bring forth the worst instincts and impulses in man. Socio-economic vices such as increase level of crime rate and struggle over scarce resources. In post ethno-religious conflict, actors in this conflict remain reservoirs of ethno-religious knowledge of factual or distorted information. The aftermath of these conflicts disrupts social relationship as actors see no reason to live happily together with one who destroys one family and society. However, in states where identity politics and partisanship dominate the political landscape, the continuity of developmental initiatives is often jeopardized. Political instability, shifting priorities with changes in leadership, and influence of vested interests can lead to the abandonment or neglect of projects hindering their sustainability. Therefore, an understanding of the nuances of these dynamic and their implications for governance and policy-making is imperative for crafting effective strategies to

promote sustainable development in Taraba state. This paper aims to delve deeper into the interplay between identity politics, partisanship and sustainable development in Taraba State, offering insights and recommendations to navigate these challenges and foster inclusive growth and prosperity for all citizens.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The elite theory was propounded by Vilfredo Pareto in his work, "The Mind and Society" as a counter to the revolutionary theories anchored on social class analysis. Gaetano Mosca in his work, *The Ruling Class* published in 1939, also highlighted the concept of elite, which subsequently became a key concept of the new social science. However, this concept formed an essential part of the political science doctrine which is critical of modern democracy and hostile to modern Socialism. The term elite in its most general sense refers to those positions in the society which are the summits of key social structure i.e. the higher positions in government, economy, politics, religion, etc (Mbah, 2014). The political system is divided into two groups. The first is the elite, who are political entrepreneurs, possessing ideological commitments and manipulative skills. The second group is the masses and the citizens at large. The masses are regarded as the apolitical layer of the system, passive followers, who have little or no knowledge of political affairs. As such, they are less interested in politics. In every sphere of social life, there is elite. These groups perform all political functions, monopolize power and enjoy the advantages that political power brings. In the words of Pareto, the upper classes are also usually the richest. These classes represent the elite in aristocracy. The success of the elite have some characteristic, real apparent, which are highly esteemed and are very influential in society. The liberals argued that political power ought to be in the hands of those who own property and those

who through, their own ingenuity and hard work, have demonstrated their superiority.

Both Pareto and Mosca were disturbed with elite who exercise directly or indirectly political power in society. They, however, recognized that the governing elite or political class itself consisted of distinct social groups. Pareto was of the opinion that the upper stratum of society, the elite, was composed of both military, religious and commercial aristocracies and Plutocracies. Mosca states that the composition of the elite refers to the various party organizations into which political class is divided and which have to compete for garnering electoral support of the more numerous class (Mbah, 2014). These elites often do everything humanly possible to secure or retain power, sometimes, constitutions were amended or replaced, religion, ethnicity, and region were usually used. Castells, (2004) submits that identities become pronounced when and if political actors build their importance around them and internalize them. Meanwhile, there, and associational freedoms were curbed, opposition parties eliminated or outlawed, political opponents and dissenters repressed or co-opted. Elections became largely farcical rituals designed to ensure retention of the incumbent. Therefore, identities are more grounded sources of significance. Identity reinforces itself and self-continues over time. It is not stable or uniform, rather, it is dynamic and adapts with time.

### **Research Methodology**

This paper adopted *expos facto* research design and gathered data through secondary sources like, books, journals articles, manuscripts, internet materials, conference papers etc. We used content analysis to analyse data gathered.

### **Impacts of Ethno-Religious Politics on Sustainable Development in Taraba State, Nigeria**

Ethnicity is generally regarded as the most basic and politically salient identity in Nigeria. This claim is supported by the fact that both in competitive and non-competitive settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than any other identity (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). In other words, "Nigerians tend to cluster more readily around the cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of the workplace" (Lewis & Bratton 2000: 25). What is more, "religious and ethnic identities are more fully formed, more holistic and more strongly felt than class identities" as evidenced in the fact that "whereas those who identify with religious and ethnic communities are almost universally proud of their group identities...those who see themselves as members of a social class are somewhat more equivocal about their pride" (Lewis & Bratton 2000: 26). All of this is not surprising, considering that ethnic formations are perhaps the most historically enduring behavioral units in the country, and were further reinforced by the colonial and post-colonial regimes.

Historically, ethnic identities in Nigeria have been summarized into the two broad categories of majority and minority groups. Although unequal size and population are essential to this differentiation, its origins lie more in the power configurations of the former colonial regions in which the large groups – Hausa/Fulani in the North, Igbo in the East and Yoruba in the West held sway (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). This is all the more important because prior to the creation of these regions, there were no major or minor group distinctions in the country. However, with the regions came a 'core' comprising the major group and a 'periphery' made up of numerous 'small groups' or minorities. The creation and multiplication of states and local government areas (the number of states has

increased from 12 in 1967 to 36 in 1996) which have replaced these broader regions has led to the emergence of new majorities and minorities; but, the old historical contexts remain, especially with regard to the major groupings. This is one of the things that have ensured the continued political relevance of the old regions and of the 'historical minorities,' which remain both regional and national in scope (Osaghae 1986).

It is quite evident that ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria have fueled insecurity, violence and have succeeded in driving Nigeria into further poverty and reduce socio-economic development in Taraba State. Taraba is now labeled one of the poorest State of the Nigeria despite its abundant human and material resources. The crises has further succeeded in driving away most investors from Taraba and existing ones have since folded and settled in other more secured States. Billions of naira that meant to develop and establish industries, infrastructures and schools has been diverted towards fighting ethno – religious conflicts. Besides, ethno religious conflicts brings about disruption of social lives of Christians and Muslims and destruction of worship centers, revealed reduction of economic resources and properties of individual families which bring about loss of livelihood. There is nexus between Sustainable development and ethno-religious conflicts in Taraba State. The state of insecurity in the aforementioned study area has become so enormous and has attracted the attention of lovers of peace all over Nigeria.

The State has continued to come under series of violence, thousands of human lives are lost and properties destroyed on daily basis. In this study, it is argued that there is high level of religious intolerance in the State (like the recent attacks on the boys brigade in Jalingo) due to high level of illiteracy and poverty with unquantifiable impact on social economic activities. This study acknowledged that federal and state governments, civil society, religious groups and leaders and

communities have responded to the different manifestations of this conflict in a variety of ways, but solutions to ethnic conflict can be achieved through a variety of efforts. In a bid to pervade the political environment for group-based benefits, the identity groups in Taraba often promote political antagonism, ethnic resentment and tribal enmity among themselves. While doing this, a common narrative of propaganda is the accusation and counter-accusations of perceived marginalization, relative deprivation, inequality, injustice and social exclusion of a particular group. The result of this has been the persistent politicization of religion and ethnicity as well as the wanton death that follows it (Nnoli 1978; Caleb & Danjuma 2018). Nigeria Watch (2020), claims that religious-related clashes have claimed more lives than ethnic-related clashes in Nigeria, with 2010 having the highest number of deaths (564). More so, these clashes and consequent deaths took place in thirteen (13) states of the country: Sokoto, Adamawa, Plateau, Bauchi, Borno, Edo, Gombe, Kaduna, Yobe, Kano, Niger, Zamfara and Taraba states. Meanwhile, the majority of the deaths are attributable to Plateau state.

Both ethnic and religious groups are responsible for most of the number of deaths witnessed in the country between 2006 and 2020. Afolabi (2015) argued that from May 1992, more than 10,000 individuals have died from communal-religious conflicts. States with the highest number of casualties are Benue, Borno, Plateau and Taraba states. The case of Taraba's ethnic and religious politics was more pronounced in 2015, 2019 and 2023 elections. Moreso, due to the influence of religion on politics, people have abandoned merit for identity. Voting behavior has become more influenced by the religious and ethnic affiliation of the candidate rather than by leadership capability (Okafor 2011).

## Conclusion and Recommendation

The paper confidently asserts that achieving political development in the State necessitates visionary leadership and an informed followership. Both federal, state governments and religion leaders both Muslim and Christian should develop other strategies like external assistance to take full account of the political, ethnic and religious dynamics in order to reduce ethno-religion conflicts and the occurrence of the phenomenon in Taraba state. It is firmly believed that more reliance on mediation and dialoguing, especially at the grass-root levels would go a long way in curbing this turbulent societal menace in Taraba. There is also, the need to create room for interethnic and interfaith dialogue, this will promote and protect the rights of all citizens irrespective of race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic class and age and preventing insecurity and Federal, state, and local governments should address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, in order to reduce conflict in Taraba State.

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# 19

## TRANS-BORDER CRIMES AND NIGERIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

Salifu Achile Momoh<sup>1</sup>

Ozi Isah Muhammed<sup>2</sup>

Eze Uchenna Okoye<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria

Email: *saliumomoh84@yahoo.com*

<sup>2</sup>Department of Business Management, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria

<sup>3</sup>Department of Mass Communication, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nigeria



### Abstract

Over the years, Nigeria has become a hub for trans-border criminal activities such as: banditry, drugs and human trafficking, oil bunkering, small arms and light weapons smuggling, armed robbery and kidnappings, money laundering etc, which in turn constitutes a threat to national security. These threats do not only endanger the lives and properties of Nigerian citizens but also the survivability and development of the country with negative impact on the rule of law, economic activities and growth, human rights and general societal advancement. This study set out to examine trans-border crimes in Nigeria and its implication on national security. The study relied extensively on secondary sources of data. The secondary data were sourced from textbooks, Journals, magazines, periodicals and internet, report. The collected data were analyzed qualitatively in order to arrive at a synthesis and make valuable deductions. The study revealed that; the causes are of trans-border crimes are traced to factors which includes; poverty, unemployment, decline in social values and other societal issues. From the foregoing, some recommendations were proffered which includes; the need for the Nigerian government as a matter of urgency to address the issue of trans-border crimes in a holistic and coordinated manner, invest in capability to trace, detects, and freeze or confiscate criminal proceeds or assets, creation of employment opportunities to alleviate poverty, strengthen international cooperation in the fight against trans-border crimes as well as training and re-training of security personnel on the modern trends in migration and border management.

**Keywords:** Trans-border crime, insecurity, national security, migration

### Introduction

The quest for security is no doubt a known primary concern of every political community from time immemorial. Thus, the search for security must have been one of the several drives or motivation for people to aggregate into tribes, kingdoms and nation state or to join international organizations (Padelford 1978:83). Crime is one of the social problems that people face at different period of their historical existence. During the early stages of man's existence, the quest for security was given expression in form of fruits gathering and periodic hunting expedition for the

purpose of meeting the basic socio-economic requirements of the people. Also, People's preference for rocky and mountainous topography as shelter was largely informed by physical security consideration. Similarly, the practice of building fortifying walls around residential structures was largely motivated by the security need of the people (Gambo, 2008:3). However, Modern society has witnessed far reaching transformation which has created complicated security problem for it; one of the major security problems facing West African sub-region today is that of trans-

border crimes. Nigeria obviously the most influential and the most populous country among its neighbors in the sub-region continue to face severe national security challenges due to trans-border criminal activities.

Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria's internal security has been threatened by trans-border crimes such as human trafficking, kidnapping, trafficking in arms and drugs, armed banditry, smuggling, vehicle theft, illegal migration, illegal lumbering, Oil bunkering, financial crimes and the activities of herders who move their herds across national borders regardless of any regulations. To make matters worse, Nigeria, like others countries within the sub-region have porous borders. This is corroborated by Adetula (2008:67) who posited that: 'Arguably, Nigeria's porous borders as well as the buoyancy of her economy relative to that of her neighbours are bound to attract migrants especially from the less developed countries within the sub-region'.

According to Babatunde, (2009), Nigeria has a total of 4,047 km of land border. Benin Republic (773 km), Niger (1,497 km), Chad (87km) and Cameroon (1,690) and a maritime boundary with Equatorial Guinea. Also there is a coastline of at least 853 km. There are lots of trans-border trades and other activities between Nigerians and citizens of these countries, particularly Benin Republic. In the mist of these commercial activities, criminals take advantage of the ease of passage guaranteed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol on free movement of persons to commit crimes, these border routes have been largely responsible for substantial part of the criminal activities mentioned.

Trans-border crimes affect national security and have effects on the stability and integrity of the nation. As observed by Mac Namara (1968). If trans- border crimes are not checked, the stability of government might be compromised and people may flee from

border areas, thereby causing refusing crisis and the challenge of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Smuggling affects local industries as well as depriving the state of revenue. All these have serious implications, creating a vicious cycle of insecurities leading to less development and further insecurity. Unfortunately issues such as poverty, unemployment, lack of basic infrastructure for quality livelihood and declining societal values which abound in Nigeria today have all combined to foster trans-border crimes and criminality. Through the federal government has established various security and other agencies to curb the menace of trans-border crimes like the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), etc, the effort is not adequate at the moments. Against the foregoing, the aim of this paper is to examine trans-border crime and its impact on Nigeria's national security with a view of providing suggestions on how the menace could be mitigated or addressed.

### **Conceptual clarification**

For better understanding of the issues raised in this paper, it is imperative that the following concepts are initially clarified as working definitions:

**a. Trans-Border Crimes:** Trans-border crimes are defined as acts which violate the laws of more than one country (Passas, 2003). According to Barkindo (2007), trans-border crimes is offence that has an international dimension and implies crossing at least one national border before, during or after the act. Sunday and Okechukwu ( 2014), see trans- border crimes as a set of criminal acts whose perpetrators and repercussions go beyond territorial borders (These acts would include arms smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, illegal oil bunkering, to mention but a few. However, for the purpose of this study, trans-border crime would be seen

as representing a number of illegal and notorious activities carried out by individuals and groups across national and international borders, either, for financial or economic benefits and also socio-political and religious considerations. Trans-border crimes pose serious threats to the security and stability of West African countries and Nigeria in particular.

- b. Security:** Security itself is a relative term that could be used and applied differently and at different circumstances. For instance, while a highly developed state like the United State is more concerned about “terrorism” as a key component of its security arrangement, poorly industrialized countries like those in the African continent have different security concerns. According to Kalu (2010), security has to do with freedom from danger or threat to a nation’s ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interest and enhance the wellbeing of its people. According to Dambazau (2007), Security embraces all measures designed to protect and safeguard the citizenry and the resources of individuals, groups, business and the nation against sabotage or violent occurrences. Nwolise, (2009), defined security as an atmosphere of guaranteed protection, and the condition of feeling happy and safe from danger and harm. For the purpose of this study, the definition of security by Kalu (2010) would be adopted.
- c. National Security:** National security has been construed in different ways, each of which emphasized vital factors underlying ideals. National security is devoid of universally acceptable definition but has been described as the concern of government about the stability and safety of a state. It encompasses the sum of what a nation does in order to safeguard itself as a sovereign entity. That is the physical protection of a nation’s subjects,

landscape, independence and even issues such as food security and national image (Okoroafor, et al, 2012). National security therefore transcends the boundaries of physical defence or military-strategic capabilities to include human security, food security, and environmental security among others. National security is therefore a collection of plans, actions and institutions built by a state in order to protect themselves from both internal and external attack. It is the act of promoting the core values of a state that would enhance the protection of lives and properties of the citizenry (Okene, 2010). According to Adebakin and Raimi (2012) national security covers critical dimensions, viz: Economic security, Political security, Food security, Health security, Environmental security, Personal security and Community security. Nigeria as a country has its own National security threats; this study is particularly concerned with the threat to Nigeria’s national security triggered by the activities of trans-border criminal. Ogunbanyo in Nwolise (2008) stressed further that security is more than military security or security from external attacks. For the purpose of this study, national security can best be conceptualized as the totality of actions and frameworks towards protecting a state from all factors that may constitute impediments to its growth and survival. Considering the meaning of, and implications associated with national security, it is important to state that National security is a matter that bothers on the well-being, stability and development of a nation.

#### **Theoretical Framework**

According to Obasi (1999:8), Theoretical framework can be said to be a device or scheme for adopting or applying the assumptions, postulations and principles of a theory in assumption and analysis of a

research problem. It is a way of describing, analysis, interpreting and predicting phenomena. A number of social theories can be used to explain the origin, extent, distribution and management of crime within an environment but the application maybe restricted to stages of development of society. Structural functionalists consider crimes to be an inevitable part of the society. Through public outrage and legal punishment, the majorities of people in a given society recognize, accept and adhere to a shared set of moral guidelines and rules (Archibong, 2016:11). Without crimes, there would be no legal system or shared morals in our society, however, when crimes rate becomes uncontrollable, the people's trust in the state is weakened with the risk of a decline in strength of commitment and patriotism.

According to social learning theory, juveniles learn to engage in crime in the same way they learn to engage in conforming behaviour through association with or exposure to others. Primary or intimate groups like the family and peer group have an exceptionally large impact on what we learn. In facts, association with delinquent friends is the best predictor of delinquency other than prior delinquency. However, one does not have to be in direct contact with others to learn from them; for example, one may learn to engage in violence from observation of others in the media or physical observation of others from afar.

This study will therefore adopt the theory of differential association which is a social learning theory developed in the 1930's and 1940's by Edwin Sutherland. This particular theory also talks about the fact that people are not naturally born criminals but learn criminality through association with others who are criminally minded. According to Sutherland (2010) "All behaviours, lawful and criminal are learned. He observed that, most important part of learning takes place within intimate personal groups or friends. He further noted that, what is learned depends largely on

the intensity, frequency and the length of association. These claims match the character of trans-border criminals because they are usually close associate to forestall backstabbing and betrayed. This theory further posits that trans-border crimes flourish in societies where there are delinquent people, people in dire need and where there is so much gap between the rich and the poor. All these are prevalent in Nigeria.

### **Research Methodology**

This study is descriptive in nature because it is based on describing and analyzing the issue of Trans-border crimes in Nigeria and its effects on national security. The data were sourced through secondary sources. The researchers reviewed journals, newspapers/ magazines, reports, textbooks etc. The qualitative method was used to analyze the data or information collected.

### **Historical Background of Trans-border Crimes in West Africa**

Trans-border crimes in West Africa became noticeable in the 1960s. Initially they were manifested in the form of individuals or groups of traders, businessmen and women smuggling goods across the borders. There were also transnational syndicates who engage in the trafficking of drugs, small arms and human beings, among others as a means of livelihood (Addo, 2006). These criminals network were characterized by flexibility and ability to take different forms. They often operate under the guise of legitimate trades and businessmen. Their activities eventually assumed alarming proportion when they started trafficking in persons as domestic servants and prostitutes. Such activities have been accompanied by peddling of narcotics and car-jacking. The outbreak of intra-state conflicts in some West African states beginning with Liberia in 1989, added mercenaries to small arms trafficking and recruitment of child soldiers and fighters in the conflicts.

Trans-border criminal activities in West Africa spread because of porous borders where state capacity to respond to the threat and challenges posed by these illegal activities is weak. These border crimes range from smuggling of goods to human trafficking and crude oil theft etc, across national borders, particularly to Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Burkina Faso. Perpetrators include ordinary businessmen and women, and sometimes rebels and criminal gangs. Goods are smuggled in vehicles or on foot, using clandestine and illegal routes across the borders to evade the payment of customs duties. Such evasion will earn more profit from the illegal transactions. At a time, there were the Corsican gangs in Ivory Coast who specialized in cigarette smuggling and the recruitment of women for prostitution in France (Ellis, 1997). However, it is believed that trans-border crimes in the sub region started during the 1970s. The economic environment was characterized by inflation and other challenges that caused people to turn to crime as a means of livelihood. Though there has always been movement of people within the sub-region, the creation of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 which encouraged free movement of persons and goods in the sub-region is also seen to have spurred transnational crimes. For example, in Sierra Leone, there was a huge influx of the Fulas from Guinea and Marakas from the Gambia, both of whom have a strong commercial tradition (Lengor, 2004). Trans-border crimes are also thought to have started in the Ivory Coast in the 1970s when a large number of job seeking immigrants flooded the country. According to Sissoko (2004) "a problem of armed robbery emerged, as bandits composed of immigrants were formed, later joined by Ivoirians".

Some analysts say there had been signs of organized crimes in Nigeria before 1975. These were mainly criminal syndicates who specialized in falsifying imports in order to

transfer money outside the country, normally in contravention of monetary regulations. This process involved over-invoicing, or importing sub-standard goods for delivery to government departments, in return for kick-backs paid to government officials. It was also argued that in general, the 1980s was the decade that first witnessed the flourishing of organized crime in Nigeria. This was attributed to the general corruption of the civilian government of 1979 – 1983 and the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 which led to greater poverty and unemployment in Nigeria. In addition, the increase in emigration, rapid and ill-prepared liberalization of the financial sector and the establishment of poorly regulated finance houses and banks provided new opportunities for money laundering, illegal foreign exchange transactions and other financial frauds. Subsequently, transnational advance-fee fraud became a public issue in Nigeria for the first time, apparently developing from prior existence of corrupt dealing in foreign exchange and money laundering that involved the transfer of stolen funds through foreign businesses and entrepreneurs. According to Alemika (2004), the growth of emigration during the same period also led to the creation of a transnational prostitution business overseas. From that era other criminal activities were introduced into Nigeria by unscrupulous elements in the society. For example, the first cases of heroin trafficking were recorded in Nigeria in the early 1980s (Alemika, 2004:9).

The Mano River Union comprising, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire had been a very unstable geographical area because of continued armed conflicts. The armed conflicts in these countries were to further aggravate the problem of transnational crime in West Africa. With the conflict over, there were lots of loose arms within the sub region, thereby encouraging transnational crimes.

### **Typology of Trans-border Crimes in Nigeria**

Trans-border crimes in the West Africa Sub-region has changed rapidly over recent years through the use of technology, the loosing of travel restrictions and through criminal diversification which has drastically increased the threat to international peace and security (Wakili, 2014; Sunday and Okechukwu, 2014). The predominant trans-border crimes in Nigeria which government and law enforcement agents try to contend with are illustrated and discussed below;

#### **a. Drug Trafficking**

According to UNODC (2014), Drug trafficking is probably among the most alarming problem in trans-border crimes. Drug trafficking, typically refers to the possession of an illegal drug in predetermined quantity that constitutes that the drug is going to be sold. The trade in drugs or narcotics is believed to be gaining ground in the West African Sub-region. The introduction of drugs trafficking in West Africa has been traced to Nigeria. Though Nigeria is not a major hub for transnational drug trafficking, it is a transit route for hard drugs being transported to Europe, Asia and America. According to Kenney, (2007), “the Latin American countries are cultivators, producers and primary processors of cocaine, the European countries source the psychotropic while the Caribbean and some African countries like South Africa, Lesotho and Nigeria are the producers of Cannabis”. He further noted that the United States of America is the highest consumer of hard drugs.

The first drug trafficking related arrest in Nigeria was made in 1983 and during Gen. Buhari regime; he introduced death penalty for drug traffickers (UNODC, 2015). This caused panic among the couriers leading to the push towards Ghana. The border area between Nigeria and Benin served as the alternative route for the traffickers into Ghana before it is later airlifted to the destination. This event led to the establishment of the

Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) to combat illicit drugs. According to Adetula (2015), arrests have been made in Chad and Equatorial Guinea of some Nigerians alleged to be dealing in drugs. Some of these drug traffickers often employ other people to carry out their activities thereby making it difficult for security agencies to detect their movement. These mule or couriers often move undetected and they can be elderly individuals, children, pregnant women, clerics, important personality in the society among others. The drug couriers are also on several occasions not aware of being in possession of the drugs. They are often told to deliver a parcel to somebody on the other side of the country. Others are made to swear oaths making it difficult to divulge information when caught (UNODC, 2015). In an environment like Nigeria where there is high poverty rate, illiteracy, poor governance, corruption, ethnic violence among others, drug trafficking and drug addiction is growing by the day. Illicit drugs have become very common among the youths in Nigeria.

#### **b. Illegal Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs)**

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) is a term used in Arms protocols to refer to two main classes of weapons. Small Arms are usually seen as hand held small caliber firearms usually consisting of handguns, rifles, shotguns, semi-automatic and full automatic weapons and man-portable machine guns. Arms trade refers to the exchange of weapons of war between manufacturers, middle persons and the consumers ‘of arms (Oshita, 2010: 168). However, the trade becomes illegal if transactions happen between unauthorized persons. Africa has witnessed armed conflicts in Libya, Mali and Sudan in recent years. These conflicts have led to illegal arms trade and consequently, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) in the West African sub- region. This has increased the number of weapons that have entered

Nigeria from across the borders due to the porous nature of the borders. The issue of small arms trafficking in West Africa is serious and a source of concern to the security agencies and a threat to Nigeria's National security.

### **C. Human Trafficking**

The trafficking of humans for the purpose of domestic service, prostitution, organ harvest and other forms of exploitative labour has been a widespread phenomenon in the West African Sub-region and Africa in general. Over time, it has become a worldwide phenomenon. The trade has taken a transnational dimension spreading to all the continents. Although it is the fastest growing criminal industry in the world and the world's third largest criminal enterprise, after drug dealing and arms trade, existing knowledge about the trade, particularly in the parts of Africa is fractured and fragmented (Lipede, 2007:3). Despite the inhumane nature of the trade, criminals still indulge in it because it is very lucrative. According to United Nation figures, human trafficking generates approximately \$9.5 billion annually for the criminals in the business.

In human trafficking, the worst hits are women and children who are trafficked to other parts of Africa, Europe and America for prostitution and forced labour. According to Okoro (2007), parents agree, and sometimes earnestly solicit, to place their children or wards in the homes of richer or more connected individuals. The latter may be relations townsmen, tribesmen or even total strangers. Some of the factors that make trafficked persons vulnerable are poverty, illiteracy, ignorance and greed. Another factor that has made the illicit trade to thrive is the abolition of visa requirement for nationals travelling within the sub-region in compliance with the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. Since traffickers do not have to procure visas for their victims when moving them from one country to another within the

sub-region, a major impediment is off their way.

### **d. Money Laundering**

Money laundering according to Ering (2011) is the practice of engaging in financial transactions to conceal the identity, source or destination of illegally gained money. It could also be defined as the process of taking any action with property of any form which is either wholly or in part the proceeds of a crime that will disguise the fact that property is the proceeds of a crime or obscure the beneficial ownership of said property". According to Sanusi (2001:96), "Money laundering is a term used to describe the various methods adopted by both organized and unorganized criminal syndicates to legitimize the proceeds of their criminal activities, by concealing their true origin and ownership, and thereby enabling them to employ such funds for further activities". He further noted that money laundering is a derivative, or a second- order financial crime. This implies that for money to be laundered; a basic criminal activity must have taken place.

Money laundering is a serious problem in the Nigerian landscape. It has become a prominent practice by Nigerian elites who often syphon the countries resources and funds into their oversea accounts. The crime of money laundering is transnational. This is corroborated by Fwa (2007:142), when he posited that "the phenomenon of money laundering is an aspect of organized crime that transcends national borders". He also noted that money laundering is of strategic importance to organized crimes generally, and corruption in particular. If transnational money laundering is not checked, money meant for investments in Nigeria will be taken out and this will further worsen the challenge of joblessness which may compound the current security problems. This simply means that if money laundering is curtailed reasonably, it will check corruption. It also presupposes that more money will be

available to enhance the local economy and reduce unemployment and poverty.

#### **e. Smuggling and Vehicles theft across Nigerian Borders**

Smuggling is an age long transnational criminal activity that takes place all over the world. However, the smuggled goods and the intensity of smuggling differ from one crime to another. Smuggling refers to cross border trading in banned or restricted goods. Similarly, if import duty is not paid on a dutiable imported good, smuggling is said to have taken place. Smuggling of used vehicles popularly known as *tokumbo* cars is a serious menace. The smuggling of *tokumbo* cars into Nigeria apart from being criminal, costs the government huge revenue that could be derived from import duty.

Vehicles theft is another cross-border criminal activity flourishing along the Nigeria borders. Organized criminal gangs steal cars from Nigeria and take them across the border to sale. Similarly, vehicles are stolen from across the border and moved to Nigeria for sale. According to Onuoha, (2013), "a larger percentage of vehicles stolen using a case study of Nigeria find their way to our neighbouring countries particularly, Benin, Togo, Chad, Cameroon, Niger Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Burkina faso". He noted that, these stolen vehicles are taken across the borders, most of the time with Nigerian number plates and then presented for registration. This make tracing of such vehicles very difficult if not impossible. Since the criminals pass through bush path, it becomes very difficult for the Nigeria Customs Service to track them down and seize such vehicles. Smuggling generally and vehicles theft are criminal activities and therefore impinge on the security of the country. Therefore, ways of curbing these criminal activities must be found to ensure national security and economic prosperity.

#### **f. Sea Piracy and other Maritime Crimes**

Piracy is typically an art of robbery or criminal violence at sea. The term can include acts

committed on land, in the air, or in other major bodies of water or on the shore. It does not normally include crimes committed against persons traveling on the same vessel as a perpetrator (e.g one passenger stealing from others on the same vessel). The term has been used throughout history to refer to raids across land border by non-state agents. Piracy or pirating is the name of a specific crime under customary international law and also the name of a number of crimes under the municipal law of the number of states. It is distinguished from privateering which is authorized by national authorities and therefore a legitimate form of war like activities by non-state actors. Privateering is considered commerce raiding, and was outlawed by the Peace of Westphalia 1648 for signatures to that treaty. Those who engage in act of piracy are called pirates. Piracy off the coast of Nigeria has become an ever increasing problem in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigerian pirates steal crude oil off tanker ships and sell them on the black market. In April 2013 the African Union began funding extra security forces and increase security in the Gulf of Guinea but this has had little or no effect on piracy in the region. According to Ogbor, (2011), the pirates that operate in Nigerian waters are both Nigerians and people from Benin, Togo and Ghana.

#### **g. Oil theft and Bunkering**

Oil theft/bunkering in Nigeria has continued to occur at an alarming rate. In the Niger Delta, Illegal oil bunkering, long prevalence in the Delta has become a sophisticated operation that no longer requires the cooperation of oil company staff to operate equipment at wellheads or allow access though, there are still reports that many of them are involved. The bunkers tap directly into pipelines away from oil company facilities and connect from the pipes to badges that are hidden in small creeks with mangrove forest cover. Most times, both in the riverine areas and on dry land, the police and military are



involved in the process or are paid off to take no action against those tapping into pipelines.

Numerous studies have highlighted the magnitude of oil theft and bunkering in Nigeria. According to a report by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria lost approximately \$825 million between 2018 and 2019 due to oil theft and illegal bunkering activities (NNPC, 2019). This staggering loss represents a significant drain on the country's revenue and compromises its ability to invest in critical infrastructure and social welfare programs. The root causes of oil theft and bunkering in Nigeria are multifaceted. Some scholars like Igbuzor, (2011) argue that poverty and unemployment play a crucial role in driving individuals towards engagement in illegal oil-related activities. High levels of poverty create an environment where people are more likely to participate in such criminal activities as a means of survival. Furthermore, According to Garuba, (2010), corruption within the Nigerian government and security agencies has been widely acknowledged as a facilitator of oil theft and bunkering. The involvement of influential political and military figures in the illicit oil trade has further perpetuated the problem.

### **h. Terrorism and Armed Banditry**

According to Imobighe (2006:18), "terrorism can be said to represent the indiscriminate and random use of different levels of violence against an opponent or the ancillary interests of such an opponent, with whom one has an adversarial relationship in order to strike fear on the latter and impose one's will on it, or tailor its action towards a desired goal". Terrorism can be considered as the most sophisticated form of violent crime. Trans-border terrorism therefore refers to acts of terrorism that are planned, coordinated, and executed by extremist groups across international borders. These groups take advantage of weak border controls, porous borders, and cross-border ethnic or religious affiliations to carry out their attacks. Nigeria's

proximity to countries like Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin has made it vulnerable to trans-border terrorist activities.

Banditry, on the other hand, involves criminal activities carried out by armed groups that operate across borders. These groups engage in various illegal activities, such as raiding of villages, kidnapping, smuggling, human trafficking, and arms trade. Bandits often take advantage of weak border security and limited law enforcement capabilities to conduct their operations.

The trans-border terrorism and banditry in Nigeria have been linked to various extremist organizations and criminal networks. For instance, Boko Haram, one of the most notorious terrorist groups in Nigeria, has established strong links with jihadist movements across the Sahel region. These affiliations enable them to carry out cross-border attacks and seek sanctuary in neighbouring countries (ICG, 2021). The activities of bandits in Nigeria have also shown trans-border connections. The movement of stolen goods, including livestock and other valuable commodities, often extends beyond national borders, with networks spanning multiple countries.

### **Causes of Trans-Border Crimes**

According to Alemika (2009:15), "transnational crimes could be caused by deprivations such as mass poverty, unemployment, low income and wide income inequalities, which motivate people to seek for illegal incomes that cannot be legitimately earned". When all these factors are present, those with criminal minds are likely to take crime.

**a. Poverty:** Poverty, which in Nigeria is generally more acute in the rural areas than in the urban centres has been on the general increase since 1980, when 28.1% of the population or 17.7 million people were considered poor (Benched at one US dollar a day). By 1985, the figure had gone up to 34.7

million or 46.3% of the total population (Barkindo, 2007:21). The poverty situation in Nigeria is precarious not only in terms of income poverty but also in terms of food insecurity. Findings have revealed that, the living condition of people in the Nigeria is not conducive as there is disequilibrium in the revenue sharing leading to an increase in poverty rate, the rich are getting richer and the poor are always at the receiving end.

Nigeria poverty rate is very high that even the minimum wage rate of civil servants which presently stands at 30,000 naira/month is not enough to cater for their immediate families. The implication therefore is that, people often engage themselves in other activities in order to make ends meet. This situation not only encourages rural-urban drift but the escalation of human trafficking in an effort to reduce the mouths to feed. Recently, one Mr. Chiana Solomon was arrested by men of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), FCT command for attempting to sell his eight (8) year old son for 20 million naira. When he was paraded and interviewed by news men, he said the economic hardship being experienced in the country led him to consider selling his son. He said; he has six (6) children without a means of taking care of them. He further said he intended training the remaining children with the proceeds from the crime if he had succeeded. This is one case among many whereby, poverty has pushed people into criminal activities to survive.

**b. Unemployment:** The kind of unemployment that could spur trans-border crimes is that of educated youths in the country. It is sad to note that there has been an increase in the number of tertiary institutions in the country since about the last four decades. However, there is no commensurate provision of jobs for the graduates of these institutions. Furthermore, there was no reasonable growth in the private sector to enable the sector to employ the numerous graduates that are seeking for jobs in the country. In addition, the

supposed embargo on public sector employment imposed since 2020 has not been lifted till date.

According to the Nigerian bureau of statistics (NBS), (2023), the unemployment rate in Q2 2023 was 4.2%, this is an increase of 0.1% from the figure recorded in Q1 2023 (4.1%). The rate of unemployment among persons with post-secondary education was 8% in Q2 2023. The Unemployment rate among youth aged (15-24 years) in Q2 2023 was 7.2% having been at 6.9% in Q1 2023. The Unemployment rate in urban areas was 5.9% in Q2 2023, an increase from 5.4% in Q1 2023. This statistics are not good at all as it relates to employment in the country. Nigeria is now faced with a large number of youths both domestic and from contiguous countries who have grudges against the society and are enlightened enough to participate in inimical acts including trans-border crimes.

**c. Porosity of the Borders:** Over the years, the Nigerian government has been confronted with the problem of ensuring effective border security. The porous border situation has led to increase in criminality particularly transnational crimes like smuggling of illegal goods, illegal movements of persons, money laundering, theft, kidnapping and terrorism. The ineffective control and management of the borders have become a serious concern to citizens especially those living around border towns. While Nigeria's border problem is related to colonial history, its porosity has been exacerbated by the failure of succeeding governments to properly administer these borders.

As Onuoha noted, "the high level of insecurity on African borders is largely due to the way they are administered and managed, and less to do with how colonialists drew them" (Onuoha., 2013). Despite the spirit of enterprising and promising neighbourliness, the borders linking Nigeria and some countries within the sub-region have become problematic because of the activities of

internationally reputed criminals engaging in smuggling and trafficking of virtually everything from human trafficking, ammunition, arms, and drugs manufactured goods, agricultural produce, prostitution, and child labour to religious fanaticism, terrorist attacks and insurgency (Adeolu, L.G., & Fayomi, O., 2012)

**d. Rural-Urban Migration:** It is a truism that there is rural-urban migration in most countries in West Africa, particularly Nigeria. In Nigeria, people migrate from rural areas to the urban centres because of a number of factors. One is the lack of basic infrastructures such as electricity, water, goods roads telecommunication facilities, among others. Another is lack of white collar employment opportunities other than farming. Even the issues of educational centres and internet cafes are enough reasons to lure people to the urban areas. According to Barkindo, (2007), “the development of urban centres gave great impetus to rural-urban migrations. Since most of government expenditures were in, or related to, the urban centres, there was human migration to the towns.” The people that migrate to the towns belong to all strata of the society, including criminals and prostitutes, all in search of jobs. Since jobs are never enough to go round everyone, the new comers become ready source of recruits for criminal activities such as armed robbery, smuggling, drug and human trafficking. These newcomers include citizens from neighbouring countries who view Nigeria as better developed and with more opportunities.

**f. Declining Societal Values:** Over the years, Nigeria has witnessed declining societal values mainly as a result of hardship due to increasing poverty in the country. It is common knowledge today that society no longer questions people’s sources of wealth. A very poor individual could acquire sudden wealth and instead of people treating such a person with suspicion and disdain he or she is celebrated and even given chieftaincy title in

certain communities. This then serves as a source of encouragement to people to get rich at all cost; that is to say the end justifies the means. The society’s growing indifference to greed and illegally acquired wealth is opposed to the traditional Nigerian societal value system that cherishes integrity, transparent honesty and contentment (Dambazau, 2007:5). Therefore, the declining societal values are a major threat to the war against trans-border crimes. The solution to this could begin at the family level, where parents are expected to show good moral examples to their children and wards. Similarly, Nigerian leaders need to live by example and shun corruption. In this way, the younger generation will want to live decently and so they will find crime unattractive and desist from it.

**g. Inadequate Manpower and Equipment for Security Agencies:** It is a fact that the Nigerian security agencies tasked to fight crimes generally and trans-border crimes are not adequately equipped for the assigned tasks. The agencies being referred to are the Police, Customs Service, Immigration, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), NAPTIP and the Military. The complaints from these agencies as to why they are unable to perform their duties effectively at any point in time have been poor financing, inadequate equipment and training. These agencies do not have enough patrol vehicles, communication equipment, arms and ammunition and in some cases, no detection equipment such as radars, scanners and intelligence gathering devices.

Manpower shortages are a major challenge for fighting trans-border crimes. Because the Nigerian borders are so long and vast, it is usually difficult to have enough manpower to cover every necessary area. Adequate provision of necessary manpower and logistics is one way of ensuring reasonable level of border security. In order to ensure proper security outfits responsible for border security.

**h. Climate Change:** Climate change affects Nigerian neighbours like Niger Republic and Chad more than it affects her but Nigeria experiences the aftermath more than them. Climate change has effect on Nigeria's national security. Climate change in the West Africa can be seen in the regular droughts, desert encroachment and ground water scarcity in northern Nigeria and Nigeria's northern neighbours' leading to famine. This phenomenon has led to an influx of cattle herdsman to the country from Niger Republic and Chad. According to Ogaba (2010), "most of the robberies are committed by the herdsman who were forced to migrate by the effects of climate change in their country". The incessant religious crises in the country have also been traced to these illegal immigrants. The impacts of climate change are presenting obvious threats to the security of the nation, especially those related to trans-border crimes. Climate change therefore, poses a potential danger of leading to unprecedented local/regional disruptions in social systems with resultant adverse impacts on fragile nations' security (Federal Ministry of Environment, 2009).

#### **Effects of Trans-border Crimes on Nigeria's National Security**

Trans-border crimes refer to criminal activities that occur across international borders. Trans-border crimes have become a significant threat to Nigeria's national security, as they affect the country's economic, political, social, and cultural spheres of life. The effect of trans-border crimes, such as arms smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, piracy, oil bunkering, drug trafficking, terrorism, banditry; etc on Nigerian national security cannot be overemphasized. These criminal activities have far-reaching consequences that threaten the socio-economic development, stability, and governance of the country.

Trans-border criminals contribute to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which further exacerbates existing security threats in Nigeria. The illicit flow of weapons

and ammunition across the counties porous borders occurs as a result of arms smuggling. As reported by Stohl and Tuttle (2009); Nte (2011) and Abdulkareem (2012), about 59% of these Small Arms and Light Weapons, are in the hands of civilians, 38% are owned by government armed forces, 2.8 % by police and 0.2% by armed groups. To make matters worse, none of the security agent currently possesses the training, resources or personnel to perform their duties effectively due to lengthy and porous nature of Nigerian borders (Alli, 2012). Nte (2011) posits that there is a direct link between the acquisition of weapons like SALWs and escalation of conflicts into a full-blown war. These weapons often find their way into the hands of violent non-state actors, including terrorist groups and bandits, enabling them to carry out attacks with greater ease and intensity. The consequence of this is the erosion of law and order. In other words, the widespread proliferation of small arms contributes to the alarming levels of armed crime, and militancy in Nigeria (Nte, 2011 and Adetula, 2008).

Criminal networks that are involved in drug trafficking and other illicit activities operate in a clandestine manner, undermining the rule of law and compromising the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in Nigeria, many of them have been involved in bribing, compromising, and even eliminating law enforcement officers like the police, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Immigration officers, Customs etc just to have their way. An example is the case of the once decorated police officer, DCP Abba Kyari who got himself compromised by drug traffickers and was arrested and is being prosecuted by the NDLEA. This leads to a weakened security apparatus and making it difficult to tackle other security challenges within the country. Furthermore, with the acclaimed high patronage of hard drugs in Nigeria, it becomes imperative for the country to fight the menace and possibly eradicate the trade in the country, this is because drug trafficking

threatens national security, since it spurs other forms of crimes. If the youths are exposed to hard drug, that could lead to a dysfunctional society with its attendant security challenges.

Trans-border crimes have also led to the destabilization of communities and displacement of populations in Nigeria. Human trafficking, for instance, leads to the exploitation and forced labour of individuals, often resulting in human rights abuses, the ever growing issue of organ harvest and social unrest. Expatiating on the issue of human trafficking further, Hamidu and Nuhu (2015) stated that, in a country where legitimate economic opportunities were far less lucrative, criminal activities such as child and women trafficking, female prostitution and child slavery, presented enormous temptation.

The activities of terrorist groups, bandits, and pirates also create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, causing displacement and disrupting daily life in affected areas. There are lots of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) Camp scattered all over the country especially in the North due to the activities of these terrorist and bandit groups. The existence of these IDP camps is a threat to National security itself as they have been alleged to be breeding ground for criminals. Criminal gangs also most times infiltrate the camp and commit various atrocities against the people in the camp and within the communities where these camps are located. Furthermore, the activities of terrorist and insurgent groups across international borders have seriously compromised internal security and weakened the country's democratic institutions. Nationals, mainly from countries in the Sahel and Western Sahara, have been linked with religious uprising in Nigeria. The exportation of religious extremism into Nigeria adds another dimension to the challenge of insecurity in the country. The porous borders in Nigeria provide an avenue for foreign actors to influence and destabilize the political landscape, making it challenging to achieve political stability and national unity. The interconnectedness of

trans-border crimes, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and banditry, poses a threat to regional stability. The porous borders and lack of effective cooperation and coordination among neighbouring countries make it easier for criminal networks and extremist groups to operate across borders. This allows them to establish transnational networks, share resources, and evade law enforcement efforts, further complicating the security situation in Nigeria and the West African sub-region.

Trans-border crimes also have a detrimental impact on the economy of Nigeria. Money laundering, for example, diverts resources away from legitimate economic activities, undermining financial institutions and hindering economic growth. Some of these illegal funds are used to buy weapons and fund insurgency in the country thereby affecting national security. Nigeria's major source of revenue is exportation of crude oil; According to Mele Kyari, the group chief executive officer (GCEO), NNPC Limited, "Nigeria loses \$1.9 billion monthly to crude oil theft". Piracy and oil bunkering disrupt maritime activities, leading to significant losses in revenue from the oil and gas sector, which is a crucial component of Nigeria's economy. Furthermore, the illegal importation of counterfeit goods produced in neighbouring countries, arms, and drugs across international borders deprives the country of significant revenue and harms legal businesses. From the foregoing, it can be seen that trans-border crimes have led to death of thousands of Nigerians and have devastating effect on national security

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Trans-border crimes is a serious source of security concerned to nations all over the world, consequently this paper set out to examine trans-border crimes in Nigeria and its implication on national security. It has been discovered that trans-border crimes have severe implications for Nigerian national

security and that of its neighbouring countries. Drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, vehicle theft, piracy, oil bunkering, terrorism, banditry and other forms of trans-border criminal activities contribute to instability, undermine governance, compromise the rule of law, and hinder socio-economic development. The cross-border nature of these activities creates complex challenges that require regional cooperation and coordination. By addressing these security risks collectively, the other countries in the West African sub-region and Nigeria can work towards creating a safer and more stable environment for their citizens and promoting regional peace and security. On these grounds, all the dimensions and sources of this crime must be forcefully combated.

The spate of trans-border criminal activities undermines Nigeria's national security. Thus, in the light of the foregoing, this study proffers the following recommendations to address the problem of trans-border crimes and its impact on Nigerian national security.

Government should adopt a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach in tackling the menace of trans-border criminals. This should involve enhancing border security and surveillance, improving intelligence sharing and cooperation with other neighbouring countries.

Government should address the root causes of trans-border-crimes such as socio-economic inequalities and governance challenges, this is essential in preventing and mitigating the spread of trans-border crimes in Nigeria.

Government should as a matter of urgency strengthening law enforcement capabilities, by properly equipping all security agencies especially those involved in border security.

Government should formulate and implement robust legal frameworks and institutions that ensure synergy amongst various agencies to combat trans-border crimes effectively.

The Nigerian government must invest in capacities to trace, detect, analyze, freeze and confiscate criminal assets.

Government should diligently prosecute suspects, offenders or their sponsors engaged in criminal activities to a logical conclusion irrespective of who they are in the country.

Governments should formulate and properly implement policies and put in place relevant infrastructures to create an enabling environment for job creation so as to reduce poverty and attraction to domestic and trans-border crimes in Nigeria. Provision of infrastructures in rural areas will also keep people in their villages and reduces rural-urban migration, thereby mitigating the multiplier effects of criminality.

Finally, government should through the relevant agencies like the National Orientation Agency (NOA) continuously carryout sensitization on the dangers of crime and its implications

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# 20

## NIGERIA'S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND ATTAINMENT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

**Nse Etim Akpan<sup>1</sup>**

**Yakubu William<sup>2</sup>**

**Edibo Vincent Olusegun<sup>3</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *nseakpan04@gmail.com*

<sup>2</sup>Department of Political Science, College of Education, Zing, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *williamsyakubu95@gmail.com*

<sup>3</sup>Department of Political Science, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *sheegeeni001@gmail.com*



### Abstract

The 2030 agenda for sustainable development came into force in January 2016 as the central platform of the United Nations (UN) for achieving integrated and indivisible goals and targets of sustainable development across social, environmental and economic dimensions. The successes of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the precursor of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has been acknowledged across the globe especially in poverty reduction as well as other spheres of human endeavor. This paper examines the possibility of the attainment of the SDGs by Nigeria in the face of mounting security challenges. Qualitatively driven and drawing from literature on security and development as well as secondary sources of data on security, it argues that Nigeria's effort in meeting the targets of SDGs particularly the peace and security goal of the agenda remains a myth given the level of insecurity in the country. It observes that Nigeria's initial effort in attaining the MDGs which centered on tackling corruption, dwindling standard of education, declining agricultural output and epileptic power supply were overtaken by the need to address the rising spate of killings, kidnapping and the general state of insurgency and terrorism in different parts of the country. The paper concludes that the challenges posed to sustainable development by insecurity will require a more concise and coordinated approach that takes into account good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and the building of strong security and justice institutions that will make the attainment of the SDGs a reality.

**Key Words:** Security, rule of law, sustainable development, governance, human right

### Introduction

Sustainable development has finally become the North Star for the international community. While introduced only 30 years ago to the UN through the "Brundtland commission" (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987), it has now moved to the center stage of international discourse. It is referenced on the UN's home page, and it has its dedicated website. This extraordinarily positive public endorsement reflects the world's official

commitment to everyone's wellbeing (development), while recognizing the need to operate within the planet's ecological limits (sustainable). This is the essence of any serious sustainable development definition, including the World-Wide Fund (WWF), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the United Nations Environment Program's "improving the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting eco-systems".

Similarly, the Brundtland commission's definition captures sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). While the latter does not explicitly reference biophysical constraints or resource security (the inverse of biophysical constraints), it does so implicitly as a depleted planet will not be able to provide the necessary physical inputs for future generations (Wackernagel, Hanscom and Lin, 2017). However, irrespective of the definition, the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are the most significant global effort so far to advance global sustainable development.

Nigeria has been faced with several security challenges in the past decade. At a more general level the security threat has social, economic, political and environmental implications for the growth and development of the country. From the Niger Delta militancy which dovetailed into pipeline vandalization and oil blow outs, the incessant cases of kidnapping and hostage taking for ransom to the farmer-herder conflict and the dreaded Boko Haram insurgency, the country has not witnessed any level of peace, a development which has affected its process of development. All these is happening alongside the serious threat of armed banditry, ethnic and religious conflicts, environmental degradation, ethnic militia armies and agitation for secession, corruption and biting poverty which has threatened the corporate existence of the country. However, of all these security threats, none has generated the kind of impact witnessed in the operations and activities of the Boko Haram insurgent group.

In fact, the challenge posed by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria is not only about the viciousness of its terror campaigns, nor the sect's avowed mission to impose Islamic law on the country, but also about the confusion regarding the exact cause(s) of the violence.

One of the outcomes of the security challenge posed by the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian society has been the emergent preponderance of theories that attempt to explain the motive of the Islamic group. Unlike the Niger Delta militancy which preceded it, and which predicated its desire for a separate state from Nigeria on decades of conspiratorial neglect by the Nigerian state and multinational oil prospecting companies in the Niger Delta region, Boko Haram has refrained from articulating and formally presenting its grievances, apart from its declared desire for the strict adherence and interpretation of Islamic Law in Nigeria. The confusion also grows out of the changing dynamics in the operations of the sect. For instance, its terror campaign, which initially targeted security formations and personnel, has expanded to include civilians and non-government targets, and the Nigerian public generally (Aloziwewa, 2014).

Globally, the successes of MDGs the precursor of the SDGs in a number of development areas have been acknowledged, especially as regards poverty reduction (Kharas & Biau, 2016). However, there is a consensus that the global agenda had failed in a critical target of ensuring justice and security (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015). The agenda also failed to make positive impact in Africa as the continent witnessed remarkable surge on incidences of crime and violence (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). Indeed, crime and violence has been recognized as one of the foremost social and development challenges that the continent is facing in the 21st century, and it connects with a range of individual, micro, societal and structural risk factors, such as increased poverty, inequality, social exclusion, unemployment and inadequate services (The World Bank, 2015). Specifically, homicide and violence have been pointed out as concurrent contributors to instability and insecurity that impact negatively at the national and sub-

regional levels (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016).

In Nigeria, initial concerns of the country's bid of achieving MDG were centered on how the federal government will tackle the caustic and corrosive corruption, dwindling standard of education, low agricultural yields, and perennial epileptic power supply (Adebakin, 2016). However, the recurring spate of hapless killings among other violent crimes in different parts of the country has effectively diverted the minds of Nigerians to clamoring for the federal government to focus on tackling security threats in the country (Achumba, Ighomereho, and Akpan-Robaro, 2013; Igbuzor, 2017). It is indeed the responsible of governments all over the world to protect their citizens as well as their properties. However, the same cannot be said of Nigerian government as the problem of insecurity has lingered for long with the federal government apparently incapacitated (Enuokora, 2015). On the other hand, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2015 to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), is the central UN platform for achieving 'integrated and indivisible' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) across social, environmental and economic dimensions. The SDGs came into action in January 2016 aimed at offering a broad and inclusive framework for ending poverty worldwide in the next 15 years. It is widely recognized that successful achievement of this agenda, which is comprised of 17 SDGs and 169 targets, requires national, regional and local efforts across all sectors of society. For some, the SDGs are seen as an opportunity to bring together the development efforts of different sectors under a single agenda. Others are concerned that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is too broad and, as a result, difficult to measure and manage (Osborn, Cutter and Ullah, 2015).

The then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called the MDGs, signed in January

2000, 'the most successful antipoverty movement in history', by lifting more than one billion people out of extreme poverty, and making specific gains on targets such as reducing hunger, increasing female education and advancing environmental protection. At the same time, it is recognized that much work remains to be done to address persistent inequalities and uneven progress. There are also concerns that recent conflicts, growing extremism, unprecedented levels of migration, continued economic and financial volatility, and large-scale environmental changes had undermined the achievement of some of the MDGs (Wilkinson and Hume, 2012). In this context, high expectations are being placed on the SDGs to do more in the coming years. The new agenda departs from the MDGs in two important respects. First, the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Sustainable Development highlights the importance of addressing the determinants of development and well-being within a 'universal framework' by which goals apply to every country and across all sectors of society. While the MDGs applied to developing countries, the SDGs are framed to address poverty alleviation in all countries. Second, the SDGs place sustainability at the heart of the development agenda, recognizing the need to address the complex links between development and the environment. Based on lessons from the MDGs, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is seen as a unique opportunity to design new objectives, measures and indicators which are innovative and transformative. Of particular concern is the need to move away from a narrow set of quantitative goals and targets towards a broader range of more 'integrated and indivisible' goals and targets (World Health Organization, 2015).

The foregoing reveals a lot about the intention of the founding fathers of both the MDGs and the SDGs. The purpose was to create a world devoid of hunger, poverty, sickness, gender disparity and environmental

degradation among others. This is also targeted at all nations in the world to which Nigeria is a key player particularly in the African continent. What remains worrisome is Nigeria's ability to fit into this world prism of sustainable development in the midst of her perennial security challenges. It is therefore this background that has energized our interest and propelled us to set to work to examine the possibility of the country meeting the SDGs within the context of sustained security challenges that has ravaged the entire country.

### **Systems Approach to Sustainable Development: A Framework of Analysis**

The systems approach is an old concept. The approach stands on the assumption that breaking down of a complex concept into simple easy to understand units helps in better understanding of the complexity.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy first proposed the systems approach under the name of 'General System Theory'. Even though he had orally created the notion of the general systems theory in the 1940's he formally published it in 1968 (Thakur, 2021). He introduced system as a new scientific philosophy and defined it in a formal manner. He noted that most systems (biological or physical) of any practical relevance are open as they interact with the environment. Therefore, to understand the system it has to be differentiated from the environment, that is, the boundary of the system has to be clearly defined along with its interaction with the environment from within this boundary.

The approach concentrates on the holistic entity of the system without neglecting the components. It attempts to understand the role each component plays in the system while simultaneously understanding the activity of the whole system. The systems approach is characterized by such concepts as holism where a change in any component or part of a system affects the whole system directly or indirectly. It also deals with specialization,

non-summational, grouping, coordination and emergent properties. Under specialization, a whole system can be divided into granular (smaller easy to understand), components so that the specialized role of each component is appreciated. Non-summational on the other hand demands that every component whether a subsystem or partial system is of importance to the whole. It is therefore essential to understand the actions of each component to get the holistic perspective (Boulding, 1985).

In terms of grouping, the process of specialization can create its own complexity by proliferating components with increasing specialization. To avoid this, it becomes essential to group related disciplines or sub-disciplines. While the grouped components and sub components need coordination. Without coordination the components will not be able to work in a concerted manner and will lead to chaos. Coordination and control is a very important concept in the study of systems as without this it will not be a unified holistic concept. Lastly, emergent properties remain an important concept of systems approach. It means that the group of interrelated entities (components) has properties as a group that is not present in any individual component. This is the holistic view of a system. For example, multicellular organisms exhibit characteristics as a whole which are not present in individual constituent parts like cells. Systems approach is based on the generalization that everything is inter-related and interdependent. A system is composed of related and dependent element which when in interaction, forms a unitary whole. A system is simply an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex whole. In relation to sustainable development, the systems approach depicts sustainable development as the intersection of the goals attributed to three interlinked systems: environmental (or ecological), economic and social. It can be captured diagrammatically with the use of a Venn diagram which on its own has produced

variants of sustainability although it was first employed by Barbier (1987).

One important insight is that attempting to maximize the goals for just one system does not achieve sustainability, because the impacts on the other systems are ignored (Holmberg and Sandbrook 1992). For example, achieving greater efficiency, equity and reduced poverty in economic systems may still generate unintended environmental and social impacts that undermine ecological and social systems. In any case, the latter approach to development fails to recognize that environmental, economic and social systems are interlinked, and that progress solely focused on one system's goals could have consequences for the other systems. Instead, sustainable development can only be achieved by balancing the tradeoffs among the various goals of the three systems. Similarly, rather than aiming to check off the 17 goals of the separately, a systems-based approach focuses on how we might achieve the SDGs as a coherent unit. A systems-based approach recognizes that progress on one goal, in one place, could either undermine or enhance progress on other goals, there or elsewhere. Interactions and feedbacks among the SDGs can be both negative (producing trade-offs or diminishing efforts) and positive (producing synergies or reinforcing efforts). As an example of a reinforcing feedback, providing access to safe drinking water, and enabling income growth will reinforce efforts to eradicate poverty.

Although the original development of the systems approach to sustainability by Barbier (1987) emphasizes the possibility of tradeoffs among the various economic, environmental and social system goals, the interlinkages could be positive as well as negative. For example, there could be a positive impact of an improvement in the efficiency in terms of improving the protection of biological productivity and biodiversity in the environmental system. Therefore, as well as taking account of trade-offs, one should look

to capitalize on any positive interaction effects across system goals when they arise. In this vein, it is imperative for Nigeria to have a holistic approach towards her development agenda as efforts in one direction could reinforce the benefits from other sectors barring any security breach as it is the case in the past decade. Linked to the issue of security and development, Nigeria faces a daunting task in her bid to achieve the SDG goals as its entire system is bereft of holism, coordination and control as well as the concept of emergent properties all needed for the proper functioning of the entire system.

### **Security and Sustainable Development: The Nexus**

The concept of security and development of any kind is like a Siamese twin as neither can be attained in the absence of the other. Similarly, issues bordering on national security are very critical for the material progress of any polity. This assertion is against the backdrop of the truism that sustainable development is a function of an enabling environment. Hutchful (2002 :1) posits that pivotal to the survival of any society is its law and order which are predicated on national security. Again, a vivid discourse on national security must take cognizance of the fact that security is not limited to the protection of national boundaries even though it is implied.

The concept of the security of any nation encompasses other vital issues such as environmental protection, social, human and food security and more especially the prevalence of internal peace. Lumumba-Kasonjo (2005 :8) states that the role of government (the administrative tool of any nation) is firstly to protect the freedom of the citizens from external aggression and secondly, to preserve law and order within the polity. The international community and indeed the operational apparatus of concerned nations employ these indices as a yardstick for measuring the success or failure

of underdeveloped economies (Orji, 2012 :199).

Oyovbaire (2007:9) notes that the World Bank in February 2007 reclassified Nigeria alongside over fifty other developing nations like Sao Tome, Papua New Guinea, Djibouti as a 'fragile' state even though much earlier the same polities have been dismally branded as 'failed' states. These states have been stigmatized for their wanton inability to engage their citizens in productive ventures that would guarantee, amongst others, security of life and property, protection of human rights and the provision of basic public utilities for meaningful development, the lack of state apparatus to contain territorial assault and the possible outbreak of civil war. Perhaps, the best point to start is to capture the words of the Brundtland Report which state that "The first step in creating a more satisfactory basis for managing the interrelationships between security and sustainable development is to broaden our vision." These words were published thirty years ago, in the report 'Our Common Future'. Many of the findings of that report in which the term "sustainable development" was coined remain valid today.

The Brundtland Report showed how conflicts may arise not only from political and military threats but also from environmental degradation and pre-emption of development options. And it argued that threats to environmental security require multilateral responses (Buttanri, 2017). Since then, there have been three decades of global engagement on sustainable development. Two important milestones were the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. They led to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that were adopted by 193 countries at the three-day Sustainable Development Summit held in New York in September, 2015. There is a logical interdependence between development and conflict. Conflict and insecurity inhibits

development and diverts resources to military purposes that could be better used for human development. Successful development of education, health, governance and infrastructure, meanwhile, are key attributes that make conflict and insecurity markedly less likely.

According to Michael Clarke (2016) a former Director General, Royal United Services Institute, the growth of middle-class interests in a society, property and small business ownership, education and a sense of family stake in a society for future generations is no guarantee that it will not be riven with conflict and insecurity. But societies are less prone to and quicker to recover from civil conflict if there is an active middle class with the opportunity to press its interests to government. To him, during the Cold War the relationship between development and conflict was effectively subordinated to the competition between the superpowers. Developed countries and the superpowers were assumed to have far too much to lose in any direct conflict. Their antagonisms were played out by proxy among other countries across the world. In these circumstances, development was highly politicized, skewed towards military and security spending, and frequently had the effect of creating and bolstering autocratic dictatorships of both capitalist and socialist persuasions. It is not surprising, therefore, that at the end of the Cold War in 1991 and after some 30 years of learning the effects of organized international development across the world there should be a desire to put development aid on a new basis. The UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were the most eloquent and important expression of this aspiration. This has equally dovetailed into the aspirations of the founding fathers of the SDGs. As a matter of fact, and in order to meet the goals of both the MDG and SDG, development had to be sustainable, not politicized for the short term, and should concentrate more on governance, security sector reform and the empowerment

of civil society. These would be the keys to unlocking economic potential in developing countries. In effect, it was frequently argued, the right sort of sustainable development was a higher priority for societies and for whole regions than security, since it created security in and of itself.

In logic it is hard to disagree with the above judgement. But other structures changed drastically after the end of the Cold War and overtook the debate. Fragmentation in many regions, no longer of such interest to the old Cold War powers, exacerbated existing trends towards civil conflict and internal warfare. Crises across the Great Lakes region and in the Balkans characterized the 1990s, crises in the Levant and in south Asia the decade after 2000, and, since 2010, instability has spread across the whole of the Middle East and North Africa, the Sahel and northern Nigeria and in the poorest parts of Europe. The sheer immediacy of security problems has been striking in many countries rendered vulnerable by internal conflict, or conflict driven from the outside that plays on internal tensions. In these situations, the essential needs of basic security appear to be paramount before sustainable development has any chance of success (Clarke, 2016).

This logic viewed against the backdrop of the Brundtland report, makes its application to the peculiar condition of the Nigerian state very critical. The exploration and exploitation of crude oil in the Niger Delta poses great environmental hazards. Numerous environmental problems are associated with the exploitation of oil. Aside oil, there is the claim for self-government by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), the farmers-herders crisis which has metamorphosed into a high wired ring of kidnapping for ransom by bandit Fulani herdsmen and the almighty Boko Haram insurgent group which has rendered the entire North Eastern geo-political zone of the country unlivable. These developments have certainly place Nigeria poles apart from anything development talk less of one which is

sustainable and further energize our interest in examining the possibility of Nigeria attaining the lofty goals of sustainable development as enunciated by the United Nations.

### **From Human Development to Sustainable Development: The Path to Agenda 2030**

The origins of the MDGs lie in a series of UN summits and conferences held during the 1990s, on topics such as nutrition, gender quality, and childhood health. Drawing on targets set at these conferences, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) articulated a set of 'international development goals' in 1996, which, in turn, formed the basis of the MDGs (Sengupta, 2016). It was discovered that the MDGs were actually never openly debated a development which made the UN to consult widely before putting the SDGs together.

Following the adoption of the UN Millennium Declaration, a group of high level experts was convened to formulate the MDGs, and the goals were presented as an annex to a report from the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). With the acceptance of this report, it was argued that the UNGA had assented to the MDGs (Hulme and Scott 2010). This was an unconventional beginning. The new agenda was challenged almost immediately by international NGOs, with the complaint that the MDGs had been devised in a top-down manner by international civil servants based in New York rather than through a democratic process of consultation with civil society. While this was a reasonable grievance, the narrow process adopted by the authors of the MDGs was quite sage given the political climate of the time (Sengupta, 2016).

In the 1990s, as Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2011:24) point out, international development specialists were bitterly divided over the merits of structural adjustment and the Washington Consensus, with the World Bank and IMF pitted against NGOs, "with the UN caught in the middle". A less stealthy approach might have led to stiff, even

debilitating resistance from the international financial institutions and powerful developed country governments. Even so, the MDGs' undemocratic beginnings were always a target of criticism, and when it came to replacing the goals, the UN was careful to adopt a more open and inclusive process.

In July 2012, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a 27-member high-level panel, co-chaired by British Prime Minister David Cameron, to advise on the global development framework beyond 2015. The high-level panel released its final report in May 2013, with the claim that it had consulted a massive swathe of people, including "over 5000 civil society organizations to global alliances, working in about 120 countries across every major region of the world." The results of an extensive online global survey (My World 2015) were also fed into the deliberations of the high-level panel.

The high-level panel suggested twelve "illustrative goals and targets" as possible replacements for the MDGs, and recommended putting "sustainable development at the core" of the post-2015 agenda. This signaled a decisive shift in the official discourse on the MDG-replacements from the idea of 'human development', which had inspired the MDGs, to that of 'sustainable development' the most influential conceptualization of which is articulated in the Brundtland Commission's Report of 1987 as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".

The OWG completed its mandate in July 2014, after thirteen rounds of thematic consultations with national governments, civil society, and the private sector, by publishing a draft text with 17 goals and 169 targets, which was to serve as the basis for inter-governmental negotiations leading up to the 2015 summit of the UNGA. It was expected that some of the goals or targets proposed by the OWG would be dropped or dramatically modified during inter-governmental

negotiations, such as the controversial inequality reduction goal. Remarkably, all goals and targets survived the process, and were adopted as part of the Agenda 2030 in September 2015. Thus, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) came on board to replace the MDGs.

### **Efforts at Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria**

In a bid to implement the SDGs the Federal Government led by Muhammadu Buhari put some mechanisms in place to achieve the implementation of the SDGs 2030 target. The President appointed Princess Adegboye Orelope-Adefulire, a former Deputy Governor of Lagos State as Senior Special Assistant to the President on SDGs in the Presidency which is a carryover from the MDGs under the Presidency too. Similarly, the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria constituted a Senate Committee on SDGs meant to provide oversight functions for SDGs alongside the Federal House of Representatives with a view to monitoring the implementation of the SDGs. There is also inter-ministerial Committee on the SDGs as well as a private sector advisory group and the civil society strategy group on SDGs. The Federal Government worked together with the States Governments through their SDGs Desk Officers who are saddled with the responsibility of implementing the SDGs in their different states and local government areas. The 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) with their 169 targets form the core of the 2030 agenda and are to balance the economic, social and ecological dimensions of sustainable development on the same agenda.

In 2017, President Muhammadu Buhari's government introduced the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) as a policy option. It was a medium term all round development initiative focused on restoring growth, investing in people and building a globally competitive economy. The focus was to stabilize the macro environment, achieve



agriculture and food security, ensure energy sufficiency in power and petroleum products security, improve transformation, infrastructure and drive industrialization (Egwuatu and Kolawole, 2019). It was expected to cover four years until 2020 while serving as the anchor of the implementation of the SDGs. Still in pursuit of the implementation of the SDGs, government established several partnerships which supported the implementation of the SDGs programmes. According to Nigeria's Road to SDGs (2015) the partnerships ranged from those that are internal between the Federal, State and Local Governments; between MDAs; between government, civil society organizations and communities, to partnerships between the Nigerian government and international aid agencies, private firms and foreign governments.

Nigeria's current President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has also not relented in ensuring the implementation of the SDGs. He was not only visible in the United Nations during the deliberations on the need to accelerate the implementation of the goals but joined other world leaders to adopt the declaration to accelerate SDGs at the 78<sup>th</sup> United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Monday 18<sup>th</sup> September, 2023. The political declaration included a commitment to financing developing countries and a clear support for his proposal for an SDG Stimulus of at least 500 billion US dollars annually, as well as an effective debt-relief mechanism. He also called for changing the business model of multilateral development banks to offer private finance at more affordable rates for developing countries, and endorsed reform of the international finance architecture which he labelled as being "outdated, dysfunctional and unfair".

### **Nigeria's Security Challenges and the Attainment of Sustainable Development Goals**

Sustainable development means better ways of doing things without compromising

the health status of the people. Therefore, sustainable development includes – economic growth, environmental stewardship and social inclusion. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is a collection of 17 global goals designed to be a blue print to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all. The Sustainable Development Goals, set in 2015 by the United Nations General Assembly and intended to be achieved by the year 2030, are part of a United Nations Resolution called "The 2030 Agenda". The 17 goals are broad and interdependent each of the Sustainable Development Goals has a list of targets which are measured with indicators. The year by which the target is meant to be achieved varies between the year 2020 or 2030 or no end date given (Bleut, 2015).

According to Agueue (2021) there are a total of 169 targets for the Sustainable Development Goals. Each has between 5 to 20 targets (or about 10 on average). Each of these targets has one, two or three indicators to measure progress towards reaching the targets. In total, there are 232 approved indicators to measure compliance. There are United Nations official initiatives such as the Sustainable Development Solutions Network which monitors the activity of countries and regions in the work of implementing the Sustainable Development Goals and also records the information. The Goals were adopted by the United Nations member states in 2015 as a universal call action to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030.

As a matter of fact, all 193 member states of the United Nations have adopted 17 goals to be achieved by 2030. The Sustainable Development Goals offer a framework and blue print for achieving sustainable global prosperity and commit participating countries to individual and joint action for the good of all on the planet. The Sustainable Development Goals are successor to and improvement on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which ran from 2000 to 2015. (MDGs 2015).

Information obtained from Nigeria's Road to SDGs Country Transition Strategy (2015) reveals that the SDGs seek to build on and complete the unfinished business of the MDGs, realize the human rights of all; achieve gender equality in all sectors and spheres of life; and importantly, strike a balance between economic, social and environmental dimensions of development. The outcome document *inter alia*, calls on member states to "develop as soon as practicable, ambitious national responses to the overall implementation of this (new) Agenda...in order to support the transition to the SDGs and build on existing planning instruments, such as national development and sustainable development strategies." A review of the MDGs implementation in Nigeria reveals that the country has registered mixed results across the goals, geographic areas and gender groups. Despite progress on some indicators, many of the goals and targets have not been met. Strikingly, the jump from the MDGs to the SDGs is not simply a question of extending the timeline and the ambition of the goals. New goals have been added, entirely new sectors have been introduced and the number of indicators has more than doubled (Aguene, 2021, p.201).

The mixed results recorded by Nigeria in its bid to implement the SDGs, demonstrates the complex nature of the problem across countries in their efforts at attaining the required targets and goals of the SDGs. Nigeria's situation becomes more complex because of the level of corruption recorded by Ministries, Agencies and Departments (MDAs) of state alongside other sectors of the country's public and private entities. However, the influence and diminishing impact of corruption and other sharp practices pales into insignificance when compared with the nature of security challenges bedeviling the country. It is common knowledge that no iota of development can take place without peace and security. These two important issues have become elusive to Nigeria as the country

continues to witness a high level of terrorist attacks and insurgency in the North East geopolitical zone, farmers-herders conflict in the North Central region, separatist agitations and the quest for self-government by IPOB and other organizations resulting in unwarranted killings in the South East, oil pipeline vandalization, oil theft and militancy in the midst of rising insecurity in the South-South geopolitical zone, the heightened level of armed banditry and kidnapping for ransom in diverse locations in the country among other security challenges. In fact, efforts by the country's security agencies to curb these rising level of security challenges has yielded very minimal results and therefore calls to question the ability of the Nigerian state to genuinely pursue and attain the SDGs as expected by the United Nations in its "Agenda 2030".

There is equally the massive persistence of poverty, particularly in rural areas, according to Rotimi (2016) which poses a problem not only for the popular acceptance of continued economic adjustment; but for growth itself. The problem lies not only in the unintended consequences of the prevailing development paradigm, but in the viability of the paradigm itself. It has also been argued by Rotimi (2016). that most of the forces creating poverty are essentially social. They reflect systems of resources allocations that are made by societies and as such can be reversed. Pricing policies, credit systems, social and productive services which neglect the poor, as well as gender discrimination, are not by nature, universal and inevitable facts and neither is the attendant poverty generated by it. Poverty in Nigeria has become hydra-headed with majority of the population living below the international benchmark of one dollar a day.

The truth remains that Nigeria can hardly attain any of the goals of the SDGs as aside from poverty, there is no possibility of its attaining gender equity by 2030.

According to the UN "gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for peaceful, prosperous

and sustainable world". UN 2017 progress report on sustainable development goals captures succinctly, the need to provide women and girls with equal access to education, health, decent Work, and representation in political, social and economic spheres. It is doubtful if Nigeria can attain this goal by 2030 given its current state of gender equity. Similarly, there is no indication that Nigeria can attain the target of peace, justice and strong institution as embedded in Goal 16 of the SDGs. The goal has the target of promoting the rule of law, equal access to justice and strong social institutions where nobody will be above the law but equal before the law. Peace and justice cannot be separated because peace can only reign where there is justice. This will mean including women in all decision making processes both in the family and society at large as well as granting inheritance rights to both boys and girls both in the family and community at large. Nigeria has weak institutions giving rise to powerful men like Olusegun Obasanjo, Ibrahim Babangida and Muhammadu Buhari all former Presidents of Nigeria and others who have refused to give account of their tenures as Presidents because of our weak institutions (Aguene, 2021).

These weak institutions have also given impetus to poor governance in which the former President of America, Barrack Obama identified as the root cause of the challenges that has befallen the African continent. In his view, poor governance arises from lack of visible dividends of democracy and lack of attention to unaligned frustrations and corruption (Obama, 2014). Good governance entails transparent and accountable management of human, economic and financial resources for the purpose of equitable and sustainable development (ADC, 2011). The World Bank defines it as the "manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development" (IFAD, 1999).

Nigeria, Africa's most populous country has some of the most daunting development indicators in the world. It has been posited by several commentators that Africa as a continent will be unable to achieve the targets in the SDGs unless Nigeria makes substantial progress in achieving the goals. This is because Nigeria accounts for one-fifth of Africa's population, and has the largest Gross National Product (GDP) and youth population in the continent. For Nigeria to inch close to attaining the SDGs, it requires that all hands must be on deck, federal, states and local government areas. Nigeria must also be ready to address the noticeable hindrances such as inadequate financial resources for investment in SDGs related activities, crisis, terrorism and insurgency in the North East, militancy in the Niger delta, corruption, unstable policies, weak social institutions and disregard to the rule of law. These issues are some set of setback for the country and a serious hindrance to the attainment of the SDGs.

### **Conclusion and Recommendation**

This paper examined the possibility of Nigeria attaining the SDGs in the midst of its daunting security challenges which affected the diverse facets of the country's national life. It discovered that the country is not in any way close to attaining even the four top goals of the SDGs because of the high level of corruption and lack of accountability in the conduct of public affairs by government. There is also the issue of endemic poverty with majority of Nigerians living below poverty line while women have continued to be marginalized in every facet of Nigeria's endeavor, a development which negates the fifth goal of the SDGs. It is stating the obvious that achieving gender equality and women's empowerment is integral to each of the 17 goals. Only by ensuring the rights of women and girls across all the goals will we get to justice and inclusion, economics that work for all, and sustaining our shared environment

now and for future generations. Conclusively, we aver that progress has been made but not at sufficient speed to realize the SDGs by the 2030 target because of gender inequality, corruption, insecurity, weak social institutions and natural disasters like erosion and flooding of water which have affected many Nigerians causing many deaths and loss of livelihood. On the basis of the above conclusion, this paper proffers the following recommendations:

Government has to deploy adequate financial resources for SDGs related activities while poverty alleviation, youth empowerment, entrepreneurship education and effective leadership should be given prime attention by the various levels of government in Nigeria. There is need for adherence to the rule of law while institutions of government should be strengthened for effective service delivery.

Job opportunities and decent work conditions are also required for the whole working population with emphasis on skill acquisition for the teeming youths who may not have opportunities for white collar jobs in both the civil and public service.

Government must realize that there can be no delivery of the dividends of democracy without good governance. What that means is that successive governments in the country must strive for good governance anchored on transparency and accountability if any aspect of the SDGs must be attained.

Lastly, the fight against insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and other forms of criminality must be taken seriously by the Nigerian government. This calls for dialogue between the insurgents and government officials in a bid to identify the root causes of the criminality with a view to addressing them.

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# 21

## IDENTITY POLITICS AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN NIGERIA'S 2023 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A DISASTER TO DEVELOPMENTAL DEMOCRACY

**Namo Innocent Benjamin**

**Attah Henry Attah**

Political Science Department, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *beninam30@gmail.com*

Political Science Department, Federal University of Education Kontagora (FUEK),

Niger State, Nigeria

Email: *attahhenryattah@gmail.com*



### Abstract

The contrivance of identity in the expression and pursuit of interests is a major element of Nigeria's political process. Identity is shaped around many principles and the increased manipulation of identities of ethnicity, religion, regionalism, race and gender among others in political contest by various competing forces undermines development that representative democracy envisaged. Democracy and voting behaviour command a central position in political analysis as voting provides one of the richest sources of information about the interaction between individuals, society and politics. This paper consequently assesses Nigeria's convoluted practice with identity politics with particular reference to how the indicators influenced voting behaviour and undermine developmental democracy, emphasizing how identity politics has overtaken national consciousness and stimulated a relationship characterized by domination, superiority and hegemony by various groups, thus threatening national integration. Relying on secondary data sources, the paper examined how politics of identity influenced voting behaviour in Nigeria, especially in the 2023 presidential election where ethnicity, religion and regional appeals were heavily employed. Findings indicate that ethnicity, religion and regional appeals were leading shapers of voting behaviour in the Nigeria's 2023 presidential election. The paper concludes that identity politics has become a powerful manipulative instrument in the hands of the political elites in Nigeria to divide the Nigerian populace. The paper recommends that there is need to promote a common sense of national identity that goes beyond religious, ethnic and sectional differences in order to surmount the challenges created by identity politics in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Identity politics, voting behaviour, rational choice, development, democracy

### Introduction

Nigeria, right from its struggles for independence has been battling with forces of identity in its polity. It is over 60 years of gaining independence and there are no signs that the narrative will soon change. Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed successful transition from one democratically elected government to another, yet democracy as practiced in Nigeria has not shown signs of what Prof. Richard L. Sklar refers to as 'developmental

democracy' (Sklar, 1987). The extent at which identity politics is influencing development of democracy in Nigeria is scary, as it has shown features of a timed bomb waiting to shatter whatever gains or progress the country has attained democratically. Democracy is said to be akin to development, but the role of keys player is confirming the opposite. The politics of identity has influenced voting behaviour in Nigeria significantly, especially in the 2023 presidential election where ethnicity, religion

and regional appeals were heavily employed. These identity indicators were the leading shapers of voting behaviour in the 2023 election.

In Nigeria, identity politics has been used to mobilize voters along ethnic, religious, and regional lines, often leading to polarization and exclusion of certain groups. The influence of identity politics in shaping voting behaviour is far reaching as it can direct to the abandonment of crucial concerns of economic development, in favor of identity-based concerns thereby impeding the formation of a national identity and weakening social cohesion. The paper seeks to examine identity politics and voting behaviour in Nigeria's 2023 presidential election with a view to analyzing the origin of identity politics, key determinants of voting behaviour and the consequences of the challenges identity politics posed for the development of democracy in Nigeria. Eventually, the paper maintains that identity politics present temporary rewards to politicians, weakens the basic principles that bring about development to a thriving democracy.

## **Conceptual Clarification**

### **Identity Politics**

Identity politics is a concept and approach in political science. It concentrates on the advantages and point of view of certain groupings that reveal a common identity, for instance ethnicity, race, religion or gender. It is a kind of politics in which groups of people with a distinct attribute or identity, like ethnicity, race, religion or gender, form special political coalitions, deviate from typical political parties and form their own political institutions (Fukuyama, 2018). Lyotard (1984) holds that identity politics is often linked to the rise of postmodernism and the denunciation of universalism, which put forward that all individuals are equal and should be treated equally. Simply put, identity politics can be attributed to a type of political engagement that is embedded in a specific social identity or

familiarity, like race, gender, sexuality, or nationality (Crenshaw, 1991). This approach according Crenshaw (1991) is traced to the 1960s and 1970s United States. It came as a reaction to the exclusion of traditionally marginalized groups from typical political and social institutions. Identity politics at its basic follows to empower these groupings by admitting and tackling the ways in which social identities influence people's experiences, opportunities, and life chances. Identity politics is a multifaceted concept that has engendered momentous debates in academic and political circles. Advocates contend that it presents an essential framework for understanding and addressing the experiences of traditionally marginalized groups, while critics squabble that it upholds a divisive form of tribalism that undermines the broader goals of liberal democracy.

### **Voting Behaviour**

Among the different indicators of political participation, people connect more in voting. This is because voting is generally a less expensive and more conservative form of political participation principally in western or developed democracies (Antunes, 2008). Antunes, (2008) describes voting behaviour as the scientific study of the voting patterns of the electorates in a constituency; it gives insight into the dynamics of the voters, factors that persuade their voting patterns and the direction of their votes. Voting is the simplest, cheapest and the most obvious among all the various indicators of political participation in a country (Onah, 1997). The study of voting patterns consistently concentrates on the determinants of why people vote the way they do and how they reach at the choices they make. What instigates voters to turn out for voting and issues they consider in making decisions on candidates or parties significantly differs. For example, in China voters' behaviour in local elections tends to be based on individuals with a desire to punish corrupt officials (Shi, 1999).

Voting behaviour is clearly shaped by short-term and long-term influences. Heywood (2007) asserted that “short-term influences are specific to a particular election and do not allow conclusions to be drawn about voting patterns”. These short-term influences include but not limited to; state of the economy which reflects the link between a government’s popularity and economic variables such as unemployment, inflation and disposable income; another short-term influence is the personality and public standing of party leaders. Major long-term influences are; ideological concerns and the mass media.

Models have been developed in order to create frameworks for theorizing voting discourses. This scientific study of voting behaviour is marked by three major research schools:

First, the sociological model - the sociological model links voting behaviour to group membership, suggesting that electors tend to adopt a voting pattern that reflects the economic and social position of the group to which they belong.

The second major model is the psychological model of voting behaviour. The central concept of this model is partisanship, which is designed as a psychological affinity, stable and lasting relationship with a political party that does not necessarily translate into a concrete link, namely registration or consistently voting for this party. Voting is therefore a manifestation of partisanship, not a product of calculation influenced by factors such as policies, personalities, campaigning and media coverage (Hyman & Singer, 1968).

The third model which is the rational choice model tries to be distinct from previous theories/models as it gives an economic explanation of voting behaviour (Antunes, 2008). In this view, voting is seen as a rational act, in the sense that individual electors are believed to decide their party preference on the basis of personal self-interest (Kimenyi & Romero, 2008).

Away from the theories discussed, factors that determine voters’ preferences also depend on the depth, consolidation and development of democracy in such societies. Therefore, voting behaviour can be said to be explained by socio-structural, socio-psychological, or rational choice models, at least for industrialized societies (Erdmann, 2007), while for African societies, voting is explained predominantly by factors such as personality, ethnicity, personal ties, and clientelism (Hyden & Leys, 1972) (Mozaffar, Scaritt, & Galaich, 2003).

### **Developmental Democracy**

The idea “developmental democracy” is without a doubt a strange wording actually present in the dictionary of democracy. Incidentally, there is an expansive heap of insightful literary works which attempt at clarifying “developmental democracy”. Regardless, most basic assertions about the serrated nature of developmental democracy have so far been to a great extent conflicting and a long way from been on point. Richard L. Sklar, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California lived in Africa for many years and wrote broadly on African development and democracy. He also lectured at a few colleges in Africa, including the University of Ibadan in Nigeria and the University of Zambia. He organized a book titled ‘Developmental Democracy’ in which he supposed that developmental democracy is the best for African continent.

Extracting from Professor Richard Sklar's thought on developmental democracy, he harangues that democracy is the best type of government with the most remarkable ability to ensure development for Africans (Van Dijk, 2012). Many researchers have for long hold reservations on the actual fundamental nature of democracy following many years of democratization process in many countries, especially underdeveloped countries in Africa. Many also have doubt on the kind of democracy that has informed democratization



to date, and contend that the decrease in democracy in the world as observed today is because of the kind of democracy that has been championed and advanced. Among the preferences projected is the thought of developmental democracy, a kind of democracy that is deviated from the political democracy approach that has represented USA democratization undertakings to date. Developmental democracy holds that the assessment of democracy lies in its assurances to national and individual development. Many years after Richard Sklar articulated confidence on democracy leading to development in Africa, many questions are still begging for answers. One most important issue about democracy in Africa relates to its relationship with development. On the connection between democracy and development in Africa, one essential question is being asked: is Africa undeveloped essentially in light of the fact that it is undemocratic? Or, on the other hand is Africa undemocratic essentially in light of the fact that it is undeveloped? Which is the source and which is the outcome?

### **Theoretical Framework**

This work is grounded on the Rational Choice Theory alternatively called economic theory of democracy (Dawns, 1957). The theory attempts to connect human's unlimited wants with the limited resources that is obtainable. It presupposes that man is rational in making choices that is of maximum benefit to him/her amid contending options. Thus, it can be employed to explicate voting decision by citizens. Dawns who is the foremost advocate discerned that citizen's vote for whatsoever party they consider will endow them with the highest utility from government action. This is so, because voting entails a cost/benefit analysis. A voter thus, will vote for a specific party where the gains derivable from the action outweigh its cost. Even though a category of other contrivances can be utilized to elucidate voting behaviour, this work is

entrenched on the rational choice theory which embraces the notion that personal social identities, for instance, ethnic affinities and shared religious faiths among others influence voting options for an individual or social group. This is more applicable in Africa where these components have long been considered as playing a significant role in party politics and electoral democracies. Certainly, ethnic affinity has a persuasive direct influence on electoral behaviour in ethnically- a carved society like Nigeria because basically, casting a vote becomes a representation of group identity.

Correspondingly, religion by its character, also communicate on the individual a type of identity in the society. It is consequently part of the multifaceted pattern of other social identities that paint human relationships, struggles and competition. Accordingly, because of its penchant for painting relationships particularly in multi-cultural societies like Nigeria, it performs considerable functions in societal politics as well as the process of making critical resolutions such as elections. Contextually from the Nigerian perspective, what is often obtained during election is that voters are being influenced by the diverse identity factors like religion of the candidate, ethnic membership or other basis of acknowledgments. Interestingly, even though critics of this theory squabble that voting is not all just about rational choice but also entails some irrational choices that can destabilize the opponent's options; notwithstanding the criticism, the utility of the theory in establishing a link between decisions and identity remains a strong point.

### **Determinants of Voting Behaviour**

Several key factors consistently emerged as influential in shaping voting decisions. These factors can be broadly categorized into individual level determinants, socio-cultural determinants, and political determinants.

### 1. Individual-Level Determinants

The relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and voting decisions is a complex and multifaceted topic that has been studied extensively by political scientists and sociologists. Although there is no single compromise on the precise nature of this relationship, research suggests that SES can have a significant influence on voting patterns. Here are a few key points to consider:

- i. **Income:** can be a significant factor influencing individuals' voting decisions. Income levels can shape political preferences and voting behavior in various ways. There is a positive correlation between income levels and political participation, including voting. Higher-income individuals tend to be more politically engaged and more likely to vote compared to those with lower incomes.
- ii. **Education:** can have a significant impact on individuals' voting decisions. Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to vote. Higher levels of education tend to be associated with more liberal political orientations and increased political engagement. Education equips individuals with critical thinking skills, access to information, and a broader understanding of social issues, which can shape their voting decisions and policy preferences.
- iii. **Gender:** can significantly influence individuals' voting decisions, with distinct patterns observed between men and women. It is important to note that the gender gap in voting behavior is not uniform across countries and contexts, and variations exist within gender groups. Factors such as age, education, race, and socioeconomic status can intersect with gender to influence voting (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2012).
- iv. **Age:** can have a significant influence on individuals' voting decisions, with distinct voting patterns observed across different age groups. Age plays a significant role in

shaping voting decisions, with younger voters tending to support more progressive parties or candidates, while older voters lean towards conservative parties. Differences in issue priorities, life experiences, and generational values contribute to the varying voting patterns across different age groups.

- v. **Political ideology:** refers to a set of beliefs, values, and principles that shape one's views on social, economic, and political issues. These ideologies often align with specific political parties or movements. Political leanings, whether tilting conservative or liberal, play a substantial role in guiding electoral choices. These leanings act as a bridge, linking voters to candidates that reflect their intrinsic values and policy inclinations. In conclusion, political ideology serves as a significant predictor of voting decisions. Understanding an individual's ideological stance provides insights into their policy preferences and the political parties or candidates they are likely to support.
- vi. **Personality traits:** can also play a significant role in shaping individuals' voting decisions. Personality traits can influence voting decisions by shaping individuals' political orientations and preferences. Understanding the relationship between personalities and voting behavior provides valuable insights into how people make their electoral choices.
- vii. **Emotional Intelligence (EI):** This concept, a turning point of psychological and social research, continues to shape our understanding of political science. EI refers to the competence to recognize, understand, control, and effectively use emotions. Emotions can offer shortcuts or heuristics that influence how individuals evaluate political stimuli. For instance, a voter might feel fear when considering certain policies, leading him/her to oppose those policies even if a logical evaluation

might suggests otherwise. Simultaneously, cognitive processes can also influence how one interprets and responds to emotional experiences, shaping the direction and intensity of political attitudes.

- viii. **Climate Change Concerns:** As the evidence and impacts of climate change have grown clearer and more pervasive, so has its influence on voting behavior. The urgency of addressing climate change has become increasingly salient among voters in recent years.
- ix. **Healthcare Experiences:** The significance of healthcare as an integral part of human welfare fundamentally impacts voters' decision-making processes. Voters' personal encounter with the healthcare system, whether satisfying or disappointing, and their perception of the system's overall performance hold considerable sway over their voting choices.

## **2. Socio-Cultural Determinants**

These determinants encompass a range of social and cultural influences that can shape political orientations and preferences.

- i. **Social identity:** Social identity plays a significant role in shaping individuals' voting decisions. The social groups to which individuals belong, such as race, ethnicity, gender, and social class, can shape their political preferences and align their voting choices with the interests and perspectives associated with their social identities.
- ii. **Ethnicity and race:** Racial and ethnic identities significantly influence voting decisions. Members of minority racial and ethnic groups often align their voting choices with candidates or parties that address their concerns regarding racial or ethnic equality and social justice, leading to cohesive voting patterns within these communities.
- iii. **Religion:** Individuals often align their voting choices with candidates or parties that they perceive as compatible with their

religious values and moral convictions, leading to variations in political preferences among different religious groups.

- iv. **Media influence:** Media exposure can shape individuals' attitudes, knowledge, and perceptions of political candidates and issues, potentially influencing their voting preferences and evaluations of candidates.
- v. **Social networks:** The influence of social networks on voting decisions has been a topic of significant interest and research in recent years. Social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, have become platforms where individuals engage in political discussions, share political content, and interact with political candidates and campaigns. Overall, social networks have emerged as powerful tools that can shape individuals' voting decisions through information exposure, social influence, and targeted messaging.

## **2. Political Determinants**

Voters take into account various political factors such as party identification, candidate characteristics, policy positions, campaign strategies, and economic conditions when determining their votes. These factors can significantly influence voter behavior and ultimately impact election outcomes.

- i. **Party identification:** Party identification is a significant factor that influences voting decisions. It refers to an individual's psychological attachment to a particular political party. Party identification can shape a voter's overall political attitudes, values, and policy preferences, serving as a guiding framework for their voting behavior (Campbell, Philip, Warren, & Donald, 1960). Party identification provides voters with a sense of identity and belonging to a larger political

community. It simplifies the decision-making process by providing a heuristic or mental shortcut for evaluating candidates and their positions (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002). Understanding the role of party identification in voting decisions provides insights into the dynamics of elections and political behavior.

- ii. Candidate characteristics: Voters often assess various personal attributes, qualifications, and characteristics of candidates when making their electoral choices. These factors can shape voters' perceptions, attitudes, and preferences, ultimately influencing their decision to support a particular candidate.
- iii. Policy positions: Voters often consider the policy positions and stances of candidates when determining their support in elections. The alignment of a candidate's policy positions with the preferences and values of voters can significantly impact their decision to vote for a particular candidate. Voters evaluate candidates based on their stance on key issues, such as the economy, healthcare, education, environment, national security, social issues, and more.
- iv. Campaign strategies: Political candidates and their campaigns employ various tactics and strategies to communicate their message, mobilize supporters, and persuade undecided voters. These strategies can influence voters' perceptions, attitudes, and ultimately their decision to support a particular candidate.
- v. Economic conditions: Voters often consider the state of the economy and their personal financial situation when evaluating political candidates and making their electoral choices. The performance of the economy and perceptions about its trajectory can shape voters' perceptions, attitudes, and preferences. Positive economic conditions, such as low unemployment rates, GDP growth, and

rising incomes, can create a sense of optimism and satisfaction among voters.

### **A concise historical perspective of identity politics in Nigeria**

The historical perspective of identity politics in Nigeria can be traced back to the colonial era when British colonial masters partitioned Nigeria into different regions on ethnic and religious leanings, by establishing a system of indirect rule through the utility of traditional rulers (Ekeh, 1975). The system of indirect rule laid the foundation of ethnic and religious identity in Nigeria and toughened a sense of division among diverse groups. The influence of the laid foundation became strong after Nigeria's independence in 1960 which witnessed tensed political instability and violence. The military incursions witnessed between the 1960s and 1970s were evidently driven by ethnic and regional sentiments (Ogundiya, 2014). The identity suspicions led also to the Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970 which resulted to the death of about a million people on the basis of the largely Christian Igbo ethnic group making an attempt to secede from the rest of the country to form an independent state of Biafra (Adebanwi, 2018). Since then, identity politics continue to raise its ugly in the political scene.

### **Consequences of identity politics on voting behaviour in Nigeria's 2023 presidential Elections**

An increased level of identity politics especially on ethnic and religious ranks was witnessed in the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. Identity politics appeals were engaged by the three (3) major political parties in Nigeria - the All Progressives Congress (APC), the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the Labour Party (LP) to get voters. The APC concentrated on its support base in the South West and North West geopolitical zones of the country, where its presidential candidate Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu and the out gone President Muhammadu Buhari hail from

respectively with added strength in the North East where it Vice Presidential candidate hails from and on religious and regional appeal generally. The PDP focused on the North East and South - South where its Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates Atiku Abubakar and Ifeanyi Okowa respectively come from and in Northern region on regional and religious appeal, while the Labour Party congregated its support on South East geopolitical zone where its presidential candidate come from and southern region of the country on regional and religious appeals.

One of the consequences of identity politics on voting behaviour in the Nigerian's election was the division of the country along ethnic, regional and religious appeals. This polarization was specifically obvious in the presidential election, where President Tinubu won a majority of votes in the northern and southern states.

A further consequence of identity politics on voting behaviour in the Nigeria's election was the utilization of ethno-religious emotions to influence voters. Political parties competed on the apprehensions and insecurities of voters by laying emphasis on the significance of voting for a candidate who shared their ethnic or religious circumstances.

Additionally, identity politics in the 2023 general election resulted in voter apathy among some groups. Some voters, particularly those who did not identify strongly with any of the major political parties, felt alienated by the emphasis on identity politics and chose not to participate in the electoral process. Besides the above repercussions, identity politics in the 2023 general election also promoted a culture of political patronage and favoritism, where politicians satisfied followers of their ethnic or religious group with political contracts, appointments, and other settlements. This is one reason why merit and capability are repeatedly ignored in support of loyalty to a particular identity group, thus weakening the quality of governance and public service delivery in the country.

Moreover, identity politics in the 2023 general election also invigorated brutal clashes and anxieties in some sections of the country. This was particularly evident in states such as Lagos, Rivers, and Kano, where ethnic and religious tensions were already prominent, and politicians used identity politics to provoke bloodshed and deepen divisions for their political gains. The consequential discords led to a general breakdown of law and order in the concerned areas. This has destabilized the stability of the country and jeopardizes its long-standing projections for development.

Finally, the frequency of identity politics in the 2023 general election painted the need for more all-encompassing politics and a redesigned national identity for Nigeria. The supremacy of ethnic and religious identities in the electoral process highlighted the collapse of the country to construct a common national identity that go beyond these differences.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

In conclusion, Identity politics has significantly influenced the pattern Nigerians vote in elections and it is a very dangerous signal for the survival of democracy and development for the country. If Nigerians are desirous of development, identity politics must be ignored with passion. Merit should be the basis for determining choices.. Policymakers must find ways to direct Nigerians with regard to a more inclusive and patriotic political dialogue, which emphasizes the importance of harmony and cooperation over rift.

There are numerous policy consequences based on the above analysis that should be addressing the influence of identity politics on the voting behaviour. These include:

The need to push for a comprehensive political discourse that put emphasis on the significance of unity and teamwork over grouping and division by civil society organizations, political leaders and the media. This can be realized through measures like

encouraging mutual understanding, advancing positive intergroup contact and respect, and resigning political discussion to spotlight on issues of common concern.

The need to reinforce government institutions at all levels, together with the law enforcement, judiciary, and public service, is significant for tackling the source of identity politics such as corruption, poverty, and underdevelopment. Officials can accomplish this through measures like for instance capacity building, anti-corruption measures and institutional reform.

The need to promote a common sense of national identity that goes above religious, ethnic and sectional differences in order to surmount the challenges created by identity politics. This can be attained through a variety of means like the promotion of national symbols and traditions, national education crusades and cultural exchange programs.

It is also strategic to concentrate on the concern of political party division, which frequently reproduces and buttresses identity politics. Stakeholders should promote the evolving of political parties that are all-encompassing and symbolic of diverse social groups, as well as dampen political parties that are rooted solely on identity-based mobilization. This can be accomplished through promotion of intra-party democracy, campaign finance reform and electoral reforms.

It is essential to acknowledge that identity politics is frequently motivated by economic and social inequalities. Politicians should consequently concentrate on advancing wide-ranging social welfare programs, economic growth, and the provision of basic services such as education and health, so as to decrease the sense of marginalization and segregation that often guides to identity-based mobilization.

It is also imperative to tackle the concern of electoral violence, which often times is energized by identity politics. Stakeholders should concentrate on upholding credible and

peaceful electoral processes, which can be reached through actions such as the employment of neutral and experienced electoral officials, the use of technology to improve the transparency of the electoral process, and the sponsorship of voter education.

In conclusion, politicians should come together on empowering marginalized groups like youth, women, and ethnic and religious minorities, via trial such as access to education and training, affirmative action programs, and the encouragement of political participation and representation. This will attend to the logic of marginalization and exclusion that often guides to identity politics in the first place.

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# 22

## INTERROGATING ETHNICITY AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN RWANDA: LESSONS FOR NIGERIA'S SOCIO-POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

**Kwede Cornelius Ishaya**

**Mohammed Danlami Garba**

**Daniel Wununyatu.**

Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *kwedecollinsk@gmail.com*

Email: *mohammeddgardgarba469@gmail.com*

Email: *dawuny2@gmail.com*.



### Abstract

Ethnicity is a powerful force that shapes societies and identities around the world, plays a particularly complex role in understanding the makeup of a society. However, it is often a source of violent conflict when twisted. This paper explores the intricate relationship between ethnicity and violent conflict in Rwanda, aiming to draw lessons applicable to Nigeria's socio-political landscape. Rwanda's tragic history, particularly the 1994 genocide, serves as a poignant case study illustrating how deep-seated ethnic tensions can escalate into widespread violence and devastation. The paper employs a documentary research method, where secondary sources of data were consulted. The study finds out that the politicization of ethnic occurrences gave rise to violent conflict leading gory experience of what is today known as the 1994 Rwandan genocide and that placing side by side Rwanda's experiences with Nigeria's socio-political context leaves a lot of lessons for Nigeria. Despite their contextual differences, both countries grapple with similar challenges related to ethnicity, identity politics, and power struggles. Drawing parallels and contrasts, the study highlights key factors that either escalate or mitigate ethnic tensions, such as political leadership, historical narratives, and institutional frameworks. The Study adopts primordialism and constructivism as framework of analysis. On the basis of this theoretical framework the study concludes that ethnicity is fluid and can be transformed. The study therefore recommends that like in the case of Rwanda, a constitutional amendment eliminating ethnic affiliation in Nigeria should be conducted as a matter of urgency as the embers of strained ethnic relationship are threatening to pull the country apart.

**Keywords:** Violent conflict, Ethnicity, Conflict transcendence, Rwanda, Nigeria.

### Introduction

Ethnicity has been a significant factor in shaping the political landscapes of many African nations, often serving as a catalyst for violent conflicts. Rwanda, a country scarred by the 1994 genocide, stands as a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of ethnic tensions. The Rwandan genocide, which claimed the lives of many people, primarily of the Tutsi ethnic group, and moderate Hutus, was fueled by deep-seated ethnic animosities

and political power struggles (Verpooten, 2020). The systematic dehumanization and targeted violence against the Tutsi population underscored the dangers of unchecked ethnic nationalism and the manipulation of ethnic identities for political gains (Ryan, 2017). In contrast, Nigeria has experienced several ethno-religious conflicts, including the Biafra War. In Ezeakukwu's view, the Biafra War was a complex interplay of ethnic, political, and



economic factors. Ethnicity played a crucial role as the Igbo people felt marginalized and oppressed within the broader Nigerian society (Ezeakukwu, 2019). More recent, the clashes between farmers and herders is highlighting the complex interplay between ethnicity, religion, and resource competition in the Nigerian context. The farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria are multifaceted and have deep-rooted connections to ethnicity, religion, and resource competition (Akinyoade, 2019). The clashes are often portrayed as clashes between predominantly Christian farmers and predominantly Muslim herders, highlighting the religious dimension. However, it is important to note that the conflicts are not solely based on religious differences but are also influenced by factors such as land scarcity, environmental degradation, and political marginalization. These conflicts have claimed thousands of lives and led to the displacement of communities, exacerbating existing interethnic and interreligious tensions in the country. They underscore the complex interplay between ethnicity, religion, and resource competition in Nigeria, where historical, social, economic, and political factors intertwine to create a volatile environment.

Drawing on insights from Rwanda's post-genocide reconciliation efforts, this paper will explore strategies for fostering inter-ethnic harmony and social cohesion in Nigeria. By examining the role of leadership, governance structures, and grassroots initiatives in promoting unity and understanding, this study aims to provide practical recommendations for addressing Nigeria's ethnic challenges. Ultimately, this paper argues that a nuanced understanding of ethnicity and its implications for conflict prevention and resolution is crucial for Nigeria's sustainable development and peaceful coexistence.

### **Conceptual Clarification**

A violent conflict involves at least two parties using physical force to resolve

competing claims or interests. While a violent conflict may involve only non-state actors, often, the term is used as a synonym for war which involves at least one government. Violent conflicts are categorized according to different factors, one of which is the number of casualties they result in per year. As such, the most frequent number coming up to distinguish violent conflict from mere conflict is 25 battle-related deaths per year. If the battle-related deaths during the course of a conflict are under 1000 they are considered as minor, while between 25-1000 in one year as during a particular year in conflict are categorized as intermediate conflicts. Above 1000 battle-related deaths during one particular year is considered as war or as a major armed conflict (Wallensteen and Axel 1994: 333-349). Another way of classifying violent conflicts is depending of which type of actors are involved in the conflict and where it takes place. These categories are however rather blurry as the distinction between national and international conflicts is difficult to establish due to the degree of international involvement in internal conflicts. An example of this is the Congo wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which, to a start was called a national war, but which transformed into an international war to the degree that it was named the 'First African World War' (Reyntjens, 2009). The distinctions remain however and internal violent conflicts are often defined as conflict that takes place within a state as opposed to between states (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Similarly, inter-state conflicts are characterized by the official involvement of two or more governments. Violent conflicts are also differentiated by the balance of power between the opposing factions: a symmetrical conflict reflects an even balance of power where the factions involved have more or less similar material, financial and technical capacities whereas an asymmetrical conflict refers to a disequilibrium between the actors, where one faction clearly has the upper hand in the

balance of power. Similarly, violent conflicts are labelled according to what the topic of the conflict concerns, be that a political, ideological issue, a social, exclusionary or inclusionary topic, or a religious or ethnic focus. Most often however, conflicts are a mixture of several different topics that overlap each other. Ethnic conflicts are for example often more of social conflicts where parts of the population have been excluded from power or education, for political reasons, whereas ideological topics also may include religious questions.

**Ethnicity:** According to (Zageeka, 2019) ethnicity is a collective that has a shared common name, a shared myth of common descent, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific "homeland," and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. In other words, Ethnicity refers to a person's identification with a particular group of people based on shared cultural characteristics. This can include things like:

**Ancestry:** A shared lineage or history of a group.

**Language:** Speaking a common language or dialect.

**Culture:** Shared customs, traditions, practices, and beliefs.

**Religion:** Adhering to the same faith or religious practices.

**National origin:** Coming from the same geographic region or having a shared history as a nation.

Ethnicity is a social construct, meaning the way we define and categorize ethnic groups is not fixed but can evolve over time. It is largely based on how people see themselves and how they are perceived by others. Ethnicity is fluid, as ethnic identities can change over time and individuals may identify with multiple ethnicities.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The paper relies on two theories primordialism and constructivism as framework of analysis. The justification for this to properly situate the background for ethnic tensions and also to understand the basis for ethnic conflict transcendence.

Primordialism, a theory with origins in the works of anthropologists like Clifford Geertz (1973) and scholars of nationalism like Ernest Gellner (1983). (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996) argues that ethnicity is a fixed and natural aspect of human identity. Proponents of this theory, such as Donald Horowitz (1985), believe ethnic identities are deeply rooted in shared histories, cultures, and languages, often perceived as inherited through bloodlines (Smith, 1996). Primordialism suggests these ethnic attachments are primordial, meaning they predate the formation of states and nations, and create strong bonds of loyalty and solidarity within groups (Van Hear, 1998).

This theory offers valuable insights when examining the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its potential parallels with Nigeria. In Rwanda, the Hutu-Tutsi divide, central to the horrific violence, has historical roots extending back centuries (Prunier, 1995). Primordialists would argue that these ethnic identities, while potentially manipulated by political actors, represent a deep-seated sense of belonging for Hutus and Tutsis. This inherent group loyalty, according to primordialism, can be exploited to incite violence against the "out-group" (Horowitz, 1985).

While the theory highlights the historical significance of ethnicity, it can downplay the role of political elites who deliberately inflamed ethnic tensions for their own gain (Mamdani, 2001). By studying the Rwandan genocide through a primordialist lens, Nigeria can gain valuable insights. Nigeria's own diverse ethnic makeup, with a history of colonial manipulation that reinforced ethnic divisions (Osaghae, 1995), presents a potential flashpoint for similar violence. Understanding

the deep emotional pull of ethnicity, as emphasized by primordialism, can help Nigerian policymakers address these issues proactively.

On the other hand, constructivism, a prominent theory in international relations, challenges the primordialist view of ethnicity as fixed and preordained. Emerging in the 1980s with scholars like Alexander Wendt (1987) and Emanuel Adler (1989) (Hopf, 2008), this theory argues that ethnic identities are socially constructed through historical experiences, political discourse, and social interactions (Behr, 2008). Constructivists propose that ethnicity is not a static reality but a fluid and evolving concept (Brown, 1994).

In the context of Rwanda, constructivism offers a valuable lens to analyze how the Hutu-Tutsi divide was reinforced and politicized. Colonial policies, for instance, solidified ethnic categories based on supposed racial differences, creating a hierarchy that favored Tutsis (Mamdani, 2001). Constructivists would argue that this colonial intervention played a key role in constructing and solidifying the Hutu-Tutsi divide, which was further manipulated by Rwandan political elites in the lead-up to the genocide (Desch, 1994). Hate speech and media propaganda demonized Tutsis, constructing them as an existential threat to the Hutu majority (Lemon, 2008). This manipulation of ethnic identities, according to constructivism, was a significant factor in inciting violence (Lake & Rothchild, 1996). The lessons learned from Rwanda, through a constructivist lens, are highly relevant for Nigeria. Nigeria's own colonial history similarly involved the manipulation of ethnic identities (Osaghae, 1995). Constructivism highlights the importance of addressing these historical narratives and promoting inclusive national identities. By focusing on dialogue, education, and media that celebrates Nigeria's diversity, the state can help deconstruct potentially divisive ethnic narratives and build a more cohesive society.

However, constructivism can be criticized for neglecting the enduring influence of historical experiences on ethnic identities. While it emphasizes the constructed nature of ethnicity, it's important to acknowledge the historical context that shapes these constructs.

By combining a constructivist approach with insights from primordialism, Nigeria can gain a more comprehensive understanding of its own ethnic landscape. Recognizing the historical roots of ethnic tensions, while acknowledging the role of political actors in shaping ethnic narratives, can help Nigeria develop more effective strategies for promoting peace and national unity.

### **Research Methodology**

This paper leverages a robust documentary research methodology to enrich its analysis of ethnicity and violent conflict in Rwanda and Nigeria. By critically evaluating a diverse range of primary and secondary sources, including academic journals, historical documents, government reports, and credible documentaries, the paper builds a solid foundation for drawing insightful comparisons and identifying potential lessons for Nigeria.

### **The Rwandan Cases Study**

With just over 26,000 square kilometres, Rwanda is one of the smallest countries in Africa, comparable in size to its southern neighbor Burundi, and to its former colonial power, Belgium. Situated immediately south of the Equator. It borders on Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. Often called "the Land of a Thousand Hills" or "the Switzerland of Africa", (Adekunle, 2007) Rwanda is dominated by mountain ranges and highland plateaus of the great watershed between the Nile and the Zaire river basins (Congo-Nile Divide). The populous central part - from Ruhengeri in the north to Butare in the south - lies between 1,500 and 2,000 metres above sea-level. West of the central plateau, the Congo-Nile Divide reaches altitudes above 2,500 metres, with the

highest parts in the north-western volcanic Virunga chain. Here, the Karasimbi peak reaches 4,507 metres. Lake Kivu - which separates Rwanda from Zaire - lies 1,460 metres above sea-level and is the highest lake in Africa. East of the central plateau, i.e. from the capital, Kigali, to the border with Tanzania. the land gradually gets lower, but is still within the 1,000-1,500 metre range and with a number of higher area.

The two largest ethnic groups in Rwanda are the Hutu and Tutsi, making up over 80% and 14% of the population respectively David, (2012). A smaller group, the Twa, account for less than 1%. Interestingly, all three groups speak the Kinyarwanda language, suggesting a long history of living together in Rwanda. Even though archaeological evidence suggests the Twa were the first inhabitants of what is now Rwanda, followed by the Hutu sometime between the 5th and 11th centuries(David, 2012) . The Tutsi arrived later, likely in the 14th century. Over many centuries, waves of Tutsi migrants came from the north. By the 16th century, this led to the formation of a small kingdom in central Rwanda ruled by the Tutsi minority. This kingdom lasted until Europeans arrived in the 19th century Uvin, (1997).

Traditionally, big social differences existed between the Hutu and Tutsi, which fueled future conflict. These differences stemmed from their occupations. The Tutsi, known for herding cattle, held more social, economic, and political power through a system called "buhake" (cattle contracts). The Hutu, on the other hand, were mainly farmers. Importantly, being Hutu or Tutsi wasn't always clear-cut Tor, & Wohlgemuth, et al, (1997). While physical features like height and skin color were sometimes used to tell them apart (Tutsi: tall and lighter skinned, Hutu: shorter and darker skinned), intermarriage and a shared language blurred the lines between the groups. During the colonial era, Germany and later Belgium assumed that ethnicity could be clearly distinguished by physical characteristics and then used the ethnic

differences found in their own countries as models to create a system whereby the categories of Hutu and Tutsi were no longer fluid (Tor,& Wohlgemuth, et al, 1997). The German colonial government, begun in 1898 and continuing until 1916, pursued a policy of indirect rule that strengthened the hegemony of the Tutsi ruling class and the absolutism of its monarchy. That approach continued under Belgium, which took control of the colony after World War I and administered it indirectly, under the tutelage of the League of Nations.

Some Hutu began to demand equality and found sympathy from Roman Catholic clergy and some Belgian administrative personnel, which led to the Hutu revolution. The revolution began with an uprising on November 1, 1959, when a rumor of the death of a Hutu leader at the hands of Tutsi (Carney, (2013). Perpetrators led groups of Hutu to launch attacks on the Tutsi. Months of violence followed, and many Tutsi were killed or fled the country. A Hutu coup on January 28, 1961, which was carried out with the tacit approval of the Belgian colonial authorities, officially deposed the Tutsi king (he was already out of the country, having fled the violence in 1960) and abolished the Tutsi monarchy. Rwanda became a republic, and an all-Hutu provisional national government came into being. Independence was proclaimed the next year.

The transition from Tutsi to Hutu rule was not peaceful. From 1959 to 1961 some 20,000 Tutsi were killed, and many more fled the country (Molly, 2017). By early 1964 at least 150,000 Tutsi were in neighboring countries. Additional rounds of ethnic tension and violence flared periodically and led to mass killings of Tutsi in Rwanda, such as in 1963, 1967, and 1973. Tension between Hutu and Tutsi flared again in 1990, when Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels invaded from Uganda. A cease-fire was negotiated in early 1991, and negotiations between the RPF and the government of longtime president Juvénal Habyarimana, a

Hutu, began in 1992. An agreement between the RPF and the government, signed in August 1993 at Arusha, Tanzania, called for the creation of a broad-based transition government that would include the RPF. Hutu extremists were strongly opposed to that plan. Dissemination of their anti-Tutsi agenda, which had already been widely propagated via newspapers and radio stations for a few years, increased and would later serve to fuel ethnic violence.

Scholars like Corey and Joireman (2004); Lemarchand (1998); Uvin (1999). Uvin (1999), have observed that Rwandan history has often been interpreted along ethnic lines. Specifically, Corey and Joirman (2004) highlight the differing viewpoints on Rwandan history. Tutsis claim their ethnicity, with their social standing based on wealth wasn't a major factor before colonialism. On the other hand, the Hutus, however, believe the division was always significant, emphasizing their perception of Tutsis as later arrivals who seized power. Even though Tutsis historically held most of the power in Rwanda, with kings and all, some say it wasn't that big of a deal for everyday people before colonialism. Corey and Joirman (2004) argue that the actual divide between Hutu and Tutsi might not have been as strict back then. It's important to remember that history can be complicated, and everyone might have a piece of the truth. Therefore, what is central to this discussion is the sustained division between these major groups which resulted in violent conflict leading to the death on many. The offshoot of the many years led to the genocide in 1994.

### **The 1994 Genocide**

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundi's president Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down over the capital city of Kigali, leaving no survivors. (It has never been conclusively determined who the culprits were. Some have blamed Hutu extremists, while others blamed leaders of the RPF.) Reuters. (2024) Within an hour of the plane

crash, the Presidential Guard, together with members of the Rwandan armed forces (FAR) and Hutu militia groups known as the Interahamwe ("Those Who Attack Together") and Impuzamugambi ("Those Who Have the Same Goal"), set up roadblocks and barricades and began slaughtering Tutsis and moderate Hutus with impunity. Among the first victims of the genocide were the moderate Hutu Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian peacekeepers, killed on April 7 (AlJazeera, 2023). This violence created a political vacuum, into which an interim government of extremist Hutu Power leaders from the military high command stepped on April 9. The killing of the Belgian peacekeepers, meanwhile, provoked the withdrawal of Belgian troops. And the U.N. directed that peacekeepers only defend themselves thereafter.

The mass killings in Kigali quickly spread from that city to the rest of Rwanda. In the first two weeks, local administrators in central and southern Rwanda, where most Tutsi lived, resisted the genocide. After April 18, national officials removed the resisters and killed several of them. Other opponents then fell silent or actively led the killing. Officials rewarded killers with food, drink, drugs and money. Government-sponsored radio stations started calling on ordinary Rwandan civilians to murder their neighbors. Within three months, some 800,000 people had been slaughtered. Meanwhile, the RPF resumed fighting, and civil war raged alongside the genocide. By early July, RPF forces had gained control over most of country, including Kigali. In response, more than 2 million people, nearly all Hutus, fled Rwanda, crowding into refugee camps in the Congo (then called Zaire) and other neighboring countries. After its victory, the RPF established a coalition government similar to that agreed upon at Arusha, with Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, as president and Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, as vice president and defense minister. Habyarimana's NRMD party, which had played a key role in organizing the

genocide, was outlawed, and a new constitution adopted in 2003 eliminated reference to ethnicity. The new constitution was followed by Kagame's election to a 10-year term as Rwanda's president and the country's first-ever legislative elections.

Molly (2017) noted that another factor impacting the emergence of the genocide in 1994 concerns the geographical context. Understanding the genocide and the deep-seated mutual fear and hatred between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups requires understanding the nature of the relationship between the two as well as events in the region, especially between Rwanda and neighboring Burundi. In fact, much of what happened in one country would routinely inspire and impact what happened in the other in the lead-up to the 1994 genocide. Lemarchand (1998) and Uvin (1999) recalled that the Tutsi army in Burundi killed 100,000 to 150,000 educated Hutu in 1972, at the hands of the Tutsi leadership; this overt mass violence inspired the power grab in Rwanda of the extremist Hutu dictator Habyarimana in 1973. Moreover, when only 20 years later, Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi, was killed by a soldier in 1993, it provoked outrage in Rwanda, where "some 20,000 Tutsi men, women and children were hacked to pieces or burned alive in October and November 1993 in an uncontrolled outburst of rage: for many Hutu on the hills, the death of Ndadaye was the harbinger of a reply of 1973" (Lemarchand 1998, ). In a more immediate sense, events in 1990 – when Ugandan-based Rwandan refugees, the descendants of those predominantly Tutsi Rwandans who had fled in the late 1950s and 1960s, pushed into Rwanda under a rebel army – comprised a third instigator of the genocide. Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1994, 11) explained that the incursion was borne of decades of frustration with Rwanda national policy and the lack of hospitality in refugee countries

### **Ethnicity and violence in Nigeria**

Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, is a tapestry woven from over 300 ethnic groups, each with its distinct language, customs, and traditions (Egbujor, 2017). This rich diversity, however, is often overshadowed by the threat of ethnic violence, a recurring theme in Nigeria's history. One key factor lies in the historical manipulation of ethnic identities during colonialism. The British colonial policy of indirect rule relied on reinforcing existing ethnic hierarchies, often favoring certain groups for administrative purposes (Osaghae, 1995).

The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) remains a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of unchecked ethnic tensions. This conflict, rooted in complex historical, economic, and political factors, had a profound impact on Nigeria's social fabric, arguably deepening ethnic divisions that continue to resonate today (Britannica, 2023). It is worthy of note that longstanding ethnic rivalries pre-dated colonialism, but British colonial policies exacerbated these divisions (Afigbo, 1989). The Northern Region, dominated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, held a significant advantage in the post-colonial political landscape. This perceived dominance fueled fears of political and economic marginalization among the Igbo people of the Eastern Region (Suberu, 1996). The perceived fears led to the declaration of independence by the Eastern Region, led by General Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, and its subsequent formation as the Republic of Biafra, and it triggered a brutal civil war (Ikpo, 2017). The war, estimated to have claimed the lives of millions, primarily civilians through famine and disease, left deep emotional scars and a profound sense of distrust between ethnic groups (BBC, 2017).

The war reinforced ethno-nationalist sentiments and a "we versus them" mentality among certain ethnic groups (Mamdani, 1997). The Igbo people felt targeted during the war, and accusations of genocide continue to surface (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

In the post-colonial era, these ethnic divisions have been exploited by political elites for personal gain. Politicians often resort to ethnic rhetoric, stoking fears and grievances to mobilize voters and consolidate power (Nnoli, 1980). This has led to a vicious cycle of violence, as one group retaliates against perceived injustices inflicted by another. Furthermore, competition for scarce resources, such as land and oil wealth exacerbate ethnic tensions. When these resources are perceived to be unequally distributed along ethnic lines, feelings of marginalization and disenfranchisement can escalate into violence (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Ample cases substantiating the above expression abound. A clear case in hand is The Niger Delta. The Niger Delta region is home to numerous ethnic groups, with the four largest being the Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo, and Ogoni. The region accounts for a significant portion of Nigeria's oil wealth. However, Local communities have long felt marginalized despite the vast oil wealth extracted from their land. This perception of unequal distribution of resources, alongside environmental degradation caused by oil exploration, has fueled resentment towards the federal government and oil corporations. Militant groups emerged, launching attacks on oil pipelines and infrastructure, disrupting oil production. Security forces often responded with heavy-handed tactics, further escalating tensions and violence. A second example is the farmer-herder conflict. The conflict which is often believed to be between nomadic Fulani cattle breeders and sedentary farmers of various ethnic groups most especially in the middle belt region over land and water has led to violent clashes resulting many loses.

#### **Conflict Transcendence in Rwanda: Lessons for Nigeria**

During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, many people perished and as many as 250,000 women were raped, leaving the country's population traumatized and its infrastructure

decimated (United Nation, 2014). Since then, Rwanda embarked on an ambitious justice and reconciliation process with the ultimate aim of all Rwandans once again living side by side in peace. When the genocide ended more than 120,000 people were detained and accused of bearing criminal responsibility for their participation in the killings (United Nations, 2014). To deal with such an overwhelming number of perpetrators, a judicial response was pursued on three levels: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the national court system, and the Gacaca courts.

**The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda:** The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the United Nations Security Council on 8 November 1994. The Tribunal has a mandate to prosecute persons bearing great responsibility for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda between 1 January and 31 December 1994. Prior to the ICTR, international law lacked a robust mechanism for prosecuting individuals for the crime of genocide (Chalk, 2015). The tribunal's creation sent a powerful message that such barbarity would not be tolerated with impunity. The first trial started in January 1997, and by December 2012, the Tribunal had completed the trial phase of its mandate. Of the 92 persons indicted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 49 were found guilty and convicted including high-ranking Rwandan officials, government ministers, military leaders, and media personalities accused of playing a role in the genocide (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, n.d.). These prosecutions demonstrated that no one, regardless of position, was above the law.

**The Gacaca court system:** The Gacaca courts, rooted in Rwandan tradition, were community-based tribunals established in 1996 to address the vast backlog of genocide cases (Heymans & Kinovu, 2001). These courts

combined elements of traditional justice mechanisms with formal legal procedures (Lieberman, 2003). Gacaca judges (Inyangamugezi) were elected by community members, and trials were open to the public, fostering a sense of community participation in the healing process (Parmentier, 2010). As such the Gacaca courts were instrumental in processing a large number of genocide cases, promoting a sense of justice for survivors (Philpot, 2009).

The public nature of the trials and emphasis on confession and forgiveness were intended to foster dialogue and reconciliation within communities (Hollaar & De Waal, 2004). Nigeria, like Rwanda, grapples with a complex history of ethnic tensions and violence. While the Rwandan genocide serves as a stark reminder of the horrific consequences of unchecked ethnic divisions, Rwanda's post-genocide journey offers valuable lessons for Nigeria. A crucial aspect of this lesson is the intentionality of the Rwandan government towards entrenching peace. Just like the Rwandan government embarked on a multifaceted and intentional approach to peacebuilding, Nigeria can do the same. The Rwandan government demonstrated a strong commitment to fostering reconciliation and ethnic unity at the highest levels (Lieberman, 2003). This can be replicated in Nigeria. Leadership was crucial in driving forward peacebuilding initiatives. Moreso, the government undertook reforms aimed at promoting inclusive governance and addressing the root causes of ethnic tensions, such as unequal resource distribution (Asiwaju, 2016). This is not too much for the Nigerian government to do as well. Again, the establishment of the Gacaca courts and cooperation with the ICTR demonstrated a commitment to accountability for past crimes, which can be a crucial step towards healing (Philpot, 2009). The Nigerian government should ensure compliance with best international practices in prosecuting criminal cases related to ethnic violence. While a direct

copy of Rwanda's approach may not be feasible, Nigeria can learn valuable lessons from their intentionality in peacebuilding. Genuine commitment from leadership with a sincere commitment to fostering peace and unity across ethnic divides. This requires concrete actions beyond rhetoric most be seen in all facets.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The horrific events of the Rwandan genocide serve as a chilling reminder of the destructive potential of unchecked ethnic tensions. Understanding the interplay between primordialism and constructivism in fueling this conflict offers valuable lessons for Nigeria, a nation grappling with its own complex ethnic tapestry. Rwanda's experience underscores the dangers of primordialist assumptions about inherent ethnic hatreds. The narrative of a timeless Hutu-Tutsi animosity ignores the historically constructed nature of these identities and the role of political manipulation in exacerbating ethnic divisions. Nigeria, with its own history of colonial manipulation of ethnic identities, must be wary of falling prey to similar primordialist narratives.

Constructivism emphasizes the constructed nature of ethnicity and the potential for social change. Rwanda's post-genocide efforts, while not without limitations, demonstrate the possibility of fostering reconciliation and national unity through deliberate social engineering. Nigeria can learn from Rwanda's focus on dismantling stereotypes through inter-ethnic dialogue and promoting inclusive institutions that transcend ethnic divides.

Therefore, Nigeria's path towards a more peaceful future requires acknowledging the limitations of both primordialist and constructivist perspectives. Ethnicity is a complex and multifaceted reality, shaped by both historical legacies and ongoing social processes. Nigeria must address the root causes of ethnic tensions, such as unequal



resource distribution and political marginalization, while simultaneously fostering a sense of national identity that celebrates diversity. This paper therefore recommends as part of the lesson captured above a constitutional amendment that eliminates references ethnicity.

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**PART V:  
DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE**

# 23

## STATE GOVERNMENTS AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

Evans Oluwagbamila Ayeni<sup>1</sup>

Christopher Ale Andeshi<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science

<sup>2</sup>Department of Public Administration

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [ayeni@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:ayeni@fuwukari.edu.ng)



### Abstract

Presently in Nigeria, attention has shifted to the federal government to act in a way that will enhance the well-being of the citizens to the neglect of the state governments that are supposed to drive real development that can enhance the well-being of the people where structural violence will naturally be addressed. The above development is because the federal government only constitutes one-third of the level of government in Nigeria, while the state governments control two-thirds of the three levels of government in Nigeria. Thus, this study interrogates state governments as drivers of structural violence in Nigeria. The research method employed for this study is the qualitative research method, while the sources of data employed for the study are both primary (observation) and secondary sources of data; consequently, content analysis was the method of analysis employed for the study. The study revealed that the sources of structural violence in Nigeria ranges from a preference for '*stomach-infrastructure*' as against infrastructural development, corruption, excessive use of power and authority, weak institutions, and lack of integrity and discipline. The study concludes that civil society organisations and media groups should make known to the public the investigative reporting and analysis of what the state governors who are the chief executive of their respective states in Nigeria are doing in comparison to what they are supposed to be doing. The study recommends that the Federal Government of Nigeria should use legally approved means to remove the control and supervision of local government councils, including the conduct of local governments' election from state governments through a constitutional amendment to address the problem of structural violence created by state governments across the country.

**Keywords:** State governors, structural violence, inequality, media groups

### Introduction

In a society where there is injustice, starvation and a lack of reward for hard work, what we see daily is structural violence. Structural violence happens when citizens cannot provide for their basic needs of survival or when people are facing unequal conditions of life (Jorondrazana, 2021). Structural violence is very pronounced in developing countries because of the challenges of poverty and unemployment that imply structural violence that developing economies have to contend with. A scholar has strongly contended that

political, economic and social inequalities are the product of larger systemic and structural arrangements rather than the creation of individuals (Rahman, 2018). This structural violence is a product of political leadership's unwillingness to address the challenges of poverty, unemployment, and inequality in the continent. This is why it has been argued that structural violence is politically, economically, and culturally motivated progression working together to limit people from achieving their full quality of life (Lee, 2016). Structural

violence is politically motivated because what addresses or promotes it lies in the power of government and the political leadership of countries. Structural violence is culturally motivated because it is the product of people's ways of life, and it is economically motivated because the government and the political class can use the economy to address structural violence or promote it. This is why Galtung (1969) argued that structural violence is the thoughtful hurt of fundamental human needs by actors of governance. What the above implies is that structural violence has a nexus with government and political leadership like the chief executive of state governments under the control of the state governments in contemporary Nigerian society.

State governors who are the chief executives of their State governments are members of the Nigerian state. According to Fadakinte (2013), the state is the dominant group of people that exercises power and authority through the government. Membership in the "state" is based on the exercise of power and authority through the instrumentality of government. What the above implies is that people who cannot employ power and authority through the instrumentality of government are not members of the "state". State governments under the control of State governors employ power and authority based on the fact that they have been given power and authority through a simple majority in an election. This development enrolled State governments under the control of state governors as members of the state because the state is made up of the ruling elites who influence politicians that occupy the state structure, as the government is the instrument of the state (Godwin, Ayeni & Peter, 2021). The role of State governments under the control of state governors in politics in terms of power and authority they weigh is enormous; this is because politics is a superstructure that controls and exerts influence over other structures in society. The above is

corroborated by Section 176 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria which says that a state governor "shall be the Chief Executive of that State", and section 193 says the governor "may, in his discretion", assign responsibilities to his deputy. The constitution of Nigeria no doubt bestows upon state governors - the chief executives of state governments powers to administer and control their various states, hence the responsibility of whether structural violence should exist or not is a big question that must be directed at them.

One of the statements of problem that inform the present study is that attention has shifted from the State governments under the control of State Governors who are supposed to be in the best position to enhance the well-being of citizens since they control two-thirds of the levels of government in Nigeria to the President, to drive development that enhances the well-being of the citizens to address structural violence. This study is imperative because many studies have focused on the need for the actors of governance at the centre to drive development that can address structural violence without paying the needed attention to the actors of governance at the sub-national governments that ought to have the magic wand to addressing structural violence in the country since the control of the various local communities and their governments lies in the palms of the state governors in Nigeria. The judicious utilization of all state and local government allocations in Nigeria lies with the state governors since the state governors have arrogated to themselves the excessive power of removing local government elected council members and installing their own appointed cronies in their place, despite Supreme Court objections to this practices. The second rationale for this study is the need to investigate the serious damage structural violence is doing without paying adequate attention to it. Lee (2019, p. 125) explains that "structural violence works gently through general misery, diminishing the dignity of

human beings and ultimately killing them, sometimes without anyone being aware that it is happening”.

The leadership of the various levels of government determines to a great extent the well-being and otherwise of the people. This is because the degree of success or failure of any human society has its roots in leadership at all levels (Muhammed & Ayeni, 2018). The success or failure of governance in the political units of Nigeria lies in the actors of governance, of State governments under the control of the state governors that control two-thirds of the levels of government in Nigeria. The need to beam our searchlight on the activities of these actors of governance becomes germane for the sake of posterity and for the fact that enough research has not been conducted to unravel the nexus between State governments (under the control of state governors) and structural violence in Nigeria. Not only that, our observations revealed that there has not been agreement among the actors of governance in the various levels of government that are supposed to address the challenges of structural violence in developing societies like Nigeria. The above inform the present study.

Therefore, this study intends to provide an answer to the research question that says that, how have the State governments served as drivers of structural violence in Nigeria?

The objective of this study is therefore to interrogate the State governments as drivers of structural violence in Nigeria.

### **Conceptual Clarifications: State Governments and Structural Violence**

The concept of structural violence defies acceptable definition, however, the definition of the proponent of the concept of structural violence and other scholars are considered imperative. According to Johan Galtung who coined the concept of structural violence, structural violence is the constraint that is placed on human potential which is caused by economic and political structures (Galtung,

1969). The above implies that structural violence is the limitation that prevents people from exploiting their full potential for greatness courtesy of political and economic structures. The above definition is corroborated by Lee (2019, p. 123), structural violence refers to preventable “limitations that society places on” individuals that hinder them from providing “for their basic needs and” attaining “the quality of life that would otherwise be possible”. The foregoing implies that structural violence is the various limitations and obstacles hindering the realisation of the expected quality of life that people are supposed to enjoy. Related to the above meaning of structural violence is the definition by Jorondrazana (2021), structural violence according to this scholar is an oppressive agenda through powerful associations, organizations, and institutions that guarantees privilege amongst its leader, prioritization of their political agenda, and an enforcement of their methods and ideologies. The above definition is broader and related to what structural violence is, in the sense that it explains structural violence to mean a situation of oppression by groups who occupy privileged positions in society.

Following from the above and for this study, structural violence means the refusal to provide fundamental basic needs and opportunities necessary for the well-being of people and the restoration of human dignity.

State Governments mean different things to different people; however, for academic discourse in this study, State governments are the governments of the sub-national political unit in Nigeria under the control of State Governors who are principal actors of governance, members of the Nigerian state and the chief security officers responsible for the implementation of laws made by state houses of assemblies of sub-national political unit.

### **Research Methodology**

This study employed qualitative research methods where secondary sources of data and observation were employed as instruments of gathering data, therefore printed and online

materials were employed to gather secondary data while direct observation was employed in gathering primary data. Content analysis is the method employed in analyzing the data for this study.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The study employed power theory. Power theory was propounded by Hans Morgenthau in 1967. According to the theory, power is seen as man's control over the minds and actions of other men. It is the "mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between holders of political power and the people at large" (Hans Morgenthau, 1967, p. 29 as cited in Mbah, 2014, p. 113).

Power theory is relevant to this study because it emphasises man's (e.g., state governors) control over other men (public office holders at both the state and the local governments) or members of the public. This development is coterminous with how State governments under the control of state governors control other public office holders at both the state and the local government levels on one hand, and also the people in their state by employing power and authority. The presence of structural violence across the various states in Nigeria can be attributed to the state governors who control the minds of elected and appointed public office holders at both the state and local government levels because of the power and authority to control their state and the local governments that the constitution has placed on their shoulders. The analysis of the activities of state governors that create structural violence helps to explain the multiple and often intersecting forces that create and perpetuate inequality on multiple levels, both for individuals and communities (Lewis, 2019). The state of unhappiness across the thirty-six (36) states of the federation is a product of structural violence being perpetuated by the activities of state governors in Nigeria.

Therefore, one of the ways out of structural violence has been identified by scholars who

argued that budget implementation that brings about road infrastructure delivers "the basic need of the people, while the absence of good road infrastructure leads to structural violence" (Ayeni & Ezirim, 2023b, p. 278). Even though massive infrastructural development has been observed as one of the ways that can be employed to address structural violence, the state governors across the thirty-six (36) states in Nigeria have failed to embark on budget implementation that brings monumental infrastructural development to their states. The infrastructural deficit across the Nigerian state disempowers the citizens and hurts people in providing for their basic needs. Consequently, State governments under the control of state governors who have refused to address structural violence by making life easy for the people have now turned around to blame the federal government under the control of the President of Nigeria for their inefficiency. Many people have over time accepted the lies of these state governors across the thirty-six (36) because of their level of exposure and literacy level to the workings of government around the world.

The activities of State governments under the control of state governors have brought hardship and snowballed into structural violence through domination, exploitation, and humiliation. The above development forces many citizens who have suffered untold hardship created by the state governors to submit to the wish of state governors who have shown the capacity of a more powerful party (Lee, 2019). State governments under the control of the state governors combined power and authority to create injustice, hardship, and suffering (structural violence) at the state and local government levels through the diversion of funds and hijacking of local government allocations in their various states.

### **State Governments as Drivers of Structural Violence**

Structural violence has been mostly determined by state actors and actors of

governance since the formation of the state where everyone transferred their powers and rights to the absolute authority, which is expected to protect and safeguard the general interest of individuals for continued survival and existence. Therefore, there are some things that actors of governance considered responsible should not be known to do (Sobowale, 2022). There are things that State governments under the control of state governors should not do because doing those things will harm the people, affect their survival, and create structural violence. The following are the things that State governments under the control of state governors imbibed that led to structural violence across the 36 states of Nigeria:

### **1. Preference for stomach infrastructure over infrastructural development**

All over the world, infrastructural development seems to have been preferred over short-term material benefits accruing from social programmes of government. The simple reason is that; infrastructure can empower people (Ayeni, 2017). Empowering people that infrastructure development provides is an end product of massive infrastructural development that delivers a suitable atmosphere and support for the growth of entrepreneurship skills and industrialization (Ayeni, Abdullahi & Andeshi, 2021). It is quite unfortunate that many State governments under the control of state governors in Nigeria have preferred stomach infrastructure that gives temporary satisfaction to beneficiaries, while they are later left on their own to continue in their previous stage of poverty. Poverty is a killer; hence the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP, 2016) contended that malnutrition is the foremost source of death around the world, killing more people each year than HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and tuberculosis combined. The end product of poverty, when it is allowed to linger, is coterminous with the end product of violent conflict where many people eventually lose their lives. Knowing fully well that poverty is a killer, actors of governance like state governors

are supposed to discourage any initiative that embraces stomach infrastructure that cannot address long-term structural violence, but fuel structural violence.

To say that State governments under the control of state governors are responsible for a high level of poverty in the 36 states across Nigeria that produces structural violence that is killing people without them knowing is not out of place. This is because it is the “failure of any society to prioritize the maintenance of road infrastructure that disempowered people from effectively participating in viable economic activities that enhance the ability to create wealth” (Ayeni., Andeshi, & Uzoigwe, 2022, p. 266). The above is aptly corroborated by scholars who argued that the problem affecting active job creation in Nigeria is the pitiable state of infrastructure; hence job creation has continued to be a daydream (Ayeni, Sani, Andeshi, Ibrahim & Adamu, 2021). When a noble initiative is not geared toward massive infrastructural investment, poverty knocks at the door of the people and structural violence sets in. The above is supported by Ayeni and Ezirim (2023b); they argued that the absence of road infrastructure that hinders people from enjoying access to a good road network is structural violence. In a country like Nigeria where there is a prevalence of infrastructural deficit, structural violence is what you experience when you travel on our highways. For instance, many State governments under the control of state governors only address the symptoms of structural violence through the provision of stomach infrastructure like the example of state governors in Nigeria using billions of naira to feed people during fasting. Distribution of food items will make the challenges of structural violence remain, except where there is massive infrastructural development that provides financial security for people undergoing structural violence to enhance peacebuilding since a hungry man is an angry man (Ogunode & Ayeni, 2024).



## **2. Corruption**

Corruption is almost becoming like an institution in Nigeria since corruption is like a guiding principle in the country, a development that is coterminous with what institutions are all about. One of the reasons why corruption is almost like a guiding principle in Nigeria is because, “governments at various levels in Nigeria are corrupt that they can no longer provide basic social amenities for the citizens to enjoy” (Ayeni, Tusayi, Joseph & Obatayo, 2018, p. 100). Two-thirds of the levels of government that have been noted to be corrupt are under the control of state governors in Nigeria. What the above implies is that State governments under the control of State governors who control both the state and local governments based on the power conferred on state governments by the constitution are so corrupt to the point that they have retarded meaningful development at both the state and local levels across the thirty-six (36) states of Nigeria, yet people have decided to ignore State governments under the control of state governors and focus more on the activities of the federal government to perform magic to turn the country around overnight. For instance, an empirical study of a northeast state (surrounded by Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, and Adamawa States in addition to sharing an

international border with Cameroon) revealed the exploitative and corrupt character of a state governor in Nigeria who did not construct road infrastructure for which funds were fully released (Ayeni & Ezirim, 2023b). This act of corruption by State governments under the control of state governors in Nigeria is so rampant that it has denied many people the opportunity to benefit directly and indirectly from such projects if they had been constructed. Non-implementation of projects due to corruption has sent many into poverty lines and caused them to suffer harm they are not supposed to have suffered. This is why Ayeni and Sani (2021) posited that corruption poses a challenge to the well-being and sustainable peace of Nigerians. To corroborate the above, Muhammed and Ayeni (2018) argued that corruption is the mother of poverty and poverty causes insecurity. To show that state governors in Nigeria are very corrupt, and their corrupt acts have led to poverty, an indication of structural violence. A report by Punch Newspaper (2024) revealed how the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) reopened the cases of so many state governors who have been discovered to have many questions to answer based on how they mismanage state resources while they were in office.

**Figure 1:** EFCC Reopen corruption probe against former governors




**Source:** Punch Newspaper (2024)

The above figure shows some of the former state governors who were found in corrupt acts while in office; however, they could not be prosecuted during their tenure as governors because of the power of immunity bestowed on them by the Constitution of Nigeria. This corrupt act by these governors is the reason for poverty, an indication of structural violence across the various states in Nigeria.

More importantly is that corruption in Nigeria has been a basis of burden as it affects the national economy (Amaechi, Ayeni, & Madu, 2019). Corruption has resulted in “systematic inequality” in the sharing of political and economic resources in communities across the 36 states of the federation, a development that is coterminous with creating structural violence

(Jorondrazana, 2021, p. 10). Even now that fuel subsidy has been removed by the federal government of Nigeria, under the administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu and more allocations are going to the coffer of state governments, the increase in the federal government allocations to state and local government have not reflected in the well-being of the people courtesy of corruption, as people across the 36 states continued to expect the federal government to rain manna from heaven even though there is more money going to the State governments under the control of state governors who controls two 2/3 of the levels of government out of the three levels of government in the country.

**Figure 2: Post fuel subsidy removal FAAC allocation to state governors, August 2023**



Source: [www.budit.org](http://www.budit.org)

Since the subsidy removal on petroleum products by the federal government in June 2023 till date, the allocations to state and local governments have increased seriously and the populace has continually refused to engage their state governors on the reason why they have not been able to do something meaningful to alleviate the suffering of people, structural violence that is on-going in the country.

**3. Excessive use of power and authority**

Nigeria is a federation that recognizes federal, state, and local governments as the three levels of government; however, the Constitution of Nigeria shares power between the federal and state governments. Out of the three levels of governments where political leadership exist, State governments under the control of state governors control two (2) out of the three (3) levels of government in Nigeria. The Constitution of Nigeria made state governors’ very important actors of governance,

hence the reason why local government which is the third tier of government has been placed under the control of the state. This is why Sobowale (2022, para. 2) noted that the “Nigerian constitution which covers state governors with immunity also created the opportunity for license bordering on lunacy”. The immunity power that the constitution of Nigeria bestowed on the governors was made, so that the chief executives of state governments would not be distracted in the course of discharging their responsibility that is expected to impart lives of the people they are to serve, since structural violence is a collective and aggregate product of legal and policy decisions (Rahman, 2018). Anything the government does or refuses to do have the capacity to create structural equality or inequality. Virtually all the state governors who are chief executives of their state governments in Nigeria have the power to create structural equality or inequality since they have the power to pocket the State House of Assembly

of their state and use it as an instrument to remove their deputy governors at will. Daily Trust (April 9, 2024) reported that Shaibu, the deputy governor of Edo State becomes the 17<sup>th</sup> impeached deputy governor since 1999. This is even as the joint ticket the impeached deputy governor enjoys with the governor remains a few months to the end of their administration. The above is just one of the numerous ways how state governors manipulate their State House of Assemblies to remove their deputy governors and other elected state and local government officials that is no more in their good book.

State governments under the control of State governors in Nigeria behave like absolute monarchs with unlimited power to act in a way that nobody can question at the sub-national unit of Nigeria. Nigerian state governors are more powerful than American state governors in terms of political and personal power, hence the former have absolute power to commandeer the resources of the state, pocketing state assemblies and local government including the security vote (Fesan, 2023). State governors are members of the state, hence they have the power to remove and install actors of governance at the local level, and sometimes some actors of governance at the level they operate. Godwin, Ayeni, and Peter (2021, p. 110) posited that “the state as the dominant class is the class that cannot be prosecuted by the state agents”. State governors are members of the “Nigerian state” that cannot be prosecuted while in office, hence they exercise excessive use of power and authority to remove and install actors of governance at both the state and local government levels. This is why Coker (2014) argued that laws, especially court verdicts were determined by political considerations rather than legal interpretations and guidance. More important is the fact that the Nigerian constitution confers huge personal authority on state governors and gives governors unlimited executive powers that enable them to act like potentates (emperors) and run their

states as personal chiefdoms (Fasan, 2023). The advantageous position of state governors as members of the Nigerian state gave them power to install and remove government (Godwin, Ayeni, & Peter, 2021). From our observation, many state governors remove democratically elected local government chairmen and councillors and install their loyalists when they get the power, hence the governors of Oyo and Benue State among others are just a few examples. Not only that, Obamwonyi and Aibieyi, (2015, p. 153) noted that “State Governors dissolve local government at will as if the officials were not elected by the local people”. The removal of local government elected officials is structural violence because it controls the voting rights of people and denies them their right to exercise their political power (Lee, 2019).

Structural violence violates the right to vote and be voted for in an election and is a coup against the people. Structural violence has been on since the inception of the Nigeria Fourth Republic, hence Ezeani (2014) noted that as far back as June 2011, 2/3 of all the 774 local government governments in Nigeria were under the control of political appointees of the state governors, a development that is both a structural violence and a total disregard for 1999 constitutions. The resultant effect of the dissolution of elected local government council members is tension and unrest; the above are examples of what structural violence can lead to. Structural violence as seen from above is a show of a power system where social structures (state governors) deliberately cause harm to people and deprive them of political representation (Lee, 2019). To corroborate the above, it has been noted that the council-manager of local government administration used in the old Western Region was in practice in Osun State, even in this Nigeria Fourth Republic (Monday & Wijaya, 2022). The use of appointed officials to head local governments in Osun State negates Section 7(1) which states that “the system of local government by democratically elected local government

councils is under this Constitution, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria guaranteed”.

As the State governments under the control of State governors employ excessive use of power and authority, they expect the federal government under the control of the President of the country to do the same. Seeing the opposite of the above gesture, the governor of Bauchi State commended President Bola Ahmed Tinubu for not influencing the Court cases to remove sitting governors in the just concluded post-election court cases. The commendation on President Tinubu was because the governor understands the obvious that the President is a more ranking member of “the state” than the governors; hence state governors expect the President to employ excessive use of power on the state governors, by removing some of them through the Courts. This is similar to how the state governors usually remove democratically elected chairmen and councillors of local governments in their states at will. State governors seem to be more exploitative and oppressive than any other actors of governance in Nigeria because of the enormous power the Constitution bestowed on them. This enormous power bestowed on the state governors placed them in the position to drive structural violence. Lee (2019) submitted that structural violence is a systematic way employed by the powerful to feed upon the powerless. The state governors committed structural violence when they hijack local government allocations in their state, however, many Nigerians are yet to see any harm in the actions of state governors when they hijack local government allocations or remove elected local government chairmen and councillors. What is more bothersome is the fact that many Nigerians are quick to condemn actors of governance at the federal level whose actions have no direct benefit to their welfare and human security

#### 4. ***Weak institutions***

The structural violence of the contemporary time has been traced to “how wealthy western

countries have been exploiting and managing poor countries in hundreds of years via inhumane colonialism and neo-colonialism that promote corruption and capitalism that lead to structural violence, this consequently leads to violence in Africa” (Jorondrazana, 2021, p. 11). This inhumane nature of colonialism and neo-colonialism that happened and still happening in many African countries including Nigeria manifests corruption and poverty that lead to structural and direct violence. To attribute the activities of developed countries in the past hundreds of years ago and now as the rationale for the predicament and suffering of developing countries like Nigeria is to deceive oneself or to say that the reason why a man is poor is that his grandfather was maltreated by his great grandfather. The reason is that many countries like India, Singapore, and Malaysia among others that were colonized are not as badly affected as Nigeria in terms of structural violence. The role of public officeholders in changing the narratives of developed and developing society is germane in driving structural violence.

In Nigeria, the role of State governments under the control of state governors in driving structural violence is germane for human survival. The governors who are the chief executives of their various state governments have control over their state houses of assemblies; hence they have power over what laws to be enacted and the ones not to be enacted for the welfare of their citizens. This is why a scholar has noted that “law is central to the construction of these structural inequalities and to addressing them” (Rahman, 2018, p. 126). However, the state governors misuse their personal power and the power they derived from the constitution of Nigeria to exert excessive control on the various local governments in their states courtesy of weak institutions. Weak institutions do not entail that there are no guiding principles or that there are no rules of the game that guide people in society, but what it does entail is that the guiding principles are not being strictly

followed by everybody in society, especially the ruling elite. Strong institutions provide equal opportunities for everybody to succeed, while weak institutions do not provide equal opportunities for everybody to succeed. Strong institutions usher in a better local government that can develop the right intervention, reduce poverty, and promote education, health, and sustainable development (Ezeani, 2014). On the other hand, the weak institution ensures that the existence of local governments does not serve as a tool for development. Obamwonyi and Aibieyi (2015, p. 149) have contended that the presence “of local governments in Nigeria has not been felt because of their denial by the state”.

From our observation, the State governments under the control of state governors have been taking advantage of weak institutions to prevent grassroots development by hijacking local government allocations. There has not been a serious outcry in the media on the hijack of local government allocation that is hurting people from providing for their basic needs and creating serious structural violence in society. The local government that ought to have served as a veritable tool for national development to provide for basic needs and address structural violence has been rendered useless by state governors through the State Joint Local Government Account (SLGJAAC). Section 162 of the 1999 constitution (para. 5) that provides for “the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) is a problem for local government, as it enables corruption and reduces the power of local governments” (Hassan, 2020, para. 7). The supervisory power that the state governors have oftentimes misused is because of weak institutions in Nigeria, where everybody is not in agreement to call a spade a spade. Weak institutions that always support the exploitative and oppressive tendency of state governors were revealed by a study conducted by Monday and Wijaya (2022, p. 53), according to the study, a head of administration in Osun State noted that “democratic system is not in

existence in Nigeria again because none of the local government chairmen and councillors can boast of winning council election on their own without the influence of the state governors”. The above is validated by Hassan (2020) who says that even though the core of local government is to bring democracy nearer to the grassroots, state governors in Nigeria have always appointed politicians who are loyal to them as caretaker chairmen and council members and are being given contracts which they hardly implement. Observation has shown that virtually all the State governments under the control of State Governors in Nigeria remove democratically local government chairmen and councillors as soon as they resume office, a development that hurts the politicians who have been elected by the people.

Weak institutions have produced “praise singers” who derive pleasure in praising and supporting people who promote injustice when it favours them. State governors often take advantage of weak institutions to cause structural violence, a development that causes dissatisfaction among people. For instance, there was a viral video showing Philip Shaibu, deputy governor of Edo State, standing flummoxed in front of a padlocked gate to his office. Why? The governor, Godwin Obaseki, banished his deputy from the Government House. The second is Governor Rotimi Akeredolu of Ondo State who, after returning from a three-month overseas medical leave on September 7, 2023, decided that one of his immediate priorities was to orchestrate the impeachment of his deputy, Lucky Aiyedatiwa (Fesan, 2023). It was weak institutions that made some people support the state governor who is hurting his deputy and performing an act of structural violence without being condemned in Unisom by everybody. The above implies that the guiding principles regulating the behaviours of people are not sacrosanct; hence structural violence becomes a norm by state governors acting as emperors. Weak institutions allow the state governors to

hijack the local government allocation without condemnation and resistance from every quarter. The development that the local government allocation ought to have facilitated is left unattended to; hence structural violence where people are left to suffer and even die slowly has been the resultant effect. The above is corroborated by Ezeani (2014, p. 6) in this manner, “the local government system has not achieved its obligation of bringing development to the grassroots even with previous reforms implemented in the system”. What the above implies is that the local government mandate is primarily to bring development to the grassroots; however, this has not happened courtesy of weak institutions that allow state governors to hijack local government allocation, since they have the power to install and remove democratically elected actors of governance at the local level.

A study carried out in some selected local governments in Taraba State revealed that political authorities at the state level have hindered the delivery of construction and maintenance of roads through misappropriation and diversion of the capital budget for their benefit to deliver structural violence to the masses through an increase in poverty (Ayeni & Ezirim, 2023b). The above implies that the government of Taraba State under the control of the state governor who was rounding off his tenure has misappropriated funds meant for road construction and maintenance in the state, a development that resulted in structural violence where many have suffered untold hardship that could have been avoided. The act of misappropriation of funds under the state governor has no doubt inflicted hardship on people who are not supposed to pass through such hardship had the various roads budgeted for and for which funds were released were constructed and rehabilitated. This is why Jorondrazana (2021, p. 7), noted that “structural violence produces suffering and death as often associated with direct violence, however, this damage is

slower, more common, and more difficult to repair”. Travelling on a dilapidated road for some time might hurt people’s health, even though its damage might not be as fast as direct violence. Not only that, the ruling elites (state governors) employed laws and politics to rule their political unit in Nigeria to their advantage to the detriment of the citizens (Godwin, Ayeni, Peter, 2021). Weak institutions allow the beneficiaries of State governments under the control of “state governors’ impunity to support and believe that such actors of governance are gifts to their state” (Sobowale, 2022, para. 3), even when the actions of the state governors are hurting other people and causing structural violence and dissatisfaction in the society.

##### **5. Lack of integrity and Discipline**

Integrity is a virtue in the development of every society. According to Ayeni (2018), integrity is doing the right thing without anybody looking at you. When a structure like the government fails to perform its expected role, there are bound to be negative consequences (Ayeni & Nwaorgu, 2018; Joseph, Cinjel & Ayeni, 2017). Integrity means standing for something, hence not standing for something means that there is an absence of integrity. In America, a party may control a state but only a handful of its local governments. But in Nigeria, the party that controls a state will almost certainly control all its local governments, thanks to sham elections. In Nigeria, State governments under the control of state governors would delay local government elections and simply appoint their cronies as “interim” chairmen of “caretaker” local governments (Fesan, 2023). It is a lack of integrity for state governors to put up a framework that enables flag bearers of their political parties to be declared winners even without elections. Not only that; it is also a lack of integrity for state governors not to embark on policy implementation especially when there are means and resources to implement such policy (Ayeni, 2018).

This is even as it has been noted that policy implementation is a major challenge facing developing countries (Dialoke, Finian & Veronica, 2017). Not implementing public policy when there are means and resources is an issue of lack of governance integrity (Ayeni, 2018). No country can develop without governance integrity. This is even as Ayeni and Ezirim (2023b) further buttress the fact that it is exploitative for public officeholders at the state level not to effectively embark on budget implementation on road infrastructure when funds have been released for such project as that can account for structural violence in the study area, since the expected beneficiary of such project must have suffered some harm as a result of not implementing such road infrastructure. To be exploitative is an act that shows that a party has harmed another party, hence integrity has been undermined and structural violence has been elevated.

Observation has shown countless cases of structural violence being perpetrated by state governors in Nigeria because of their lack of developmental integrity. Developmental integrity is the ability of an individual or nation to make use of its natural and human resources to enhance the standard of living of its citizens (Ayeni, 2018). For instance, many State governments under the control of state governors are still in the habit of defaulting in the payment of public and civil servants' salaries from their states, including the local government workers that they have since taken control of in their states. This attitude of state governors has serious implications for structural violence. For instance, Lee (2019, p. 131) posited that "an extreme form of structural violence is contemporary slavery, which exists in the form of underpayment and the withholding of wages and salaries, especially to workers from low-income countries". It is a crime for State governments under the control of state governors to default in the payment of public and civil servants' salaries to both state and local government in their state, this time the crime is called

"structural violence". This crime being committed by state governors is not being condemned in Unisom by the public because of a lack of integrity by the supporters of such governors and their benefactors. State governors in Nigeria are all slave masters as long as they default in the payment of salaries of workers at both state and local governments. This structural violence being committed by state governors can lead to another serious violent crime. Thus, it has been further noted that "structural violence can also lead to higher suicides" (Lee, 2019, p. 129). The nature and character of many state governors portray them as perpetrators of structural violence who lack the integrity to lead by example. This act of structural violence has led to serious frustration among citizens, about the local government system in Nigeria (Ezeani, 2014). Frustration leads to structural violence in a land where little provocation can lead to protest, looting of material items, and engagement in criminal activities for survival.

Most State governments under the control of state governors in Nigeria lack the discipline to mobilise resources necessary for development, save the federal allocation from Abuja. This is why Nigerian state governors are mere equivalents of city mayors in the UK and the US based on the resources they control and the impacts they make, hence it is only Lagos, Ogun State in addition to Abuja that have their IGRs surpass their allocations from the federal account (Fesan, 2023). Even when the above few states have been able to generate funds which is a good development, the question is how impactful is the use of funds they have so far generated to address the structural violence by addressing the suffering of the people especially at this post-subsidy removal-era in Nigeria. The absence of discipline in the leadership of the state government of Nigeria was brought to the fore when scholars argued that, most ruling elite "are not disciplined to themselves", hence they cannot implement all their promises (Dialoke, Finian & Veronica, 2017, p. 25). State



governors hardly implement their manifestoes when they get to the office because they lack the integrity necessary to say something and do it, for the betterment of the people to address structural violence.

The findings of this study revealed a preference for stomach infrastructure, corruption, excessive use of power and authority, weak institutions, and lack of integrity and discipline as those things that State governments under the control of state governors imbibed that create structural violence across the thirty-six (36) states in Nigeria. The foregoing character and nature of the State governments under the control of state governors create poverty, inequality, and frustration across the thirty-six (36) states in Nigeria. The finding of this study correlates with the finding of Lee (2019) that snowballing into poverty is another warning sign of structural violence. The activities of State governments under the control of state governors across the thirty-six (36) states in Nigeria produce poverty, an indicator of structural violence that is prevalent in the 2023 post-fuel subsidy removal era of the federal government led by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Not only that; a previous study carried out by Ayeni and Ezirim (2023b) revealed that poor countries are poor because the ruling elite who have power make a choice that creates structural violence through the ineffective implementation of the budget. The refusal to implement budgets that address poverty and create equal opportunity by State governments under the control of state governors is a recipe for structural violence in Nigeria. Further, the findings of this study revealed that the excessive use of power and authority that state governments in Nigeria have over local governments creates structural inequality, poverty and unemployment at the various locale and communities in Nigeria.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The study has been able to interrogate the State governments' and structural violence in Nigeria. The State governments under the control of state governors in Nigeria deliberately create structural violence through a preference for stomach infrastructure, corruption, excessive use of power and authority, weak institutions, and lack of integrity and discipline that create structural inequality.

The study concludes that the power to control and supervise local governments that the Nigerian constitution gives to state governments in Nigeria empowers the latter to create structural inequality, poverty and unemployment in Nigeria.

Based on the findings of this study, the study made the following recommendations: Civil society organisations and media groups should make known to the public the investigative reporting and analysis of what the State governments under the control of state governors in Nigeria are doing vis-a-vis what they are supposed to be doing. The suggested recommendation will enable members of the public to know the State governments under the control of state governors creating poverty, inequality, and frustration leading to structural violence in Nigeria.

Secondly, the Federal Government of Nigeria should use its power to remove the control and supervision of local government areas, including the conduct of local governments' election from state governments through a constitutional amendment to address the problem of structural violence created by state governments across the country. The suggested recommendation will enable local governments in Nigeria to embark on rural and community development to address some of the root causes of structural violence across Nigeria.

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## POLITICAL CULTURE AND ELECTORAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

**Nebeife Chigozie Joseph<sup>1</sup>**

**Ochim Fidelis Ikaade<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State  
Email: [cjnebeife@gmail.com](mailto:cjnebeife@gmail.com)

<sup>2</sup>Department of Political Science  
Federal University of Lafia, Nasarawa State, Nigeria  
E-mail: [ochimfidelis@yahoo.com](mailto:ochimfidelis@yahoo.com)



### Abstract

Since 1999, Nigeria has experienced various stages of electoral process following the third wave of democratization which resulted in transition from several years authoritarian rule to democratic governance. Incidentally, there are indications that the electoral process in the country has not been able to produce functional leadership capable of fostering socio-economic development. This trajectory is attributable to the inherent parochial culture characterized by high grade fraud and malpractices which tend to undermine a credible electoral process in Nigeria. Therefore, this paper examines the impact of political culture on credible electoral process and the attendant implications on socio-economic development in Nigeria. The paper posits that a parochial political culture seems to have orchestrated dysfunctional electoral processes in Nigeria resulting to reproduction of poor leadership that fail to engender socio-economic development. Relying on the abstractions of the political culture theory and qualitative data, this paper argues that the existing political culture has continued to engineer a dysfunctional electoral process that produce fraudulent political leaders that stifle socio-economic development in Nigeria. It further argues that factors of ethnicity, parochialism, endemic corruption, religious sentiments, godfatherism and primordial considerations tend to undermine credible electoral process in Nigeria. The paper, therefore, recommends urgent need for a value re-orientation of the political actors and citizenry to shun the highlighted negative tendencies and develop a value-laden political culture for credible electoral process that will be a catalyst for socio-economic development in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Democracy, godfatherism, governance, political culture, development

### Introduction

Following the third wave of democratization in most African countries including Nigeria, representative democracy seems to have become the most preferred form of government and generally accepted as a prerequisite for socio-economic development. In this sense, government is basically constituted for the socio-economic development of its citizens amongst other critical functions. In line with the 1999 constitution as (as amended) the government in Nigeria is saddled with the roles of policy formulation, provision of infrastructure,

education, vocational, moral and political, creation of enabling environment for investment and economic growth, provision of employment opportunities, mobilization of patriotic spirit, etc.

Undoubtedly, the norms, values, beliefs, attitudes and traditions of the society tend to shape the political systems, institutions and processes of governance. According to Ibeanu & Orji, (2014) political culture is one of the most powerful influences that shape a political

system, as it creates norms and beliefs about how people should behave and these norms influence governance and social behavior. Political culture is therefore a critical bedrock of any democratic political system and it has the capacity to either facilitate or undermine electoral process in any society and thus determine the pace of socio-economic development.

As noted by Polazzo (2014) political culture of a country affects its political practices and developmental aspirations. Indicatively, the type of political culture practiced in Nigeria has been responsible for the skewed electoral process resulting to poor socio-economic development in the country. It is indicative that the success or failure of this critical role of the government in fostering socio-economic development is predicated majorly upon the prevailing political culture in the country among other factors. The fact that majority of Nigerians live below poverty level in a society so blessed by natural resources has a lot to do with the dynamics political culture and the pattern of electoral process that produce the political leadership in the country.

The inherent socio-economic cum political weakness evident in poor economic planning, policy summersaults and retardation in Nigeria depict leadership deficits orchestrated by faulty electoral process mid-wife by the inherent parochial political culture. It is thus discernible that political culture which shapes the dynamics of leadership features prominently as factor for credible electoral process and socio-economic development in the Nigeria. The interplay of political culture and electoral process in producing the needed leadership is critical to socio-economic development in any society.

However, the manifestations of inordinate political culture and fraudulent electoral process appear to have made key institutions of government in Nigeria to be frail and weak, lacking the capacity to effectively coordinate and implement collectively prosperous policy in the country. Instances of compromised and

faulty electoral processes abound and these tend to negate the will or wishes of the electorate leading to erosion of public trust, lack of accountability, transparency and probity. The operation of situational politics where elected representatives conduct themselves in government with little or no regards to the yearnings and aspirations of the electoral populace.

Studies such as Nwanegbo (2006), Okoli and Orinya (2013) observed that the prevalence of opportunistic political culture in Nigeria threatens the achievement of credible elections to the effect that development becomes a mirage. Other studies such as Jega and Ibeanu (2007), Jega (2007), Omotola (2014), as well as Okoli and Orinya (2013), have argued variously that political opportunism, oppositional intolerance, and poor dispensation of electoral administration have undermined credible electoral process in Nigeria. Nonetheless, these studies have not adequately interrogated how political culture and electoral process impact on socio-economic development. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the linkage between political culture and electoral processes in Nigeria's fourth republic with an insights on how that matters for the country's socio-economic development.

### **Conceptual clarifications: Political Culture, Electoral Process and Socio-economic development**

**Political Culture:** Political culture entails a nation's political personality that encompasses the deep-rooted, well-established political traits that are characteristic of a society. It takes into account the attitudes, values, and beliefs that people in a society have about the political system, including standard assumptions about the way that government works. Almond identified three distinct types of Political culture having studied some countries political process. These include parochial political culture, subjective political culture and participant political culture.

In this regard, Adebayo & Omotola, (2007) averred that political culture entails a predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system represents a consistent pattern that influences the electoral process of any democratic society. In fact, elections and the process of democratic consolidation through party politics are often influenced by political culture due to its influence on the electoral process expressed in their attitudes, behaviors and actions in respect of the control of state power and allocation of resources. The above assertions tend to unveil the primacy of the influence of political culture on the electoral process in any society.

**Electoral Process:** Electoral process refers to all the activities and procedures involved in the election of representatives by the electorates ranging from the provision of voter education to the dissolution of the National Assembly, (Jinadu, 2007). It entails all the pre and post election activities consisting of registration of political parties, review of voters' register, delineation of constituencies, resolution of electoral disputes, return of elected representatives and swearing-in of elected representatives. Eya, (2003) posited that electoral process entails the rules that guide the conduct of election, and important activities that make up an electoral process emphasizing that any conduct that threatens the electoral process is a subversion of the peoples' sovereignty.

This indicates that electoral process is immensely characterized by a culture of electoral malpractices such as illegalities committed by government officials responsible for the conduct of elections, political parties, groups or individuals with sinister intention to influence an election in favour of a candidate or candidates. Fundamentally, electoral processes can be divided into three key phases, consisting of pre-voting, voting, and post-voting. Oladipupo, (2011), noted that the degree of transparency of electoral processes and acceptability of outcomes by greatest number of the members

of the society determines its capacity to guarantee political stability and accountability which ultimately facilitates socio-economic development.

**Socio-economic Development:** This has to do with the transformation of a society with regard to its social and economic dimensions. The ultimate objective of social development is to bring about sustained improvement in the well-being of the individual, groups, family, community, and society at large. As such, Socio-economic development encompasses public concerns in developing social policy and economic initiatives. This is achievable through improvement within the lifestyles of the individuals through improved education, incomes, skill development and employment. It is the process of economic and social transformation based on cultural and environmental factors.

Socio-economic development is the process measured with indicators, such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment and the provision of basic amenities and infrastructural facilities. Ukpong and George (2012) posited that socio-economic development is the sustained actions of citizens and policy makers geared towards enhancing the people's living standard, safety, human capital development, infrastructural development, literacy, health and other initiative.

In the light of this, the state in its civic roles is expected to provide enabling environment that would enhance socio-economic development. Kapur (2018) averred that socio-economic development can be achieved when and where people's potentials must be harnessed for societal good without recourse to their ethnic, religious or political affinities. From the foregoing, socio-economic development can be conceptualized as the collaborative effort of the governed and government in identifying and solving the needs of the people in the community or society.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This paper is anchored on Political culture theory which emphasizes on the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments, which give order and meaning to a political process by providing the rules that govern the behavioural pattern in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideal and the operating norms of a polity which deals with commonly shared goals and accepted rules as well as pattern of orientations to political objects such as parties, government, the constitution expressed in beliefs, symbols and values (Babawale, 1999). This tends to suggest that political culture theory is a product of both the trajectory of a political system and the histories of the members of the society. Its value lies in the fact that it explains the expectation of any political system, especially the trajectory of electoral processes and implications on socio-economic development. The implication of this is that the nature and character of politics in a political system reflects the essentials of its people's dominant political culture (Ibeanu & Orji 2014).

Although, Political culture theory has been criticized by Lijphart, (2000) for its failure to recognize that the political sphere constitutes a distinct subculture with its own rules of conduct and its distinct processes of socialization, it exposes the socio-cultural imperatives that underpin the practice of politics as well as the conduct of public life in any political system. In the Nigeria's political culture, it is common knowledge that with political office come the spoils where the practice of using public office for private gain is seen as normal, (Egharevba & Chiazor, 2013). There seems to be manifestations of electoral malfeasance, electioneering hooliganisms, ethnic bigotry and elite and leadership. The inherent political opportunism facilitates lawless politicking whereby political actors pay no regard to etiquette, due diligence and moral cum legal restraint in their political engagements (Okoli & Orinya 2013).

### **Political Culture and Electoral Process: The linkages**

The norms, values, beliefs, attitudes and traditions of the society tend to shape the political systems, institutions and processes of governance. Political culture is one of the most powerful factors that shape a political system notable for creating norms and beliefs that shape social behavior (Ibeanu and Orji 2014). Thus, Political culture is a critical bedrock of any democratic political system which has the capacity to either facilitate or undermine governance in any society due to its capacity to build societal perceptions and expectations necessary for political leadership. Being embedded in the process of political socialization, Political culture deals with the behaviors of people in relations to political development, governance and state policies (Almond and Verba 1965; Duverger 1976). Laski (1986) observes that it is imperative to comprehend a country's political culture as prerequisite for understanding the design and operations of political decisions of any society.

The level of trust or mistrust of leadership, level of compliance, allegiance, patriotism etc., are all elements of political culture. In other words, political culture determines what is acceptable, prohibited and sanctioned in a nation's democratic processes, including electoral process. It is the manifestation of aggregate psychological and subjective dimensions of politics (Roskin 2014). Thus, it encapsulates what people believe and feel about government, and how they think people should act towards it. When and where the political values of a society are at odds with good governance and democracy, the political future becomes bleak and could revert to authoritarianism.

Political culture highlights the pattern of individual's attitudes and orientations towards his political world (Almond and Verba 1965). People's political culture determines their actions and reactions as players in a political system (Okeke 2015). Types of political culture include civic, subject and parochial cultures.

Civic culture is characterized by participatory dynamism and activism. It has to do with a population that is abreast and conscious of its political world. Under subject political culture, the citizenry is inclined to limited participation; they are more or less passive players in the system. In a parochial culture, the populace is oriented towards their traditional and primordial authorities and symbols of identification (Almond and Verba 1965). To this end, Almond and Verba (1965) emphasized that political culture is potentially a powerful, unifying concept capable of specifying how people affect their political system, and vice-versa.

Thus, the level of trust or mistrust of leadership, level of compliance, allegiance, patriotism etc are all elements of political culture. In other words, political culture determines what is acceptable, prohibited and sanctioned in a nation's political and electoral process.

The element of political culture is classified into affective and evaluative element, (Almond & Verba, 1965). Whereas the affective element of political culture relates to feeling or orientation of people towards political system expressed in the level of trust on the leadership of the state; the evaluative element refers to the people's opinion and judgment of the political system based on standard, knowledge and orientation of the citizenry. Almond & Verba, (1965) identified the various types of political culture as: parochial political culture, subject political culture, participant political culture and civil political culture. When and where the political values of a society are at odds with good governance and democracy, the political future becomes bleak and could reverse to authoritarianism. This portends that the nature of society determines its political culture and system of organization in relations to government and political system (Adibe, 2014).

The above indicates that political culture apart from consisting of attitude, beliefs, values and affections that are consciously held

or implicit in a society in relation to its political process also has to do with people's dominant orientation towards electoral processes. Adebayo and Omotola (2007) point out that political culture as a predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system represents a consistent pattern that influences the electoral process of any democratic society. The above assertions tend to underscore the primacy of the influence of political culture on the electoral process in any society.

Electoral process comprises of all the activities and procedures involved in the election of representatives by the electorates ranging from the provision of voter education to the dissolution of the National Assembly (Abiodun 2014). It entails all the pre and post-election activities consisting of registration of political parties, review of voters' register, delineation of constituencies, resolution of electoral disputes, return of elected representatives and swearing-in of elected representatives. Eya (2003) posits that electoral process entails the rules that guide the conduct of election and important activities that make up an electoral process, emphasizing that any conduct that threatens the electoral process is a subversion of the peoples' sovereignty.

Also, Ezeani (2005) noted that electoral process is a complex process that encompasses the good intentions and undesirable outcomes of election administration, particularly in emerging democracies where general elections are often marred by culturally hued electoral malpractices. Electoral processes can be divided into three key phases, consisting of pre-voting, voting, and post-voting (Abiodun 2014). The pre-voting stage has to do with electoral frameworks which determine the voter eligibility. The various elements and activities of the pre-voting phase include voter and civic education, voter registration, party nominations, and electoral campaigns also take place.



Electoral process is therefore considered to be so crucial that some scholars have argued that it is the bedrock of all democratic variables. To this end, Egwu, (2015) stated that where the interests of the people are articulated in a credible electoral process, the government in power tend to enjoy the sovereign legitimacy of the people; but election rigging can thwart the interest of the people hence the dubious imposition of an unpopular candidate. Incidentally, the ugly situation orchestrated by perverse political culture seems to account for the erosion of electoral integrity in Nigeria with implications on socio-economic development. The outcome of this anomaly has been poor leadership responsiveness, lack of accountability and legitimacy crisis.

The above implies that the level of openness and credibility of the electoral process and acceptability of outcomes by greatest number of the members of the society determines its capacity to guarantee political stability and accountability which ultimately shape socio-economic development. The prevailing electoral process in any society has the capacity to determine how democracies could be secured and life expectancy extended beyond the short term, (Ibeanu & Orji, 2014). This suggests that it is through the electoral process that socio-economic development could be achieved.

### **Manifest Political Culture, Electoral Process and Socio-economic development in Nigeria: The Nexus**

Nigeria's political culture seem to be parochial and characterized by lack of patriotism, low level of social trust, manipulations and poor leadership. On the other hand, a positive political culture should be anchored on sense of patriotism, national pride, high level of social trust and relatively good leadership. Events since the return of democratic rule in Nigeria from 1999 has revealed that vote buying and vote selling have become regular occurrences before, during and after elections, thereby portending a very

dangerous trend for Nigeria's democratic aspirations (Idike 2014).

This holds grave implications for credible electoral process, good governance and political participation in the country. Nigeria's Fourth Republic seems to be confronted with a political culture characterized by pervasive monetization of politics, where people tend to care more for material benefits rather than the integrity of the democratic process. This is as a result of the collapse in the civic values of the people which has been accentuated by the desperate political class (Aderonke 2012). This worrisome situation is laced by ethnic, religious and regional based politics resulting to corporate national damage evident in the level of political corruption, electoral malfeasance, electioneering hooliganism, and ethnic bigotry as well as leadership rascality, national cabalism, irresponsibility and the culture of winner-takes-all.

As earlier stated, there are three basic political cultures known to social scientist and each has its peculiar attributes. Specifically, the type of political culture practiced in Nigeria is the parochial political culture which consequently breeds what Dike (2006) termed instrumental leadership and situational politics. Most of the leaders are mired in the pursuit of selfish and personal goals at the expense of broader national interests. In Nigeria due to the type of political culture practiced, the leaders are concerned about how to use official position to achieve personal objectives while national objective is very secondary.

The Nigerian Political Culture fuels politics of hooliganism and electoral brigandage manifest in the winner-takes-all culture, (Egharevba & Chiazor, 2013). This is a difficult scenario for electoral process and tends to hinder the chances of elections to be turned into opportunities for political choice due to electoral fraud evident in all manners of elections rigging. Odigbo, (2015) lamented that the repetitive patterns of electoral malpractices evident in rigging, and

disenfranchisement breathe hatred and alienation into the political arena in Nigeria.

To this end, Adebayo & Omotola, (2007) stated that the Nigeria's political system is characterized by political culture inundated with electoral malpractices and sinister intention to influence an election in favour of a candidate. This occurs by means of illegal voting, bribery, and undue influence, intimidation and other acts of coercion exerted on voters, falsification of results, fraudulent announcement of a losing candidate as winner as witnessed in the general elections in Nigeria, (Adebayo & Omotola, 2007).

The Nigeria's scenario depicts a primordial political culture that elevates all manner of malpractices and electoral impunity.

Indeed, Nigeria seems to manifest a political culture of pervasive monetization of politics where people tend to care for money rather than the integrity of their votes occasioned by the collapse in the values of the people which has been accentuated by the desperate political class, (Aderonke, 2012). This worrisome situation is laced by ethnic, religious and regional based politics resulting to corporate national damage evident in the level of political corruption, electoral malfeasance, electioneering hooliganisms, and ethnic bigotry as well as leadership rascality, national cabalism, irresponsibility and the culture of winner-takes-all.

The culture of lawlessness and impunity demonstrated by the political class has compromised the Nigerian state autonomy; the managers of the state become self-seeking and anti-democratic both in thoughts and actions. In order to achieve their parochial political power, the ruling class orchestrates and reinforces confusion and manipulates the ignorance of the people. It also enthrones the rule of men instead of the rule of law as well as destroys political institutions like political parties that brought them to power in order to foster recklessness, thuggery and general anomie because its conception of politics does not conform with universally accepted democratic principles and public order.

Some of the political leaders indulge in looting of the treasury and make policies that are to their own advantage. Incidentally, most of the Nigeria's leaders have been submerged in the culture of plunder, power politics and chronic corruption. Over the years bulk of the funds allocated to capital projects to advance socio-economic development have been looted by political leaders. As a result, the education sector is still in shambles, the health sector has virtually collapsed, unemployment rate heightened and crime rate unabated.

Favouritism, nepotism, ethnic and religious dichotomisations have also bereaved the leadership of its objectiveness in maintenance of law and order and peaceful coexistence among Nigerians for meaningful socio-economic development to thrive. Poor leadership orchestrated by parochial political culture and fraudulent electoral process has been at the root of Nigeria's problem, resulting to poor management of public resources, the inability to ensure development and maintenance of a transparent economic and regulatory environment through sound policies. Lack of purposeful leadership in Nigeria has subjected her people to poverty, unemployment, poor infrastructure and weak institutions characterized with gross violation of human rights and absence of the rule of law.

In fact, the prevailing socio-economic development crisis is a serious indictment of the quality of leadership in Nigeria. The above indicates that the Nigerian political turf is dominated by parochial and subject political cultures. There are manifestations of Electoral violence, Crises of legitimacy and personalized leadership, Institutionalized Corruption and Monetized Politics, Illiteracy/political ignorance, Ethno-religious crises and Recurring Political Instability, Poverty and unemployment as well as weak Democratic Institutions due to Political Culture of impunity.

The citizens display high level of cynicism and distrust towards the political leaders. Lack of national loyalty and pride has led to erosion of patriotism or nationalistic tendencies

required for meaningful socio-economic development. In their struggle for political power, the citizens are seen as pawns to be used, abused and dumped at their discretion. They are driven by the Machiavellian principle of “the end justifies the means”. This explains why elections in Nigeria are characterised by electoral corruption, violence and the abuse and usurpation of the inalienable rights of the citizens to decide who will govern them by the political elites.

Essentially, the way the citizens relate to the state, in terms of levels of participation, political activities and efficiency or cynicism, level of trust or mistrust of leadership, level of compliance, loyalty, allegiance and patriotism are all products of the political culture. As should be noted, political culture tends to influence the electoral process and determines the tendency of socio-economic development as captured in the table below:

**Table 1.1 Manifestations of Political Culture and implications on electoral process and socio-economic development**

| Negative Political Culture          | Impact of electoral process,   | Implications on Socio-economic development  | Positive Political culture         | Impact of electoral process   | Implications on Socio-economic development  |
|-------------------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|---|---|
| Lack of patriotism.                 | Low level of social trust, Cynicism, distrust, disloyalty and unpatriotism,                                    | Social distrust, governance deficits and recklessness, disunity, poor infrastructure, unemployment and poverty, disenchanted citizens etc             | High sense of patriotism           | national pride, loyalty, High level of social trust   | Social trust, effective governance, provision of social goods and services, job creation and employment, happy citizens |
| Prebendal political office holders. | Lack of integrity, lack of responsiveness, transparency and accountability                                     | High level corruption, misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds, White elephant projects and misgovernance                                   | Competent and persons of integrity | High level of Accountability, transparency and responsiveness, low corruption   | Good governance, improved security, socio-economic development and rule of the law etc.                                 |
| Fraudulent Elections                | Emergence of losers as winners in election, Rigging of elections, falsification of results, electoral violence | corruption, arbitrariness and violation of rule of the law, insecurity, poor socio-economic development and erosion of democratic ethos or principles | Credible elections                 | Emergence of Credible leaders, Very low Electoral malpractices, Low incidence of election-related violence and killings | Legitimacy, Citizens support, effective leadership, tolerance, discipline   |
| Fragile Political Institutions.     | Institutions built around individuals, pervasive corruption  | weak democratic institutions and institutionalized corruption, High handedness, manipulative court cases etc  | Strong Political Institutions      | Institutions are built for societal benefit.  | High degree of independence and autonomy of government institutions, rule of the law                                    |

Source: Author’s compilation from sundries (2024)

The table above showed that negative Political Culture breeds lack of patriotism, fraudulent Elections, prebendal political office holders and fragile Political Institutions. This in turn creates electoral process characterized by low level of social trust, cynicism, distrust, disloyalty and unpatriotic, emergence of losers as winners in election, rigging of elections, falsification of results, electoral violence, lack of integrity, pervasive corruption, lack of responsiveness, transparency and accountability and institutions built around individuals. The implications on socio-economic development are evident in governance deficits and recklessness, disunity, poor infrastructure, unemployment and poverty, disenchanted citizens, high level corruption, misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds, White elephant projects, arbitrariness and violation of rule of the law, insecurity, poor socio-economic development and erosion of democratic ethos or principles. Also, weak democratic institutions, High handedness, manipulative court cases are common. The consequences of these challenges pose serious threats to socio-economic development in Nigeria.

On the other hand, Positive Political culture engenders high sense of patriotism, credible elections, competent and persons of integrity and strong political institutions. The impact on electoral process are seen in the emergence of credible leaders, very low electoral malpractices, low incidence of election-related violence and killings. This results to national pride and loyalty, high level of social trust, high level of accountability, transparency and responsiveness, low corruption due to strong political institutions that are built for societal benefit. The outcome encompasses legitimacy, effective governance, tolerance, discipline, provision of social goods and services, job creation and employment, happy citizens, improved security, socio-economic development and rule of the law owing to high degree of independence and autonomy of government institutions.

### **Indicators of socio-economic development deficits in Nigeria**

Socio-economic development is a product of development that embraces changes taking place in the social and economic sphere of the society. Thus, socio-economic development is made up of processes caused by exogenous and endogenous factors which determine the course and direction of the development. Socio-economic development is measured with indicators, such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment. Changes in less-tangible factors are also considered, such as personal dignity, freedom of association, personal safety and freedom from fear of physical harm, and the extent of participation in civil society. Causes of socio-economic impacts are, for example, new technologies, changes in laws, changes in the physical environment and ecological changes.

Poor socio-economic development in Nigeria manifest unemployment, corruption, non-diversification of the economy, income inequality, laziness, low standard of education as infrastructural deficits, social exclusion, insecurity, crimes, poor housing and inadequate provision of public services. The inability of government to provide a secure and safe environment for lives, properties and the conduct of business and economic activities has led to resentment and disaffection among the citizens. The alarming level of insecurity in Nigeria has made the economy unattractive to foreign investors, and this has impacted negatively on socio-economic development of the country.

Nigeria's policy space has been characterized as a battleground and arena of disputes for instinctive dispositions given the governance structure alongside governing behaviors inclusive of unavoidable effects of socio-economic failures. Poor governance resulting from poor policy implementation issues in Nigeria hinges on crucial influences such as governance, policymaking, and behavior influences. The inconsistency of governance policy indicates the magnitude

that government directions and policy are disorientated and unaccountable. The absence of appropriate governance policies results in rising economic inequality, poverty, and social difference where policy actions to revamp socioeconomic developments are not addressed.

The above therefore underscores the centrality of the electoral process in socio-economic development. The electoral process therefore is central to socio-economic development in the sense that credible electoral process ensures that the best candidates emerge through a transparent process irrespective of ethno-religious inclinations. This results to high level of social trust, accountability, transparency and responsiveness, low corruption due to strong political institutions that are built for societal benefit and consequent effective governance that propel socio-economic development in the country.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has argued that there are certain requisite political norms, orientation and attitudes that create and sustain the environment for credible electoral process that can foster socio-economic development. It has established that the type of political culture operational in any country has a way of influencing the electoral process as seen in Nigeria. The unwholesome electoral malpractices manifest in churning out confusing voters' register, ballot rigging, vote buying, disenfranchisement and manipulation of election results amongst others tend to be inimical to effective governance. This trajectory accounts for the inability of political culture to engender electoral process of promoting socio-economic development in Nigeria's fourth republic. Incidentally, the above ugly scenario seems to account for the erosion of electoral integrity evident in imposition of candidates, poor leadership responsiveness, lack of accountability and legitimacy crisis.

Thus, the seemingly failure of electoral processes in Nigeria has been attributed to the parochial political culture by the political leaders and citizens, that often make election periods the occasions when ethnic and other primordial differences among the people are played up and brought to the fore". Such primordial tendencies tend to influence the electoral process in terms of voting patterns, party membership, contesting elections, interest aggregation and policy formulations amongst others. Such sustained Political Culture tend to have continued to affect the outcome of electoral processes and thus seem to undermine socio-economic development in the country.

In view of the above, this paper recommends for a value re-orientation to develop a value-laden political culture capable of enhancing electoral process in Nigeria and thus replace incumbency supremacy in Nigeria with a political culture of high value system and supremacy of the will of the people. There should be patriotism where interest and socio-economic development aspirations of Nigeria should supersede the individual, ethnic or religious interest. Above all every political forum should be utilized to re-orient the electorate on the need to embrace political culture that will help to reduce to barest minimum all manners of electoral malpractices in Nigeria.

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# 25

## REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF BIAFRA, 2015 – 2023

**Agwadu Lhebade**

Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [felablax@gmail.com](mailto:felablax@gmail.com); [agwadu@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:agwadu@fuwukari.edu.ng)



### Abstract

Since the 1960s, secessionist movements have challenged the continued existence of the Nigerian state. Secessionism in Nigeria culminated in the Nigeria Civil War (1967 – 1970). Nigeria was constitutionally declared as one indivisible and indissoluble state to prevent future secessionist movements. Although numerous secessionist agitations have risen since the Nigeria Civil War, especially following the return of democracy in 1999, none has impacted the country like the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), principally between 2015 and 2023. This study examines the impact of democratic representation on the increased lethality of IPOB between 2015 and 2023. The research was anchored on the theory of relative deprivation, which argued that a group of people are likely to join social movements to challenge any system that denies them some opportunities relative to other groups. The study adopted a pretest-post-test research design to test how a change of perception about democratic representation between two different governments impacted the secessionist agitations in Southeast Nigeria. The study used surveys and documentary (mixed method) methods to gather data, which were then analysed using descriptive statistics and graphs. The study found that the IPOB's secessionism is a protest fuelled by a perception that the people of Nigeria's Southeast were not effectively represented in the Buhari administration. This is solidified by the administration's seeming lopsided appointments and citing of capital projects. The study recommends more federal appointments and capital projects to the Southeast to change the region's marginalisation perception.

**Keywords:** Secession, representative democracy, IPOB, Southeast Nigeria

### Introduction

The state is an essential element of human relations and has evolved to be the highest level of organisation among humans. Aristotle holds that man only realises himself within the state. The state has held for society its authorising power, making laws, implementing and interpreting them. State also takes charge of the security and welfare of citizens and has been at the forefront of the pursuit of 'national interest' over the years. National interests are crystallised and pursued by instruments of the state, leaving the state as the number one property of all members of a given society. In the words of Aristotle in Enemuo (2005), "state embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater

degree than any other and the highest good". He believes that the state is a natural community and the highest of all communities. Aristotle went further to view the state as the natural and final stage in growing human relations, rising from family through the village. For him, it is only through state that man realises his entire self and, in particular, highest self. The importance of state to the individual man and groups of men that make up society cannot be overstressed.

The state is also related to other elements of society, including nations, groups, communities, and society. The state relates with them to sometimes crystallise or enforce



their will. Sometimes state serves as a force for organising them into a coordinated unit. One of the highest achievements or attainment of organisations in society is forming a nation out of a community of people. The use of state machinery best achieves this through the process of nation-building. According to Onuoha & Ugwueze (2014) "Nation-building defines the progress of any country and this is why it is not taken for granted by those who hold development close to their hearts". It is synonymous with development and a compromise against it amounts to a compromise against development itself (Onuoha & Ugwueze, 2014). The existence of a national identity is a necessary prerequisite for nations to stay together as captured in the opinion of Alberto & Reich (2015) "nations stay together when citizens share enough values and preferences and can communicate with each other". The aim is to either create homogeneity or a filling of national identity amongst the people of a given state.

Throughout history, states and nations have been creating each other. On the one hand, some existing nations have built states around their nation to serve them and protect their interest and identity in the committee of nations. In other instances, states predate nations and then use their machinery to create nations out of people. The main concern of the modern world is the latter due to recent events. Migration has moved people from different parts of the world to other parts, thereby cosmopolis, the world with most states containing a diversity of people that did not naturally evolve with the state as a nation. Other states were a result of colonial mergers of nations for the purposes of exploitation. In such cases, the state's power will be relied upon to build a nation out of the diversity of people inhabiting the state. This is the case of Nigeria where the country is a result of colonial experience and a collection of diverse groups needing a nation building process to merge into one. However, Nigeria has been unable to effectively build a nation out of its diversity,

leading to feelings of dissatisfaction by some quarters to the point of calls for separatism and secession. This is particularly prevalent in the Southeast of the country.

It would be incorrect to argue that since Nigeria's independence, the government has not consciously or purposefully worked to implement the nation-building process. State attempts to establish a nation have been made despite the fact that the country is far from becoming a nation in the word's traditional meaning. The civil war that ended in 1970 gave the endeavour a new focus. The state implemented the "no victor, no vanquished" policy to begin the process of rebuilding the country after the conflict. The three-pronged (three-Rs) approach of reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction was implemented by the Gowon administration. The goal of the initiative was to demobilise Biafrans and reintegrate them into Nigerian society (Onuoha & Ugwueze, 2014).

Another initiative that adhered to the three Rs was the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), which requires young people who have graduated from high school and are under thirty to go and serve in states other than their home states in order to expose them to cultures different from their own. The program's main goal was to promote national unity and cultivate and encourage the formation of common links among Nigeria's young (Onuoha & Ugwueze, 2014). It was established by decree No. 24 of May 22, 1973. Some corps members have moved permanently to their host states as a result of this, while others have integrated into the host communities to the point of getting married. This may not have been possible without the scheme. However, one of the most potent tools Nigeria has used for national integration is representative democracy.

Berisha in Haxhiu & Alidemaj (2021) held that representative democracy is a system of government in which citizens use their freedom to make political choices through elected representatives. In this manner, the

people select their representatives to the representative bodies. The core of representative democracy is that the people's will is carried out by representatives who are directly chosen by the population themselves. The highest state authority, chosen by the people, is accountable to the people and must act in line with their interests. Haxhiu & Alidemaj (2021) believe that the foundation of representative democracy is made up of several intricate ideas, the most significant of which are: - The legitimacy of governmental authority; - The equality of all people before the law, popular sovereignty is fulfilled, people participate in public life, majority rule is respected, minority rights are protected, political pluralism is upheld, free and fair elections are held, and power is separated and restricted. One of the most important foundations of representative democracy to this research is that of political pluralism. The existence of several political forces allows each person to freely express their political beliefs and views, which is what political pluralism is all about. Political pluralism is known as the variety of political parties, alliances, principles, viewpoints, and philosophies that shape the nation's political landscape and provide voters with options (EMA, 2009). Western democracies view pluralism as the social contract that governs their society. This is about a vast array of freely created interest groups with competing interests in politics, economics, religion, ethnicity, and other areas, all vying for influence in society and politics. Political plurality refers to the unrestricted ability of political parties to function as essential participants in legislative proceedings. It upholds the freedom of speech of many political stances, choices, alternatives, and their conflict and rivalry (Haxhiu & Alidemaj, 2021). Ultimately, it opens up the opportunity for different shades of people to find some level of expression in governance through representation.

Nigeria adopted representative democracy to offer opportunities for different segments

of Nigerians to be represented as a way of national integration. After an intense debate between federalists and unitarians, it started with the adoption of federalism at independence (Agwadu, 2020). The country was segmented into three federating units in the Richard Constitution of 1946, offering opportunities for various ethnic groups to enjoy some governmental powers. This did not automatically engender national integration as political parties from this period had major ethnic and regional foundations, leading them to mobilise support by appealing to regional, ethnic or religious sentiments (Agwadu, 2024). This drove a wedge into the country's attempt at national integration. This culminated in the crises that erupted following the conduct of the 1964 elections that resulted in the January 1966 coup by General Aguyi Ironsi and the subsequent countercoup, which all resulted in regional and ethnic tensions across Nigeria, culminating in the Civil War between 1967 and 1970 with the former Eastern Region's attempt to secede.

Following the return of democracy in 1979, the Nigerian government made conscious attempts at national integration by placing measures that could fight against ethno-religious mobilisation in politics. First, it was ensured that national spread was a requirement for any association to qualify for registration as a political party. This was to ensure that the type of regionally based political parties that dominated the first republic will not rise again. In effect, associations were required to show their presence in 2/3 of the country to avoid dominance by any region. Equally, political parties were barred from bearing regional or ethnic names in an attempt to stop ethno-religious mobilisation of voters (Agwadu, 2021). However, This did not stop the political parties from being regional, as the new parties became resurrections of old First Republic parties without regional names.

The government also introduced the federal character principle in the 1979

Constitution to ensure that various segments of the country were represented in government and bureaucracy. In order to implement and uphold the Federal Character Principle of fairness and equity in the distribution of public posts and socioeconomic infrastructures among the various federating units of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Federal Character Commission (FCC) was created by Act No. 34 of 1996 as a Federal Executive body. The foundation of the FCC for operating under a democratic form of government was established by the 1999 Constitution's Sections 14 and 153. One of the responsibilities of the Federal Character Commission is to devise a fair formula, subject to the President's approval, for the distribution of all cadres of posts in the armed forces, the Nigerian Police Force and other security agencies, corporations owned by the federal or state governments, extra-ministerial departments, and parastatals of the federal and state governments (Federal Character Commission, 2021).

Even though there are laws in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions that specify the distribution of offices across Nigerian federating units, the principle and spirit behind the law is even more important, and that is the quest to end discriminatory practices in Nigeria and ensure that various segments of the country are represented in the legislature, judiciary, executive and bureaucracy. Across the globe, nations with heterogeneous populations devise comparable yet distinct strategies to augment prospects and guarantee equitable representation of their disenfranchised factions and impoverished neighbourhoods. These regulations are designed and implemented to level the playing field and prevent prejudice and underrepresentation, whether systemic or not. Additionally, they go under numerous titles, including positive discrimination, reservation quotas, and affirmative action. This is known as the Federal Character Principle (FCP) in Nigeria (Stears, 2023). The FCP succeeded the quota system

that was in place in colonialism. Ethnic groups were disproportionately represented in public service and federal institutions during colonisation. Due to the outrage and discontent caused by this imbalance, a quota for entrance to public service was established in 1958. The North was given a 50% allotment, while the East and West each received 25%. The federal character principle was proposed before the quota system. However, it was disregarded because the University of Ibadan admitted students based only on their merits (Stears, 2023).

The federal character principle has ensured that some level of representation is seen in the country, especially in appointing cabinet members, as ministers have always been chosen from all federation states, commissioners from all local governments, and supervisory councillors from all wards. However, the principle is not without its flaws. The Federal Character Principle has been the subject of extensive criticism in Nigerian media outlets, with many arguing that it is a misguided attempt that would hinder the productivity and production of the federal civil service. Many people think there is a direct link between making sure that representation is fair and administrative inefficiencies, which feeds the belief that applying the latter ideal at the expense of competence and merit is counterproductive (Stears, 2023). Although it makes sense to advocate for ending the division of competence and representation, the federal character has created multiple challenges, including the following: The manipulation of one's place of origin to get an unfair advantage, corruption, and the concentration of opportunity and power in the hands of a small elite group at the expense of the general populace.

Even though the Federal Character Commission has been in place since 1996, allegations of marginalisation and nepotism have plagued every administration since then. However, none has perhaps drawn as much criticism as President Buhari's government.

According to many public observers, Nigeria is currently more divided than before the civil war (Stears, 2023). No region complained about this discrimination than the Southeast. It all started when former President Buhari stated that he would not treat regions of the country that gave him 97% votes and those that gave 5% equally. Knowing that he got his lowest support from the region, the attention of the Southeast was drawn to how he could possibly treat them. Following the statement, several appointments were made that tended to favour the North and the Southwest to the exclusion of the Southeast, which the Igbo ethnic group predominantly occupied. This seemingly sparked an ethnic nationalism in the region, leading to the rise of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), which called for the secession of the Southeast region of Nigeria to form the former Biafran republic. This raises a question: Did the feeling of underrepresentation of the Southeast region in Nigeria's government account for the rise of secessionism between 2015 and 2023? This research, therefore, inquired if the feeling of underrepresentation of the Southeast region in Nigeria's government accounts for the rise of secessionism between 2015 and 2023.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The study is anchored on the theory of relative deprivation. The concept of relative deprivation was coined by Samuel Stouffer in 1949 to explain surprising connections found in World War II polls of American soldiers. Despite enjoying a significantly faster rate of advancement than the military police, Stouffer and his colleagues (1949) discovered that US Army Air Corpsmen expressed greater irritation over promotions compared to the police. According to Stouffer, the pilots knew numerous comparable peers who had been promoted inside their Air Corps ingroup; therefore, the military police were not a useful contrast for them (Smith, Pettigrew, & Huo, 2020). The theory of relative deprivation was

how developed by Walter Runciman, Robert K. Merton and Tedd Gurr (Longley, 2021).

Relative deprivation is defined in three phases. First, individuals must make comparisons. There cannot be relative deprivation if no comparison is made. Second, there must be a cognitive assessment that causes the individual to believe that she or her ingroup is at a disadvantage. This perceived comparative disadvantage sets relative deprivation apart from the previous frustration-aggression theory and other non-comparative conceptions of social fairness and discrimination. Third, the apparent disadvantage must be considered unjust. The perceiver believes she or her ingroup deserves more, which causes passionate resentment. This component is essential to relative deprivation (Smith, Pettigrew, & Huo, 2020).

Relative deprivation theory suggests that sentiments of deprivation and unhappiness are linked to desired reference groups. Feelings of relative deprivation occur when aspirations become valid expectations and are denied by society. Social satisfaction is the opposite of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is a key factor in explaining social movements stemming from a desire for social change. Collective sentiments of deprivation drive these movements (Okechukwu, 2018). According to relative deprivation theory, people who believe they are being denied something considered fundamental in their society (for example, money, rights, political voice, or prestige) would organise or join social movements aimed at getting such items. For example, relative deprivation has been considered as one of the roots of the 1960s Civil Rights Movement in the United States, which was motivated by Black Americans' desire for social and legal equality with white Americans. Similarly, many homosexual individuals joined the same-sex marriage movement to have their marriages legally recognised in the same way that heterosexual people do (Longley, 2021).

The theory applies to this research as it explains the drive behind IPOB's secessionist movement in Nigeria's Southeast. As the theory argues, the people of Southeast Nigeria felt a sense of deprivation relative to other regions of Nigeria under the Buhari administration. His seeming lopsided appointments and citing capital projects favouring the North some more crystallised this. This made Southeasterners feel relatively deprived in comparison to Northerners. This led many of them to join the movement to secede the region out of Nigeria so that they could manage their affairs by themselves and ensure more equity in an egalitarian representative democracy in the Republic of Biafra.

### **Research Methodology**

The research adopts the pretest-posttest research design. The pretest-posttest research design is a standard method for evaluating the effect of an intervention or treatment on a specific variable. It entails assessing the variable of interest prior to (pretest) and after (posttest) the intervention is implemented (Phyoe, 2003). This research tries to understand how the difference in democratic representation between the government before the Buhari administration may have affected Igbo nationalism and the clamour for secession in Nigeria's Southeast. To achieve this aim, the research compared the representation of the Southeast in the government before and after the Buhari administration. It compared how Igbo nationalism was before Buhari and how it became in response to the clamour for representation. Equally, the citations of capital projects in the Southeast were also compared between the two administrations.

The research got facts and figures about the spread of appointments, promotions and citing of capital projects under the Buhari and Jonathan Administration from secondary sources such as newspapers, magazines and official publications. The study also utilised

questionnaires and interviews to get the views of people from the Southeast to understand their perception and their representation in Nigeria's democracy and how it affects their nationalism to the point of secessionism. One hundred questionnaires were distributed randomly in the five southeast states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo, with each state receiving 20. 5 self-professed members of IPOB were interviewed through X Spaces, formerly known as Twitter. Also, broadcasts and posts by leaders of the IPOB were extracted from their YouTube channels and X pages. Data were analysed using simple percentages and verbatim quotations.

### **Igbo Nationalism and Secessionist clamour in Nigeria's Southeast**

The Igbo people of Southeast Nigeria have occupied the region for thousands of years as independent people. They, however, came under Nigeria through colonialism and the amalgamation of different nationalities into one. The origins of Igbo nationalism may be traced back to a variety of conditions, including the rise of ethnic nationalism, micro-nationalism, and sub-nationalism in the aftermath of the 1940s. Igbo nationalism is a sub-nationalism or micro-nationalism that existed within broader Nigerian nationalism before independence in 1960. The Igbo people have political potential and grabbed the chance to begin their nationalist process (Aro & Ani, 2017).

Onuoha in Aro & Ani (2017) advanced that upon Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's return in 1934, the people of Onitsha hailed him as their own son and asked to host a celebration in his honour. Rather than being viewed as a pan-Africanist or Nigerian, the Igbo people in Lagos and Onitsha accepted Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe as an Igbo leader who asserted his pan-African and pan-Nigerian identity. The event made Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe more of an Igbo leader than a Nigerian nationalist. Igbo organised nationalism as a sub-nation in Nigeria was born as a result of the reception. Dr. Nnamdi

Azikiwe's involvement in NCNC was impacted by his association with Igbo sub-nationalism. Even though Azikiwe was not quite aware that he was implementing Igbo nationalism, he was unable to take it too far as he confused the political concerns in Nigeria with the Igbo aspects of his own identity. Igbo people at the time mostly utilised the NCNC as a foundation to advance their political interests.

Coleman states in Aro & Ani (2017) that the Igbo Federal Union's (IFU) founding in 1936 gave the Igbo nation's growth a new dimension. In Aba, the Igbo Federal Union transformed in 1948. According to the NCNC freedom charter, the Igbo language group was to be formally organised into a powerful political entity. The creation of the Igbo State Union marked the beginning of a new chapter in the Igbo people's rights and interests inside the Nigerian Federation. Although it was not stated clearly in its vision, the Igbo State Union (ISU) was the NCNC's extension, working to further the goals and interests of the Igbo people. The Igbo people exploited the Igbo State Union's institutional structure to further their interests as Nigerian nationalism became politicised and split into three factions, eventually leading to regionalism and ethnic nationalism in 1946.

According to Nnoli in Aro & Ani (2017), the Igbo State Union made a concerted effort at the lowest political levels to associate the NCNC with the progress and well-being of the Igbo people. A militant form of Igbo sub-nationalism emerged during the 1967–1970 civil war. The Igbo Political Consultative Assembly (IPCA) in Enugu gave the Igbo political elites the authority to proclaim the Republic of Biafra as soon as it was practical. Forsyth in Aro & Ani (2017) argued that Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu was the leader of Igbo nationalism at the time. He advocated and fought for Biafra's separation from Nigeria as an independent state. The Igbo people wanted to break away from Nigeria to establish their own independent state, which led to a three-year conflict between them. Thus, before

1970, Igbo agitation and their demand for an independent state from Nigeria were driven by nationalism, the concept of a developing nation state.

Also, the extreme poverty and inhumane conditions that many Igbo people experienced after the war caused Igbo nationalism to lose steam in the 1970s (Aro & Ani, 2017). However, there has been a revival of Igbo nationalism since the return of democracy in 1999. However, Nwangwu, Onuoha, Nwosu, and Ezeibe (2020) argued that the first generation of Igbo nationalism began just after the Nigerian Civil War ended in 1970 and is led and supported by the conservative Igbo petty bourgeoisie. The most powerful elite groups these petty bourgeois elements work with are Ohanaeze Ndi-Igbo (also known as Ohanaeze), Aka Ikenga, and Alaigbo Development Foundation (ADF). They offer the forums needed to safeguard and advance the goals of the Igbo petty bourgeoisie. The Igbo nationalists of the second generation view these bourgeois elements as surrogates of their federal counterparts, as they are perceived as mainly detached from the grassroots. They desire more Igbo engagement in mainstream Nigerian politics, and a big portion of their efforts are governed by the ideology of "ako-na-uche" (intelligent and delicate). The core principles of "Ako-na-uche" are "the application of wisdom, common sense, sound judgement and restraint in dealing with all issues and situations to achieve desired results." The emergence of combative Igbo nationalism following the restoration to civil government in 1999 may be primarily attributed to the division between the conservative Igbo petty bourgeoisie and the masses.

In contrast, the second generation of Igbo nationalism is prone to see the crises of the Igbo nation as a consequence of the repressive Nigerian state and the collaborationist role of the conservative Igbo nationalists who comprise the opposite half of the petty bourgeois class. The second generation of Igbo

nationalism is driven by the radical Igbo petty bourgeoisie, who ally with the underclass and youth-led ethno-nationalist organisations. The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a contemporary example of a radical neo-Biafran movement following the 'nzogbu-nzogbu' doctrine, emphasising conflict. 'Nzogbu-nzogbu' is a popular traditional war song in Igboland. It "evokes the idiom of the men's alleged bravery and fighting prowess likened to the elephants' incredible body mass and bulldozing power." to crush and trample their opponent. Despite being primarily based on the professed non-violent ideology; these populist groups embody the militant aspect of Igbo nationalism following the conflict. The separatist trend that has been on the rise since 1999, after the expansion of democratic forum for the voice of complaints that were suppressed under military control. Notably, the expansion of the political sphere in Nigeria provided support for the rise of various ethnic activist organisations, including the IPOB, the MEND, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and the Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (Nwangwu, Onuoha, Nwosu, & Ezeibe, 2020).

With the return of democracy in 1999, Igbo nationalism found new life. A group of Igbo political elites founded the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) to actualise Biafra and revive Igbo nationalism. Despite the failure to establish an independent Igbo state, Igbo nationalism has continued to be a vibrant movement that has impacted the nation-building process in Southeast Nigeria and across the nation (Aro & Ani, 2017). Igbo nationalism attained a new height in the 21<sup>st</sup> century after the rise of IPOB. Established in 2012, the group is a reorganisation of the Biafran Zionist Movement (BZM) and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), two previously weak pro-secessionist organisations. The organisation,

led by Mazi Nnamdi Kanu and his deputy Uche Okafor-Mefor, wants to use a referendum to grant the people of the former Eastern Region independence (Henry, Obiora, & David, 2020; Igwebuikwe & Akoh, 2023).

Although IPOB was founded in 2012, its leader, Nnamdi Kanu, became well-known in 2009 thanks to his Radio Biafra broadcasts. He broadcasts from London, where he criticises the actions of the Nigerian government and demands the liberation of the Biafran people. International Crisis Group has characterised Radio Biafra in Henry, Obiora & David (2020: 42) as "an unlicensed station urging violent struggle to achieve independence for Biafra," with its broadcasts featuring "highly provocative messages laced with misinformation, hate speech, and anti-Nigeria criticism." Biafraland, according to the organisation, is an area in the South East. The majority of the Niger Delta is included, and the River Niger forms its western boundary. Cameroon is the border to the east. While some Biafrans speak Urhobo-Isoko, Ijaw-Epie-Ogbia, Ogoni, Efik, Annang, Eket-, Oron-Ibibio, Ogoja, Ejagham, Igala, Idoma, Ibani, and Igbanke, among other languages, many Biafrans are Igbo speakers (Henry, Obiora, & David, 2020).

Undoubtedly, Nnamdi Kanu and the IPOB employ a conspicuous tactic of civil disobedience to hammer home their demands for the emancipation of the Biafran people. A YouTube video from 2015 depicted Nnamdi Kanu asking for guns from Biafrans living abroad to support the Biafran cause during the World Igbo Conference on September 14, 2015, in the United States. Furthermore, the group radio's daily radio broadcasts have stoked animosity and bad sentiments among the populace, further rupturing the already fragile fabric of Nigeria's unity (Henry, Obiora, & David, 2020).

Prior to 2015, the government of former President Dr Goodluck Jonathan mainly disregarded the actions of IPOB, which were essentially limited to internet radio (Radio

Biafra) rants and other media hysteria. However, starting in 2015, just after President Muhammadu Buhari took office, the organisation grew increasingly aggressive, brash, and outrageous. According to Ekpo (2018:48), this resulted from what he called "Buharophobia," or the dread of Muhammadu Buhari, the former President of Nigeria. The literature revealed the long-lasting bond between Buhari and the Igbo during his military rule (1984–1985), particularly concerning his handling of Igbo political leaders of the Second Republic and the allocation of development projects compared to other areas and ethnic groups. It shows that Buhari was not fond of the Igbo. The previous President's "97 percent and 5 percent" remark, as well as the brazen murderous attacks and national arrogance of Fulani herders, have stoked Igbo fears about security, which IPOB believes only Biafra can provide (Ekpo & Agorye, 2019).

By October 2015, the IPOB commander had abandoned his London propaganda office, Radio Biafra, to travel to Nigeria. When he arrived, security personnel captured him and placed him in the custody of the State Security Service (SSS). This signified the start of the conflict's intensification and the growing hostility between IPOB and the Buhari government. Members of IPOB staged many demonstrations demanding the release of their leader, and security personnel responded to these demonstrations with a show of brutal force. In such confrontations between separatist demonstrators and security personnel, it is believed that at least 146 persons lost their lives in 2016 alone (Ekpo & Agorye, 2018).

Ekpo & Agorye (2018) state that after Nnamdi Kanu's release on April 15, 2017, a sense of euphoria contributed to the illusion of victory. This illusion must be maintained by ongoing rallies targeting intimidating and influencing the federal government and the international community. A comparable threat of secession from groups in the Niger Delta

and the Western geopolitical zone, as well as widespread calls for the "restructuring" of Nigeria's federalism, were stoked by Kanu's histrionics and megalomania, which inflamed the political climate. The Kaduna Declaration was impacted by Kanu's rise to prominence, which also upset the political establishment.

With demands for independence, threats of ethnic warfare, and counterthreats, the political climate was definitely tense. In an absurd attempt to get intelligence, IPOB absurdly created a paramilitary organisation called the Biafra Security Service (BSS) and put Nigeria's national security to the test. Although it was clear that IPOB had become a significant security risk, the group was legally untouchable since the issue could only be resolved within the bounds of accepted rules and customs. This led to the group's proscription in September, 2017 (Igwebuike & Akoh, 2023).

IPOB declared a 'Sit at Home' on May 30, 2017, to honour fallen Biafran fighters and mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Nigerian Civil War (Ujumadu, 2017). People of Igbo origin across the world were expected to 'Sit at Home' on that day, especially in Southeast Nigeria. This declaration was highly complied with across Nigeria's Southeast and beyond, including Asaba and Port Harcourt in Delta and Rivers state. IPOB declared that the general compliance showed that Igbo people wanted Biafra (Opejobi, 2017). IPOB declared 'Sit at Home' on May 30 to be an annual event to honour 'Biafran heroes' (Igwebuike & Akoh, 2023).

Mr Nnamdi Kanu, who also holds a UK passport, escaped Nigeria in 2017 while still on trial (Khalid & Macaulay, 2022). While in the UK, he waged a massive verbal war against Nigeria through his propaganda outlet Radio Biafra and his YouTube Channel. He described Nigeria as a zoo republic and asked his armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), to wage war against Nigeria's security forces. Mr Nnamdi Kanu particularly waged a verbal war against Northerners, especially the Fulani and



called everyone aligned to them from Igbo land an enslaved person. This sparked a series of violent activities in Nigeria's Southeast, leading to the rearrest of Kanu in Kenya on June 19, 2021, and extradition to Nigeria on June 27, 2021 (Nnochiri, 2024). He was rearrested on allegations of potentially treasonous felonies presented by the federal government due to his advocacy for the separatist Republic of Biafra. On July 30, 2021, IPOB spokesperson Emma Powerful announced that Mondays will be a sit-at-home day beginning on August 9, 2021. An ongoing mode of protest that will last until its leader, Nnamdi Kanu, is freed from the custody of the Department of State Security. A day set aside to memorialise the deceased was welcomed by many when IPOB announced the sit-at-home order in August 2021. Originally, the order was implemented annually in part as a way to honour those who lost their lives in the Nigeria-Biafra War. The yearly sit-at-home eventually evolved as a vehicle for accomplishing other objectives, including as raising awareness of more current Biafra-related concerns (Mark, Obi, & Oham, 2022). Abba, Ani, Ayatse, & Agullah, (2023: 9) argued that 'the current sit-at-home tagged 'Ghost Monday' has been violent as it was hijacked by a group of people know as 'Unknown Gunmen". These unknown gunmen continue to wreck havoc on the Southeast in the name of implementing the sit at home until Governor Charles Soludo of Anambra state declared an end to it in his state and Governor Peter Mbah of Enugu state allow followed suit a year later.

### **Southeast Representation before and after the Buhari Administration**

Upon the return of democracy in 1999, there was a renewed hope among Nigerians

that an opportunity would be offered to be represented as the erstwhile military government never created an opportunity. The stage was left for the political parties that took over power to create a sense of belonging among Nigerians and further the course of national integration. Two political parties have governed Nigeria since 1999, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC). Olabode George, a former national deputy chairman of the PDP on Channels TV (2022), pointed out that the party was founded to advance national unity to create regional cohesion. He pointed out that the PDP created a zoning formula that took into account the six geographical zones in the nation because they never wanted to go back to the days of regional politics. The Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, the President, the Vice President, and the National Chairman of the party are the six crucial national positions that the party determined needed to be assigned to the six geopolitical zones of the nation.

Additionally, they established a system wherein the North and South of the nation would alternate in holding the President. He noted that a similar arrangement was made for states and local government areas. With this, the PDP became what Odigbo (2014) described as a congress party. The APC, on the other hand, did not make such an arrangement. It is, therefore, pertinent to compare how the two parties created avenues for representation to understand how that may have triggered secessionism in Nigeria's Southeast. This is going to be done through a comparison of major appointments by President Goodluck Jonathan and President Mohammedu Buhari.

Table 1: Showing President Goodluck Jonathan's ministerial appointments

| North |                                      |                       |          |                   |
|-------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|
|       | Ministry                             | Minister              | State    | Geopolitical Zone |
| 1     | Attorney General, Justice            | Mohammed Bello Adoke  | Kogi     | North Central     |
| 2     | Information                          | Labaran Maku          | Nasarawa | North Central     |
| 3     | Interior                             | Comrade Abba Moro     | Benue    | North Central     |
| 4     | Niger Delta Affairs (State)          | Zainab Ibrahim Kuchi  | Niger    | North Central     |
| 5     | Trade and Investment (State)         | Samuel Ioraer Ortom   | Benue    | North Central     |
| 6     | Youth Development                    | Bolaji Abdullahi      | Kwara    | North Central     |
| 7     | Water Resources                      | Sarah Ochekepe        | Plateau  | North Central     |
| 8     | Agric and Natural Resources (State)  | Bukar Tijani          | Borno    | Northeast         |
| 9     | Federal Capital Territory            | Bala Mohammed         | Bauchi   | Northeast         |
| 10    | Finance (State)                      | Yerima Lawal Ngama    | Yobe     | Northeast         |
| 11    | Transport                            | Idris A.Umar          | Gombe    | Northeast         |
| 12    | Women Affairs                        | Zainab Maina          | Adamawa  | Northeast         |
| 13    | Water Resources (State)              | Obadiah Ando          | Taraba   | Northeast         |
| 14    | Health (State)                       | Mohammed Pateh        | Bauchi   | Northeast         |
| 15    | Defence                              | Haliru Mohammed Bello | Kebbi    | Northwest         |
| 16    | Education                            | Ruqayyah Ahmed Rufa'i | Jigawa   | Northwest         |
| 17    | Foreign Affairs (State) <sup>2</sup> | Dr Nuruddeen Muhammad | Jigawa   | Northwest         |
| 18    | Mines and Steel Development          | Mohammed Musa Sada    | Katsina  | Northwest         |
| 19    | National Planning                    | Shamsudeen Usman      | Kano     | Northwest         |
| 20    | Sports                               | Yusuf Sulaiman        | Sokoto   | Northwest         |
| 21    | Works (State)                        | Bashir Yugudu         | Zamfara  | Northwest         |
| 22    |                                      | Yusuf Abubakar        | Kaduna   | Northwest         |

| South |                          |                                      |             |                   |
|-------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------|
|       | Ministry                 | Minister                             | State       | Geopolitical Zone |
| 1     | Aviation                 | Stella Oduah-Ogiemwonyi              | Anambra     | Southeast         |
| 2     | Finance                  | Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala                  | Abia        | Southeast         |
| 3     | Foreign Affairs (State)  | Viola Onwuliri                       | Imo         | Southeast         |
| 4     | Health                   | Onyebuchi Chukwu                     | Ebonyi      | Southeast         |
| 5     | Labour                   | Emeka Wogu                           | Abia        | Southeast         |
| 6     | Power                    | Osita Nebo took over from Bart Nnaji | Enugu       | Southeast         |
| 7     | Niger Delta Affairs      | Godsday Orubebe                      | Delta       | South-South       |
| 8     | Petroleum                | Diezani Alison-Madueke               | Bayelsa     | South-South       |
| 9     | Science and Technology   | Ita Okon Bassey Ewa                  | Akwa Ibom   | South-South       |
| 10    | Works                    | Mike Onolememen                      | Edo         | South-South       |
| 11    | Culture and Tourism      | Edem Duke                            | Cross River | South-South       |
| 12    | Education (State)        | Nyesom Wike                          | Rivers      | South-South       |
| 13    | Defence (State)          | Erelu Olusola Obada                  | Osun        | Southwest         |
| 14    | FCT (State)              | Olajumoke Akinjide                   | Oyo         | Southwest         |
| 15    | Foreign Affairs          | Olugbenga Ashiru                     | Ogun        | Southwest         |
| 16    | Communication Technology | Mrs. Omobola Johnson                 | Ondo        | Southwest         |
| 17    | Police Affairs           | Caleb Olubolade                      | Ekiti       | Southwest         |
| 18    | Trade and Investment     | Olusegun O. Aganga                   | Lagos       | Southwest         |

Source: Author's compilation with information from (OGALA, 2011)

Table 1 above shows the distribution of ministers by states, regions and portfolio under the Jonathan administration. It is clear here that beyond the constitutional mandate to appoint ministers from each state of the Federation, President Jonathan appointed additional ministers for each geopolitical zone including the Southeast. Buhari did same but excluded the Southeast. Equally, president Jonathan assigned people of Southeast origin to significant ministries such as Health, Power and Finance. The Minister of Finance was in fact made the Coordinating Minister for the Economy giving a 'Super Ministerial' status. Although Deziani Alison Madueke was appointed to represent Bayelsa state, she was married to a Southeasterner from Enugu state and bearing his name. She was assigned to a significant ministry like Petroleum which until then, previous Presidents had taken themselves. President Jonathan himself, an Ijaw man from Bayelsa state amplified his Igbo names of Azikiwe and Ebele which almost made him look like the long awaited Igbo President. This rekindled the yearning for an

Igbo President as Jonathan's appointments made it look like a possibility. This hope was however destroyed by President Buhari who did not place people of Southeast origin in positions of significance.

Some reasons that undoubtedly reflect the peculiarities of the 1970 reconciliation and amnesty plans are blamed for the resurrection of the agitations for the actualisation of the defunct Biafra. Ibeanu, Orji, and Iwuamadi (2016) state that the political unrest in the country is based on the Igbo elites' failure to use politics to seize the presidency. This political dissatisfaction manifests itself politically as the young Biafran people's dissatisfaction with their economic situation. Here, the lack of economic prospects is viewed through the prism of inconsistencies in the country's economic landscape. Indeed, since the 1970s, economic marginalisation and political exclusion have replaced the issue of life and property insecurity as the central complaints of the Igbo people (Ekpo & Agorye, 2018).

**Table 2 Showing Appointments by the Jonathan Administration from security forces**

|    | Name                                   | Portfolio                                      | State of Origin | Geopolitical Zone |
|----|--|--|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1  | Genral Andrew Owoye Azazi              | National Security Adviser                      | Bayelsa         | South-South       |
| 2  | Col. Sambo Dasuki                      | National Security Adviser                      | Sokoto          | Northwest         |
| 3  | Air Marshall Alex Badeh                | Chief of Defence Staff                         | Adamawa         | Northeast         |
| 4  | Major General Kenneth Minimah          | Chief of Army Staff                            | Rivers          | South-South       |
| 5  | Rear Admiral Usman Jibrin              | Chief of Naval Staff                           | Kogi            | North Central     |
| 6  | Air Vice Marshall Adesola Amosu        | Chief of Air Staff                             | Lagos           | Southwest         |
| 7  | Lieutenant-General Azubuikwe Ihejirika | Chief of Army Staff                            | Abia            | Southeast         |
| 8  | Rear Admiral D.J. Ezeoba               | Chief of Naval Staff                           | Plateau         | North Central     |
| 9  | Air Marshall Alex Badeh                | Chief of Air Staff                             | Adamawa         | Northeast         |
| 10 | Suleiman Abba                          | Inspector General of Police                    | Jigawa          | Northwest         |
| 11 | Solomon Arase                          | Inspector General of Police                    | Edo             | South-South       |
| 12 | Mohammed Dikko Abubakar                | Inspector General of Police                    | Zamfara         | Northwest         |
| 13 | Hafiz Ringim                           | Inspector General of Police                    | Jigawa          | Northwest         |
| 14 | Brig-Gen Nnamdi Okore-Affia            | Director General NYSC                          | Abia            | Southeast         |
| 15 | Ita Esien Ekpeyong                     | Director General of the State Security Service | Cross River     | South-South       |

Source: Author's compilation with information from (Channels TV, 2012) and (Usman, 2014)

Table 2 above shows appointments by President Goodluck Jonathan from Nigeria's security forces. It is worthy of note that the people of the Southeast felt included as he appointed one of them Lieutenant-General

Azubuikwe Ihejirika from Abia state as the first Nigerian Chief of Army Staff since the end of the Civil War in 1970. Table 3 below shows that President Buhari did not appoint a single person from the Southeast into any position of

significance from any of the security forces. It is worthy of note that President Jonathan also appointed Brig-Gen Nnamdi Okore-Affia from Abia state as Director General NYSC. Equally, he appointed Major General Kenneth Minimah Chief of Army Staff. Although he hailed from Rivers state, he was ethnically affiliated to the Igbo people of the Southeast. According to some interviewees, these appointments gave a lot of Southerners a sense of belonging and a feeling that their region was finally being reintegrated into the Nigerian mainstream after the Civil War. This feeling was crushed by the Buhari administration's total neglect of that region in its appointments from Nigerian security forces. Interviewees said that Buhari's appointments did not make them feel

represented in the country's security architecture. This was why when herdsmen attacked their crop farmers, they felt the security forces did not do much to stop them because they were not represented in its decision-making ranks.

This is corroborated by Nwangwu, Onuoha, Nwosu, and Ezeibe (2020), who stated that Victimisation allegations are particularly strong in relation to appointments made at the federal level by Buhari's government, notably in terms of internal security management. This is demonstrated by the fact that 16 of the 18 leaders of important national security institutions are from Northern Nigeria, whereas none are from the South-East zone.

|    | Name                                      | Portfolio                                      | State of Origin | Geopolitical Zone |
|----|---|--|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1  | Retired Major-General Babagana Monguno    | National Security Adviser                      | Borno           | Northeast         |
| 2  | Air Vice Marshal Monday Riku Morgan       | Chief of Defence Intelligence                  | Edo             | South-South       |
| 3  | Major-General Abayomi Gabriel Olonishakin | Chief of Defence Staff                         | Ekiti           | Southwest         |
| 4  | Major-General T.Y. Buratai                | Chief of Army Staff                            | Borno           | Northeast         |
| 5  | Rear Admiral Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas           | Chief of Naval Staff                           | Cross River     | South-South       |
| 6  | Air Vice Marshal Sadique Abubakar         | Chief of Air Staff                             | Bauchi          | Northeast         |
| 7  | Ibrahim Kpotun Idris                      | Inspector General of Police                    | Niger           | North Central     |
| 8  | Mohammed Adamu                            | Inspector General of Police                    | Nasarawa        | North Central     |
| 9  | Usman Alkali Baba                         | Inspector General of Police                    | Yobe            | Northeast         |
| 10 | Lawal Musa Daura                          | Director General of the State Security Service | Katsina         | Northwest         |
| 11 | Maj. Gen. S.Z. Kazaure                    | Director General NYSC                          | Jigawa          | Northwest         |

**Table 3 Showing Appointments by the Buhari Administration from security forces**

Source: Author's compilation with information from (Usman, 2015)

### Data presentation and analysis

People in the Southeast of Nigeria were interrogated about their views and reactions to the Buhari administration's appointments and allocation of capital projects in their region. They were asked to know whether they felt represented in the government and to

understand if they found IPOB's agitation for secession justifiable. One hundred questionnaires were distributed to the five states of the Southeast, but only 74, representing 74%, were returned. The responses were as follows:

**Table 4**

| S/N | Questions   | Yes | No |
|-----|---|-----|----|
| 1   | Did you feel represented in the Buhari led administration?  | 8   | 66 |
| 2   | Were you better represented in the administration preceding Buhari?   | 49  | 25 |
| 3   | Do you think the Southeast was marginalised in terms of appointments by the Buhari-led administration?                            | 68  | 6  |
| 4   | Do you think that the Southeast was efficiently represented in government in the administration preceding Buhari?                 | 47  | 27 |
| 5   | Do you think that the Southeast was marginalised in terms of capital project allocation by the Buhari-led administration?         | 69  | 5  |
| 6   | Do you think the Southeast was better in terms of the allocation of capital projects by the administration preceding Buhari?      | 32  | 42 |
| 7   | Do you think the Buhari administration was nepotistic?  | 68  | 6  |
| 8   | Was the Buhari administration disproportionately nepotistic against the Southeast?  | 70  | 4  |
| 9   | Are you satisfied with the Buhari administration's handling of the clashes between crop farmers and herders in the Southeast?     | 3   | 71 |
| 10  | Owing to your feelings about representation in the Buhari administration, do you find IPOB's agitation for secession justifiable? | 36  | 38 |
| 11  | Is secession the only way out for the plight of Southeasterners?  | 32  | 42 |
| 12  | Do you think the Southeast should continue being in Nigeria if equity will be guaranteed?   | 48  | 26 |

**Source: Author's compilation from Questionnaires**

As shown in Table 1 above, the views of Southeasterners have been clear: the Buhari administration did not effectively represent them, unlike the one preceding it. 66 out of 74, representing 89% of respondents, said they did not feel represented in the Buhari administration, leaving only eight people, representing 11%, who said the opposite. Equally, 49 people, representing 66%, said they felt represented in the administration preceding Buhari, leaving only 25 people, representing 34%, who said they were not represented. Sixty-eight people, representing 92% of respondents, said that the Buhari administration marginalised the Southeast in terms of appointments, leaving only six people, representing 8%, that said otherwise. Equally, 47 people, representing 64% of respondents said that the Southeast was better represented in government in the administration preceding Buhari.

The issue of allocation of capital projects was also interrogated, and respondents expressed their disapproval of the Buhari administration's allocation of capital projects

to the Southeast. 69 people, representing 93% of respondents, said that the administration marginalised the region in the allocation of capital projects. On the other hand, 32 people, representing 43% of respondents, argued that the Southeast was treated better in terms of the allocation of capital projects by the administration preceding Buhari. Although in the minority, the feeling of marginalisation regarding capital project allocation was not as strong for the preceding administration as it was for the Buhari administration.

Sixty-eight people, representing 92% of respondents, argued that the Buhari administration was nepotistic, leaving only six people or 8% of respondents, saying otherwise. Worse still, 70 people, representing 95% of respondents, believed that the Buhari administration was disproportionately nepotistic against the Southeast. This clearly shows that the people of Southeast Nigeria felt that they were disproportionately discriminated against by the Buhari administration, which could make them willing tools for fighting against such discrimination. When

interviewed, IPOB leaders mentioned that they recruited their members from frustrated Southeasterners who saw the actualisation of the Biafran republic as the only way out of their plight.

Seventy-one respondents, or 96% of respondents, said they were not satisfied with the Buhari administration's handling of the clashes between crop farmers and herdsmen in the Southeast. When interviewed, many respondents expressed belief that the Fulani ethnic group was on a land-grabbing expedition in the Southeast. They believed that President Buhari supported the herdsmen to takeover their lands as a solution to the pressures of climate change in the North where they (Fulani) come from. He supported them by refusing to deploy security forces to stop herdsmen attacks but looking the other way. They believe that the former President deliberately appointed his kinsmen to head all security forces as part of a Fulanisation agenda to refuse deploying security forces to stop herdsmen attacks. They said that most of them welcomed the ESN, the armed wing of IPOB, because they believed they were going to fight the herdsmen and send them out of the Southeast. They also believe that if Southeasterners had been part of the leadership of Nigeria's security forces, they would decisively be dealt with attacking herdsmen.

Despite how difficult it is to admit publicly for security reasons, 36 respondents, representing 49%, said that IPOB's call for secession was justifiable. This may signal public sympathy for the group and their course in the Southeast. Still, 38 people, representing 51% of respondents, did not favour the group's call for secession, showing they most likely believe in one Nigeria. However, the activities of IPOB may be a product of general frustration. This is further supported by 57% of respondents saying that they did not believe that secession was the only solution to the plight of their region.

Furthermore, 65% of respondents said that they believe that they believed the Southeast should continue being part of Nigeria if equity is guaranteed, leading the research to conclude that the escalation of the secessionist agitation of IPOB is a result of frustration from poor representation in the Buhari administration between 2015 and 2023. The frustration stems from the perception of being nepotistically ignored in vital federal appointments, citing capital projects and fighting against herdsmen's attacks on crop farmers in the Southeast. IPOB's fight was not so intense because such a perception of poor representation in the administration preceding Buhari was not felt so strongly.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The study concludes that IPOB's secessionism is a protest fuelled by a perception that the people of Nigeria's Southeast were not effectively represented in the Buhari administration. This is solidified by the administration's seeming lopsided appointments and citing of capital projects. Following the findings of the research, the study makes the following recommendation: The present Tinubu administration and administrations in the future should make conscious efforts to incorporate the people of the Southeast region in government, increase capital projects to the region and fight the insecurity bedevilling the region to give the people a sense of representation in government.

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# 26

## FOOD INSECURITY AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

Nwokah Imere Lordmizer<sup>1</sup>

Amakoromo Woyinmo Timi<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1&2</sup>Department of Political Science, Federal University Wukari

Email: *imerenwokah@yahoo.com*

Email: *amakoromotimi@gmail.com*



### Abstract

Food sufficiency has become a sweltering contemporary issue due to the role it plays in shaping human behavior. Rising food demand and falling supply has been credited to governance crisis, which manifest in various forms including poor implementation of economic policies, high cost of governance, dysfunctional institutions, poor infrastructural facilities, corruption, amongst others. Paradoxically, in Nigeria, food insecurity has reached a worrying dimension when evaluated within the context of the rapid population growth; thus, making Nigeria a food-deficit country. The above scenario poses serious negative implications and a precursor to the rising insecurity, hunger-induced instability and violence in many parts of Nigeria. This paper sets out to highlight the implications of the rising food insecurity in Nigeria on democratic governance. Using secondary sources of data, the relative deprivation theory and content analysis, the paper argues that in the phase of acute food shortage and biting economic conditions, democratic governance appears to loose meaning to the citizens. The consequence is that civil obedience and national loyalty will be threatened. It posits that the inability to formulate and implement good policies that will stimulate economic prosperity underlines the citizens' violent reactions due to the perception that there is a gap between what is and what should be done to satisfy collective values. It concludes that food insecurity is a precursor to other forms of insecurities, and recommend among others, that stakeholders at all levels should formulate and execute sustainable food security policies aimed at promoting food availability, accessibility, and adequacy for all.

**Keywords:** Dilemma, democratic governance, food security, relative deprivation

### Introduction

What kind of country plants tomatoes and does not have plan for tinned tomatoes? What kind of nation has fisheries everywhere, but imports sardine and geisha? What kind of country plants corn in all its regions and imports canned sweet corn? Which other country do you know where cows obstruct vehicular traffic in all its state capital cities but still imports corned beef? Which nation has fertile land to plant all the food it needs to feed its citizens, but leaves it to weeds? Welcome to Nigeria... (Egbemode, 2008, cited in Onuoha, 2008, p.38)

The above lamentation by Funke Egbemode captures the prevailing sentiment of

frustration, anger, and despair among the majority of Nigerians regarding the ongoing crisis in the Nigerian economy and the widespread prevalence of hunger resulting from food shortages throughout the nation. In Nigeria, food insecurity has reached a worrying dimension, when evaluated within the context of the rapid population growth; thus, making Nigeria a food-deficit country. Nigeria is among the nations facing food shortages in sub-Saharan Africa, despite potentially having a more robust production capacity compared to its regional counterparts (Ojo & Adebayo, 2012). Yet, this development appears to be relatively recent. During the 1940s and early

1950s, Nigeria did not face the challenge of food insecurity. The nation's agricultural system successfully provided sustenance to its citizens while also allowing for the exportation of surplus food items. Each region of the country focused on cultivating one or two primary crops, whether they were food or cash crops. Consequently, Nigeria achieved a commendable level of self-sufficiency in terms of food production.

Nigeria's agricultural landscape once boasted of the impressive groundnut pyramids in the North, the flourishing cocoa plantations in the west, the abundant oil palm and kernel heaps in the East, and the thriving rubber plantation in the mid-west (Tell, August 3, 2009, in Ojo & Adebayo, 2012). However, the discovery of crude oil in 1956 in Oloibiri, present day Bayelsa state, and the subsequent commencement of its exportation in 1958 brought about a gradual and later rapid transformation. As the prices of oil surged, the interest in agriculture waned, signaling the beginning of a decline in food production in the nation.

This drastic decline in agricultural activities and the consequent reduction in food production gradually, but steadily, resulted in acute food shortages across the nation. This series of development pose serious negative implications and a precursor to the rising insecurity, hunger-induced instability and violence in many parts of Nigeria. Thus, this paper is an attempt to delve into the dilemma of food insecurity and the dynamics of democratic governance in Nigeria. The central aim of this paper is to explore how rising food shortages can drastically impede good democratic governance in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the paper has been deliberately partitioned into six sections with this brief introduction and conceptual explication as section one. Section two explores the relative deprivation theory, which we intend to use as our theoretical framework. In section three, we shall examine the link between democracy and food security. In section four, we

attempted to show that food insecurity is an antithesis to democratic governance in Nigeria. Section five delves into the dilemma of food insecurity on democratic governance in Nigeria; while we conclude and recommend in section six.

### **Conceptual Explication**

In this section, we shall attempt a comprehensive, yet concise review of the two key concepts that formed the basis for the study under review. They are: (a) food security and (b) democracy and democratic governance.

#### **(a) Food security**

Food security is an essential concept that embodies the totality of the presence, accessibility, utilization, and consistency of food for individuals and communities. It plays a pivotal role in guaranteeing that every individual has the opportunity to obtain safe, nourishing, and ample food to fulfill their dietary requirements and choices.

Food security as a concept is shaped by various factors, including economic conditions, agricultural practices, environmental sustainability, and social policies. These factors interact and intertwine, influencing the availability, affordability, and quality of food resources. Understanding the intricate relationships between these elements is crucial for devising holistic approaches to enhance food security and mitigate the risks associated with hunger and malnutrition (Guo-qin & Lin, 2021).

A nation is deemed to have attained food security when a significant portion of its populace has the ability to obtain food that is of satisfactory quantity and quality consistently, in accordance with a decent standard of living. The implication of this definition is that food should be accessible to individuals in a manner that satisfies a satisfactory level of nutritional requirements, encompassing calories, protein, and essential minerals that are necessary for the body.

Moreover, individuals should possess the necessary means to obtain and have consistent and uninterrupted access to food supply (Davies, 2009). From the foregoing, we can deduce that food security entails two fundamental components: (a) the availability of food and (b) the possession of the capability to obtain it (Adeoti, 1989).

Ojo & Adebayo (2012) opined that food security should not solely be viewed in terms of availability, whether it is in quantitative or qualitative aspects, however, it is crucial to also prioritize food hygiene and safety to safeguard the well-being of individuals. In its essence, therefore, a nation attains food security when it can provide enough food to meet the needs of its population for a satisfactory standard of living, while also ensuring that the consumption of food does not present any health risks to its citizens (Davies, 2009).

### c. Democracy and Democratic Governance

**i. Democracy:** The concept of democracy and democratic governance are twin concepts that need clarification. Even though we used them interchangeably in this study, they deserve some level of explication. The word 'democracy' originates from two Greek words: 'demos', meaning 'the people', and 'kratos', meaning 'authority'. As a concept, democracy has attracted a lot of definitions from different writers at different times and places over centuries past. For instance, Robert Dahl defined democracy as a political system in which the rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives (Dahl, 1971).

Similarly, Joseph Schumpeter conceived of democracy as a system where individuals and political parties compete in free and fair elections to gain political power and influence the policy-making process (Schumpeter, 1942). In his part, Martin Lipset postulated

that democracy is a system characterized by free and fair elections, political pluralism, the protection of civil liberties, and the rule of law (Lipset, 1959). Just as equally, Carole Pateman defined democracy as a system that emphasizes equal participation and the active involvement of citizens in decision-making processes, particularly in matters that affect their lives (Pateman, 1970).

*Perhaps, the most popular definition of democracy that arguably sums up all the definitions above is the classical one given by Abraham Lincoln, a onetime president of the United States of America. Lincoln (1858) defined democracy as the government of the people, by the people and for the people. This definition of Lincoln (1858) has, throughout the years, retained its prominence in literature perhaps due to its ability to effectively capture the fundamental nature of democracy. The definition portrays democracy as a form of government that grants power to the people, allowing them to enjoy freedom, happiness, and adequate representation. Moreover, it emphasizes the significance of decision-making through elected representatives, with the government consistently prioritizing the general will of the people. As a political system of governance, democracy is based on certain fundamental principles, some of which include:*

1. **Popular Sovereignty:** *Democracy is founded on the concept of popular sovereignty, wherein the highest political authority is vested in the populace (Locke, 1689; Rosseau, 1762). Individuals are granted the privilege to engage in the decision-making procedures and elect their leaders via transparent and equitable voting mechanisms.*
2. **Political Equity:** *Democracy is rooted in the principle of political equality, affirming that every citizen holds an equal voice and rights in the political sphere. Despite differences in social, economic, or cultural backgrounds, individuals are granted an equal chance to engage in and influence political decisions (Mill, 1859; Dahl, 1971).*

3. **Rule of Law:** *The rule of law principle dictates that all members of society, including those in positions of authority, are accountable to and must adhere to the legal system. This guarantees impartiality, fairness, and the preservation of the rights and liberties of citizens (Montesquieu, 1748; Fuller, 1964).*
4. **Protection of Individual Rights and Liberties:** *Democracy upholds and defends individual rights and civil liberties, encompassing freedoms such as speech, assembly, press, religion, and the right to a just trial. The preservation and protection of these rights are crucial in maintaining the integrity and independence of individuals in a democratic community (Locke, 1689; Mill 1859).*
5. **Majority Rules with Minority Rights:** *While democracy is commonly associated with the concept of majority rule, it also underscores the importance of safeguarding the rights of minority groups. This principle is essential in guaranteeing that the rights and interests of minority communities, regardless of their race, religion, gender, or other distinguishing characteristics, are not disregarded or oppressed by the prevailing majority (Madison, 1788; Rawls, 1971; de Tocquville, 2000).*
6. **Pluralism and Political Competition:** *Political pluralism is a fundamental aspect of democracy, as it encourages the presence and free competition of diverse political parties, groups, and perspectives. This competitive atmosphere fosters a vibrant and transparent political sphere, where different ideas and policy alternatives can be openly debated and rigorously evaluated (Dahl, 1971).*
7. **Accountability and Transparency:** *Democratic systems prioritize accountability and transparency, where elected representatives and government officials are held responsible for their actions and decisions by the public.*

*Transparency in governance guarantees that information is readily available to the citizens, fostering trust and empowering individuals to demand accountability from their leaders (Fung, 2007; Tilly, 2007).*

These fundamental principles are integral to the functionality and legitimacy of democratic systems. It is noteworthy that the application and interpretation of these principles can vary across different democratic societies, reflecting the unique cultural, historical, and institutional settings of each.

**ii. Democratic Governance:** *An inquiry into the nature and dynamics of 'democratic governance' should logically begin with addressing a prerequisite question: "what exactly is governance?" Without a clear understanding of the concept of governance, any attempt to expound upon the nature of democratic governance would be inherently vague and ambiguous. The concept of governance is one that holds diverse connotations and interpretations. It is commonly employed to describe the manner in which a government fulfills its responsibilities and commitments.*

*Governance is perceived as the mechanism through which a state and its citizens are guided towards achieving common objectives. It highlights the intricate yet challenging and occasionally conflicting interaction between the government and society (Alcantara, 1998; in Okoroafor, 2010).*

*The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2000) defines governance as a dynamic process involving the interaction between those in power and the established norms within a political community. This concept comprises the formulation and implementation of rules and standards, the effective management of governing structures, and the overall outcomes and achievements resulting from the social contract among the community members.*

The United Nations Development Programme (1997) views governance as: the

totality of the exercise of authority in the management of a country's affairs, comprising of the complex mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, and mediate their differences. It encompasses the political, economic, legal, judicial, social and administrative authority and therefore includes government, the private sector and the civil society. Governance therefore, entails the procedures, frameworks, and organizations that facilitate the exercise and execution of power, authority, and decision-making. It encompasses the mechanisms and protocols by which societies and organizations are directed, managed, and overseen (Easton, 1953; Bevir, 2012).

From the foregoing analysis on the concepts of democracy and governance, the concept of democratic governance is probably already clear. Democratic governance simply pertains to the application of democratic principles and practices in the processes of governance. It involves the fusion of democratic ideals and mechanisms to guarantee that power is exercised in a manner that is accountable, transparent, participatory, and inclusive (Fung, 2007). At its core, democratic governance is guided by the principles of popular sovereignty, political equality, rule of law, protection of rights and liberties, and accountability. These principles shape the decision-making processes, structures, and institutions within a democratic system (Dahl, 1971; Rawls, 1971). The aim of democratic governance, therefore, is to engage majority of the citizenry in national projects, which involve policymaking, rule enforcement, rule adjudication and collaborative efforts at development.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework for this study is premised on Relative Deprivation Theory. The theory was first articulated by Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues to explain series of

unexpected relationships between feelings of satisfaction and ones position in the army. It was Ted Robert Gurr, Walter Garry Runciman and Abraham Miller who popularize the theory. Gurr, a prominent contributor to the relative deprivation theory saw relative deprivation as the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction, and this disposes men to agitation and later violence. Gurr's definition explains the difference between what people ought to get or their value expectation and what they actually get and so, they are likely to agitate and then revolt when their expectations are not met. This is as a result of the fact that there are other persons who have what they are entitled to and they know getting what they want is realistic and this can only be gotten with employment or use of violence. This is also reflected in Runciman's four preconditions of relative deprivation (of object X by person A):

- i. Person A does not have X
- ii. Person A knows of other persons who have X
- iii. Person A wants to have X
- iv. (therefore) Person A believes that obtaining X is realistic

For Abraham Miller (1971), the theory of relative deprivation is a comprehensive framework in the field of social sciences that aims to explain the complex connection between individuals' perception of being at a relative disadvantage and their inclination to participate in collective protests or rebellions (Crosby, 1976; Walker & Smith, 2002). Essentially, this theory suggests that when individuals or groups perceive a significant disparity between their own circumstances and those of others they compare themselves to, it generates a feeling of relative deprivation, which can act as a potent catalyst for collective action (Runciman, 1966; Smith et al., 2012).

By integrating insights from sociology, psychology, and political science, relative deprivation theory investigates the underlying

cognitive, emotional, and behavioral processes involved in this phenomenon (Crosby, 1976; Smith, 2000). It acknowledges that relative deprivation is not solely determined by objective measurements of resources or achievements, but rather, it is shaped by individuals' subjective interpretations and evaluations of their own circumstances in relation to others (Walker & Smith, 2002).

At the core of this theory is the idea of social comparison, which suggests that people naturally tend to evaluate themselves by comparing their own qualities, accomplishments, and material wealth to those of others (Festinger, 1954; Suls & Wheeler, 2000). These comparisons can take place in different aspects, such as income, education, occupation, or social status. By engaging in this process, individuals determine their relative position in society, forming a perception of their own value and position through these comparative assessments (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

The theory acknowledges that relative deprivation functions on multiple levels of analysis, encompassing both individual and group dynamics (Crosby, 1976; Smith, 2000). At the individual level, it underscores how the perception of being deprived compared to others can impact an individual's emotions, attitudes, and behaviors (Smith et al., 2012). Negative emotions such as resentment, frustration, and anger can surface when individuals perceive a significant gap between their own circumstances and those of their reference group (Crosby, 1976; Smith et al., 2012). These emotional responses, in turn, can ignite a desire for social change and motivate individuals to engage in collective action to address perceived injustices (Walker & Smith, 2002).

Furthermore, the theory of relative deprivation highlights the importance of collective identities and group dynamics in comprehending how individuals come together (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It acknowledges that individuals frequently associate themselves with a specific group or category, whether it be a social class, ethnic group, or political movement

(Simon, 1995). When individuals view their relative disadvantage as a shared experience within their reference group, they form a collective identity that reinforces their dedication to collective action (Simon, 1995). This collective identification nurtures a feeling of unity and common goal, motivating individuals to mobilize and challenge the existing state of affairs (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

### **Basic Assumptions of the Relative Deprivation Theory**

The relative deprivation theory is based on a set of core assumptions that form the basis of its framework and offer valuable insights into the dynamics of collective action and social change (Walker & Smith, 2002).

1. **Social Comparison:** The theory acknowledges the significance of social comparison processes in the formation of relative deprivation (Festinger, 1954). Individuals have a natural tendency to evaluate themselves by comparing their attributes, achievements, and material well-being to those of others (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007). These social comparisons occur across various dimensions, such as income, education, occupation, or social status, and shape individuals' perceptions of relative disadvantage.
2. **Emotional Responses:** The theory acknowledges that the feeling of relative deprivation can trigger adverse emotions like resentment, frustration, and anger (Crosby, 1976). When individuals perceive a substantial disparity between their own situation and that of their reference group, these emotions can emerge due to the perceived injustice or unfairness of the situation (Smith et al., 2012).
3. **Subjective Perception:** The theory posits that relative deprivation is shaped not only by objective measurements of resources or accomplishments, but also by individuals' subjective interpretations and evaluations of their own circumstances in relation to others (Walker & Smith, 2002). People assess their own conditions and

compare them to those of others, resulting in a perception of relative disadvantage (Crosby, 1976).

4. **Collective Identity and Group Processes:** The theory of relative deprivation highlights the importance of collective identities and group dynamics in motivating individuals to take action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When individuals believe that their relative disadvantage is experienced by others in their reference group, they form a collective identity that enhances their dedication to working together (Simon, 1995). This shared identification promotes unity and a common goal, inspiring individuals to organize and confront the existing social order.
5. **Contextual Factors:** The theory recognizes that the probability of collective action is impacted by the social, political, and economic circumstances in which individuals are situated (Walker & Smith, 2002). Various elements, including social norms, political opportunities, institutional arrangements, and historical legacies, interact with relative deprivation to shape the potential for mobilization and the approaches utilized in collective action (McAdam et al., 2001).

Deduced from the above, relative deprivation essentially means the feeling of been deprived of what one feels entitled to. The agitation for food security, poverty eradication, improvement of standard of living and the concomitant individual or group violence, robbery, kidnapping, cultism, etc., which follows are quintessential cases. The extent of relative poverty, inequality, and food insecurity and the gargantuan individual and group problems resulting thereof in Nigeria have led several scholars to argue that the rationale behind the high level of insecurity in Nigeria could be traced to poverty and other factors relating to unhealthy standard of living and unstable economy. The situation of relative deprivation has led some parts of the

country to graduate from peaceful agitation to violent ones, in an attempt to ensure good standard of living for its people.

Food insecurity and lack of amenities for improved standard of living has created a divide in the country, where in an attempt to survive, some regions resort to claiming ownership and control of resources endowed in their areas. It has been argued rationally that if the reverse was the case, where there is a stable economic progress with good living standard and adequate food, there will be little or no need for resource control agitations in any part of the country, as it was in the early Nigeria. Therefore, food insecurity and poverty are issues that require urgent attention.

#### **The Environment of Democratic Governance in Nigeria**

The democratic governance in Nigeria elicits a variety of responses, with some groups praising it while others condemn it. These reactions highlight the presence of opposing forces in all aspects of life, influencing human behavior and actions. The ruling class in Nigeria often supports a system that benefits them personally, even if it comes at the expense of the public good. On the other hand, the general public, who bear the brunt of poor leadership and misplaced priorities, tend to criticize the system due to recurring violence, violations of rights, and lack of essential resources. Ultimately, the public is disproportionately affected by crumbling infrastructure and suffers the consequences of systemic failures and corruption.

By implication, in order to achieve good governance within a democratic system, transparency, accountability, respect for human rights, and adherence to the rule of law are essential. However, these elements are notably lacking in the Nigerian context. When there is a consistent commitment to the fundamental principles of democracy, it serves as evidence of a genuine dedication to democratic ideals (Okibe, 2017a). Various studies and works by scholars and democracy

practitioners have highlighted the attributes and sub-attributes of democratic practice. These attributes encompass representative government, protection of fundamental rights, government oversight, fair administration, and active citizen engagement (Behrend & Whitehead 2016; Chou et al., 2017; Okibe, 2017b; Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017).

The characteristics of democracy and the sub-characteristics of democratic practice reveal a significant disparity with the African system, particularly in Nigeria. In this country, the application of democratic principles deviates greatly from the established standards of democracy. Despite their interdependence in ensuring effective governance within a political system, the assumption of democratic governance in developing political systems is often taken for granted solely due to the democratic label attached to the system. Consequently, this leads to substantial gaps in the implementation of true democratic practices. These gaps can be attributed to either a deliberate disregard for democratic principles or the intricate complexities arising from the diverse cultural backgrounds of the individuals exposed to the system (Okibe, 2017a).

The deliberate relegation of democratic principles occurs when the ruling class intentionally disregards the rules of engagement by engaging in conspiracies and corrupt practices, without any sense of accountability. As a result, they promote policies that undermine justice, fairness, transparency, and the rule of law. The complex background, which is shaped by dissonant cultural diversity, gives rise to primitive considerations such as nepotism, mediocrity, cronyism, opacity, ethnicity, and religious sentiment in democratic governance (Okibe, 2017a). These contradictions are clearly evident in the African model of democratic practice, which unfortunately receives undeserved hypocritical admiration. This is particularly true in Nigeria, where the aforementioned factors play a decisive role in the hands of political leaders, leading to

governance that is biased towards ethno-religious influences and corruption.

### **Democratic Governance and Food Security: A nexus**

*In this section, we provided a discourse on the nexus between democratic governance and food security. We attempted to show that democratic governance, most times referred to as good governance can engender food security and that; therefore, the prevalence of food insecurity in any society may as well be traceable to bad governance. The purpose of this section is to lay a foundational groundwork for our next discussion: Food Insecurity in Nigeria: An Antithesis to Democratic Governance.*

*The ongoing deterioration of global food supplies and nutrition security is a major threat to national and international peace and security. The uneven distribution of food availability, particularly in parts of the developing world, is a cause for alarm. An estimated 852 million individuals in developing countries suffer from chronic food deprivation, in addition to 16 million people in developed countries and transition economies (FAO, 2012, cited in Sunday & Joseph, 2015). This highlights the urgent need for policymakers worldwide to tackle food security as a critical global challenge.*

*The recent surge in food prices on a global scale demands serious contemplation. The deteriorating food crisis worldwide over the last 40 years signals a potential disaster. This pressing matter has become a focal point for world leaders, heightening concerns about the world's capacity to provide for its 7 billion plus population. The implication of this unprecedented situation is that the rise in food prices will result in heightened food insecurity and widespread food crises in numerous developing nations, seriously posing a threat to democratic governance (Eme, et. al., 2014).*

*Since the early 1990s, the concept of good governance has gained significant importance in international development discussions and*



*policy conversations. In recent decades, the growing body of indicators and research has consistently supported the notion that good governance is crucial for sustainable growth and development, especially in developing nations. It has been suggested that addressing the ongoing issue of food insecurity in these countries, largely stemming from poverty, power dynamics, and inequality, requires effective governance (Sunday & Joseph, 2015).*

### **Food Insecurity: An Antithesis to Democratic Governance in Nigeria**

Democracy, or the concept of democratic governance, is built upon the principle of maximizing the happiness of the majority. In essence, it is a social agreement that protects the interests of the majority through proper representation and comprehensive security measures. Democratic governance assures individuals of good governance by devising and implementing favorable policies that enhance their well-being, including ensuring unhindered availability and accessibility of food. Undoubtedly, food availability stands as the most significant advantage of democracy that should never be underestimated, as hunger can drive individuals towards engaging in various forms of social misconduct.

As pointed out by Eni (2012), when a government imports goods, it simultaneously creates employment opportunities for the countries involved in exporting those goods. This practice also contributes to the promotion of good governance and the reduction of political instability, as idleness can lead to undesirable outcomes. The issue of food insecurity in Nigeria is directly associated with poverty. Therefore, in order to ensure the continuous existence and sustainability of democratic rule in Nigeria, it is essential to implement not only poverty alleviation programs, but also well-formulated and effectively implemented agricultural policies to achieve food security. Furthermore, addressing food availability, accessibility, and

adequacy for all is crucial in finding a comprehensive solution.

### **Dilemma of Food Insecurity on Democratic Governance in Nigeria**

The proverbial saying "a hungry man is an angry man" finds resonance in Akinola's (2009) assertion that a hungry dog is an angry dog. Both statements highlight the notion that food insecurity serves as a fundamental cause for various other forms of insecurity. In other words, it is crucial to recognize that deprivation, whether it be economic or political, contributes to social crises worldwide, as the absence of food fosters nonconformist behavior in individuals.

Despite numerous assurances made by political leaders, the ordinary citizen in Nigeria faces a life of deprivation and scarcity, struggling to find enough food to sustain themselves. In such circumstances, it becomes imperative for people to react or engage in civil disobedience. When individuals perceive that their relative disadvantage is shared by others within the same reference group, they develop a collective identity that strengthens their commitment to collaborate. This sense of shared identification fosters unity and a shared vision, motivating individuals to mobilize and challenge the prevailing social structure (Simon, 1995).

During the peak of the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in widespread hunger and suffering across numerous nations, instead of distributing the relief materials as intended, the designated leaders selfishly kept them for undisclosed reasons. This led to widespread protests and chaos, with many hoodlums, commonly known as area boys, transforming into tools of chaos and vandalism for corrupt politicians in their desperate pursuit of survival by compromising their moral principles for financial gain.

Furthermore, the theory of relative deprivation posits that the absence or insufficiency of resources, as well as the disparity between individuals' expectations and their actual circumstances, often results in feelings of anger and resentment. It is evident that the scarcity of food in Nigeria is fueling the resentment of its

citizens towards the government on a daily basis. Presently, in light of this deep-seated bitterness towards the government caused by food insecurity, the concept of democracy holds no significance; individuals are not concerned with the type of governing system in place, but rather with who or what is providing them with sustenance. The central contention is that there exists a discrepancy between the expectations of a democratic government and the actual provisions made by the leadership for its people. The truth of the matter is that individuals perceive a sense of deprivation in terms of food availability and accessibility, leading them to engage in acts of civil disobedience and violence against the state.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

*The purpose of this paper was to draw attention to the implications of the increasing food insecurity in Nigeria on the functioning of democratic governance. To put it another way, the main argument is that when confronted with acute food shortages and challenging economic conditions, democratic governance seems to lose its significance to the citizens. As a result, civil obedience and national loyalty are put at risk. There are five essential elements that are indispensable for any community to be considered democratic. These elements include, but are not limited to, equality, the sovereignty of the people, respect for human life, provision of welfare, and adherence to the rule of law and individual liberty. However, these aforementioned elements represent the ideals of democracy that can be embraced and strengthened by a determined populace over a relatively long period of time (Enemu, 1999).*

Nigeria, endowed with rich agro-ecological resources and diversity, has unfortunately emerged as one of the primary food importers in sub-Saharan Africa. This trend is likely attributed to poor leadership. It is imperative for the Nigerian government to prioritize food security as a key objective to demonstrate a commitment to democratic governance. Without well-formulated and effectively implemented agricultural and food policies,

sustainable democracy may be challenging to achieve. The state's economic viability is closely tied to its ability to meet the material needs of its people and government. As Daniel Wit (1953 cited in Ojo & Adebayo, 2012) aptly stated, "welfare represents a crucial objective of modern government." Any government, regardless of its political system, that fails to ensure its citizens are well-fed will inevitably face difficulties.

In order to curb the menace of food insecurity and the potential, catastrophic effect in Nigerian democracy, it is recommended that stakeholders at all levels should formulate and execute sustainable food security policies aimed at promoting food availability, accessibility, and adequacy for all. Also, the government should monitor prices of food stuff to reduce unnecessary hike. Furthermore, it is necessary for the government to honestly invest in agriculture and ensure transparency in all agricultural schemes sponsored by the government. Finally, government at all levels should make efforts to ensure the safety and protection of farmers.

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Joel Emmanuel<sup>1</sup>

Josephine Japheth Wubon<sup>2</sup>

Wunuji Emmanuel<sup>3</sup>

Ndigefa Ernest Johnson<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Economics, Federal University Wukari, Nigeria

Email: *mungalelau86@gmail.com*

<sup>2</sup>Department of Economics, Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria

Email: *joybt.2014@gmail.com*

<sup>3&4</sup>Department of Economics, Federal University Wukari, Nigeria

Email: *emmatsken@yahoo.com, ndigefaernestjohnson@gmail.com*



### Abstract

The objective of this research is to investigate the role of empowering women in the economic development of a nation. The study employed secondary research and data from the World Development Indicator (WDI) from 1986 to 2022 on Nigeria. The study was underpinned by the Schumpeter's theory of economic development and the Esteve-Volart's Model which explained the importance of gender equality on economic growth. The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing was used to examine the relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Pesaran et al., 2001). Findings revealed that empowering women is inversely related to economic development. Labor force participation rate of female (LFMPR) a proxy for women participation in the labour force shows that there is a significant positive relation between women participation in the labour force and the level of economic development proxied by GDPPC in Nigeria. women's secondary school enrolment impacts on economic development significantly but negatively. Recommendations include that government should provide enabling environment that will encourage investment in women empowerment as well as provide incentives to stakeholders in the pursuit for more quality lives for women. The incentives include education, skills acquisition and employment opportunities for women. Economic reforms must target macro-economic stability, removal of structural distortion and creation of women-friendly environment for enhancing greater investment in the lives of women. The study is limited since it cannot be generalized to all countries or economies due to peculiarities inherent in the Nigerian economy making certain indices to work differently if applied to other countries.

**Keywords:** Gender equality, women empowerment, labour force, economic development

### Introduction

Women's empowerment is crucial for achieving sustainable development and promoting universal human rights (Srivastava, 2009). Empowerment was perceived as a means to pursue transformation in their socio-economic standing. It is widely believed by nations and individuals that the development of a society is contingent upon the inclusion of women, who play a crucial role in society.

Empowering women has a positive impact on families and future generations. This is because it provides women with greater access to economic opportunities, productive resources, financial prospects, assets, wealth, skill development, and market knowledge (Rani, 2014; Jagtap, 2021). Economic independence refers to a woman's ability to have control over economic decision-making

and effectively carry out those decisions for her personal growth.

Moreover, women have a crucial impact on the economic advancement of their families and communities. Nevertheless, when compared to men, women face a disproportionate number of obstacles, including low-income homes, poverty, unemployment, insufficient training, and discrimination. Nigeria has witnessed numerous programmes and activities aimed at enhancing the empowerment of women, although there has been minimal discernible effect on the actual empowerment of women. The Pat Utomi widow support initiative, started in 1992, aims to provide assistance to women in alleviating poverty and addressing various issues they face following the death of their husbands. In 2013, Intels, an oil and gas corporation in Nigeria, started the Women Empowerment project and Scheme Synergy (WEPSS) with the aim of empowering rural women. This project offers a twenty-year training plan in fashion design and tailoring. Women for Women International Assists Nigerian women in developing their expertise in various fields such as agriculture, animal husbandry, knitting, petty trading, poultry, and small and medium enterprises.

Additional organisations that focus on women's development include the Women Development International Association (WODIA), which aims to enhance women's overall well-being by providing improved healthcare services, facilitating access to small-scale business loans, and creating employment opportunities for sex workers. Another organisation is the Girls Power Initiative, established in 1993 in Calabar Cross Rivers State. Its mission is to support adolescent girls in Nigeria by equipping them with the necessary skills, information, and opportunities to become fulfilled young women through research, education, and action. WODIA is operational in Benin City, Edo State, where numerous initiatives against female genital mutilation and business training have been conducted.

Kanagavalli (2012) argues that there is a significant link between the empowerment of women and the progress of the economy. Development programmes are believed to have the capacity to significantly diminish gender imbalance by fostering economic growth. On the other hand, enabling women can also contribute to the progress of general development. Kanagavalli (2012) asserts that the connections between empowerment and development are tenuous and susceptible to rupture independently. Therefore, it is imperative for policies to demonstrate a strong dedication to attaining gender equality both as an objective in itself and to bridge the disparity between males and females. Ensuring the participation of women is a crucial component of economic progress, which is a basic element of long-term and environmentally-friendly development (Solomon and Memar, 2014; OECD 2008).

Nigeria is experiencing rapid economic growth and is among the fastest-growing economies globally. However, similar to numerous developing nations, it is imperative to effectively employ the women's labour force. Although the government has made targeted changes, there is still a need for significant growth in the economic possibilities and engagement of women in Nigeria. The exclusion of women from the formal employment sector in male-oriented development programmes leads to their confinement to unpaid and burdensome household chores (Solomon and Memar, 2014).

Furthermore, it is crucial to ensure that women have sufficient access to training, extension and credit services, financial support, and current technology (Uzoamaka et al. 2016). Moreover, numerous female entrepreneurs in underdeveloped nations, particularly Nigeria, encounter significant barriers as a result of limited mobility, capability, and technical expertise, leading to instances of prejudice, adversity, and marginalisation (Uzoamaka et al., 2016). Moreover, it is imperative to provide them

with increased educational opportunities in order to enable their inclusion in employment opportunities that demand diverse skills and qualifications. These factors result in women adopting a passive role as spectators in the country's economic sector.

Furthermore, it is important to highlight that women make up a substantial majority, precisely 70%, of the underprivileged population worldwide. In 2008, the OECD brought attention to this inequality. The presence of unequal economic possibilities is the cause. Recognising and valuing women's work is essential in addressing their socioeconomic disadvantage and empowering them to actively contribute to national economic growth. The importance of this issue cannot be exaggerated, and all endeavours in this direction should be actively encouraged.

Poverty is defined by a lack of basic necessities such as education, food, proper nutrition, housing, and access to critical social services like primary education, healthcare, clean water, and sanitation. Based on the data from the National Bureau of Statistics in 2019, the poverty rate is alarmingly high, with a national average of 40.1%. Women in Nigeria experience significant deprivation, with women making up more than 60% of the country's lowest population. This has highlighted the worsening poverty condition within households, which has further deepened the gender disparity. Due to the gender disparity in the overall labour force, the contribution of women to the workforce in Nigeria is comparatively minimal in comparison to men. In 2020, precisely 40.5% (equivalent to 12.2 million) of women in the overall female workforce were engaged in full-time employment. In the same year, a total of 18.3 million males, or 46.3% of the male labour force, secured full-time employment.

Consequently, there is a disparity of approximately 6% between the genders in the nation's labour market, exacerbating the financial hardships faced by women. The elevated poverty rate among women is a

consequence of various restraints, such as socio-cultural, political, legal, and economic factors, that limit the opportunity for women to achieve economic empowerment. These limitations have a substantial impact on the extent and locations in which women can engage in economic endeavours, encompassing both the official and unofficial sectors. UNESCO (2015) reports that the education standard in Nigeria is abysmal. The country is ranked 103rd out of 113 countries worldwide. The absence of government dedication and insufficient allocation of funds to the education sector negatively impact the education of girls. The latest data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2021) reveals that the percentage of women enrolled in adult/basic literacy education saw fluctuations over the years. In 2016, the enrolment rate was 48.49 percent, which declined to 45.57 percent in 2017. However, it rebounded to 50.48 percent in 2018, only to slightly decline to 49.19 percent in 2019. The proportion of girls who have successfully finished their primary school is approximately 66%, whilst the corresponding figure for boys exceeds 80%. The out-of-school rate for girls is 32%, which is higher than the rate of 28% for boys (World Bank/IBRD/IFC 2018). Research indicates that women make up a substantial share of the severely destitute population. This is mostly because they face social barriers that hinder their ability to access economic resources such as skills, property, and credit. As a result, these obstacles pose significant difficulties for women in their attempts to reduce poverty. Individuals face an increased vulnerability to poverty when they meet the absence of the primary earner in their family due to abandonment, divorce, or death. The enduring presence of gender disparities in employment, income opportunities, education, and asset management suggests that development measures predominantly favour men (GSMA Connected Women, 2015).

This research project will undoubtedly be highly significant as it contributes to the

literature on women's empowerment, economic empowerment, and economic growth and development in Nigeria. This study would help the government and policymakers regarding the policies that will influence the inclusion of women in governance, reduce or eliminate women's dependency, widen their life choices, and provide them with opportunities to make progress.

This research will provide a basis for further study and serve as a reference tool for the researchers who consult this work. This study will serve as a source of knowledge for whoever flips through the pages of the work.

This research covers a period from 1986 to 2022, employing secondary time series data from the WDI on female labour participation, women empowerment, economic growth and development and other control variables in Nigeria. The secondary data will be obtained from the existing literature and the World Data Indicator (WDI) for data analysis and reporting. The study is intended to be a case study of the Nigerian economy.

### **Conceptualizing Women's Empowerment**

As stated by Bhoganadam, et al. (2014), Women's Empowerment refers to the ability of women to control and influence their actions in the external sphere, encompassing social, political, and economic aspects. Women's empowerment is a recent stage in the progress of economic growth. Enhancing women's empowerment has a profound impact on economic development. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the 2000s have established the empowerment of women and the promotion of gender equality as crucial global development endeavors. The empowerment and autonomy of women are essential factors in promoting their progress (Fox and Romero 2017).

The purpose of women's empowerment is now universally acknowledged to have social, moral, political, and economic advantages. Most governments of the globe have officially committed to advance the agenda of the

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by enacting non-discriminatory laws and promoting changes in behaviour that impact economic opportunities and results. Many countries assess the absence of empowerment for women by examining either the disparity in their involvement in the market (such as occupational or sectoral segregation, or limited access to credit) or the disparity in market outcomes, such as lower pay for women compared to males. However, economic empowerment encompasses a broader range of factors and implications. It also pertains to the financial abilities and actions of women and girls within households, communities, and societies, and it is influenced by the governing structures that oversee these. It encompasses both the actions and aspirations of women. Although the concept of economic empowerment is widely acknowledged, there is a lack of quantitative measures that can be used to compare it within and between countries (Fox and Romero 2017).

There is a significant association between the empowerment of women and economic development. On one side, economic progress has the capacity to substantially diminish gender inequality on its own. Additionally, the empowerment of women can have a favourable impact on the development process (Duflo, 2012). Empirical research indicates that poverty and restricted access to opportunity are factors that contribute to the continuation of gender inequality. Therefore, when economic development aims to reduce poverty, it has two positive effects on women: firstly, as poverty decreases, the general welfare of society, including women, improves; secondly, the decrease in poverty levels leads to a decrease in gender inequality, resulting in a more significant improvement in the situation of women compared to men. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that whereas development endeavors contribute to advancement, they are not enough on their own to attain full gender equality.

Bhoganadam, Malini, and Rao (2014) carried out a research investigation.

### **Empowering women for sustainable development**

Women's empowerment is a dynamic process that involves recognizing and addressing existing gender disparities that put women at a disadvantage. This is a crucial aspect to consider. It is crucial to engage women directly in order to gain a deeper understanding of their needs and concerns. Furthermore, building upon this analysis grounded in data, essential measures are implemented to establish a secure, equitable, and empowering atmosphere. These measures involve the implementation of specific legislation as well as the integration of gender considerations into various aspects of society. Furthermore, in order to actively promote sustainable development, it is imperative that women are empowered to become catalysts for change. Consequently, the development of their skills and capabilities is of utmost importance. Ultimately, it is crucial to ensure that women are included in all aspects of activity and decision-making, at every level. The complete and equitable participation of women is absolutely necessary. Sustainable development spans the socio-cultural, economic, and environmental aspects, making it a comprehensive and expansive field. Up to this point, gender issues have predominantly been addressed as a matter pertaining to society. This is evident in the domains of poverty alleviation, education, and healthcare as outlined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This endeavor is to emphasize the instances of the economic and environmental aspects of sustainable development (Warth and Koparanova 2012).

### **Women's empowerment and gender equality**

As numerous studies have shown, gender equality and women's empowerment are prerequisites for attaining sustainable development. Gender equality is claimed to be

a human right as well as a prerequisite for and indicator of sustainable development, according to Alvarez and Lopez (2013). In addition, it is commonly known that gender disparity is pervasive throughout the world's cultures. It is stated that sustainable development would not be possible unless considerable steps were taken to solve this problem (Stevens, 2010). Furthermore, UN Women (2014) correctly underlined that achieving gender equality is crucial for creating a just and lasting world as well as for empowering women to sustain their families and communities. On the other hand, a lack of gender equality will inhibit international development. According to Stevens (2010), an increasing amount of data indicates that gender disparities have substantial economic ramifications and also play a role in social inequities and environmental degradation on a worldwide scale. From these explanations, it follows that all of the previously described components of sustainable development can be achieved by guaranteeing women's fair participation in all project aspects. However, there are still persistent and pervasive gender differences in the areas of the economy, society, and environment (UN Women, 2014).

### **Economic Empowerment**

The UN's international publications on women in the 1990s signalled the initial stages of the development of empowerment. The organisations and individuals involved in women's issues and development were widely spread out. The objective of women's economic empowerment is to provide possibilities and choices, enabling them to actively engage in decision-making processes. For women to fully engage, they must enhance their personal growth and cultivate their abilities and potential to assume influential roles that can bring about societal transformation. This power emanates from one's aptitudes, expertise, and confidence. They opt to work inside the framework



established by the organisation rather than pursuing independent action (Klaa 2020).

Empowerment refers to the fundamental understanding of one's inherent skills and the resources and strategies necessary to harness and capitalize on them. Empowerment is the act of providing marginalized groups with essential opportunities, either directly or indirectly. This involves countering any efforts to reject or resist these opportunities. To address the power imbalance between men and women, we aim to enhance women's self-sufficiency and bolster their internal capabilities through activities that raise awareness and build capacity. This will result in increased participation in decision-making processes and greater control over their lives, ultimately leading to transformative change. Our focus is particularly on promoting the economic empowerment of women. The process of recovering from low-paid work and achieving gender equality in employment, compensation, and diverse economic possibilities (Kamruzzaman 2020).

Empowerment helps people and groups use their creativity and productivity to improve their lives. Empowerment extends beyond democracy, human rights, and participation to help people understand their social, economic, political, and cultural surroundings and improve their quality of life. As empowerment became more popular, women began to recognize a development strategy that stressed their active and constructive participation in the development process without societal support. Women must be mobilized to become a powerful political force that can change the world (Klaa 2020).

The African Union proclaimed "2016: African Year of Human Rights, with a specific emphasis on women's rights" during its annual summit in Addis Ababa and Maqali in 2016. The Union highlighted the economic empowerment of women as the primary catalyst for speeding development in underdeveloped nations. Secondly, the focus

is on the social and economic condition of African women, as well as their vulnerability to economic insecurity. African women constitute around 50% or more of the population of Africa. According to figures from the Africa Union in 2020, African women are found to have the lowest levels of education and are the most challenging to provide assistance to, particularly when it comes to children. Factors such as divorce or abandonment. African women experience significant economic vulnerability. This leads to economic deprivation and unemployment. Africa possesses significant wealth, however a staggering 59% of its population resides in a state of poverty. 37 nations, including 21 African countries, are experiencing food insecurity. According to the Africa Union in 2020, due to the fact that half of Africa's population consists of females, more than half of the women in Africa are living in poverty.

### **Challenges of Women Empowerment in Nigeria**

The efforts of the government and other stakeholders, including multilateral organisations and non-governmental agencies, to empower women in Nigeria have not met expectations due to several circumstances (Eze 2023). The first aspect pertains to the limited definition or understanding of women empowerment. Government officials and politicians frequently conflate women's empowerment with poverty reduction measures. This pertains to the act of providing women with nominal amounts of money or assisting them in establishing small-scale businesses under the guise of empowerment (Uzuegbunam 2013).

Egwurube (2022) listed legal, economic, political, and socio-cultural obstacles as hindrances to the achievement of genuine women empowerment in Nigeria. The author provided an example from the Nigerian Police Regulations, which states that unmarried female police officers who become pregnant must be expelled from the Force and are not allowed to re-join without the approval of the

Inspector-General of Police. Additionally, female police officers who desire to marry must seek permission to do so and can only proceed with marriage if granted permission. Nigerian women are impacted by gender discriminatory laws in this particular region. In addition to this, there is the socio-cultural issue of women being perceived as subordinate to men. Women in certain states are subjected to being seen as their husbands' possessions and are hindered from amassing riches (Itua, 2021).

### **Empowerment of Women Empowers the Nation**

Women who are empowered contribute to the advancement of both their families and society. In order to achieve sustainable development, it is imperative to empower women as advocates for natural resources and as contributors to socio-economic progress (Saifullah 2019). The concept of empowering women is based on the human capability approach, which allows individuals to determine their own area of expertise where they can feel most important. No single entity, whether it be governments, private corporations, NGOs, or civil society, can achieve success on its own. Sustainability encompasses the concept of a globally interconnected world. Sustainability endeavours require the collaboration of multiple entities. Given that women constitute 50% of the global population, their contribution to achieving sustainability goals is of utmost importance (Eze 2023).

### **Educationally Empowered Women Leads to an Educated Nation**

It is essential to have women who are empowered in education worldwide in order to create a highly educated nation and ensure a secure future. Women are the prospective progenitors of any nation. The education that a female acquires is more likely to priorities education for her future children. This leads to a cascading impact of positive transformation in both the community and the nation. "The world's ability to achieve all of its goals will be

hindered if half of its population is unable to reach their maximum potential." "By harnessing the potential of women, we can ensure a prosperous future for everyone," stated former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. If a family or society provides adequate support to enhance the capabilities of a female by investing in her education, health, financial resources, security, and overall social development, that empowered and resilient woman contributes to the nation by promoting high fertility rates, effectively managing population growth, reducing infant and child mortality, improving family well-being, and fostering an educated society. This is finally combined with improvements in women's involvement in sustainable social development.

### **Empowered Women Foster the progress of Family/Society**

Hendricks (2019) argues that the financial independence of women is now seen as an essential requirement for a country's progress. Hence, the issue of women's financial empowerment holds paramount importance for social scientists, political leaders, and reformers. The economic empowerment of women has resulted in the advancement of family and community by ensuring that women have equal access to education, resources, and financial prosperity. This allows women to utilise their creativity, skills, and resolve for the betterment of their families and communities. Ensuring the inclusion of all citizens, particularly women, in development is a commendable objective, and the advantages of doing so have been extensively established. Women's financial empowerment refers to the attainment of equal rights and control over economic resources, enabling women to exert amplified influence over various aspects of their lives. Women's economic security and the growth of individual and household economies depend on their ability to access and control physical and financial assets and possessions.

### **Empowered Women Ensures Global Sustainable Development**

Studies indicate a strong correlation between environmental sustainability and women's empowerment in the context of global sustainable development. Women are responsible for the management and supervision of all significant natural resources and have the power to bring about transformation. Women have a vital role in promoting environmental conservation and long-term viability. Women often depend directly on natural resources and efficiently manage them through unpaid labour to provide fuel, housing, food, and water for their families. Women bear an unequal share of unpaid work and unacknowledged contributions, which hinders their capacity to advocate for the empowerment of women in sustainable development. Gender equality is the primary determinant of country development. The predominant tradition in underdeveloped civilizations was the confinement of women to domestic spaces, where they were expected to perform menial duties and submit to men as if they were divine beings. Nevertheless, there is a shift occurring in worldwide gender norms. Gender norms undergo ongoing debates, distortions, and modifications, but they are not entirely revolutionised. These women have elevated family earnings, earned recognition for their technological expertise, and established the acceptance of women's employment in corporate sectors, business centres, and traditionally male-dominated offices. Global initiatives for gender equality aim to emphasise unjust gender stereotypes that restrict the opportunities of women, men, transgender individuals, and intersex individuals. The problem is of a global nature. Genuine exemplars of gender equality do not exist.

### **Empowered Women Ensures Global Gender Equality**

Woman empowerment requires property and land rights, which empower entire communities. Land rights provide people significant power and change their cognition and social dynamics. Being a scarce natural

resource, land's importance in human activities, power dynamics, and ability to offer income, security, status, and recognition make it important as property.

The Sustainable Development Goals increasingly identify the global gender wage gap as a major obstacle to women's empowerment. The global gender pay gap leaves women earning 77 cents for every \$1 men earn. The gender gap in lifetime wages leads to more women slipping into poverty. The gender pay gap is difficult to solve. The only way to achieve gender equality is to empower women economically (Hasin et al 2018).

### **Empirical Review**

The research by Uzoamaka, Gerald, and Eze, (2016) examines women empowerment as a panacea for economic development in Nigeria. The study tests the hypothesis that women empowerment has effect on economic growth. Data used for this study were sourced from secondary sources of data. The data were analyzed using econometric methods. The study was conducted using some selected women entrepreneurs registered with National Association of Small-Scale Industries (NASSI) in Enugu State, Nigeria. The study found out that women need education, skills, access to assets/credit, social protection in order to fully develop their productive assets and tackle poverty. The researcher recommended that for women, their families and society to reap the benefits of economic development and poverty reduction; investments in and empowerment of women both economic and socially are inevitable.

Research conducted by Bayeh (2016) in Ethiopia using qualitative method and secondary data analysis revealed the role of empowering women and achieving gender equality in the sustainable development of Ethiopia. findings of the study show that the role of women across different dimensions of sustainable development is less reflected in the country. The use of a women's labour force

in the economic development of the country is minimal. The political sphere of the country is, by and large, reserved for men alone. The place of women in society is also relegated to contributing minimally to the social development of the country. In addition, women's rights are not properly being protected in order for women to participate in various the issues of their country but are subjected to abysmal violations. Moreover, women are highly affected by environmental problems, and less emphasis is given to their participation in protecting the environment. The researcher concluded that unless women are empowered and gender equality is achieved so that women can play their role in economic, social, political, and environmental areas, the country will not achieve sustainable development with the recognition of only men's participation in all these areas. The fact that women constitute half the entire population of the country makes empowering them to be an active part of all development initiatives in the country a compelling circumstance. Hence, this paper calls for the strong commitment of the government to empower women and utilize all the potentials of the country to bring about sustainable development.

On a study covering the African sub region, the paper by Klaa (2020) investigated the issue of African women's role in development and economic life between the reality and challenges, based on some important themes which include: the concepts of development and economic empowerment; the social and economic situation of women in Africa and the state of economic insecurity; the social and economic challenges of women in Africa; and the ways to contribute to improving the socio-economic status of women in Africa and their economic empowerment. Findings revealed that women represent half the population of Africa, and although they are considered internationally as one of the main pillars of economic development, they have suffered from an unjust social heritage in addition to

discriminatory practices both in terms of gender equality and in the market.

Bhoganadam, Malini, and Rao, (2014) reviews the relationship between empowerment and development. Their findings revealed a bidirectional relationship between economic development and women's empowerment. In one direction, development alone can play a major role in driving down inequality between men and women; in the other direction, continuing discrimination against women can, as Sen. has forcefully argued hinder development. Empowerment can, in other words, accelerate development.

Sylvia, C. (2016) investigated whether reliance on women and girls to solve world poverty is an effective means to achieve greater female empowerment and gender equality, or whether, instead, it threatens to lock-down essentializing stereotypes which are unlikely to dismantle gender disparities within and beyond the home. Their findings highlight some key problems and paradoxes in three popular interventions nominally oriented to helping women lift themselves and their households out of poverty: conditional cash transfer programmes, microfinance schemes, and 'investing in girls', as promulgated inter alia by the Nike Foundation's 'Girl Effect'.

Using a critical feminist lens, Kabeer (2020) in this article interrogated the storytelling practices deployed by "randomista" economists through a critical reading of a widely cited essay by Esther Duflo, one of the 2019 Nobel recipients, on the relationship between women's empowerment and economic development. According to Kabeer (2020), the limitations of randomista economics have given rise to a particular way of thinking characterized by piecemeal analysis, ad hoc resort to theory, indifference to history and context, and methodological fundamentalism. The author concluded that the randomista argument that broad-based economic development alone – without focused attention to women's rights – will lead to gender equality has not been borne out by recent data.

Ikechukwu (2013) carried out a study on Social Welfare Analysis of Gender Inequality in Education and Employment. The study analyzed the social welfare effect of gender inequality in human capital development (education and employment) across rural and urban Nigeria. Using Nigeria data set on labour force survey by NBS, gender unemployment by educational level and sector, gender schooling ratio, gender population growth rate and economic active participation by gender. The study found that female unemployment by educational level is predominant in the urban sectors compared to the rural sectors. This was further proved by Olanrewaju and Okoko (2015) in their research on Gender Inequality in Agriculture. They found that gender inequality is high in Agricultural sector and thus, hamper economic growth in Nigeria. They suggested that empowerment of women with needed resources will help to improve the economy. Adeoti and Awoyemi (2006) examined the effect that gender inequality in employment has on productive efficiency for rural cassava farms in southwest Nigeria. Their findings indicate that increased gender inequality decreases productive efficiency.

Risikat (2012) carried out research on Female Education and Economic Performance in Nigeria using the co-integration and error correction techniques for the period 1975-2008. He found that female education does not have any significant impact on real GDP in Nigeria. They emphasized on the need for adequate investment in female education. Anochie et al (2015) holds that the empowerment of women through such things as the promotion of women's rights and an increase in the access of women to resources and education proves to be key to the advancement of economic development.

Choudhry, et al. (2019) conducted a study that investigated the role of socio-cultural factors affecting women economic empowerment in Pakistan. Findings revealed the major socio-cultural factors are educational barriers, decent work and access to property. All

these socio-cultural factors are potential barriers and create hurdles for women to become empowered. Furthermore, the state has failed to promulgate the policies in true letter and spirit. It seems that documenting a women empowerment policy has a state concern but has failed to bring out the oppressed and marginalized group out of oppression.

There exists a gap in terms of empirics, theory and data. The gap relating to empirics is because there is dearth of studies that covers exactly the same period and scope related to Nigeria. So doing this study will help bridge the existing gap as this study will provide with empirical evidence in this area. Secondly, there are theories relating to the topic when concepts are taken separately. However, taking the topic as a whole requires tweaking and combining theories that will help answer the research question. Finally, data covering up to 2022 means that this study will be current and variables are expanded to cover more nuances as relating to topic.

#### **Theoretical Framework: The Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development**

When formulating his theory, Schumpeter differentiates between two categories of economic influences: the first he labels the growth component, which consists of changes in the availability of factors of production; and the second he labels the development component, which encompasses technological and social transformations. Economic growth, according to Schumpeter, is "variations in the sum of savings and accumulation adjusted for the fluctuation in the purchasing power of the monetary unit." As per his assertion, the fluctuations in these two variables are concurrent and gradual. The author observes that development is a unique occurrence that is completely unrelated to the trend towards equilibrium. This phenomenon defies economic explanation (Schumpeter, 1934, as cited in Langroodi, 2021). The growth component, according to Schumpeter,

signifies the impact of alterations in the utilisation of production factors. Given that the supply of land remains constant, the growth component solely accounts for fluctuations in population size and increases in the means of production, which Schumpeter differentiates from capital. Regarding economic change, population expansion is regarded as an external factor in Schumpeter's theory. The rate of population change, according to Schumpeter, is determined by factors external to the system. Similarly, to population expansion, increases in producer products are considered to be a component of economic change that is undergoing growth. An increase in the supply of producer products, according to Schumpeter, is typically contingent on a positive savings flow. Conversely, the rate of savings in an economy seldom experiences sudden increases. Rates of savings growth are gradual and gradual, frequently involving minuscule increments. According to Schumpeter, savings seldom function as an independent variable in the face of change. Profit, according to Schumpeter, is a consequence of the development process. It is entirely eradicated within the cyclical motion of economic existence, as the output's value is precisely equivalent to the productive factors utilised in its production.

An additional determinant that impacts the developmental aspect of economic transformation is the shift in social climate. In regard to social factors, Schumpeter's methodology resembles that of Marxist theory. Due to the fundamental interdependence of economic factors with all other aspects, he argues that economic change cannot be explained solely by previous economic conditions. According to Schumpeter, the economic condition of individuals does not solely result from the economic conditions that came before it, but rather from the entire situation that came before it. Innovation in technology, credit, capital, and entrepreneurship are additional significant determinants of economic development and growth in Schumpeter's framework.

### **The Esteve-Volart's Model**

Esteve-Volart's model as described in Stacey (1993) and emphasised in Dankelman (2003), examined the impact of gender inequality in the presence of both complete (no women as managers) and partial (some women as managers) sex discrimination. The study divided the population into two categories: workers and managers, each with distinct educational requirements. She discovered that growth rates are negatively impacted by partial discrimination, but not by absolute discrimination. Furthermore, her model forecasts that economies characterised by any form of gender-based discrimination will encounter a diminished per capita GDP. Given that no practical economy demonstrates complete gender discrimination, it may be anticipated that nations with higher levels of discrimination against women will experience reduced growth rates and lower per capita GDP. Esteve-Volart's model focuses on discrimination in the workforce. However, she highlights that due to varying education requirements for workers and managers, this type of discrimination can also be observed in educational disparities. Therefore, it is crucial to examine gender differences in education as a significant factor (Esteve-Volart 2004).

### **Research Methodology**

The study used a quantitative research approach to examine the relationship between women empowerment, gender equality and economy growth in the economy of Nigeria. Quantitative method makes use of numerical data which is applied in both statistical and econometrics techniques (Cooper and Schindler, 2014). The data employed in carrying out this study is a time series data. The study also involves a parametric analysis.

The ordinary least square regression analysis shall form the main procedure to be followed in testing our hypotheses in this research (Bryman and Bell 2019).

The main type of data to be used in this study is the secondary data obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank and the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics database. Time series data relating to the dependent and explanatory variables employed for a period covering 1986-2022. The data analysis technique used in this study is the regression approach. The estimation procedure here would be that of unit root test, cointegration test and ordinary least squares regression. This study will employ analytical statistics to examine the variables' trends, flows and relationships.

### Model Specification

The purpose of economic modelling is to accurately depict the phenomenon being

$$GDPPC = f(FEML, FSSE, FPRL, LFM, LFMPR) \dots (1)$$

The model is restated in an econometric form as follows

$$GDP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FEML_t + \beta_2 FSSE_t + \beta_3 FPRL_t + \beta_4 MPRL_t + \beta_5 LFM_t + U_t \dots (2)$$

The model is specified in its log-linear form:

$$\log GDPPC = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log FEML_t + \beta_2 \log FSSE_t + \beta_3 \log FPRL_t + \beta_4 \log MPRL_t + \beta_5 \log LFM_t + U_t \dots (2)$$

Where:

- GDPPC = Gross Domestic Product Per Capita
- FEML = Female Employment level
- FSSE = Female Secondary School Enrolment
- FPRL = Female participation rate in the labour force
- MPRL = Male participation rate in the labour force
- LFM = Total number of males in the labour force
- Log = Natural Logarithm
- B<sub>0</sub> = Constant
- B<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>, and B<sub>3</sub> = Coefficients of the respective variables
- U<sub>t</sub> = Stochastic error term

In this research work, FEML, FSSE, FPRL, LFM and FPRL are considered explanatory variables (independent variables) used to explain the Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPPC). In essence, GDPPC is the dependent variable.

Since the data are time series, we first test for the Stationary of the series using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root test; this is followed by the test for the long-run

studied in a manner that allows the researcher to assign numerical values to the notion. Model specification entails the articulation of the mathematical representation of the relationship between variables. To clarify, the intention is to determine the specific model that will be used to examine the economic phenomenon through empirical analysis (Koutsayianis 1977). The chosen approach will be the classical least squares regression model, utilising the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. This method is selected due to its optimal suitability for evaluating precise hypotheses regarding the nature of economic relationships (Studenmund, 1998). The functional form of the model is formulated below.

relationship amongst the variables using the Bounds test in the case of mixed order of integration of the variables. The variables are tested for individual and joint significance using the t-statistic and F-statistic tests, which follow the Ordinary Least Square Regression model technique. The analysis concludes with the Autocorrelation test of the model's error terms and the Multicollinearity test

### The A’p priori Expectation

The female employment rate and their participation rate in the labour force would positively impact the Nigerian economy's growth. Mathematically, this can be expressed as: For  $H_01$  to  $H_03$ .  $\beta_1... \beta_3 > 0$ .

**Table 3.2: Apriori Expectation Table**

| Variable Type               | Variable Name            | Proxies                                       | Abbreviation | Expected Signs |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|---|--------------|----------------|
| <b>Dependent Variable</b>   | Economic Development     | Gross Domestic Product<br>Per Capita          | GDP          | Positive       |
| <b>Independent Variable</b> | Women education          | Female secondary school enrollment            | FSSE         | Positive       |
| <b>Independent variable</b> | Women empowerment        | Female participation rate in the labour force | FPRL         | Positive       |
| <b>Independent variable</b> | Male empowerment         | Male participation rate in the labour force   | LFMPR        | Positive       |
| <b>Independent variable</b> | Male in the labour force | Total number of males in the labour force     | LFM          | Positive       |

### Estimation Method or Technique

A multivariate regression model examined how independent variables affected the dependent variable. Econometric models were employed to test the established hypotheses. The regression equations will be evaluated using econometric models. Regression equations and various other pre/post-estimation and diagnostic tests will be

examined on the E-views 12 Output. The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing procedure to examine the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The bounds test is basically computed based on an estimated error correction version of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator (Pesaran et. al., 2001).

## Section Four: Data Analysis

### 4.1 Data Analysis

**Table 4.1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics**

| Variable | Obs. | Mean     | Std.     | Max.     | Min.     |
|----------|------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| GDPPC    | 31   | 248700   | 239135.7 | 740432   | 5195.059 |
| PFEM     | 31   | 1.10806  | 0.124165 | 1.310101 | 0.917937 |
| FSSE     | 31   | 15.48314 | 13.46347 | 41.19099 | 0.000000 |
| FLFPR    | 31   | 55.37177 | 2.212831 | 56.92500 | 51.45800 |
| LFMPR    | 31   | 63.39732 | 1.367830 | 65.73400 | 58.97600 |
| LFM      | 31   | 25779158 | 6124226  | 38514548 | 17064637 |

### Source: Authors’ Compilation on EViews 12 Students Version

Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used for study. The mean value of the Gross Domestic Per Capita Income is 248700, the PFEM is 1.10806, FSSE is 15.48314, FLFPR is 55.37177 while LFMPR is 63.39732 and LFM is 25779158. The minimum and maximum value shows the highest and lowest values in

each of the variable dataset as seen on appendix 1. The result indicated that all the variables under study mirrors a normal skewness since the kurtosis values are  $\leq 3$  except for LFMPR that has kurtosis  $> 3$  which implies that the values in each of the variables will have a lower value below the mean.



### Unit Root Test for Stationarity

**Table 4.2: Test for Stationarity Based on Augmented Dickey Fuller**

| Variable | ADF t-statistic | 5% critical value | P-value | Order of Integration |
|----------|-----------------|-------------------|---------|----------------------|
| GDPPC    | -5.372022       | -3.568379         | 0.0007  | I(1)                 |
| PFEM     | -3.288093       | -1.952910         | 0.0019  | I(1)                 |
| FSSE     | -8.011431       | -2.957110         | 0.0000  | I(1)                 |
| LFMPR    | -8.189016       | -2.971853         | 0.0000  | I(0)                 |
| LFM      | -4.058020       | -3.595026         | 0.0192  | I(0)                 |

Source: Authors' Compilation on EViews 12 Students Version

All the variables tested for unit root attained stationarity at first difference with trend and intercept. Table 2 shows that the variable GDPPC was differenced and attained stationarity at the first difference but with intercept. But PFEM and FSSE all attained stationarity at level without trend or intercept. Finally, all the variables attained stationarity at 5% text critical values.

### 4.3: Lag Order Selection Criteria

VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria  
Endogenous variables: GDPPC PFEM FSSE LFMPR LFM  
Exogenous variables: C  
Date: 02/12/24 Time: 09:09  
Sample: 1990 2023  
Included observations: 32

| Lag | LogL      | LR        | FPE       | AIC       | SC        | HQ        |
|-----|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 0   | -1207.535 | NA        | 5.62e+26  | 75.78343  | 76.01245  | 75.85934  |
| 1   | -993.5776 | 347.6805  | 4.27e+21  | 63.97360  | 65.34773  | 64.42909  |
| 2   | -923.1305 | 92.46178* | 2.82e+20* | 61.13316* | 63.65239* | 61.96821* |

\* indicates lag order selected by the criterion  
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)  
FPE: Final prediction error  
AIC: Akaike information criterion  
SC: Schwarz information criterion  
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion

The first task in the bounds test approach of co-integration is estimating the ARDL model specified using the appropriate lag-length selection criterion. In this research work Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was taken as a guide and a maximum lag order of 2 was chosen for the conditional ARDL model as evidenced in the results. Then, F-test through the Wald-test (bound test) is performed to check the joint significance of the coefficients. The Wald test is conducted by imposing restrictions on the estimated long-run coefficients of the GDP per capita (GDPPC), PFEM, FSSE, LFMPR and LFM.

### ARDL Model Estimation

**Table 4.4: ARDL MODEL RESULT**

| Variable | Coefficient | t-stat    | Prob. Value |
|----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|
| PFEM     | -136201.3   | -0.307643 | 0.163       |
| FSSE     | -994.7997   | -4.541163 | 0.0039      |
| LFMPR    | 13032.52    | 30.92964  | 0.0000      |
| LFM      | 0.018148    | 1.793235  | 0.1231      |

Source: Authors' Compilation on EViews 12 Students Version

The result in the table 4.4 is an extract from the result in Eviews and shows the estimates for the ARDL model results. The outcome of the diagnostic checks indicated that the model did not suffer from any severe econometric problems. The LM test indicated that the null hypothesis of serial correlation assumption should be rejected. The Ramsey and Jarque-Bera check model specification and normality showed that the specification was rightly specified and the errors normally distributed. Thus, the autoregressive distributed lag model was found to be reliable. Next, the long run parameter of the independent variables GDP per capita (GDPPC), PFEM, FSSE, LFMPR and LFM were calculated.

From Table 4.4 above, the multiple regression model indicates a positive relationship between the dependent variable GDPPC, and the independent variables LFMPR

and LFM variables. Thus, the coefficient indicates that for every one-unit change in the GDPPC, the PFEM falls by -136201.3, all things being equal. Also, for every single increase in FSSE of women, GDPPC falls by -994.7997 all things being equal. The result shows that the coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) is 0.99. These findings imply that the mix of predictors in the model on average account for about 99% of changes in the Economic development of Nigeria, while the remaining 7% variation is accounted for by the error term. The F-statistic offers reliable proof of the overall significance of the model, from the table, the F-statistic [32.84.623(0.000)] is significant at 5% level of significance. This simply means that overall, the model is statistically significant. Furthermore, the t-statistic indicates that PFEM and LFM are all not significant. Whereas, FSSE and LFMPR are all significant.

### ARDL Long-run relationship

**Table 4.5: F-BOUNDS TEST**

| Test Statistic     | Value    | Significant level | I(0)               | I(1)  |
|--------------------|----------|-------------------|--------------------|-------|
|                    |          |                   | Asymptotic: n=1000 |       |
| F-statistic        | 10.89201 | 10%               | 2.2                | 3.09  |
| K                  | 4        | 5%                | 2.56               | 3.49  |
|                    |          | 2.5%              | 2.88               | 3.87  |
|                    |          | 1%                | 3.29               | 4.37  |
| ACTUAL SAMPLE SIZE | 30       |                   | FINITE SAMPLE n=30 |       |
|                    |          | 10%               | 2.525              | 3.56  |
|                    |          | 5%                | 3.058              | 4.223 |
|                    |          | 1%                | 4.28               | 5.84  |

**Source: Authors' Compilation on EViews 12 Students Version.** Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship.

The bound test is the test to determine if there is a long-run relationship as a null hypothesis says that; there is no long-run relationship, according to the value of F-statistics, first case; if this value is lower than the I(0) we don't reject the null hypothesis and there is no long run relationship, second one; if this value greater than I(1) we reject the null hypothesis and we can indicate that there is long relationship, the last case; if this value lies between two bounds we cannot judge. Here, we are in second case as the value of F-statistic

greater than both the lower and upper bound which include that there is a long-run relationship at all level of significance 1%, 5%, and 10%.

The F-statistic of 10.89201 is higher than the both the lower band and critical value and upper band critical value of 3.058 and 4.223 even at one percent and five percent significance levels, respectively. Hence the null hypothesis of zero co-integration was not accepted, implying that there was co-integration, long run, economic relation

between the variables when normalized on economic growth. It can be observed from the examination of co-integration above that, the series were found to be co-integrated in the long run. The following steps below examined the ARDL model and the associated long run relationship between GDP per capita (GDPPC), PFEM, FSSE, LFMPR and LFM.

Finally, the analysis found evidence of positive economic relation between LFMPR

and economic growth. Also, a positive relationship was established between LFM and economic growth. However, this finding is not significant even at 10% level of significance. This was perhaps, may be because the analysis did not include some other variables which are beneficial to the model but were not included in the model.

**Diagnostic Test**

**Autocorrelation Test**

**Table 4.6: Serial Autocorrelation test result**

| Diagnostic test    | Test result | Prob. Value |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Serial Correlation | 5.6291      | 0.0687      |

**Source: Authors' Compilation on EViews 12 Students Version**

From the test results presented above, the probabilities of both the F-statistic (0.0000) and the observed R-squared of 22.13539.  $H_0$  is

therefore, not accepted, meaning autocorrelation is present. Results is computed using Eviews 12.

**Heteroscedasticity Test**

**Table 4.7 Test for Homoscedasticity**


| Diagnostic test    | Test result | Prob. Value |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Heteroskedasticity | 1.2928      | 0.4348      |

**Source: Authors' Compilation on EViews 12 Students Version**

The probabilities of F-statistic (0.4348) and the observed R-squared of 24.70882 are all greater than 0.05 indicating the absence of heteroscedasticity. Implying that the errors

are homoscedastic and therefore the long run results succeed all major tests and thus useful for analysis and forecasting.

**Normality Test**



The test was conducted to check whether the error term follows the normal distribution. The normality test adopted is the Jarque-Bera (JB)

statistics. Looking at the histogram, the study observes that the residual is not normally

distributed because of the insignificant probability value of 0.724182.

#### Discussion of Findings

The findings are discussed under this section according to the objectives of the research work in chapter one.

#### **To investigate the importance of empowering women in economic development in Nigeria**

According to the findings of the ARDL model, there is a negative correlation between empowering women and economic progress. The reason for this is that the variable PFEM has a negative coefficient and is not statistically significant. This indicates that for each empowered woman, the Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDPPC) decreases by a certain amount of 136201.3 naira, assuming all other factors remain constant. This outcome is consistent with the conclusions drawn by Odeh (2014), which indicate that despite significant investments made to promote women empowerment, the actual advancement in enhancing the status of women in Nigerian society is considerably below the desired standard. This may be the cause of the adverse consequences observed. Nevertheless, this outcome contradicts the conclusions of many research, such the one conducted by Ajayi and Adebayo (2022), which discovered a favourable correlation between women's empowerment and economic progress in Nigeria. Although this study relies on secondary data, the study conducted by Ajayi and Adebayo (2022) was based on a survey. This could potentially explain the discrepancy in the results. Dahlum, Knutsen, and Mechkova (2021) discovered a direct correlation between empowerment and economic development. However, the term "women empowerment" in their study specifically pertains to political empowerment, excluding economic and educational development. Manuere (2018) argues that a country's long-term developmental strategy cannot be considered complete without giving

careful consideration to this sector and acquiring sufficient knowledge about it prior to making policy decisions. Women empowerment should not be conflated with only providing women with a quality education or increasing their access to employment opportunities. It is important for women to comprehend the reasoning behind gender equality and the empowerment of women.

#### **To establish the relationship between women's empowerment and the economic development of Nigeria**

The Johansen Juselius cointegration analysis and the long run relationship result of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model indicate the presence of a long-term association between women empowerment and economic progress in Nigeria. The variable holds significance in both models. This discovery aligns with the findings of Saqib, Aggarwal, and Rashid (2016), who conducted an empirical study on the relationship between Women Empowerment and Economic Growth in Saudi Arabia. The findings demonstrate a substantial and favourable long-term correlation between the empowerment of women and economic growth. This outcome is consistent with the findings of our investigation. Therefore, our research findings provide evidence that the promotion of women's empowerment is a catalyst for sustained economic development in the nation. Economic growth is quantified by the level of female employment.

#### **To investigate how women's participation in the labour force affects economic development in Nigeria**

Based on the results obtained, Labor force participation rate of female (LFMPR) which is a proxy for women participation in the labour force shows that there is a significant positive relation between women participation in the labour force and the level of economic development proxied by GDPPC in Nigeria. This is seen in the positive coefficient of the

variable (LFMPR) with a probability value of 0.0000. it means that for every single woman that participate in the labor force, economic development is further entrenched by a GDPPC of 13032.52 naira, all things being equal. Kanagavalli (2012) in their study on Women's Empowerment and Economic Development established that the interrelationship between women empowerment and economic development is weak to be self-sustaining, and that continuous policy commitment to equality for its own sake maybe needed to bring about equality between men and women.

### **To assess the impact of women's school enrollment (secondary) on Nigeria's economic development**

In assessing the impact of women's enrolment in secondary school on Nigerian economic development, a negative and statistically significant relationship was established. The variable representing women's secondary school enrolment impacts on economic development significantly but negatively. This may be because secondary schooling cannot be equated to being a graduate and leaves women without proper and adequate qualification to better their lives and contribute their part in the growth and development of the economy. Uzoamaka, Gerald and Eze (2016) in their findings observed that women need education, skills, access to assets/credit, social protection in order to fully develop their productive assets and tackle poverty.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This study examined the relationship between women empowerment and economic growth in Nigeria. The study employed PFEM, FSSE, LFMPR and LFM as proxy for the independent variables, while GDPPC was used as the dependent variable respectively. The study adopted the descriptive statistics which was used to quantitatively describe the important feature of the variables used. The Coefficient of Determination (R-Square) and Adjusted

Coefficient of Determination (R-Square) was employed to test if the regression model is of good fit. data from Nigeria on gross domestic product per capita GDPPC, percentage of female who are employed (PFEM), female secondary School enrollment (FSSE), Labor force participation rate of female (LFMPR) and the population of female in the labour force (LFM) were employed. descriptive statistics was computed to give a feeling and description of the variables in the dataset. The mean value of the Gross Domestic Per Capita Income is 248700, the PFEM is 1.10806, FSSE is 15.48314, LFPR is 55.37177 while LFMPR is 63.39732 and LFM is 25779158. The minimum and maximum value shows the highest and lowest values in each of the variable dataset as seen on appendix 1. All the variables tested for unit root attained stationarity. Appendix 2 shows that the variable GDPPC was differenced and attained stationarity at the first difference but with intercept. But PFEM and FSSE all attained stationarity at first difference with trend and intercept. While LFMPR and LFM all attained stationarity at level without trend or intercept. Finally, all the variables attained stationarity at 5% text critical values.

The ARDL model indicates a positive relationship between the dependent GDPPC and independent PFEM, FSSE, LFMPR and LFM variables ( $R^2 = 0.99$ ). Thus, the coefficient indicates that for every one-unit change in the dependent variable, the independent variables is predicted to increase by -136201.3, -994.7997, 13032.52 and 0.018148 respectively. The result shows that the coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) is 0.99. The results of the Johansen Coingration suggest the existence of four cointegrating relationship among variables in the series at 5 per cent level of significance, implying that these series are driven by common trend. Similarly, both Trace and Max-Eigen value test indicates the existence of four cointegrating equations. This result test the second hypotheses and shows

one more reason why the choice of ARDL model cannot be faulted.

This study examined the correlation between the empowerment of women and the economic progress in Nigeria from 1986 to 2022. Research has revealed that the promotion of women's empowerment in Nigeria has a little yet adverse effect on economic progress. Moreover, research indicates that the act of empowering women has a negative correlation with economic development. The reason for this is that the variable PFEM has a negative coefficient and is not statistically significant. Therefore, if one woman is empowered, the GDPPC decreases by a fixed amount of 136201.3 naira, assuming all other factors remain constant. The Johansen Juselius cointegration analysis and the long run relationship result of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model indicate the presence of a long-term association between women empowerment and economic progress in Nigeria. The labour force participation rate of females (LFMPR), which serves as an indicator of women's involvement in the workforce, demonstrates a notable positive correlation between women's participation in the labour force and the level of economic development represented by GDPPC in Nigeria. The enrolment of women in secondary schools has a large and detrimental impact on economic development. This is likely due to the fact that secondary education does not provide the same level of qualification as a university degree, leaving women without the necessary credentials to improve their lives and make a meaningful contribution to the economic growth and development.

In the light of the findings and analysis of this research, the following recommendations are considered necessary for short, medium and long term implementations.

Government should provide enabling environment that will encourage investment in women empowerment as well as provide incentives to stakeholders in the pursuit for

more quality lives for women. The incentives include education, skills acquisition, employment opportunities for women.

Economic reforms must target macro-economic stability, removal of structural distortion and creation of women-friendly environment for enhancing greater investment in the lives of women.

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## DISPLACEMENT, HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA

**Emmanuel Adeniran Alebiosu**

Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [alebiosuemma@gmail.com](mailto:alebiosuemma@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria has led to a severe humanitarian crisis, resulting in the displacement of millions of people. Despite these challenges, local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are taking actions to address the crisis. In spite of this, there is inadequate research on the displacement of citizens in northeast Nigeria and the challenges faced by NGOs in delivering effective humanitarian action. This paper examines how NGOs contribute to addressing the needs of displaced populations in northeast Nigeria and the key challenges faced by NGOs in delivering effective humanitarian action. The findings suggest that NGOs play a crucial role in complementing government agencies' efforts to address the challenges faced by internally displaced persons in northeast Nigeria. The paper revealed that non-governmental organisations face significant challenges, including insecurity and inadequate funding in delivering humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northeast Nigeria. The paper concludes that NGOs, in collaboration with government agencies, local communities, and international organisations, remain indispensable actors in delivering effective humanitarian services to IDPs in northeast Nigeria. The paper recommends that sustained international support, increased funding, strengthened partnerships, and innovative approaches are essential in making NGOs more effective in delivering humanitarian action in northeast Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, humanitarian action, NGOs, IDPs, northeast Nigeria

### Introduction

Conflict is an inevitable outcome of human diversity. Africa is a diverse continent—diverse in ethnic, religious, and socio-cultural terms. Conflict usually occurs primarily as a result of a clash of interests in the relationship between parties, groups, or states, either because they pursue opposing or incompatible goals (Oyeniyi, 2011). Some of the violence and displacement in West Africa is linked to conflict over land and resources, although these conflicts often have ethnic and religious dimensions too (United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, 2018). Arhin-Sam (2019) observed that other conflicts and situations have also led to internal displacement in Nigeria. In 2018, Adamawa State experienced deadly inter-communal

conflicts involving more than 100 communities, which led to further displacement in the Northeast (Arhin-Sam, 2019). Also, electoral violence has led to internal displacement across the country.

Aside from these, natural disasters, for example, flooding in states along the River Niger like Anambra, farmer-herder conflicts in north-central Nigeria, and other community clashes across the country also account for internal displacements (Arhin-Sam, 2019). The Boko Haram insurgency, which began in 2009 in the northeast, combined with counter-insurgency operations and communal clashes over scarce resources, has led to significant displacement in the Lake Chad region. The Boko Haram group, which was founded in

2002, sought to establish an Islamic State in Nigeria. The group's commander, Muhammad Yusuf, was taken into custody in 2009 and later assassinated. A violent and aggressive member named Abubakar Shekau oversaw assaults in north-eastern areas, including Yobe, Adamawa, and Borno. In terms of tactics, scope, geographic reach, and target choice, the gang has grown crueller and more audacious.

The Boko Haram insurgents did not only engage in kidnappings, massive killings, and wanton destruction of properties but also captured territories that were effectively under the sect's control (Omede & Alebiosu, 2020). Since 2013, Boko Haram insurgents have escalated attacks in northern Nigeria, generating significant population displacement and humanitarian needs in northeast Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgency has also forced many Nigerians to flee to neighbouring countries for asylum and refugee protection. As of May 2019, the total number of Nigerian refugees in neighbouring countries was 239,667, made up of 118,868 in Niger, 104,884 in Cameroon, and 15,915 in Chad (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR, 2019a).

Conflict-related violence has contributed to acute food insecurity, the unavailability of health care and other basic services, and widespread malnutrition in Boko Haram-affected areas (UNHCR, 2014). The United Nations Organisation estimates that 8.5 million people across the country's three north-eastern states require humanitarian assistance due to the ongoing violence. Amid this humanitarian crisis, persistent insecurity has disrupted overland transportation routes and hindered efforts to reach out to the populations caught in the conflict. With more than 2.2 million IDPs, Nigeria ranked among the top 10 countries with the highest number of people displaced due to conflict and violence by the end of 2018. In the same year, there were more than 600,000 IDPs in Cameroon and over 156,000 in Niger (Internal

Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). As of March 31, 2019, Nigeria had recorded a total of 1,948,349 (UNHCR, 2019b). Out of the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), 92% are displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria (UNHCR, 2019b).

From the above statements, it is clear that the northeast of Nigeria has been heavily affected by displacement occasioned by internal conflicts based on ethnic and religious tensions and rivalries, political instability, disputes over the control of natural resources, natural disasters, poverty, food insecurity, and the imperatives of development, which have all resulted in significant population displacement. Regrettably, these internally displaced people are also confronted with different challenges within their camps. In spite of this, humanitarian action is being carried out by local and international non-governmental organisations to address the humanitarian crisis of internally displaced persons. In carrying out humanitarian action, the non-governmental organisations are also confronted with challenges in northeast Nigeria. Despite this, there are inadequate studies on the displacement of Nigerians occasioned by insurgency and the humanitarian action of non-governmental organisations in northeast Nigeria. Therefore, how do non-governmental organisations (NGOs) contribute to addressing the multifaceted needs of displaced populations in northeast Nigeria? What are the key challenges faced by NGOs in delivering effective humanitarian action in the context of displacement in northeast Nigeria?

### **Internal Displaced Persons in Northeast Nigeria**

Internal displacement is by no means a new phenomenon. However, it has in recent years gained increased popularity, capturing significant and sustained attention and concern both locally and internationally (UNHCR, 2005). The United Nations (2006)

describes internally displaced persons as individuals or groups of individuals forced or obliged to run away from or leave their usual residences, consequent to or so that they can avoid the harmful effects of armed conflict or terrorism, situations of generalised violence, abuse of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internally recognised State border. Two issues are key to the definition. The movement is involuntary and happens within the borders of a country, unlike refugees who cross an international border and lose protection in their home country. Persons compelled to leave their homes due to conflict or disasters are entitled to the protection of their home-country governments (UNHCR, 2013). The term internally displaced person is considered merely descriptive of an individual's actual circumstances. Also, the term does not convey any special legal status since the displaced persons remain within the confines and jurisdiction of their country and are entitled to all the rights and privileges of citizens and customary residents of that country (UNHCR, 2013).

The government is responsible for providing protection to displaced people through a three-phase process. These phases, according to the United Nations Human Rights Commission (2013), include pre-displacement, during-displacement, and post-displacement. The pre-displacement phase involves developing precautionary measures against unforeseen circumstances, while the during-displacement phase provides protection and assistance to IDPs and affected communities. Precautionary steps can prevent further displacements. The post-displacement phase focuses on finding durable solutions for disadvantaged individuals and communities, providing humanitarian assistance, and promoting sustainable livelihoods.

Nigeria has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa and the third-largest in the world, accounting for 10% of all IDPs (Punch, 2015; Olajide, 2016). With

over 4 million IDPs forced out of their homes due to violent conflicts, Nigeria has the largest population of IDPs in Africa (Abdulazeez, 2016; Mohammed, 2017; The International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, 2017; IOM, 2017). Internal displacement in Nigeria is a result of factors such as terrorist activities, deplorable environmental conditions, and ethnic and religious violence. Over two-thirds of Nigerian internally displaced persons (IDPs) are caused by insurgency (91.98%), with communal clashes and natural disasters accounting for 7.95% and 0.06%, respectively (Mohammed, 2017). In other words, the Boko Haram insurgents have been the most significant factor in increasing IDPs in Nigeria (UNICEF, 2014; Lenshie & Yenda, 2016; ICRC, 2016), leaving many dead and homeless. Their activities have also affected Nigeria's polity, security, and economy, particularly in northeast Nigeria.

Northeast Nigeria is made up of six states (Yobe, Taraba, Gombe, Borno, Bauchi, and Adamawa) and is characterised by a variety of topographical characteristics, including savannahs, mountains, and the Sahel desert belt. Kanuri, Fulani, and Hausa are just a few of the many ethnic and cultural groups found in the region. On the other hand, the region has significant levels of infrastructure deterioration, poverty, illiteracy, inequality, unemployment, and low living conditions. Because of issues like underdevelopment, the socioeconomic climate in the region is favourable to the Boko Haram insurgency. The Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria, particularly in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States, has made these states camps for thousands of internally displaced persons fleeing violence from Boko Haram in areas like Mubi, Madagali, Askiral-Uba, Bama, and Gwoza (OCHA, 2019).

In northeast Nigeria, IDPs are subjected to all kinds of inhuman treatment, exploitation, and humiliation. The United Nations World Food Programme (2021) reported that displaced families in Nigeria's northeast face

severe hunger due to years of insecurity, causing hundreds of thousands to migrate. They face precarious situations, particularly children aged 10–15 who exhibit aggression in camps due to their past experiences in local communities (Olagunju, 2006; Ogwo, 2013). Women and girls also face abuse, including abduction, forced marriage, or girl sales. The IDPs are afraid of doing any meaningful business in the camp or even returning to their local communities (Olukolajo, 2014). The IDPs face challenges like inadequate access to essential resources like food, clean water, healthcare, and education. They often live in subpar conditions, causing concerns about their safety and wellbeing, especially for vulnerable groups like women and children. Indeed, many IDPs in northeast Nigeria are living in overcrowded camps or makeshift settlements. Access to healthcare services is often limited in IDP camps. Medical facilities are insufficient to meet the healthcare needs of the displaced population, leading to concerns about the spread of diseases and a lack of essential medical treatments. Many IDPs had lost their livelihoods due to the conflict and displacement, making it difficult for them to support themselves and their families. The trauma of displacement, violence, and loss took a toll on the psychosocial well-being of IDPs. Concerns regarding sustainability over the long run are raised by IDPs' reliance on humanitarian aid. Conflict and insecurity make matters much more difficult for them as they struggle with uncertainties about going back to their homes, reintegrating, and separating from their families.

### **Understanding Humanitarian Action: Principles and Structures**

Humanitarian action is the active provision of humanitarian aid—aid designed to save lives, alleviate suffering, and restore and promote human dignity in the wake of disasters and during large-scale emergencies (Pringle & Hunt, 2015). In other words,

humanitarian action is intended to relieve suffering in people and communities impacted by disasters, crises, or emergencies. It responds to epidemics, armed conflicts, natural disasters, and other complicated events by providing urgent aid, support, and safety. There is variation in how humanitarian action is framed and understood. It can be perceived as political or non-political, as secular or non-secular, as a movement or an institution, or as a short-term emergency response or longer-term development (Pringle & Hunt, 2015).

Humanitarian action has some broad defining characteristics but is fiercely context-specific. It varies in terms of socio-political context, population in need, mandate and capacity of the organisation, nature of the response, and intended and unintended consequences (Pringle & Hunt, 2015). Humanitarian action continues to expand in response to diverse and complex forms of crisis and human suffering. Contemporary humanitarian action is directed towards groups ranging from refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to prison inmates and sex workers (Pringle & Hunt, 2015). Indeed, humanitarian action can take many forms and has been conceived in many different ways over time (Pantuliano, 2014).

United Nations Resolution 46/182, 1991, outlines core principles for humanitarian action, including humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, to ensure access for affected individuals in crises. Humanity involves providing humanitarian assistance, respecting individual dignity and rights, and aiming to save lives, prevent suffering, and promote well-being, regardless of background or affiliation. Neutrality involves humanitarian actors providing assistance without involvement in political, religious, or ideological conflicts, guided by the needs of affected populations without taking sides. Impartiality ensures humanitarian assistance is provided without discrimination and based on need, prioritising vulnerable

groups. Independence refers to providing assistance autonomously from economic, political, and military objectives, driven by humanitarian imperatives.

Humanitarian assistance is given in a variety of situations, such as occupation, armed conflicts, and natural disasters, but the demand is great and the provision of it can be difficult (Haider, 2013). However, there are international legal frameworks and conventions that are crucial for ensuring effective humanitarian action. These frameworks include the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness, the Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter, Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (Kampala Convention). These instruments serve as the cornerstone for international efforts to defend the rights of displaced persons, provide them with protection and assistance, and assure moral and efficient humanitarian responses.

The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, established in 1998, provide a comprehensive framework for protecting and helping internally displaced persons (IDPs). They emphasise the roles of states and the international community in avoiding and reacting to internal displacement. These principles include protection against displacement, protection during displacement, humanitarian aid, and protection during return; assuring equal rights and freedoms; preventing discrimination; and emphasising national authorities' responsibilities to satisfy fundamental rights.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II establish rules for protecting civilians, wounded soldiers, and prisoners of war during armed conflicts. They are central to international humanitarian law,

aiming to limit the effects of war. These treaties aim to provide minimum protections, humane treatment, and fundamental guarantees of respect to victims. The development of these conventions was closely linked to the Red Cross, and their importance was reflected in the establishment of war crimes tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the Rome Statute.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which recognises the fundamental human rights of all people, including those who are displaced, is a key text in the history of human rights. On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations announced it, and it has since been transcribed into more than 500 languages. The UDHR serves as a worldwide blueprint for liberty and equality, defending the rights of all people everywhere. It lists 30 universal rights and liberties that continue to serve as the cornerstone of international human rights legislation. The UDHR declares that all people are free and equal, regardless of sex, colour, creed, religion, or any other traits, and is the document that has been translated into the most languages in the world. The rights cover civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights as well as freedom from torture, freedom of expression, education, and refuge.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which protects children's civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, is the most broadly embraced human rights document. It was approved by the UN General Assembly in 1989, and it came into effect in September 1990. The CRC specifies 41 provisions covering the rights of children under the age of eighteen, including protection, wellbeing, and access to education and healthcare. It mandates compliance with child custody and guardianship legislation and calls upon governments to act in the best interests of children. The CRC recognises children's rights to life, identity, and parental support. Additionally, it forbids the death penalty and requires state parties to implement

the necessary judicial, administrative, social, and educational safeguards to safeguard children from physical and psychological abuse.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a global treaty that requires governments to protect individual civil and political rights such as life, religion, freedom of expression, assembly, electoral rights, and due process. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966 and went into effect in 1976. The ICCPR requires governments to respect fundamental human rights such as life, dignity, equality before the law, freedom of expression, freedom from torture, gender equality, a fair trial, family life, and minority rights. Every four years, state parties are obligated to submit a country report outlining their efforts to implement the Covenant's rights and freedoms.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is a multinational instrument signed in 1966 by the United Nations General Assembly. It advocates for economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to work, an education, good health, social security, and cultural involvement. The ICESCR prioritises non-discrimination and equal access to these rights, and nations are required to fulfil them through basic duties and minimum standards. State parties must report and monitor to guarantee their implementation. The Optional Protocol permits individuals and organisations to file complaints if a state party violates their rights.

The Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness was adopted in 2005 with the intention of increasing the efficiency of aid coordination and development support. It emphasises cooperation between donors and recipient nations, integrating assistance into national development plans, and upholding responsibility and openness. The principles place a strong focus on the role that civil society, business, and other stakeholders play in the development process. Global conferences and agreements, such as the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan

Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, have adopted the Paris Principles.

Sphere Handbook is a collection of principles and guidelines for humanitarian response that aims to raise the calibre of assistance provided in times of crisis and armed conflict. It is built on respecting and addressing the needs of impacted groups. The Handbook is used as a reference for professionals, groups, and governments to direct their actions and collaborate positively with humanitarian organisations. It may be modified to suit many situations and places, and it is often updated to reflect new humanitarian best practises and difficulties.

The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (Kampala Convention), a regional legislative framework created in 2009, aims to meet the requirements of IDPs in Africa. It is the first binding document that only focuses on providing protection and support for IDPs. The agreement places a strong focus on equality, the defence of IDPs' human rights, dignity, and security, as well as collaboration between governments, regional organisations, international organisations, and civil society. To protect IDPs' rights and well-being, it urges a comprehensive strategy for dealing with internal displacement.

International legal frameworks provide direction and assistance for safeguarding civilian populations. On issues like the bindingness of non-state actors, particularly in domestic armed conflicts, the legal framework is still hazy. As a result, compliance with and enforcement of the growing norm of responsibility to protect are difficult (Haider, 2013). For the protection, direction, and accountability of humanitarian activity, international legal frameworks and treaties are crucial. They place a strong emphasis on humanism, neutrality, impartiality, and independence while allowing unrestricted access, safeguarding assistance workers, and encouraging collaboration between nations, organisations, and stakeholders.

### **Non-Governmental Organisations and Internally Displaced Persons in Northeast Nigeria**

A non-governmental organisation (NGO) is a non-state agent of development saddled with a responsibility of providing social welfare, economic empowerment, humanitarian services, political participation, human capital development and economic activities (Ikelegbe, 2013). NGOs are non-profit institutions that run without interference from the government and concentrate on their own activities and goals. They participate in civic society and advance its social, cultural, and political spheres. NGOs address social, environmental, or humanitarian challenges and are motivated by specific goals. In addition to direct service delivery to underserved populations, they can participate in advocacy, public education, policy change advocacy, and lobbying. In order to operate locally, nationally, or worldwide, many NGOs rely on volunteers. This depends on the scope and concerns of the organisation.

The Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria has caused one of Africa's worst humanitarian crises, and NGOs are essential in addressing the needs and difficulties of IDPs there. In addition to assisting individuals impacted by violence and displacement, they work in tandem with governments and international organisations to provide vital services and assistance. Since 2016, the humanitarian presence in northeast Nigeria has rapidly grown from a few operational NGOs and the UN to over 80 local and international organisations, employing around 4,000 aid workers (Edwards, 2017; cited in Stoddard et al., 2020). These include 37 Nigerian NGOs, 34 international NGOs, eight UN entities, and four Nigerian government entities (OCHA, 2019b).

The IDPs in northeast Nigeria get humanitarian aid from NGOs, which takes care of their basic needs, including food, water, shelter, and medical attention. Additionally, they offer protection, community development, health care, education, assistance for livelihoods,

psychosocial support, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. NGOs also gather information, carry out research, work with government organisations, and lobby for financing. When it comes to meeting the intricate humanitarian needs of IDPs, their efforts complement those of governments and international organisations. The majority of the operational aid presence is concentrated in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, where the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency (OCHA, 2017). Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe are the epicentres of the conflict and home to the majority of people in need of aid.

In spite of the NGOs' contributions, many IDPs have little or no access to shelter, sanitation, clean water, education, or good health care. The World Health Organisation (2016) stated that 743 health facilities (35 percent) were destroyed, 29 percent were partially damaged, and only 34 percent were intact. Through the efforts of NGOs, about 100 temporary health facilities have been provided for the people. The World Health Organisation (2016) observes that of the 481 health facilities in the state, 31 percent are not functioning due to the insurgency. Almost 60 percent have no access to safe water, 32 percent have no access to potable water at all, and 3 out of 4 (73 percent) cannot decontaminate the water used in the facility (World Health Organisation 2016). To ameliorate the situation, the European Commission provided Borno state with €143 million for the recovery and reconstruction needs of the people. The financing package brings the EU's total support for the crisis in Borno State to €224.5 million for 2017 (European Union, 2017).

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) also known as (Doctors Without Borders) is a vital humanitarian organisation in northeast Nigeria, providing medical care, assistance, and vaccination campaigns to the displaced population affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. MSF operates hospitals, clinics, and mobile medical teams. In the first half of 2019, Doctors Without Borders teams treated over 15,000 emergency patients, made 2,446 safe deliveries, and vaccinated 9,117 people

against measles (MSF, 2019). MSF teams are providing inpatient and outpatient treatment for malnourished children, targeting feeding for moderate malnutrition to prevent deterioration (MSF, 2023). They also run clinics, providing basic healthcare to people in Hajj camp and Muna and Maisandari informal sites (MSF, 2023). From January to April 2023, 1,283 malnourished children were admitted for intensive hospital care at the MSF feeding centre (MSF, 2023).

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is actively working in northeast Nigeria to address the humanitarian crisis caused by the Boko Haram insurgency and other conflicts, collaborating with local authorities, humanitarian organisations, and civil society groups to alleviate suffering. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) protects civilians, provides healthcare services, supports local health infrastructure, restores family links, and supports livelihoods. It also facilitates humanitarian dialogue, promotes international humanitarian law, and assists vulnerable populations, including women, children, and people with disabilities. The ICRC also monitors armed groups and security forces to uphold humanitarian law.

The ICRC supports five government primary health centres in Borno State with a combined catchment area of more than half a million people (ICRC, 2019). Almost 400,000 people in the north-east and Middle Belt regions received food rations from the ICRC (ICRC, 2017). It has also provided access to clean water for 213,000 displaced persons, returnees, and residents in north-east Nigeria and Middle Belt regions; improved sanitation and hygiene conditions for 109,000 displaced persons in north-east Nigeria (ICRC, 2017). The ICRC and the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS) coordinated efforts and focused on re-hydration in ICRC-supported health clinics, chlorination of water and the promotion of hygiene to control the spread of the disease in Dikwa, Jere, Maiduguri and Monguno (ICRC, 2023). The ICRC teams continue to raise

protection issues of the conflict-affected children, women, and detainees with relevant stakeholders to alleviate their suffering (ICRC, 2023).

UNICEF provides humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in northeast Nigeria, focusing on protection of children, education, healthcare, and malnutrition. They provide psychosocial support, education, rehabilitation, medical supplies, and sanitation facilities. UNICEF also advocates for children's rights and supports emergency preparedness, often acting as a first responder. UNICEF (2022), through its humanitarian action between January and June, has successfully treated 154,697 children aged 6–59 months in northeast Nigeria, with 53% of them being girls. The agency also vaccinated 207,024 children against measles after the largest outbreak in Nigeria, improved water supply for 503,719 vulnerable people, reintegrated 2,884 children formerly associated with armed groups, and provided 1,330,257 children with improved access to basic quality education in both formal and non-formal schools (UNICEF, 2022). The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2016) distributed a total of 562 non-food item (NFI) kits and 400 kitchen sets. Out of the total, 162 NFI kits were distributed to 3,228 IDPs in Borno in support of the relocation from Arabic Teachers College (ATC) to Bakassi Camp, and 400 NFI kits and 400 kitchen sets were handed out in host communities—200 households in Bauchi State and 200 households in Gombe State (IOM, 2016).

Food, shelter, and security are seen as the main concerns for those forced to flee their homes, but increasingly, health experts fear that psychological wounds are being left to deepen in a region with few psychiatrists and no mental health services (Nwaubani, 2017). The Neem Foundation is an NGO providing psychosocial support, mental health services, and rehabilitation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northeast Nigeria. They also conduct research on conflict, extremism, and



humanitarian crises, work with local communities, empower women, and support education. The foundation also works on building community resilience to prevent violent extremism. The "Counselling on Wheels" programme of the Neem Foundation is a community-based service that addresses the trauma needs of communities displaced by the insurgency. Neem provides comprehensive psychological services for up to 1,250 beneficiaries a month (Neem Foundation, 2019). The programme begins with assessing the needs of the participants, and psychologists and counsellors then spend the next three weeks teaching them how to block negative thoughts, an essential skill to cope with the trauma they have been through, and also how to build resilience (Nwaubani, 2017).

Displacement is a key determinant of vulnerability, and many IDPs are facing formidable challenges that have made some able to retain or develop coping mechanisms, but most continue to rely partially on humanitarian aid (OCHA, 2023). Indeed, these NGOs, among others, play a crucial role in complementing the efforts of government agencies to address the multifaceted challenges faced by the people of Northeast Nigeria. They often have a deep understanding of the local context and are well-positioned to provide tailored assistance to those in need.

NGOs have been instrumental in addressing the humanitarian crisis in the northeast, but concerns have been raised about their roles and an alleged international conspiracy to delay the end of the insurgency (Nwezeh, 2022). Military authorities are concerned that some NGOs paid for hotel accommodations for 10 years ahead, indicating the absence of an exit plan, and as such, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has declared that the movement of funds by NGOs operating in the northeast must be approved (Nwezeh, 2022). Despite this, NGOs have expressed their willingness to be scrutinised and remain focused on raising funds to meet humanitarian challenges (Nwezeh, 2022).

### **Non-Governmental Organisations Challenges in Delivering Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Northeast Nigeria**

Non-governmental organisations face significant challenges in delivering humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northeast Nigeria. The region's complex and dynamic security situation poses significant obstacles to the effective delivery of aid. Aid workers face risks from armed groups like Boko Haram, leading to injuries and fatalities. Since the start of operations, at least 26 aid workers have been held hostage, with 13 of these abductions occurring in 2021 and 2022 and at least 27 killed, including 9 in 2022 (OCHA, 2023). Access to IDP camps and affected areas is often restricted due to security concerns. For instance, overland movement between towns and along main supply routes, such as the Maiduguri-Monguno, Bama-Pulka- Gwoza, Maiduguri-Dambo, and Maiduguri-Damaturu roads, is risky because of attacks (OCHA, 2023).

Humanitarian facilities, such as warehouses, health clinics, and distribution centres, are targeted by armed groups, causing destruction of infrastructure and the loss of essential supplies. Transportation of aid and personnel is often perilous due to the threat of ambushes, improvised explosive devices, or armed attacks. Transporting humanitarian supplies often requires a military escort along exposed routes (OCHA, 2023). The high risks involved in road travel mean that humanitarian operations are heavily dependent on the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service for moving personnel around and transporting limited amounts of cargo to deep-field locations, which increases the cost of the operation (OCHA, 2023). Building trust and cooperation with local communities can be challenging due to the fear of retribution from armed groups for collaborating with NGOs.

Maintaining security for personnel and aid shipments can increase operational costs for NGOs, while aid distribution can be monitored

to ensure it reaches the intended beneficiaries. Negotiations with armed groups, government authorities, and other stakeholders can be complex and protracted. The high-security-risk environment can have a significant psychological impact on humanitarian workers, leading to stress, anxiety, and trauma. The unpredictable security situation in northeast Nigeria necessitates constant adaptation to changing circumstances. Despite these challenges, many NGOs remain committed to delivering aid in northeast Nigeria, employing strategies such as close coordination with security agencies, strict security protocols, and regular assessments to make informed decisions about aid delivery.

The Boko Haram insurgency and ongoing conflict in northeast Nigeria have caused extensive infrastructure damage, limiting access to internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps and affected communities. This makes it difficult for NGOs to provide aid, especially in remote or isolated areas. Repairing or bypassing damaged infrastructure requires significant time, effort, and resources, leading to costly logistical operations and increased costs. The damaged infrastructure also poses safety risks for humanitarian workers, as unsafe or partially destroyed buildings and roads can lead to accidents and injuries. The need to repair or work around damaged infrastructure increases the cost of delivering aid, diverting resources that could be used to provide essential assistance to IDPs. Infrastructure damage can lead to delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially in emergency situations. In some cases, NGOs may need to rely on air transport to bypass damaged road networks, which is expensive and may not be sustainable in the long term. Maintaining a consistent flow of aid to IDPs becomes difficult when infrastructure is regularly targeted and damaged, which is exacerbated by disruptions in aid supply.

Resource constraints are a major challenge for NGOs providing humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons in northeast Nigeria. These constraints include insufficient funding, donor fatigue, competition for funds,

and shifting priorities in the donor community. The security situation in the region increases operational costs for NGOs, as security measures, insurance, and logistics in conflict zones are expensive and can divert resources from actual assistance programs. NGOs struggle to recruit and retain qualified personnel, and their dependency on donor funding can limit their ability to plan and implement long-term, sustainable programs.

Exchange rate fluctuations can also impact the purchasing power of funds received in foreign currency, affecting local market access. The rising inflation is impacting the humanitarian operation as the cost of delivering assistance increases with the cost of procuring and transporting commodities, as well as other costs that are susceptible to the vagaries of the global economy, which imply that there are fewer resources available to meet increasing needs (OCHA, 2023). Funding cycles may not align with the fluid and evolving nature of humanitarian crises, hindering NGOs' ability to respond swiftly to emerging needs. Additionally, multiple humanitarian crises occur globally, and NGOs often compete for the same pool of donors and resources, reducing the available funding for any single crisis.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

In northeast Nigeria, the intersecting challenges of displacement, humanitarian action, and the crucial role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) form a complex narrative that demands ongoing attention and collective effort. The region has been ravaged by conflict, resulting in the displacement of millions of people, both within and beyond its borders. These IDPs face dire circumstances, including food insecurity, inadequate shelter, limited access to healthcare, and disrupted education. Amid these hardships, NGOs play an indispensable role in providing humanitarian assistance. They are on the frontlines, working tirelessly to

deliver lifesaving aid, including food, clean water, medical care, education, and psychosocial support. NGOs also strive to protect the most vulnerable, including women and children, from the threats posed by the ongoing conflict. However, their work is fraught with challenges, chief among them being security concerns that jeopardise the lives of both aid workers and those they seek to help. Resource constraints, ranging from insufficient funding to the high cost of operations in a conflict zone, further strain their capacity to provide comprehensive assistance.

Addressing the multifaceted crisis in northeast Nigeria necessitates sustained international support, increased funding, strengthened partnerships, and innovative approaches to adapt to the ever-evolving situation. NGOs, in collaboration with government agencies, local communities, and international organisations, remain indispensable actors in this complex humanitarian theatre. The determination and resilience of these organisations offer a glimmer of hope amid the ongoing challenges, showing that, even in the face of adversity, dedicated efforts can make a difference in the lives of those affected by displacement and conflict in northeast Nigeria.

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**PART VI:**  
OIL REVENUE, POVERTY REDUCTION, EDUCATION AND  
WEALTH CREATION

# 29

## IMPACT OF DRY SEASON FARMING ON POVERTY REDUCTION IN TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

Diseh Joel Shamaki<sup>1</sup>

Ajie H.A<sup>2</sup>

Zechariah Wanujeh<sup>3</sup>

Anyanwu Evangelin Emmanuel<sup>4</sup>

Oluwaseun Adeniran Sunday<sup>5</sup>

Department of Economics

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [desirediseh@gmail.com](mailto:desirediseh@gmail.com)<sup>1</sup>, [ajie.hycenth56@gmail.com](mailto:ajie.hycenth56@gmail.com)<sup>2</sup>, [zechariahwanujeh@gmail.com](mailto:zechariahwanujeh@gmail.com)<sup>3</sup>, [emmanuelefans@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:emmanuelefans@fuwukari.edu.ng)<sup>4</sup>, [adeoluwaseun621@gmail.com](mailto:adeoluwaseun621@gmail.com)<sup>5</sup>



### Abstract

Agricultural development is the foundation upon which the economic progress of the nation depends. It lays the foundation for food security, employment generation and lowering poverty. This study therefore sought to establish the impact of dry season farming on poverty reduction in some selected local government areas of Taraba state using three selected local government. The study made use of four specific objectives, drew research questions based on the specific objectives and drew hypotheses to guide the study. Income generation, employment creation and food security were the proxy variables for poverty reduction. Dry season farming was the independent variables. The study relied on the Mellor theory of Agricultural Development. The study made use of Taro Yamane formula to select a sample size of 390 Dry season farmers. A combination of purposive sampling and random sampling were employed in the course of this study. Test-retest method was used in determining the reliability of the instruments used. The Cronbach-alpha test gave a co-efficient of 0.81 indicating that the instrument designed for the study was reliable and dependable. Descriptive statistic, such as simple percentages, mean and standard deviation were used to answer research questions. The study revealed that dry season farming significantly contributed to income generation and employment generation capacity farming households in the three selected local Government Areas of Taraba State. This may be attributed to the fact that the three selected Local Governments Areas fall within the Riverine area of Taraba State. The study further revealed that lack of agricultural finance, extension workers, irrigation water and uncontrolled pests and disease reduced farmer's capacity to ensure stable income for farming households, created unemployment and reduced food capacity to ensure stable income for farming household, employment and sustained food security. The study concludes that dry season farming can be a very viable poverty reduction tool if well supported. Based on the findings and conclusion we recommend that dry season farming should be encouraged through the establishment of cooperatives and create access to more finance through Central Bank of Nigeria agricultural financial scheme.

**Keywords:** Poverty, food security, farming, agricultural financing, employment

### Introduction

Agriculture is one of the oldest occupations of humanity. Even before the development of a systematic study of its nature and processes,

humans began to produce food as an alternative to the hunting and gathering that had previously been the basis of human living and survival. Over time, farming has evolved

and become not only a major industry but the foundation of an individual revolution in many places around the world. It continues to provide the basic raw material and commodities required for the manufacturing of both primary and secondary goods (Boehlje M. et al 2011). With reference to Nigeria, her rich and expensive arable lands provided the primary incentive for the development of rich commodity markets in many parts of the West African region. During the colonial period—whether in Kano, Lagos, Port Harcourt or Aba—commodities like cocoa, groundnut, palm oil, and cotton formed the basis of the major economic activities of the people.

Agricultural development is the foundation for economic growth and provides a primary means of food security, employment generation and poverty reduction for Nigerians (Onumadu & Inyang 2015), these are also the very reasons motivating successive incumbent governments of Nigeria to initiate one type of agricultural intervention programme or another in order to generate employment, attain food security and aid in poverty reduction. Recent studies have revealed that the improvement of agricultural methods and access to credit are two ways to reduce poverty (Nwakanma, Nnamdi & Omojefe, 2014, Olatomide & Omowumi 2014).

The poverty situation in Nigeria is quite disturbing. Both the quantitative and qualitative measurements attest to the growing incidence and depth of poverty in the Country (Apata, 2010). This situation however, presents a paradox considering the vast human and physical resources that the country is endowed with. It is even more disturbing that despite the huge human and material resources that have been devoted to poverty reduction by successive governments, actual evidence suggests that the depth and severity of poverty is still at its worst in Nigeria, Sub-Saharan African and Asia (Lakner & Schoch, 2020). Ayoo (2022) pointed out that for growth to have significant impact on poverty, it must take place in sectors in where majority of the poor their livelihood. And agricultural sector still remains the most important sector

for rural dwellers in Nigeria, which accounts for more than 70% of the population. However, income redistribution can significantly improve efficiency at aggregate level.

The issues of poverty among rural households in Nigeria as well as rising food insecurity and high rates of unemployment present the need to promote measures that will ensure economic growth that will benefit the poor and ensure income generation. Poverty in Nigeria is concentrated in rural areas which accommodate more than 70% of the nation's poor (Oyakhilomen & Zibah, 2014). The majority of the poor in sub-Saharan Africa relies on agricultural activities for a livelihood and hence that sector is fundamental to spurring growth, enhancing food security, alleviating poverty and generating income (Awotide, Awoyemi & Diagne, 2012). In order to deal with the challenges of the high rates of poverty, unemployment and problems of food insecurity among the rural poor in Nigeria effectively as outlined by Olaolu, Akinnegbe and Agber (2013). It is crucial that agriculturally productive activities be revitalized. Programmes embarked upon by the Federal Government with the aim of addressing agriculture and rural development related problems in Nigeria are numerous. These programmes include Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), the Green Revolution and the establishment of the National Agricultural Land Development Agency (NALDA). The programmes set up specifically for rural development were the Farm Settlement Scheme, the River Basin and Rural Development Authorities (RBRDA), the Directorate of Food Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) and the Family Economic Advancement Programmed (FEAP).

National Fadama Development Project (NFDP) is part of Agricultural Development Programme (ADP). This project is anchored on Community Driven Development (CDD) approach. Areas in which investments was proposed in the project were; empowering communities (with financial resources, expanding their knowledge base and strengthening their organization), promoting

private enterprise to foster growth of the non-oil sector and enhancing governance and organizational capabilities of local governments, coordinated and transparent delivery of public services (Roseland, 2006).

Taraba State is an agro-based state that is addressed *Nature's Gift to the Nation* and is well known for the production of food and cash crops like yam, melon, rice and millet. Most of its food production is carried out during the wet or rainy season. Some few farmers however with limited support from the government embarked upon both the rainy and dry season farming with evidence of increased food production, income and job opportunities. If properly encouraged, dry season farming has the capacity to boost food supply for sustainable food security in Taraba State. The benefits may not only be limited to food supply alone but also a source of income and employment during the slack period of rain-fed agriculture. There are two distinct seasons in Taraba. These are the rainy season between April and October, and the dry season between November and March. Farmers are less busy on the farm during the dry seasons. Therefore, dry season farming serves as an alternative employment as well as additional source of income during the period. It is on this note that this Study seeks to assess the impact of dry season farming on poverty reduction in Taraba state. Based on the objectives of the dry season farming programming in Nigeria, this present study is interested to see if and possible how these objectives have been met by both Fadama and non-Fadama farmers who have keyed into dry season farming in Taraba State.

### **Theoretical Framework: Diffusion Theory of Rural Development**

Everett Rogers (1962), a United States Rural Sociologist propounded the Diffusion Theory of Rural Development. His theory was an attempt to explain the existence of significant productivity differences among farmers in a similar economic and geographical region

(Omeje and Ogbu, 2015). According to this theory, such differences among farmers in a similar region could arise because of variations in their adoption of new trends in agriculture such as innovations and adoption of new varieties of seeds, including mechanical and chemical inputs. Rogers (1962) further contended that, while within the same environment, some farmers could embrace modern techniques of food production such as mechanical equipment, improved seedlings and chemical inputs that would enhance productivity and guarantee food security, others will remain opposed to the adoption of these modern techniques and as a result continue to reap poor harvest leading to food insecurity in such a society. This theory is essentially a pro-technological and pro-modernization hypothesis that examines the behavioural pattern of diverse farmers to adapt to changes in agriculture and food production.

Based on the assumptions of this theory, to correct the structural impediments towards improved agricultural productivity, the farmers need to embrace modern techniques of farming in order to be assured of food security, and to achieve this objective, the diffusion of innovations to farmers would require reorientation and rehabilitation, which the theory presupposes is also possible. The need for orientation, perhaps through the use of mass media is to convince the various farmers and farming communities on the advantages of the modern techniques to be adopted for them to understand its applicability and practicability, which is aimed at reducing incidences of poor harvest, poverty and food insecurity in a nation.

### **Empirical Literature**

Dogon-Daji and Mohammed (2021) investigated the impact of Fadama III project (dry season farming) on income generation of dry season rice farmers in Sokoto state. Purposive sampling was used to select six Local Government Areas. Random sampling



technique was used to select 20 project participants and 12 non-project participants from each of the selected LGAs. Descriptive statistics and gross margin analysis were used for data analysis. Result of the gross margin analysis showed that the project participants made more profit (N319,459.44 Per Hectare) in dry season rice production compared to N270, 334.61 Per Hectare earned by non-project participants. It was recommended that the *Fadama* III project should as much as possible expand their area of operation so that more farmers can benefit from their services.

Ayodeji, Atungwu, Fadeyi, Ifezue, Okoye and Akinwale (2021) sought to determine the profitability of three different cropping systems. Data collected include cost of fixed assets, cost of variable inputs, yields and prices of outputs. Data were subjected to budgetary technique; analysis of variance and significant means were separated using Duncan's Multiple Range Test at 5% level of probability. Results of the gross margin analysis showed that both the intercropping and only sole Amaranth vegetable production were profitable, but there was a significant difference in the profitability of the intercrop cropping system practised as the Amaranth/Jute intercrop was more profitable. The intercrop is, therefore, recommended to farmers since it is more profitable and provides a variety of income generation for the farmer's thereby ensuring food and income security.

Muleta and Girmay (2021) assessed the impact of small-scale irrigation on household income using the primary data collected from 220 households of Walmara district. Descriptive and econometric data analyses were executed. Logistic regression and PSM methods were used to measure the impact. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) result revealed that participation in irrigation significantly affected household income, and irrigator households get more gross income than non-irrigators. Therefore, policy interventions focusing on installation of new small-scale irrigation schemes and fully utilization of the existing schemes are

recommended for their direct contributions in improving household income, and indirect contribution in improving food security and national GDP, especially in erratic rainfall and drought-prone areas.


Aminu and Sadi (2020) examined the economic profitability of dry season tomato production in Ikara Local Government Area, Kaduna State, Nigeria. A total of 370 tomato farmers were purposely selected from the Local Government Area. Primary data were collected using structured questionnaire. For the analysis of the data, farm level technique and gross margin analysis were adopted. The result revealed that dry season tomato farming is profitable in the study area. The study therefore, recommended that government should also provide extension services and price guarantees to the farmers to avoid exploitation by middlemen and wastages due to lack of modern storage facilities.

### **Research Methodology**

Being a survey-type of study, data collected for the study is analyzed using descriptive statistics such as simple percentages, mean, and standard deviation to answer the research question, however, to test the hypotheses to validate the answers emanating from the data analysis, the independent t-test will be employed due to its suitability for ordinal variables.

Demographic Data elicited from section A of the survey was presented in tables and pie charts.

A total of 384 respondents were administered with the questionnaires. All the respondents returned the questionnaires which represent 100% of the sample size. This was achieving because the administration of questionnaire was done in persons and properly supervised by the researcher and his assistants.



**Farming Experience of Respondents**

Shows that dry season farming is gaining recognition for its economic potential as new comers accounted for 16.41% of the respondents with less than 5 years’ experience. 21.21% of the farmers have been practicing for about 15 years, 25.00% had farming experience of about 20 years, 17.17% had been farming for about 30 years while 20.20% had over 30 years’ experience in farming. This indicated that the farmers who participated in the study possess enough experience in dry season farming to be able to provide relatively accurate answers to the research questions raised. This section presented the collated data from the survey for initial summary and inferences before data analysis.

**Research Question One:** What is the impact of dry season farming on income generation in Taraba State, Nigeria?

|  |                |                |               |
|--|----------------|----------------|---------------|
| To what extent has dry season farming provided opportunities to earn money from direct sales | 133<br>(33.6%) | 184<br>(46.5%) | 79<br>(19.9%) |
|--|----------------|----------------|---------------|

Furthermore, the result above revealed that 33.6% of the respondents are of the opinion that to a very high extent dry season farming provided them with opportunities to earn

money from direct sales, 46.5% were of the opinion that to a high extent the statement occurs, while 19.9% of them believed that the statement holds true occasionally.

**Research Question Two:** What is the impact of dry season farming on employment generation in Taraba State, Nigeria?

|  |                |                |              |
|--|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| To what extent has dry season farming provided opportunities to be self employed | 396<br>(56.1%) | 145<br>(36.6%) | 29<br>(7.3%) |
|--|----------------|----------------|--------------|

This result revealed that 56.1% of the respondents are of the opinion that to a very high extent dry season farming provided them with opportunities to be self-employed, 36.6% of them believed that the statement occurs to a high extent, while 7.3% of them believes that some time it is difficulties to utilize the opportunities for self-employment that may emanate from dry season farming enterprise.

**Research Question Three:** What is the impact of dry season farming on food security in Taraba State, Nigeria?

|  |                |                |               |
|--|----------------|----------------|---------------|
| To what extent has dry season farming improved your households’ nutrition (i.e eating well and good mix of food) | 201<br>(50.8%) | 123<br>(31.1%) | 72<br>(18.2%) |
|--|----------------|----------------|---------------|

The result revealed that 50.8% of the respondents are of the opinion that to a very high extent dry season farming improved their households' nutrition (i.e eating well and good

mix of food), 31.1% were of the opinion that to a high extent the statement occurs, while 18.2% were of the opinion that the statement occurs to a low extent.

## Discussion of Results

### Summary of Descriptive Statistics result on the impact of dry season farming

|          | N   | Mean   | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean |
|----------|-----|--------|----------------|-----------------|
| INCOMGEN | 396 | 3.2734 | .3489          | .01754          |

Source: Researcher's Computation from SPSS 25

The above table revealed a mean of 3.27 indicating dry season farming has had a moderate impact on income generation of the farming households in Taraba State.

**Table 4.7: Summary of Descriptive Statistics result on the impact of dry season farming on employment generation in taraba state, Nigeria.**

|           | Descriptive Statistics |        |                |                 |
|-----------|------------------------|--------|----------------|-----------------|
|           | N                      | Mean   | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean |
| EMPLOYGEN | 396                    | 3.3314 | .3219          | .01618          |

The above table revealed a mean of 3.33 indicating dry season farming has had a moderate impact on employment generation in the farming households in Taraba State.

**Summary of Descriptive Statistics result on the impact of dry season farming on food security in Taraba State, Nigeria.**

|         | Descriptive Statistics |        |                |                 |
|---------|------------------------|--------|----------------|-----------------|
|         | N                      | Mean   | Std. Deviation | Std. Error Mean |
| FOODSEC | 396                    | 3.0739 | .4002          | .0201           |

## Conclusion and Recommendations

The study sought to examine the impact of dry season farming on poverty reduction in Taraba State. The study was based on the Theory of Rural Development. The methodology of the study focused on research design, the population of the study, sample and sampling technique, instrument for data collection and method of data analysis. Data presentation and analysis were based on a presentation of collated data using tables, percentages, count and frequency, data analysis using statistical package (SPSS) and discussion. The study revealed that dry season farming significantly contributed to poverty reduction in Taraba State. It also demonstrates that the prevalent farming enterprise for dry season farmer is small holder and family owned farms. This

implies that farmers generated enough income to meet their basic needs such as housing, medical, sanitation etc. Also, the study revealed that dry season farming provided a lot of self-employment opportunities in Taraba State. Based on the findings, the study concluded that dry season farming can be a very viable poverty reduction tool if well supported, however it does not seem to support literacy development which is also necessary for poverty reduction. Local Government Councils within the State should develop solar powered water irrigation schemes to provide water to the farmers during the dry season.

More extension workers should be employed and mobilized to reach out to the

most remotes areas to improve agricultural production necessary for poverty reduction.

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Emmanuel Eche<sup>1</sup>

S.O Ajegi<sup>2</sup>

David Terfa Akighir<sup>3</sup>

Joy Mbakosun Ayaga<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Economics, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

e-mail. *lecheznk@yahoo.com*

<sup>2&3</sup>Department of Economics, Benue State University Makurdi, Benue State, Nigeria

*ajegisimeon@yahoo.com*

*akighirdavidterfa@gmail.com*

<sup>4</sup>Department of Economics and Development Studies, Federal University Kashere, Gombe State, Nigeria. *sethdoose@gmail.com*



### Abstract

The study examined the extent to which oil export influence economic growth in Nigeria. Although it has been difficult to ascertain why oil rich countries similar to Nigeria have succeeded but Nigeria has not been able to efficiently benefit from her oil wealth adequately, it is on this premise that the work offers a practical means of addressing the phenomenon. The study covers the period 1970 -2022, the study is descriptive and quantitative in nature using statistical tools, trends, the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR), among other econometric models. The findings of the study showed a short-run relationship among gross domestic Product, oil exports, exchange rate, inflation, index of openness, and oil price. Finding showed that the lag value of gross domestic product has a positive but a statistically insignificant effect on economic growth in Nigeria. Oil exports have a positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth in Nigeria in the short-run. The analysis implies that a 1% increase in oil exports will lead to a 0.18% increase in economic growth in the economy. Exchange rate has a positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth in Nigeria in the short-run. This suggests that a 1% increase in exchange rate will lead to 8.73% increase in economic growth in Nigeria. Inflation rate has a negative and a statistically insignificant impact on economic growth in the short-run in Nigeria. The paper concluded by recommending that Pragmatic mechanisms should be put in place by the ministry of defense and interior to forestall oil theft and bunkering. Also, efforts should be made to forestall pipeline leakages and prudent management of oil revenue by the monetary authorities should be put in place. These efforts will go a long way in increasing the volume of oil exports that will guarantee sustained economic growth in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Oil export, economic growth, foreign direct investment, exchange rate, inflation

### Introduction

Economic openness is widely acknowledged to increase economic growth in both rich and developing countries. The oil and gas industry in Nigeria draws the greatest FDI inflows, according to a sector-by-sector examination of FDI inflows. \$20.83 million and \$203.9 million dollars in foreign capital were invested in the

oil and gas industry during the first quarter of 2016, and the second quarter's respectively. A total of \$171.63 million and \$227.3 million were reported in the third and fourth quarters, respectively. In the first six months 2017, foreign investment inflows into Nigeria's oil and gas sector climbed to US\$291.47 million.

Compared to the 21.21% inflows saw in the first half of 2016, inflows grew by 31.76%. (NBS, 2017) Beginning in 2020, Nigeria's primary trade partner for crude oil was Europe. In the fourth quarter of 2020, crude oil shipments to Europe were worth roughly N853 billion, which is about US\$2 billion. However, in the fourth quarter of 2020, exports from Nigeria exceeded N880 billion and reached over US\$2.2 billion, making Asia the top destination for Nigerian crude oil. A total, shipments of crude oil drastically declined in the second quarter of 2020. Nigeria's export value is mostly derived from crude oil exports.

The Nigerian economy has been significantly impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic epidemic, Due to declining demand, crude oil prices fell precipitously, and the nation continuously reduced daily crude oil output. About 9% of Nigeria's GDP comes from the country's petroleum industry. However, due to the decreased in demand which was occasioned by the COVID-19 epidemic, Nigeria's oil output and exports decreased. The oil sector's share of this total real GDP in 2020 between October and December was roughly 5.9%, which is a decrease of about 3% from the prior quarter. Finally, the oil sector's share of the nation's GDP increased to 9.25% in the first quarter of 2021. The mineral fuels, petroleum, and distillate products industry contributed more than 80% of Nigeria's export value in 2019, totaling about \$45 billion (NBS, 2021). A downturn in FDI into Nigeria during the past years, coupled with a drop in oil prices on the global market, has slowed Nigeria's oil exports, which has had an adverse effect on economic growth. The government's pursuit of an expansive fiscal policy through public expenditure was simplified as a resultant effect. This decline in her FDI influx will have an impact on employment possibilities, consumption levels, investment levels, and employment growth. Given that global uncertainties decreased net FDI inflows from 1996 to 2019 and that oil exports were influenced by declining oil prices, the current

epidemic on FDI is particularly concerning. Majority of the time, rising economies like Nigeria and those in the Asia-Pacific region experience severe shocks brought on by GDP uncertainty (Ho and Gan, 2021). Because of the loss in FDI coming in, host nations like Nigeria may see a drop in oil output and exports, which would cause the economy to contract. This has made it necessary to conduct a research of this kind, which look at how oil exports affect economic growth in Nigeria.

Nigeria receives a higher proportion of FDI in the petroleum sector than in other industries, similar to other Sub-Saharan African countries. UNCTAD (2020) stated that FDI inflows to Nigeria surged by 71% from \$2 billion in 2018 to \$3.4 billion in 2019, led by resource-seeking inflows in the petroleum sector. Capital from Nigeria's petroleum sector accounted for the majority of a 17% increase in capital flows to around \$11 billion in West Africa. This demonstrates how cash flows to Nigeria's petroleum industry are distorted. Nigeria's oil exports and FDI have a favorable correlation, according to empirical literature (see Adereni, Azeez, Elufisan and Awomailo 2019; Afolaya and Jimoh 2019; Hussain and Ahmed 2017; Makuchukwu, Salami; Fatimah, Gazi and Oke 2012). Despite an increase in oil exports fueled by FDI inflows, oil money in Nigeria has not had the desired effects, notably in the aspect of economic progress and development. There is no conclusive evidence that the increase in oil exports brought on by FDI inflows has had any direct or indirect effects on economic growth in Nigeria, unlike other oil-rich nations that have frequently exchanged their oil for fixed capital, leading to enormous capital formation and, consequently, economic growth and development. The development and expansion of Nigeria's economy are gravely threatened by this. Although it is possible that the export of oil would have a direct impact on Nigeria's economic welfare, it is also very likely that this impact will only be indirect. With an

increase in oil export profits, the government may decide to spend more or conserve more. Increased government expenditure may be directed toward developing fixed capital or human capital, both of which support economic growth and development. Furthermore, increased government savings add to general savings, which when used can boost the economy. This study aims to conduct an empirical assessment of how oil exports affect Nigeria's economic prosperity.

Oil export has unsurprisingly been extremely important to Nigeria's political economy. The transmission channels oil sales towards achieving economic growth in Nigeria have not been adequately subjected to any empirical details, despite the fact that these contributions to economic growth in Nigeria have been enormous and have each been the subject of empirical investigation separately. The relationship and nature of transmission between oil export, and economic growth in Nigeria have not been adequately documented in empirical literature. Additionally, this research will serve as a resource for decision-makers and aspiring researchers on related subjects, which will incite profound and innovative thoughts that are practically applicable to help improve the management of oil export for the achievement of capital formation for the purpose of achieving real economic prosperity and development in Nigeria and other resource-rich countries.

### **Review of Related Literature**

Despite several empirical works on oil export, there is little conceptual literature on oil exports. The entire amount of oil exported, including both crude oil and refined oil products, is measured in barrels per day (bb/day). According to Akighir and Kpoghul (2020), oil exports include semi-finished and unfinished petroleum products, liquid fuel, lubricating oils, solid and semi-solid goods made from distillate and cracking of crude petroleum, and solid and semi-solid products

made from liquid fuel. Oil and gas extraction is a key source of export income and, to a lesser extent, source of employment in many developing economies. However, the most significant benefit that a nation may get from its growth is arguably the fiscal role that the oil and gas industry plays in generating tax revenue and other government funds. To ensure that the state, as the owner of the resource, receives a fair share of the economic rent generated by oil and gas development, export strategies and the tax system must be properly established (Sunley, Baunsgaard and Simard, 2002).

### **Economic Growth**

The expansion of a nation's capacity to produce goods and services from one period to the next is referred to as economic growth. It is also refers to as the gradual rise in the quantity of goods and services an economy generates. Ogunleye(2014). The World Bank (2019) sees economic growth as an increase in the production of goods and services over a specific time period. For precision, the measurement of economic growth must take the effects of inflation into account. Business profits increase as a result of economic growth. The effect is a rise in stock prices. Businesses can invest and increase employee numbers as a result. As more employment opportunities are created, income rises. The consumers have sufficient funds to purchase extra goods and services. Purchases stimulate economic growth at a higher rate. This is why good economic growth is the goal of all nations. As a result, one of the important economic indicators is economic growth.

The most reliable growth metric is the Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP). It eliminates the detrimental effects of inflation. The World Bank uses Gross National Income (GNI) as a growth indicator rather than GDP. It includes cash sent home by Americans working overseas. It is a key source of revenue for many developing countries like Nigeria. While growth rates are important, the World Bank

(2019) Group emphasizes that growth patterns that prioritize increasing opportunities for the disadvantaged and excluded, especially women and youth, can result in more strong and sustainable growth.

Comparisons of GDP by nation will understate the full magnitude of these nations' economies. The GDP does not include unpaid services. This excludes daycare, unpaid volunteer labor, and illegal black market activities. Environmental expenditures are not included in. For instance, plastic is cheap since disposal fees are not included in. However, the impact of these costs on social wellbeing is not taken into consideration by GDP. A nation's level of living can be improved when environmental costs are considered. Only the values of a society are measured. The gross domestic product is the most reliable measure of economic growth (GDP). It takes into account the whole nation's economic output, which includes all goods and services produced for export by local businesses whether they are sold domestically or overseas. A measure of output is the GDP. The parts that are created to make a product are not included, though. Because they are made domestically, exports are taken into account. Imports are taken into consideration while adjusting economic growth.

Since 2015, the pace of economic growth has been moderate. After averaging 1.9% in 2018, growth was constant at 2% in the first six months of 2019. Internal demand is still hedged as a result of low private spending and high inflationary episodes (11% in the first six months of 2019). From the perspective of output, the services sector, particularly the telecoms, was the primary engine of development in 2019. The North-East insurgency and ongoing farmer-herdsmen disputes are to blame for the continued underperformance of the agriculture sector. Industry performance is inconsistent due to a worse power sector performance in 2019, manufacturing production is slowing down, while GDP growth is steady. It was predicted

that output of food and beverages would rise in response to import restrictions. The construction sector, on the other hand, is still performing well as a result of continuing megaprojects, increased public spending in the first half of the year, and import restrictions. The growth rate is too slow to eradicate poverty among the poorest 50 percent of the population. The agriculture sector's failure harms the chances of poor rural inhabitants, while excessive food inflation has a detrimental effect on the poor in urban regions. Oil production is slowing in 2019 as a result of a poorer power sector performance, GDP growth is constant. In reaction to import limitations, an increase in food and beverage production was anticipated.

Nigeria's medium-term growth is forecast to stay constant at roughly 2% in the absence of major fundamental policy adjustments. As a result, it is anticipated that the economy would expand more slowly than the population and that living standards will decline. Growth is also constrained by a weak macroeconomic environment, high persistent inflation, several exchange rate windows, restrictions on foreign exchange, distorting actions of the central bank, and a lack of revenue-driven fiscal consolidation outcomes. The increase of private sector credit is constrained by increasing public debt as well as more complex central bank policy measures. Nigeria's economy is vulnerable to external risks because fiscal buffers have been exhausted and external balances are unstable due to hot money flows. The opportunity exists for the incoming administration to quicken the pace of structural changes in order to create an institutional and regulatory framework capable of controlling the volatility of the oil industry and fostering long-term expansion of the non-oil economy. The abolition of trade and forex restrictions, the elimination of subsidies, enhanced domestic tax mobilization, and more openness and predictability of monetary policy are all bold measures that might have a substantial



influence on the economy's trajectory. While raising spending on much needed public services, such measures would help enhance the standard of life for low-income populations. After much consideration, the signing of the Africa Continental Trade Agreement may also provide the economy a boost in the medium run. Economic indicators from the World Bank


**Evaluation of Oil Exports and Nigeria's Economic Development.**

Odularu (2008) estimates that crude oil exports made up around 86% of all export revenue, despite the fact that the industry only actually generates 40% of government revenue. The nation has 37 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves, a daily output of 2.5 million barrels, and an average crude oil output of 1.5 million barrels daily. Oil and gas sales comprised almost 98% of all foreign sales and nearly 83% of all National income in 2000. Nigeria is estimated to contain natural gas

reserves of 1,000 trillion feet (2,800 km), 35 billion barrels of known oil reserves, and a daily crude oil production rate of roughly 2.2 million barrels (350,000 km) (Odularu 2008). The government also gained substantial quantities of money from the export of natural gas and oil, which over time led to a positive balance of payments.

Nigeria is the sixth-biggest producer of crude oil in the world and one of the oldest and largest in Africa, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (2021). By 2021, Nigeria was the continent's top oil producer. About 78 million metric tons of oil were produced in the nation. Each of the next three countries—Libya, Algeria, and Angola—produced more than 50 million metric tons. The total amount of oil produced in Africa that year, including crude oil, shale oil, oil sands, and NGLs, was 345 million metric tons, a 4.5 percent increase over the previous year.

Africa's oil exports and production are broken down by nation in Figure 2.2



Source: Statista (2022)

**Oil Production and Exports in Africa as of 2021 by Country (in million metric tons)**

The figure shows that Nigeria is the leading country in Africa in oil production and exports and this is followed by Libya, Algeria, and Angola.


The backbone and one of the most crucial areas of the economy of Nigeria is the petroleum industry. Nearly 5.8% of Nigeria's real GDP and 95% of its foreign exchange profits were accounted for by the oil and gas industry

### Contribution of Oil to GDP in Nigeria from 2018 Q4 to 2021 Q4

Nigeria's oil industry contributed roughly 9% of the nation's GDP prior to the Covid-19 epidemic (GDP). The oil sector's share of the overall real GDP between October and December 2020 was 5.9%, a drop of almost 3% points from the prior quarter. The oil industry's share of the national GDP reached 7.5% in the third quarter of 2021. 2019 saw the mineral

fuels, oils, and distillation products industry provide over 80% of Nigeria's export value, or around \$47 billion. However, oil output and export decreased due to the COVID-19 pandemic's reduced demand. In fact, data for 2020 indicate a significant decline in the value of oil exports (NBS, 2021).

Furthermore, oil exports in Nigeria from 2010 to 2021 are shown in the following figure2.4



Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2021)


### Oil Exports in Nigeria from 2010 to 2021

The figure shows that oil exports were estimated to be 1,592.333 barrels per day in December 2021. The previous figure for December 2020 was 1,879.288 barrels per day, averaging 1,822.850 barrels per day from December 1980 to December 2021. The statistics peaked in 2010 at 2,464.120 barrels per day and hit a record low of 935.200 barrels per day in 1983.

### Analysis of Economic Growth in Nigeria

Oil exports constitute a sizeable proportion of the Nigeria's GDP. The Figure 3.6 depicts the trend of GDP in Nigeria from 1986 to 2021.

Fig 2.5



### Trend of Real GDP in Nigeria from 1986 to 2021

Following the implementation of the structural adjustment program in 1986, the



is oil production. Therefore, the equation is transformed thus

$$\Delta gdp_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_{2i} \Delta oilx_{t-1} + \sum_{i=0}^p \beta_{3i} \Delta noilx_{t-1} + \sum_{i=0}^p \beta_{4i} \Delta exr_{t-1} + \sum_{i=0}^p \beta_{5i} \Delta oinflt_{t-1} + \sum_{i=0}^p \beta_6 \Delta opn_{t-1} + \sum_{i=0}^p \beta_7 \Delta oilp_{t-1} + \varphi_1 gdp_{t-1} + \varphi_2 oilx_{t-1} + \varphi_3 noilx_{t-1} + \varphi_4 exr_{t-1} + \varphi_5 infl_{t-1} + \varphi_6 opn_{t-1} + \varphi_7 oilp_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{1t} \dots \dots$$

In order to trace the pass-through effect of FDI to GDP via oil export, our SVAR model is specified as follows:

The generic specification of SVAR equation is written thus:

$$A_0 Z_t = A_1 Z_{t-1} + \varepsilon_1$$

Where  $A_0 = n \times n$  matrix of contemporaneous impact of endogenous coefficients

$Z_t = n \times 1$  column vector matrix of the estimated endogenous coefficients,

$A_1 = n \times n$  matrix of lagged estimated endogenous coefficients of the variables,

$Z_{t-1} = n \times 1$  column vector matrix of lagged estimated endogenous coefficients, and

$\varepsilon_{1t} = n \times 1$  column vector of disturbance term.

In Nigeria, export of oil contributes about 90% of foreign exchange earnings and thus, has implications for government revenue foreign exchange rate stability and consequently economic growth. Contraction in FDI inflows will reduce production in the oil and gas sector, thereby leading to a fall in the volume of oil export in an oil-mono economy like Nigeria. It is expected that there will be a reduced amount of foreign exchange, foreign reserve, employment avenues among other and consequently the economy. Thus, the transmission which is the pass-through effect of FDI to economic growth via oil export is given as follows:

$$FDI \longrightarrow OILX \longrightarrow GDP$$

Transposing the transmission yields,

$$GDP_t = f(GDP_{t-1}, OILX_{t-1}, FDI_{t-1}, OILX_t, FDI_t)$$

$$OILX_t = f(GDP_{t-1}, OILX_{t-1}, FDI_{t-1}, GDP_t, FDI_t)$$

$$FDI_t = f(GDP_{t-1}, OILX_{t-1}, FDI_{t-1}, GDP_t, OILX_t)$$

Therefore, the presentation of the N-SVAR (4.56) yields the following,

$$GDP_t = \alpha_{11}^1 GDP_{t-1} + \alpha_{12}^1 OILX_{t-1} + \alpha_{13}^1 FDI_{t-1} + \alpha_{12}^0 OILX_t + \alpha_{13}^0 FDI_t + \varepsilon_{1t}$$

$$OILX_t = \alpha_{21}^1 GDP_{t-1} + \alpha_{22}^1 OILX_{t-1} + \alpha_{23}^1 FDI_{t-1} + \alpha_{21}^0 OILX_t + \alpha_{23}^0 FDI_t + \varepsilon_{2t}$$

$$FDI_t = \alpha_{31}^1 GDP_{t-1} + \alpha_{32}^1 OILX_{t-1} + \alpha_{33}^1 FDI_{t-1} + \alpha_{31}^0 GDP_t + \alpha_{32}^0 OILX_t + \varepsilon_{3t}$$

Aggregating the contemporaneous impact to the Left Hand Side (LHS) gives,

$$GDP_t - \alpha_{12}^0 OILX_t - \alpha_{13}^0 FDI_t = \alpha_{11}^1 GDP_{t-1} + \alpha_{12}^1 OILX_{t-1} + \alpha_{13}^1 FDI_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{1t}$$

$$-\alpha_{21}^0 GDP_t + OILX_t - \alpha_{23}^0 FDI_t = \alpha_{21}^1 GDP_{t-1} + \alpha_{22}^1 OILX_{t-1} + \alpha_{23}^1 FDI_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{2t}$$

$$-\alpha_{31}^0 GDP_t - \alpha_{32}^0 OILX_t + FDI_t = \alpha_{31}^1 GDP_{t-1} + \alpha_{32}^1 OILX_{t-1} + \alpha_{33}^1 FDI_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{3t}$$

Expressing equation 17 to 19 in matrix form

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 - \alpha_{12}^0 & -\alpha_{13}^0 \\ -\alpha_{21}^0 & 1 - \alpha_{23}^0 \\ -\alpha_{31}^0 & -\alpha_{32}^0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} GDP_t \\ OILX_t \\ FDI_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_{11}^1 & \alpha_{12}^1 & \alpha_{13}^1 \\ \alpha_{21}^1 & \alpha_{22}^1 & \alpha_{23}^1 \\ \alpha_{31}^1 & \alpha_{32}^1 & \alpha_{33}^1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} GDP_{t-1} \\ OILX_{t-1} \\ FDI_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{1t} \\ \varepsilon_{2t} \\ \varepsilon_{3t} \end{bmatrix} \dots$$

$$\text{Hence, } A_0 Z_t = A_1 Z_{t-1} + \varepsilon_1$$

Where  $A_0 = 3 \times 3$  contemporaneous impact of endogenous coefficients

$Z_t = 3 \times 1$  column matrix of estimated endogenous coefficients,

$A_1 = 3 \times 3$  lagged estimated endogenous variables,

$Z_{t-1} = 3 \times 1$  lagged estimated endogenous variables, and




|      |           |         |          |          |          |          |          |          |    |
|------|-----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----|
| OILX | 1271025   | 9659773 | 509.622  | 2591585  | 2.125181 | 6.080556 | 60.8515  | 0        | 53 |
| OPEC | 2004.768  | 2631    | 1246     | 374.6964 | -0.31559 | 1.962881 | 3.255092 | 0.196411 | 53 |
| OPN  | 44.70089  | 81.81   | 16.35    | 17.27557 | 0.188195 | 2.002617 | 2.509645 | 0.285126 | 53 |
| RES  | 8321.4709 | 6775510 | 159.6448 | 1.60E+10 | 1.391408 | 3.054807 | 17.10812 | 0.000193 | 53 |

Source: Author's Computation using E-views 10

### Analysis of the Impact of Oil Exports on Economic Growth in Nigeria

Before estimating the model, the minimum Schwarz criterion was estimated to select the optimal model as shown in Figure 3.1



**Figure 3.1: Schwarz Criteria**

Source: Author's Estimation Using E-views 10

Figure 3.1 shows that ARDL (1,0,0,0,0,0) is the optimal ARDL model to be estimated among the top 20 ARDL models.

In order to determine the long-run relationship among the variables of interest, Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds test was estimated and is presented in Table 5.9.

**Table 3.1: Autoregressive Distributed Lag Bounds Test**

| Test Statistic | Value    | Sign. | I(0) | I(1) |
|----------------|----------|-------|------|------|
| F-statistic    | 5.742931 | 10%   | 2.08 | 3    |

Asymptotic: n=1000

|   |   |      |      |      |
|---|---|------|------|------|
| K | 5 | 5%   | 2.39 | 3.38 |
|   |   | 2.5% | 2.7  | 3.73 |
|   |   | 1%   | 3.06 | 4.15 |

Source: Author's Estimation Using E-views 10

Table 3.1 indicates that the F-statistics value of 5.74 is higher than the upper bound value of 3.38 at a 5% level of significance. This suggests that there is a linear long-run relationship among the variables in the model. Thus the short-run and the long-run estimates were estimated as shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3

**Table 3.2: Short-Run Estimate of the ARDL (1,0,0,0,0,0) Model**

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error | t-Statistic | Prob.  |
|--------------------|-------------|------------|-------------|--------|
| C                  | 0.945849    | 0.466945   | 2.025613    | 0.0488 |
| GDP(-1)*           | 0.164734    | 0.102739   | 1.603429    | 0.1158 |
| OILX**             | 0.177734    | 0.037561   | 4.731876    | 0.0002 |
| EXR**              | 8.731205    | 2.001426   | 4.362490    | 0.0004 |
| INFL**             | -0.001348   | 0.001922   | -0.701541   | 0.4866 |
| OPN**              | 0.001375    | 0.002858   | 0.480925    | 0.6329 |
| OILP**             | 0.533138    | 0.168272   | 3.168310    | 0.0004 |
| ECM(-1)            | -0.141785   | 0.055544   | -2.552644   | 0.0142 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.728071    |            |             |        |
| F-statistic        | 23.75818    |            |             |        |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.000000    |            |             |        |
| Durbin-Watson stat | 1.510495    |            |             |        |

Source: Author's Estimation Using E-views 10.

Table 3.2 shows the short-run relationship among gross domestic Product, oil exports, exchange rate, inflation, index of openness, and oil price. From the table, the lag value of gross domestic product has a positive but a statistically insignificant effect on economic growth in Nigeria. Oil exports have a positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth in Nigeria in the short-run. This implies that a 1% increase in oil exports will lead to a 0.18% increase in economic growth in the economy. Exchange rate has a positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth in Nigeria in the short-run. This suggests that a 1% increase in exchange rate will lead to a 8.73% increase in economic growth in Nigeria. Inflation rate has a negative and a statistically insignificant impact on economic growth in the short-run in Nigeria.

The index of openness indicates a positive but statistically insignificant impact on economic growth in Nigeria in the short-run. Oil price has a positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth in the short-run in Nigeria. This implies that a 1% increase in oil price will lead to a 0.53% increase in economic growth in Nigeria in the short-run.

The speed of adjustment [ECM(-1)] which explains the speed of adjustment of variables to equilibrium in the long-run is negative (-0.141785) and statistically significant. Implying that disequilibrium among gross domestic Product, oil exports, exchange rate, inflation, index of openness, and oil price will readjust to equilibrium in the long-run.

The Adjusted R-squared value of 0.73 suggest that, oil exports, exchange rate, inflation, index of openness, and oil price have

explained short-run variation in economic growth by 73% in Nigeria. Also, the F-statistic value of 23.75818 is statistically significant, implying that, the explanatory variables have a strong joint effect on economic growth in Nigeria. Finally, the Durbin-Watson statistic

value of 1.510495 shows the absence of autocorrelation in the model.

Furthermore, the long-run estimates for the model were estimated and presented in Table 5.11.

**Table 3.3: Long-Run Estimates of the ARDL (1,0,0,0,0,0) Model**

| Variable | Coefficient | Std. Error | t-Statistic | Prob.  |
|----------|-------------|------------|-------------|--------|
| OILX     | 0.046951    | 0.019451   | 2.413809    | 0.0316 |
| EXR      | 0.000530    | 0.002744   | 0.193147    | 0.8477 |
| INFL     | -0.008185   | 0.002328   | -3.515893   | 0.0004 |
| OPN      | 0.008344    | 0.019007   | 0.439015    | 0.6628 |
| OILP     | 0.201158    | 1.096494   | 0.183456    | 0.8553 |
| C        | 5.741667    | 2.025761   | 2.834327    | 0.0069 |

Source: Author's Estimation Using E-views 10.

Table 3.3 indicates the long-run relationship among the oil exports, exchange rate, inflation, index of openness, and oil price in the model. Oil exports have a positive and statistical significant impact on economic growth Nigeria. This means that a 1% increase in oil exports in the long-run will lead to a 0.05% increase in economic growth in the country. Exchange rate indicates a positive but a statistically insignificant impact on economic growth in Nigeria in the long-run. Inflation rate has a negative but statistically significant impact on economic growth in the economy.

This suggests that a 1% increase in inflation rate in Nigeria will lead to a reduction economic growth by 0.01% in the long-run. The index of openness has a positive but statistically insignificant impact on economic growth in Nigeria in the long-run. Oil price has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on economic growth in the long-run in the country.

**Diagnostic Tests**

To ensure the validity of the results, diagnostic tests were estimated as presented in the following tables.

**Table 3.4.1: Results of Ramsey Reset Test**

|             | Value    | Df      | Probability |
|-------------|----------|---------|-------------|
| t-statistic | 1.277461 | 44      | 0.3421      |
| F-statistic | 0.29667  | (1, 44) | 0.4571      |


Source: Author's Estimation Using E-views 10

The t-statistic and F-statistic of the Ramsey Reset tests are both statistically insignificant. This means that, the model is correctly

specified in terms of its functional form and inclusion of relevant explanatory variables.



Furthermore, the normality test of the residuals was estimated and the results are presented in the following figure.



**Figure 3.4.1: Normality Test**

Source: Author's Estimation Using E-Views 10

The normality histogram and the Jarque-Bera statistics have both shown that, the residuals of the model are not normally distributed. However, the violation of the assumption of normality in a distributed lag model does not

have serious consequences on the validity of the estimates. Also, the serial correlation test was estimated using the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test and the result is presented in the following table.

**Table 3.4.2: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test**

|               |          |                     |        |
|---------------|----------|---------------------|--------|
| F-statistic   | 0.981966 | Prob. F(2,43)       | 0.3828 |
| Obs*R-squared | 2.271253 | Prob. Chi-Square(2) | 0.3212 |

Source: Author's Estimation Using E-views 10

The result of both F-statistics and Chi-Square (2) are statistically insignificant indicating the absence of serial correlation among the residuals of the model.

Again, the Heteroskedasticity test was conducted using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey and the results are presented in Table 3.4.3


**Table 3.4.3: Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey**

|               |          |                     |        |
|---------------|----------|---------------------|--------|
| F-statistic   | 1.086019 | Prob. F(6,45)       | 0.3852 |
| Obs*R-squared | 6.577320 | Prob. Chi-Square(6) | 0.3617 |


Source: Author's Estimation Using E-views 10

Both the F-statistics and Chi-Square (2) are statistically insignificant indicating that the residuals are homoscedastic.

Finally, stability test were conducted and the results are presented in the following figures.



**Figure 3.4.5: CUSUM Test of Stability**  
 Source: Author's Estimation Using E-views 10



**Figure 3.4.6: The CUSUM of Squares Test for Stability**  
 Source: Author,s Estimation Using E-Views 10

Both the CUSUM and CUSUM of Square tests have shown the presence of stable estimates, since all the graphs are within the 5% significance critical bounds.

The study found long-run relationship among oil exports, foreign direct investment, and index of openness, exchange rate, oil prices, OPEC quota, and foreign demand. Specifically, the study found that FDI oil and gas has positive and statistically significant

impact on oil export both in the short- and long-run. This finding is in line with Tolkin and Atlay (2019) who found that FDI has positive impact on oil exports. This means that increase in the inflow of foreign investment in the oil and gas will exert positive impact on the volume of oil exports in the country. This could be through huge capital investment, innovations and efficient production techniques in the oil and gas sector.

Also, the study found that oil export has positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth in both the short and long-run in Nigeria. This finding is in tandem with Ugwu et al. (2019); Sultan and Haque (2018) who found positive impact of oil exports on economic growth. This suggests that the export of oil provides revenue for the funding of the economy in diverse ways such as critical infrastructures, welfare services and direct investments in the economy which has a multifaceted impact on the aggregate economy.

Furthermore, the study found that foreign direct investment in the oil and gas sector has positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth in both the short and long-run in Nigeria. This finding is in collaborate Idris and Usman (2022); Udi et al. (2021); Obinne et al. (2020); Alabi (2019); Okey and Amba (2018); and Akinyemi et al. (2018) who found that foreign direct investment positively impact on economic growth. This suggests that the inflow of foreign direct investment in the oil and gas sector affect oil production, exports and revenue which has multiplier effect on the Nigeria economy.

The study also investigated the indirect effect of foreign direct investment on economic growth in Nigeria focusing on employment, foreign reserves and exchange rate channels. The study established that, the employment channel has a positive potential effect on economic growth in Nigeria; however, the channel is weak in transmitting the spillover effect of foreign direct investment in oil and gas industry to economic growth in Nigeria. This can be attributed to high tech in the oil and the employment of expatriates' in the oil and gas sector.

Also, the findings from the foreign reserve channel have revealed positive potential effects on economic growth in Nigeria; however, the channel is weak in transmitting the spillover effects of foreign direct investment in oil and gas sector to economic growth in Nigeria. This weak transmission may be attributed to inefficiencies in reserves management in Nigeria. Again, the study found that the exchange rate has weak

negative potential effect on economic growth in Nigeria. The implication is that, the exchange rate channel is weak in transmitting the spillover effects of foreign direct investment in oil and gas industry to economic growth in Nigeria. This weak transmission may be ascribed to inefficiencies in the management of foreign exchange market that often results in persistent pressure in the market leading to exchange rate depreciation in the country.

Furthermore, the study found that there is a positive pass-through effect from foreign direct investment in oil and gas industry to economic growth via oil exports in Nigeria. The finding is in line with the findings of Istaiteyeh and Ismail (2014) and Belloumi (2014) who found a positive nexus among FDI, oil exports and economic growth. This suggests that increase in the inflows of foreign direct investment in oil and gas will increase oil production and consequently, the exports of oil in the international market which translates to increase in oil revenue that finance investment in critical infrastructure, investment in services and direct domestic investment that propel economic growth in the country.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

On the basis of the findings of this study, it is concluded that, oil and gas exerts strong positive impact on economic growth in Nigeria. Indirectly, oil and gas through employment, foreign reserves and exchange rate channels transmits weak spillover effects to economic growth; but through oil exports, there is a strong pass-through effect to economic growth in Nigeria.

On the basis of the findings the study recommends the followings:

The Government through the ministry of industry, trade and investment in collaboration with the ministry of petroleum and gas should make concerted efforts in attracting and retaining foreign direct investment in the oil and gas sector. This can be done by improving on the investment

climate in the country through control of rising insecurity and economic policies that can ensure economic stability. Also, by ensuring full implementation of the Petroleum Industry Bill in the country.

Pragmatic mechanisms should be put in place by the ministry of defense and interior to forestall oil theft and bunkering. Also, efforts should be made to forestall pipeline leakages. These efforts will go a long way in increasing the volume of oil exports that will guarantee sustained economic growth.

To improve on the positive potentiality of employment transmission effect in the oil and gas industry, there should be adaptation of indigenous technology and indigenous manpower engagement to acquire skills from the expatriates on the job.

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David Vincent Hassan<sup>1</sup>

Adi Pajo<sup>2</sup>

Patience Vincent Hassan<sup>3</sup>

Joyce Mbakosun Ayaga<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1,3&4</sup>Department of Economics, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *davidvincenthassan@yahoo.com*

Email: *patiencevincenthassan@yahoo.com*

<sup>2</sup>Office of the Accountant General, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *pajoadi@gmail.com*



### Abstract

Industrial expert also claim that a committed and sustainable exploration of resources in the blue economy is a job creation enabler, capable of improving food security, tourism and infrastructure development just as it can give real meaning to the country's green energy pursuits among other benefit. To this backdrop, this paper explore the potentials of the blue economy in Nigeria focusing on the sustainable development of the marine and aquatic resources. Through a combination of literature review the paper sourced secondary data from the Central Bank of Nigeria and National Bureau of statistics for the period under study. The study employed the use of Augmented Dickey Fuller test to dictate the presence of unit root among the variables under study and Autoregressive Distributive lag estimate for its analysis. The study was able to identify the current state of the blue economy in Nigeria discover key challenges and opportunity, and proposed strategies for sustainable growth. The finding of the study reveals that there is exist short run, positive and significant relationship between blue economy and sustainable growth in Nigeria, the findings also found out that Nigerian coastal and marine resources has immense economic potentials, but are underutilized and facing significant environmental threats. The study recommend among others the importance of policy support, investment in infrastructure and technology, and community engagement for the successful development of the blue economy in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Blue economy, sustainable growth, marine resources, environmental threats

### Introduction

The blue economy, or the ocean or maritime economy, refers to the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and ocean health. The blue economy encompasses a range of sectors, such as fisheries, aquaculture, shipping, energy, tourism, and marine biotechnology. It's potential to contribute to sustainable development, and poverty reduction has gained attention from policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders (Smith-Godfrey, 2016).

The Nigerian economy, until the late 1960s, heavily relied on agricultural products and a

few solid minerals for its foreign exchange. However, the oil discovery in abundance and subsequent boom in the oil industry during the 1970s led to the abandonment of other predominant sectors, particularly agriculture (blue economy) (Adeyemi & Abiodun, 2021). Blue economy activities, associated with ocean resources, are globally recognised for playing a crucial role in alleviating extreme poverty and hunger through employment and economic opportunities. Nigeria, endowed with a coastline of about 870km and approximately 3,000 kilometres of inland waterways,

possesses various natural resources such as petroleum, natural gas, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, zinc, limestone, lead, and other minerals. The adverse implications of over-dependence on oil underscore the need to diversify towards the blue economy, prompting a shift in focus from oil to alternative economic sectors

Proponents argue that increasing agricultural outputs, particularly from the blue economy, holds significant potential to stimulate growth and development in the Niger Delta region and the broader Nigerian economy. The blue economy, integral to biodiversity, ecosystems, food chains, livelihoods, and climate regulation, offers an innovative approach to sustainable development for a growing global population (Abdullahi, 2018). As the ocean covers about 75% of the Earth's surface and supports more than half of all living things, sustainable management becomes paramount to ensuring its ability to sustain human populations, especially for small island nations like those in the Niger Delta region.

The study recognises the potential linkage between the blue economy, sustainable development, and economic growth, aligning with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. SDG target 14.7 specifically focuses on enhancing economic benefits to Small Island developing states (SIDS), water-enclosed areas, and less developed countries (LDCs), such as the Niger Delta, through the sustainable use of marine resources. The Niger Delta region is at the forefront of blue economy development, acknowledging the crucial role oceans play in humanity's future and providing an approach to sustainable development tailored to the region's circumstances, constraints, and challenges. However, the blue economy also faces modern challenges threatening its sustainability and potential benefits. Climate change, overfishing, pollution, and habitat destruction are significant threats to the health of oceans and their resources. These challenges affect the environment and have economic and social consequences, such as losing biodiversity, livelihoods, and cultural heritage (Bari, 2017).

From a scholarly point of view, the blue economy requires a multidisciplinary approach that combines natural, social, and economic sciences to understand the complex interactions between human activities and ocean ecosystems. Scholars have emphasised the importance of policy coherence, governance frameworks, and stakeholder engagement to ensure the sustainable use of ocean resources. The role of innovation, technology, and finance in supporting the transition to a blue economy has also been highlighted in recent literature (Abhinav et al., 2020). Overall, the blue economy offers opportunities and challenges that require a holistic and integrated approach to balance economic growth with environmental sustainability and social equity

### **Origin and Conceptualization of the Blue Economy**

The idea of the blue economy invented in the early 2000s when sustainable development was gaining adhesion globally. The term "blue economy" was devised by Professor Gunter Pauli a renowned 1994 as an economic philosophy reflecting business models for the future Gunter Pauli, a Belgian entrepreneur and sustainability advocate, in his book "The Blue Economy: 10 Years, 100 Innovations, 100 million Jobs", published in 2011 (Smith-Godfrey, 2016).

Pauli presented the concept of a new kind of economy based on the efficient and sustainable use of marine resources. He argued that the oceans are a source of untapped wealth and could solve many of the world's environmental and economic problems, such as climate change, energy scarcity, and poverty (Pauli, 2011).

Pauli proposed a new business model that imitates the functioning of natural systems and creates value from waste and by-products. He highlighted the potential of aquaculture, renewable energy, and biotechnology sectors to drive economic growth while promoting environmental sustainability and social inclusion (Pauli, 2011).

Since then, the blue economy concept has gained recognition from international organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, as well as from governments, academia, and the private sector. It has become a key driver of sustainable development and a pathway to achieving the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 14, which focuses on the conservation and sustainable use of oceans, seas, and marine resources (Rees et al., 2018).

In addition to Gunter Pauli's contribution to developing the blue economy concept, other influential thinkers and initiatives have contributed to its evolution. For instance, the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, led to the adoption of Agenda 21, a comprehensive plan of action for sustainable development that recognised the importance of the oceans, seas, and coasts in promoting sustainable development. The conference highlighted the need for the integrated management and sustainable use of ocean resources and ecosystems (McCammon, 1992).

Furthermore, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg, South Africa, emphasised the importance of the ocean economy as a driver of economic growth and poverty reduction. The WSSD led to the establishment of the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, which aims to reduce the impacts of human activities on the marine environment (Nath, 2005).

The blue economy has recently gained momentum as a critical strategy for sustainable development. The European Union, for instance, has developed a blue growth strategy that promotes the sustainable use of marine resources. In contrast, the African Union has launched the Blue Economy Strategy, which aims to promote sustainable economic growth, food security, and job

creation by developing marine resources (Bond, 2019; Henderson, 2019).

Overall, the blue economy concept has its roots in the broader sustainable development agenda and has evolved to become a critical pathway to achieving environmental sustainability, economic growth, and social development. The emergence and evolution of the blue economy concept underscore its importance as an alternative economic model for sustainable development, acknowledging nations' dependence on oceans (UNECA, 2016). It reflects a modern view that emphasises sustainability, social justice, and intergenerational equity as guiding principles for further development.

The term "blue economy" was first introduced by Professor Gunter Pauli in 1994 as an economic philosophy reflecting business models for the future (Pauli, 2010). The concept gained prominence during the Rio+20 summit in 2012, introduced by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as an application of green economy principles to the ocean realm. The blue economy seeks to promote economic growth, social inclusion, and the preservation of livelihoods while ensuring environmental sustainability. It aims to decouple socioeconomic development from environmental degradation and optimise the benefits derived from marine resources.

Various definitions highlight the blue economy's focus on the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and job creation while safeguarding the health of ocean ecosystems. The concept covers a wide range of economic activities associated with oceans, seas, and coasts, including established and emerging sectors. Additionally, the blue economy recognises nonmarketable economic benefits, such as carbon storage, coastal protection, cultural values, and diversity.

In summary, the blue economy is viewed as an innovative approach to economic exploitation, encompassing oceans, lakes, rivers, and other bodies of water. The concept



promotes economic growth, social inclusion, and livelihood preservation while ensuring environmental sustainability. This study aims to explore the blue economy and its potential contributions to the national economy, particularly in regions like Nigeria and the Niger Delta, emphasising job creation and improved living conditions for coastal communities and islands

### **Theoretical Framework**

Growth theorists argued that development is an outcome of economic growth while other scholars like (Rostow, 1952; Harrod-Domar, 1957) posited that economic development and growth result from structural changes, savings and investments in an economy. The failure of economic growth in most developing and developed countries of Latin America and Africa, in the late 1970s, to deliver corresponding social goods and solve problems of unemployment, poverty, disease, hunger, illiteracy and ever increasing crimes and wars, necessitated the new thinking, and redefinition of development from economic growth centered perspective to human centered approach.

Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2018) in this light Chandler (2017) sees development as a broader concept that recognizes psychological and material factors that measure human well-being. Development therefore is a multifaceted phenomenon and man centered. It is the process of empowering people to maximize their potentials, and develop the knowledge capacity to exploit nature to meet daily human needs (Rodney, 1972; Nnoli, 1981; Ake, 2001) the transformation of the society and the emergence of new social and economic organizations are critical indicators of development.

Stieglitz (2020) cited in Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2018) Economic development is a product of development and can be defined as the process of economic transformation in a society. Economic development embraces changes taking place in the social sphere

mostly of an economic nature. Thus, economic development is made up of processes caused by exogenous and endogenous factors which determine the course and direction of the development. Economic development is measured with indicators, such as GDP, economic growth, balance of payment equilibrium life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment. Changes in less-tangible factors are also considered, such as personal dignity, freedom of association, personal safety and freedom from fear of physical harm, and the extent of participation in civil society.

Causes of economic impacts are, for example, new technologies, changes in laws, changes in the physical environment and ecological changes. Scholars have identified strong links between security and development since the cold war ended (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2018; Chandler, 2007) they argued that development cannot be achieved in any nation where there are conflicts, crisis and war. There is a consensus in the literature that security and development are two different and inseparable concepts that affect each other, and this has naturally triggered debates on security-development nexus.

### **Research Methodology**

The descriptive and inferential statistic is a very important preliminary test before conducting any test on the variables. The descriptive statistics test is normally carried out to ascertain the characteristics of the variable, it show if the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation of the variables are normally distributed. The decision to accept the null hypothesis lies on the Jarque-Bera probability value.

However if the value of the Jarque-Bera probability is more than 0.5 implies accepting the null hypothesis that the variables are normally distributed and fit for estimation.

### **Test of stationarity**

The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is employed to test for the unit root as the disturbances or the error term in Dickey and fuller unit root test is unlikely to be white noise, the ADF unit root test includes extra

lagged terms of the dependent variable in order to eliminate the problem of autocorrelation the decision to accept or to reject the null hypothesis of  $\delta = 0$  is based on the Dickey –Fuller critical values. The test was then applied as follows

$$\Delta Y_t = \rho Y_{t-1} + a_{2t} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta \Delta Y_{t-1} + U_t \dots \dots \dots \text{equ(3.1)}$$

Where

$\Delta$  = difference operator

$Y_t$  = dependent Variable

$U_t$  = white noise

Under the null hypothesis if  $\rho = 1$  becomes a random walk, that is non-stationary process if  $\rho < 1$  this means that the series  $Y_t$  is stationary. The stationarity test for each of the series is stated as follows

$$\Delta RGDP_t = \rho RGDP_{t-1} + a_{2t} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta \Delta RGDP_{t-1} + U_t \dots \dots \dots \text{equ(3.2)}$$

$$\Delta fAQU_t = \rho DAQU_{t-1} + a_{2t} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta \Delta DAQU_{t-1} + U_t \dots \dots \dots \text{equ(3.3)}$$

$$\Delta STR_t = \rho STR_{t-1} + a_{2t} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta \Delta STR_{t-1} + U_t \dots \dots \dots \text{equ(3.4)}$$

$$\Delta INF_t = \rho INF_{t-1} + a_{2t} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta \Delta INF_{t-1} + U_t \dots \dots \dots \text{equ(3.5)}$$

$$\Delta GF CF_t = \rho GF CF_{t-1} + a_{2t} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta \Delta GF CF_{t-1} + U_t \dots \dots \dots \text{equ(3.6)}$$

$$\Delta EXR_t = \rho EXR_{t-1} + a_{2t} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta \Delta EXR_{t-1} + U_t \dots \dots \dots \text{equ(3.7)}$$

**Descriptive and inferential statistics**

The descriptive and inferential statistic is a very important preliminary test before conducting any test on the variables. The descriptive statistics test is normally carried out to ascertain the characteristics of the variable, it show if the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation of the variables are normally distributed. The decision to accept the null hypothesis lies on the Jarque-Bera probability value.

However if the value of the Jarque-Bera probability is more than 0.5 implies accepting the null hypothesis that the variables are normally distributed and fit for estimation.

**Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates**

ARDL model was introduced by Pesaran et al. (2001) in order to incorporate I(0) and I(1) variables in same estimation so, if your variables are stationary at I(0) then OLS is appropriate and if all are non-stationary I(1)

then it is advisable to do VECM (Johanson Approach) as it is much simple model.

We cannot estimate conventional OLS on the variables if any one of them or all of them are (1) because these variable will not behave like constants which is required in OLS and as most of them are changing in time so OLS will mistakenly show high t values and significant results but in reality it would be inflated because of common time component, in econometric it is called spurious results where R square of the model becomes higher than the Durban Watson Statistic. So we move to a new set of models which can work on I(1) variable

In order to run ARDL some preconditions needed to be checked

- Dependent must be non-stationary in order for the model to behave better.
- None of the variable should be I(2) in normal conditions (ADF test)
- none of the variable should be I(2) in structural break (Zivot Andrews test)

**3.5 Model Specification**

$$\Delta \ln RGDP = \alpha_0 + \partial_2 \ln AQU_{t-1} + \partial_3 \ln STR_{t-1} + \sum_{i=0}^q \Omega \Delta \ln GFCF_{t-1} + \sum_{m=0}^q \lambda \Delta \ln INF_{t-1} + \sum_{n=0}^q \phi \Delta \ln EXR_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \dots \dots \dots (3.7)$$

Where  $\partial_i$  are the long run multipliers,  $\alpha_0$  is the intercept,  $\Omega$  and  $\lambda$  are the speed of adjustment and  $\varepsilon_t$  is the error term.

RGDP = Real gross domestic product  
 AQU = proceed from Aqua resources  
 STR = proceed from Sea Transportation  
 INF = Inflation  
 GFCF = Gross fixed capital formation

EXR = Exchange rate

### 3.4 Error Correction Model

The error correction model was used to answer objective III of the study it express the relationship between RGDP and INSDEX. The error correction model (ECM) was specified below

$$\Delta \ln RGDP_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{j=1}^q \gamma_j \Delta \ln AQU_{t-j} + \sum_{m=0}^q \Omega_m j \Delta \ln STR_{t-m} + \sum_{z=0}^q \phi_z \Delta \ln GFCF_{t-z} + \sum_{m=0}^q \Omega_m j \Delta \ln INF_{t-m} + \sum_{z=0}^q \phi_z \Delta \ln EXR_{t-z} + \Pi \text{ecm}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \dots \dots \dots (3.8)$$

## Results and Discussion

Table 4.1

|              | RGDP     | AQU      | GFCF     | EXR      | INF       | STR      |
|--------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| Mean         | 27.44581 | 22.89638 | 25.28356 | 207.7500 | 23.73626  | 68.61546 |
| Median       | 27.43547 | 22.15243 | 25.33990 | 138.0000 | 24.94306  | 67.49200 |
| Maximum      | 30.67273 | 25.15591 | 28.29214 | 800.0000 | 27.35679  | 103.0810 |
| Minimum      | 24.64067 | 20.64135 | 22.89796 | 45.00000 | 19.23400  | 44.34520 |
| Std. Dev.    | 2.092329 | 1.542474 | 1.697130 | 184.7552 | 2.621560  | 19.90482 |
| Skewness     | 0.014014 | 0.281014 | 0.148851 | 1.987143 | -0.354514 | 0.248450 |
| Kurtosis     | 1.544439 | 1.587295 | 1.716431 | 6.354992 | 1.685155  | 1.663229 |
| Jarque-Bera  | 2.472683 | 2.696880 | 2.025537 | 31.55941 | 2.603463  | 2.372846 |
| Probability  | 0.00455  | 0.000645 | 0.00012  | 0.000000 | 0.000060  | 0.000011 |
| Sum          | 768.4827 | 641.0987 | 707.9396 | 5817.000 | 664.6152  | 1921.233 |
| Sum Sq. Dev. | 118.2017 | 64.23913 | 77.76673 | 921631.3 | 185.5596  | 10697.45 |
| Observations | 28       | 28       | 28       | 28       | 28        | 28       |

**Source: Computed by Authors Using Evies 10**

From table 4.1 is the descriptive statistics which one of the pre-condition on a data before analysis is carried out the above result of the descriptive statistics reveal that all variable under consideration are suitable and fir for the analysis. This is reveal by the Jarque-Beran probability values of the 0.00455, 0.00645, 0.00012, 0.000000, 0.000060, and

0.000011 of the variable RGDP, AQU.GFCF, EXR, INF and STR respectively are less than 0.005 which fall within the acceptances level while the values of the kurtosis fall with the acceptance region and the variable is not skewed to one direction as shown by the values of it skewness

**Table 4.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test**

| Variable | test statistic | critical values | probability | Stationarity |
|----------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------|
| RGDP     | -4.142737      | -3.711457       | 0.0036      | I(I)         |
| AQU      | -6.494575      | -3.711457       | 0.0000      | I(I)         |
| GFCF     | -4.070136      | -3.737853       | 0.0004      | I(I)         |
| EXR      | -1.524725      | -3.752946       | 0.0008      | I(I)         |
| STR      | -5.674493      | -3.711457       | 0.0001      | I(I)         |

|     |           |           |        |      |
|-----|-----------|-----------|--------|------|
| INF | -4.876025 | -3.711457 | 0.0005 | I(0) |
|-----|-----------|-----------|--------|------|

**Source: Computed by Authors**

Table 4.1 is the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test carried out to determine the stationary condition of each variable which is a necessary condition in other to determine the suitable method of analysis to avoid a spurious result. From the analysis the test statistics value of -4.142737 for RGDP is less than the critical value of -3.711457 and the probability value of 0.0036 is less than 0.005 which denotes rejection of the hypothesis that RGDP has unit root and accept the alternative that RGDP has no unit at 1%, similarly the test statistics value of -6.494575 for AQU is less than the critical value of -3.711457 and the probability value of 0.0000 is less than 0.005 which denotes rejection of the hypothesis that AQU has unit root and accept the alternative that AQU has no unit at 1%, similarly on the same vein the test statistics value of -4.070135 for GFCF is less than the critical value of -3.737853 and the probability value of 0.0036 is less than 0.005 which denotes rejection of the hypothesis that GFCF has unit root and accept the alternative that GFCF has no unit at 1%, similarly.

Furthermore, the test statistics value of -1.524725 for EXR is less than the critical value

of -3.752946 and the probability value of 0.0008 is less than 0.005 which denotes rejection of the hypothesis that EXR has unit root and accept the alternative that EXR has no unit at 1%, also the test statistics value of -5.674493 for STR is less than the critical value of -3.711457 and the probability value of 0.0001 is less than 0.005 which denotes rejection of the hypothesis that STR has unit root and accept the alternative that STR has no unit at 1% this show that all variable are non-stationary variable but became stationary after first differencing at 1% level also and on a different measurement INF is a stationonary series as it is reveals by the test statistics value of -4.876025 which is less than critical test value of -3.711457 with a probability value of 0.0005 which denotes accepted the alternative that INF is a stationary series.

Based on the stationary condition of the variables Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates is selected for the analysis which is capable of incorporation I (0) and I (0) in the same estimation

**Table: 4.3 Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimate**

| Regressor | Coefficient | Standard Error | T-Ratio[Prob] |
|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------|
| AQU       | .19858      | .074555        | 2.6636[.001]  |
| STR       | .00441269   | .0049818       | .82839[.417]  |
| EXR       | -.01618E-4  | .2971E-3       | .054456[.007] |
| GFCF      | .0127137    | .11549         | 2.3497[.002]  |
| INF       | -.16570     | .045271        | 3.6603[.002]  |

**Source: Computed by Authurs Using Microfit**

Table 4.3 is the estimate for the variable under consideration from the analysis is reveals that 1 unit increase in real gross domestic product RGDP in Nigeria, is as a result 19.855 percent of AQU which is the proxy for proceed marine resources contributes in the model secondly the finding of the study reveals that 1 unit increase in real gross domestic product is

influence by only 4 percent of STR which is a proxy for proceed from sea transportation. The analysis of the finding reveal that exchange rate has affected potentials of marine transport negatively during the period under review. The analysis reveals that 1 unit increase in exchange rate will lead to 6 percent decrease in real gross domestic product in

Nigeria for the period under study, similarly the findings of the study reveals that 1 unit increase in gross domestic product is influence 0.127 percent of gross fixed capital formation. While lastly 1 unit 1 unit increase in real gross

domestic product will lead to 0.1657 percent decrease in inflation. The probability values for AUQ, EXR, INF and GFCF show that the variables are significant.

**Table: 4.4 Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model**

| Regressor | Coefficient | Standard Error | Ratio[Prob]   |
|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------|
| dAQU      | .19858      | .074555        | 2.6636[.015]  |
| dSTR      | -.0041269   | .0049818       | .82839[.417]  |
| dEXR      | .1618E-4    | .2971E-3       | .054456[.957] |
| dGFCF     | .27137      | .11549         | 2.3497[.029]  |
| dINF      | .16570      | .045271        | 3.6603[.001]  |
| ecm(-1)   | -.62003     | .16937         | 3.6609[.001]  |

Source: Computed by Authors Using Microfit.

Table 4.4 is the error correction model which show that if there is deviation from equilibrium from the variables under consideration it adjust back to equilibrium by 62 percent as the speed of adjustment. The analysi reveal that even the variables exhibit random work will converge after 6 year 2month which show a short run relation.

more infrastructure in and acquire modern technology to deal with illegal fishing and improper use of Nigerian water ways and thirdly the ministry of blue and marine economy need necessary legislative framework to strengthen its activities and also to be able to monitor the Nigerian water ways effectively.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The findings of the study reveals that proceed from marine resources contributes to 19% to the real gross domestic product which is the proxy for economic growth, while only 4% of the proceed from sea transportation contributes to real gross domestic product, the result of the finding reveals that both exchange rate and inflation affect real gross domestic product negatively while only 12% of the access of marine potentials have been utilized which in summary entails that Nigeria is not harnessing up to 15% of its marine resources which is capable of contributing to its real gross domestic product

Having fund out the positive contribution of marine resources and it potentials to the Nigerian economy, the study recommend that government should ensure proper utilization of Nigerian water ways in other to harness it potential secondly government should build

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## APPENDIX

|                         | RGDP                 | AQU                  | GFCF                 | EXR                  | INF                  | STR                  |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Mean                    | 27.44581             | 22.89638             | 25.28356             | 207.7500             | 23.73626             | 68.61546             |
| Median                  | 27.43547             | 22.15243             | 25.33990             | 138.0000             | 24.94306             | 67.49200             |
| Maximum                 | 30.67273             | 25.15591             | 28.29214             | 800.0000             | 27.35679             | 103.0810             |
| Minimum                 | 24.64067             | 20.64135             | 22.89796             | 45.00000             | 19.23400             | 44.34520             |
| Std. Dev.               | 2.092329             | 1.542474             | 1.697130             | 184.7552             | 2.621560             | 19.90482             |
| Skewness                | 0.014014             | 0.281014             | 0.148851             | 1.987143             | -0.354514            | 0.248450             |
| Kurtosis                | 1.544439             | 1.587295             | 1.716431             | 6.354992             | 1.685155             | 1.663229             |
| Jarque-Bera Probability | 2.472683<br>0.290445 | 2.696880<br>0.259645 | 2.025537<br>0.363212 | 31.55941<br>0.000000 | 2.603463<br>0.272060 | 2.372846<br>0.305311 |
| Sum                     | 768.4827             | 641.0987             | 707.9396             | 5817.000             | 664.6152             | 1921.233             |
| Sum Sq. Dev.            | 118.2017             | 64.23913             | 77.76673             | 921631.3             | 185.5596             | 10697.45             |
| Observations            | 28                   | 28                   | 28                   | 28                   | 28                   | 28                   |

Null Hypothesis: RGDP has a unit root  
 Exogenous: Constant  
 Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | 0.485144    | 0.9829 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.699871   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.976263   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.627420   |        |

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
 Dependent Variable: D(RGDP)  
 Method: Least Squares  
 Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:15  
 Sample (adjusted): 1997 2023  
 Included observations: 27 after adjustments

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error            | t-Statistic | Prob.     |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------|
| RGDP(-1)           | 0.008453    | 0.017423              | 0.485144    | 0.6318    |
| C                  | -0.007569   | 0.477369              | -0.015856   | 0.9875    |
| R-squared          | 0.009327    | Mean dependent var    |             | 0.223410  |
| Adjusted R-squared | -0.030300   | S.D. dependent var    |             | 0.177888  |
| S.E. of regression | 0.180563    | Akaike info criterion |             | -0.514289 |
| Sum squared resid  | 0.815073    | Schwarz criterion     |             | -0.418301 |
| Log likelihood     | 8.942902    | Hannan-Quinn criter.  |             | -0.485747 |
| F-statistic        | 0.235365    | Durbin-Watson stat    |             | 1.605207  |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.631798    |                       |             |           |

Null Hypothesis: D(RGDP) has a unit root  
 Exogenous: Constant  
 Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | -4.142737   | 0.0036 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.711457   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.981038   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.629906   |        |

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
 Dependent Variable: D(RGDP,2)  
 Method: Least Squares  
 Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:16  
 Sample (adjusted): 1998 2023  
 Included observations: 26 after adjustments

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error            | t-Statistic | Prob.     |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------|
| D(RGDP(-1))        | -0.817098   | 0.197236              | -4.142737   | 0.0004    |
| C                  | 0.189259    | 0.056819              | 3.330905    | 0.0028    |
| R-squared          | 0.416942    | Mean dependent var    |             | 0.003230  |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.392648    | S.D. dependent var    |             | 0.227778  |
| S.E. of regression | 0.177514    | Akaike info criterion |             | -0.545734 |
| Sum squared resid  | 0.756267    | Schwarz criterion     |             | -0.448957 |
| Log likelihood     | 9.094536    | Hannan-Quinn criter.  |             | -0.517865 |
| F-statistic        | 17.16227    | Durbin-Watson stat    |             | 2.023945  |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.000367    |                       |             |           |

Null Hypothesis: AQU has a unit root  
 Exogenous: Constant  
 Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | -0.648149   | 0.8434 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.699871   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.976263   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.627420   |        |

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
 Dependent Variable: D(AQU)  
 Method: Least Squares  
 Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:17  
 Sample (adjusted): 1997 2023  
 Included observations: 27 after adjustments

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error            | t-Statistic | Prob.    |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------|
| AQU(-1)            | -0.025747   | 0.039724              | -0.648149   | 0.5228   |
| C                  | 0.748990    | 0.908365              | 0.824547    | 0.4174   |
| R-squared          | 0.016526    | Mean dependent var    |             | 0.161479 |
| Adjusted R-squared | -0.022813   | S.D. dependent var    |             | 0.303349 |
| S.E. of regression | 0.306789    | Akaike info criterion |             | 0.545877 |
| Sum squared resid  | 2.352994    | Schwarz criterion     |             | 0.641865 |
| Log likelihood     | -5.369336   | Hannan-Quinn criter.  |             | 0.574419 |
| F-statistic        | 0.420097    | Durbin-Watson stat    |             | 2.503600 |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.522798    |                       |             |          |

Null Hypothesis: D(AQU) has a unit root  
 Exogenous: Constant  
 Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | -6.494575   | 0.0000 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.711457   |        |



|           |           |
|-----------|-----------|
| 5% level  | -2.981038 |
| 10% level | -2.629906 |

\*Mackinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation

Dependent Variable: D(AQU,2)

Method: Least Squares

Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:18

Sample (adjusted): 1998 2023

Included observations: 26 after adjustments

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error            | t-Statistic | Prob.     |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------|
| D(AQU(-1))         | -1.296975   | 0.199701              | -6.494575   | 0.0000    |
| C                  | 0.212873    | 0.068652              | 3.100773    | 0.0049    |
| R-squared          | 0.637350    | Mean dependent var    |             | -0.012330 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.622240    | S.D. dependent var    |             | 0.491556  |
| S.E. of regression | 0.302121    | Akaike info criterion |             | 0.517828  |
| Sum squared resid  | 2.190656    | Schwarz criterion     |             | 0.614605  |
| Log likelihood     | -4.731763   | Hannan-Quinn criter.  |             | 0.545696  |
| F-statistic        | 42.17951    | Durbin-Watson stat    |             | 1.872034  |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.000001    |                       |             |           |

Null Hypothesis: GFCF has a unit root

Exogenous: Constant

Lag Length: 3 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | -0.537406   | 0.8670 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.737853   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.991878   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.635542   |        |

\*Mackinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation

Dependent Variable: D(GFCF)

Method: Least Squares

Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:18

Sample (adjusted): 2000 2023

Included observations: 24 after adjustments

| Variable    | Coefficient | Std. Error | t-Statistic | Prob.  |
|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|--------|
| GFCF(-1)    | -0.017538   | 0.032635   | -0.537406   | 0.5972 |
| D(GFCF(-1)) | 0.348396    | 0.203003   | 1.716212    | 0.1024 |
| D(GFCF(-2)) | -0.366984   | 0.227056   | -1.616270   | 0.1225 |
| D(GFCF(-3)) | 0.556276    | 0.237645   | 2.340786    | 0.0303 |
| C           | 0.555362    | 0.801545   | 0.692864    | 0.4968 |

|                    |          |                       |           |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------------|-----------|
| R-squared          | 0.281385 | Mean dependent var    | 0.207436  |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.130097 | S.D. dependent var    | 0.229393  |
| S.E. of regression | 0.213952 | Akaike info criterion | -0.063079 |
| Sum squared resid  | 0.869733 | Schwarz criterion     | 0.182349  |
| Log likelihood     | 5.756949 | Hannan-Quinn criter.  | 0.002033  |
| F-statistic        | 1.859936 | Durbin-Watson stat    | 1.812858  |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.159131 |                       |           |

Null Hypothesis: D(GFCF) has a unit root

Exogenous: Constant

Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | -4.070136   | 0.0004 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.737853   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.991878   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.635542   |        |

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation

Dependent Variable: D(GFCF,2)

Method: Least Squares

Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:19

Sample (adjusted): 2000 2023

Included observations: 24 after adjustments

| Variable      | Coefficient | Std. Error | t-Statistic | Prob.  |
|---------------|-------------|------------|-------------|--------|
| D(GFCF(-1))   | -0.552576   | 0.266927   | -2.070136   | 0.0516 |
| D(GFCF(-1),2) | -0.136702   | 0.228089   | -0.599338   | 0.5557 |
| D(GFCF(-2),2) | -0.507151   | 0.215425   | -2.354188   | 0.0289 |
| C             | 0.125976    | 0.062700   | 2.009185    | 0.0582 |

|                    |          |                       |           |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------------|-----------|
| R-squared          | 0.563224 | Mean dependent var    | 0.019852  |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.497708 | S.D. dependent var    | 0.296467  |
| S.E. of regression | 0.210113 | Akaike info criterion | -0.131326 |
| Sum squared resid  | 0.882953 | Schwarz criterion     | 0.065016  |
| Log likelihood     | 5.575918 | Hannan-Quinn criter.  | -0.079237 |
| F-statistic        | 8.596696 | Durbin-Watson stat    | 1.778574  |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.000726 |                       |           |

Null Hypothesis: EXR has a unit root

Exogenous: Constant

Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | 3.194244    | 1.0000 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.724070   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.986225   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.632604   |        |

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation

Dependent Variable: D(EXR)

Method: Least Squares

Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:20

Sample (adjusted): 1999 2023

Included observations: 25 after adjustments

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error            | t-Statistic | Prob.    |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------|
| EXR(-1)            | 0.331544    | 0.103794              | 3.194244    | 0.0044   |
| D(EXR(-1))         | 0.363550    | 0.300735              | 1.208869    | 0.2401   |
| D(EXR(-2))         | -1.056835   | 0.338167              | -3.125186   | 0.0051   |
| C                  | -25.72750   | 13.94223              | -1.845292   | 0.0791   |
| R-squared          | 0.716374    | Mean dependent var    |             | 29.32000 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.675856    | S.D. dependent var    |             | 49.63342 |
| S.E. of regression | 28.25810    | Akaike info criterion |             | 9.666284 |
| Sum squared resid  | 16768.92    | Schwarz criterion     |             | 9.861304 |
| Log likelihood     | -116.8285   | Hannan-Quinn criter.  |             | 9.720374 |
| F-statistic        | 17.68042    | Durbin-Watson stat    |             | 1.861630 |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.000006    |                       |             |          |

Null Hypothesis: D(EXR) has a unit root

Exogenous: Constant

Lag Length: 3 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | 1.524725    | 0.0008 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.752946   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.998064   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.638752   |        |

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation

Dependent Variable: D(EXR,2)

Method: Least Squares

Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:21

Sample (adjusted): 2001 2023

Included observations: 23 after adjustments

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error            | t-Statistic | Prob.    |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------|
| D(EXR(-1))         | 1.116532    | 0.732284              | 1.524725    | 0.1447   |
| D(EXR(-1),2)       | -1.278588   | 0.884142              | -1.446134   | 0.1653   |
| D(EXR(-2),2)       | -1.849458   | 0.769060              | -2.404830   | 0.0272   |
| D(EXR(-3),2)       | -0.955852   | 0.576419              | -1.658258   | 0.1146   |
| C                  | -3.545769   | 10.51780              | -0.337121   | 0.7399   |
| R-squared          | 0.398550    | Mean dependent var    |             | 3.391304 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.264894    | S.D. dependent var    |             | 37.69946 |
| S.E. of regression | 32.32287    | Akaike info criterion |             | 9.979087 |

|                   |           |                      |          |
|-------------------|-----------|----------------------|----------|
| Sum squared resid | 18805.82  | Schwarz criterion    | 10.22593 |
| Log likelihood    | -109.7595 | Hannan-Quinn criter. | 10.04117 |
| F-statistic       | 2.981919  | Durbin-Watson stat   | 2.053667 |
| Prob(F-statistic) | 0.047241  |                      |          |

Null Hypothesis: STR has a unit root  
 Exogenous: Constant  
 Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | 0.573648    | 0.9862 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.699871   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.976263   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.627420   |        |

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
 Dependent Variable: D(STR)  
 Method: Least Squares  
 Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:22  
 Sample (adjusted): 1997 2023  
 Included observations: 27 after adjustments

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error            | t-Statistic | Prob.    |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------|
| STR(-1)            | 0.019851    | 0.034605              | 0.573648    | 0.5713   |
| C                  | 0.798131    | 2.418844              | 0.329964    | 0.7442   |
| R-squared          | 0.012992    | Mean dependent var    |             | 2.134952 |
| Adjusted R-squared | -0.026488   | S.D. dependent var    |             | 3.324226 |
| S.E. of regression | 3.367965    | Akaike info criterion |             | 5.337682 |
| Sum squared resid  | 283.5797    | Schwarz criterion     |             | 5.433670 |
| Log likelihood     | -70.05870   | Hannan-Quinn criter.  |             | 5.366224 |
| F-statistic        | 0.329073    | Durbin-Watson stat    |             | 2.332393 |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.571331    |                       |             |          |

Null Hypothesis: D(STR) has a unit root  
 Exogenous: Constant  
 Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | -5.674493   | 0.0001 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.711457   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.981038   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.629906   |        |

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
 Dependent Variable: D(STR,2)  
 Method: Least Squares

Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:22  
 Sample (adjusted): 1998 2023  
 Included observations: 26 after adjustments

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error            | t-Statistic | Prob.     |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------|
| D(STR(-1))         | -1.147459   | 0.202213              | -5.674493   | 0.0000    |
| C                  | 2.540556    | 0.803362              | 3.162407    | 0.0042    |
| R-squared          | 0.572953    | Mean dependent var    |             | -0.007627 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.555159    | S.D. dependent var    |             | 5.092681  |
| S.E. of regression | 3.396635    | Akaike info criterion |             | 5.357251  |
| Sum squared resid  | 276.8911    | Schwarz criterion     |             | 5.454028  |
| Log likelihood     | -67.64426   | Hannan-Quinn criter.  |             | 5.385119  |
| F-statistic        | 32.19987    | Durbin-Watson stat    |             | 2.019605  |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.000008    |                       |             |           |

Null Hypothesis: INF has a unit root  
 Exogenous: Constant  
 Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

|  | t-Statistic | Prob.* |
|--|-------------|--------|
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic | -4.876025   | 0.0005 |
| Test critical values:                  |             |        |
| 1% level                               | -3.711457   |        |
| 5% level                               | -2.981038   |        |
| 10% level                              | -2.629906   |        |

\*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
 Dependent Variable: D(INF)  
 Method: Least Squares  
 Date: 04/21/24 Time: 10:24  
 Sample (adjusted): 1998 2023  
 Included observations: 26 after adjustments

| Variable           | Coefficient | Std. Error            | t-Statistic | Prob.    |
|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------|
| INF(-1)            | -0.041776   | 0.047688              | -0.876025   | 0.3901   |
| D(INF(-1))         | -0.514468   | 0.173350              | -2.967800   | 0.0069   |
| C                  | 1.434840    | 1.137566              | 1.261324    | 0.2198   |
| R-squared          | 0.301122    | Mean dependent var    |             | 0.284968 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.240350    | S.D. dependent var    |             | 0.673768 |
| S.E. of regression | 0.587242    | Akaike info criterion |             | 1.881407 |
| Sum squared resid  | 7.931617    | Schwarz criterion     |             | 2.026572 |
| Log likelihood     | -21.45829   | Hannan-Quinn criter.  |             | 1.923209 |
| F-statistic        | 4.954937    | Durbin-Watson stat    |             | 1.861807 |
| Prob(F-statistic)  | 0.016241    |                       |             |          |

Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates  
 ARDL(1,0,0,0,1) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 Dependent variable is RGDP

27 observations used for estimation from 1997 to 2023

```
*****
Regressor      Coefficient   Standard Error   T-Ratio[Prob]
RGDP(-1)      .37997        .16937           2.2435[.036]
AQU            .19858        .074555          2.6636[.001]
STR            .00441269    .0049818         .82839[.417]
EXR            -.01618E-4    .2971E-3         .054456[.007]
GFCF          .0127137     .11549           2.3497[.001]
INF            -.16570       .045271          3.6603[.002]
INF(-1)       .086742      .053667          1.6163[.002]
*****
R-Squared      .99684        R-Bar-Squared    .99589
S.E. of Regression .13182      F-stat. F( 6, 20) 1052.1[.000]
Mean of Dependent Variable 27.5497      S.D. of Dependent Variable 2.0573
Residual Sum of Squares .34753      Equation Log-likelihood 20.4508
Akaike Info. Criterion 13.4508      Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 8.9154
DW-statistic   2.1873      Durbin's h-statistic 1.0247[.306]
*****
```

Diagnostic Tests

```
*****
* Test Statistics *      LM Version      *      F Version      *
*****
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= .38935[.533]*F( 1, 19).27799[.604]*
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= .80787[.369]*F( 1, 19).58604[.453]*
* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 5.6122[.060]* Not applicable *
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= .028152[.867]*F( 1, 25)026094[.873]*
*****
```

- A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
- B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
- C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
- D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values

Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL Model  
 ARDL(1,0,0,0,1) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion

\*\*\*\*\*

Dependent variable is dRGDP

27 observations used for estimation from 1997 to 2023

```
*****
Regressor      Coefficient   Standard Error   Ratio[Prob]
dAQU            .19858        .074555          2.6636[.015]
dSTR            -.0041269    .0049818         .82839[.417]
dEXR            .1618E-4     .2971E-3         .054456[.957]
dGFCF          .27137       .11549           2.3497[.029]
dINF            .16570       .045271          3.6603[.001]
ecm(-1)        -.62003      .16937           3.6609[.001]
*****
```

List of additional temporary variables created:

- dRGDP = RGDP-RGDP(-1)
- dAQU = AQU-AQU(-1)
- dSTR = STR-STR(-1)
- dEXR = EXR-EXR(-1)
- dGFCF = GFCF-GFCF(-1)
- dINF = INF-INF(-1) ecm = RGDP - .32028\*AQU + .0066559\*STR -.2610E-4\*EXR -.43768\*GFCF .4071 5\*INF

```
*****  
R-Squared           .57760   R-Bar-Squared      .45088  
S.E. of Regression  .13182   F-stat. F( 5, 21)  5.4698[.002]  
Mean of Dependent Variable .22341   S.D. of Dependent Variable .17789  
Residual Sum of Squares .34753   Equation Log-likelihood 20.4508  
Akaike Info. Criterion 13.4508   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 8.9154  
DW-statistic        2.1873  
*****
```

R-Squared and R-Bar-Squared measures refer to the dependent variable dRGDP and in cases where the error correction model is highly restricted, these measures could become negative.

## IMPACT OF E-LIBRARY ON ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE OF STUDENTS ACROSS DISCIPLINES IN SELECTED TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS IN ZARIA, KADUNA STATE NIGERIA

Ogunwede Olanrenwaju Abimbola<sup>1</sup>

Zakari Yusuf Halilu<sup>2</sup>

Afolayan Sarafa Olayinka<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1-3</sup>Department of Economics

Federal College of Education, Zaria, Nigeria

Email: [lanrewede@gmail.com](mailto:lanrewede@gmail.com)

Email: [yusufhaliluzakari@gmail.com](mailto:yusufhaliluzakari@gmail.com)

Email: [afolayanola2014@gmail.com](mailto:afolayanola2014@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The role of libraries in tertiary institutions cannot be amplified due to the tripartite function they perform in research, learning, and teaching. The current study attempts to examine the impact of e-library on the academic performance of students across disciplines in select tertiary institutions in Zaria. The study adopted the descriptive survey design and the sample size of 391 respondents was drawn from the population which comprised students of Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Nuhu Bamalli Polytechnic, and Federal College of Education, Zaria employing the stratified sampling technique. The sum of 391 questionnaires was administered to the respondents utilising the simple random sampling (SRS) technique whereas the data was analysed using descriptive statistics. The findings of our study revealed that the majority of the respondents do not agree that e-library aids their academic performance despite admitting to the benefits of e-library and the adequate institutional support for accessing and using e-library resources. Consequently, policymakers and administrators of education should deploy more resources to these institutions to strengthen infrastructure and enhance support services.

**Keywords:** E-library, academic performance, tertiary institutions, Zaria, Nigeria

### Introduction

The role of libraries in tertiary institutions cannot be overemphasized. This stems from the tripartite pivotal support they provide to any institution of higher learning in the area of teaching, research and learning. Bribena et al. (2021) argued that matters arising from the evolution of academic libraries in the last 10 years have largely been on the advancement of information communication technology, latest concepts in teaching and learning, modern economic models and legal frameworks. In Nigeria, there has been a gradual paradigm shift from the archaic traditional library or physical library system to an electronic library or otherwise known as e-library as a result of the adoption and

increased consumption of information communication technology (ICT) particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 which further democratise the information technology space.

E-library is a medium through which electronic materials and/or resources such as online journals, e-books, academic databases, web directory, etc. are accessed using internet-enabled devices (Chime & Ekwueme, 2023) consumed by students, teachers and other researchers. Chime and Ekwueme (2023) averred that these materials provided by the e-library are enhancers of research and academic work. The emergence of e-libraries in Nigerian higher institutions has facilitated



access to a variety of cross border information by students, teachers and other members of the academic community in real-time and without hassles (Moorthy et al., 2019). This stems from the fact that academic performance oftentimes is an important measure of learning objectives.

Academic performance according to Ejegwa and Mngutyo (2023) measures the success of educatee in different courses. Adding that, educationist generally utilise scores from graded tests, rate of graduation, and class performance to assess students' success. The rationale behind integrating electronic technology in libraries is to have non-passive students in education (Udoudoh et al., 2021). Nonetheless, in spite of the conceivable gains from the adoption of e-library in Nigerian academic institutions, there are infrastructural bottlenecks such as poor internet connectivity and epileptic power supply, congestion of library facilities, inadequate technical staff and student know-how (Ejegwa & Mngutyo, 2023; Adeeko et al., 2023; Chime & Ekwueme, 2023; Bribena et al., 2021) that have hindered the full utilization of this important resource in the nation's higher education sector.

To this end, a critical survey of literatures suggests that prior studies in this area have focused attention on examining the overall positive impact of e-library on students' academic performance as it relates to scoring higher grades in examination as well as the graduation rate of students (see Chisadza et al., 2021; Alasa & Quadri, 2022; Onobrakpor & Ibegwam, 2020; Girei, 2022; Udoudoh et al., 2021; Ogunbodede & Oribhabor, 2022; Archibong, 2022). Likewise, some group of studies evaluated the perception plus experiences of students in the utilization of e-library resources and its influence on their academics (see Omotayo & Haliru, 2020; Moorthy et al., 2018; Dada et al., 2019; Alzahrani et al., 2017; Rosman et al., 2019; Anser et al., 2021; Ofordile et al., 2019; Sadiku et al., 2019). In these studies, the authors

focused attention on how often students use this facility, the kind and the quality of materials they are able to access and the user interface or how user friendly it is. Equally, there are studies that investigated accessibility or ease of access to digital resources and the quality of the network infrastructure of e-library in tertiary institutions of Nigeria. This is demonstrated in studies by (Agwunobi & Umoren, 2020; Ofordile et al., 2019; Udoudoh et al., 2021; Pinho et al., 2020; Bribena et al., 2021; Okeji & Mayowa-Adebara, 2020; Moses et al., 2023).

However, in spite of these studies there is paucity of studies on discipline centred analysis. That is, no studies to the knowledge of the authors that have considered in detail the unevenness of the impact of e-library resource utilization on the academic outcomes of students across the different academic disciplines (sciences, social sciences and arts) found in the Nigerian tertiary institutions. This is because the needs, experiences as well as exposure in terms of information technology literacy levels differs amongst students. Also, there is a dearth of literatures on comparative analysis of the impact of e-library utilization across the different tiers of tertiary institutions in the country. This is because a comparative study will allow for identifying, the similarities and dissimilarities as well as issues around best practices in the consumption of e-library resource for the actualization of the gains therein particularly for the students. Therefore, the motivation for this research is hinged on the criticalness to address these identified gaps; and to make far reaching pragmatic recommendations that will enhance the utilization and assimilation of e-library materials by students in the nation's tertiary education sector.

While the aim of this research project is to examine the impact of e-library on academic performance of students across different academic disciplines in selected tertiary institutions in Zaria, its objectives include - investigating the use of e-library resources by

students across academic disciplines in the select tertiary institutions in Zaria; assessing the different patterns of use of e-library resources by students of diverse disciplines in the select tertiary institutions in Zaria; and evaluating the discrepancies in institutional factors such as e-library infrastructure, policies etc. amongst the select tertiary institutions in Zaria.

The next section of the research reviews related theories and empirical literatures on the theme of the research. While sections three and four separately focus on the methodology and analysis and discussion of the research findings, section five concludes the study with recommendations.

### **Theoretical Review**

Several theories have been employed to underpin the utilization of technology in libraries of tertiary institutions to make the academic journey rewarding particularly for students. However, for this study, the authors relied on the technology acceptance model (TAM) due to its prominence in the literature and relevance to the research study and the access theory to complement the TAM theory. TAM centres on behavioural intent and patterns of technology usage whereas the access theory emphasizes the availability of technological resources for students use.

TAM is a theory based on information systems that seeks to explain the adoption and use of technology by individuals (Davis, 1989). It states that individuals embrace and utilize technology in accordance with “perceived usefulness (PU)” plus the “perceived ease of use (PEOU)” (see Venkatesh, Morris, Davis & Davis, 2003; Davis 1989). It also underscored that behavioural intention (BI) and one’s attitude toward the use of technology are a function of PU and PEOU.

For this purpose, PU gauges students’ perception of how the use of e-library resources will help them reach their learning objectives, perform better academically, and have access to a greater variety of information,

while PEOU tallies the extent to which students believe that using e-library resources is user-friendly and doesn’t require a lot of work. Likewise, attitude (A) and BI consider how the general disposition of students to utilize e-library affects how they intend to use the resources that are made available. The actual system use (ASU) measures the extent of active engagement of e-library resources by students for their academic work (Iwemi, 2020).

Access theory, on the other hand, highlights the significance of having access to electronic resources. It posits that students’ academic success is directly impacted by their access to a variety of digital resources, including databases, journals, and e-books allowing them to study and conduct research independently unconstrained by the traditional library environment. Jantti and Cox (2013) argued that students can overcome convectional information barriers like physical and geographical limitations by having access to electronic resources.

Therefore, TAM offers a valuable theoretical framework for comprehending and forecasting the adoption and utilization of electronic libraries. Also, access theory ensures that the necessary conditions for the acceptance and usage of technology are fulfilled in terms of unhindered access to electronic materials in the context of e-library for better academic outcomes in higher institutions of learning.

### **Empirical Review**

This section provides a concise review of extant literature about the impact of e-library on the academic performance of students across disciplines in selected tertiary institutions in Zaria to understand the contemporary scholarly debate in this area.

In a comparative analysis of e-learning availability and utilization in tertiary institutions in Kogi and Benue State of Nigeria, Obaloko, Akpa and Ameh (2024) use a t-test to determine the variation in the sets of means. The outcome shows how these institutions are currently doing

and how much e-learning resources are needed. It also highlighted the degree to which each institution uses e-learning tools. Consequently, it was recommended that the government give e-learning in these institutions of learning priority when allocating funding.

A simple percentage analysis was used to assess the impact of the virtual library on undergraduate students' academic performance in the Department of medicine and Surgery at Benue State University in Makurdi, Nigeria. The findings by Ejegwa, and Mngutyo (2023) indicate that the majority of undergraduate medical students are not well-versed in the virtual library's resources, that their usage of the virtual library is limited due to their busy schedules of lectures and clinical rotations, and that using the virtual library's resources improves rather than worsens their academic performance. In addition, inadequate or erratic internet access, an inconsistent power source, and a lack of open space to review the virtual library's resources are other barriers to its effective use. The study recommended that a series of seminars be held by the Department of Medicine and Surgery's administrators and the College of Health Sciences to educate undergraduate medical students about the value of the resources contained in the virtual library.

Adeeko et al. (2023) conducted a study to examine the correlational impact of personal characteristics on library use among undergraduates in Nigerian universities. The study used a multistage sampling approach with a purposive sample method to achieve its goals, and the results indicate that undergraduate students at federal universities in North-Central, Nigeria used libraries based on their circumstances. Therefore, to increase library utilization, the many stakeholders in the university library must disseminate knowledge of the role of the library through ongoing awareness campaigns.

In their study, Chime and Ekwueme (2023) investigated the difficulties postgraduate students encountered when using Electronic Information Resources (EIRs) at Southeast

Federal Universities for research purposes. The results indicate that plagiarism, insufficient network computers, frequent system failures, insufficient bandwidth, irrelevant information, and a lack of cooperation from library staff are among the difficulties faced by postgraduate students when using electronic resources for research output. As a result, information about these resources accessibility to graduate students and increased financial support for libraries, among other things that can improve students' use of the resources, should be made public.

Barfi et al. (2023) used a multivariate structural equation modelling approach to investigate the acceptance of e-library and support services for distance education students. They discovered a negative correlation between students' intent to use the e-library and support services and their operational and strategic skills. However, it was discovered that social influence was a substantial predictor of students' propensity to use the e-library and support services. For students to effectively use e-library services, the study underscored the need for distance education institutions to offer courses that develop their operational and strategic skills.

Evaluating how often students of biological sciences in the University of Calabar, Nigeria, use the library. Mbere (2023) used a t-test, and the study discovered that student use of print resources (t-value: 90.13), e-resources (t-value: 75.75), internet facilities (t-value: 54.6), and computer and electronic databases (t-value: 93.29) is not statistically significant or positive in the University of Calabar's biological sciences. Therefore, it was suggested that sufficient e-library resources be set up by the university library for student access.

Igbozuruike, and Ile (2022) conducted a study on knowledge of digital skills and e-library information resource usage among post-graduate students in River State, Nigeria. The study used both descriptive and correlation techniques and found that one

tactic to increase PG students' understanding of digital skills is to schedule frequent training sessions aimed at enhancing their search skills in e-libraries. Therefore, the Universities should continue to support and launch programmes designed to help postgraduate students develop digital and information resourcing skills so they can become more adept at browsing, searching, and finding pertinent information from electronic databases and libraries, according to the study's recommendations.

In 2021, Bribena et al. (2021) carried out research on the problems and prospects of electronic libraries in Nigerian tertiary institutions. The five likely causes of management issues as itemized by the study are planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling. As a result, the traditional library's internal structures must be reorganized, and librarians will need to overcome these organizational obstacles.

In a survey, Onwubiko (2020) examined how integrating e-learning into the teaching-learning process could improve students' learning and comprehension of library use in federal universities in Nigeria. Using a descriptive statistic, the findings imply that e-learning is a vital instrument for improving instruction and student comprehension of library use in Nigerian federal universities.

Another significant study examined a few key variables that affect how well Federal College of Agricultural Ishiagu, Ivo LGA, students in Ebonyi state, Nigeria, use electronic libraries. Using frequency distribution, mean scores, tables, and the t-test statistical tool, Aniedu et al. (2019) demonstrated that skill, individual characteristics, and environmental factors have a substantial impact on how users utilize e-libraries. Thus, school administrators must provide librarians and information scientists with ongoing training and retraining to enable them to acquire the skill sets required for efficiently providing high-quality library services, particularly in the areas of research and user reference.

Consequently, despite various studies on the role of e-libraries on the academic performance of students in different countries, to the best knowledge of the researchers, none of these studies are focused on different disciplines, and also comparative studies in this regard are scanty. Hence, it becomes pertinent and paramount to critically examine the impact of e-library on the academic performance of students across disciplines in selected tertiary institutions in Nigeria.

### **Research Methodology**

The present study espoused the descriptive survey. The study population is comprised of three (3) selected tertiary institutions in Zaria, Kaduna State, Nigeria. Namely, Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) Zaria, Kaduna State; Nuhu Bamalli (NUBA) Polytechnic, Zaria; and Federal College of Education (FCE) Zaria, Kaduna State. These institutions were selected to account for the three (3) levels of institutions in the tertiary education sector of Nigeria. Also, it will facilitate the comparative analysis of outcomes on the influence of e-library on students' academic attainment across disciplines in these institutions of higher learning.

The study relied on the mixed methods sampling approach by utilizing both the non-probability and probability sampling techniques. First, the members of the population were chosen purposively to form the sample of the study. To this end, faculties or schools that are common to the selected tertiary institutions were carefully chosen for the purpose of ensuring evenness in discipline or program of study amongst the institutions of interest to the researchers. These faculties or schools are the faculty of sciences, and the faculty of arts/social sciences/management. A total of 17,480 students from these selected faculties or schools constituted the sampling frame for the study (as at the 2023/2024 academic year). Of these number, 8,538 students were from ABU; 3,949 were students of NUBA; and the remaining 4,993 students were from FCE. Therefrom, a sample of 391 students was drawn from the target population using the

Yamane (1967) formula. Second, having determined the sample size, the respondents (who are the students of the institutions under consideration) for our study were chosen at random using the proportionate stratified random sampling technique (on the basis of 0.49:0.23:0.29). That is, 0.49 for the selected faculties in ABU, 0.23 and 0.29 for the selected schools in NUBA, and FCE respectively.

### Instrumentation

The instrument for collecting data as per the objectives of the study is a structured questionnaire as it is best suited for collecting information from a sizeable group of respondents within a reasonable time frame. The close-ended research questionnaire is divided into five (5) different sections consisting of thirty-one (31) question items. The question items in sections A and B were designed to get information on the demographics of the respondents and the use of e-library resources by the respondents of the different institutions respectively. Whereas sections C, D, and E had question items based on the 5-point Likert scale (starting from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree) covering the thematic issues that are key to answering the questions raised by the current research.

Further, we tested the reliability of our research instrument using the Cronbach Alpha statistics (Amirrudin et al., 2021) which returned an alpha score of 0.86, 0.84, 0.75 (see table 2) for question items in sections C, D, and E separately. It demonstrated that our instrument is internally consistent, and hence, satisfied the reliability criterion of above 0.70 (see Hair et al., 2011; Sarstedt et al., 2021). Equally, our questionnaire was reviewed by two experts in library and information science at ABU and FCE to ensure that it satisfies both content and construct validity.

The data collection exercise which involved administering the questionnaire to our target respondents in the selected higher institutions of learning lasted for a period of four (4) weeks. The responses of the respondents were treated by the researchers with utmost confidentiality as it is customary with research exercise of this nature. A total of 387 duly completed questionnaires were retrieved from the respondents, while the remaining 4 were not properly completed, damaged and returned. Accordingly, we employed descriptive (such as the percentage and frequency distribution, mean value, and standard deviation) statistical technique to analyse the data we collected from the field.

**Table 1**  
*Select Population and Sampling Proportion*

| Institution                         | Population | Sample Size |
|-------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria      | 8,538      | 191         |
| Nuhu Bamalli Polytechnic, Zaria     | 3,949      | 88          |
| Federal College of Education, Zaria | 4,993      | 112         |
| Total                               | 17,480     | 391         |

Source: Field survey, 2024

**Table 2**  
*Reliability Statistics*

| Constructs            | Aggregate items | Alpha ( $\alpha$ ) score |
|-----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| E-library usage       | 5               | 0.86                     |
| Academic performance  | 6               | 0.84                     |
| Institutional factors | 7               | 0.75                     |

Source: Field survey, 2024

#### 4. Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion

This section presents the result of the data and the subsequent analysis.

**Table 3**  
*Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents*

| Characteristic   | Frequency (n) | Percentage (%) |
|--|---------------|----------------|
| <b>Gender</b>  |               |                |
| Male   | 243           | 62.8           |
| Female   | 144           | 37.2           |
| <b>Age</b>   |               |                |
| Under 20   | 52            | 13.4           |
| 21-24  | 137           | 35.4           |
| 25-29  | 146           | 37.7           |
| 30 and above   | 52            | 13.4           |
| <b>Institutions</b>  |               |                |
| Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria   | 190           | 49.1           |
| Nuhu Bamalli Polytechnic, Zaria  | 90            | 23.3           |
| Federal College of Education, Zaria  | 107           | 27.6           |
| <b>Faculty</b>   |               |                |
| Science  | 222           | 57.4           |
| Arts/ Social Sciences/Management   | 165           | 42.6           |
| <b>Do you know how to browse the internet?</b>                                   |               |                |
| Yes  | 370           | 95.6           |
| No   | 17            | 4.4            |
| <b>Do you use e-library in your institution?</b>                                 |               |                |
| Yes  | 271           | 70.0           |
| No   | 116           | 30.0           |
| <b>If yes, how often do you use the e-library resources in your institution?</b> |               |                |
| Weekly   | 107           | 27.6           |
| Monthly  | 39            | 10.1           |
| Fortnightly  | 24            | 6.2            |
| Occasionally   | 114           | 29.5           |
| Never  | 103           | 26.6           |
| <b>What devices do you use to access the e-library?</b>                          |               |                |
| Smartphone   | 178           | 46.0           |
| Tablet   | 31            | 8.0            |
| Laptop   | 75            | 19.4           |
| Desktop Computer   | 103           | 26.6           |
| <b>Which of these tasks do you perform with e-library?</b>                       |               |                |
| To carry out assignment  | 166           | 42.9           |
| To prepare for exams   | 52            | 13.4           |
| To source materials for project writing  | 26            | 6.7            |
| To develop your general knowledge  | 40            | 10.3           |
| All of the above   | 103           | 26.6           |
| <b>What type of e-library resources do you use most often?</b>                   |               |                |

|   |     |      |
|---|-----|------|
| My institution's e-library website  | 113 | 29.2 |
| online database (e.g., science database, social science databases etc.)   | 93  | 24.0 |
| E-books   | 62  | 16.0 |
| Online journals   | 11  | 2.8  |
| All of the above  | 108 | 27.9 |
| <b>Do you prefer e-library resources over traditional library?</b>  |     |      |
| Yes   | 323 | 83.5 |
| No  | 64  | 16.5 |
| <b>If yes, how would you access the quality and reliability of information obtained from e-library resources compared to traditional library materials?</b> |     |      |
| Better than traditional library materials   | 298 | 77.0 |
| similar to traditional library materials  | 28  | 7.2  |
| worse than traditional library materials  | 13  | 3.4  |
| I am not sure   | 48  | 12.4 |
| <b>Do you find e-library resources beneficial to your studies?</b>  |     |      |
| Yes   | 381 | 98.4 |
| No  | 6   | 1.6  |

Source: Field survey, 2024

The result from Table 3 shows the socio-demographic characteristic of the respondents. There were 243 male respondents (62.8%) and 144 female respondents (37.2%). This indicates a slight male majority among the respondents, which might suggest variations in preferences or behaviours related to e-library usage based on gender. Also, majority of respondents fell within the age range of 21-29 (35.4% and 37.7% respectively), with fewer respondents under 20 (13.4%) or 30 and above (13.4%). This suggests that the survey predominantly captured responses from young adults, which may influence the prevalence and preferences regarding e-library usage.

In the same vein, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria had the highest representation (49.1%), followed by the Federal College of Education, Zaria (27.6%) and Nuhu Bamalli Polytechnic, Zaria (23.3%). Also, majority of respondents were from the Science faculty (57.4%) compared to Arts/Social Sciences/Management (42.6%). The distribution across institutions and faculties provides insights into the diversity of respondents, which may influence their access to and utilization of e-

library resources based on institutional and disciplinary differences.

Furthermore, overwhelmingly, most respondents reported knowing how to browse the internet (95.6%) suggesting a high level of digital literacy among the surveyed population, which is crucial for utilizing e-library resources effectively. More so, a significant portion of respondents reported using e-library resources in their institutions (70.0%), with various frequencies ranging from weekly to never. This implies that despite the availability of e-library resources, a notable proportion of respondents do not utilize them frequently, indicating potential barriers or preferences for alternative information sources. Moreover, smartphone (46.0%) and desktop computers (26.6%) were the most commonly used devices to access e-library resources by the respondents indicating the importance of ensuring mobile compatibility and accessibility of e-library platforms to cater to diverse user preferences.

Additionally, majority of respondents reported using e-library resources for multiple purposes such as carrying out assignments, preparing for exams, and sourcing materials

for project writing. This suggests that e-library resources serve various academic needs beyond traditional library materials, indicating their versatility and importance in supporting students' learning activities.

Also, a significant majority of respondents preferred e-library resources over traditional library materials (83.5%). This preference highlights the perceived advantages of e-library resources, potentially related to accessibility, convenience, and the breadth of available materials. Most respondents considered e-library resources to be better more, the major findings of this study are presented in table 4, 5 and 6 respectively.

than traditional library materials in terms of quality and reliability (77.0%) showing confidence in the credibility and relevance of e-library resources, which may further reinforce their preference over traditional library materials.

Lastly, almost all respondents found e-library resources beneficial to their studies (98.4%). This implies that e-library resources are an integral tool for supporting academic success and learning outcomes.

Further

**Table 4**

*Responses of Students on the disparities in the use of e-library resources by students across academic disciplines in the select tertiary institutions in Zaria*

| Items  | SA (%)     | A (%)      | UN (%)    | D (%)    | SD (%)   | Mean | $\sigma$ | Decision |
|--|------------|------------|-----------|----------|----------|------|----------|----------|
| E-library allow me to learn independently.   | 172 (44.4) | 174 (45.0) | 14 (3.6)  | 14 (3.6) | 13 (3.4) | 4.24 | 0.935    | Accepted |
| E-library has helped me to expand the scope of my learning.                        | 145 (37.5) | 211 (54.5) | 11 (2.8)  | 12 (3.1) | 8 (2.1)  | 4.22 | 0.816    | Accepted |
| It makes me to develop interest in learning content.                               | 123 (31.8) | 214 (55.3) | 24 (6.2)  | 14 (3.6) | 12 (3.1) | 4.09 | 0.893    | Rejected |
| My GPA has improved because of the use of e-library.                               | 96 (24.8)  | 208 (53.7) | 42 (10.9) | 21 (5.4) | 20 (5.2) | 3.88 | 1.013    | Rejected |
| I use e-library to aid completion of my assignments, term paper or project report. | 136 (35.1) | 201 (51.9) | 26 (6.7)  | 13 (3.4) | 11 (2.8) | 4.13 | 0.891    | Accepted |
| E-library has helped me to achieve my academic goals and aspirations.              | 131 (33.9) | 202 (52.2) | 21 (5.4)  | 14 (3.6) | 19 (4.9) | 4.06 | 0.989    | Rejected |

Source: Field survey, 2024

**Note:** N=387, SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; UN=Undecided; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree. Decision- weighted average-  $24.62/6 = 4.103$

The data analysis shows that majority of the respondents accepted that e-library allow them to learn independently. Also, they agreed that the e-library has helped them to expand the scope of their learning. Similarly, majority of the respondents use e-library to aid completion of their assignments, term paper or project report. This is consistent with the work of Oketunji and Okunola (2020) and Ekong and Ekong (2018). Conversely, majority

of the participants rejected the notion that e-library aid their academic performance. For instance, they rejected the notion that e-library makes them to develop interest in learning content, their GPA has improved because of the use of e-library and that e-library helped them to achieve their academic goals and aspirations. This is in contrast with the previous study of Ibrahim et al. (2022) and Umukoro and Tihamiyu (2017)



**Table 5**

*Responses of Students on the different patterns of use of e-library resources by students of diverse disciplines in the selected tertiary institutions in Zaria*

| Items  | SA (%)     | A (%)      | UN (%)    | D (%)      | SD (%)    | Mean | $\sigma$ | Decision |
|--|------------|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------|----------|----------|
| I always use the e-library platform in my Institution.   | 92 (23.8)  | 166 (42.9) | 36 (9.3)  | 60 (15.5)  | 33 (8.5)  | 3.58 | 1.243    | Accepted |
| I can access e-library resources relevant to my discipline or course of study.                                       | 122 (31.5) | 199 (51.4) | 29 (7.5)  | 23 (5.9)   | 14 (3.6)  | 4.01 | 0.978    | Accepted |
| I use e-library resources for getting materials on my discipline only  | 82 (21.2)  | 164 (42.4) | 47 (12.1) | 71 (18.3)  | 23 (5.9)  | 3.55 | 1.183    | Accepted |
| I use e-library resources for more than 4 hours.   | 63 (16.3)  | 114 (29.5) | 56 (14.5) | 115 (29.7) | 39 (10.1) | 3.12 | 1.279    | Rejected |
| Students in my faculty or institution use e-library resources more than students of other faculties or institutions. | 85 (22.0)  | 111 (28.7) | 40 (10.3) | 106 (27.4) | 45 (11.6) | 3.22 | 1.364    | Rejected |

Source: Field survey, 2024

**Note:** N=387, SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; UN=Undecided; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree. Decision- weighted average:  $17.48/5=3.496$

The result of the response from participants in Table 5 suggests that most of the participants accepted that they always use the e-library platform in their institutions. Also, they agreed that they can access e-library resources relevant to their discipline or course of study. They also use e-library resources for getting materials on their discipline only. This finding is consistent with the work of Ekong and Ekong (2018), Yusuf, Adekunle and Adenike (2021) and Mandrekar (2020). On the other hand, majority of the participants did not agree

about that pattern of use of e-library resources by students of diverse disciplines in the selected tertiary institutions in Zaria. For example, they rejected the fact that they use e-library resources for more than 4 hours and that students in their faculty or institution use e-library resources more than students of other faculties or institutions. This result conforms with similar findings of Afolabi., Oluwaseun and Oluwaseun (2019), Olaniyi and Oluwatobi (2022), and Ejegwa and Mngutyo (2023)

**Table 6**

*Responses of Students on the discrepancies in institutional factors such as e-library infrastructure, policies etc. amongst the select tertiary institutions in Zaria*

| Items  | SA (%)    | A (%)      | UN (%)    | D (%)     | SD (%)    | Mean | $\sigma$ | Decision |
|--|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------|----------|----------|
| My institution provides adequate and quality e-library resources for my discipline | 95 (24.5) | 160 (41.3) | 45 (11.6) | 58 (15.0) | 28 (7.2)  | 3.61 | 1.212    | Accepted |
| The internet network for using e-library resources in my institution is poor.      | 73 (18.9) | 132 (34.1) | 46 (11.9) | 97 (25.1) | 39 (10.1) | 3.27 | 1.297    | Rejected |

|  |               |               |              |              |              |      |       |          |
|--|---------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------|-------|----------|
| The computers and devices for using e-library resources in my institution are adequate and working properly. | 83<br>(21.4)  | 149<br>(38.5) | 53<br>(13.7) | 66<br>(17.1) | 36<br>(9.3)  | 3.46 | 1.257 | Rejected |
| I receive support and guidance for using e-library resources in my institution.                              | 88<br>(22.7)  | 162<br>(41.9) | 52<br>(13.4) | 56<br>(14.5) | 29<br>(7.5)  | 3.58 | 1.201 | Accepted |
| My institution encourages me to use e-library resources for my studies.                                      | 100<br>(25.8) | 176<br>(45.5) | 52<br>(13.4) | 38<br>(9.8)  | 21<br>(5.4)  | 3.76 | 1.105 | Accepted |
| The e-library in my institution is difficult to access when students are much.                               | 89<br>(23.0)  | 127<br>(32.8) | 51<br>(13.2) | 92<br>(23.8) | 28<br>(7.2)  | 3.41 | 1.271 | Rejected |
| The power supply for using e-library resources in y institution is not reliable                              | 91<br>(23.5)  | 100<br>(25.8) | 45<br>(11.6) | 98<br>(25.3) | 53<br>(13.7) | 3.20 | 1.402 | Rejected |

Source: Field survey, 2024

**Note:** N=387, SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; UN=Undecided; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree. Decision- weighted average- $24.29/7=3.47$

Table 6 presents the response on the discrepancies in institutional factors such as e-library infrastructure, policies etc. amongst the selected tertiary institutions in Zaria. Hence, the result indicates that majority of the participants accepted that their institution provides adequate and quality e-library resources for my discipline. Also, they agreed that they received support and guidance for using e-library resources in their institution. In addition, they all agreed that their institution encourages them to use e-library resources for their studies. This is indeed consistent with the findings of Mandrekar (2020), Adeyemi, Olajide and Oluwaseun (2021), and Ibrahim, Yusuf and Fatima (2022). In contrast, majority of the respondents did not agree on the discrepancies in institutional factors such as e-library infrastructure, policies etc. amongst the selected tertiary institutions in Zaria. For instance, they rejected the fact that the internet network for using e-library resources in their institution is poor, the computers and devices for using e-library resources in their institution are adequate and working properly, the e-library in their institution is difficult to access when students are much and the power supply for using e-library resources in their institution is not reliable. This further confirm

the findings of Babalola, Oluwaseun and Temitope (2020), Ejegwa and Mngutyo (2023) and Akindele, Ayodele, and Ayodeji (2023).

### Conclusion and Recommendations

Essentially, students acknowledge the benefits of e-libraries in facilitating independent learning and expanding the scope of their education. Additionally, they utilize these resources extensively for assignments and term papers, indicating their practical relevance. However, there is a notable scepticism regarding the direct impact of e-libraries on academic performance, as evidenced by the rejection of claims regarding improved GPA and academic goal achievement. This scepticism suggests a need for further exploration into the efficacy of e-library resources in enhancing academic outcomes.

Furthermore, while students generally express satisfaction with access to relevant materials and institutional support for e-library usage, there are concerns regarding infrastructure and resources. Despite the acknowledgment of adequate e-library provision by institutions, issues such as poor internet connectivity, insufficient devices, and unreliable

power supply remain prevalent challenges. These discrepancies highlight the importance of addressing infrastructural limitations to ensure equitable access to e-library resources for all students.

Consequently, while e-libraries offer promising opportunities for enhancing learning experiences, their full potential is hindered by existing disparities in infrastructure and perceptions regarding their impact on academic performance. It is therefore, recommended that concerted efforts from educational institutions and policymakers be pertinent to improve infrastructure, provide adequate support, and conduct further research to better understand the role of e-library resources in academic achievement in the country at large.

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## EMERGING ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

**Audu Godwin Ankeli**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Science Education  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
Email: [gankegodwin44@gmail.com](mailto:gankegodwin44@gmail.com)



### Abstract

This paper explores the essence, nature, and characteristics of educational planning and educational management in Nigeria as well as the emerging issues therein. For Nigeria to achieve the sustainable development goals by the year 2030, the professional status, vibrancy, quality, and competence of planners and managers of education in the country needs to be revived and sustained. Hence, the emerging issues affecting educational planning and management, as discussed in this paper, need urgent attention, consideration, and intervention. In all, education stakeholders are to re-evaluate, re-position and assist education planners and managers as well as the ministries/departments of planning and management in all government and non-government institutions and organizations, especially in Nigeria.

**Keyword:** Development, intervention, management, educational evaluators

### Introduction

Education is the key to the social, economic, political, religious, and technological development of nations and the populace therein. For the goals of education to be fully attained, there should be robust and efficient planning and management mechanisms (Akpan, 2018). Educational planning and management is the foundation of successful schools, institutions, and organizations. Attaining educational-oriented schemes is dependent upon the status and efficiency of the educational planning and management mechanisms at hand. Educational planning and management are vital for the actualization of the programmes and objectives of education in Nigeria. According to Gregory and Jegede (2021), the issues with educational planning are caused by inadequate funding, a lack of data and information, insufficient educational planners, a lack of planning materials, political influence and instability, and inadequate capacity building of educational planners in the nation. The

disciplines governing the allocation and usage of educational resources within the school system have evolved through time, and include educational planning, management, human resource training, and development (Ololube, 2013).

Planning for education, according to Noun (2009), entails taking unanticipated challenges into account and formulating plans for potential solutions. It is the process of making decisions for future action with the aim of accomplishing pre-set objectives through the best use of limited resources, according to Long's definition from 2003. Ololube (2009) reiterated that educational planning, in its broadest sense, is the application of logical and methodical analysis to the process of educational development in order to increase education's effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the needs and objectives of students and society at large.

Noun (2012) highlighted the motivations for educational planning to include enabling

education managers to acquire economic insights into the usage of resources, which are typically limited, and ensuring that resources are distributed judiciously across various education projects and programmes; assuring logical and proper allocation of educational facilities and equipment since it processes on education through in-depth analysis; plans are made for education to ensure the internal effectiveness of the educational system. i.e., to lessen or eliminate systemic waste; to ensure that the interests of all educational stakeholders are aligned. In other words, the interests of the students, parents, and society; to facilitates the control of educational resources, provides direction for actions, and serves as the foundation for monitoring and evaluating the standards, benchmarks, and guidelines; to integrates various knowledge areas, such as economics, sociology, computer science, mathematics, and others to operationalize the planning of education; and ensure that it is relevant to social values and objectives. In a similar vein, Chakma (2019) claims that educational planning can necessitate educational forecasting as it describes events, needs, or conditions of the future with regards to teaching and learning processes; calls for interpretation of future data on education as well as its application; serve as a means of generating relevant present and future goals, and objectives for an organisation, institution, or school; decision-making on matters that affect education; and impacts on the economy, society, and politics.

Chakma (2019) restates that educational planning principles entail a system analysis and is research based; it is a continuous process; it is peculiar to educational organizations; it is practical and realistic; planning involves continuing and active participation of all interested persons and groups in an organisation; the planning content and scope of an organisation is usually determined by individual and group needs; it employs the services of specialists; educational planning should be undergo a continuous evaluation

process, while providing opportunity for modification for further action. Similarly, it also listed the characteristics of educational planning to be: it is the choice of best alternative; requires teamwork; has both social and economic goals; cooperation; anticipation; it is a remedial measure; leads to scientific changes.

Educational planning is essential as it ensures the success of the educational institutions: educational planning is a tool for resolving relevant and vital issues in education, as well as the factors militating against its quality. It aims at improving the goals, visions, and objectives of education; it is for addressing and improving the availability of finance and other material resources needed for educational output; efficient and effective educational planning saves efforts, time, and money; it is to attract governments' support and intervention into education; and it fosters the fulfilment of educational objectives and financing. The quality of the school, which is a reflection of the general performance of the instructors, pupils, and school administrators, is determined by the educational planning (Hénard, 2012; Ololube & Kpolovie, 2013). Educational planners regulate and determine the extent to which educational resources and duties can be distributed among individuals and groups (Chance & Williams, 2015). Moreover, planning provides members of an educational institution with direction and assistance for outputs and service delivery (McNamara, 2016). For instance, in Nigeria, the federal government (which has the upper hand and influence over the state, and the local governments) are responsible for planning and managing the education system (NEEDS, 2014). The creation and execution of educational policies, as well as the administration and oversight of schools in their various fields, are all the responsibility of the ministries of education, particularly the federal and state ones. These ministries' primary duties include setting teacher wages, hiring, promoting, and disciplining

insubordinate staff members. They also provide rules for opening new schools and train and retrain school staff (Gregory & Jegede, 2021). On the other hand, educational management is the process of organising, planning, directing, and managing the operations.

The characteristics of educational management according to Chakma (2019) are that it is related to each organization, of an institution while utilising both people and material resources to effectively and efficiently carry out teaching, research, and extension work tasks. It could be termed as the application of management theory and practise to the field of education or educational institutions. The practical implementation of management ideas in the disciplines of education is at the heart of educational management (Ali & Mohamed, 2017). The field of educational management spans a wide range of topics, including the background and ideas of management science, the duties and obligations of an educational manager, and the necessary managerial abilities. Usually, educational management revolves around human, physical/material, and ideation resources management. In general, the rationales for education management are for: programme planning and progress; controlling the implementing process, organising available resources; setting and ensuring organisational standards. institution, society, and country; and it is interconnected with other disciplines; it is an art with a humanitarian face; it is a social science since it deals with man and everything that surrounds man; it is a profession as it entails the management of activities and resources; it is a multidisciplinary subject since the concept, principles, and skills involved in educational management are related to other disciplines such as Economics, Psychology, Mathematics, Sociology, Anthropology, and so on.; it is a dynamic process as management principles are changeable with time. New policies and action are needed to adapt to

these changing policies and principles; effective management is guided by specific objectives. Without management, nothing can stand the test of time; it involves a group of individuals who are aware of and wants to achieve a common goal; and is a social process that provides social benefits and responsibilities to an individual or an organisation. Similarly, the scopes of educational management as hinted by Chakma (2019) are the allocation of both material and human resources; construction of the school curriculum; organisation of co-curricular activities; preparation of the school timetable; maintaining school and students' discipline; organization and management of school properties; budgeting, financing, evaluation and coordination functions.

To address the escalating issues with underfunding, inadequate infrastructure, inadequate teachers, overcrowding in classes, poor monitoring and supervision, poor school administration, corruption, insecurity, unstable educational policies, political interference and instability, and lack of effective planning, the Nigerian educational system needs regular and standard planning and management processes (Gregory & Jegede, 2021). Government and stakeholders' oriented and sponsored projects and intervention programmes are prematurely aborted or abandoned because of the weak or non-existing planning and management apparatus in place. According to Mgbekem, Ntukidem, and Etor (2004), the Nigerian educational system has frequently come under fire for being poorly planned and inherited from colonial masters since it does not fulfil the requirements and aspirations of the country today. Therefore, this paper x-rays the nature, characteristics, and essence of educational planning and management; and the emerging issues as regards the planning and management of education in Nigeria, with implications for educational evaluators.

In order to make decisions on the effectiveness and efficiency of such



educational programmes (including how it is being planned and managed); evaluation is needed. Evaluation is a technique used to acquire reliable and valuable information about previous, ongoing, or completed educational programmes, events, or activities (Osiesi, 2020). It entails the evaluation and monitoring of educational performance and progress, assisting education policymakers and education ministries in assessing the degree to which the specified educational objectives have been met, and essential for educational planning and forecasting; for appropriate guidance and counselling services; and in enhancing learners' learning outcome, and to provide feedback on the overall performance of educational stakeholders (Osiesi, 2020). A key factor in predicting and enhancing the quality of education is educational evaluation. It is used to assess general learning behaviours, quality, effectiveness, educational results, and elements that support or inhibit effective teaching and learning processes in both teachers and students (Osiesi, 2020).

### **Emerging Issues in Educational Planning and Management in Nigeria**

The emerging issues militating against effective planning and management of education in Nigeria may include inexperienced and inadequate educational planners/managers, poor records and data management, political instability and interference, frequent changes in policies, poor funding of education, unavailability of planning and management tools, corruption and lack of professional development and training for education planners and managers. These are discussed below:

1. ***Inexperienced and inadequate educational planners/managers:*** Many planners and managers in the Nigerian education system are not experienced enough to effectively and efficiently plan and manage the system. At the education

ministries and boards, there are few or no professional education planners and managers (even those who are there, do not possess the required competence), who would proffer solutions through effective policies, in solving major problems in education (Ololube, 2013). The absence of well-trained educational planners and managers may have hindered enhanced performance and productivity in the realm of education (Noun, 2009). It will be an advantage for Governments at all levels to recruit or redeploy well-trained and proficient educational planners and managers in their education ministries if the expected positive changes and progress are to be recorded in the sector.

2. ***Poor records and data management:*** Poor records and data management is another emerging issue preventing effective educational planning and management in Nigeria. In most cases, data on education in Nigeria is usually poorly kept and most times misplaced or misappropriated. There are shortfalls in data/records relating to the different levels of education in the country. Generating up-to-date and reliable data remains a problem in the sector (Ololube, 2013), and this has been affecting the quality and output of educational planning and management systems in the country.
3. ***Political instability and interference:*** Political instability and interference are other emerging issues affecting effective planning and management of education in Nigeria. Frequent change in governments or political office holders, results in an abrupt policy change, even when such policy is the needed transformation the sector needs at the time. These frequent changes in governments affect educational planning and management processes since the various political parties have their specific agenda and programmes. Political office holders do not allow educational planners and managers to have their way

of executing educational plans, policies, and objectives, which would have benefitted the sector. Also, many of these politicians divert the resources which have been planned for the education sector, into personal use (Gbenu, 2012). The amount of resources allotted to the sector might occasionally be influenced by political conflict between various groups in the nation.

4. **Frequent changes in policies:** Policies are the ingredients that keep the agenda and programmes of an organization alive. However, in the Nigerian context, many a time, policies are not allowed to strive as they should. This is due to the recurrent changes in the political, social, and economic climate of the nation over time. Where and when policies are engineered for implementation, the education system therein would take a positive and progressive status.
5. **Poor funding of education:** Generally, the resources been allocated to the Nigerian education sector have been worrisome over the years (Ololube, 2013). Funds allocated to the education sector have been insufficient in meeting the needs and challenges confronting it. These in more ways than one, have been the problem stifling effective planning and management of education in Nigeria. Sufficient allocation of resources (in form of finance, human capital, and facilities) is paramount for the successful implementation of education programmes. This issue of poor funding may have been worsened by the global economic recession as well as the recent outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic; as aids and grants from international organizations, which were originally allocated to education are expended on other sectors of the economy such as health, infrastructure, etc. Tools necessary for planning and management of education in Nigeria are either unavailable or in short supply. Some of these planning and management tools could include computers, calculating machines, statistical soft wares, planning/management charts and metrics; and other facilities and materials for effective planning and management concerns.
6. **Corruption:** Corruption in Nigeria remains a burning issue affecting every sector and structure of the nation (including the education system). Funds originally designated for education planning and management purposes are often, diverted by officials of the ministries of education, both at the federal, state, and local governments. According to Gbenu (2012), high levels of corruption and resources misappropriation is a factors militating against adequate and proper funding of education in Nigeria.
7. **Lack of professional development and training for education planners and managers:** Lack of professional development of educational planners and managers working in education agencies and departments at the federal, state, and local governments is a factor affecting efficient planning and management in education. Many educational planners and managements may have been allowed opportunities for further professional training or retraining programmes. This has led to the staleness of these planners and managers. As such, they are not exposed to current, modern, and proficient strategies for planning and management.
8. **Unavailability of ICT and use:** There is a paucity of ICT as well as its use in many Nigerian schools, organisations, and education ministries. This has hampered the art and science of educational planning and management. This lapses actually affected the planning and management of education in the country, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.
9. **Lack of planning and management training institutes:** In Nigeria, there is little or no special institution of planning and management where individuals are to

learn and master the technicalities/formalities of educational planning and management.

10. **Unavailability of planning and management tools:** Tools necessary for planning and management of education in Nigeria are either unavailable or in short supply. Some of these planning and management tools could include computers, calculating machines, statistical soft wares, planning/ management charts and metrics; and other facilities and materials for effective planning and management concerns.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

Educational planning and management are a necessity for the advancement of educational programmes and objectives in Nigeria. For Nigeria to achieve the sustainable development goals, the professional status, vibrancy, quality, and competence of planners and managers of education in the country needs to be revived and sustained. Hence, the emerging issues affecting educational planning and management, as discussed in this paper, need urgent attention and consideration. In all, education stakeholders are to re-evaluate, re-position and assist education planners and managers as well as the ministries of planning and management in all government and non-government institutions and organizations, especially in Nigeria. As such, educational trained evaluators are to fully participate in the task of evaluation and recommendation making with regards to the planning and management of education in Nigeria and elsewhere.

Stakeholders in education at all levels, are to possess the political will to support education planners and managers. Full and timely implementation of education policies should be ensured by all government agencies. Education data should be continuously generated and made useful for planners and managers in the sector. Education stakeholders should support the increased

budgetary allocations of funds and resources to education. Professional and capable educational planners and managers should be recruited into educational institutions and agencies. Education stakeholders, especially the governments, should support and organize professional training and retraining programmes for education planners and managers. Planning and management departments/units should be established in all government agencies and ministries, and were already present, should be strengthened. Funds meant for the education sector should be properly appropriated into education. All forms of political interference in the education sector should be discouraged.

To ensure the efficacy and sustainability of educational planning and management in Nigeria, well trained educational evaluators should be mandated by law to regularly assess, monitor, and evaluate the extent of the implementation of educational plans, policies, and management concerns in the country; be it the primary, secondary or tertiary levels. Educational evaluators are also to provide and always furnish the ministries and boards of education at all levels with the evaluation reports regarding the state of educational planning and management in the country. This will go a long way in ensuring a vibrant and efficient educational system in Nigeria.

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**PART VII:**  
**IDENTITY, VIOLENCE AND RELIGION**

# 34

## TREND AND PATTERN OF VIOLENT CRIMES IN WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, TARABA STATE

**Ameh Sunday Ojonugwa**  
**Gana Chuseh Damian**

Department of Sociology, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria



### Abstract

This work examines the pattern and trends of violent crimes in Wukari. The study used secondary data by consulting numerous materials such as text books, journal, newspaper and internet, and also consults the Nigeria Police Force in Wukari division for relevant document. This paper discovered that there is proliferation of dangerous weapon in the hand of private individuals, as such, violent crime become prevalent in Wukari. It also discovered that violent crimes would continue to persist with much intensified acts of violence on the citizenry as long as government and community show lack of desire to arrest the situation. The study recommends that there should be adequate and proper policing of the Wukari Local Government Area. There should also be entrepreneurial skills training for the youth in order to create job for the people as that will reduce poverty and also discourage violent criminal behaviour in the area.

**Keywords:** violent, violence, pattern, youth and crime

### Introduction

Increase in violent crime, is a common feature of countries in transition. This has been attributed to the uncontrollable nature of change in its formative stage, demobilization or dismantling of repressive security apparatuses used by previous authoritarian regimes in controlling crime and the unequal socio-economic opportunities brought about by economic liberalization programmers. What differentiate societies in transition from one another with regard to increase in common crimes and disorders are the policies and strategies that have been adopted by the governments to address them. Countries that have invested more in social crime prevention and in finding peaceful solutions to their political problems through transparent processes appear to have managed rise in criminal deviance and discontent better than others (Etannibi & Chukwuma, 2005).

Violent crime is a combination of two concepts; crime and violence. Crime involves rule breaking while violence involves

intentional harm-doing using physical means (Igbo, 2007; Odekule, 1981). Therefore, an understanding of violent crime requires an understanding of both aggression and deviance. It's imperative to understand why people harm others as well as why they break rules. To gain a theoretical understanding of individual and group differences, one must pay attention to whether individuals and groups vary in their violent behavior or in their criminal behavior. and establish what facts require explanation before attempting to explain them. Violence and crime are overlapping domains: some acts of violence are not criminal or even deviant. For example, violence in self-defense, violence by social control agents (parents and police), and violence in war are typically neither criminal nor deviant on the other hand, theft and illicit drug use are crimes but do not involve violence (Igbo, 2007; Odekule, 1981).

In addition, different types of crime involve different attitudes toward harm. Some

offenders want to harm the victim (e.g., most assaults), some do not care (e.g., most robbery, rape, and property crimes), and some commit victimless crimes (e.g., taking illicit drugs). Since the interest is in criminal violence, it is important to explain why people want to harm others or do not mind harming others, cum why they are willing to break the law and the types of violent crimes. There are different types of youth violence crime ranging from sexual violence, violence against women, child abuse, gang violence, hate crimes, workplace violence, homicide, and mass murder. As a result, the study of violence has become Balkanized. Sometimes those researching in one of these areas develop special theories to explain the particular type of violence they study. For example, feminist theory is often used to explain violence toward women when the explanations for violence against men and women may be similar (Felson 2002). Hence this study examines trend and pattern of violence crime in Wukari. It looked into the factors that influence violence criminal behavior, as well as the nature of violence criminal behavior. The study is also designed to recommend possible ways of controlling violence criminal behavior in Wukari.

### **Conceptual Clarifications**

Crime is part and parcel of human nature and society. That is why no society can claim to be completely free of crimes. But the types of criminal behavior tend to follow the pattern of social and economic development of a given society. It is therefore not unexpected that a society at a low level of development tends to experience an upsurge in the rate of violent crimes such as armed robber, politically motivated killings, the use of illegal weapons, ethnic and religious clashes and the like (Olujinmi, 2005). Crime can be defined as human conduct in violation of the criminal law of state, federal government and local jurisdiction which have powers to make such a law. According to Emeh (2012), no society is

immune from this thorny social problem but what differs is the frequency and magnitude of the situation and the response mechanism to address same. Furthermore, crime can be viewed in different perspectives; is an act of violation by the individual criminal actions in which society prescribes punishment attached to it. Crime is viewed as a conduct behaviors or an act which violate criminal law or formal or written laws of a state for which a punishment is prescribe (schmallenger, 2004; Terito, Halstaed and Bromley, 2004; Adler, Mullier, & Laufer, 2001).

In 1981, crime wave grew to nearly pandemic proportions, particularly in Lagos and other urbanized areas characterized by rapid economic growth and change, stark economic inequality and deprivation, social disorganization and by inadequate government service and law enforcement in capabilities (Emeh, 2012). Published crime statistics were probably grossly understated because most parts of the country were virtually under-policed coupled with the issue of dark figures. Wukari became caught in the web of crime problems which include the increase of violent and non-violent crimes. The crime flourished from minor offences to robbery, homicide, rape, arson, assault and kidnapping thus, created the state of insecurity and threat to nation security. (Igbo, 2007; Odekule, 1981). According to Igbo (2000) violence appears to be the norm rather than the exception for armed robbery in Nigeria (Igbo, 2007). Drawing from above premise violent crime is so alarming and destructive; in the same vein prevalent upsurge of violence in Wukari have created a greats questioned traditional leader, religion leaders and the capability of the law enforcement agencies in containing the problems. Mostly at the past armed robbery was operating in the night. But, now the operation is both night and days attacking home, office, bank shop, restaurants and churches; leaving behind victims that are raped, maimed and killed. They attack banks

with dynamites, strike at filling stations and swoop on victims at traffic jams (Emeh, 2012; Ugwoke, 2010; Igbo, 2007). Likewise, rape, homicide, arson, assault, kidnapping cultism have taken sharp and upsurge dimension in recent period, the upsurge range in rate of violent crimes of all categories in Wukari and the nation at large. This seminar paper is therefore structured to x-ray the trend and pattern of violent crimes in Wukari, Taraba State.

### **Conflict and Violent Crimes**

According to conflict theory, society is defined by a struggle for dominance among social groups that compete for scarce resources. In the context of violent, conflict theory argues that some pattern of criminal's behaviors postulate in the society is in a perpetual conflict with social order because of the competitions for limited resource. It holds that social order is maintained by domination and power, rather than consensus and conformity. As such violent crimes in society persisted because individuals are forced into behaviors that break laws. Further, individual want to be successful and control wealth and power as such violent crimes become civic in Wukari. According, to conflict theory those with wealth and power try to hold on to it by any means possible chiefly by suppressing the poor and powerless. The result of that is that the suppressed individual, are force to choose violent crimes as a mean to achieve wealth for them, most especially the youths that want to be rich and have class in society.

#### **Theoretical Framework**

Conflict theory as propounded by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and his collaborator Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) claims society is in a state of perpetual conflict because of competition for limited resources. It holds that social order is maintained by domination and power, rather than consensus and conformity. According to conflict theory, those with wealth and power try to hold on to it by any means possible, chiefly by suppressing the poor and

powerless. A basic premise of conflict theory is that individuals and groups within a society work to maximize their own benefits. Conflict theory has been used to explain a wide range of social phenomena, including wars and revolutions, wealth and poverty, violent crimes and discrimination as well as domestic violence. It ascribes most of the fundamental developments in human history, such as democracy and civil rights, to capitalistic attempts to control the masses rather than to a desire for social order. The theory revolves around concepts of social inequality in the division of resources and focuses on the conflicts that exist between classes. However, the three basic assumptions of conflict theory as posited by Giddens (1989) are:

- (1) Between individual and group, conflict emerges from having opposing interests or competing for limited resources;
- (2) Struggle and conflict typically lead to some groups and individuals controlling and dominating others, and that pattern of subordination and domination are self-perpetuating;
- (3) Dominant groups disproportionately influence resource allocation and societal structure.

### **Research Methodology**

This study made use of secondary data in sourcing relevant data. Data was obtained from available sources such as text books, journals, on-line published articles, information from the local newspapers and internet. As well as relevant data collected from Nigeria Police Force division in Wukari Local Government to clearly ascertain whether there is an increase in violent criminality or not.

### **Nature, Prevalence and Patterns of Violent Criminal Behaviour in Wukari**

The study discover that there are different patterns and types of violent crimes which include assault, murder, house breaking,



grievous harm and wounding, theft, fraud, receiving stolen property, store breaking and kidnapping in Wukari. The escalation of violent crimes has been attributed to the proliferation of arms and ammunition in the hands of private individual; (Okiro, 2005). Okiro laments that the proliferation of small arms also contributes to a culture of violence and a cycle that is difficult to break. Violence fuels insecurity; insecurity fuels violence. In addition, the hard economic times coupled with deteriorating standard of education and lack of specific training in areas relevant for sustaining both the agricultural and industrial sector have all contributed massively for the worsening insecurity and violence in Wukari. Also many youths went astray and incessant unpredictable political atmosphere, lack of progressive management of the economy led to galloping inflation and concentration of wealth in the hands of the few who were in positions of public authority. This situation fuelled sense of hopelessness and depression among the masses. It is significant that all the indices for violence were prevalent in Wukari which included high population explosion with

its attendant unemployment, corruption, gross indiscipline among politicians, kidnapping, poor wages, poor living conditions, urban culture shocks and poor quality of management which manifested in crisis in the health care delivery, housing and employment. Rotberg (2002) would prefer to relate the above indices as signs of a weak and failed state. Ottaway and Mair (2004) observed that failing and failed states present a grave danger to international stability as well as to the well-being of their populations, because they cannot provide security for their citizens or deliver essential goods (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). Hence, lawlessness pervades the society leading to intense violence and insecurity.

Among the numerous data collected for this work, statistics of crimes from January to December 2021 and January to September 2022 revealed a lot. Table 1 below shows a breakdown of the crimes reported and recorded. Record of crime committed as recorded by NPF Wukari division from January to December 2021 and January to September 2022.

**Table 1: Prevalence and Nature of violent crimes in Wukari**

| Type of crime                     | 2021      | 2022      |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| No. of murder                     | 18        | 6         |
| No. of Grievous harm and wounding | 4         |           |
| No. of Assaults                   | 1         |           |
| No. of Kidnapping                 | 17        | 6         |
| No. of arm Rubbery                | 1         | 3         |
| No. of theft                      | 20        | 14        |
| No. of House breaking             | 3         | 2         |
| No. of fraud                      | 5         | 4         |
| No. of Receiving stolen property  | 3         |           |
| No. of store breaking             |           | 1         |
| <b>Total</b>                      | <b>72</b> | <b>36</b> |

Source: NPF Wukari, 2022.

Table 1 above reveals that, the proliferation of violent crimes in Wukari is increasing or decreasing with regard to different pattern of the crimes. Therefore, the number of murder was 18 from January to December 2021 while in 2022 was 6 as at September. And also the record of grievous harm and wounding was 4 in

2021 while in 2022 there was none so far. Assault crime was 1 in 2021 while in 2022 none. However, according to the police record the rate of kidnapping was 17 in 2021 while in 2022 was 6 in Wukai while crime on Arm Rubbery recorded was 1 in 2021, in 2022 none was recorded for Arm robbery in wukari. Also

on the record of violent crime in Wukari, by the police record member of theft for 20 in 2021 while in 2022 the record was 14 member of House Breaking was recorded 3 in 2021 while in 2022 it was 2 of house breaking that was recorded. Record on fraud was recorded 5 in 2021 while in 2022, 4 was recorded cases Receiving or being in possession of stolen property 3 was recorded in 2021, while in 2022 none was recorded. Finally, on store breaking 1 was recorded by the Nigeria Police Force 2022 while none was recorded in 2021.

According to the record by the Nigeria police force in Wukari, it was revealed that theft and kidnapping constitutes the most prevailing pattern and type of crimes in Wukari.

### **Factors that Influence Violent Crimes in Wukari**

The factors that facilitated the emergence of violent crime can be viewed in major dimensions. These include political, emotional and cognitive factors, among others. According to Ameh, Kingsley, Adejo, & Kelly (2019) posit that emotional and cognitive dissonance implies a state of psychological conflict arising from a contradiction, disputes or erosion between a person simultaneously held beliefs and reality in a constantly evolving society provides a fertile ground for conflict. Ameh, etal (2019) argued that political manipulations suggest that violent crime or conflict among the group is not a natural occurrence but a creation of desperate few, who are determined, not minding the pain such an ambition will inflict on the larger society. The political respected individuals within the communities, for personal gains may manipulate the depending youth in continual violent crime clashes. Similarly, the environmental factors encompasses physical, social, economic, cultural and political environments may shape behavior of people. Poor physical social and family environments may strengthen the intention toward criminal behaviors living in poverty, lack of social

support and negative family experiences may increase the possibility of crime. Furthermore, unemployment and education levels are other risk factors for a criminal behavior. There may be a direct connection between unemployment and crime rate. Crime may be the consequence of defective social structure, and people may learn criminal actions because of the socialization. All of these conditions caused the creation of sociological theories to notion the criminal behaviors.

The strain theory (merton, 1938) is one of the socio structural perspectives. According to this argument, social structure within the society can cause criminal behaviors. When people experience with strain or stress, they can behave like a criminal to reduce and escape from negative feelings. Cohen, (1955) opine that if there are different levels and classes in the society, and these classes are not equal and fair, some people may feel stress and anger. Society's goals such as achievement may be available for only some classes. Therefore, disadvantaged people tend to express their feelings in different ways such as crime, suicide, alcoholism. Finally, based on general strain theory (Agnew, 1992), in the view of Agnew argued that two general categories of strain can contribute to crime; others prevent individual from achieving your goals. And others take things you value or present you with negative and harmful stimuli's, these goals can be money, value status and for adolescents the autonomy from adults (Agnew, 1992).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

In conclusion the study discovered that assault, armed robbery, kidnapping, house breaking, murder, theft, fraud, grievous harm and wounding, receiving stolen property and store breaking are the pattern and types of violent crimes in Wukari LG. The study also finds out that individuals with access to dangerous arms always contribute to violent crime in Wukari LGA. Thus, the study suggests

that there should be provision of job opportunity for the youth, re-enforcement of good morals and ethics in the youths as well as the provision of relevant equipment for the security personals to controlling violent crimes.

The study recommended that government should provide employment opportunities for the youth in other to divert their attention in criminal activities. People should be properly educated on the dangers of crime and criminality. There should be a joint task force between the community and government agency in other to curtail crime. Security agency should be well equipped in other to help in fighting against crime and regulate the proliferation of dangerous arms available to young adults and the general public.

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**Ameh Sunday Ojonugwa**

**Blessing Agbu Mariki**

Department of Sociology, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria



### Abstract

Across the globe, nations are experiencing increase in violent crime victimization, hence the need for a change in style of policing. Community policing emphasizes partnership between the police and the law abiding citizens to effectively prevent and control crime, through some core values which includes but not limited to problem solving, partnership, service-delivery and accountability. The study adopts qualitative research method which involves the use of secondary data accessed from textbooks, journals, and literature and internet materials. The theoretical framework is based on broken window theory and rotten apple/rotten barrel theory. The paper was designed to ascertain the concept of community policing, determine how to improve and utilize and also examine the role of community policing in the reduction of violent crime victimization. Based on the paper's findings, it is evident that community policing is indeed a veritable tool for violent crime reduction. The study recommends among others that recruitment of police officers that can understand the terrain of communities should be taken seriously.

**Keywords:** Community, community policing, violent crime, victimization

### Introduction

The primary responsibility of government in any nation whether developed or developing alike, is the protection of lives and property of its citizenry. Following this, government devotes her resources (both human and material) to keep the society safe and free from every form of crime and criminality. Ndukwe (2018) believes that crime and criminality are as old as mankind and is inevitable in any human society around the globe therefore; one of the government agencies saddle with the responsibility of crime reduction is the police. However, over the years, the Nigerian Police has witness many reforms and prominent among these reforms is the introduction of the community policing which helps in the reduction of crime among the masses at the grassroots level.

Community policing as a crime reduction mechanism is a security arrangement between members of the community and the police which members of the public are involved in

the conduct of policing their locality to complement the efforts of the police in crime control by giving useful intelligent information to law enforcement agencies in the neighborhood (Eke, 2009). This could not be farfetched from the fact that members of the community recognize each other and can also partake in securing their immediate environment through information given to the law enforcement agencies. Community policing in Nigeria was apparently adopted to address the challenges confronting the nations as a result of soaring crime rate. The prevalence of violent crime victimization in Nigeria has been on the rise and has plunged the nation into a state of unrest with far reaching effect on her economic and socio-political development among others. Ofole and Odetola (2011) believes that in recent times the situation of violent crimes in Nigeria has rapidly been on increase especially in northern Nigeria where the police and other

law enforcement agencies appear to be incapable of arresting various security breaches that have undermined the safety of lives and property. This seminar paper is therefore designed to x-ray, the role of community policing in the reduction of violent crime victimization in Nigeria.

### **Conceptual Clarification**

#### **Community Policing**

“Policing through the community” is the involvement and participation of the citizens in the security arrangements of their communities by collaborating with the other formal security outfits, to secure their community space as opposed to “policing the community” which is a reactive and military inspired approach to crime fighting by formal security outfits (Oke et al, 2021). In the same vein, Ndukwe (2018) averred that community policing is a strong partnership and collaborative effort of police and members of the public with a view to protecting lives and properties in the neighborhood level. Mastrofski (2006) sees Community policing as an attempt to link the police more closely to the community in ‘partnership’ arrangements, joint activities to co-produce services and desired outcomes, giving the community a greater say in what the police do, or simply engaging with each other to produce a greater sense of police-community compatibility.

In line with this ojukwu (2011), outlined some principles and core values of community policing which include but not limited to: problem-solving, partnership, service delivery and accountability.

#### **Violent Crime**

WHO (2002), defined violent crime as any intentional use of physical or psychological force or power, which can be in the form of threat or involve the use of force, against oneself, another person or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, disorders in development,

or deprivation. In order words, violent crime according to Nurse and Schubert (2021) is defined as one that results in detrimental force being used or threatened against a victim. These scholars’ further states that what constitute a violent crime varies from one nation to another because specific jurisdiction determine their own laws and consequently the acts that breaks them. For instance, in France, punching a victim is not considered assault, but in the United Kingdom, it is considered a violent crime. Most violent crimes are felony crimes which are considered to be the most serious crimes and carry a sentence of a year and more in prison. In addition, Francis et al (2004) as cited in O’Brien and Yar (2008) posit that victims usually know the perpetrators of violence. Therefore, community policing plays a vital role in reducing violent crime victimization.

#### **Victimization**

According to Muratore (2008), victimization is the process of being victimized, either from physical or a psychological or a moral or a sexual point of view. Victimization can also be referred to an event where persons, communities and institutions are damaged or injured in a significant way. Those persons who are impacted by persons or events suffer a violation of rights or significant disruption of their wellbeing. Muratore further states that, victimization can be economic, physical, psychological and/or emotional and that it is technically caused by criminal actions such as rape or sexual assault, robbery, kidnapping, theft etc. Victimization has primary and secondary typology. Primary victimization refers to the first experience of crime by victim while secondary victimization also called post crime victimization or double victimization refers to further victim-blaming from criminal justice authorities following a report of an original victimization. When institutions or criminal justice system personnel fail to support the victimized individual, victims are vulnerable to secondary victimization (Doerner, 2012).

Casarez Levison reviewed several models of victimization and she develop a straightforward model of how people move from being a member of a general population to being a victim and to being a survivor, she indicated that people move through four condition; Pre-victimization (life as normal); Victimization (crime or event takes place); Transition (the individual begins to cope with their victimization and gradually stop fixating on the incident); Reorganization (the individual is able to circle back to a pre-victimization state). Generally, in one way or the other we have been victimized.

There seems to be scarcity of empirical researches on the role of community policing in crime reduction in Taraba State. It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to examine the role of community policing in the reduction of violent crime victimization in Nigeria.

### **Theoretical Framework**

It is important for this paper to explain some policing theories in investigating the role of community policing in the reduction of violent crime victimization. For the purpose of this work, two policing theories will be used and they are: Broken Window theory and Rotten Apple theory.

#### **Broken Window Theory**

The name broken window theory was derived from an experiment conducted by Philip Zimbardo 1969, in which an automobile was placed in a high crime neighborhood where it remains untouched for a few weeks until part of it was smashed by a researcher within a few hours of the initial damage the car was destroyed. The theory was propounded by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling(1982) from the findings of a foot-patrol experiment conducted in Newark, new jersey by police administrators and social scientist(police foundation 1981) the theory posit that if a broken window is left unfixed, its sends a signal to criminals or would be offenders that nobody(the police or community members) is there to care for the window and this will encourage the vandals to break more and

furthermore feels that there is no authority in the community that can stop them from committing crime.

In the word of Valaski (2012), that Wilson and Kelling found that the level of disorder in a neighborhood provides a message to motivated offenders that there is a lack of concern about the neighborhood which indicates that there is a lack of social control, either formal (I.e. police officers) or informal(I.e. neighbors & family) which reduces that chances for apprehension, therefore the offenders will target disorderly neighborhood to commit crimes because the cost of their illegal actions are greatly reduced or eliminated. By so doing the theory predicts that it will result to sequence criminal activities such as; accumulation of disorderliness of neighborhood, perceive increase in violent crimes by the residents, even though violent crimes are not directly linked to disorderliness but instead leads to the third sequence which is fear and withdrawal from residents and use of public space which will finally result to serious crime (violent crimes) because of decreased level of informal social control.

According to Wilson and Kelling (1982;30) cited in Valaski (2012) broken window theory is primarily concerned with two forms of disorder that is physical and social, it further states that physical disorder represents the level of maintenance for a neighborhood physical environment which include the condition of the buildings property surrounding the building and vacant lots. On the other hand, social disorder is the pattern of social activities or interactions, which is visible to the public and considered to be "deviant "or 'inappropriate "to most individuals. According to Wilson and Kelling it could be the presence of "no nonviolent people or necessary criminal, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks addicts rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiters, the mentally disturbed. Broken window advocate argues that the role of the police is fundamentally to maintain public order and this requires enforcing the community standards, desired by residents of

a giving neighborhood and not simply on police surveillance.

Broken window theory is in fact without criticism, critics such as Sampson & Cohen (1998), Harcourt (2001), Taylor (2001), argue that by aggressively removing disorder or solving minor crimes such as vandalism, loitering, public drinking, jaywalking and fare evasion has not significantly able to eliminate or combat crime. Another argument is that by targeting minor crimes in neighborhood and the number of people gets affected the most is the juveniles because they are being knuckle head by following some of their deviant friends into committing these minor crimes. It affects them in the long run if they get a criminal record for vandalism or littering, it may hinder them from getting a decent job or getting into college. Similar to this argument is that the increase in arrest for minor crimes will result to overpopulation or congesting in the police cells / jails since the theory is emphasizing or zero tolerance. Despite it criticism, the theory has been proven in numerous studies to be successful in crime reduction.

### **Rotten Apple Theory/ Rotten Barrel Theory**

The rotten apple metaphor originates from the proverb “a rotten apple quickly infects its neighbor” when it was first used in English in 1340 and later rephrased by Benjamin Franklin in 1736 stating “the rotten apple spoils its companion” and later “rotten apple spoils the barrel”. Theories posit that the presence of one highly unethical person is capable of tarnishing the reputation of the entire member of an organization. In the modern times the theory has been used by the police, pro-police politicians, and municipalities to minimize the public’s negative perception of police corruption and / or incompetence. O’Connor (2005: p2) states that, police departments tend to use the rotten apple theory to minimize public’s backlash against policing after every exposed act of corruption. They try to make the public understand that, the presence of one unethical or corrupt police

officer do not reflect the performance and behavior of the rest.

The theory is one of the popular theories that try to explain police corruption and also create room for examining the entire organization of the police force and thus, improve through renewing and restoring both the officers and the entire system. The theory not only examines the “rotten apple” (corrupt individuals), but also the “rotten barrel” (the entire police system). According to Gottschalk et’al (2012) corrupt police officers are not natural born criminals nor morally wicked men, constitutionally different from their honest colleagues. He further mentioned that the task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples, the organizations not just the individuals in it because corrupt police are made, not born. Similarly, Punch (2003) employs an alternative “rotten orchard” metaphor to explain the wider system failure that enabled these miscarriages of justice to take place. In furtherance punch also stated that systematic change must take place following the cases of systematic failure if confidence is to be restored and that “the more systematic the deviance, the more profound and far-reaching they have to be. As cited in Griffin (2020). This implies that, officers put in a position of the public trust must be of the highest character, because the public expect police officers to be above reproach so also with other law enforcement professionals.

In line with this, Heley (2020) suggests that, when a department sets a clear policies and guidelines as to what is acceptable and what is not, it will help guide officer’s actions. He further states the need for policies to be designed that can actually allow the acceptance of some gratuities by the police while setting clear boundaries as where gratuities stop and where low level extortion begins. He went ahead to explain that. This will not only prevent innocuous actions from becoming a slippery slope but will allow for better rapport between the police and the

public. Heley concluded that, with the contemporal principle of community policing within the field, these small gratuities could be seen as humanizing of both the police and the public and hearken back to the days when the police were neighborhood figure and friend. Critics of rotten apple theory believe that, the rotten apple doctrine has in many ways been a basic obstacle to meaningful reform.

The study combines broken window theory and rotten apple/ rotten barrel theory as theoretical framework. The former holds that if broken window is left unfixed, it sends signal to motivated or would be offender that the police and community members do not cared about the security of lives and properties in the neighborhood. It means therefore, that the formal and informal social control should partner and collaborate with one another in order to prevent and control crime in the society. While the later theory is suggesting for examining the barrel (the organization) not just the apple (the individuals) in improving the police organization through the process of re-orientation of officers. That might reduce police corruption and combating crime effectively through the principle of community policing within the department.

### **Research Methodology**

This study employed the qualitative method of data collection. Precisely, the content analysis technique of data collection. Krippenoff (2004) conceptualized content analysis as the systemic reading of texts, images and symbolic matters not necessarily from an author's or user's perspective. This implies that, inferences were drawn from existing documents such as textbooks, media, newspapers etc. to ascertain how community policing foster the reduction of crimes in Nigeria.

### **Historical Overview of Community Policing in Nigeria**

As a result of the public distrust of the police, the former TO, Balogu, in 2003

undertook a number of measures to improve the police and citizen relationship. He established in all states commands the police complaints Bureau and the Human Rights Desks, and with help of the British government, he introduce a pilot community policing project in Enugu State (Gbenemene & Adishi, 2017). Community policing was formally and legally launched by former president Obasanjo on 27 April 2004 into selected pilot division. It is a philosophy that started many decades in the United Kingdom and the United States before it adoption in Nigeria. Community policing is a strategy of policing which focuses on developing relationship with community members in order to establish and maintain a safe and orderly social environment. According to Bullock (2013), community policing was established to complement police efforts in the maintenance of internal security and protection of lives and properties. He further states that, this policing strategy has been incorporated into modern policing so that the police will respond to democratic system of governance which involves the police relinquishing some of their powers to the community so that, they can become eye of the police in the neighborhood. Furthermore, Bullock assert that, community policing philosophy emphasizes partnership, proactive policing and decentralization of power. By this he means, by working together, the police and the community can accomplish what neither can accomplish alone.

### **Role of Community Policing in the Reduction of Violent Crime Victimization in Nigeria**

Community policing as a philosophy has a huge role to play in the reduction of violent crime victimization because most of these crimes such as rape, robbery, murder, assault etc. takes place within the community and sometimes by members of the community who are criminals. Akani et al (2020) and Ojukwu (2011), assert that perpetrators of crime are often times known within their



communities. This is more reason for partnership between the police and citizens to work together to prevent crime and solve neighborhood problems. Together in partnership, the community and police department will work to achieve a common goal of a safer and better place to live, Teacher (2013). The partnership that develop overtime can ultimately help the police find the underlying cause of crime within the neighborhood.

By involving the community base organizations such as vigilance group, credible local guards, able-bodied civilian youths, traditional rulers and chiefs into the conventional police sub-system it provides security service to communities, as such complement the effort of the police in combating crime and enhancing the safety of live and properties in the society (Haruna & Aliyu 2016). It implies that community policing promotes public safety and improve quality of life through partnering and collaborating with residents by their effective and efficient crime control.

Community policing reduced the fear of crime in the community. With an increase in police presence in the neighborhood the residence feels more secure, the feeling of security helps the police establish trust within the community, without the trust and involvement of the community, any attempt at community policing will fail, cited in Teacher (2013). This improves police-community relations and ultimately quality of life for the community improves and crime is reduced. Reduced levels of crime will allow more police resources to be allocated to services that have the greatest impact on the quality of community life. So far community policing creates awareness and room for the participation of every individual and not only the police in protecting lives and properties in the community. In addition, Skogan (2007) state that, active participation is required from the local government to the average citizen in order for community policing work; everyone is responsible for safeguarding the welfare of the neighborhood. Unlike traditional policing

methods, the goals of policing are expanded and the perception of community is changed.

“Policing through the community” create supportive environment for police officers by giving out useful information that will aid investigation. In furtherance of this (Haruna & Aliyu 2016) state that, policing is everybody’s business as they cannot know what is happening everywhere, and so the public is the eyes of the police, they have better information on crime and criminality which they share with the police thereby improving the intelligent gathering on crimes; an aspect that is crucial in crime prevention and control. Without intelligent report, the police cannot effectively solve the problem of crimes in the community and that is why it seek for complementing bodies to assist them.

Lastly on this note, community policing helps to reduce human rights abuses against women and children. The United Nations (2015) claims that an estimated 20,000 civilians including women and children have been killed by Boko Haram since 2009, according to this report, some of these civilians are amputated, beheaded, stoned, drowned, burned or bombed. In addition to the crime against humanity perpetrated by the notorious sect, is the problem of banditry. In the light of this, it is imperative that community policing can drastically help combat these problems in that there would be a synergy between the community and law enforcement agencies in tackling insecurity and violent crime victimization as against the traditional policing which is reactive rather than proactive.

### **Challenges of Community Policing**

**Inadequate funding:** Lanre (2009) opine that, underfunding is a major constraint on community policing, that community policing requires much greater funding than traditional policing, since it requires that all officers be trained and retrained, more modern crime-fighting equipment and morale building pay raises for officers. By this police officers will be

encouraged to do more by partnering with community members.

**Dishonesty of informant:** an informant can be a useful law enforcement tool, a necessary evil when used properly, but when they are dishonest with the information they provide to the police or are pressured into lying at the expense of innocent people in order to save their skin, then, the police has a recipe for disaster, (Hartley, Maddan & Sponhn 2007). If community members are not honest with information, community policing cannot be effective.

**Non reward and safety of informant:** Hartley et al (2007) assert that, individual who have information that could help the police in arresting criminals and reducing crime have neglected doing so because of absence of assurance from the police to protect informants. That most informants have always cited that, lack of protection of their privacy after they have reported or provided the police with information in aiding criminal arrest prevents them from cooperating with the police. They further states that, most community members feel that the police do not effectively execute reported cases to their satisfaction and as a result of that, most criminals are left to go free after an informant have provided useful information that could led to the arrest and sentence of an offender. When community members don't feel safe after providing information that led to the arrest or prosecution of criminals, then they will hold back their truth and information and this will have a negative effect on the successful operation of community policing.

**Lack of cooperation among security agencies:** while addressing the media on the state of the nation, the Board Chair of Action Aid, Professor Patricia Donli challenged the security agencies on partiality, professionalism, training and intelligence to upscale the nation's security architecture. In her words, "there appear to be lack of synergy amongst security agencies in the country". According to her that the security situation in

Nigeria has continued to deteriorate as a result of perceived lack of neutrality and professionalism on the part of security agencies as well as lack of synergy in operation and sharing of intelligence has resulted in the state of insecurity that has manifested in diverse forms across the country, (The Guardian Newspaper, 2018).

### **How to Improve and Utilize Community Policing**

Though community policing seems complicated and expensive but that does not mean it is undoable. Bullock (2013) outlined some strategies to be used in order to utilize and improve community policing.

**Encourage Community Volunteer:** welcoming volunteers in the police department can perfectly help in establishing good relations. Sometimes, people tend to construct negative images of the police because they don't have any idea on what the law enforcer are working on and so encouraging volunteers to take part in community policing builds transparency and also help supplement officers and civilian personnel in many ways.

**Community Education:** to advance community policing, many police department will have to implement community education as an effective strategy to inform people about crime-prevention techniques and police responsibilities and efforts. This will help community members to become better partners in the reduction and prevention of crimes.

**Initiate Neighborhood Watch:** neighborhood watch is another strategy that police department can adopt in order to maintain public safety. Member of the neighborhood watch can receive direct training from law enforcers on how to organize a particular area in the community and come up with methods to better communicate with their neighbours while working together with the police.

**Attend Community Meetings:** by attending community meetings and actively participating

with all the stakeholders, the police representatives can directly communicate, help to solve issues and facilitates a positive and collaborative relationship with the people.

**Youth Engagement:** the police department can create programmes that would engage the youth and their families on how to they can collaborate with law enforcers through activities like police explorer, citizen policies academy, police athletic leagues etc.

**Consistent Supervision:** all other strategies can be effective if supervision is done consistently by police heads. With this patrol police and supervisors can collaborate closely as department heads are now functioning as mentors, motivators and facilitators. Through this, law enforcers can better respond to a wide variety of service demands.

**Participate in Community Surveys:** the police departments can directly ask input from community members with the community efforts through performance evaluation. This can be done through surveys that reflects the departments and the community's needs, not necessarily standardized assessment.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has examined the role of community policing and how it can help to reduce violent crime victimization. The paper has also examined the violent crimes prevalent in the country, it concludes that, the best way to tackle Nigeria insecurity problem is community policing. That the Nigeria police force must have to accept change and shift from their traditional model of policing to the new model of community policing which deals with partnership and decentralization of power. Also recruitment of police officers that can understand the terrain of communities should be taken seriously, that where community policing is practiced, violent crime victimization is steadily on the decline. However, improvement is needed in the area of orientation, incentive, and quality of recruited police officers due to the sharp

change in mode of operation. The study recommends further that government and other stakeholders should provide the enabling platform for the partnership of the police and members of the community in the fight against violent crimes.

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**Gimba Hezekiah Dikop**

Department of Sociology

University of Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria

Email: [dikopg@unijos.edu.ng](mailto:dikopg@unijos.edu.ng), [dikopg@gmail.com](mailto:dikopg@gmail.com)



### Abstract

This paper attempts to examine religion as an institution in two dimensions, the functions it provides to society, on the other hand the problems it creates for society. Though religion means different things to different people, it is widely accepted as a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things; things set apart and held in awe, which unites the believers into a moral community. Looking at religion in Nigeria today, it is obvious that various religious institutions have made significant contributions in different spheres of human life, such as education, health, agriculture, transport, information and communication technology etc. On the contrary, there have been heightened trends of religious intolerance in Nigeria especially in the Northern region which often leads to open conflicts with colossal losses and damages on human lives and property. The purpose of this study is to examine the role(s) of religion as an institution and its implication on the general development stride in Nigeria. The method used for information gathering was through the review of relevant literature. Current and existing publications in relation to the theme of this paper were thoroughly reviewed where data on contemporary social issues were obtained. The result of the study showed that intolerance is the major cause of inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria. The dominant religions now live together in mutual suspicion. Findings also revealed that instead of progressive development, Nigeria is experiencing retrogressive development due to human and infrastructural destructions. In conclusion, religious intolerance has become a mechanism for social control by religious leaders. Sanctions are recommended on conflict merchants who use religion to cause crisis in society.

**Keywords:** Religion, development, intolerance, leaders, conflict merchants, violence

### Introduction

It is difficult to date back when religion as an institution emerged, but it is a known fact that the institution of religion is as old as human history. This is so because man is a spiritual being. Though religion is a universal phenomenon, it is found in every society, it is understood and practiced differently. According to Shankar Rao (2008) Man from the earliest times has been incurably religious. He has religious quest which makes him restless even beyond the satisfaction of his basic physical needs. Hence the Biblical saying, "Man cannot live by bread alone". Religious beliefs and practices are however, far from being uniform. Laws, customs,

conventions, fashions etc are not the only means of social control, overriding them all are religion and morality which formulate and shape all of them. Furthermore, Shankar Rao opined that religion has been exerting tremendous influence on other institutions. That religious dogma have influenced and conditioned economic endeavour, political movements, property dealings, educational tasks, ideological favours etc. Religion which is based on the cultural needs of men, has added new dimension to human life and human development.

Religious intolerance is the inability to accept other religious beliefs and practices as

valid. Looking down on or disparaging a person or group because of their religion. Religious intolerance in Nigeria is the inability to recognize and accommodate views and opinions of others which serves as one of the major sources of religious violence in the nation. Nigerian religious adherents, especially the Muslims and the Christians have demonstrated intolerant attitudes to result to violence. Religious intolerance is expressed in discrimination, repression and rivalry, leading to persecution.

Stefanos Foundation (2009) "history has recorded a high level of intolerance orchestrated through terrorism that has continued to pose a threat to life around the globe". The attack of the American twin towers of September 2001, the bombing in Kenyan capital and other activities of Al-Qaida around the world are classic examples of such. Nigeria also has seen many deaths; wanton destruction of property and incidences of intolerance has continued to plague the nation, thereby threatening its stability and unity.

The concept of underdevelopment can better be understood when we know the term development. Development as a concept does not have a precise definition. Different people have different perspectives. Rodney (1982) development in human society is a many-sided process. He views development largely from human and infrastructural dimensions. At the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being. On the other hand, the term development is used in an exclusive economic sense being that the type of economy is itself an index of other social features. A society develops economically as its members increase jointly their capacity for dealing with the environment depending on their advancement in science and technology. Development can be seen from an overall

social process depending on how man is able to deal with his environment.

Underdevelopment is not absence of development because every people have developed in one way or another and to a greater or lesser extent. Underdevelopment makes sense only as a means of comparing levels of development. It is tied to the fact that human social development has been uneven and from an economic viewpoint some human groups have advanced further by producing more and becoming more wealthy (Rodney, 1982)

Jary and Jary (2000) underdevelopment is a process whereby a society, especially its economy changes under the influence of another society which becomes dominant. Seer (1972) raised three critical questions for which the answers would help to understand whether a society is developed or underdeveloped. (1) what has been happening to poverty? (2) what has been happening to unemployment? (3) what has been happening to inequality? These are indices of underdevelopment for any country that cannot adequately address them (Quoted in Alanana, 2006. P.2).

There are two dominant factors that are likely to influence the trend of underdevelopment of a nation: external and internal. For external factor, it would be the unequal relationships of two or more countries where one exerts dominance over the others. For internal reason, it could be due to internal challenges e.g inter-group conflicts, aggression, terrorism, antagonism, intolerance, discrimination.

However, the purpose of this paper is to examine the role of religion on the trend of development in Nigeria with emphasis on religious intolerance and underdevelopment. The rivalry among the two dominant religions Islam and Christianity has often resulted in series of crises with high magnitude of destruction on lives and property. The phenomenon of religious intolerance as assumed a disturbing dimension, if left

unchecked will frustrate all aspects of nation building in Nigeria. However, the contributions of various religious institutions in Nigeria cannot be ignored especially in health care services, education, agriculture, empowerment programmes and investment initiatives.

Further, the method of data collection for this paper depends largely on review of relevant literature and other documentaries. Several well researched literatures exist on religious intolerance with statistics on how it has translated to open conflicts. The facts are collated and analysed thematically. This approach helps in identifying contemporary development challenges having nexus with religious intolerance, how to address it and prevent future occurrences.

### **Religious Intolerance and Conflicts in Nigeria**

In attempt to explain the phenomenon different people look at religious intolerance in Nigeria from different historical antecedents. Stefanos Foundation (2010) traced the origin of religious conflicts from the colonial era especially the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914 when Nigeria became a federating unit. That the geographical demarcation of the three regions, North, south and East was more in favour of the North predominantly Muslims. The size allocated to northern religion was larger than the other two South and East put together. This imbalance gave rise to fears in the other two regions dominated by Christians.

Since then, the two dominant religions have been relating to each other on mutual suspicion. The competition has economic background, that is, who has more access to the national cake, and who presides over its distribution.

Some writers in their analysis traced religious intolerance in recent times when Nigeria started to experience religious violence most especially in the Northern

Region. Patriots (2004) started by examining the Shari'a debate during the constituent assembly sitting in 1978 which created so much heated argument between Muslim and Christian members on the advantages and disadvantages of the Islamic system in the Nigeria constitution.

Gwamna (2010) identified some of the causes of religious conflicts to include: competition for resources, quest for power in the political space, conflict of values and identities etc. To him, religious conflicts mean the differing religious opinions, interests and view points, between contesting religions which have often times resulted into situations of hate, anger, bitterness and even war.

Gofwen (2004) opined that, the way in which both Islam and Christianity were introduced into Nigeria made for a competitive and conflictual relationship between the two having been introduced at different times and historical epochs, they all fitted into the different worldviews borne out of their historical experiences of antagonism and hatred towards each other.

Furthermore, Gofwen contended that the politicization of religion in Nigeria got to its peak of saturation and openly manifested itself during the second republic during the 1977 constitution drafting which created an opening for the elite to express some of the bottled religious grievances which for long have been suppressed. After this open manifestation of religious intolerance, the nation has never been the same again with series events of religious conflicts most of which are in the North.

To buttress his points, Gofwen provided a summary of some violent religious conflicts as follows:

| Date                      | Location  | Principal Actors   |
|---------------------------|---|--|
| May 1980                  | Zaria (Kaduna State)  | Disturbances in Zaria during which property belonging to mainly Christians were destroyed.   |
| December, 18-29, 1980     | Yan-Awaki Ward in Kano. (Kano State)                        | Riots by Maitatsine sect, 4, 177 people died, extensive destruction of property.   |
| October 29- 30, 1982      | Bullumkutu, Maiduguri (Borno State)                         | Kala-Kato and Maitatsine sects... 118 people died, extensive damage to property.   |
| October 29-30, 1982       | Kano (Kano State)   | Muslim demonstrators burnt down Churches.  |
| February 27-March 5, 1984 | Dobeli Ward, Jimeta- Yola (Gongola State)                   | Maitatsine sect, 586 died, wanton destruction of property.   |
| April 26-28, 1985         | Pantami Ward, Gombe. (Bauchi State)                         | Maitatsine sect, 105 died Extensive destruction of property.   |
| March 1986                | Ilorin (Kwara State)  | Muslims and Christians clashed during a Christian procession at Easter.  |
| May 1986                  | Ibadan, University of Ibadan (Oyo State)                    | Demonstrations by Muslims in which <b>they</b> burnt the figure of the Risen Si in <b>the</b> chapel of Resurrection, University of Ibadan.  |
| March 1987                | (a) Kafanchan (Kaduna State)                                | Clashes between Muslims and Christians at the College of Education, Kafanchan... loss of some lives and the burning of some Mosques by Christians and native Kajes   |
|                           | (b) Katsina, Funtua, Zaria, Gusau and Kaduna (Kaduna State) | Wave of religious riots in which Muslims burnt down numerous Church buildings, and damaged property belonging to Christians. Many lives were lost.   |
| February 1988             | Kaduna, Kaduna Polytechnic (Kaduna State)                   | Religious riots, ostensibly among students, destroyed the foundation walls of the Christian Chapel.  |
| April 1991                | (a) Katsina (Katsina State)                                 | Religious violence spearheaded by Mallam Yahaya Yakubu, leader of the fundamentalist Shi'ite sect in Katsina. It was a protest over a blasphemous publication in Fun- Times. Several lives were lost and property destroyed.   |
|                           | (b) Tafawa Balewa (Bauchi State)                            | Started as a quarrel between a Fulani man and a Sayawa meat seller in Tafawa Balewa. Escalated into a full blown violence and later took the colouring of a religious war in Bauchi, Several lives were lost and property valued over hundreds of millions of Naira was destroyed. |
| October 1991              |   | A peaceful procession initiated by the Izala sect to halt Rev. Reinherd Bonke from having a crusade in Kano, later degenerated into very bloody religious violence. Thousands of lives were lost and property valued at millions of Naira was destroyed.                           |
| May 1992                  | Zangon Kataf, Zaria, Kaduna, Ikara. (Kaduna State)          | A communal feud between the Katafs and the Hausas later took the dimension of inter-religious war between Muslims and Christians   |



|              |                        |   |
|--------------|------------------------|---|
|              |                        | in other major cities of Kaduna State. Several lives and property were destroyed.   |
| January 1993 | Funtua (Katsina State) | The Kalakato religious sect assaulted   the village Head and burnt down a Police Vehicle. Lives and property were also lost.                                    |
| Feb. 2000    | Kaduna                 | Conflict engulfed the city between Christians and Moslems over the implementation of Sharia law. Thousands of lives and property worth millions were destroyed. |

Source: R. I. Gofwen (2004, P. 65-67)

In attempt to explain the alarming rate of religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria, various scholars have offered different explanations.

Usman (1987) in his writing on the subject matter of “manipulating of religion in Nigeria” established that religious and ethnic conflicts are part of the inevitable competition for scarce resources by modernizing ethnic elites.

Religious intolerance which often results in open conflicts is largely a reflection of inter-religious competition on the scarce resources of the nation. Therefore, whether it is inter-religious or ethno-religious conflicts will always have economic influence attached.

Takaya (1990) also noted that religious intolerance is a product of fundamentalist fanaticism where a dominant religious group or an emergent revolutionary sect refuses to accommodate the views, rights or practices of adherents to other religious faiths in the same community.

Gwamna (2010) noted, Nigeria has witnessed ethno-religious crises that have led to significant loss of lives and property. The Maitatsine religious riots which began in Kano in 1980 spread to Yola, Bulumkutu and Gombe, touching even non Muslims. The Maitatsine riots opened the flood gates for what have become ethno-religious crises in Nigeria with the states in the North bearing the greater part of the brunt. Gwamna identified some of the ethno-religious conflicts to include, the Zangon-Kataf (1992), Tafawa Balewa (1991, 1995, 2000), Jos crisis of 2001, 2008 and 2010 and the Shariah conflicts of 2000.

In all these conflicts and riots, there is always the destruction of lives and property

leading to setback on the trends of development of the nation on both human and infrastructures.

Gwamna (2010) identified poverty as another factor for the continuing ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. It is argued that the ever-increasing level of poverty typified in joblessness and deteriorating infrastructures creates conditions for conflict to thrive. It is obvious that poverty is often associated to the various conflicts stated as the perpetrators are usually involved in looting of property.

However, the current security challenges witnessed in Nigeria today especially the Herders-Farmers conflicts have religious undertones. The herders are predominantly Muslims while the farmers are mostly of the Christian faith. Any time there is a clash between the two groups, religious elements will always manifest in the crises. It has been in the public domain that in Benue state the herders-farmers conflict has led to the destruction of churches and killing of some Catholic Priests. Similarly, it also happened in Plateau state where both Churches and Mosques destroyed in events of herder-farmers conflicts. Worrisome is the Christmas eve 2023 night attacks on some farming communities in Bokkos Local Government Area of Plateau state by suspected Fulani herders where churches were burn down leading to the killing of the wife and children of a CAC Pastor with only the man (Pastor) as the survivor in the family. Prior to these events, a leader of Miyetti Ala Group in Mangu Local Government Area was

assassinated by unknown people suspected to be from farming community.

Suchi and Musa (2021) in their study on the “Root cause of Farmers-Herder crisis in North Central Nigeria” identified that the impact of the herders-farmers crisis is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted in nature. Apart from loss of lives and economic goods,

the conflict has also heightened the fear of insecurity among ordinary citizens thereby hampering social, economic and political activities in affected communities and localities. Suchi and Musa provided some statistics on the incidents and impact of Farmers-Herders clashes in Nigeria.

| S/n | Date           | Incident   | Targets/Location  | Casualty   |
|-----|----------------|--|---|--|
| 1.  | July, 2009     | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Karim iamido villages, Taraba state                                 | Unconfirmed number of persons killed   |
| 2.  | August 2000    | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Plateau state   | Unconfirmed number of persons killed   |
| 3.  | October 2000   | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Cattle destroying crops and farmland in of Oyo north, Oyo state     | Unconfirmed number of persons killed   |
| 4.  | October 2001   | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Cattle destroying local farmland in Tarok Plateau state             | Unconfirmed number of persons killed   |
| 5.  | August 2002    | Hausa Fulani and Tarok people                    | Maza, Plateau State   | Unconfirmed number of persons killed   |
| 6.  | March 1,2003   | Yungar people and Fulani herdsmen                | Sony area of Adamawa state  | 10 people killed   |
| 7.  | December, 2009 | Fulani herdsmen with Jukun and Ebira mercenaries | Udeni-gida communities in Nassarawa state                           | 40 people killed   |
| 8.  | March, 2010    | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Beye and Batern villages  | 13 people were killed, cattle and farms destroyed                                  |
| 9.  | April, 2010    | Suspected Fulani herdsmen                        | Berom village in Plateau State                                      | Unconfirmed number of persons killed   |
| 10. | May, 2010      | Fulani herdsmen and suspected Berom youths       | Tusung village in Barkin LGA in Plateau state                       | 3 people killed  |
| 11. | July, 2010     | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Maza in Plateau state   | 8 people killed and several houses burnt   |
| 12. | February 2011  | Fulani herdsmen                                  | 3 districts in Riyom LGA in Plateau state                           | Scores were killed   |
| 13. | June, 2011     | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Guma LGA in Benue state   | 12 soldiers and 18 people were killed while more than 3,000 persons were displaced |
| 14. | March 2012     | Fulani herdsmen                                  | TseAbatse and Tseyoo in Benue state                                 | Unconfirmed number of persons killed   |
| 15. | March, 2012    | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Katsina-Alla (Benue) and fled to Utanga Obaniku L.G.A (Cross-River) | 3,000 Fulani herdsmen displaced from their settlement                              |
| 16. | July 2012      | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Riyom LGA, Plateau state  | 50 people killed   |
| 17. | October, 2012  | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Benue state   | 30 people killed   |
| 18. | April 23,2013  | Suspected Fulani herdsmen                        | Mbasenge community, Guma LGA  | 10 farmers killed  |
| 19. | May 7,2013     | Suspected Fulani herdsmen                        | Agatu Community in Benue state                                      | 47 persons killed  |
| 20. | May 14,2013    | Fulani herdsmen                                  | Ekwo-Okpanchenyl, Agatu LGA   | 40 local Farmers   |

|     |                   |                           |   |  |
|-----|-------------------|---------------------------|---|--|
| 21. | July 5,2013       | Fulani herdsmen           | Nzorov, Guma LGA  | 20 people were killed""  |
| 22. | July 28,2013      | Fulani herdsmen           | 2 villages in Agatu LGA, Benue state  | Retaliation for the alleged killings of 8 villagers and 112 cows                   |
| 23. | August 2, 2013    | Fulani herdsmen           | Troke in Wase LGA in Plateau state  | Unconfirmed number of persons killed   |
| 24. | October, 2013     | Fulani herdsmen           | Ketu Ogun state   | 1 person killed  |
| 25. | October, 2013     | Suspected Fulani herdsmen | Kaura local government, Kaduna state  | 100 people killed  |
| 26. | October 7, 2013   | Fulani herdsmen           | Eguma settlement in Benue state Agaiie LGA  | Properties worth millions of Naira destroyed                                       |
| 27. | October 10, 2013  | Suspected Fulani herdsmen | Kukek community in Barkin Ladi LGA in Plateau state   | Cows were stolen, 21 people including 9 members of a family and 12 herdsmen killed |
| 28. | November 7, 2013  | Unknown attackers         | Ikpele & Okpopolo communities in Benue state  | 7 were killed while over 6000 inhabitants  |
| 29. | November 9, 2013  | Fulani herdsmen           | Agatu L.G-A in Benue state  | 7 villages overrun while 36 locals killed  |
| 30. | February 4, 2014  | Suspected Fulani herdsmen | Kirim, Zagar and Zandyan villages of Southern Kaduna  | Several people were killed and many displaced from their homes                     |
| 31. | June 2015         | Suspected Fulani herdsmen | Motokun village in Patigi L.G.A Kwara state, Oro-Ago community in Ifelodun L.G.A and Ninji and Ropp villages in Plateau state | 27 people and 70 Christians were killed  |
| 32. | July 16, 2015     | Fulani herdsmen           | Plateau state   | Some farmers were killed   |
| 33. | September 2015    | Fulani herdsmen           | Onitsha Ukwuani community in Ndokwa Wes L.G.A of Delta state  | 3 persons were killed  |
| 34. | September 2015    | Fulani herdsmen           | Edo state   | Middle aged woman was raped and killed   |
| 35. | October 2, 2015   | Fulani herdsmen           | Ogun state  | Undisclosed numbers of person raped and killed residents and Farmers               |
| 36. | November 2015     | Fulani herdsmen           | Ulaja and Ojeh communities in Dekina LGA of Kogi State  | 22 persons were killed   |
| 37. | December 1, 2015  | Fulani herdsmen           | Ofagbe community, Isoko North council area of Delta   | 1 person killed  |
| 38. | January 24, 2016  | Fulani herdsmen           |   | Nigerian police DPO and 29 others killed   |
| 39. | February 2016     | Fulani herdsmen           | Tom-Anyiin, Tom- Ataan, Mbaya and Tombu in Buruku Benue state   | 10 persons killed  |
| 40. | February 8, 2016  | Fulani herdsmen           | Tom-Anyiin, Tom- Ataan in Buruku  | 10 killed while over 300 displaced   |
| 41. | February 11, 2016 | Fulani herdsmen           | Abbi community in Uzo-Uwani LGA, Enugustate   | 2 people were killed while houses and motorcycles were burnt                       |
| 42. | February 29, 2016 | Fulani herdsmen           | Agatu LGA, Benue state  | Over 500 locals killed and 7000 displaced  |

|     |                  |                                |  |   |
|-----|------------------|--------------------------------|--|---|
| 43. | March 9, 2016    | Fulani herdsmen                | Ngorukgan, Tse Chia, Deghkia and Nhumbe. Logo LGA, Benue state |   |
| 44. | April 5, 2016    | Fulani herdsmen/farmers' clash | Benue state  | APC youth leader and 3 others were killed                       |
| 45. | April 8, 2016    | Fulani herdsmen                | Ondo state   | Chief OluFala security guard was kidnapped and killed           |
| 46. | April 9 2016     | Unknown assailant              | Edo state  | Fulani camp razed following the killing of a 64-year old farmer |
| 47. | April 12, 2016   | Fulani herdsmen                | Dori and Mesuma villages in Taraba                             | 15 people killed  |
| 48. | April 19, 2016   | Suspected Fulani herdsmen      | Lagun village, Lagelu local council Oyo state                  | 1 person killed   |
| 49. | April 25, 2016   | Fulani herdsmen                | Ukpabi Nimbo community, Enugu state                            | 48 people killed, 60 injured                                    |
| 50. | May 14, 2016     | Fulani herdsmen                | Binev council ward of Buruku LGA, Benue state                  | 13 people killed  |
| 51. | January 24, 2017 | Fulani herdsmen                | Ipiga village in Ohimi- ni LGA of Benue state                  | 15 persons killed   |
| 52. | March 2, 2017    | Fulani herdsmen and farmers    | Mbahimin community, Gwer East LGA of Benue state               | 10 persons <i>killed</i>  |
| 53. | March 11, 2017   | Fulani herdsmen                | Tiv community, Mkgovur village in Buruku LGA, Benue state      | 7 people killed   |
| 54. | May 8, 2017      | Fulani herdsmen                | Tse-Akaa village, Logo LGA, Benue state                        | 3 persons killed  |
| 55. | May 13, 2017     | Fulani herdsmen                | Three communities of Logo LGA, Benue state                     | 8 people killed   |

Source: Suchi and Musa (2021) Fieldwork data compilation.

This study revealed the high level of intolerance among adherents of the two dominant religions Islam and Christianity in Nigeria. Members of the two religions are now living together in mutual suspicion.

The study also discovered that the two religions have been heavily politicized through their leaders. This was witnessed in recent times where religious leaders would come out openly either in worship centres or social media to make public political statements. A typical example was seen in the last general elections of 2023 where debate on the emerging concept of Muslim-Muslim ticket dominated the political space before the election.

The study has shown that religious intolerance has resulted to series of violent conflicts leading to colossal loss of lives and property. This is the height of underdevelopment perpetrated by adherents of the two religions in Nigeria. It is well established

that inter-religious/ethno-religious conflicts have significantly contributed to the underdevelopment of nation.

### Conclusion and Recommendation

It is a statement of fact that religious institutions in Nigeria have contributed significantly to nation building through the provision of social services e.g schools, healthcare centres, financial institutions, agricultural services. However, because of religious intolerance and conflicts, some of these service providing institutions are in ruin due to violence. The level of destruction of lives and property resulting from religious conflicts cannot be quantified. Most religious leaders have deviated from their primary responsibility of leading members to the path of morality and eternity; rather, they pay

more attention to material benefits. It justifies the view that most of the crises are propelled by competition on scarce resources.

Government should develop the political will to punish sponsors and perpetrators of religious crises. Religious leaders who are found to be inciting members in the direction of intolerance and conflict should be made to face the wrath of the law. Government should establish an inter-religious commission to promote religious harmony in the country. The principle of justice and fairness should be the over-riding philosophy in leadership at all levels both government and non governmental organizations.

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## RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN JOS, PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA

**Ameh Sunday Ojonugwa**  
**Geoffrey Nanbal Shipurut**

Department of Sociology  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria



### Abstract

The series of religious violence in Jos necessitated this paper titled the role of religious leaders in management of religious violence in Jos Plateau State. The paper aims to examine how religious leaders in Jos Plateau State handle interfaith conflict. The paper adopted a descriptive cross-sectional survey research design. Key Informant Interview (KII) was used to collect primary data. Six (6) religious leaders were purposively selected across Jos north, Jos south and Jos east with each local government having two key informants respectively. Content analysis and narrative techniques were taken to analyse and report the findings. The paper concluded that religious leaders are critical actors who have contributed significantly in management of violent conflict in Jos. On the other hand, some religious leaders are guilty of instigating violent conflict in Jos Plateau State. Thus, religious leaders have the capacity to either manage violent conflict or instigate violent conflict in Jos Plateau State. The paper recommended that the action of religious leaders should be appropriately regulated by the government. Preaching in public places shouldn't be permitted for everyone. This is to prevent ignorant statements by religious leaders who are prone to inciting violence and have little understanding of their own religion.

**Keywords:** Religious, violence, religious leaders, management

### Introduction

Religious leaders play a key role in mobilizing believers as they can call for peace or instigate violence. However, no religion preaches war, violence and conflict. Both Christianity and Islam frowns at violence, injustice, destruction of public property and the killing of innocent souls. That is to say, every religion advocate peace and harmony among its adherent and fellow human beings. It was on this note that Osunyikanmi and Sapele (2019) posited that nearly every religious doctrine forbids doing evil, committing crimes, being greedy, or killing innocent people. For instance, Christians consider Jesus Christ to be the prince of peace (Nache, 2001). Therefore, it is widely held that Christianity can help all of its followers achieve peace, wealth, advancement, and development.

In the same vein, Islamic faith derives its teachings from the life and teachings of Muhammad, which are recorded in their holy book, the Holy Qur'an. Each and every Muslim believes that Islam is a religion of peace. Islam contains excellent teachings on peace and peacebuilding, as far as the majority of Muslims are aware. The Islamic teaching on religious tolerance makes this clear when it says this. Don't offend anyone who they worship other than Allah, lest they unknowingly and unfairly insult Him (Qur'an 6:108; Achunike, 2017). The verse above demonstrates that one must learn how to listen to others in order for them to listen to him. To put it another way, one must respect the religions of others in order for one's own to be respected.

Religious leaders in particular have a great deal of power to affect the lives and actions of people who practice their faith and adhere to their beliefs. Their messages can be powerful and far-reaching when they speak up (Aemro, 2018). Religious leaders have the power to utilize their influence for good or bad. Some people have incited violence by disseminating hateful and hostile messages using their position. However, by promoting messages of peace, tolerance, acceptance, and respect for one another, as well as by acting to ease tensions between communities, a great number of people have been instrumental in preventing violence and its provocation (Asogwa & Ifeanyi, 2021).

The majority of Nigerian communities have seen various forms of violence and conflict because of membership in particular religions. There are issues with discord, unity, intolerance, bigotry, and similar things even among followers of the same faith, such as Christianity. In Nigerian society, none of these have permitted harmonious cohabitation. The sermons of the majority of Nigerian religious leaders have frequently been used to sow discord and discontent among their followers. This is at odds with the reality that religion serves as a unifying force and, frequently, a messenger of peace (Peter & John, 2020).

The views expressed in public discourse and the media that propagate hatred and incite people to commit acts of violence against particular communities, frequently on the basis of their ethnic or religious identity, are among the warning signs and potent triggers of violence that can result in genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, according to Ejikeme (2018). Online and offline hate speech and incitement, in both peaceful and conflictual contexts, has alarmingly increased in the past several years. Accordingly, religion as exemplified by the teachings of diverse religious bodies can be utilized to mold followers' minds with values of love and peace.

Unfortunately, some Muslim and Christian preachers are guilty of unwholesome preaching and negative comments against each other's religions, particularly in Nigeria. It appears that too much freedom is accorded religious leaders in Nigeria. Anybody can carry a microphone and say whatever he or she likes in the name of religion. There is no censor for religious preachers. Some religious leaders, despite their calling, are given to selfishness (Nwankwo, 2021).

In this sense, it is envisaged that religion will contribute favourably to the maintenance of harmony, peace, tranquillity, inclusivity, happiness, integration, and love. Being a religious country, one would have thought that Nigeria would have been endowed with all the personal and societal virtues necessary for peaceful coexistence by the fruits of her trinity, Christianity, Islam, and African Traditional Religion. Regrettably, it appears to be the opposite. It is left to conclude that either society has destroyed the true purposes of religion, or those in charge of religion have exploited those purposes to sow discord in the community. Accordingly, this study examines how religious leaders in Jos Plateau State handle interfaith conflict. Finding out if religious leaders in Jos are useful in managing violent conflicts or if they fuel ethno-religious violence in Jos Plateau State is the main focus of the study.

### **Religious Leadership and Violence**

Religious leaders, whether from Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, or another faith, generally have the power to affect governments, legislative bodies, and society at large. They serve as dispute resolution mediators. They participate in discourse about interfaith conflict or programs pertaining to interfaith conflict, as well as dialogue aimed at promoting reconciliation as well as dialogue during and after the conflict (Dorcas & Olusola, 2018). Religious leaders are like shepherds, according to the Bible (John 10:11); I am the good shepherd. A good shepherd is one who

gives his life in order to guide, protect, and care for a group of individuals under his direction. People will therefore be lost and without direction without them.

Khairulnizam and Suzy (2015) posited that there are several meanings to the concept of religious leader, but the feature that sets different religious contexts apart, especially in Christianity, is the emphasis on the deity element. For example, a religious leader is a person who possesses the divinely assigned ability and duty to guide a particular group of God's people toward his intended goals for the organization. Furthermore, according to Khairulnizam and Suzy (2015), it can also mean someone who is called by God to be a leader; someone who leads with and through Christlike character; and someone who exemplifies the functional abilities necessary for leadership to occur. According to other Western scholars, religious leaders are those who possess the capacity to influence others by virtue of their personality being imbued with, penetrated by, and inspired by the Holy Spirit. (Higazi, 2019).

Dorcas and Olusola (2018) suggested that religious leaders have an essential part in Plateau State politics because the public trust them. They question their followers, which naturally include political leaders, and mold the opinions and behavior of their members. They also bring attention to a range of social and political concerns. They participate in peace work in their individual congregations and localities and represent their religious groups at peacebuilding gatherings. For example, churches have helped provide displaced people with basic necessities. Pastors have also given people who have lost family members, homes, and organizations assistance with counselling. Some have provided resources to other local non-governmental organizations, while others have used church buildings as camp sites. Additionally, congregations have offered monetary, spiritual, and psychological support

to victims of violence, especially to members of the congregation (Dorcas & Olusola, 2018).

Similarly, mosques have assisted with medical treatment for victims, conducted search and rescue operations, given clothing to the homeless, housed displaced persons, donated food and other supplies of relief, and paid for victim care. In Plateau State, efforts to promote peace and manage conflicts have unquestionably included religious leaders and institutions at their core. Assogwa and Ifeanyi (2021) note that although there are interreligious conflicts and violence in the state, constructive ties between Muslims and Christians are demonstrated through economic cooperation, interreligious communication, youth involvement, and peacebuilding initiatives. For instance, the state government established an interfaith council in 2001 that was composed of ten Christians and ten Muslims and was tasked with promoting peace throughout the state (Best, 2011). This organization is still in operation and keeps promoting interfaith communication between followers of the two major religions in the state.

Particularly religious leaders have a great ability to affect the lives and actions of people who practice their faith and have similar views. When they speak up, their words can have a significant and broad influence. Religious authorities have the power to utilize their influence for good or bad. A few people have incited violence by using their position to propagate messages of animosity and hatred. On the other hand, a great deal of people have prevented violence and the causes of it by acting to ease tensions between communities and by disseminating messages of peace, tolerance, acceptance, and respect for one another (Ibrahim, 2019).

One clear sign of how religion has been utilized to drive a wedge between communities and incite religious violence is the role that religious individuals and institutions have played in fomenting conflict. For example, it was pointed out in the 2002



Catholic Bishops Conference that religion, like ethnicity, has been exploited by religious and ethnic leaders to further their own selfish goals (Best, 2011). The Conference observed that certain religious leaders manipulate the minds of their followers, who are frequently gullible and dependent, taking advantage of them for their own gain. Some religious leaders seem to preach about an intolerant God who sows hatred and division rather than a God of justice and love (Gwamna, n.d.: 40).

Ostien (2009) reported that during the 2008 local government elections in Plateau State, pastors reportedly advised churchgoers not to support Muslim candidates. Similarly, religious leaders have urged their community to take a more militant stance, according to Krause (2011). Attacks on mosques and churches, as well as the people who reside inside, in 2001, 2008, and 2015 demonstrate the importance of religion. Islamic and Christian leaders frequently use discriminatory language and religious rhetoric, according to HRW (2015). Drawing on Akinade's (2002) perspective, these acts can be characterized as the confrontational aspect of Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria, a result of the political elite's use of religion. Additionally, hate speech has been encouraged by religious leaders (Ashton, 2013). A Christian lady caught with a Muslim guy should be sent back, according to some pastors, while other pastors prohibit women from marrying Muslim men (Krause, 2011). Some people have misgivings about the different interreligious dialogue initiatives that haven't succeeded in re-establishing social harmony.

Religion has made several appearances in politics. Muslim sentiments of marginalization and hostility have been exacerbated by the fact that Christians hold the majority of important jobs in both the Plateau State government and the LGAs. (HRW, 2005). If the selection of Christians for these roles is perceived to have been influenced by their religious affiliation, then this could perhaps clarify the militancy of Muslims. Retaliation by

violence has been a common tactic used by the injured, and it almost always has a religious undertone. In order to effectively handle religious conflicts, religious actors and institutions must be at its centre.

Following the violence in 2001 in Jos, Plateau state, numerous organizations held seminars aimed at fostering discussion and peace or took part in them. Interfaith seminars were attended by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), which also facilitated conversations between Christians and Muslims. Participating in all government-organized peace committees, the Islamic group Jamatul Nasiru led Christian-Muslim interaction. It seemed that participants varied religious backgrounds contributed to the development of trust. According to Best and Rakodi (2011), other tactics such as mixed workshops seemed to have contributed to the development of trust amongst constituents.

### **Research Methodology**

The research adopted descriptive cross-sectional survey research design. Key Informant Interview (KII) was used to collect primary data. Six (6) religious leaders were purposively selected across Jos north, Jos south and Jos east with each local government having two key informants respectively. Content analysis and narrative techniques were taken to analyse and report the findings.

This part of the study discusses the findings generated from the study. Using thematic approach, the findings are logically discussed as follows:

### **The Role of Religious Leaders in Management of ethno-religious Violence in Jos**

Each religion's doctrine contains accepted norms, values, and standards. It is anticipated that religion will encourage social control and acceptable standards in society by instilling these norms and ideals in its followers, thereby lowering vices like violence and corruption. There is emerging evidence that religious influences can be beneficial in

resolving disputes, indicating that religion can both promote conflict and foster peace. A key informant identifies that:

Religious leaders frequently aid in post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation efforts due to their moral authority and perceived trustworthiness. Interreligious councils, for example, made up of representatives from Christian and Muslim organizations, offered guidance and funding to reconstruct communities in Jos in the wake of the religious crisis, and they also looked out for refugees. With the help of performing arts and counselling, these networks try to uphold the conditions necessary to establish lasting peace, such as providing food and non-food items to internally displaced individuals and psychosocial support to lessen trauma for those impacted by the violence (KII/10/6/2023/Religious leader, Jos East).

Another key informant identifies that:

For example, churches have assisted in providing displaced people with food, clothing, medical treatment, home goods, and first helping hands. Religious leaders have additionally offered victims who have lost loved ones, homes, and businesses solace. Some have provided resources to local non-profit organizations, while others have used church buildings as camp sites. Additionally, congregations have supported victims of violence especially their fellow members materially, spiritually, and psychologically. Similar to this, mosques have carried out rescue and search operations, supplied food and other items for relief efforts, covered the cost of victims' medical care, given clothing to the homeless, and utilized sermons to calm down victims of violence (KII/3/6/2023/Religious leader, Jos South).

Without a doubt, religious organizations and leaders have taken center stage in Plateau State's efforts to manage conflicts and promote peace. Positive working ties between Muslims and Christians are demonstrated through economic cooperation, interreligious dialogue, youth participation, and peacebuilding initiatives, despite the state's interreligious tensions and bloodshed. For instance, the state government established an

interfaith council in 2001 that was composed of ten Christians and ten Muslims and was tasked with promoting peace throughout the state (Best, 2011). This organization is still in operation and keeps promoting interfaith communication between followers of the two major religions in the state.

*Religious leaders have a vital responsibility to play in clearly and swiftly denouncing intolerance, discriminatory stereotyping, and hate speech. They should also abstain from making statements that encourage violence, animosity, or prejudice. It is imperative to clarify that responding to hate speech with violence is never acceptable (KII/10/6/2023 /Religious leader, Jos East).*

#### **How Religious Leaders Contributes to Ethno-Religious Violence in Jos**

The majority of Nigerian religious leaders have incited resentment and ferocious hostility among their followers through their sermons. This is in contrast to the reality that religion serves as a unifying force and, frequently, a messenger of peace. The study's informants all agreed that some religious leaders should be held accountable for inciting violence rather than encouraging harmony and peace among their followers. A key informant who has headed a religious group within Jos metropolis for over a decade identified that:

Although religious leaders are likewise imperfect human beings, we cannot tolerate deliberately inciting hostility toward another religious group. In any religion, that is generally unacceptable. In addition to the constructive role that is expected of us in preserving peace and harmony, there are instances when we find ourselves contributing to discord, prejudice, exclusion, breakdown, crises, and similar situations (KII/3/6/2023/Religious leader, Jos South).

This finding is of the utmost importance since it not only revealed that religious leaders are responsible for inciting interfaith violence, but it also revealed their sexuality. Adherents can be made aware that religious leaders are

human beings and that their sermons should be challenged through critical thought.

Similarly, it may be inferred that the majority of religious leaders in Jos lack the necessary knowledge and abilities, such as those related to negotiation, accommodation, mediation, and other non-violent approaches to dispute resolution. It was made obvious by one of the key informants who stated that:

Some pastors and imams in this city are not sufficiently educated on what coexistence and mutual interaction is, how it can be achieved, and how they can contribute to it. The only language they understand is violence. To some is ignorant but to me is deliberate arrogant and selfish interest. They gamble with the lives of their adherents for political reasons. They lack the capacity to say no to evil plans that can destroy the entire city most especially when money is involved. I personally know some Pastors and Imams who accumulated personal wealth through crime and violence from political patronage. Unfortunately, they are good in brainwashing their followers to always view them as saint. The religious leaders of the 21<sup>st</sup> century uses their position to mislead and exploit their followers for the sake of self-centeredness (KII/6/6/2023/Religious leader, Jos North).

There is no gain saying that One of the main causes of religious violence in Nigeria is ignorance. The perpetrators of these acts, who claimed to be defending their religion and could practice their beliefs at any time of their lives, were people who only knew a portion of what their religion really taught. According to the key informant's hypothetical stance above, followers of a certain religion frequently saw their leaders as persons endowed with a lot of knowledge, impartiality, and honesty. This supports the findings of an Inter-Religious Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria (IPNN) study from 2016, which found that religious leaders are well-liked and occupy a prominent position in the community. Religious leaders get greater respect and greater public trust than other types of leaders (Ibrahim, 2019). This could be the cause of people's

vulnerability to manipulation based on their religion. They also think that disobeying the commands of your religious leaders is a sin against God. As a result, the study discovered that religious leaders had a significant ability to affect the attitudes and behaviors of others. Some religious leaders take advantage of this to control their followers and incite them to carry out violent acts for their own personal gain.

Some religious leaders play a role in inciting conflict by spreading inflammatory messages. For example, a key informant reported cases where places of worship were used to encourage violence, with one report of a religious leader who used harsh words and incites violence against other religious groups. The key informant identified that:

Certain mosques and churches are used as weapons and criminal hideouts. These days, churches and mosques donate money to buy weapons and ammo. For precisely what purpose? Even the government recognizes the broad issue but is unwilling to take appropriate action (KII/6/6/2023/Religious leader, Jos North).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This paper discussed the role of religious leaders in management of ethno-religious violence in Jos Plateau State. The findings of the study show that religious leaders are important actors who have help in managing ethno-religious violence in Jos Plateau state. They have contributed significantly in promoting peace and unity in Jos. the study finds out that religious leaders offer their worship premises as camps for displaced people. They spearheaded the distributing of first aid, household goods, medication, food and clothing to displaced persons. This research backs up the claims made by Asogwa and Ifeanyi (2021) that religious leaders have helped by giving out clothing, offering refuge to internally displaced people, distributing food and other relief supplies, covering the cost of victims' medical care, using sermons to

comfort violent victims, and conducting search and rescue operations. Additionally, congregations have supported victims of violence especially their fellow members materially, spiritually, and psychologically.

Conversely, the inquiry conducted also found that a few religious figures in Jos Plateau state were responsible for inciting violence. It is not for religious protection that they incite violence, but rather for their own selfish or personal benefit. The investigation also reveals that religious authorities in Jos Plateau State exploited religion as a means of gaining financial gain. For their own benefit, they utilized, deceived, and brainwashed their followers. The insecurity of lives and property in Jos Plateau State is usually exacerbated by the actions of religious leaders. This result supports the findings of Krause (2011), who states that religious leaders have demanded a more "militant response from their community." The direct attacks on mosques, churches, and their occupants in Jos in 2001, 2008, and 2015 demonstrate the centrality of religion in the city. In a similar vein, Ashton (2013) asserted that religious leaders had incited violence by their statements. While some Christian pastors advocate forbidding women from marrying Muslim men, others suggest that a Christian woman who is found in a relationship with a Muslim man should be forced to return him (Krause, 2011).

The study therefore, concluded that religious leaders are critical actors who have contributed significantly in management of violent conflict in Jos. On the other hand, some religious leaders are guilty of instigating violent conflict in Jos Plateau State. Thus, religious leaders have the capacity to either manage violent conflict or instigate violent conflict in Jos Plateau State.

From the foregoing, the study recommended that religious leaders ought to promote the values of love and harmony among themselves by using the tool of discourse. It is imperative that religious organizations and leaders uphold and preach

the virtues of justice, compassion, forgiveness, and reconciliation. The relationships, attitudes, and behaviours of followers of the two leading religions will be significantly altered by intergroup celebrations of religious festivals and rituals like Christmas and Ramadan, and this should be promoted.

Leaders from the Muslim and Christian communities can collaborate to address social issues such as promoting political reform, combating corruption, and resolving a range of social, health, and environmental issues in their local areas. Communities can benefit from initiatives such as this in terms of relationships. Along with not promoting violence and speaking out against offenders, religious leaders can also work to stop more conflicts by reaching out to young people and engaging with them. According to Ashton (2013), there are instances in Plateau State where religious leaders, both Muslim and Christian, have moved away from a perspective of hating each other and toward advocating for nonviolence and the value of cooperating to advance peace.

Finally, the action of religious leaders should be appropriately regulated by the government. Preaching in public places shouldn't be permitted for everyone. This is to prevent ignorant statements by religious leaders who are prone to inciting violence and have little understanding of their own religion.

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**PART VIII:**

**SECURITY, DE-RADICALIZATION AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION**

## GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY AS PANACEA TO SUSTAINABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

**Alhassan Mohammed Aminu<sup>1</sup>**

**Musa Salisu Ibrahim<sup>2</sup>**

**Bello Salmanu Batsari<sup>3</sup>**

<sup>1&2</sup>Department of Economics and Development Studies

Federal University Dutsin-Ma, Katsina State, Nigeria

Email: *maalhasn@fudutsinma.edu.ng/alhassanmohammed58@yahoo.com,*

*musibecons2015@gmail.com*

<sup>3</sup>Department of Sociology

Umaru Musa Yar'adua University, Katsina, Nigeria

Email: *bello.salmanu@umyu.edu.ng*



### Abstract

The study empirically explores the nexus among security expenditure, governance and socioeconomic variables in Nigeria with disaggregation of both governance and socioeconomic development into their various indicators and components respectively. The study therefore, utilized descriptive statistics on the stylized facts and trend of dataset for the employed variables in the study. Importantly, the study found that, poor state of government accountability has led to the deterioration of poverty rate in Nigeria, worsening situation of bureaucratic quality deters employment opportunities thereby, contribute to the rising rate of unemployment in Nigeria and poor practice of the rule of law hinders Nigeria from attaining knowledge-based economy and gives room for breeding illiterate society in Nigeria. Conclusively, poorly shaped indicators of governance hindered the rising security expenditure from delivering the desired impact on socioeconomic development in Nigeria. In the light of this, the study recommends among others that, good governance particularly in the area of its indicators like government accountability, bureaucratic quality and rule of law must be established with particularity to make Nigerian elites like the public office holders adhere to the principles and practice of patriotism, accountability and transparency so as to socioeconomic development through rising security expenditure in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Governance, security expenditure, socioeconomic development, patriotism

### Introduction

Socioeconomic development that encompasses such components as improved literacy rate, reduced level of poverty and unemployment rate, sound healthcare and enhanced income per head, among others, remains the absolute goal countries all over the world aspire to attained sustainably (World Bank, 2020). However, attainment of socioeconomic development in terms of its key indicators like literacy level, employment opportunity, poverty level and health status of citizens among others, which are fundamental

to economic independence and prosperity of nations has been thwarted by the wave of governance and security problems in most of the African countries including Nigeria (Emmanuel, Joseph & Jacob, 2021). For instance, enhanced access to education which is tantamount to the rising literacy rate of a country and subsequently fosters human capital development is seen as one among other principal factors without which socioeconomic development of any country can be difficult to attained at a sustainable



manner. This is due to the fact that, the productivity of people and that of nation can be boosted through acquisition of sound education and as such, education supports realization of economic independence of citizen and that of nation. Similarly, when people are offered the opportunity to acquired sound education, they become sensitive to the adherence to the rule of law and accountable for their actions as well as circumvent any risky acts and conducts that undermines the personality and lives of theirs as well as that of others; hence, governance and national security can be preserved by the means of sound education (as one among other components of socioeconomic developments) (Varrella,2021).

More so, education increases opportunities to gain economically rewarding employment and consequently lessens the poverty rate in the country. Alas! Nigeria in the midst of abundant endowments and long aged of nationhood still ranked low among the poorest countries of the world, with poor shape of socioeconomic development indicators like unemployment rate, poverty rate, per capital income literacy rate, life expectancy and mortality rate among others, (World Bank, 2020). For example, in 2021, the unemployment rate in Nigeria skyrocketed to reach 32.5 percent, literacy rate remained as low as 62 per cent, life expectancy rate still low at average of 53 years, per capital income deteriorated to as low as USD2,030 and proportion of the total population living on less than USD1.90 per day is approximately 69% owing to poor socioeconomic development that is prominently attributed to the advent of governance and security problems bedevilling the country (World Bank, 2022; NBS, 2021). This therefore suggests that, more number of able bodied youths or individuals remains idle and poor in Nigeria with consequential effects on income per head, physical and mental health conditions of citizenry.

Consequently, the illiterate, idle and poverty ridden individuals can easily be manipulated to cause security havoc in the country without conscious for penalty and sanction against such acts. Therefore, several efforts advanced to surmount the problems of poor socioeconomic status of the citizenry of the country yielded no significant outcome due to the twin problems of security and governance confronting the country. In this connection therefore, security and governance are identified as critical problems thwarting the actualization of standards individual, group, nation and worldwide community aspired because, they jointly set essential background that aid the pursuit and realization of socio-economic life of the citizens (Alhassan & Daud, 2020; Herbert & Michael, 2014; Nwolise, 2006). This is owed to the fact that, no meaningful social and economic life that are encompassed in socioeconomic development like employment opportunities, literacy rate, modernized infrastructures and good health condition, among others, can be accomplished under the atmosphere of bad governance and unsecured state of living (Hadi & Alhassan, 2020). Therefore, entrenching good governance through promoting the practice of government accountability, bureaucratic quality and rule of law on one hand, and ensuring expanded security coverage to safeguard the lives and properties through increasing security spending for both acquisition of modern security apparatus and improving welfare of the security personnel to combat security threats on the other hand are required ingredients for sustainable socioeconomic development in Nigeria. Though, Nigerian government has over the years demonstrated pragmatic efforts in combat security menace through rising security expenditure where ₦8trn was said to have been expended on security sector of the country during the first six years of the president Buhari's administration to pave way for pursuit of socioeconomic lives in Nigeria

(Dennis, 2021). However, this huge sum allocated to the security sector of the country could not translate to meaningful atmosphere serenity to guarantee stable socioeconomic wellbeing of the country because, the said expended amount was accompanied with lack of accountability and bureaucratic quality (as key indicator of governance) in the administration and utilization of expenditure on sector of the country. And as such, the situation of poor administration of security expenditure for the lack of accountability and bureaucratic quality as well as abuse of the rule of law among the officers of security personnel could not guarantee safety environment thus, making the pursuit of socioeconomic lives difficult to attain in Nigeria. From the foregoing, this study is designed to explore the nexus among security expenditure, governance and socioeconomic development in Nigeria with particularity to the indicators of governance like government accountability, bureaucratic quality and rule of law, and components of socioeconomic development like unemployment rate, poverty rate and per capita income in Nigeria.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study is hinged on the law of increasing state activities/spending propounded by Adolph Wagner (1835-1917) complemented by accountability theory by Tetlock in 1983 setting the theoretical basis for this study.

### **Wagner's Law of Public Spending**

The Wagner law of public spending posited that the increase in government expenditure is a function of growth in economic development and therefore, stated that the advent of contemporary society which culminate into in rising social, economic and political pressure for socioeconomic and political progress necessitates allowance for economic, political and social consideration with regards to government spending. Consequently, the law envisages that the development of an industrial economy will go along with increase

in the share of public expenditure. Hence, it become obvious that public spending is endogenized into the projection process of the country, which is in turn governed by the size and growth of national income. Therefore, increase in the security expenditure will in turn foster relative increase in social and economic advancement in the country (Magazzino, Giolli & Mele, 2015).

Also, Magazzino, Giolli and Mele (2015) opined that Wagner's law is tantamount to the long-run phenomenon, that is, the longer the time series (or the larger the observation spread over the long-run period), the better the economic interpretations and statistical inferences that public expenditure on security potent great influence on socioeconomic growth and development of a country. Wagner's law therefore, echo on critical facets of government expenditure in Nigeria. Being a developing nation with policies directed towards industrialization, public expenditure as postulated by Wagner is steadily increasing, particularly the allocation to security sector. Also, the trend of Nigeria's total security expenditure in recent years exhibits the Wagnerian increasing forecast, that is, ₦246b spent in 2006, ₦352b in 2007, ₦506b in 2008, ₦607b and ₦828b in 2009 and 2010, and a seriously increasing trend from ₦866b in 2008 to ₦1.020 trillion in 2011 and from 1.006trillion in 2016 to ₦1.2 trillion in 2021 (CBN, 2022). However, it is apparent that in the midst of rising trend of security spending as postulated by Wagner's law, the law could not properly and adequately set premise for efficient utilization of such spending and subsequently, the persistent rate, multi-dimensional nature of insecurity ranging from Boko haram, agitation for secessionist, Niger-Delta militancy, kidnapping and banditry, among others, could not be adequately tame for socioeconomic development to thrive in Nigerian state. Therefore, the rising security spending postulated by Wagner's law must be efficiently utilized through by means of strengthening the culture of good governance.

Hence, the Wagner’s law is hereby complemented by the theory of accountability.

**Theory of Accountability**

The theory of Theory of Accountability is propounded by Tetlock in 1983 in an attempt to assess the performance of the public fund management by the assigned public institutions and private organization to efficiently utilized the public fund for the purported interest and this was later refined by Lerner in 1999 to incorporate other key influencing factors in the build-up of the accountability model (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996). The further extension of the theory by Friedman in 1964 gave birth to other principles or theories like shareholders or agency, stakeholder and legitimacy theories and subsequently averred that, management of a nations or organizations’ wealth is the core motive of the manager of nation’s or organization’s wealth giving the premise of contracting relationship between the principal manager and subordinates aided by the conferring and delegating authority on certain individuals or groups who acts on the directives or on behalf of the principal manager (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).

Furthermore, Desai and Jarvis (2012) pointed out that, the theory is applicable to a situation of the measurability of effective reporting systems between public institutions and performance of the public funds in the management of establishment of governance and security in a country. The theory therefore set the premise that would aids the management of public funds in relation to the governance and security for socioeconomic development of a country (Anthony, Paul & Dennis, 2015). In this regards, Iyoha and Oyeride (2009) stress that, accountability in the public sector entails answerability of the government to the citizens by means of qualifying the applications of voted funds for security to drive the socioeconomic development in Nigeria. The key principles

that accountability theory emphasises includes the citizens having right to know and receive openly declared facts and figures which would empower them to agree or contest on how good or even best their common wealth (security voted funds) is managed and how best their interest is protected by their leaders especially, the individuals or institutions charged with task devoting such funds to the entrenchment of good governance system and security atmosphere of the country (Iyoha & Oyeride, 2009). Flowing from the above, the accountability theory complementing the Wagner’s law of public spending posited that socioeconomic development is a function of voting funds to expend on establishing good governance and security and how efficient the said voted funds is managed. Therefore, the theory and Wagner’s law is thus expressed as:

$$SED=f(gov,, sec) \dots\dots\dots (2.1)$$

Where SED is socioeconomic development, gov. is governance and sec. is security. Subsequently, the socioeconomic development is in this disintegrated into its key indicators like employment opportunity, poverty rate, literacy rate, while, the governance is taking in terms of key indicators like government accountability, bureaucratic quality and rule of law. Therefore, governance is expressed as:

$$SED=f(Ga, Bq, RoL) \dots\dots\dots (2.2)$$

Where SED remained socioeconomic development, Ga is government accountability, Bq is bureaucratic quality and RoL is rule of law. Substituting equation (2.2) into equation (2.1) generate further equation as:

$$SED=f(Ga, Bq, RoL, Sec) \dots\dots\dots (2.3)$$

Thus, equation (2.3) is the main model deduced from jointly complemented theories for the study

**Research Methodology**

This study utilizes secondary data on the key variables of the study like security, governance and socioeconomic development.

The security in this context is analysed in terms of government expenditure on security sector to maximum security for the country while governance is viewed in terms of the key indicators of governance like government accountability, rule of law and bureaucratic quality, and socioeconomic development is measured with regards to unemployment, poverty and income per capita in Nigeria. The dataset on security expenditure is obtained from NBS (2022), the dataset on the two indicators of socioeconomic development (i.e poverty and unemployment) is obtained from NBS (2022) and the other indicator (i.e income per capita) is obtained from World Bank (2022). The dataset on the indicators of governance like government accountability, bureaucratic quality and rule of law were sourced from World Governance Indicator (WGI) (2017) and data for World Governance Indicator (WGI) (2017) was completed to 2022 by adopting autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) method of interpolation to fill the missing data points. Consequently, the study adopts descriptive statistics and trend analyses on the stylized facts for the examination and analysis of the obtained datasets for the variables under examination.

### **Data Presentation and Analysis of Findings**

#### **Stylized Facts on Selected Macroeconomic Variables in Nigeria**

Ewetan and Urhie (2014) asserted that, security problems necessitating security expenditure in Nigeria can be traced back to the early years of military rule when large sum to the tune of about ₦9.08 was allocated for the importation of large quantities of arms into the country for the use of the military to combat unrest situation occasioned by civil

war and aftermaths, security threats that exerts fears and anxieties on the lives and properties of the Nigerian populace. Subsequently, the situation of security expenditure has witnessed rising trend in Nigeria for example from ₦6.60 in 1995bn to ₦588.99bn in 2020 caused the Nigeria's GDP per capita to grows from ₦28,719 in 1995 to ₦601,966 in 2020 yet, in the year 2020, about 130.2m people representing about 60.2% of Nigerian population were dimensionally poor and below the poverty line.

Hence, Nigeria was in the year 2018 declared as the world headquarters of poverty by the world poverty clock, which shows that Nigeria has overtaken India as the poorest country in the world despite the abundant material and human endowments like oil and gas, arable land and many mineral resources. This is in no doubt that, high poverty rate in the midst of simultaneous rising trend of security expenditure and appreciable rate of GDP per capita in Nigeria is not unconnected with unleashed carnage of governance problems in Nigeria where governance indicators like government accountability deteriorated from 2.00 in 1995 to 4.05 in 2020 thus, negating the Keynesian and Wagner's postulation of increasing public spending to address the hiking rate of and unemployment and poverty. And so, the deteriorated rate of governance in Nigeria has caused increasing government on security and rising GDP per capita less impactful on unemployment and poverty where poverty and unemployment deteriorated from 49.00% in 1993 to 60.21% in 2020 and 2.7% in 1993 to 23.132% in 2020 respectively. Thus, the stylized facts of the under examination are presented in the table 4.1

**Table 4.1: Trend Analysis of the key Variables**

| Year | Literacy Rate | GACT | RoL  | BQLT | GDP-C    | LnGDP-C | UNM    | POV   | Sec. Exp. | LnSec.Ep. |
|------|---------------|------|------|------|----------|---------|--------|-------|-----------|-----------|
| 1991 | 55.45         | 1.00 | 1.92 | 2.00 | 6041.508 | 8.71    | 3.1    | 43.50 | 4.21      | 22.16     |
| 1993 | 57.98         | 2.50 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 12241.15 | 9.41    | 2.7    | 49.00 | 4.21      | 22.16     |
| 1995 | 55.45         | 2.00 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 28719.62 | 10.27   | 1.8    | 60.00 | 6.60      | 22.61     |
| 1998 | 52.17         | 0.50 | 3.00 | 0.00 | 41309.89 | 10.63   | 3.2    | 69.50 | 14.76     | 23.42     |
| 2000 | 54.8          | 3.00 | 3.00 | 1.00 | 57757.02 | 10.96   | 13.1   | 74.00 | 43.40     | 24.49     |
| 2003 | 62.45         | 3.17 | 1.50 | 1.00 | 102781.7 | 11.54   | 14.8   | 71.20 | 51.06     | 24.66     |
| 2005 | 70.2          | 3.17 | 1.67 | 1.00 | 166506.1 | 12.02   | 11.9   | 54.40 | 71.67     | 25.00     |
| 2008 | 58.53         | 3.50 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 265883.5 | 12.50   | 14.9   | 32.70 | 95.85     | 25.29     |
| 2010 | 51.08         | 3.50 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 344549.9 | 12.75   | 21.4   | 69.00 | 198.71    | 26.02     |
| 2013 | 53.25         | 3.50 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 471630.4 | 13.10   | 24.7   | 55.55 | 272.33    | 26.33     |
| 2015 | 51.08         | 4.25 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 525444.8 | 13.17   | 25.7   | 60.08 | 330.59    | 26.52     |
| 2018 | 60.53         | 4.05 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 659027.8 | 13.40   | 23.132 | 60.21 | 442.15    | 26.81     |
| 2020 | 62.016        | 4.05 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 601966   | 13.31   | 23.132 | 60.21 | 588.99    | 27.10     |


**Trend Analysis on Selected Macroeconomic Variables in Nigeria**

Essentially, the trend analysis utilized time series data on government accountability and poverty rate in Nigeria, security expenditure on employment rate in Nigeria, bureaucratic quality on per capita income in Nigeria and rule of law on literacy rate in Nigeria. and data for governance (GOV, 2017) was completed to 2022 by adopting autoregressive moving average (ARMA) method of interpolation to fill the missing data points.

As described in the data source from the World Governance Indicator, the government accountability index ranged from 1% to100%, the high percentage index signifies poor government accountability as an indicator of governance while the lower percentage index signifies good government accountability as an indicator of governance. Whereas, the indices for poverty rate is given in a linear trend. Therefore, as presented in figure 4.1, there is disproportionate relationship between government accountability and poverty rate in Nigeria.

**Government Accountability on Poverty rate in Nigeria**

**Figure 4.1**




Furthermore, worsen state of government accountability in Nigeria shown by the rising trend of government accountability (indices) from 1.00 in 1991 to 3.00 in 2000 induced the poverty rate in Nigeria to rise rapidly from 43.50% in 1991 to 74.00 in the year 2000. However, further deterioration of government accountability characterized by slight rise in government accountability indices from 3.00 in 2000 to 3.50 in 2008 birthed a decline in the poverty rate in Nigeria from 74.00 in 2000 to 32.70 in 2008. Similarly, continued deterioration in the government accountability occasioned by rise in government accountability indices from 3.50 in 2008 to 4.05 in 2020 caused poverty rate in Nigeria to rise from 32.70 in 2008 to 62.1% in 2020. This thus suggested that, degraded level of government accountability (as an indicator of governance) in Nigeria has been deduced to be one among other factors responsible for the lingering problem of poverty in Nigeria. This is owed to the fact, resources earmarks for policies and programmes like technical and entrepreneurial skill acquisition centres that can spur self-employed stride as means of

gaining gainful employment for earning a living and combat poverty shackles have been found both mismanaged and diverted from the intended policy actions for lack of accountability among public and government officials responsible for such programmes. And as a result, poor government accountability in Nigeria leaves the soaring level of poverty unabated in Nigeria.

### Bureaucratic Quality and Unemployment rate in Nigeria

As defined in the data sourced from the World Governance Indicator, the bureaucratic quality index ranged from 1% to 100%, the high percentage index signifies poor bureaucratic quality as an indicator of governance while the lower percentage index signifies good bureaucratic quality as an indicator of governance. Whereas, the indices for unemployment rate is given in a linear trend. Therefore, as presented in figure 4.2, the relationship between bureaucratic quality and unemployment rate in Nigeria is characterized by both positive and inverse relationship.

**Figure 4.2: Bureaucratic quality and unemployment rate in Nigeria**



As depicted in the figure 4.2, from 1991 to 1998, Nigeria experienced upgraded level of

bureaucratic quality because, the bureaucratic quality (indices) declined from 2.00 in 1991 to


0.00 in 2000 while, the country witnessed slight and negligible rise in unemployment rate from 3.1% in 1991 to 3.20% in 1998 thus, showing the inverse relationship between bureaucratic quality and unemployment rate in Nigeria. However, beyond 1998, the country started witnessing deterioration in bureaucratic quality occasioned by rise in the indices of bureaucratic quality from 0.00 in 1998 to 1.00 in 2020 while unemployment rate correspondingly rises from 3.2% in 1998 to 23.132% in 2020 thereby, presenting the positive and direct relationship between bureaucratic quality and unemployment rate in Nigeria. Therefore, it can be deduced from the figure 4.2 and the above expression that, bureaucratic quality as an indicator of governance an influencing variable to the prevailing level of unemployment rate in Nigeria. this is because, with presence of good bureaucratic quality in an indication of good governance system that can spur investment in key infrastructures like providing stable

power supply, sound healthcare facilities accessible to all and good transportation system (encompassing road, rail and air means of transportation), among others, that subsequently drive both local and foreign investment into the country thereby, raising employment opportunities and reduce unemployment rate in the country.

### Security Expenditure and Per Capita Income in Nigeria

The dataset for both security expenditure and per capita GDP were from their respective sources recorded nominally in billions and thousands of naira respective, however, for the sake analysis, the scale of both data were reduced to fraction by taking natural logarithm of both data and to be contained in the given scale graph. Consequently, the security expenditure is linearly and positively related to the GDP per capita in Nigeria as thus, depicted in figure 4.2.3

**Figure 4.3: Expenditure and Per Capita Income in Nigeria**



As presented in figure 4.2.3, the rise in security expenditure from 22.16 units in 1991 to 24.49 units in 2000 caused the GDP per capita to correspondingly rise from 8.71 units to 10.96 units in 2000. Furthermore, rise in security

expenditure from 25.00 unit to 27.10 units between 2005 and 2020 has resulted to rise in GDP per capita from 12.02 to 13.31 units between 2005 and 2020. Therefore, rising security expenditure resulting from economic


activities causing the GDP per capita to correspondingly rises conformed to both Wagner’s and Keynesian postulations that government intervention through increasing government expenditure would go a long way to influence macroeconomic variables like poverty, employment and per capita income in an economy.

### Rule of Law and Literacy rate in Nigeria

As defined in the data sourced from the World Governance Indicator, the rule of law

index ranged from 1% to100%, the high percentage index signifies poor representation of rule of law as an indicator of governance while the lower percentage index signifies good representation of rule of law as an indicator of governance. Whereas, the indices for literacy rate is given in a nominal percentage. Therefore, as presented in figure 4.4, the relationship between rule of law and literacy rate in Nigeria is characterized by positive and indirect relationship.

**Figure 4.4: Rule of Law and Literacy rate in Nigeria**



As shown in the figure 4.4, from 1991 to 1998, Nigeria experienced deteriorated level of rule of law because, the rule of law (indices) rises from 1.92 in 1991 to 3.00 in 1998 while, the country witnessed drop in literacy rate from 55.45% in 1991 to 52.17% in 1998 thus, showing the direct and positive relationship between rule of law and literacy rate in Nigeria. Similarly, beyond 1998, the country was characterized by improvement in the presentation of rule of law occasioned by dropped in the indices of rule of law from 3.00 in 2000 to 1.67 in 2005, the literacy rate correspondingly appreciated and rise from 54.80% in 2000 to 70.2% in 2005. Also,

deterioration in upholding the practice of rule of law occasioned by increase in the indices of rule of law from 1.67 in 200 to 2.00 in 2020 caused downgrading level of literacy rate in Nigeria prompted by falling in the rate of literacy from 70.2 in 2005 to 62.16% in 2020 thereby, presenting the positive and direct relationship between rule of law and literacy rate in Nigeria. Therefore, it can be deduced from the figure 4.4 and the above expression that, rule of law as an indicator of governance remained an influencing factor to the prevailing rate of literacy in Nigeria. This is because, with presence of established rule of law is an indication of good governance system



that can spur investment in education sector in the area of expanding the existing capacity of schools, constructing modern schools, equipping laboratories and improving the welfare of both class instructors and school administrators, among others, that subsequently attracts citizenry to schools and school administrators become more enthusiastic to the profession of teaching thereby, raising up literacy rate in the country for building knowledge-based economy.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The objective of this study is to empirically explore the nexus among security expenditure, governance and socioeconomic variables in Nigeria where both governance and socioeconomic development were disaggregated into their various indicators and components respectively. This is impetus looking at governance system surrounding the security expenditure with varied magnitudes of the components of socioeconomic development in the country since the eve of preparation for democratic system of government in 1991 and the aborted plans of establishing civilian government in 1993. From the postulations of Wagner's law of public spending, security expenditure corroborated with good governance system spurs socioeconomic development of a country. However, in Nigeria, the situation looks different where increased security spending has not in real term translated to an improvement in the indicators of socioeconomic development like unemployment, poverty and literacy rate owing to poor establishment of various indicators of governance like government accountability, bureaucratic quality and rule of law in Nigeria.

Conclusively, the study found that the poor state of government accountability has led to the deterioration of poverty rate in Nigeria, worsening situation of bureaucratic quality deters employment opportunities thereby,

contribute to the rising rate of unemployment in Nigeria and poor practice of the rule of law hinders Nigeria from attaining knowledge-based economy and gives room for breeding illiteracy rate in the country. In view of drawn conclusion, the study recommends that good governance particularly in the area of its indicators like government accountability, bureaucratic quality and rule of law must be established to checkmate the earmarks funds for security expenditure so as to allow the allocated funds for security expenditure to play influence in improving the employment rate, poverty and literacy rate which are the key components of socioeconomic development in Nigeria. Similarly, Nigerian elites particularly, the public office holders must internalize and practice the principles of patriotism, accountability and transparency, among others, in the administration and management of Nigeria and her natural endowments, for the prosperity of Nigeria. Also, redefining of Nigerian security architecture to accommodate the decentralization of the security department; acquisition of modern security equipment, training and retraining of security personnel, and welfare of security personnel are pragmatic solutions to the Nigerian security challenges to guarantee safety society where socioeconomic development can thrive.

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## PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF DE-RADICALISATION OF REPENTANT BANDITS IN NIGERIA

**Abubakar Ahmadu**

**Saheed Rahman Olanrewaju**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *ahmaduabubakar85@gmail.com, lanreandrahman@gmail.com*



### Abstract

Insecurity has exerted toll across countries on the globe in varying magnitudes. It is as though every sovereign state has got variants of insecurity issues to contend with. Even nations that are dubbed saner climes have been confronted with the monster of insecurity in diverse ways. Nigeria including other neighbouring West African countries like Niger, Burkinafaso, Mali and Togo have been dragged backward following unwholesome activities of bandits and other terrorist groups. This paper attempted a qualitative review of prospects and challenges of de-radicalisation of repentant bandits. Rehabilitation theory, Relative Deprivation and General Strain theory were used as theoretical orientation. The paper suggested that, banditry is perpetuated through indiscriminate killings, cattle rustling, looting of economic resources of poor villages, kidnapping, seeking vengeance, invasion and succession agenda among others. Institutional and/or systemic corruption truncated the provision of social and economic resources that would have created employment avenues for repentant bandits. Even the reformatory system is not rolled out effectively to de-radicalise repentant bandits. While they are designated as crime against the State and person, they left huge consequences in soiling Nigeria's image, prostrating socioeconomic activities, loss of productive manpower, stagnated farming activities, and consumed substantial amount of money as security vote. The prospects of De-radicalisation of such deeply rooted security quagmire requires among others effective rehabilitation ideals, effective community policing, private individual participation, synergizing with traditional authorities and soothing the wounds of attack starting from individual victims to group victims in order to pre-empt violent vengeance among repentant bandits. It is recommended among others intensified security in rural areas, jobs for repentant bandits, resolving age-long feud between rival bandit groups, effective aftercare services including enrolment of repentant bandits into schools.

**Keywords:** Banditry, cattle rustling, bandits, de-radicalisation, repentance, rehabilitation

### Introduction

Security of lives and properties is the ultimate goal of government at all levels. Even concerned citizens have roles to play in safeguarding or providing for the security of human including social and economic infrastructure. The growing pace of banditry and high profile crimes like kidnapping, terrorism and armed robbery has been worrisome. The perpetuation of such crimes has deleterious consequences on social and

economic lives of human. In an attempt to fulfill the social contract agreement, government at all levels strive to mobilize the least resources at their disposal to protect lives and properties of citizens. Also, clamping down on terrorists and managing repentant bandits would create the enabling environment for socio-economic development. This is because the ill consequences of crime and other security threats may have been contained.

Europe that is often considered as the birth place of many nation states and multinational corporations is not left out of the laundry list of continents infested with high profile crimes like insurgency. France is one of the European nations that have come under wild attacks by insurgents and militants groups alike. The 2005 London bombing, 2015 Ile-De-France attack are pointers to the perpetuation of insurgency in Europe. One intriguing factor to explore is the homogeneous nature of the European community. Even though the continent's liberal immigration policy may have accounted for considerable presence of non Europeans in the continent, the European culture is still homogeneous amid a significant population of the native whites. As the continent witness mass exodus of migrants from African and other developing continents, the society is moving into a complex heterogeneous setting boasting a significant presence of diverse ethnic and religious groups thus, creating window for divergent perspectives that are prone to militancy and other violent crimes.

Nigeria has endured several cases of banditry. It is as though an appendage of the Boko Haram group that were tipped to have been decimated in strength and attacks in Northeast Nigeria. While the Boko Haram group is infamous in Northeast Nigeria, bandits are commonly spread in Northwest Nigeria. The style and mode of operation of this twin-terror group leaves much to be explored in Nigeria's security lexicon. In terms of insensitivity and callousness, both groups share similar fate. This is evident in the series of attacks and indiscriminate killing of civilians mostly in remote areas. There have been divided lanes of argument about the philosophies surrounding banditry. Social and public commentators have pointed to the factor of ethnic hegemony and/or sentiment between the Hausas and the Fulanis. This presumptuous position questions why most of the villages under incessant attacks by bandits are predominantly inhabited by Hausas. As speculative as this position may appear, social

commentators have likened it to invasion and succession agenda. At the height of banditry, both the Federal government and State government seem to be overwhelmed in coming up with the best way ever to nip in the bud the menace in their respective jurisdictions. A number of factors have been fingered following the proliferation of banditry. To some, unresolved internal wrangling among bandits, the quest for ethnic hegemonisation which is evident in invasion and succession agenda, cattle rustling, and looting among others. Cattle rustling may broaden the fallout of unemployment and poverty that have been one of the chief triggers of involvement in militancy and other related violence. Ajufu (2013) revealed increased militancy, violent crimes, kidnappings, restiveness and socially delinquent behavior as a result of unemployment. When banditry reached a tipping point, Oyero (2021) reported that, the former Minister of Police Affairs, Maigari Dingyadi suggested the need for accommodating and re-integrating repentant bandits citing the imperatives of amnesty and international laws. Also, the former Zamfara State Governor, his Excellency, Bello Matawalle's peace initiative was instructive as a number of bandits renounced banditry (Maishanu, 2021). This peace initiative had a snowball effect since the population of repentant bandits increases by the day. It is against this backdrop that, this paper assesses the prospects and challenges of repentant bandits in Nigeria.

Banditry refers to a form of terrorism which involves indiscriminate killing, maiming and looting of resources of rural communities including kidnapping and cattle rustling.

Repentant bandit refers to persons who have renounced banditry either after prosecution and incarceration or through amnesty and/or outright submission to law enforcement agencies.

De-radicalisation refers to the process of erasing the values and norms of banditry among repentant bandits. The norms and values of indiscriminate killing, attacks, cattle rustling, maiming, looting of resources of villages, sacking of defenseless commoners

from their homes through invasion and succession.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **Rehabilitation theory**

This theory advances punitive measures to modify or change the behavior of a criminal in order to conform to the general laws, rules and regulations of the society. It is understood that rehabilitation prevents one from becoming a criminal and imbue law-abiding disposition in people who are found to have deviated from conventional rules and regulations of the society. As offenders are subjected to treatment and training, they are afterwards integrated into the larger society, hence, contributing their parts to growth and development of the society.

However, repentant bandits are by the submission of this theory exposed to treatment having renounced banditry. The processes of advancing treatment are targeted at the core values of radicalization. Vocational training, counseling, and other related rehabilitative ideals are administered to ward off ill values that predispose bandits to banditry. By so doing, the prospects could be good given that, repentant bandits may have something to do and that they may have been disoriented from radicalization values. While this theory may have reflected on the prospects, it has not touched extensively the challenges of de-radicalisation of repentant bandits. The very social, economic, political and psychological factors sabotaging de-radicalisation are not interrogated. Relative Deprivation theory and Agnew's contribution to General Strain theory could expand the horizon of prospects and challenges of de-radicalisation of repentant bandits.

### **Relative deprivation**

This theory was developed by Radzinowicz and King in 1997. Relative deprivation refers to a feeling of deprivation which a group or an individual experience when their expectations are not met or when a group or person feels deprived in comparison to other similar groups or persons. The basic tenet of the theory is that

people who are being deprived of something precious in society may be pitched to join social movement in order to redress their grievances. Social scientists have identified relative deprivation as chief trigger of social movement which accounts for violence related acts like banditry inclusive of terrorism, rioting and conflicts. British statesman and Sociologist Walter Runciman listed four required conditions for relative deprivation thus: 1. A person does not have something 2. That person knows other people who have things 3. That person wants to have the things 4. That person believes that they have reasonable chance of getting the thing which suggests he or she is being deprived of it.

From the foregoing, bandits could be classified within aggrieved and deprived segment of the society. The sources of deprivation are numerous in social, economic, political and psychological space. Deficit in entrenching sense of belongingness during rehabilitation echoes feelings of deprivation which may trigger not only banditry but also inability to truly repent from banditry. Moral, economic and political deprivation has thrown many into violent groups and it has been one of the many challenges frustrating rehabilitation and reformatory measures of repentant bandits. While moral deprivation is attributed to the failure of informal and formal mechanism of social control, economic and political deprivation is the by-products of bad governance. Families, schools, and significant others have failed to provide the requisite morals for repentant, unrepentant and prospective bandits. Since the return to democracy in 1999, Nigeria has not recorded any quantum improvement in employable ventures. And even the dividends of democracy have not been distributed appropriately to the right quarters. Amid all these, the rich display affluence in the face of poverty stricken population and deprived segment of the society. Cattle rustling, looting of few amenities in poor villages and kidnapping becomes the last resort as one of

the many nefarious activities of bandits so that they can raise money to meet their needs, and buy weapons. To ensure that repentant bandits do not relapse, the basis and/or sources of deprivation should be blocked. Also, cases of alleged territorial deprivation birthing the drive for invasion and succession of one group against another through the instrument of banditry should be addressed. This theory succeeded in revealing the effect of deprivation on the prospects and challenges of de-radicalising repentant bandits, but it did not point the challenges of subduing temptation when repentant bandits are confronted with negative stimuli like money, fame, and vengeance etc. It therefore, becomes necessary to consider the tenet of Agnew's contribution to General Strain theory in the context of the prospects and challenges of de-radicalisation of repentant bandits.

### **Robert Agnew General Strain Theory**

American sociologist Robert K. Merton developed structural strain theory as an extension of the functionalist perspective on deviance. This theory traces the origins of deviance to the tensions that are caused by the gap between cultural goals and the means people have to achieve those goals. According to this theory, societies are composed of both culture and social structure. Culture establishes goals for people in society while social structure provides (or fails to provide) the means for people to achieve those goals. In a well-integrated society, people use accepted and appropriate means to achieve the goals that society establishes. In this case, the goals and the means of the society are in balance. It is when the goals and means are not in balance with each other that deviance is likely to occur. This imbalance between cultural goals and structurally available means can actually encourage banditry.

Agnew's (1992) contribution to General strain theory contextualized criminal and deviant acts as one possible adaptation to stress. He illustrated his argument by

identifying three types of deviance-producing strain: Failure to achieve positively valued goals; removal of positively valued stimuli; confrontation with negative stimuli. Deviance is most likely to occur when the response of the individual to any of these stressors is angered. Agnew also expanded the concepts of strain to include not only objective and subjective strains, but also vicarious and anticipated strain.

An average bandit in Nigeria strives to meet his physiological needs (positively valued goal). Failure to achieve such needs would amount to failure to achieve positively valued goal. Amid this, since the positively valued stimuli (justice, vengeance, emotional balance, fame, territorial claim, money, protection of group identity, ethnic hegemonisation), is not achieved probably being due to goal blockage/institutional deficit, Agnew argued that such person is prone to deviate, join and/or rejoin banditry when confronted with negative stimuli like money, killing for pleasure, avenue for fame, territorial/land grabbing bribe, and vengeance. Many a repentant bandit relapse to banditry because of not meeting their material needs. This is because some of them joined banditry to better their economic standing through regular pay checks and appropriation of proceeds of banditry. Therefore, providing the requisite opportunity to ward off luring repentant bandits back to banditry has been a challenge that needed to be resolved.

### **Exploring Challenges of De-radicalisation of Repentant Bandits in Nigeria**

Over the years, a number of factors in social, economic and political domain have raised their ugly heads in the processes of reformation and rehabilitation of bandits who have throw in the towel including other notorious criminal elements. The Nigerian security apparatus seems to have been overwhelmed by the tripartite heinous crime: Banditry, insurgency and kidnapping. A new course that rekindles hope has been the culture of repentance peculiar to erstwhile bandits and insurgent groups. This means that

our security and reformatory institutions have experience a new term called repentance of high profile criminals. While repentance seems to have been embraced, the challenges surrounding de-radicalisation raised serious concerns. Corruption has exerted significant toll on seminal institutions that are established to reform and rehabilitate criminals. This has been a problem dragging back the world most populous black nation on earth. Corruption has multiplier effects in expanding the pool of impoverished repentant bandits, frustrating the provision of the rehabilitative and reformatory ideals for repentant bandits, poor parole, shortening of sentencing terms among others including recruitment of mediocre to handle de-radicalisation of repentant bandits.

The processes of de-radicalisation require that, repentant bandits are provided with the requisite basic amenities like good housing, portable pipe borne water, toiletries and other important infrastructure that will support smooth execution of de-radicalisation processes. These important components of reformation are barely supplied within the four walls of correctional centres. This informs the many cases of cell suggestion, jail breaks and even the acquisition of sophisticated values of radicalization as inmates interact with other high criminals in the cell. This is obtainable when repentant bandits are randomly allotted to cells without due consideration for categorization on the basis of lethality of crime committed. The whole purpose of this could stem from inadequate infrastructure and so on. However, most prison wardens are recruited without consideration for competence. When repentant bandits are not counseled by professionals, there will always be a problem in imbuing the values of de-radicalisation. A disturbing scenario presents itself wherein unprofessional warden are designated to lead de-radicalisation processes. Here, specialisation and competence is in the abyss.

Also, aftercare services are not delivered to repentant bandits. It is expected that, after release, correctional service officers or its equivalence is assigned to follow up and

furnish authorities on the development and/or progress of repentant bandits. This process also considers the provision of stipends and/or start-ups for repentant bandits in order to ameliorate their impoverished condition. For instance, poverty itself was conceived as one of the many causes of youth involvement in insurgency (Mustapha, 2015). It may be safe to say that, poverty is socially created through the instrument of corruption. Failure of the various poverty alleviation programmes and other social and economic platforms created to move repentant bandits out of the poverty cycle is a testament to the manifestation of institutional corruption. Monies earmarked for repentant bandits often find their ways into private pockets thus recycling generational poverty which has been one of the inducing factors of involvement in criminal and dissidents groups.

#### **Prospects of De-radicalisation of Repentant Bandits**

As earlier indicated, poverty and unemployment are twin factors leveraging propensity to partake in crimes. Since survival occupies front seat of needs on our scale of preference, engaging repentant bandits in lucrative ventures that will move them out of poverty cycle will work wonders. Even the famous social cum economic thinker, Karl Marx posited that, man must eat before thinking of philosophy, Art and Science. The applicability of this philosophical injunction is overlapping because it has a place in everything we do as human. The import of this postulation is that, where there is blockage of needs and/or wants, repentant bandits will always improvise means of getting their needs and/or wants through the illegitimate means. An ex-convict will always look for means of survival anytime they wake up for a new day. It does not matter whether the means of survival is legitimate or not, so long as it is accessible. This could be used as a resort even if it means reconciling with their erstwhile criminal group for economic respite. Ahmadu and Valentine (2022) suggested a strong link between

unemployment and youth involvement in banditry and other forms of violent crime in Nigeria. They further pointed out that, unequal access to employable ventures denies youth the avenue of meeting up with their needs. This is corroborated by Goment (2020) who held that unemployment among other factors is the trigger of Boko Haram insurgency which is an appendage of banditry.

However, there will be high odds of achieving de-radicalisation ideals through engagement of repentant bandits in viable economic cum commercial endeavours. Regular paychecks and fame are economic and social baits depositing significant sway on recruitment of youth into banditry. Physiological needs like food and sex are met through financial supports bandits receive from their paymasters. By depending on uninterrupted paychecks, bandits stay afloat and perpetuate notoriety. Economic liberation through enlistment of repentant bandits into salaried jobs, high-tech skills, and provision of start-ups for private businesses among others will provide repentant bandits legitimate source of income thereby making it difficult for them to fall back into the trick of bandits financiers. As a result, such economic liberation model will resonate new mode of thought as they find succour through engagement in legitimate endeavours. When this liberation is realised, and having grown up to certain proportion, the paradox will be whether to give out more time on one's economic ventures or go out for life threatening activities. This echoes the curative premises of crime prevention.

Another area holding the ace to de-radicalisation of repentant bandits is the punitive components of crime prevention. This encompasses three domains: rehabilitation, reformation and effective aftercare services. Punishment is a categorical obligation. In this context, punishment is meted on an offender in order to advance something good, not that the offender is discriminated against following their involvement in crime. Those who dish out punishment never did so to please themselves but to enforce the law within the ambit of the

constitution. A true reformatory and rehabilitative ideals ought to be entrenched to the letter. In doing so, cognitive, dogmatic and psychomotor overhaul is needed for de-radicalisation. The idea is to produce a new self in repentant bandits.

Cognitive and dogmatic overhaul would screen the state of mind and long standing position triggering involvement in banditry. Some of these long standing positions may have been supporting the drives to kill for pleasure, seek vengeance, attack, and kidnap and steal valuables for pecuniary purpose. There is also the drive to kill to protect group's identity. All these may have been possible because of the internal crises between the "Id", "Ego" and "Super ego". Therefore, as repentance is expressed, a psychological reformation is needed.

Also, in yearning for a good prospect following repentance of the militant group, development of psychomotor skills in craftsmanship and cutting edge technical skills for repentant bandits is needed. The huge gap created by lack of what to do would reduce through financial independence. The cognitive overhaul integrates improved access to orthodox education in primary and secondary schools as well as tertiary institutions. The chances are that, people with high level of education could be less likely to indulge in crime including banditry.

Effective parole for repentant bandits who passed through the confines of incarceration will produce a good prospect for de-radicalisation. This is because parole supervision and the duration help to ensure that the reformatory values imbue in repentant bandits is sustained (Rhine, Peterside & Reitz, 2017). When officers do not do the needful in post incarceration period, bandits may go back to their previous practices. This informs incidences of violence perpetuated by newly released parolees which claimed lives of police officers (Vilcica, 2016).

However, there is a need for deployment of genuine community policing, engaging traditional authorities and soothing wounds of repentant bandits to preempt incidences of



vengeance and/or reprisal attacks between one group and the other. Revelation from a repentant bandits pointed that, he joined banditry to avenge the killing of his parents and other members of his family by vigilante group in Zamfara State (Maishanu, 2021). This, including other scenarios of reprisal attacks by bandits was perpetuated following unresolved feud either between bandits and law enforcement agency or between one bandit group and the other.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

Banditry has assumed a disproportionate level particularly in Northwest Nigeria. Its manifestation sequel to the declining strength and logistics of Boko Haram group is suspicious. Academics and social commentators alike conceived banditry as an appendage of the Boko Haram group though with different strategies of operation. Some of the key factors in the birth and categorization of banditry have been revolving around indiscriminate killing of defenseless villages, cattle rustling, and kidnapping for ransom among others. Over the course of time, authorities have had to record a number of repentant bandits. It follows that, on the one hand, sustaining the status of repentance by erasing radicalization values is surrounded with challenges like processing job for repentant bandits, challenges in overhauling cognitive domain and ineffective monitoring of development and progress of repentant bandits. De-radicalisation of such deeply rooted security quagmire requires among others jobs for repentant bandits, effective rehabilitation ideals, synergizing with traditional authorities and soothing the wounds of attack starting from individual victims to group victims in order to pre-empt vengeance among repentant bandits. There is a need for intensified security in fragile rural areas, jobs creation for repentant bandits,

resolving age-long feud between rival bandit groups, effective aftercare services including enrolment of repentant bandits into schools. Intensified security in rural areas in Nigeria. Job creation for repentant bandits. Resolving age-long feud among rival bandit groups to preempt vengeance. Effective monitoring (Parole) of progress and development of repentant bandits after release from authorities. Enrolment of repentant bandits into conventional schools.

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## KIDNAPPING AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTHERN SENATORIAL DISTRICT, TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

**Nacho Vyonkhen Tanko**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [vnacta70@gmail.com](mailto:vnacta70@gmail.com)



### Abstract

Kidnapping operation in Nigeria has become a very serious social problem for more than two decades. It has resulted in the loss of life of innocent citizens and has created fears in all facets of lives in the country. This study examined the types of kidnapping operation and the consequences on human security in the Southern Taraba State. A social structure and anomie theory was reviewed. The study adopted the exploratory research design. The Taro Yamane formula was employed in the determination of the sample size of 400 respondents. Respondents were proportionally selected from five Local Government Areas (Ibi, Donga, Takum, Ussa, and Wukari) in Southern Taraba and administered questionnaire. The data collected were analysed quantitatively, using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The statistical tools include descriptive statistics and multi linear regression analysis for the test of hypothesis. The findings revealed that kidnapping has significantly affected security of lives and property. The types of kidnapping operation included kidnapping for ransom, tiger kidnapping, express kidnapping, political kidnapping, and virtual kidnapping. Incessant operations of the crime in the study area mostly affected these aspects of human security: right to life, right to human dignity, freedom of association, and freedom of expression'. These invariably affect economic, social, food, health inter alias as components of human security; thereby undermining the quest for sustainable development. The study, therefore, recommended among others that, inter-state and international borders security-check should be intensified; creation of viable economic policy to support small scale businesses, cooperation between informal and formal security to curb kidnapping in the state.

**Keywords:** Human Security, kidnapping, economic policy, sustainable development

### Introduction

The need to secure lives and property of the people in every given society around the globe cannot be overemphasized. From a global viewpoint, it is evidently known that all nations strive to ensure the realization of the security of lives and property of their citizens no matter how enormous resources are required for its attainment. Security is of course, the basic requirement of the social contract that makes the coming together of villages, communities and hamlets to form a common society-country-possible, such that the sovereign was given mandate of protecting lives and property and save each from the tyrant of the other (Hobbes, 1651,

cited in Bobier, 2020). It is the major reason why the Head of State is addressed as the Commander-in-Chief of armed forces; since the armed forces are institutions use to protect the country.

In the context of security, the quality of leadership, patriotism and availability of resources at each nation's disposal matters. According to Katsina (2012), the quest for stability and development is, without doubt, the Holy Grail for many third world countries. It is a never ending, tedious, yet elusive search because of insecurity. The condition, under which developing countries would be able to develop institutions and structures with the

capacity to ensure economic growth, requires not only equitable distribution of national wealth, political stability and accountability but also security. As daunting as these may appear, still it is possible to argue that there is a certain level of security which all countries, developed and even those that are developing, aspire to reach. Security enhances the survival of any country. It is paramount in the consideration of governance because the survival of the political, economic, social and diplomatic sovereignty of any country depends majorly on the national security of that nation. This is the more reason why Section 14 (2)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 as amended provides that, protection of lives and property is the primary responsibility of the government.

Elsewhere, lack of security has rendered the country ungovernable. For instance, the Latin American countries of Jamaica, Venezuela, Honduras and Trinidad and Tobago are regarded as the most dangerous American countries because of security problems. This is opposed to Uruguay, which is one of the most stable countries in Latin America, ranking third in Human Development Index (World Bank Report, 2020). The Latinobarometro's self-reported crime survey rated Costa Rica, Peru, and Argentina as above the Latin American average in terms of criminal activities. The report revealed that the fear of becoming a victim of violent crime was more elevated in Mexico, Brazil, and Honduras than Peru (Latinobarometro Corporation, 2021). In these countries, insecurity tends to be a cyclical problem. While insecurity breeds crime through the culture of sub-violence, crime also breeds insecurity. The two phenomena create a nexus that thwart all effort of socio-economic development.

In order to checkmate insecurity in Nigeria, government has been putting efforts ranging from huge budgetary allocations to the security sector (Ubong, 2016), collaboration with other nations and

enactment of various legislations in a quest to show its commitment in this regard. However, contemporarily, trending issues of crime have geared up in large proportion. It includes crimes such as insurgency, cyber-crime, rape, armed banditry, and kidnapping. In one of their analyses, the Sahara Reporters, referred to Nigeria as the kidnapping centre of Africa. Kidnapping is belittling all measures put in place by the government to safeguard people's lives and property. In the 1980s, kidnapping incident was an insignificant factor in criminality in Nigeria. When militancy surfaced in the Niger-Delta Region due to protestations on marginalization by the government, the militants adopted kidnapping for ransom to earn money to buy arms. The target was oil workers. But as militancy abetted due to amnesty, mainstream criminals in the country adopted kidnapping as their mainstay not only for ransom but also for raping and killing of victims in many cases.

Kidnapping for ransom is regarded as hostage-taking. The International Convention against the taking of Hostage (1979) defines kidnapping for ransom as an act which involves seizing and / or detaining threatening to kill, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a state, an international, intergovernmental organization, a natural or judicial person or group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of hostage(s). Thus, the recent wave of kidnapping in Nigeria is raising fear across the country. Nassar Al- Wuhayshi, a former leader of Yemen-based Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, called kidnapping an easy spoil, a profitable trade, and a precious treasure (Rhode, 2014). The truth in the statement can be seen in the current jamboree that criminals and bandits are having in Nigeria. School children and students are becoming easy target and the parents are paying heavily for their release. According to Agbakwuru and

Wuyo (2021), in the first half of year 2020, about 2,371 persons were kidnapped. Their report added that, over ten (10) billion Naira (\$19.96 million) was demanded for ransom. The analysis of Vanguard Report by Agbakwuru and Wuyo (2021) further revealed that, an average of 13 persons was kidnapped in Nigeria daily. The inability by security agencies to rein these kidnapers has consequences, as insecurity is thriving, and is affecting development adversely.

According to the Human Right Watch (2020), despite claims by federal authorities of increased security measures, an atmosphere of insecurity has continued to persist across Nigeria. Due to increasing rate in crime, people have begun to seek for alternative security measures (Inyang & Abraham, 2014). Example of these alternative security measures include the 'Amotekun' (a security outfit) established in the South-Western Nigeria (Adeniyi, 2020), recently. Other communities and ethnic nationalities in the country have also formed their ethnic security network including vigilantes. It is not certain how much security these different establishments can promise and deliver. The proliferation of informal police structures established by local communities to ensure the protection of live and property, and rapid growing of private security industry in most urban centres is a pointer to the importance of security.

Taraba state has had its share of the ugly trend of kidnappings over the years. This has in fact, led the state government under the administration of Arch. Darius D. Ishaku, to amend the Prohibition of Kidnapping and Abduction Law (2010) early in 2019 to accommodate stricter punishments against the crime of kidnapping. Thus, death penalty and life imprisonment as punishment for the crime of kidnapping are stipulated in Sections 3 and 4 of the new law respectively. However, the new law seems only to be barking and not biting as envisaged. Very few kidnapers have been arrested and are

not yet charged under the law; and so kidnapping incidents are increasing. Worthy of note is the arrest, sentencing of Hamisu Bala aka Wadume and subsequent released of an accused kidnap kinging-an outright show of impunity.

Kidnapping is widely spread in the state, such that, socio-economic activities of the citizens are being threatened. In Southern Taraba, Nnaemeka (2019) reported of severe socio- economic setback. This condition is by no means improves today; not when the notorious case of Hamisu Bala (Wadume) has shown that kidnapping is indeed a crime which some criminal elements in the Security Agency have a hand in planning and execution. In spite of these, kidnapping must be fought. And the more people understand the impact of kidnapping on human security, the more they will come to join force in the fight against kidnapping. The reasons are obvious, the criminals live among us; the impacts of their activities affect all of us; and so, the fight against them should be collective. The philosophy behind this study is therefore anchored on the fact that, security of the people in the study area is seriously undermined by recurrent activities of criminals in which kidnapping appears to be the most frequent. Hence, this study is initiated to examine the crime of kidnapping and its effect on the security of the people of Southern Taraba State. Thus, this study seeks to identify various types of kidnapping and analysed the effects that the crime has caused human security in the study area and hopes it will enlighten the citizens on the menace of kidnapping and why a common front is needed in the fight against it.

### **Conceptual Clarifications**

#### **The Concept of Kidnapping**

Kidnapping may be difficult to define with precision because it varies from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction (Asuquo, 2009). However, the concept of kidnapping

has been defined by various scholars taking cognizance of what the law says, time and space. For instance, Inyang and Abraham (2013) defined it as the forcible seizure, taking away and unlawful detention of a person against his/her will. It is a common law offence and the key part is that it is an unwanted act on the part of the victim. Another definition is offered by Fage and Alabi (2017), who conceived kidnapping as forceful or fraudulent abduction of an individual or a group of individuals for reasons ranging from economic, political, and religious to [struggle for] self-determination. However, the authors later admitted that the forcefully or fraudulently abducted individuals are carried off as hostages for ransom purposes. This implies that while political and economic factors can instigate kidnapping, economic reason is the most common predisposing factor of the phenomenon. In this regard, Okoli (2019) maintained that kidnapping is the unlawful detention of a person through the use of force, threats, fraud or enticement. The purpose is an illicit gain, economic or material, in exchange for liberation. The author further added that, it may also be used to pressure someone into doing something or not doing something. These conditions may be justifiable or not, but the bottom line is that the process is achieved through illegal means.

### **The concept of security**

Security has to do with the process connected with assuaging any kind of threat to people and their precious values. This is why Buzan (1991) asserted that security is about freedom from threat and ability of states to maintain independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile while its bottom line is survival. From the foregoing, security is generally agreed to be about feeling of being safe from harm, fear, anxiety, oppression, danger, poverty, defence, protection and

preservation of core values and threat to those values. William (2008) equally submitted that security is most associated with the alleviation of threats to cherish values, especially those threats which threaten the survival of a particular reference object. In line with the above, Imobighe (2003) stated that security has to do with freedom from danger or threats to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interest and enhance the well-being of its people. Thus, internal security could be seen as the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies, which could undermine internal cohesion, and the corporate existence of a country and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values and socio-political and economic objectives, as well as meet the legitimate aspirations of the people (Ogaba, 2010). It could therefore be inferred that security, be it classical, state-centric and traditionalist or non-traditionalist, is all about protection of assets including living and non-living resources against loss or damage.

### **Human security**

The Commission on Human Security (CHS, 2003, p. 4) defined human security as, "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment". Human security, therefore, means protecting fundamental freedoms, which are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It includes using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It also means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (CHS, 2003). In an analysis provided by Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru (2004), the authors maintained that in the aftermath of the Cold War, the security debate has become part of the international development agenda. Traditionally, it had focused on military activities, the control of military hardware, action against armed

groups and networks and the reform of state military institutions, but today, increased attention is being paid to other actors within the “security system” and this include citizens’ access to resources, well-being, health, environmental risk and absence of fear of insecurity. Many of these issues are incorporated into work undertaken during the 1990s by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Based on the foregoing clarification, human security is re-conceptualized with focus on three specific objectives (CHS, 2003, p. 6):

moving away from traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of the individuals, their protection and empowerment, drawing attention to a multitude of threats that cut across different aspects of human life and thus highlighting the interface between security, development and human rights; and promoting a new integrated, coordinated and people-centred approach to advancing peace, security and development within and across nations. Thus, Human security brings together the ‘human elements’ of security, rights, and development. As such, it is an inter-disciplinary concept that displays the following characteristics: people-centred, multi-sectorial, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented (CHS, 2003).

### **Theoretical Framework**

A Social Structure and Anomie theory is adopted for analysis.

**Social Structure and Anomie Theory:** This theory was propounded by Merton in 1968. Social structure and anomie theory was proposed to analyse the relationship between culture, structure and anomie. According to Merton, culture refers to the organized set of normative values governing behaviour which is common to members of a particular society or group and social structure as that organized set of social relationships in

which members of the society or group are variously involved (Ritzer, 2008, p. 256). The main tenet of the theory is that anomie occurs when there is an acute disjunction or disagreement between the cultural norms and goals due to the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them (Merton, 1968). The theory proposes that all members of the society share the same values. However, since members of society are placed in different positions in the social structure (for example, they differ in terms of class position), they do not have the same opportunity of realizing the shared values. This situation can generate deviance. For instance, because of the position of individuals in the social structure of the society, some people or individuals are unable or incapacitated to act in accordance with the norms and values that guide the society. Following the theory, Ritzer (2008) argued when culture places much emphasis on material success, while preventing some people or individuals from achieving such success, innovative behaviour, howbeit, criminally may be devised. Under such circumstances anomie is said to exist, and as a result there is a tendency toward deviant behaviour.

In the context of this study, deviant behaviour (kidnapping) takes the form of alternative, unacceptable and illegal means of achieving economic success. The collection of ransom by kidnappers is for pecuniary benefit, while impoverishing the victims and generating fear and insecurity on the public. Social structure and anomie theory is appropriate and related to the study because in Taraba in particular and Nigeria in general, material wealth is given recognition, immaterial the means and methods of acquisition. In this context, many criminally minded individuals and groups have found kidnapping as a sure means to wealth. The desire to overcome poverty and become successful without matching it with hard work and creativity can only heighten the

tendency for complicity and increase crime in the society. As people deviate from acceptable norms and means with active collaboration of some members of the security agencies, kidnapping thrives; and it is creating adverse consequences in southern Taraba.

### **Types of Kidnapping**

The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) officially classified kidnapping into kidnapping for ransom, kidnapping between or within criminal groups, kidnapping for sexual exploitation, kidnapping linked to family or spouse disputes, revenge kidnapping, political kidnapping and ideological kidnapping (UNODC, 2003 cited in Ayuba, 2020). However, Ayuba (2020) posited that, the kidnapping for ransom seems to be the most prevalence in Nigeria where wealthy people are being abducted in exchange for money. Also, the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC, 2019) identified kidnapping for ransom as one of five (5) basic types of kidnapping. Thus, kidnapping for ransom is a major strategy used by kidnappers to source for funds with which to run their illicit operations and it is regarded as the oldest and the most popular form of kidnapping which entails taking hostage to extract some money from their relatives or business associates. In developing countries like Nigeria for instance, expatriates and wealthy individuals constitute the larger group of the victims of this type of kidnapping. Several cases involving foreigners in the country abound. For instance, in 2015, an American missionary was abducted in south of Abuja and a ransom worth \$300,000 demanded for her release (Ayuba, 2020).

Though recently, kidnapping in Nigeria has evolved into a lingering, pervasive security challenges to the extent that it has metamorphosed into a fast-paced and multi-faceted criminal enterprise (Assanvo & Okereke, 2019). Like in many other parts of Nigeria, contemporarily Southern Taraba State has witnessed an unprecedented incidence of kidnapping for ransoms. The

crime which was hitherto unknown in the area has become domesticated as criminals within the state no longer rob properties and valuables but chose to so array with the victims. Criminal elements have found it a lucrative venture more than other traditional form of crimes such as armed robbery, theft, and burglary. Unlike in the Niger Delta region where due to militancy, kidnapping became rather entrenched as one of the untoward legacies of the struggle; where foreign oil workers were kidnapped and use as bargaining chips to draw international attention to the environmental degradation and under-development in their oil-producing communities, the dimension and motive behind the crime differ in other climes across Nigeria (Assanvo & Okereke, 2019).

Another type of kidnapping identified by the OSAC (2019) is tiger kidnapping or proxy bombings. It is a form of kidnapping in which ransom is not sought; rather the victim is forced into doing a specific action for the criminals like coercing a banker to disclose the password of the vault of the bank to steal from it. Sometimes, the victim could be kidnapped and coerced to plant an explosive in a target (proxy bombing) which is very common among militant groups through guerrilla warfare. The tiger kidnapping is common in western and Asian countries. Moreover, they further identified express kidnapping as the third type of kidnapping, and which is most common in several parts of Africa and Latin America. It is, according to the OSAC (2019), a kidnapping that involves only the perpetrator and the victim where the victim is threatened by the criminal using weapon or other dreadful means usually to coerce them to make Automated Teller Machine (ATM) withdrawals of maximum daily amount of cash. In some instances, the victim is held hostage to pass the night with the criminals, particularly when the victim exceeds the daily maximum limit of withdrawals.

It is further emphasized that, express kidnappers use different strategies or forms to execute their evil and nefarious intentions. Apart from using weapon to physically conscript the victim and get him/her do what they want, the express kidnappers sometimes pose as taxi drivers or even police officers in order to fool their unsuspecting victim (Ayuba, 2020). For instance, report by Crimes and Safety Report (2016) identified express kidnappings by kidnappers posing as police officers around the South Africa's airports as a major security threat facing travellers into the country. The kidnappers, dressed in police uniforms would mount a checkpoint and stop the unsuspecting victim to either rob him/her or abduct them for an express kidnapping. In most cases, the victims of express kidnapping are eventually released unharmed especially if the victims cooperated well with his/her captors. This type of kidnapping has led to the innovation of ride-share applications in numerous countries such as Nigeria. For instance, the introduction of Uber in Nigeria is partly seen as a laudable initiative which helps to curb the menace of express kidnapping in the country. However, there is an indication that, the ride-share system too is being penetrated to perpetrate express kidnapping by the criminals as evidently shown in South Africa in 2017 when a couple was attacked and forced to withdraw money from an ATM by a criminal who posed as a ride-share driver (Ayuba, 2020).

The fourth type of kidnapping identified by OSAC (2019) is political and ideological kidnapping. This is a kidnapping that is politically and/or ideologically motivated. Here, the victims of kidnapping are held hostage by their abductors to swap for their members who are being held by government as prisoners. Thus, the victims are deemed to have some sort of kidnap ransom value; ransom value in the sense that they are either personalities that the government cannot afford to ignore their abduction or for fear of losing political relevance. Also, this

type of kidnapping could be carried out to acquire some negotiations advantage over the government or simply for propaganda purposes. The Boko Haram terrorist group in the north-eastern Nigeria have in different occasions abducted school children in Chibok, Borno state, Dapchi, Yobe state, Jengebe, Zamfara state to mention but few. In some instances, perceived political opponents are kidnap in the course of electioneering to give undue advantages to their political rivals.

It is premised on this note that, Chinwokwu and Michael (2019) asserted that the Nigerian politics of the winner takes all, and the loser loses all may be fingered in kidnapping, as Chris Ngige, a onetime Governor of Anambra State was made to suffer kidnapping in the hands of his political fathers. This was a basis on which Obasanjo (2002) maintained that politics in Nigeria is basically regarded as a war. He states that 'we fight and sometimes shed blood to achieve and attain political power because for us in Nigeria, the political kingdom has for too long been the gateway to economic kingdom'. Accordingly, when political competition is made for the control of the state, political power becomes a bloody warfare as the state holds the key to wealth (Chinwokwu, et al, 2019). The fifth type of kidnapping identified by OSAC (2019) is virtual kidnapping. This entails the use of the victim's details and daily routine by the criminals to claim having him with them using an accomplice who pretends to be the hostage by crying and screaming for help from the family of the victim. This way, the family of the victims would be compelled to send the demanded ransom, which is often not much so as to enable the family to send the money in time. Meanwhile, the presumed victim might be elsewhere engaged in his activities ignorant of what transpired between his family and the criminals (Ayuba, 2020). Virtual kidnapping is often targeted at individuals who live far away from members of their families such as



foreign students, those who work abroad or those in transit. It is a scam that exploits panic, fear, and urgency (USSS, 2016). The modus operandi of the virtual kidnappers varies across space and time.

It is significant to point out that, there are certain elements associated with kidnapping in many cases as observed by Okoli and Agada (2014); thus, they identified three elements that need to be taken into account: (i) taking one away against their consent; (ii) keeping one in false imprisonment or illegal confinement; and (iii) extortion of ransom from the victim. Whereas for Zannoni (2003), kidnapping is broadly categorized into three (3): a. Criminal kidnapping: This according to him, it is a kidnapping motivated by the quest to obtain ransom from the victim's family, business, or associates; b. Political kidnapping: this type of kidnapping is informed by the desire to advance a political course often through the use of sophisticated weapons. Militant and terrorist activities fall under this category; and c. Pathological kidnapping: also known as emotional kidnapping. It is a type of kidnapping where the motive is to inflict psychological pains on the victim. Examples of this include rape, child abduction by separated parents among others.

### **Effect of Kidnapping on Human Security**

The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 emphasized on the need to promote human security in order to achieve global peace, human right and development. It is on this note that security is equated with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms. This has to do with "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" (Human Development Report, 1994). This implies that nothing should undermine the right of people to live, and ensuring their basic needs are accessible. Thus, to expand the concept, the UN Resolution (A/Res/66/290), described

human security as the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. However, one interprets the concept, it is clear that it is closely related to human development (Tanaka, 2015).

The incidence of kidnapping over the years poses serious threat to these basic requirements of human security. People's rights are usually infringed while carrying out this nefarious activity. The kidnappers who are based in some secluded environments across Southern Taraba State use their hide out to falsely imprison their victims. Those terrains are not usually good for human habitation. Victims of kidnapping are usually denied access to freedom of expression, movement, quality housing, food and dignity of life. And many have died under severe torture. The significant loss of human lives and infliction of bodily injuries and trauma in some instances are the most serious effects of kidnapping. Although, in most cases, the primary motive of kidnapping is to detain a victim to receive money in exchange for the person's freedom, innocent bystanders, victims, and security forces have been killed in violent attacks associated with incidence of kidnapping in Southern Taraba State. It is in this regard that, Onuoha and Okolie-Osemene (2019) maintained that the kidnappers, innocent individuals, and the targeted victims are usually at risk of losing their lives due to the use of arms in the process of trying to scare people away and enforce obedience before taking the targets away.

Many families have lost their members to criminal gangs that engage in kidnapping. Of course, the killing of any member of the family by kidnappers leads to a deep fracturing of kinship structures. Some children have been left without parents, husbands without wives, and vice versa. For every person killed or injured by kidnappers, there are many more who must cope with the physical and psychological effects that

endure in its aftermath. For instance, in a particular case that occurred in 2019, a Medical Doctor was kidnapped along Wukari-Takum road. Despite payment of ransom, the kidnappers went ahead and killed the victim. The wife of the late Doctor could not cope with the traumatic stress-disorder as a result of her husband’s death; she fell sick and later died leaving behind children without parents (Shinge, 2019). In addition to the exposure of victims of kidnapping to harrowing traumatic experiences, they are usually injured in the process of whisking them away or when they are being moved from one location to another to avoid being rescued by security operatives. Victims are known to be subjected to several dehumanizing treatments such as torture, rape, and starvation, among others. Thus, Ilechukwu, Uchem and Asogwa (2015) maintained that victims suffer psychological trauma from the loss of freedom and dignity. The psychological trauma that victims experienced endures even long after they have regained their freedom. This exposes such people to post-traumatic stress disorder that makes it difficult for them to recover fully from the inhuman treatment. Ilechukwu, et al (2015) further cited vicarious traumatic experiences that are felt by the victim’s relatives, who often live-in fear over the

safety of their loved ones in the hands of very cruel criminals. In this context, children are invariably the hardest hit, when they are the direct victims of such cruel act as well as when their parents are the ones directly victimized.

### Research Methodology

The design for this study was exploratory survey design. Whereas, the study area was Southern Senatorial District, Taraba State. The Taro Yamane formula was employed in the determination of adequate sample size, which was 400. Respondents were proportionally selected from five LGAs (viz : Ibi, Donga, Takum, Ussa, and Wukari) in Southern Taraba and administered questionnaire. The data collected were analysed quantitatively, using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The statistical tools include descriptive statistics and multi linear regression analysis for the test of hypothesis. The population of this study comprised the public in Southern Taraba State. The estimated population of Southern Taraba State according to the National Population census Commission as of 2006 was 910, 400. The population is growing at the rate of 3.2%. The distribution of the population among the five (5) LGA in Southern Taraba is shown in table 3.3.1

Table 9.1 : Projected population distribution of Southern Taraba Senatorial District per LGA as of 2016

| LGA          | Population projection, 2006 |
|--------------|-----------------------------|
| Donga        | 177,900                     |
| Ibi          | 112,700                     |
| Takum        | 179,900                     |
| Ussa         | 121,500                     |
| Wukari       | 318,400                     |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>910,400</b>              |

Source: NPC, 2016

To estimate current population for the purpose of this study, we adopted the exponential growth rate formula, which is given as  $P_n = P_o e^{rn}$

Where:

$P_n$  = Estimated population as at 2021

$P_o$  = Initial population as at 2006

e = Exponential growth rate given as constant = 2.71828

r = Annual growth rate of the population 3.2%

n = Time interval between 2016 population and 2021 Therefore,  $P_n = 910,400 \times 2.71828^{(0.032 \times 5)}$

=  $910,400 \times 2.71828^{(0.16)}$

=  $910,400 \times 1.173510745$

= 1068364.182

= 1,068,364

The estimated population of Southern Taraba Senatorial District as of 2021 mid-year was 1,068,364. The proportional distribution of the population per LGA is shown in table 9.2

Table 9.2: Estimated population distribution of Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State as at midyear 2021 by LGA

| LGA          | Population projection, 2006 | Population estimate, 2021 |
|--------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Donga        | 177,900                     | 208,768                   |
| Ibi          | 112,700                     | 132,257                   |
| Takum        | 179,900                     | 211,115                   |
| Ussa         | 121,500                     | 142,582                   |
| Wukari       | 318,400                     | 373,645                   |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>910,400</b>              | <b>1,068,364</b>          |

Source: Calculation of population estimate for 2021 by researcher, 2022

### Data Analysis and Interpretation

The data gathered during this study is presented and analysed in this section. The discussion of the findings is also presented. A total of four hundred (400) respondents participated in this study. However, three hundred and seventy-five (375) respondents (93.75%) were able to return completed questionnaire. They were drawn proportionally across five Local Government Areas in Southern Taraba Senatorial District. The location of study as well as the

distribution and retrieval of question is shown in table 10.1 the analyses of the findings, therefore, depended on the responses from 375 respondents.

### Data Presentation

Table 10.1: Distribution of respondents by study location, number of questionnaires administered and retrieved

| S/N          | Location of study | Frequency % |            |              |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
|              |                   | Distributed | Retrieved  | Retrieved    |
| 1            | Donga             | 78          | 73         | 93.59        |
| 2            | Ibi               | 50          | 47         | 94.00        |
| 3            | Takum             | 79          | 72         | 91.14        |
| 4            | Ussa              | 53          | 51         | 96.23        |
| 5            | Wukari            | 140         | 132        | 94.29        |
| <b>Total</b> |                   | <b>400</b>  | <b>375</b> | <b>93.75</b> |

Source: Field Survey, 2022

As shown in table 10.1, only 25 (6.25%) of the 400 questionnaires administered were not retrieved. The 375 questionnaires that were retrieved and used for the analyses represented 93.75% responses. More than

90% of the questionnaires administered in each of the 5 locations of study were successfully retrieved.

**Table 10.2: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents**

Table 9.2: Distribution of respondents by socio-demographic characteristics N = 375

| Variables                     | Frequency | Percent | Mean  | Std Dev |
|-------------------------------|-----------|---------|-------|---------|
| <b>Age</b>                    |           |         | 34.38 | 1.25    |
| 18-30                         | 40        | 10.7    |       |         |
| 31-40                         | 105       | 28.0    |       |         |
| 41-50                         | 170       | 45.3    |       |         |
| 51-above                      | 60        | 16.0    |       |         |
| <b>Sex</b>                    |           |         |       |         |
| Male                          | 290       | 77.3    |       |         |
| Female                        | 85        | 22.7    |       |         |
| <b>Educational attainment</b> |           |         |       |         |
| Primary Education             | 19        | 5.1     |       |         |
| Secondary Education           | 66        | 17.6    |       |         |
| Tertiary Education            | 260       | 69.3    |       |         |
| Other                         | 30        | 8.0     |       |         |
| <b>Marital Status</b>         |           |         |       |         |
| Single                        | 90        | 24.0    |       |         |
| Married                       | 250       | 66.7    |       |         |
| Divorced                      | 15        | 4.0     |       |         |
| Widowed                       | 12        | 3.2     |       |         |
| Separated                     | 8         | 2.1     |       |         |
| <b>Occupational level</b>     |           |         |       |         |
| Public Service                | 184       | 49.1    |       |         |
| Private Sector                | 55        | 14.7    |       |         |
| Artisan                       | 73        | 19.5    |       |         |
| Student                       | 48        | 12.7    |       |         |
| Others (farming)              | 15        | 4.0     |       |         |
| <b>LGA of Residence</b>       |           |         |       |         |
| Wukari                        | 132       | 35.20   |       |         |
| Ibi                           | 47        | 12.53   |       |         |
| Takum                         | 72        | 19.20   |       |         |
| Donga                         | 73        | 19.47   |       |         |
| Ussa                          | 51        | 13.60   |       |         |

Source: Field survey, 2022

Table 10.2 is a summary of the socio-demographic data of the respondents that participated in this study. In terms of age distribution, the mean age of the respondents

was 34.38 years with a standard deviation of 1.25 years. Majority of the respondents (335 or 89.3%) were above 30 years of age. The age range suggests that the respondents are

well aware of the subject matter under enquiry, and the effect on human, economic and social security in Southern Taraba State.

In terms of sex distribution of respondents, more male than female participated in the study (77.3% vs. 22.7%). Since the selected respondents were household heads, the finding also suggested that very few households were headed by female. This may have also influenced the distribution of marital status observed during the survey. About 24% of the respondents were single, while 4% were divorces, 3.2% were widowed, while 2.1% were separated.

In terms of educational distribution of respondents, majority of the respondents were graduates of tertiary institutions (N = 260 or 69.3%). Only 5.1% of them had primary education. Given the high level of education, it was easy to elicit the interest of the respondents about the subject matter of the study; and also convinced them that the

study was not politically motivated. The occupational distribution of respondents included “public service”, where many of the respondents were drawn from (40%); and this may have been influenced by respondents from Wukari LGA, which is largely urban, and contributed majority of the respondents due to the population size. The rest of the respondents were engaged in private entrepreneurial work (14.7%), as well as students (12.8%) and farmers (4.0%).

All the five Local Government Areas in Southern Taraba were adequately represented in the study. Respondents were drawn proportionally based on the population size of each LGA. These include Wukari (35.20%), Ibi (12.53%), Takum (19.20%, Donga (19.47% and Ussa, (13.60%).

**Table 10.3: Types of Kidnapping operation in Southern Taraba**

Table 9.3: Respondents’ rating of types of kidnapping operation in Southern Taraba

| Types of Kidnapping  | Rating (%) |     |     |     |     | Mean        | Std Dev      |
|----------------------|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------------|--------------|
|                      | VL*        | L*  | UD* | H*  | VH* |             |              |
| Ransom Kidnapping    | 5          | 20  | 50  | 59  | 241 | <b>4.36</b> | <b>.990</b>  |
| Tiger kidnapping     | 25         | 40  | 80  | 150 | 80  | <b>3.59</b> | <b>1.134</b> |
| Express kidnapping   | 21         | 69  | 35  | 143 | 107 | <b>3.66</b> | <b>1.227</b> |
| Political kidnapping | 27         | 110 | 43  | 57  | 138 | <b>3.45</b> | <b>1.417</b> |
| Virtual kidnapping   | 97         | 73  | 85  | 53  | 67  | <b>2.79</b> | <b>1.430</b> |

\*VL = Very low, L = Low’ UN = Undecided; H = High; VH = Very high Source: Field work, 2022

The types of kidnapping operation in Southern Taraba were categorised to include “kidnapping for ransom, tiger kidnapping, express kidnapping, political kidnapping and virtual kidnapping”. As shown in table 9.3, kidnapping for ransom was rated above all other types of kidnapping. On a 5-point Likert scale, the mean score was 4.36 with a standard deviation of 0.990. Since the standard deviation is less than one, it suggests the convergence of opinion of respondents around the mean. It suggests that the most prevalent type of kidnapping was kidnapping

for the purpose of payment of ransom. In this context, victims are usually seized, carried away, and detained by force or fraud for the purpose of demanding cash, monetary instrument, property or service.

The second type of kidnapping was “express kidnapping”. It was rated with a mean score of 3.66 (std = 1.227), just a little above “tiger kidnapping” (Mean = 3.59, std = 1.134). While “express kidnapping” involves abduction, where a small and immediate ransom is demanded by forcing the victims to either pay out of his pocket or withdraw money

from their ATM, “tiger kidnapping” (usually referred to as tiger robbery), involved two separate crimes, which include abduction; and then instead of demanding ransom to free the victim, robbed him or her, and /or used the victim to commit other crimes like robbery, and murder.

Political kidnapping also exists in Southern Taraba, but was rated below, tiger kidnapping. It received a mean score of 3.45. The standard deviation was high (std = 1.417), which suggests wide differences in opinion. Such variability of opinion suggests differences among the respondents in the rating of the prevalent of kidnapping to obtain political concession in Southern Taraba. In contrast to “political kidnapping”, virtual kidnapping was not very highly prevalent, although rated

above average (Mean = 2.79, std = 1.430). This is an extortion scheme, carried out by tricksters. The victims usually received phone calls that their loved ones have been kidnapped and shall be killed or harm except they immediately pay ransom. This is usually done when the kidnapers know the persons said to have been kidnapped are not within network reach; and so, the relatives who are being tricked cannot reach them by phone to confirm the authenticity of the information. In terms of ranking of the kidnapping operation, ransom kidnapping was the most prevalent in Southern Taraba state, followed by “express kidnapping”, “tiger kidnapping”, political kidnapping, and “virtual kidnapping” (Figure. 9.3)




Fig. 10.3: Chart presentation of types of kidnapping in Southern Senatorial District, Taraba State  
 the daytime (Mean = 3.26, std = 1.225).

### Effect of Kidnapping on Human Security

Kidnapping has consequences on the security of Southern Taraba State. One aspect of such consequences is human security. This involves infringement on the fundamental freedom of the people. As part of this study,

human security was operationalized to include the indicators provided by the United Nations (James, 2014). These include ‘rights to life, rights to human dignity, freedom of association, and freedom of expression’. To this list, we added freedom of movement, including “inter-city movement, movement by night, movement in the evening, and movement in the daytime.” Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which kidnapping

affects these human security indicators. The result is shown in table 9.4

**Table 10.4: Respondents’ rating of effect of kidnapping on human security**

| Effect of Kidnapping:       | Rating (%) |    |     |     |     | Mean        | Std Dev      |
|-----------------------------|------------|----|-----|-----|-----|-------------|--------------|
|                             | SD*        | D* | UD* | A*  | SA* |             |              |
| Hinders intra-city movement | 12         | 15 | 55  | 130 | 103 | <b>4.11</b> | <b>1.010</b> |
| Hinders movement by night   | 17         | 18 | 40  | 105 | 195 | <b>4.18</b> | <b>1.094</b> |
| Hinders movement Evening    | 17         | 38 | 90  | 103 | 127 | <b>3.76</b> | <b>1.157</b> |
| Hinders movement Dav        | 25         | 86 | 64  | 165 | 35  | <b>3.26</b> | <b>1.115</b> |
| Right to life               | 20         | 35 | 50  | 210 | 60  | <b>3.68</b> | <b>1.023</b> |
| Right to human dignity      | 00         | 65 | 30  | 215 | 65  | <b>3.75</b> | <b>.941</b>  |
| Freedom of association      | 35         | 70 | 40  | 165 | 67  | <b>3.42</b> | <b>1.240</b> |
| Freedom of expression       | 25         | 55 | 45  | 170 | 80  | <b>3.60</b> | <b>1.168</b> |

Source: Field data 2022

Respondents’ rating of effect of kidnapping on human security (table 10.4) revealed constraints on freedom of movement. “Movement by night”, and “inter-city movement” were mostly constrained (Mean = 4.18 and 4.11, respectively). The high mean scores recorded from respondents’ rating suggest the fear of travelling from one town to the other in Southern Taraba as well as movement in the night. Such hindrance has further consequences on both social and economic lives. This is because inter-city movement enhances trade and commerce, and for businesses in the entertainment and hospitality industries, movement in the night within the city is necessary as people attend clubs and relaxation centres.

Kidnapping was also found to affect right to human dignity. It also hindered movement in the evening. The mean scores recorded for the two variables were high (3.75 and 3.76, respectively). In terms of human dignity, kidnapping involves forceful abduction, then detention and sometimes, torture. In some instances, victims are kept in the bush and / or secluded places. Such inhuman maltreatment has consequences on even the life of the victims (Mean = 3.68, std = 1.023).

In order to avoid falling victim to kidnapper, citizens restrict, and may even cancel engagements in the evening and chose to stay indoors. In some instances, important assignments in the evening that could have yielded economic benefits to the family are cancelled. The effect of kidnapping on freedom of expression was recorded during the survey (Mean = 3.60, std = 1.168). Freedom of expression has to do with free speech and airing of one’s opinion. However, speaking publicly about kidnapping suspects was like incurring the wrath of kidnappers and their gang to oneself. Evidence to this rating exists after the arrest of Hamisu Bala Wadume, the kidnap kingpin from Ibi. His influence in the town of Ibi and Takum among his gang members; and even among law officers and security personnel did not allow people to condemn kidnappers openly. The fear of kidnapping also constrained freedom of association (Mean = 3.42, std = 1.240). People were afraid to hold parties and elaborate ceremonies for fear that kidnappers may visit them, thereafter, to request for money. Holding elaborate parties and / or ceremony was a confirmation of “having kidnapping value” (i.e ability to pay ransom). Given the

*fear of kidnapping, people were careful of their movement even in the daytime (Mean = 3.26, std = 1.225).*

**Test of Hypothesis**

Kidnapping has no significant effect on human security in Southern Taraba State, Nigeria.

The hypothesis seeks to test the effect of kidnapping on human security in Southern Taraba State. In order to do this, the summary of respondents’ rating on human security (table 10.4 was used as the dependent variable and regressed on “types of kidnapping operation in Southern Taraba

State” as the independent variables (table 10.3). The result of the Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) analysis is shown in table 11.2. Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) is used since it helps to examine how multiple independent variables are related to one dependent variable. However, to avoid recording spurious relation among the variables as a result of multicollinearity, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was conducted to test the presence of multicollinearity. Table 10.1 is a result of the VIF test, while table 11.2 is the MLR showing the effects of predictor variables (after removing multicollinearity) of table 1 1 .1.

**Table 11.1: Test of multicollinearity among the independent variables using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)**

| Independent Variables | Unstandardized Coefficients |            | Standardized Coefficients | T      | Sig. | Collinearity Statistics |        |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|--------|------|-------------------------|--------|
|                       | B                           | Std. Error | Beta                      |        |      | Tolerance               | VIF    |
| (Constant)            | -.253                       | .086       |                           | -2.950 | .003 |                         |        |
| Kidnapping for ramson | .728                        | .057       | .640                      | 12.840 | .000 | .085                    | 11.771 |
| Tiger kidnapping      | .393                        | .052       | .397                      | 7.591  | .000 | .077                    | 12.916 |
| Express kidnapping    | .182                        | .054       | .199                      | 3.399  | .001 | .062                    | 16.173 |
| Political kidnapping  | .028                        | .035       | .035                      | .793   | .428 | .106                    | 9.402  |
| Virtual kidnapping    | -.273                       | .043       | -.347                     | -6.284 | .000 | .069                    | 14.474 |

a. **Dependent Variable: Human security** Source: computed from field data

The general rule of thumbs for the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test is that if the VIF value is greater than 10, then there is multicollinearity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). In this context, the result in table 4.2.1 indicates high tolerance for only one variable (political kidnapping). The rest of the variables indicate very low tolerance. In like manner, the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all other variables except “political kidnapping” are greater than 10. The results,

therefore, suggest the existence of collinearity problem. In order to solve the collinearity problem, we decided to omit the highly correlated variables. Since there is no statistical ground for choosing to omit one variable over the other, we decided to remove only one variable at a time while repeating the test for VIF. After series of test, two variables: “express kidnapping” and “tiger kidnapping “were removed to reduce the multicollinearity between the variables. The result is presented in table 11.



Table 11.2: Multiple linear regression analysis of the effect of kidnapping on human security in Southern Taraba State, Nigeria

| Variables                |        |      |       |        |      |      |       |
|--------------------------|--------|------|-------|--------|------|------|-------|
| (Constant)               | -0.497 | .094 |       | -5.297 | .000 |      |       |
| Kidnapping for<br>Ramson | 1.145  | .033 | .995  | 34.253 | .000 | .324 | 3.090 |
| Political<br>kidnapping  | -0.008 | .041 | -.010 | -.202  | .840 | .107 | 9.329 |
| Virtual<br>kidnapping    | -0.043 | .034 | -.054 | -1.262 | .208 | .150 | 6.649 |

As shown in Table 11.2, the three independent variable that remain in the equation: kidnapping for ransom, political kidnapping, and virtual kidnapping, each has a high tolerance with a VIF that is less than 10. It can be concluded therefore, that multicollinearity was no longer a problem in the data. In terms of fit of the regression model, the linear relationship between the independent and the dependent variable was high and positive ( $R = .95$ ), about 89.9% of the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable (security) can be explained by the independent variables ( $R^2 = 0.899$ ). The analysis of variance (ANOVA) result supported the existence of significant relationship between the dependent and the independent variables [ $F(3; 371) = 1096.769, p < .05$ ].

The regression coefficients' result indicates that of the three independent variables, viz: political kidnapping, ransom kidnapping, and virtual kidnapping, retained in the MLR equation, only "kidnapping for ransom" exerted a significant effect on human security ( $\beta = .995, t = 34.253, p > .05$ ). It was a positive effect, which suggests that as kidnapping for ransom increases, the effect on human security also increases. In this context, a unit increase in kidnapping for ransom, elevated the effect on human security by 0.995 units in Southern Taraba. The rest of the variables did not indicate significant effect on human security. For

instance, political kidnapping exerted a negative contribution ( $\beta = -.010; t = -.202, p > .05$ ). Similarly, virtual kidnapping did not exert any positive effect on human security in the study area ( $\beta = -.054; t = -1.262, p > .05$ ). The possible explanation here is that for everyone unit increase in "virtual kidnapping, human security will decrease by -1.262 value. The MLR equation shows that: Human Security =  $-.497 + 1.145$  (Kidnapping for ransom) -  $.008$  (Political kidnapping) -  $.043$  (Virtual kidnapping).

The first specific objective of the study was to find out the types of kidnapping operation in Southern Taraba State. The findings of the study showed that kidnapping for ransom was the most prevalence out of the five types of kidnapping found in the study area. Kidnapping was principally done for pecuniary interest. This was followed by express kidnapping, tiger kidnapping and political kidnapping. Elsewhere, Ayuba (2020) had found that kidnapping for ransom was the most prevalence types of kidnapping in Nigeria. Our findings agree with Ayuba's own. In Southern Taraba, our findings suggested that rarely was kidnapping victims released without payment of ransom whether the reason for kidnapping was for political purpose or virtual one. Many kidnapped victims may have lost their lives due to inability to pay ransom. This was also corroborated by Assanvo and Okereke (2019), who argued that kidnapping in Nigeria is evolving into a

lingering, pervasive security challenges; and is metamorphosing into a fast-paced and multi-faceted criminal enterprise. Like in many other parts of Nigeria, Southern Taraba State has witnessed an unprecedented incidence of kidnapping for ransoms. The crime which was hitherto unknown in the area has become domesticated as criminals within the state no longer rob properties and valuables but chose to so abduct the victims, and demand ransom, thereafter. Criminal elements have found it a lucrative venture more than other traditional form of crimes such as armed robbery, theft, and burglary.

The second specific objective of the study was to examine the effect of kidnapping on human security in Southern Taraba State. The result as indicated in Table 9.4 showed respondents' rating of effect of kidnapping on human security. It revealed constraints on freedom of movement. Thus, "Movement by night", and "inter-city movement" were mostly constrained due to fear of being kidnapped. The high mean scores recorded from respondents' rating suggest the fear of travelling from one town to the other in Southern Taraba as well as movement in the night. While movement in the day was not significantly affected by kidnapping, the opinion of the sampled respondents differs on influence of kidnapping on movement in the evening and night as well as inter-city movement. Overall, this is an indication of impediment on people's freedom of movement in the study area. It has grave consequences on people's fundamental rights. This is against the United Nations Resolution-A/Res/66/290 which described human security as the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair.

In terms of policy objective to curb kidnapping at Southern Taraba, the findings, favoured intensifying inter-state as well as international borders security-check, a viable economic policy, formal and informal security agency collaboration, enhanced technological

service delivery like surveillance cameras, mostly in the banking sector, and synergy among conventional security outfits on intelligence sharing. The recommendations also include enhancing welfare of the security personnel. The prevalent rate of kidnapping coupled with other attendant consequences has rendered living in the study area very frightening. Thus, great emphasis should be given to economic policy that would stimulate rapid economic growth and wellbeing of the people. As the test of hypotheses revealed, the relationship between kidnapping for ransom and human security exerted significant adverse effect on human security, while kidnappers smiled to the bank on the sacrifice of human security. It is therefore necessary to encourage security of life and property in the study area to rescue the citizens from suffering under the reign of kidnappers.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The study examines effect of kidnapping on human security in southern Taraba State. The explorative nature of the study revealed insights into the operation of kidnapping in southern Taraba. Based on quantitative analysis from the responses on the effect of kidnapping, it can be concluded that kidnapping exerted adverse consequences on human security of the people of southern Taraba. The types of kidnapping included kidnapping for ransom, tiger kidnapping, express kidnapping, political kidnapping, and virtual kidnapping. In all these kidnapping for ransom tend to be the most prevalence; and failure to pay ransom often resulted to death. The incident of kidnapping in Southern Taraba therefore, affected all aspect of lives of the people and exerted a negative multiplier effect on the 'rights to life, rights to human dignity, freedom of association, and freedom of expression'. Additionally, freedom of movement, including "inter-city movement, movement by night, movement in the evening,

and movement in the daytime” were affected. Kidnapping in Southern Taraba State did not only affect economic and human security but also social security. In this context, social, and interpersonal relationship across the numerous tribes in the study area has been affected by kidnapping. This is due to suspicion and fear among ethnic groups.

Based on the findings of the study, it can be seen that kidnapping in Southern Taraba State is majorly driven by pecuniary interest; there is influx of criminals from other state into southern Taraba, therefore government should intensify internal security and border control to check the influx of criminals into the state; and check against those within the state.

Following from recommending one above, human security can be enhanced if government supports the increase security presence, including support to community vigilante groups, and Neighbourhood Crime Watch. Both government and private sectors should improve on surveillance facilities that will enhance technological oriented service delivery most importantly, in the banking sectors. The cashless policy of the apex bank (Central Bank of Nigeria) can help to stop kidnapping since payment to kidnappers can easily be tracked. An improved synergy among conventional security outfits and/or informal security outfits will aid in intelligence gathering, collection and sharing. With a viable cooperation, nipping the crime of kidnapping in the bud can be achieved; and reduces the fear associated with kidnapping at social gathering as well as intercity and intra-city movement.

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## BANDITRY AND INSECURITY: IMPLICATIONS ON HUMAN SECURITY DEPRIVATION IN NORTH-WEST, NIGERIA

**Auwalu Abdullahi<sup>1</sup>**

**Lawal Stephen<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science  
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria  
Email: *aabdullahikuki@gmail.com*

<sup>2</sup>Department of Sociology  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
Email: *stephenlawal@fuwukari.edu.ng*



### Abstract

Rural banditry and its associated insecurities have created human insecurity for most people in the country. This new phenomenon have worsened human security condition through kidnapping for ransom, villages, schools, markets and farmlands were frequently raided. As a result, people no longer go to their farms, nor do they conveniently transport farm produce to markets or patronize such markets. All these have compounded existing socio-economic crises in the country particularly in the north-west. Based on this, the paper examines the genesis of banditry and its implications on human security. The paper adopts the use of secondary data generated from documentary sources while descriptive and historical methodology is used to qualitatively analyze data. The paper used frustration-Aggression theory as its theoretical frame-work for analysis. The paper reveals that banditry has worsen human security conditions in north-west Nigeria. There is also the neglect of the address of the root causes of banditry in the region; thus, the frustration of people in the region heightens banditry in the region. The paper therefore, recommends among other things that, good governance and generally acceptable commitment towards addressing root causes of banditry such as ruthless fight against corruption in all sectors and social injustice

**Keywords:** Banditry, insecurity, human security, corruption, social justice

### Introduction

The criminal activities of banditry and insecurity in the nation have dispossessed many rural dwellers from their farmlands, put travellers in constant fear of being kidnapped on highways, villages, markets and schools. These have significantly negated socio-economic development in many parts of Nigeria, investment opportunities are stultified, and leaving individuals in a perpetual encumbrance as human lives in the country seem to be at the mercy of criminals who have the will to give options to their victims to choose between ransom payments, getting killed or both. Although, every part of the country is grappling with one or another

problem of insecurity, in recent years the acts of terrorism, banditry and insecurity is specifically more pronounced in northern Nigeria, particularly the North-Western region. This new phenomenon of banditry and insecurity have seriously endangered not only state security, but also human security by exposing people to perpetual fear of violence, anxiety, want, poverty and misery because human safety, livelihood, dignity and survival have been compromised by the activities of these bandits.

The phenomenon of banditry and insecurity has always been aggravating as neither federal government nor state government efforts

seem to have yield any positive result. This is despite human and material resources deployed to curb it, all efforts are grossly becoming abortive leading people to lack confidence in governments and demonstrate their hysteria for the security of their personal life and properties and across the country (Mohammed & Alimbi, 2015). In Nigeria today there is a widespread feeling of fear, anxiety and lack of concrete protection among all citizens due to insecurity through the activities of banditry as manifested in kidnapping, armed robbery, terrorism and insurgency. As a result, insecurity ensues into the nation with serious dilemma for peace and development which is now becoming a challenge for the corporate state existence since people cannot freely pursue their cherished socio-economic and political ambitions (Adegbami, 2013).

Banditry refers to the incidences of armed robbery or allied violent crimes such as kidnapping, cattle rustling, and village or market raids through the use of force or threat of it to intimidate and or coerce people in order to rob, rape or kill (Okoli & Egwu, 2019). Thus, banditry is a highly organized, coordinated and syndicated network of actors united in the perpetration of criminal activities across places and communities for the sake of looting people's properties mostly in the country side or in the rural areas where it is characterized by higher incidences of stealing, cattle rustling, kidnapping, armed robbery and village raids as a result of gross deficit in governance (Olaniyan & Aliyu, 2016).

Human security is that pervasive feeling of been safe and protected from any kinds of danger and threats; real and imagined and which placed an individual human person at the centre rather than the state. Human security is a deliberate protection and promotion of human core values that safeguard human lives from any form of threats in a consistent and sustainable manner against want, fear and anxiety through institutionalized response and preventive measures (Alkire, 2003). These core values are

those necessary, important and paramount aspects of human lives which define the basic essence of human life in fundamental rights and freedoms, basic capabilities and absolute needs. The concept of human security was popularized by Human Development Report by Mahbub Ul Haq (1994) as ensuring freedom from want and fear for all purposes as safety from such chronic threats as poverty, the overall objective is to reduce poverty, eliminate malnutrition, disease and unemployment to better the objective reality in the living condition of man for more production and equitable distribution of societal resources.

Human security is basically achieved when basic material needs are supplied and when human dignity including real participation in the community is fulfilled or any other necessary condition that can help enrich the quality of human life such as economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment (Roznai, 2014). Human security and development are mutually related for development enhance the process of expanding liberties, and economic, social and political freedoms. For this, the concept of human security lies in the concepts of sustainable development that protect people from excessive fear and wants because, humans are adequately protected and secured from any threats and anxiety due to economic, social and environmental sustainability. Sustainable development enhance human security for the main objective is to guaranteed and maintain secured and sustainable future that in a more wider sense of security and beyond a restricted physical military defence for state territory.

Human insecurity provides two major sources of security threats; security from want and security from fear, in which insecurity arises first, from human concerns on wants in relations to hunger, poverty, unemployment, diseases and natural disaster and the treats of fear arises from the issue of physical assault and trauma due to violence, human rights

abuse, civil war and ethnic conflicts. In relations to this, human security cover seven interrelated significant component that includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political values that underline the operational capacity and satisfactory human life under economic, social and environmental conditions for sustainable development (Ahsan, 2016). Thus, human security revolves around two major fronts; an effective security due to efficient freedom from fear and anxiety and socio-economic front when people are relatively better up because of equity in resource allocation and and job security that free them from wants. The objective of human security is therefore to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats and without corresponding impediments to long term human fulfilment, which is the most basic and paramount for the preservation of human means for survival and dignity (Alkire, 2003).

The above is rooted from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report of 1994 which consider seven dimension of human security to includes economic, foods, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (Ugbomah, etal, 2023). That are all informed by re-examining and evaluation of interrelated threats as well as proactive responses to such threats rather than mere political thinking. For the UNDP, the focus of security should not be on strictly on the protection of national governments, sovereignty and territorial integrity, but safeguarding individual human life. This is because, human security aspire to guaranteed sustainable human development, for underdevelopment is the primary cause to insecurity since for any measures to address insecurity and militarization will favour equitable, sustainable and human centred approach to development (INEF, 2011). With this, human security is understood through three (3) major approaches based on their political impacts; the narrow based approach

that see threats of political violence against people by the state, political organization or any other organized groups or territorial polity in which the basic idea is to give people the idea of freedom from fear. There is also a broad based school which argues that human security should go beyond freedom from fear, but freedom from want, ability to overcome physiological needs for human life as well as the European or western conception of human security as anything to be more encompassing, not only narrowed freedom from the threats of fear and want, but should also include those other basic tenants principles of liberal democracy as human rights, liberty, rule of law, transparency and open competition for political offices as the only ways through which peoples safety, equity and social justice make sense of human security.

Human insecurity is said to exist when first and foremost there is vulnerabilities for people to the implicit or explicit threats of fear, want and anxiety due to violent acts or human conditions whether by state or non-state actors to which it may have negative impacts on human peace, development and social cohesion for proper functioning of societies. For this, peoples vulnerabilities to the threats of human insecurity could take two dimensions; flourishing social vices that make environmental security conditions difficult and significantly affects political stability in the assessment of vulnerabilities and agenda settings, and the overall values for each country when compared with other whose citizens behaviour demonstrates unacceptable conducts that calls for governmental and non-governmental responses (INEF, 2011). Human security at minimal concern with reducing and at maximum removing all aspects and dimensions of insecurities that threatens human lives and which creates a condition for excessive human despair in want, fear and anxiety. The overall objective of human security is all about protection, promotion and projection of those vital core for human

survival from any adverse threats and impeding future life.

Human security is the foundational basis for national security without which international security will also not be achieved because any society that suffer excessive human insecurity due to poverty, hunger, violence, anxiety and fear, conflicts and war became eminently prevalent; democracy, rule of law and human rights protection became an illusion, in this situation, peoples hope and legitimacy of government became stultified and immigration of people became very real. In this manner, human security rejected the realist theory of international relations that much emphasis on conventional military security for a state instead, of putting individual human beings as referent point for security rights of every one. For the realist, security is more concern about state securing itself from external attacks by other states or terrorist groups in which state iss needed to have strong military mechanism for the protection of individual interest from danger of anarchy due to human tendency of been selfish, greedy and egoist.

### **Perspectives on Rural Banditry and Insecurity in Nigeria**

Rural banditry is said to be organized crimes perpetrated against rural communities by certain groups of people who loot from the people's wealth mostly through the acts of armed robbery, kidnapping and cattle rustling against human life and properties (Okoli & Egwu, 2019). Thus, different scholars try to look at this heinous act perpetrated by rural bandits through different perspectives.

Some scholars (Rufa'I, 2018, and Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016) consider it from the perspective of the complex relations between pastoralist-farmers with its delicate security context which was compounded further by the state incapacity to govern. The prevalence of rural banditry is seen to be motivated by armed bandit gangs as ultimate consequences of growing number of ungoverned spaces

where effective government control was rarely ineffective or absent. This endangered human security as a result of persistent fear and frustrations from violence, want, and poverty. In Nigeria, this has continued to exist and worsen because of the correlations between high rate of crime being perpetrated and the low level developmental capacities. This, with its accompanying protracted insecurity, is what motivated criminal gangs for economic opportunities as affected communities often claim looting of their wealth and payment of ransom for kidnapping using scorched-earth tactics. Egwu (2015:41) asserts that:

“The key assumption is that a nation cannot be secured if it fails to address issues of governance, unemployment and corruption, all of which can subvert the rule of law and undermine the welfare of the citizenry, even if the state has the most modernized army or the most sophisticated police force”.

Some studies (Abimbola, 2010, Olimisi, 2013, and Onoja, 2014) associate the raising problems of insecurity in Nigeria as manifested through Boko Haram insurgency and the phenomenon of banditry to the glaring failure of governance which has a bandwagon for most people that cannot stand the challenges of a changing socio-economic realities of life in the face of a draconian economy. The decline in the people's economic earning for most rural dwellers also corresponded with the raising prices of commodities leading many to socio-economic hardship and their inability to re-adjust to the changing situation, This, eventually led many to venture into criminal acts that create insecurity in the country.

Another perspective to the prevalence of rural banditry and insecurity is attached to often competition for the pastoral lands arising from the changing environmental climatic conditions, leading to drastic failure in the productivity of land which often creates competition over these vegetative lands. This also worsens due to rapid population growth (Abdullahi, et al, 2017, Blench, 2004). In Nigeria and other underdeveloped nations, on



one hand, there is an increase in human population growth leading to an increase in the demand for more food, milk and meat hence, animal population is also expanded with the help of new breeds using technical-know-how in animal rearing. On the other hand, the decline of the national economy and income with the rate of unemployment, most people return to their lands to farm leading to intense competition for available rural land resources and space such as grazing pasture lands due to exponential population growth (Conroy, 2016, Manbe & Ebonyi, 2019 and Suleiman, 2017). For this reason, the carrying capacity of land resources as against the population strength and the new breeds of animal due to technology, land and water resources become significantly low for the maximum desire of both parties.

Therefore, rural banditry is generated from two multi-dimensional conditions: the crisis and the politics of identity relations between the pastoralist and the crop farmers during the trans-human migration in search of good postural lands. Through this, there is perceived social injustice and political marginalization of the Nigeria state system by the herdsmen hence, herdsmen were dangerously armed in the fierce fight with crop farmers and other rural dwellers with impunity (Rufa'l, 2018, Gadzama et al, 2018 and Mburu, 1999). Therefore, with environmental pressure because of the scorched earth conditions, people perpetually live in the environment with scarcity of water supply, grazing lands and healthy soil, competition and conflicts become eminent. The effects and consequences arising from the changing climatic conditions that ultimately resulted into resource scarcity which have endangered existing pattern of social co-existence among rural dwellers as groups are now largely locked into hostility and violent competition.

From the foregoing, people go into banditry as a result of structural deprivation and frustration from the alienation in the distribution of resources and their inability to

satisfy their desired means of living. It is the prevalence of unwarranted social conditions in the society such as growing poverty, hunger, social distress and the general breakdown of law and order. This resulted into the flagrant violations of social values, disregard for leaders and general social crises, the combined effects of which are social instability, corruption, poverty and general economic depression.

However, banditry and insecurity is simply associated with the porous nature of the Nigerian national borders. This is because, government is grossly unable to exercise strict control of authority over these territories that serve as a sanctuary for criminal activities. As such, insecurity will continue especially when the nation have ungoverned spaces which are very conducive for criminal activities to thrive with massive influx of weapons through smuggling of illegal arms and ammunitions (Goyei, 2021). This is further compounded by the growing lack of organizational co-ordination and linkages among security outfits and other associated complexities of corruption among security officials charged with the responsibility of fighting against banditry. Also, lack of modern technological weapons by security agencies if compared with what these bandits possess and the speculated rumours of budget misappropriation in the security sector make most officers irritated and suffer psychological pressure which truncates the fighting spirit among officers and complicate issues of insecurity in Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2020).

Ungoverned spaces exist due to the inability of government to provide fundamental functioning of a state; physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management and social welfare for the citizens, all of which negate the effective control of state territories leading to absence of state functionaries. For this, ungoverned space complicate insecurity with conducive

atmosphere for the bandits, terrorists and other criminal groups to

“Plan, recruit, train, indoctrinate, secure access to weapons and equipment, the ability to engage in illegal smuggling to generate income and the benefits they can drive from the existence of staging ground and transit zones” (Foreign and Common Wealth Office, 2014:1).

From the above, state’s inability to exhibit strict border control, institutions in such a state can no longer exercise monopoly of power hence, they are unable to penetrate remote areas where such bandits are well established.

Similarly, banditry and insecurity is associated with the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) into the hands of non-state actors and which are by extension, as a result of porous borders due to unrestricted movement of people, goods and weapons by authorities which brigands take the advantage of. This is further compounded by the power vacuum created between state authorities and rural population, which criminal elements and or religious fanatics exploit to perpetrate their heinous acts (Gadzama, Saddiq, Oduehie & Dariya, 2018). This shows that proliferation of illicit arms and financial flows have been a major driver for banditry and insecurity, the availability of which funds several extremist activities and transnational criminal movements. All of these things caused and exacerbated debilitating effects and increase grave security risk (Morgan, 2020). The collapse of Ghaddafi’s regime in Libya, Sahel countries including Nigeria have seen the proliferation and mass influx of Small Arms and Light Weapons most of which ended up in the hand of terrorist, militants and bandits who, with the aid of such weapons, use to destabilize and terrorize individuals and communities.

However, the view above may differ from that of other scholars (Mamdani, 2007 and Nnoli, 2009), who maintain that, conflicts and insecurity in Africa and Nigeria in particular

have to do with the politicization of cultural heritage of our national life by the colonialist who under operated under the guise of compliant local authorities who promote colonial interest. As such, the effects in the politicization of ethnic identity was the basis for administrative, legal and political organization’s fraudulent conflicts and insecurity in Africa and Nigeria in particular and also a product of ethno-linguistic configuration of the nation due to the plurality of its people who are heterogeneously diverse and therefore, the under current fault line is identity clashes (Osamba, 2008 and Egwu, 2015). This was rooted from the regional imbalance between the north and the south where the north has an overbearing political influence due to its population, the south dominates economically and administratively due to their level of western education and industrialization.

Some studies (Abimbola, 2010 and Danjibbo, 2009) associate the raising problem of insecurity as manifested in Boko Haram and banditry to the glaring failure of governance which became a bandwagon for most people that cannot stand the challenges of socio-economic realities in the face of dwindling economic problems. The decline in economic earning for most rural dwellers which corresponded with the rising prices of commodities led many to socio-economic hardship. It is the inability to re-adjust the living condition for most people eventually made many rural neglected poor to venture into criminal activities that created insecurity in the nation. With the above realities, the optimism of Nigerians to get life more abundant from the polity became shattered. This is complicated by how rotten governmental structures are and the kind of warped sense of justice among leaders leads to the attachment of stereotyped sentiments into the political competition especially at the national level. In addition to the poor economic performance, there were massive flow of poor peasants and other poor migrants

into the urban labour markets which lower wages, intensify exploitation and make life more difficult (Boswell & Dixon, 1993). From the above, a weak state that cannot deliver for the public good is prone to conflicts and insecurity because of the problems of social trust between citizens and state. In this situation, the disadvantaged group will automatically contest the legitimacy and autonomy of the state which may result into violent conflicts as violent struggle for power may ensue.

There is still another school of thought (Oluwadare, 2016 and Innocent, 2018) which is of the opinion, banditry and insecurity arise and became prevalent as a result of lack of coordinated and harmonious working relationship among inter-security agencies which provide a loopholes for the poorly organised pro-activeness in checkmating the insecurity problems in the country. Improper coordination and linkages among security outfits created some complexities, disarray and rivalry among such organizations and their officials. This is in addition to other fatigue of war, logistical problems and perceived maltreatment in relations to their salary, allowances as well as lack of modern technological weapons in relation to what these bandits possess and the speculated rumours of misappropriated security budget make officers irritated and truncated their psychological fighting spirit. All of these complicate insecurity in the country further (Oluwadare, 2016, International Crisis Group, 2018).

This means, the inability of security pro-activeness in the event of bandit attacks for fear of death or injury is due to poor social life packages and remuneration from government leading to corruption and the crisis of social image in the eyes of the public make the institution weak and unable to deter any threats to security. From this perspective thus, harmonious and coordinated pooling of human and material resources in the security sector with collaboration of the agencies,

insecurity would have been eradicated or effectively mitigated but instead “Security agencies in Nigeria have consistently been intolerant to one another and frequently enmeshed with acrimonious altercations and conflicts” (Innocent, 2018). Therefore, inter-agency rivalry negates the nation’s capacity to deal with security threats that sometimes because such organization may have a clash of purpose in the process of investigation and arrest of suspects, a weakness criminals utilize to get judicial freedom from facing the wrath of the law.

### **Implications of Rural Banditry on Human Security in North-West Nigeria**

Banditry in many villages and outskirts in some major cities across the north-western region have exhibited dire consequences for people in many manifolds leading to abrupt disruption of normal and organized way of usual social life. Banditry is known and associated with criminal acts of killing, maiming and kidnapping of people, young men, abduction and raping of women, cattle rustling, raiding villages, markets, schools and farmlands, a total way of bruising the pride of every community (Ogbomah, 2022). The consequences of banditry in Nigeria is not limited to only their victims, but generally to the socio-economic, political and security aspects of human lives in the nation in general. Victims suffer particularly from both material, social and psychological traumas, banditry impaired other people from free freedom of movements, mutual social interactions, fear of intimidation, material and financial losses, physical injuries or victimization through death and other forms of violations.

However, different from the Hobsbawn (1959) prescription of social bandits as peasant outlaws that championed the course of the unprivileged poor against the autocratic exuberance of the ruling class, making people to consider them as heroes, champions, avengers, justice fighters and salvations of the masses. Contemporary bandits as experienced

today, are unlike social bandits, they are criminal miscreants who are very destructive, vicious and exploitative in nature because they possess the capacity to overwhelm the state security, contest state legitimacy, act as alternative authorities especially in ungoverned territories and dominate informal economic sectors to advance their self-centred interest (Mohammed & Alimba, 2015).

The prevalence of banditry and insecurity in Nigeria which also corresponds to the time when the nation was faced with economic crises in the face of dandling price of its sole international commodity (crude oil) and frequent political instability, the country has become so fragile as it grapples with political, economic, environmental and social risks which threaten peace, stability and prosperity. This fragility worsens every day due to over growing dysfunctional public institutions as a manifestation of governance deficit and will continue to worsen as the state is continuously lagging behind in institutional capacities and resources to meet the needs of the populace and “the ongoing struggle for greater influence, inclusion, accountability and representation between various political leaders, social groups and regions leading to more fragmentations” (Howard, J. Etal, 2019).

Banditry leads to the serious humanitarian crises by dislocating thousands people from their traditional communities leading to attendants social, economic and demographic consequences as well as the general loss of societal opportunity cost of resources as siphoned and used by the bandits. Bandits cause violence, panic, havoc which even government finds difficult to contain due to proliferation of bandit attacks with the use of weapons, deficit in security provision as well as general loss of hope on government to protect people. Bandit’s violent resistance to government intervention leads regular armies to perceptibly lose the initiative and monopoly of policing the society (Mohammed & Alimba, 2015).

Banditry and its associated insecurity leads to the loss of human lives, injuries, displacement of routine social life as well as loss of material and financial resources and properties. The fatalities perpetrated by the acts of criminal bandits seem to be worsened because from the year 2011-2019, about eight thousand (8000) people were killed, with over two hundred and ten thousand, three hundred and fifty-four (210, 354) persons were internally displaced. This situation become more acute due to resurgence of more bandit activities because, by the first half of the year 20s21 alone, over six hundred and five (605) people were killed and two thousand, three hundred and seventy one (2, 371) persons became internally displaced persons while over ten billion naira (#10 billion) was demanded for ransom (National Security Summit Report, 2021 and Vanguard, July 13, 2021).

Banditry and its insecurity have seriously caused trauma to the social life of women and children who became particularly more vulnerable for they have to bear an additional responsibility of their life and that of their children. Women are now faced with new challenges of life in feeding, clothing, medication and schooling for their children which is unconventional for women to bear. Bandit attacks are carried out and more pronounced in rural villages which leads to under reportage by the media and government security agencies which further compounds victims’ situation of excessive shortages of food, water and medication as most of them live in makeshift camps, villages and forests struggling with crude lack of shelter and other basic means of life. The situation of women is now compounded after their husbands are killed or kidnapped and when they are forced to Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs) where they are usually harassed and victimized with sexual violence and can no longer seek for redress due to impunity of some officials in the administration of such places (Oluyemi-Kusa & Salihu, 2015).

When bandit attacks are not specifically targeting women, but attacking men who are more victimized while women became casualties of attacks. However, women were raped in most cases by bandits in order to assuage their gratification for sex, a demonstration of their power and further traumatize the persons attacked as a means of bruising the pride of the community (Oluyemi-Kusa & Salihu, 2015). As such women become easily subjective and vulnerable when their men are subdued by the fire power of the armed bandits.

Increasing access and use of modern conventional weapons such as Small Arms and Lights Weapons (SALW's) by bandit groups against both the state security and the ordinary citizens in the country lead to dual problems: weaken the traditional ways of resolving conflicts such as through courts judgements and mediation, as well as also undermine minimal state security intervention in facilitating peace, but also lead to a new clamour among Nigerians on the serious need to allow legal possession of weapons in the hands of every citizen who may wish to do so which is another source of insecurity in the nation.

Economically, acts of banditry have severely affected agricultural mode of production which is the mainstay for rural dwellers as their economic source of living for most parts of the northern region. Farmers were forced to abandon their farms for fear of being attacked or kidnapped for ransom. For instance, in Katsina State alone, over two thousand, six hundred and eighty-eight (2688) hectares of farmland were destroyed, while many other farms are not accessible to farmers for fear of kidnapping otherwise they had to pay tax and get clearance from these bandits before going to their farms (Ladan & Matawalli, 2020). In this manner, banditry ensues into the nation a compounding problem of food insecurity as part of the negative impact of killing, kidnapping farmers and destroying their farmlands leading to low

turnout of farm cultivation thereby preventing people from the production process. This has caused a corresponding consequence of derailing commercial activities as businessmen cannot attain to local markets and farmers could not transport farm products to such markets while the confidence of national and international investors has drastically fallen.

Food insecurity is now becoming more worrisome because bandit killings and kidnapping of farmers are increasing every day, thereby deterring people from rural farming, because of cattle rustling and blockading access routes to local markets for the purpose of selling and purchasing farm produce. In fact, all farm produce that are produced locally including fish and livestock are transported and sold at local markets for local consumptions but:

“Banditry can severely affects the supply of cash crops, as public and commercial transportations to markets is often interrupted and consequently farmers, are forced to abandoned commercial harvest. Where this happen repeatedly, on a large scale, social investment often declines with broad ripple effects on both foreign investor’s confidence and overseas development assistance” (Muggah & Bachelor, 2002:32).

In relation to the national unity and integration among the diverse Nigeria nationalities, the prevalence of armed banditry does not only compound the problem of inter-ethnic tension among various groups in the country, but it has now ensured new phenomena of social mistrust even among Hausa-Fulani who were seen as one group centuries ago. Hausa/Fulani who are seen and treated as virtually one homogeneous group due to longer historical, cultural, religious and regional integration as one people have yielded to the fear of impending attacks by armed bandits and as such, a resonating dichotomy, tension and the decline of hospitality towards one another has is now evident.

Education is another sector which the northern region is particularly lagging behind

in even before banditry, but the sector has become seriously destabilized by the frequent attacks on schools and abduction of students. In the first half of the year 2021 alone about hundred schools were attacked, over one thousand (1000) students were abducted and kidnapped for ransom including 300 Kankara boys and 80 at Mahuta Islamiyya, in Katsina state, 27 students from Kagara Niger State, Hundreds at Jangebe, Zamfara state, and two other different schools (Bethel Baptist and Forestry) from Kaduna state among others. And about sixty-five (65%) per cent of which are girls most of whom were mutilated, abused and raped by their abductors (Blueprint, March5, 2021, Vanguard June 21, 2021, and DailyTrust). This has deepened the already deep educational crises the northern region is undergoing leading to total shut down of schools, unstable academic calendar, and abandoning of education by many school children.

In Nigeria, an estimated 8.7 to 13 million are out of school children, out of which the north account for about eighty per cent (80%), which the activities of armed banditry are now further eroding educational provision especially in the northern region for future skills and bright generation because of an already instilled fear in both students and staff leading to more dropouts. Thus, the gap between the north and south in terms of education will continue to widen as high level of illiteracy is aggravated as both students, teachers and parents live in an environment that is insecure to allow for proper teaching and learning to take effect. Therefore, the rise of banditry and the fear of abduction of students make most northern states such as Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Yobe, Niger, Jigawa, Sokoto and Zamfara states to close down their schools.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

North-West region in Nigeria that used to be the most peaceful region, is now gradually

becoming most insecure and violent part of the country. This is despite the fact that, the region produces most of the national leaders and other public office holders, the positive impacts of government in the region is minimal. As such, the government has not positively contributed to the region's socio-economic status with regards to poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, public health or infrastructural development. In fact, governments in the region are incapable of providing for the basic needs of the general populace which affects the legitimacy of the state and its institutions giving the impression of a strong link between governance deficit, banditry and human insecurity. This is what compounded the socio-economic life of most people in the region leading to everyone perpetual fear, want and anxieties hence, the human insecurity.

Thus, using the perspectives of human security, the phenomenon of banditry and insecurity has always been exacerbating peoples feeling of fear, want and anxiety in the region. Is contributed a lots to the loss of human lives, properties, excruciating socio-economic conditions and shattered mutual relations. It also undermine agricultural mode of production, transportations and business activities particularly in the most affected states in the region.

Banditry and it associated insecurity in Nigeria have negatively affected the national security of the state at large and the human security in particular. As a result, to tamed the problem of banditry and insecurity in order to enhance the human security of the people, its recommended that there is need to have strong political institutions, political wills and public provisions from the government at all levels as against weak and ineffective government. Concerted joint efforts by all stake holders is desperately needed in order to solve it once and for all. A serious government policies that will ensure sufficient and efficient economic diversification especially for rural dwellers against hunger, poverty, illiteracy,

health. There is need for synergy among different state security agencies and the communities in ensuring maintenance of law and order.

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Wonotanzokan Nzeda Tagowa<sup>1</sup>

Veno Micloth Yongo<sup>2</sup>

Isa Mohammed<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

<sup>2</sup>Adamawa State Polytechnic, Yola-Nigeria

<sup>3</sup>Department of Political Science & International Relations,  
Taraba State University, Jalingo-Nigeria.



### Abstract

This paper examined Civil-Military Relations (CMR) and effective maritime security in Nigeria's maritime domain. It highlighted the significance of improved CMR in the promotion of security in general and specifically in the maritime sub-sector. The central focus of discourse is that civilian control of the military should be the accepted norm than military control of the civil society. Therefore, the security challenges of Nigeria's maritime domain and the entire Gulf of Guinea required improved CMR with respect to the role of Nigerian Navy in securing the entire country's ocean space. The paper adopted descriptive qualitative content analysis as a methodology for the study. It reviewed the traditional theories of CMR and introduced two interrelated concepts of 'deepening' and 'widening' as new theoretical framework for deeper understanding of the importance of stronger CMR in advancing maritime security. This new theoretical underpinning helped us to highlight the primary role of the Nigerian Navy in maritime security in the Nigerian maritime domain. The major finding of the paper is that effective maritime security depends much on good maritime neighborhood policy and other externalities which required formal and informal enlargements, nationally and internationally. In this regard, the deepening and widening of CMR is the core value that can enhance maritime security. The paper therefore recommended strategy of integration of NN CMR activities, CMR capacity building training programs and measures should become part and parcel of institutional building of the NN and that NN should critically monitor partner and donor arrangements and supplies to avoid disadvantaged position.

**Keywords:** Civil-military relations, maritime security, Nigerian Navy, neighborhood policy

### Introduction

The relationship between the civil authorities and the military has generated concerns leading to the assumption that the civilian control of the military should be preferable to that of military control of the state affairs. This has created a new area of academic discourse and research in several disciplines in the humanities with international character. Since the writings of Sun Tzu (1956) and Carl von Clausewitz (1960), the argument that the military organizations were primarily the servants of the state became popular such that

the concerns about increasing militarization of the society generated greater interest in examining and re-examining the link between military organizations and the civil society. This has led to a number of theoretical debates such as institutional, convergence, concordance, etc. The primary concern of these debates is the "civil-military culture gap" in most nations of the world and the normative purpose of the debates were to promote ideas that will narrow the gap between the civil society and the military authorities. The

question is that if this gap is narrow enough will it enhance security? The paper is predicated on the assumption that a strong CMR is directly proportional to successful military operations or conversely that a weak CMR can jeopardize and complicate military operations. The paper thus argues that in the present circumstances, CMR concerns extends beyond the interaction between national military, national civil society and institutions but must also have a “geographical spill-over.”

Generally, CMR describe the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military establishment. In a more general sense, however, it embraces the interaction between civil society as a whole and the military organization or other armed organizations established to protect it. Thus, the relationship between the civil authorities and the military has generated concerns leading to the normative assumption that the civilian control of the military should be preferable to that of military control of the state affairs. This has created a new area of academic discourse and research in several disciplines in the humanities with international character. In this discourse the argument that the military organizations were primarily the servants of the state became popular such that the growing concerns about increasing militarization of the society generated greater interest in examining and re-examining the link between military organizations and the civil society. This has led to a number of theoretical debates ranging from institutional, convergence to concordance.

Therefore, this paper is an attempt to underscore the significance of improved CMR for effective maritime security in Nigeria’s maritime domain in particular and the Gulf of Guinea in general with specific attention on the role of the Nigerian Navy (NN). It undertakes a review of the traditional theories of CMR with special emphasis on the civil-military culture gap debate. The gap debate is then connected to a bi-concept of ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ of CMR as a theoretical framework for this study.

### **Conceptual and Theoretical Review**

In this part we conceptualize civil-military relations, maritime domain, maritime security, and two but not limited to other theoretical concepts of ‘deepening and widening’ in the context they are used in this study.

#### **Civil-Military Relations (CMR)**

The phrase ‘civil–military relations’ generally tries to bridge the relationship gap between civil society as a whole and the military establishments. It can be narrowed in another sense to mean the relationship between the civil organizations of a given society and its military authorities. The basic assumption of civil-military relations is that the military should submit itself to the control of civil authorities of the state. Also central to this civilian control of the military is the concern that the military should maintain its professionalism under civilian authorities. It is this professionalism that provides the impetus for a veritable military effectiveness in the circumstances of civilian control of the military. The problem that arises, however, is that if the professionals hold the guns, how can this control be established and maintained? It is, therefore, this normative problem that scholars of civil-military relations try address.

The increased wave of military coups d’état in the Third World and more particularly in Africa between 1960s and 1970s led to more interest in military studies and a paradigm shift in line with the parameters set by Schiff (1996) which gained acceptance in military studies discourse. This made CMR studies to gain acceptance in conceptualization to cover the interactive process between three mutually reinforcing interfaces:

The first, is the interaction between the governmental institutions and the military; the second is the interaction between the civil society and the military; and third is the interaction between the civil society and the institutions in relation to the control of the military (Onuoha and Okafor, 2019:15).

Accordingly, these mutual interactions between the three elements of CMR are vital to a state polity as far as security issues are concerned. The institutions of the state such as the executive, legislature and the judiciary are expected to provide the required legislation, favorable policies, adequate resources, oversight and support necessary to sustain a professional force. The military on its part will be able to defend and protect the citizens and institutions of the state against external and internal threats. Although the civil society operates independently from the two, it collaborates with the national and international institutions to ensure that the military performs its responsibility in a professional and accountable manner (Onuoha and Okafor, 2019). This is the context in which CMR is used in this study.

### **Maritime Security**

Maritime security can hardly be defined in a simple or single sentence simply because what may constitute maritime threat in one place may be different in another. Paradoxically, maritime criminals operate differently in different parts of the world and this has a trickle-down effect on the legitimate economy. Such variation determines both policy strategy and responses. Neethling (2014), referred to maritime security as:

the freedom from or absence of those acts which could negatively impact on the national integrity and resilience of any navigable waterway, or which undermine the safety of persons, infrastructure, cargo, vessels and other conveyance legitimately existing in, conducting lawful transactions on or transiting through territorial and international water ways.

This definition implies an unhindered access for trade and safe navigation of people, cargo, vessels and other conveyances as part of maritime security.

This study conceives maritime security in its generic form from two or a number of perspectives. The first is that it is concerned with traditional naval security along international water ways in terms of

navigation, transport and communication. This interfaces with the maintenance of international peace and security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence in respect of the sea areas of a coastal state or maritime domain. It also covers security from all crimes at sea including the safety of seafarers and fishing activities. Thus, the peaceful use or freedom to conduct any type of lawful activities in the sea may mean the absence of violent and destructive relationship between people and the oceans.

The second component of maritime security has to do with the larger part of environmental security and the contestation over ocean resources vis-à-vis the ecological fall out they produce. This is considered from the point of safety, security and freedom from the threat to human activities in the marine environment. Thus:

... the spate of human violence and abuse as result of unsustainable use and illegal activities in the oceans have resulted in wanton destruction of the living creatures and biomass of the sea, leading to unbalanced relationship between man and the oceans. This unbalanced relationship is central to maritime security. Maritime insecurity in this regard is connected to the triple threat of global warming, loss of marine biodiversity and pollution (Tagowa and Nwanebo, 2022).

It has been emphasized that maritime insecurity has negative impacts on economic development of coastal states of Africa. Therefore, an unsecured maritime domain denies a coastal state of the benefits of its exclusive economic zone, including fishing and off-shore resource exploitation. This can only be realized if there is an effective maritime security regime. That is why the Brenthrust Discussion Paper 2010/03 defined maritime security in the African context to cover “anything that creates sustains or improves the secure use of Africa’s waterways and the infrastructure that supports these waterways”.

In this sense maritime security covers any measures employed to make the maritime space or maritime domain safe. The Brenthurst Paper thus provides an explanation as to what constitutes the maritime space: such as rivers, dams, lakes as well as the seas off the coast of Africa. Such definition suggests the incorporation of national security into the protection of the territorial waters to checkmate not only crime but also the protection of associated infrastructures, and thus ensures national territorial sovereignty.

### **Maritime Domain**

Maritime Domain is term used to describe all areas and things around the maritime space and covers all issues and matters related to the sea, ocean and other navigable ways. These include the surface, underwater and coastal area activities such as movement of people, cargo vessels and other conveyances in the maritime environment. In contemporary maritime security literature maritime domain cannot not defined in isolation from the term “Maritime Domain Awareness,” another term defined by International Maritime Organization (IMO) as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain that could impact on the security, safety, economy, or environment.” Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is fundamental to and “key enabler” of maritime security issues, especially in relation to all activities taken to prevent or minimize insecurity in the maritime environment.

Coastal states usually gather information about the marine environment, including intelligence necessary for various security missions or on enemy navies, if their MDAs are high or if they are not “sea blind.” The function of MDA is to gather information, fuse it together and analyze the data in order to identify trends and patterns that breed insecurity as well as provide useful information for law enforcement, ocean governance and capacity building. Therefore, MDA does not only aim at detecting threats to maritime

security but also comes up with resolutions and strategies that help decision-makers to address different threats and ensure that international laws are kept to ensure freedom of navigation. As the interests and activities taking place in the maritime environment are extensive and multiple in character CMD provide a galvanizing force for MDA for promotion of maritime security.

### **‘Deepening’ and ‘Widening’**

For the purpose of this study ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ are as a bi-concept which superimposed each other. However, for the sake of clarity the two concepts are conceptualized separately before their theoretical relationship are explained. In the ordinary dictionary meaning, ‘deepening’ is to “increase”, “grow”, “intensify”, “grow”, “escalate”, etc. The term is, therefore, used here as an integration term to refer to an enlargement of relationship through legal expansion of institutions for greater linkages. Gaby and Hofmann (2009: 2) define deepening as a “gradual and formal process of vertical institutionalization” or in neo-functional terms, as a rise in the scope and level of ... integration in terms institution-building, democratic and legitimacy and ...policies affecting both polity and politics”. In another sense, deepening may be understood as the vertical integration in the form of transfer of competences and shift of decision-making power.

On the other hand, the ordinary meaning of widening is to increase the width, scope or extent of something. But in the context used here it is referred to “as a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization... or as a process of geographical spill-over” (Bonvicini and Comelli, 2009: 6). While deepening refers to vertical institutionalization, widening has to do with horizontal institutionalization. It should therefore be understood that deepening could be formal or informal. Formal deepening may be in the form of enactment of new laws to deepen the scope of deepening while informal

deepening is the pragmatic and ad-hoc mechanisms put in place to increase the depth. Widening too will involve enlargement through exploring new areas of cooperation and integration of policies and institutions.

In order not to confuse deepening and widening as the terms can be independently or separately used in a variety of policy issues, it is necessary to introduce an additional concept: 'broadening' in order to bridge the conceptual gap between deepening and widening. The concept broadening is

"essentially referring to an extension of scope of policies linked to the creation of new and informal instruments intended to manage them, would not necessarily lead towards formal 'deepening' in the strict sense. The concept of broadening is particularly useful in accounting for analyzing the effects of enlargement on ... security policy, and for this reason it has played an important role in research work.... (EU-Consent, 2019:4)

In addition, the concept is used in a variety of disciplines including defense and foreign policy, economics, law, etc. and it is found useful in complementing our theoretical concepts of deepening and widening in theorizing CMR in general and in reference to the role of Nigerian Navy (NN) and maritime security in particular.

### Theoretical Review

The debate on civil-military relations as a special area of study was first popularized by a three-track debate that was heightened by Samuel Huntington's *Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics and Civil Relations* (1957), Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960) and Morris Finer's *The Man on the Horse Back: the role of the Military in Politics* (1962). This wave of debates started in the United States beginning from the start of the Cold War in 1945 and ended in 1973. The second period began from 1973 and continued until the end of the Cold War, while the third period was from the end of the Cold War up to present.

Despite the variegated theories, analysts and researches, there are still concerns about the existence of "civil-military culture gap." The debate then was focused on how best can the military coexist without posing danger to liberal democracy considering the general believe that the military organizations were two distinct worlds that were fundamentally different from one another. Huntington (1957) in particular, contrasted the military officer corps to that of civilian authority in terms of attitudes and values: military as "mostly conservative" and civilians as mostly liberal" (1957). His argument was given that each of the institutions were separate and different (conservatism versus liberalism), it was necessary to find a way of ensuring that the liberal world maintained its dominance over the military. Huntington thus introduced the idea of military professionalism with a decision-making authority in the military apparatus. Once the civil authority recognized the institutional values such as structural organization, discipline, order and self-sacrifice, the military officers will be willing to submit itself to the civil authority.

Although Huntington anticipated a "control dilemma" he, however, advocated an "objective civilian control" as against a "subjective control," arguing that "the more 'objective civilian control,' the more the military security" (Huntington 1957). According to this perspective, "civilian control is ...the independent variable for the subsequent dependent variable of military effectiveness." As civilian control becomes a critical variable for effectiveness, it raises the question of how the control can then be exercised. To address the problem Huntington identified two imperatives for civilian control, the functional and societal, which depict the ideological and structural components of the society. The ideological and structural components are also embroiled into the societal orientations such as the legal and constitutional frameworks that guide the political and civil-military affairs of the society.

Janowitz (1960) joined the theoretical debate by agreeing with Huntington that the civilian and military worlds were separate. He, however, differed in the aspect of finding the ideal solution to the problem by arguing that since the military was fundamentally conservative, it was likely to resist changes. Janowitz thus amended Huntington's position by introducing the convergence theory. This theory posits that the society is dynamic and change is inherent in every society, whether military or civilian. The solution therefore lies in either the "civilianization of the military or militarization of the society" (Janowitz in (Omoigui, 2018). Civilianization or militarization helps to ensure that the military acquired the norms and expectations of the civil society that created it. In this way the civilian elites will have to closely interact with the military authorities in order to make sure that the military not only acquired a higher standard of professionalism but also get "attuned to the ideals and norms of civilian society" (Omoigui, 2018:4).

Joining the theoretical debate were Moskos (1977) and Summers (1984) who complemented Huntington and Janowitz with other perspectives, the institutional/ occupational and agency theories. These neo-Huntington/Janowitz institutionalist/ occupationalist ideas which were otherwise termed the Postmodern Military Model (PMM) argue that in modern times the military was moving away from institutional model to a more or less occupational character. According this perspective, "an institutional model presents the military as an organization highly divergent from civilian society while an occupational model presents the military more convergent with civilian structures" (Omoigui 2018: 6). According to Omoigui (2018), while the Moskos hypothesis did not oppose the view that the military was a separate institution or entirely attuned to civil society, the use of a measurement instrument may help to understand the dynamics and the interface between the military and the civil society.

Summers (1984) simply asserted the supremacy of the military in war affairs

('masters of the profession of arms') and reinforced Huntington's argument for strengthening military professionalism in his agency theory. This assertion was based on the contention that an arrangement in which civilian political class provided objective control to the military and then step back to leave the military perform its tasks as suggested by Huntington may be effective but: the most dangerous arrangement was one: whereby civilian leaders intruded extensively in the military world, creating a situation whereby the military leadership was not politically neutral and security of the nation was thus threatened both by an ineffective military by provoking the military to avoid taking orders. ((Omoigui 2018: 8)

Contributing to this debate Feaver (1996) used the microeconomics analysis by introducing the "principal-agent" framework in which he explored how actors in superior positions impact on subordinates. Feaver also used the concepts of "working" and "shirking" in which he explained that the agent, which is the military was supposed to work or shirk. Work is to carry out the designated task and shirk is to evade the principal's interest for the military's selfish interest. Feaver likened shirking to foot-dragging, leaks to press and the worse state as "disobedience." Thus, Feaver's "principal-agent" analysis was intended to profoundly reduce the cost of monitoring the gap between what the civilians want the military to do and the what military would prefer to do.

As the civil-military debate continued to popularize the separateness of civilian and military worlds, both physically and ideologically, Schiff (1996) offered an alternative theory known as the Concordance Theory. This theory was introduced when most newly independent nations began to witness military take-overs at the peak of the Cold War. The most important question to answer in the debate at that time was how to determine the conditions under which the

military was to intervene in the politics of a nation. More so, the theory of separateness of the civilian and military worlds only held sway in the advanced democracies and especially in the United States civilian-military relations. Schiff's Concordance Theory was also explained from institutional and cultural perspectives.

Although the theory did not hold strongly that the civilian and military worlds are not separate, the theory contends that such a condition hardly exists. The theory therefore identified four societal institutions that matter in civil-military relations. These institutions are i) the social composition of the officer corps, ii) the political decision-making process, iii) the method of recruiting military personnel, and iv) the style of the military (Schiff, 1996). In her book, *The Military and Domestic Politics* (1996), Schiff argued that if there are agreements on the four parameters and the four indicators, military intervention in domestic politics was not likely to be possible in any nation.

As noted earlier, surrounding these debates and theories, there is a culture gap between the civilian and the military establishments. This culture gap can be operationalized into two notions of cultural gap and connectivity: cultural gap connotes the differences in the culture, norms and values of the civilian and military worlds, while the connectivity gap has to do with the understanding between the civilians and the military. To narrow this gap, we need to theorize along the theoretical concept of "deepening and widening" in order to reduce the gap between the political elites, the military and the citizenry to enhance CMR for effective security.

The idea of deepening and widening as a theoretical discourse and as defined was borrowed from the EU-Consent in its Work Package where the desire for "wider Europe and deeper integration" was theorized (EU-Consent, 2005). The Network of Excellence of the EU-Consent thus established that the

theory of deepening and widening can be used as a framework of analysis in number of policy areas such as economics, social, military or foreign policy in relation to integration, especially where clear gaps were established (Umbach and Hofmann, 2009).

Empirically, therefore, it can be understood that a deepening, widening or broadened integration provide a linkage between constant development with a regular strength, intensity and direction which takes place incrementally and in a path-dependent way. Umbach and Hofmann (2009: 8) capture a "step-by-step progress" in all fields, with an enlargement in deepening and widening that lessens disparities that must be controlled to strengthen institutions and enhance solidarity between actors. The greatest advantage of this theory is that there is a two-way mutual interrelationship between deepening and widening. In other words, areas of deepening can impact on widening and as well areas of widening can impact on deepening in broadened circumstances. That is why the two concepts must be treated as a coin with two sides.

### **Research Methodology**

The paper used qualitative content analysis where aggregate data was collected from books, internet materials and interviews. We also used information on NN strategic documents and transformation plans, reports, speeches, and newspaper reports. The NN CMR unit was also useful in making certain information available in its website including doctrinal plans and external linkages. A combination of all these provided the data for the content analysis.

### **Nigeria's Maritime Domain and Security Challenges**

It is important to highlight Nigeria's Maritime Domain and the maritime security challenges of the country's ocean space. Nigeria is centrally and strategically located on the Gulf of Guinea, that part of the Atlantic

Ocean indenting the West Coast of Africa between Cape Palmas in Liberia and Cape Lepez in Gabon. A coastline of 420 nautical miles provides Nigeria with a claim of political and economic jurisdiction over sea area of 4,980 square nautical miles as far as the provisions of the law of the sea (UNCLOS III) are concerned. When viewed superficially the area can be extended to about 84,000 square nautical miles or 210,900km<sup>2</sup> in terms of functional jurisdiction in respect of the doctrines of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf (CF) under which the country claims additional area of sea for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of the resources of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine area of the zones (Ibas, 2019). This sea expanse of the maritime domain has more than 3,000 creeks making Nigerian Navy's operation more complex in terms of both blue and brown water-laden.

In addition, Nigeria is separated from Equatorial Guinea by a 55-nautical-mile (100 kilometres) sea distance, presupposing that the delimitation of both EEZ and CS will apply in the territorial seas of both countries. There are no records to show the extent of the CS of Fernando Po, Nigeria's CS along the Calabar River (the closest part of Nigeria's territory to Fernando Po) is 40 nautical miles towards the sea. Generally, Nigeria's CS ranges from 26 kilometres off Lagos to 56 kilometres off Cape Formosa and increases to about 64 kilometres off Calabar (Davies, 1984).

Therefore, its limit of 40 nautical miles towards Fernando Po appears very close to the territorial sea of Equatorial Guinea and much within her contiguous zone. The same goes with the issue of overlapping claims of EEZ where each country is entitled to claim. If we consider the fact that Equatorial Guinea is divided into two portions (mainland and island) which are separated at the nearest point of a 90 - nautical-mile sea distance, the claims of both countries definitely overlap. According to Article 46 of UNCLOS III, the two portions are not only entitled to territorial seas

but also to other zones. This means that the territorial sea of Equatorial Guinea, putting the two portions (mainland and island) together, will extend 90 nautical miles seaward in the Gulf of Guinea more than if the mainland alone were to claim a similar territorial sea. Secondly, an appropriate limit of Nigeria's EEZ and CS will pass mid-way between the two islands of Sao Tome and Principe (which form an independent state and separated by a sea distance of 120 nautical miles from the west coast of Rio Muni, mainland Equatorial Guinea), thus creating another overlapping claim. Presently, there is a Joint Management Zone (JMZ) agreement between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea to engage in joint exploration of oil.

This maritime domain faces a number of security challenges. These range from the complications of the area described above, economic, political, legal and environmental (Chatham House, 2013). It is therefore not unthinkable that the area covers an expanse of water, stretching almost 6,000km from Senegal to Angola, with weak surveillance and uncoordinated security patrols. It is believed that the area has a concentration of land security for over a long period of time leaving the maritime domain almost unpatrolled. Economic wise the area has been a home for incessant armed robbery at sea, piracy, theft of hydrocarbon resources on the high seas/illegal bunkering; pipeline vandalism; illegal, trafficking in arms, drugs and persons; and illegal unreported and unregulated fishing in the waters.

On the political scene, Nigeria's Maritime Domain has been a breeding ground for youth restiveness with devastating effects on the home governments of dissidents. Moreover, there has been massive challenge of poverty among the host communities of the rich natural resources of the region. There are also issues of environmental pollution from exploitation and exploration activities and accidental oil spills and illegal refineries. From the legal point of consideration, the unclear



definitions of piracy and armed robbery at sea in addition to the inadequate legal framework for prosecution of maritime criminals when they are intercepted. The above security challenges require improved Maritime Domain Awareness through a vibrant neighborhood policy. This can only be catapulted in an atmosphere of deepened and widened CMR.

### **Maritime Security Culture and the Neighborhood Policy**

Nigeria's maritime security culture is the totality of perceptions, practices and actions taken to maximize safety of operations in the maritime environment. A recurrent feature of the African Maritime Domain environment is the inability of the states and the stakeholders to prevent, respond to, or even effectively monitor and track criminal activities such as piracy, illegal fishing leaving their maritime areas largely ungoverned (Walker, 2014). The Nigerian maritime situation is therefore no exception. Indeed, Nigeria's maritime environment is an area of extensive use as the country relies on import-export trade with 90 percent of the volume of trade maritime being related. In addition, the Maritime Domain houses oil and gas installations which have consistently been under threat by maritime criminals such pirates, sea robbery, illegal bunkering, militancy, hostage taking and other vices that cause the country billions of dollars. Land-based factors such as seeming governance deficits generated an army general poverty, unemployment and unemployable youths; both inter-state and political disputes; corruption and weak governance worsened the insecurity in Nigerian waters. Unemployment in the coastal areas made maritime crimes realistically attractive. The overgrown armies of jobless youths in the Niger Delta easily make them easy prey for recruitment for violent conflicts and maritime criminality.

This has garnered government attention leading to the deployment of multiple security agencies in the maritime areas. The over-deployment multiple security agencies created what Steffen (2014) describes as "use and abuse" as security personnel not only engage

in inter-service clashes but got uncomfortable with the presence and proliferation of private maritime security companies (PMSCs) which were established to plug the maritime security gap. The recent Tompolo Pipeline Security Guard contract is good example of the employment of private security organizations into what some people might consider as military responsibilities.

Nigeria operates a policy of good neighborliness since independence and the maritime sector cannot be different. More so, the irregular nature of the coastal zone of the Gulf of Guinea dictates that neighboring maritime states must mutually cooperate. For example, it is important to understand that Nigeria is separated from Equatorial Guinea by a 55-nautical-mile (100 kilometres) sea distance as noted earlier. This presupposes that the delimitation of both countries' EEZ and CS will apply in the territorial seas and Nigeria's CS along the Calabar River, the closest part of Nigeria's territory sea Equatorial Guinea is 40 nautical miles towards the sea. In fact, Nigeria's CS ranges from 26, 56 and 64 kilometres which bring its limit of 40 nautical miles towards towards the territorial sea of Equatorial Guinea and that country's contiguous zone (Tagowa, 2018).

The same goes with the issue of overlapping claims of EEZ which each country is entitled to considering the fact that Equatorial Guinea is divided into two portions (mainland and island) which are separated at the nearest point of a 90 - nautical-mile sea distance. This creates another overlapping claim. With these possibilities of overlapping claims, Nigeria's maritime security neighborhood policy must of necessity open up to her maritime neighbors. This explains why there is a Joint Management Zone (JMZ) and exploration agreement with some of her neighbors. There are other maritime issues between Nigeria and some of her maritime neighbors, such as Malabo, Sao Tome and Principe and Cameroun, most especially after the ICJ judgment on Bakassi Peninsular in 2002. Other maritime concerns

that require cooperation with maritime neighbors cover transport and communication, military and strategic interests, marine scientific research and transfer of technology, hydrographical survey and nautical charting, marine environment protection and preservation. All these require effective collaboration under a good neighborhood policy and this imposed external dimensions on Nigeria's maritime security concerns.

### **External Dimensions of Nigeria's Maritime Security**

The external dimensions of Nigeria's maritime security can be understood from three broad perspectives. First, is the guide provided by the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), second, is Nigeria's maritime neighborhood policy, and the third is the foreign power interest in Nigerian waters and the Gulf of Guinea. The Law of the Sea provides guidelines on adjacent and opposite coastal states' boundary delimitations, especially with respect to overlapping or opposite claims and also the sharing of excess or trans-boundary maritime resources. For this reason, Nigeria's maritime security policy must have due regards to its maritime neighbors as the law of the sea itself has a neighborhood content.

At the West and Central Africa Level, the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) was the oldest maritime institution established to "serve the regional international community for handling all maritime matters that are of regional character" (AMSSA, 2008). Although MOWCA appears more like a West and Central Africa shipping and port management association outfit than maritime security architecture, it has issued a memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a sub-regional integrated coast Guard network for the two sub-regions it covers, especially as the guard system is intended to address the challenges of piracy. Besides, MOWCA's MoU intended to establish national Maritime Rescue coordinating centers (MRCC) for maritime safety and rescue with

the four zones, the Yaoundé regional submit of 2013 expanded the zones to six.

At the ECOWAS level, the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Safety (EIMS) is another maritime security integrated outfit that followed the AU's 2050 AIM strategy. AIMS target the economic opportunities in the Maritime Domain, including internal water ways and lakes, and addressing land-based reasons for maritime insecurity. The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) was created in 1999 with the aim of harmonizing policies on the management of oil and natural resources to avoid conflict of interest in exploration of activities. Indeed, the interest of MOWCA and GGC have so far become interwoven as combating piracy and other matters of maritime security have become their collective focus.

The Yaoundé Summit on inter-regional cooperation of 2013 discussed the regional maritime arrangement of the ECCA established in 2009. The discussion developed and adopted a maritime security strategy based on six principles. These include: information management; community surveillance through the detection and sharing of assets; legal and functional harmonization of states' action at sea; self-financing through communities; logistics; and institutionalization of maritime conference for central Africa (UN 2012). The ECCA strategy created three maritime security operational zones, named A, B and C, each with an Operational Centre. After the Yaoundé submit in 2013, ECOWAS decided to copy the approach and established similar structures with its own maritime security zones: E, F and G with a pilot project under an Operational Centre in Cotonou (Zone E) to cover the waters of Nigeria, Togo and Benin. It is expected that if this initiative works, ECOWAS may contain the spread of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Other institutional arrangements with Maritime security relevance are the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre of the Gulf of Guinea (MTISC-GOG). Located in Accra (Ghana) the Centre was initiated in 2014. MTISC-GOG develops, maintains and shares details of

information on the maritime domain, especially on piracy and armed robbery at sea and other related maritime security issues.

From a continental point of view, it needs mention that Nigeria's Maritime Domain and the Gulf of Guinea is a microcosm of external interests ranging from West and Central Africa to continental and extra-continental powers. At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has already adopted a maritime security policy in 2014 due to converging interests. This policy was tagged Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (2050 AIM) with a Plan of Action for Operationalization (PoA). The 2050 AIM is an ambitious document that aimed at addressing various security challenges such as IUU fishing, smuggling and terrorism in the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2015).

At the extra-continental level, the Group 7 and other countries outside Africa engaged the West and Central African States to form an organization known as G7 Friends Plus of Gulf of Guinea (G7++FOGG). The Group is composed of Germany, Canada, the United States, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Brazil (observer), South Korea, Denmark, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, the European Union, UNODC and INTERPOL. The focus of this Group is to improve maritime security with regards to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Although the main focus of G7++FOGG is piracy, it has, in the past, engaged oil and shipping industry to alongside ECCAS and ECOWAS, leading to the creation of working groups that coordinated different maritime capacity initiatives between donors and states in West Africa (Ukeje and Mvomo Ela: 2013; Jacobsen and Nordby, 2015). This has placed the Nigerian Navy on a higher platform of linkages not only in the maritime security neighborhood but also continental and extra-continental.

### **Nigerian Navy and Maritime Security in Nigeria's Maritime Domain**

The Nigerian Navy (NN) is one of the branches of the Nigerian Armed Forces and

also one of the largest navies on the African continent, consisting of about 6000 thousand personnel. The Nigerian Navy dated to 1914 as the Nigerian Marine Department was formally reconstituted into the Colony of Nigeria Naval Defence Force as a wing of the Royal Nigerian Navy in 1958. At independence in 1960 and Republic in 1963 the 1964 Navy Act assigned to the NN the tasks of defending territorial waters, naval training duties, conduct of hydrographic surveys, assisting in the enforcement of customs laws, as well as performing other missions assigned by the government.

From the 1980s the task of the NN expanded to include defense against seaborne attack, protection of international shipping, offshore oil and sea installations, and particularly prevention or prosecution of illegal bunkering and lifting of petroleum (file:///G:/Nigerian%20Navy%20%20Wikipedi a.html). Since then, the NN has been undergoing structural and administrative reforms and transformations to improve its operational efficiency. In 1993 the Armed Forces Decree No 105 (now the Armed Forces Act) was incorporated to the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which clearly redefined the military and constabulary roles of the NN especially in the oil and gas sectors and other insecurity challenges in the Maritime Domain.

In recent years, the term "transformation" has become an establishment name especially with the promulgation of the Nigerian Navy Transformation Plan (NNTP) 2011-2020 in 2011. This plan brought all aspects of NN strategic development aspirations into a single document with the hope of making all stakeholders aware of their roles in maritime security. Accordingly, the NNTP 2011-2020 was revised in Aug 14 and re-named 'Revised Nigerian Navy Transformation Plan (R-NNTP) 2011-2020', to achieve and sustain effective NN capacity to carry out her statutory roles:

The R-NNTP 2011-2020 defines appropriate strategic objectives, milestones and requisite

activities along identified Lines of Development (LODs), which are the pillars of the NNTP. These are Concept and Organization, Fleet Renewal, Infrastructure and Logistics. Others are Human Resources Management (HRM) and Administration, Training and Doctrine, ICT as well as Inter-Agency and Sub-Regional Cooperation. ... To drive this process, the Nigerian Navy Transformation Office (NNTO) was established in Dec 10 and tasked to develop and coordinate all aspects of NN transformation activities. After 4 years of implementing the NNTP and cognizant of changes in the strategic environment, the NN considered it incumbent to strengthen the structures for the attainment of NN transformation objectives. Accordingly, the NNTO was upgraded to a branch and renamed Nigerian Navy Transformation Branch (NNTB) in Mar 15 (NN).

The transformation process was further deepened and widened by the creation the Department of CMR by Order 0917 of 2017. The NN CMR trickles down to all commands with officers at all levels. The Civil-Military Relations Officers (CMROs) perform a number of functions including:

- i) interaction with the civil society and civil organizations;
- ii) providing training for naval personnel/CMR cooperation courses in naval training schools;
- iii) participation in United Nations offices for Coordination of Civil-Military Relations (UNOCHA); undertaking periodic interface/experience sharing/creating awareness and capacity building platforms for naval CMROs; providing medical outreaches; and facilitating better interactions by providing certain Naval facilities available to the civil population (Olofin, 2019)

### **Deepening and Widening Civil-Military Relations for Effective Maritime Security**

It must be pointed out that the promotion of peace, security and stability is the hall mark of a robust CMR in a state. When deepened and widened or broadened, CMR will achieve the desired objectives. Thus, the greatest advantage

of the theory of deepening and widening is that it makes CMR to strike a balance between value-driven policy and internal security. Put in another way it drives closer cooperation between maritime neighbors and continental and extra-continental powers leading to intensive closer cooperation through institutionalized agreements.

These two processes (which must be taken as a whole) are respectively called “gradual formal vertical institutionalization” and “gradual informal institutionalization.” While the formal institutionalization leads to building of democratic legitimacy internally, the informal institutionalization leads to continental and extra-continental linkages to satisfy the external dimension of maritime security. At times CMR do capitalize on treaty-based and non-treaty reforms. The agreements leading to joint management or joint exploration zones with Nigeria’s maritime neighbors can be further leveraged upon by the NN to strengthen CMR. This then implies an extensive expansion of the scope in the management of CMR. CMR is thus broadened in a number of ways such as increase in resources for security policy implementation, enlargement of historical and cultural affinities and pragmatic approach to specific security issues ((Bonvicini and Comelli, 2009).

More empirical evidences abound in explaining the NN’s CMR. First it can be empirically explained in line with the NN transformation programme which started in 2011. The transformation package has broadened CMR and contains a process of deepening and widening. From 2011 the term “transformation” became an establishment name in the NN, especially after the promulgation of the Nigerian Navy Transformation Plan (NNTP) 2011-2020. This has propelled the deepening and widening process of the NN CMR for more effective maritime security. This Plan which “brought all aspects of NN strategic development aspirations into a single document” with the hope of making all stakeholders aware of their roles in maritime security (NN, 2019). The high point of the transformation process was the establishment

of the Department of Civil-Military Relations (DCMR) through Order 0917 of 2017. The Order trickles down NN CMR to all commands with Civil-Military Relations Officers (CMROs) at all levels.

The CMROs perform a number of functions including: i) interaction with the civil society and civil organizations; ii) providing training for naval personnel/CMR cooperation courses in naval training schools; iii) participation in United Nations offices for Coordination of Civil-Military Relations (UNOCHA); undertaking periodic interface/experiencesharing/creating awareness and capacity building platforms for naval CMROs; and iv) providing medical outreaches; and facilitating better interactions by providing certain Naval facilities available to the civil population (Olofin, 2019). This aspect of transformation laid the foundation for the deepening and widening of CMR in Nigeria which can be understood as the increased interaction between the core stakeholders, that is, military, institutions and the civil society. This explains some of the policy thrusts of the NN since 2011 which adopted the policy of “taking the Navy to the people.”

From time to time the Naval Staff Annual Conference (CONSAC) has been rotated across the country to cultivate peoples’ understanding of the NN. The CONSAC was designed for senior and middle level officers to brainstorm, make policy input and showcase or open up the NN to the people in localities across the country. Indeed, the act of taking the sea power campaign to the people in the furthest parts of the country is an essential element of making the civil population to understand the link between land power and "critical dependence" on sea power. This is part of the deepening and widening of CMR that expands or broadens the appreciation of the sea power following the saying in naval cycles that a wise Admiral, will, always, “market the Navy to the people, then to the parliament and then to the President.” (Oladimeji, 2008).

In 2018 the NN participated in United States-initiated military exercise along with 24

other African navies. The exercise was designed “to boost capacity of West and Central African nations’ navies in tackling vessel hijack and hostage taking at sea” (Adeolu, 2018). Eleven of the navies were from Europe and North America including the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Germany, Portugal France, the Netherland and the United States. Some ECOWAS, Economic Community of Central African States (ECAS) and non-military institutions who also participated in the exercise were NIMASA, Federal Department of Fisheries (FDF) and EFCC, among others. The exercise stretched from Angola through Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Nigeria before it ended at Cote D’Ivoire, Each country starved within her territorial Sea and EEZ. Most of the extra-continental nations that participated in that exercise were members of G7++FOGG.

Some institutions of government ranging from the principal ones such as the executive, legislature and judiciary as well ministries and extra-ministerial departments and agencies (MDAs) do interact with the NN on maritime security issues. Other relevant MDAs such as the Ministry of Defense, National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Customs and Immigration departments are critical to CMR in Nigeria. These institutions of government have responsibility to ensure the existence of a competent, accountable, representative and professional military. These institutions have the responsibility and state interest to work together with the NN to check abuses in the maritime domain. They are also to provide legal and policy frameworks to guide the NN and promote awareness on maritime domain awareness, maritime defense and security. The effectiveness of these institutions will be the function of the level of institutionalization based on their degree of autonomy, adaptability, complexity and coherence (Huntington, 1968). In fact, when there is low

level of institutionalization, there is the tendency of the navy to be ineffective in its responsibility. Therefore, deepening and widening through formal vertical institutionalization will broaden and enhance CMR for improved maritime security.

The component of CMR in any society is the civil society which covers the entire private citizenry and other organized actors outside the realm of government or state. These include trade unions, paramilitary and private security agencies, the media, civil society organizations (CSOs), professional associations, faith-based groups, governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media organizations, community-based groups and private citizens. The civil society generally has a very powerful influence on CMR as it can engage the military in various ways to promote CMR. CSOs, in particular, can dialogue with the NN about public concerns on maritime security. Interaction with the civil society creates maritime domain awareness, and this provides informal institutionalization and broadening of CMR or otherwise the informal deepening and widening. The character of institutionalization in security matters is people-based approach to security and defense.

The NN had a number of engagements not only with the organized CSOs but also the national and international governmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and INGOs). Apart from individuals and groups that operate within the maritime domain, there are over 20 registered private maritime security companies (PMSCs) that operate in Nigeria's maritime domain. The operations of these PMSCs often generate conflicts with the safety and security guidelines of the NN. Unfortunately, however, the licensing and supervisory authority of the PMSC lies with the Nigerian Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), the NN had to sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) stipulating conditions under which private armed security may perform guard duties onboard merchant ships in Nigerian waters. Instances of failure to comply with the terms of the MoU and lack of collaboration with the NN serve little or no deterrence to maritime criminals thus posing greater risks for

ship operators (RIIS, 2015). Deepening and widening further relations NSCDC and PMSCs may create operational synergy and reduce risks.

On the international plane US Africa Command (AFRICOM) partners with the NN and other African navies in the areas of equipment and promotion of capacity building under two specific programmes. These programmes are the Africa Partnership Station (APS) and Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEM). APS is a specific maritime safety and security cooperation programme initiated by the US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF) based on bilateral and multilateral agreements. The programme is aimed at increasing maritime safety and security through the strengthening of "capabilities of partner naval forces through four pillars: (1) develop maritime domain awareness, maintaining a clear picture of the maritime environment; (2) build maritime professionals; (3) establish maritime infrastructure; (4) develop response capabilities while building regional integration" (Qstensen, et al, 2018: 5),

The AFICOM cooperation has a dual advantage in the deepening and widening CMR process. At the national level it brings the NN to work closely with other maritime security related agencies. These include the Nigerian Maritime Police (NMP) which has police jurisdiction in the territorial and inland water ways, ports and harbors, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), which is in charge of port security and flag administration and also functions like a coast guard Authority. Other Nigerian agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the Director of Public Prosecutions have specific maritime components. At the international level AFRICOM brings African nations and their institutions such as the African Union, and the African regional security organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECCAS and other extra-continental institutions such as the British High

Commission (BHC). Under APS Nigeria, among other African states, receive technical tools that enhance the NN to detect and monitor criminal activities assistance.

To assist the coastal nations of Africa, including Nigeria, APS provides technological tools to detect and monitor criminal activities at sea in addition to practical tactical and operational training through joint exercises, port visits, professional training and community outreach. As an operational part of APS, AMLEP targets enhanced law enforcement partner countries at the national level in the context of institutionalized legal practices. Under APS series of regional training programmes ashore and at sea which involved joint sea exercises, simulations and real world operations such as the Operation Obangame Express annual exercises with 20 other African partners (Qstensen, et al, 2018). Between 2010 and 2017 The NN has participated 8 of such exercises (see appendix I). These exercises have helped tremendously in the reduction of piracy incidents and other maritime criminalities.

Another international non-governmental organization (INGO), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), has been interested in organizing political dialogue on maritime security in Nigeria and Africa. FES has been engaging some key national and regional institutions to assist in strengthening intra-African exchange on maritime security through the creation of continental platforms for researchers, politicians, and security advisers. On a number of occasions, FES has gathered over 90 participants from the civil society organizations (CSOs), academia, security services, the armed forces (including the NN), the diplomatic corps and regional bodies to brainstorm on African approaches to maritime security with recommendations on how to improve safety and security in the maritime environment (FES, 2014).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This paper has tried to discuss the significance of improved civil-military relations in the promotion of maritime security. The basic assumption in the discourse is that strong CMR has direct link with successful military operations or that a weak CMR can hamper and or jeopardize military operations. The chapter reviewed the traditional theories of CMR the culture gap of the two worlds of civil and military is still an issue for more academic exposition. For this reason a bi-concept of deepening and widening was introduced as an additional theoretical framework for analysis which help us understand how the maritime domain and its security challenges, neighborliness, culture, external dimensions, etc. determine CMR for effective maritime security. As a maritime nation, Nigeria is strategically located in the GOG with circumscribed borders and strategic interest in the sea. This presupposes that maritime security challenges in its maritime domain and the entire GOG are serious matters of concern to the country.

The paper highlighted Nigeria's maritime security neighborhood policy which emphasized that Nigeria generally operates a good neighborhood policy which dictates that her CMR in respect of maritime security must take cognizance of the fact that there are problems of overlapping jurisdictional zones as well as joint management and exploration zones between the country and some of her maritime neighbors. Similarly, due the strategic significance of the GOG with heavy deposits of hydrocarbons and other marine resources, Nigeria's maritime domain and the GOG has both continental and extra-continental interests and even physical military presence. Therefore due to the external dimension of Nigeria's maritime domain NN's CMR must be fashioned to take advantage of such interest and military presence to enhanced maritime security.

The NN has a principal responsibility in Nigeria's maritime security and as well is a core institution for crafting and implementing CMR

within the bounds of the law of the sea for effective maritime security. There are, however, other governmental non-governmental institutions such as NMP, Nigerian Customs and Immigration, NSCDC and PMSCs which require enhanced CMR for synergy for effective maritime security. Preceding these highlights the paper considers the NN transformation policy as part of the strategies for deepening and widening of CMR for enhanced effective maritime security.

From this analysis the following conclusions become apparent. First, that from a maritime security perspective, CMR must not only be conceptualized beyond restriction to national institutions of civil-society and military authorities but must also be extended to neighborhood policy, continental and extra-continental institutions and agencies. This is because the degree of maritime insecurity in Nigeria's maritime domain and GOG indicated a security vacuum which must be filled if the maritime environment must be effectively protected. Secondly, the application of deepening and widening as a theoretical analysis will help us in in-depth understanding of the crafting and implementation of CMR. Thirdly, due to divergent interests in the maritime environment, securing the domain cannot be approached in a sectorial manner but in a holistic way taking into account the preamble of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which states that "the problems of ocean space are closely related and need to be taken as a whole." As the maritime sector is the lifeline of the country all sectors of governance and the economy are relevant in planning and implementation of CMR for improved maritime security.

Against this background it is therefore recommended that NN CMR activities should avoid compartmentalization and so must be integrative in nature. Secondly, CMR should be embedded into NN capacity building training programs on maritime security matters and CMR measures should become part and parcel of institution building and training and stakeholders should be drawn to joint

maritime domain awareness training. Since Nigeria's maritime domain and the GOG is very strategic because of its importance it will continue to attract extra-continental powers, NN should critically monitor partner and donor arrangements and supplies to avoid a disadvantaged position.

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**PART IX:**  
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND SECURITY

# 43

## RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY IN AFRICA

**Samson Adeniyi Aladejare**

**Magaji Ibrahim Yakubu**

Department of Economics

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

E-mail: [aladejare4reel2000@gmail.com](mailto:aladejare4reel2000@gmail.com), [ymagaji1976@gmail.com](mailto:ymagaji1976@gmail.com)



### Abstract

Since the last decade, ecological preservation has become a critically debated topic in developing and developed nations. Hence, to ensure environmental sustainability, countries and international bodies have canvassed for measures that support severe restrictions to protect the Earth's biodiversity. This study's objectives were two-fold: the sole effect of renewable energy on ecological sustainability and second, identify the impacts of external debt and financial globalisation in the renewable energy-ecological sustainability nexus, both within the Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC) framework for 44 African economies. Second-generation estimation techniques were employed and deduced inferences from the cross-sectional autoregressive distributed lag method used in the study. The study empirically demonstrated that renewable energy is insignificant for ecological sustainability without debt stock and financial globalisation. However, the inclusion of both variables revealed that while renewable energy and financial globalisation accelerated ecological sustainability, external debt worsened it in the short and long-term periods. Therefore, the study proposed amongst others that for the productive benefits of renewable energy use to human and environmental well-being, policymakers must execute clean energy portfolios by restricting brown energy use. This measure will require considering introducing a significant amount of carbon tax or emission permit and incentivising businesses to adopt green technologies.

**Keywords:** Globalisation, renewable energy, sustainability, debt, economic growth

### Introduction

The unprecedented rise in global energy demand has been generating critical concerns in recent decades due to its intense contribution to the context of global warming (Aladejare, 2022a; Aladejare, 2023a; Akram et al., 2022). For instance, in 1980, the energy consumption level was 7.323 terawatt-hours, but it moved to 25.343 terawatt-hours in 2021 (IRENA, 2022). Similarly, the average global temperature in 2021 alone was about  $1.11^{\circ}\text{C}$ , while the world temperature data from 2015 to 2021 consistently exceeded  $1^{\circ}\text{C}$ , rising beyond the pre-industrial levels (Aladejare, 2022a). A pointer is that the preference for energy by households and businesses has been the primary source of greenhouse gas (GHG)

emissions. 80% of today's fossil energy sources (oil, natural gas, and coal) are unsustainable but have powered economies for over 150 years (Ritchie et al., 2022). Thus, national governments and international organisations have continued to worry about managing the trend since nations can hardly develop without energy consumption. Energy is crucial in generating the needed activities that contribute to economic growth and development. Intuitively, economic activities in every country rely mainly on energy use, given its pivotal role in accelerating productivity, income generation, and employment. However, many extant studies concur that the environment responds positively or negatively to the economic growth-energy utilisation nexus (Usman et al., 2019; Sarkodie

and Strezov, 2019; Usman et al., 2020; Iorember et al., 2020; Aladejare, 2023a). Thus, nations face the dilemma of reducing energy utilisation intensity and reaping negative economic growth and development; or continuing the prevalence of unsustainable energy and exacerbating environmental atrophy.

Since energy utilisation is one significant factor responsible for economic growth and development, a smooth transition from unsustainable to environmental-friendly sources is needed. Hence, renewable energy sources have attracted the desired attention of many economies due to their cost-effective merit and role in mitigating climate change. Global interest in renewable energy sources, including wind, nuclear, hydrogen, and solar, are conscientious and emission-free (Samour and Adebayo, 2022; Aladejare, 2023b,c). In 2018 for instance, improved cleaner energy adoption aided the decline in ecological pollution by thwarting 215 million tons (Mt) of emissions globally (Adedoyin et al., 2021; Sadiq et al., 2022). Hence, economies are scaling-up their share of renewable energy adoption to enlarge their carbon-free and cost-effective energy supply. Other benefits include downgrading dependence on volatile imported fossil energy, cutting adverse effects of fossil energies, and accelerating the transition to efficient and clean energy. For instance, despite the vast potential of solar energy, only 5% of this potential is exploited globally (Fotio et al., 2022). However, it is pertinent to note that renewable energy transition alone cannot deliver environmental sustainability as other critical factors must be considered in the process.

As identified in recent studies, one measure for slowing down the rate of GHG emissions is to scale up investment in green economy and infrastructure (Shahnazi and Shabani, 2021; Mehmood, 2021; Yu et al., 2022; Fotio et al., 2022). Therefore, deploying public borrowing for green economic and infrastructural development can be tagged as borrowing for sustainability. Since the mid-1990s, foreign indebtedness has soared, and advanced

economies, followed by emerging countries, accounted for most of the significant growth in foreign debt (Akam et al., 2021; Ebi and Aladejare, 2022). Similarly, in recent times, developing countries have been accumulating external debt due to the substantial saving-investment gap in these countries (Sun and Liu, 2020; Aladejare, 2022c; Aladejare, 2023b,d). Nevertheless, external indebtedness is also critical in the campaign for environmental protection. In most energy-reliant nations, external debt contributes immensely to resource use (Sun and Liu, 2020). Also, investing foreign borrowing into heavy industry, real estate, and the construction sector can surge emissions and potentially trigger adverse ecological implications (Bese et al., 2022; Aladejare and Nyiputen, 2023).

Also, recent studies are beginning to stress the critical role of financial globalisation (FGB) in achieving environmental sustainability. For instance, countries may erect financial regulations and barriers on investment projects that will receive foreign collaboration and what regulations foreign investors will comply with while investing in foreign countries. Such enabling laws may hinder or promote the free flow of international funds and investment in ecologically sustainable projects. The last three decades have seen globalisation expand and result in financial development as an essential ingredient responsible for the economic progress of countries (Erdoğan et al., 2020; Kirikkaleli and Adebayo, 2021; Kihombo et al., 2022; Miao et al., 2022). Thus, African economies are urged to remove constraints to external financial portfolios and investment inflows due to the pressing need to tackle poverty and achieve rapid output growth. However, studies have shown that ecological sustainability does not always respond positively to foreign financial development. For instance, African economies' quest for external financial investment has made them vulnerable to all forms of foreign financial aid and investment that can be ecologically detrimental.

Therefore, this study's objectives are: first, determine the sole effect of renewable energy on ecological sustainability within the theoretical context of the Environmental Kuznet curve (EKC) premise. Second, given the EKC hypothesis, identify the impacts of external debt and FGB in the renewable energy-ecological sustainability nexus in Africa. This study dwelled on African countries for three principal grounds. First, the continent is a minor carbon emitter globally (Aladejare, 2022a; Aladejare and Nyiputen, 2023). However, Africa's emission growth rate has exceeded other regions, such as East and Central Europe (Fotio et al., 2022). It is not unlikely that the continent's GHG emissions could significantly outpace other regions in a few years due to the widespread usage of dirty energy across African countries (UN, 2021). For instance, Africa's energy demand grew from 91 to 163 terawatt-hours between 2010 and 2020, respectively; and is projected to reach 463 terawatt-hours by 2040 (IRENA, 2022). Second, globally, countries are fast upgrading to renewable energy sources to curtail GHG emissions, hence, the need to assess its ecological effect on the continent. Third, the post-2015 goal of the African Development Bank, among their development preferences, includes enhancing the quality of life, powering, and integrating Africa. By integration, the plan seeks to connect Africa through infrastructures and globalisation, which will aid in better access to broader markets. About 95% of renewable energy projects in the continent are funded through grants, while 3% and below 1% are with loans and private equity, respectively (Fotio et al., 2022). Given that grants are deployed for small-scale projects, the execution of energy projects on an enormous scale in highly impoverished economies such as Africa demands foreign financing through debt, foreign investments, development support, foreign organisations, or regional development Banks in public infrastructure accumulation.

There are four perspectives to which this study contributes to the literature. First, today's

primary policy focus of most countries reflects sustainable development. Thus, this study extends the literature by considering the role of renewable energy in ecological sustainability towards climate change mitigation. Of particular interest is the pace of renewable energy adoption in African countries characterised by energy grid systems that are some of the least efficient in the world (Asongu et al., 2019; Aladejare, 2020; Asongu and Odhiambo, 2021). Second, a substantial rise in external debt and its effect has attracted much concern from the empirical literature. Most empirical studies have linked external debt to economic growth and development, macroeconomic policies, energy issues, etc. (IMF, 2019; Chien et al., 2022; Azolibe, 2022; Aladejare, 2023b,d). However, limited studies have assessed the effect of external debt on ecological sustainability in emerging and developing economies. Interestingly, most such studies have focussed on CO<sub>2</sub> (carbon dioxide) emissions to proxy environmental sustainability (Akam et al., 2021; Bese and Friday, 2022; Sadiq et al., 2022). Thus, scant literature relates foreign borrowing to the ecological footprint (EFP), a more comprehensive measure of environmental sustainability. The only known study for Africa is Akam et al. (2022), which focussed on three countries (South Africa, Algeria, and Nigeria); thereby making it a less comprehensive African study.

Third, extant FGB literature on Africa has often adopted indicators such as foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and remittances (Asongu and De Moor, 2017; Asongu and Nnanna, 2020; van Treeck and Wacker, 2020; Holzl, 2021; Asongu and Nnanna, 2021). Consequently, this study leads by adopting the aggregate KOF FGB index for a comprehensive African analysis. Its adoption is because, aside from the poor state of inclusive development in Africa, factors such as climate change, ecological degradation, and exclusive growth are mainly linked to inadequate funding and poor financial development (Joshua and Alola, 2020; Asongu et al., 2020; Joshua et al., 2020, Nathaniel and Bekun, 2021). Hence, the FGB index provides a robust

measure. Furthermore, despite the documented substantial relevance of funding and financial development in enhancing ecological sustainability in extant studies, no consensus existed on how finance impacts environmental sustainability.

Fourth, the study relied on a dataset from 44 African countries sourced between 1990 and 2020; and second-generation panel unit root, cointegration, and estimation procedures are employed. The essence is controlling for the panel dataset's cross-sectional dependence, heterogeneity, and endogeneity. Specifically, the cross-sectional autoregressive distributed lag (CS-ARDL) model derived the study's inferences. There is no known study to have adopted this approach in a renewable energy-ecological sustainability nexus for Africa. Empirically, the study demonstrated that renewable energy does not impact ecological sustainability without external debt and FGB. However, the inclusion of both variables indicated that while renewable energy and FGB enhanced environmental sustainability, external debt degenerated environmental sustainability in the short and long-term periods.

The rest of the paper shows Section 2 contains the reviewed literature; Section 3, the study's data and methodology; Section 4, the study findings and discussion; Section 5, the conclusions and policy implications.

### **Renewable Energy-ecological Sustainability Nexus**

Ansari et al. (2021) revealed through the fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS), dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) and panel mean group (PMG) procedures that renewable energy reduces EFP in top renewable energy-consuming nations. Likewise, Yang et al. (2021) employed the augmented mean group (AMG) and common correlated effects mean group (CCEMG) techniques. They found that renewable energy consumption reduced EFP in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies. A study of 25 developing Asian countries conducted by Mohsin et al. (2021) applied the

Hausman-Taylor regression (HTR) and robust random effect (RE) procedures. Findings from the study indicate the positive impact of renewable energy use on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions decline. Qayyum et al. (2021) demonstrated, using autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) and vector error correction (VECM) models, that renewable energy consumption reduces CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in India. Chien et al. (2021) applied the method of moments quantile regression (MMQR) approach for a study on BRICS countries and concluded that renewable energy deteriorated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Also, Anwar et al. (2021) showed with the use of MMQR that renewable energy lowers CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in ASEAN countries.

Similarly, Miao et al. (2022) applied MMQR, FMOLS, DOLS, and fixed effects (FE) OLS methods for a study on newly industrialised countries (NICs). Findings from the research showed that renewable energy decelerates EFP. Suki et al. (2022) applied bootstrap ARDL and found the blessing effect of renewable energy on EFP for Malaysia. Chien (2022) further demonstrated using the MMQR technique that renewable energy consumption reduced CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in N-11 countries. Raihan and Tuspekova (2022) showed with the application of the ARDL, DOLS, FMOLS, and canonical cointegrating regression (CCR) that, renewable energy mitigates CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Peru. Aladejare and Salihu (2023) applied FMOLS, DOLS, Driscoll-Kraay (D-K), and MMQR procedures in their analyses. They demonstrated that while an increase in brown energy utilisation exhausted resource productivity, green energy utilisation enhanced it from the lower to the higher quantiles in 40 developing economies.

Furthermore, Khan et al. (2022) demonstrated with generalised least squares (GLS), and panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) models that renewable energy depreciates CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in BRICS countries. In contrast, Esquivias et al. (2022) revealed by applying the panel quantile regression that renewable energy raised CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for emerging Asian economies. Also, Kartal (2022) showed by applying multivariate adaptive

regression splines that renewable energy consumption was partially significant in mitigating CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the top-five carbon-emitting nations. Similarly, by using a two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) and Dumitrescu-Hurlin (D-H) causality techniques, Cakmak and Acar (2022) revealed that renewable energy has no significant effect on EFP in oil-producing countries (Nigeria, USA, China, Canada, Brazil, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Russia).

Also, Shayanmehr et al. (2023) revealed with the aid of MMQR, DOLS, FMOLS and GMM procedures that renewable energy is insignificant for EFP in countries with lower pollution. However, using bootstrap Fourier Granger causality in quantile analysis, Kartal et al. (2023) submitted that renewable energy consumption reduced CO<sub>2</sub>, EFP, and load capacity factor (LCF) for the USA. Also, Lee et al. (2023) applied the computable general equilibrium (CGE) technique and concluded that renewable energy is beneficial for decreasing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in China. Likewise, Ramzan et al. (2023) used non-parametric causality-in-quantiles algorithms approach to confirm the predictive power of renewable energy on EFP for the USA. Similarly, Bashir et al. (2023) employed CS-ARDL, FMOLS, AMG, and CCEMG approaches to confirm the EFP-reducing effect of renewable energy in top-10 manufacturing countries. Wang et al. (2023) further demonstrated with the system GMM and panel quantile approaches that renewable energy benefits EFP in G7 and E7 countries.

#### **Foreign debt-ecological sustainability nexus**

In their study of Turkey, Katircioglu and Clebi (2018) confirmed significant interaction between foreign debt stock and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Later, Akam et al. (2021) showed that foreign indebtedness aggravated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Likewise, Bese (2021a) affirmed with the ARDL technique that external debt exacerbated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in China. Also, Bese (2021b) confirmed the positive effect of foreign debt

stock on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in India. Wu et al. (2021) showed that green financing mitigated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in E7 and G7 economies. Sadiq et al. (2022) demonstrated using CS-ARDL, AMG, and CCEMG that foreign debt depreciated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in BRICS countries. Also, Batmunkh et al. (2022) revealed with the aid of FE, RE, and pooled effect models that debt stock promotes temperature changes in Central Asian countries. Likewise, Akam et al. (2022) used the AMG method and confirmed the CO<sub>2</sub>-emitting effect of external debt in South Africa and Algeria.

Also, Xu et al. (2022) applied the bootstrap ARDL and submitted that foreign debt is significant for enhancing Turkey's EFP quality. Samour and Adebayo (2022) demonstrated with the MMQR, CCEMG, and AMG methods that foreign debt worsened LCF in BRICS countries. In contrast, Bese and Friday (2022) adopted the ARDL method and confirmed the irrelevance of foreign debt for EFP in Turkey. However, using the FMOLS technique, Alhassan and Kwakwa (2022) proved a U-shaped impact of debt stock on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for Ghana. Ramzan et al. (2023) established the predictive power of external debt on EFP for the USA. The study by Farooq et al. (2023) confirmed the CO<sub>2</sub>-emitting effect of external debt in OIC countries. However, using AMG, FMOLS, and DOLS procedures, Zeraibi et al. (2023) affirmed that external debt reduces CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in emerging economies.

#### **Financial Globalisation-ecological Sustainability Nexus**

Ulucak et al. (2020) showed in their study that FGB mitigated EFP in emerging countries. Ahmad et al. (2021a,b) later documented the reducing effect of FGB on EFP in G7 nations. Conversely, Zia et al. (2021) showed with the dynamic simulated ARDL method that FGB worsened EFP for China. Similarly, Yang et al. (2021) revealed that financial development adversely impacted EFP in Gulf cooperation council (GCC) countries. Khan et al. (2022) further indicated that financial development



reduces CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in BRICS countries. Similarly, Sadiq et al. (2022) demonstrated that FGB worsened CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in BRICS countries. Miao et al. (2022) established that FGB enhanced EFP in NICs. Chishti and Sinha (2022) also showed that financial innovation reduces CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in BRICS countries.

Also, Adebayo (2022) confirmed using quantile-on-quantile regression that FGB diminishes CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in E7 economies. An enhancing effect of FGB on EFP was reported by Kihombo et al. (2022), who applied the continuously updated fully modified (CUP-FM) and continuously updated bias-corrected (CUP-BC) methods for West Asian and the Middle East (WAME) countries. In contrast, Akadiri et al. (2022) demonstrated that FGB increased LCF for India. Bashir et al. (2023) confirmed the depreciating effect of financial development on EFP in top-10 manufacturing countries. Wang et al. (2023) later demonstrated that FGB increases EFP in G7 and E7 countries. However, Ramzan et al. (2023) applied the time-varying rolling window method and confirmed the enhancing role of FGB for EFP in the United Kingdom. Also, Hasan and Du (2023) asserted that green financial development is essential in decelerating climate change per person in China. Similarly, Wu et al. (2023) applied the CS-ARDL technique and confirmed that financial development diminishes CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Nordic economies.

From the above review, there is evidence to support the beneficial effect of renewable energy, external debt, and FGB on environmental quality. However, some other studies have reported their harmful and no impact on ecological quality, thus, leaving room for a further probe of these associations. Also, studies that have examined any of the three relationships for African countries are scant, constituting an enormous gap in the literature. Furthermore, many of these studies relied on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to proxy ecological/environmental sustainability against the much more comprehensive EFP indicator. In

addition, none of the reviewed studies determined the contemporaneous role of foreign indebtedness and FGB in the renewable energy-ecological sustainability nexus.

Consequently, this study extends the literature on these fronts.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Empirical works have commonly examined the nexus between renewable energy consumption and ecological sustainability from the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) perspective. Grossman and Krueger (1991) proposed the EKC hypothesis to evaluate different environmental atrophy and income per capita indicators. The theory states that ecological degradation and pollution are bound to rise during the initial stages of economic prosperity. However, later stages of economic growth reverse this effect by promoting ecological quality. Grossman and Krueger (1994 and 1995) further noted that three factors are responsible for the asymmetric association between environmental sustainability and economic growth. These factors are scale, composition, and technique effects. While the scale effect denotes the impact of a rise in pollution due to economic expansion, the composition effect represents the structural change in production from an agrarian to an industry and service-driven economy (Aladejare, 2020). This transformation leads to resource reallocation in the economy.

Third is the technique effect, which emphasises the role of technology in the ecological quality-economic prosperity relationship. Adopting efficient production processes and technology will likely enhance economic output and decelerate pollutant emissions per unit of production (Aladejare, 2020). Consequently, the EKC hypothesis is adopted for this study since the form of energy applied in the process of pursuing economic prosperity impacts the environment. However, the energy-ecological nexus cannot be complete without a significant public sector investment in infrastructural development.

Likewise, through globalisation, the relevant role of interacting with other advanced or similar economies for financial aid in the quest for economic growth is acknowledged, particularly for developing countries. Thus, African economies have been encouraged to eliminate barriers to aid inflows of external financial portfolios and investments due to the urgency to fight poverty and deliver rapid economic prosperity in the continent. However, the quest for external financial investment in these countries has made them vulnerable to all forms of foreign financial aid and investment that can be ecologically detrimental.

### **Research Methodology**

The study employed a dataset between 1990 and 2020 to assess the impact of renewable energy, external debt, and financial globalisation on ecological sustainability in 44 African countries. The country list is in Table 9, and their preference from 54 African countries is justified by data completeness and availability. In this study, ecological sustainability represented the response variable and is indicated by the ecological footprint per capita. The measure provides a robust indicator of ecological quality in recent environmental and energy-related literature. EF uniquely incorporates the amount of various natural areas needed for economic prosperity. These natural spaces include forest resources, built-up land, crops and grazing lands, carbon space, and fishing grounds (Aladejare, 2020). Further justification for this measure stems from its link to the destructive tendencies energy consumption creates for the ecosystem, such as surface water degeneration, biodiversity loss, groundwater pollution, and soil erosion.

Furthermore, the study used four explanatory variables: external debt, renewable energy, financial globalisation, and economic growth. Due to the saving-investment gap in countries, external debt is a viable tool the public sector can deploy for investment in green economic and infrastructural development. Deliberately

borrowing for ecological sustainability by governments, especially developing ones, is seldom widespread. Intuitively, environmental issues only recently began dominating the national and international discourse. In many countries, the diverse economic and socioeconomic challenges are still counted as more pressing challenges than ecological sustainability. Also, the indicator for renewable energy is its share in total energy consumption. It is used in this study since energy consumption constitutes one of the essentials of a better life, and the socioeconomic stability of any economy depends on its accessibility. Thus, the growing carbon emissions and global warming ills have spurred the significant pursuit of renewable energy as a clean and sustainable alternative to fossil energy sources. As a result, renewable energy has the potential to provide energy safety and climate change.

FGB is the extent to which nations relax cross-border financial transactions. For this purpose, this study used the aggregate KOF FGB index because it combines *de facto* and *de jure* financial integration. While the *de facto* index captures the flow of foreign capital and the stocks of international assets and liabilities, the *de jure* component covers indicators of government policies and rules that aid the international flow of capital. These regulations and guidelines include constraints on investment, capital account openness and the number of foreign investment agreements (Gygli et al., 2019).

Economic growth is another explanatory variable used as a control indicator in the study. Its proxy is the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. As the economy grows, the demand for more energy services for a higher industrial drive increases. Consequently, more resources are deployed to meet energy needs and sustain economic growth. However, the significance of such economic growth on environmental sustainability depends on the size and productivity of the country's real sector. Table 1 further captures the study variables, their measurement and sources.

**Table 1:** Variable description

| Variable                  | Measurement   | Source              | Symbol     |
|---------------------------|---|---------------------|------------|
| Ecological sustainability | Ecological footprint global hectares (gha) per capita | GFN (2022)          | <i>efp</i> |
| External debt             | Total external debt % of GDP                          | WDI (2022)          | <i>edy</i> |
| Renewable energy          | Renewable energy % of total energy consumption        | WDI (2022)          | <i>rwe</i> |
| Financial globalisation   | Weight in percentage                                  | Gygli et al. (2019) | <i>fgb</i> |
| Economic growth           | GDP per capita growth (%)                             | WDI (2022)          | <i>ypc</i> |

**Source:** Authors' computation.

Based on the study objectives, the study estimated two relationships. Objective one, which is to determine the effect of renewable energy on ecological sustainability, is as follows:

$$efp_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 rwe_{it} + \alpha_2 ypc_{it} + \alpha_3 ypc_{it}^2 + \mu_{it} \quad \text{Equ. 1}$$

where  $ypc_{it}^2$  denote the square of economic growth representing the later stages of economic prosperity in the EKC hypothesis. Objective two, which examines the role of external debt and FGB in the renewable energy-environmental sustainability relationship, is as follows:

$$efp_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 rwe_{it} + \beta_2 rwe_{it} + \beta_3 edy_{it} + \beta_4 fgb_{it} + \beta_5 ypc_{it} + \beta_6 ypc_{it}^2 + \varepsilon_{it} \quad \text{Equ. 2}$$

These two Equations express the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable.

### 3.2.1 Estimation procedure

The econometric analysis of this study begins with testing for cross-sectional dependency test (CSD). This test is essential as a pre-condition for obtaining good outcomes since ignoring the CSD effect in a panel analysis can bias the regression through spurious regression results. Consequently, the study adopted four CSD tests for a robust output, and they include Breusch and Pagan's (1980) Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, Pesaran's (2004) scaled LM test, Pesaran's (2004) CSD test, and the Baltagi et al. (2012) bias-corrected scaled LM test.

Similarly, the susceptibleness of panel data analysis to slope homogeneity, arising from different economic and demographic configurations of cross-sectional units, may produce misleading regression results (Aladejare and Musa, 2023; Aladejare, 2023a,d). Therefore, having a slope heterogeneity test is necessary when evaluating panel datasets. The procedure makes it easier to conclude the coefficients' homogeneity or heterogeneity across cross-sections. Consequently, two homogeneity tests, namely Swamy (1970) and the Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) adjusted version, was used in this study.

Furthermore, the validation of CSD and heterogeneity in the panel dataset informed the use of unit root and cointegration tests incorporating both effects. For unit root, the study combined first, and second-generation tests that correct these effects. The panel unit root methods are Madalla and Wu (1999), Pesaran (2003) cross-sectional augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF), and Pesaran (2007) cross-sectional Im Pesaran and Shin (CIPS). Also, we applied the Westerlund (2007) error correction model (ECM)-based cointegration technique. Aside from correcting for CSD and heterogeneity, this long-run test can suitably combine variables of different order of stationarity in a model (Aladejare and Musa, 2023; Aladejare, 2023b,d).

### The cross-sectional augmented ARDL (CS-ARDL) approach

Traditional econometric procedures are vulnerable to spurious outputs in the presence of CSD and heterogeneity in panel dataset analysis (Chudik et al., 2017). Thus, as a remedy, the CS-ARDL approach was developed to handle biases such as CSD, endogeneity, heterogeneity, non-stationarity, and omitted variables in panel data estimation (Chudik et al., 2017; Bindi, 2018). The CS-ARDL's structure

is built on augmenting the first-generation (mainstream ARDL) technique by integrating the response series, cross-section means of covariates, and their lags. Also, the method regulates cross-sections' structural identities to produce unique short and long-term explanatory coefficient effects on the

dependent series. Furthermore, the CS-ARDL approach is known to outdo the panel ARDL model, especially when  $30 \leq T < 100$  (Chudik et al., 2017); thus, it's suitable for this study.

Consequently, the CS-ARDL technique is as follows:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{i=1}^p \vartheta_{i1} y_{i,t-1} + \sum_{1=0}^q \omega'_{i1} X_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad \text{Equ. 3}$$

By rewriting Equation 3, the CS-ARDL model transforms to:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{i=1}^p \vartheta_{i1} y_{i,t-1} + \sum_{1=0}^q \omega'_{i1} X_{i,t-1} + \sum_{1=0}^q \omega'_{i,1} \overline{Z_{t-1}} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad \text{Equ. 4}$$

$$\overline{Z}_t = (\overline{y}_t, \overline{X}_t) \quad \text{Equ. 5}$$

$$\varepsilon_{it} = \Pi'_i f_t + \mu_{it} \quad \text{Equ. 6}$$

where Equation 5 is denoted by  $\overline{Z}_t$  is the cross-sectional averages of the covariates for the response variable ( $\overline{y}_t$ ) and the explanatory variable ( $\overline{X}_t$ ).  $f_t$  signifies the unobserved common component responsible for the dependency of cross-sectional units. The

common elements are given through a detrending process of the cross-sectional means and lagged through Equation 5. Equation 4 is estimated by a pooled mean group (PMG) approach, and Equation 7 provides the long-term coefficients

$$\hat{\eta}_i = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^q \hat{\omega}'_{1i}}{1 - \sum_{i=0}^q \hat{\vartheta}_{1i}} \quad \text{Equ. 7}$$

Further transformation of Equation 3, as expressed in Equation 8, will yield the ECM of the model (Ditzen, 2019).

$$\Delta y_{it} = \alpha_i [y_{i,t-1} - \phi_i X_{it}] - \sum_{i=1}^p \vartheta_{i1} y_{i,t-1} + \sum_{1=0}^q \omega'_{i1} X_{i,t-1} + \sum_{1=0}^q \omega'_{i,1} \overline{Z_{t-1}} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad \text{Equ. 8}$$

where:

$$\hat{\phi}_i = \frac{\sum_{i=0}^q \hat{\omega}'_{1i}}{\hat{\alpha}_i} \quad \text{Equ. 9}$$

## Estimated Results and Discussions

### Descriptive statistic test outcome

Table 2 reveals the mean *efp* for the African countries as 1.52 (gha) approximately. This value marginally falls short of the world's mean (1.75 gha) (GFN, 2022). Table 2

demonstrates that the average debt-to-GDP of 51.66% exceeds the prudential baseline of 40% for developing and emerging economies required for fiscal sustainability (Choudhury and Islam, 2016; Aladejare, 2021; Aladejare,

2023d). The mean renewable energy as a share of total energy consumption (66.60%) is relatively high, indicating the growth of the energy source in the continent. Meanwhile, Africa's mean financial globalisation index is approximately 45.1, falling short of the world's average value of 55 (Gygli et al., 2019), which indicates a lower preference for the African

market regarding foreign capital flow. Also, evidence in Table 2 reveals that the mean income growth for African countries is approximately 1.15%. This value marginally lies below the world's mean of 1.7% for the study period (WDI, 2022); and implies a slower income convergence rate between the continent and other parts of the world.

**Table 2:** Aggregate descriptive statistic

| Variable   |         | Mean    | Std. Dev. | Min      | Max      | Observations |
|------------|---------|---------|-----------|----------|----------|--------------|
| <i>efp</i> | Overall | 1.517   | 0.774     | 0.284    | 4.915    | N = 1364     |
|            | Between |         | 0.611     | 0.369    | 3.304    | n = 44       |
|            | Within  |         | 0.484     | 0.240    | 4.508    | T = 31       |
| <i>edy</i> | Overall | 51.655  | 106.431   | 2.814    | 2056.541 | N = 1364     |
|            | Between |         | 60.123    | 10.818   | 418.815  | n = 44       |
|            | Within  |         | 88.274    | -350.738 | 1689.381 | T = 31       |
| <i>rwe</i> | Overall | 66.600  | 27.832    | 0.6      | 0.06     | N = 1364     |
|            | Between |         | 27.373    | 0.320    | 0.320    | n = 44       |
|            | Within  |         | 6.468     | 45.030   | 45.030   | T = 31       |
| <i>fgb</i> | Overall | 45.1151 | 11.475    | 15       | 87       | N = 1364     |
|            | Between |         | 9.387     | 27.710   | 66.032   | n = 44       |
|            | Within  |         | 6.745     | 20.405   | 66.438   | T = 31       |
| <i>ypc</i> | Overall | 1.148   | 5.964     | -50.047  | 90.14    | N = 1364     |
|            | Between |         | 1.439     | -1.801   | 4.216    | n = 44       |
|            | Within  |         | 5.792     | -49.747  | 91.952   | T = 31       |

Source: Authors' Estimated Output.

**Correlation matrix and cross-sectional dependency results**

Presented in Table 3 are the correlation and variance inflation factor (VIF) tests. Both tests confirmed the level of collinearity between the study covariates. In the upper panel of Table 3, the correlation test showed weak multicollinearity between the independent

variables. Similarly, the VIF report in the lower forum shows the same conclusion, judging by the rule of thumb that VIF values ranging between 1 and 5 imply a moderate correlation. Thus, since the mean VIF for the study is 1.07, we conclude that there is less multicollinearity between the study's regressors.

**Table 3:** Correlation matrix

|            |                |            |            |            |            |
|------------|----------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
|            | <i>efp</i>     | <i>edy</i> | <i>rwe</i> | <i>fgb</i> | <i>ypc</i> |
| <i>efp</i> | 1              |            |            |            |            |
| <i>edy</i> | -0.068         | 1          |            |            |            |
| <i>rwe</i> | -0.482         | 0.087      | 1          |            |            |
| <i>fgb</i> | 0.073          | -0.143     | -0.267     | 1          |            |
| <i>ypc</i> | 0.031          | -0.093     | 0.054      | 0.029      | 1          |
|            | VIF            | 1/VIF      |            |            |            |
| <i>fgb</i> | 1.11           | 0.900      |            |            |            |
| <i>rwe</i> | 1.10           | 0.911      |            |            |            |
| <i>edy</i> | 1.05           | 0.954      |            |            |            |
| <i>ypc</i> | 1.01           | 0.988      |            |            |            |
|            | Mean VIF: 1.07 |            |            |            |            |

Source: Authors' Estimated Output.

Results in Table 4 demonstrate the four CSD tests applied. Evidence reveals the rejection of the null hypothesis of cross-sectional

independence. Therefore, given the study variables, the conclusion is that there is significant CSD across the cross-sections.

**Table 4:** CSD test output

| Variable   | Breusch-Pagan LM | Pesaran scaled LM | Bias-corrected scaled LM | Pesaran CSD |
|------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <i>efp</i> | 8357.857***      | 170.399***        | 169.665***               | 8.295***    |
| <i>edy</i> | 8899.645***      | 182.855***        | 182.121***               | 47.407***   |
| <i>rwe</i> | 10870.82***      | 228.172***        | 227.439***               | 69.070***   |
| <i>fgb</i> | 5634.180***      | 107.781***        | 107.048***               | 17.608***   |
| <i>ypc</i> | 1885.167***      | 21.591***         | 20.858***                | 25.327***   |

**Note:** \*\*\* indicates statistical significance at 1%.  $H_0$ : No cross-section dependence

**Source:** Authors' Estimated Output.

**Slope heterogeneity and unit root outcomes**

Table 5 captures the slope heterogeneity test outcome. Inference derived from the output supported the insignificance of the null

hypothesis stating homogenous slope parameters and, instead, justifying the alternative hypothesis confirms slope heterogeneity in the study variables' parameters.

**Table 5:** Slope heterogeneity Test

| Test-Statistics           | Coefficient                        | p-value  |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|----------|
| $\bar{\Delta}$            | 27.346                             | 0.000*** |
| $\bar{\Delta}_{adjusted}$ | 30.338                             | 0.000*** |
| $H_0$                     | Slope coefficients are homogenous. |          |

**Note:** \*\*\* indicates statistical significance at 1%.

**Source:** Authors' Estimated Output.

Furthermore, the confirmation of CSD and slope heterogeneity in the panel dataset informed implementing unit root tests enabled with the capabilities to correct both issues. Thus, Table 6 shows the outcome of first and second-generation panel unit root

tests designed for tackling CSD and heterogeneity challenges. Also, table 6 expressed that except for the economic growth indicator, which revealed stationary at level, all other variables attained stationarity at the first difference.

**Table 6:** Unit root test output

| Variable   | First-generation unit root<br>Maddala and Wu (1999) |            | Second-generation unit root |            |                       |            | Decision |
|------------|---|------------|-----------------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|----------|
|            | Without trend                                       | With trend | Pesaran's CADF (2003)       |            | Pesaran's CIPS (2007) |            |          |
|            | Without trend                                       | With trend | Without trend               | With trend | Without trend         | With trend |          |
| <i>efp</i> | 84.451  | 91.254     | -3.919***b                  | -4.041***b | 1.962                 | 2.480      | I(1)     |
| <i>edy</i> | 49.300  | 37.725     | -3.113***b                  | -3.365***b | 2.944                 | 4.337      | I(1)     |
| <i>rwe</i> | 48.391  | 56.994     | -3.629***b                  | -3.759***b | -0.788                | 2.801      | I(1)     |
| <i>fgb</i> | 153.846***  | 146.694*** | -4.049***b                  | -4.158***b | -0.921                | -0.849     | I(1)     |
| <i>ypc</i> | 349.879***  | 281.974*** | -3.262***b                  | -3.711***a | -10.528***            | -10.333*** | I(0)     |
| $H_0$      | Series is I(1)                                      |            | Series is non-stationary    |            | Series is I(1)        |            |          |

**Note:** a and b represent stationarity at the level and first difference, respectively, while \*\*\* indicates statistical significance at 1%.

**Source:** Authors' Computation.

**Westerlund panel cointegration output**

After determining the variables' stationarity condition, the Westerlund cointegration procedure ascertained their long-term relationship. The technique, as prior noted, efficiently tackles CSD and heterogeneity issues

in panel data analysis. Table 7 contains the test output, which shows the rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-run association. Instead, the test validated the alternative view that the study series has a long-term relationship.

**Table 7:** Westerlund panel CSD cointegration Test

| Equation 1               |           | Equation 2 |            |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Statistic                | Value     | Statistic  | Value      |
| $G_t$                    | -2.007*** | $G_t$      | -2.867***  |
| $G_a$                    | -7.716*** | $G_a$      | -11.710*** |
| $P_t$                    | -8.934*** | $P_t$      | -15.978*** |
| $P_a$                    | -4.545*** | $P_a$      | -8.795***  |
| $H_0$ : No cointegration |           |            |            |

**Note:** \*\*\* indicates statistical significance at 1%6, respectively.

**Source:** Authors' computation.

### CS-ARDL estimated result

Table 8 demonstrates the outcome for the two equations capturing the two study objectives. In the first panel, renewable energy consumption indicates an insignificant effect on ecological sustainability in the short and long term. Similarly, economic growth and its square showed no substantial short and long-run impact on environmental sustainability.

However, the second panel of Table 8 reveals that renewable energy consumption and financial globalisation significantly negatively impact ecological sustainability in the short and long run. Conversely, the

coefficient of external debt shows a positive relationship with environmental sustainability in the short and long term. In contrast, economic growth and its square exhibit an insignificant short- and long-term effect on environmental quality.

Furthermore, both equations' adjustment factor (ECM) is rightly signed and statistically significant. Also, they are similar in response to long-run adjustment because, while the value for Equation 1 suggests about nine months, the value for Equation 2 indicates about eight months of adjustment period from short-term distortion to long-term equilibrium path.

**Table 8:** CS-ARDL long-term and short-term results

| Variable                             | Long-run output |        |         | Short-run output |        |         |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|--------|---------|------------------|--------|---------|
|                                      | Coefficient     | z-stat | p-value | Coefficient      | z-stat | p-value |
| Equ.1: Dependent variable <i>efp</i> |                 |        |         |                  |        |         |
| <i>rwe</i>                           | -0.008          | -1.39  | 0.165   | -0.007           | -1.43  | 0.153   |
| <i>ypc</i>                           | 0.002           | 1.09   | 0.274   | 0.002            | 1.27   | 0.204   |
| <i>ypc</i> <sup>2</sup>              | -0.0001         | -0.29  | 0.770   | -0.0001          | -0.24  | 0.812   |
| <i>constant</i>                      | 0.009           | 0.10   | 0.918   | 0.013            | 0.16   | 0.874   |
| <i>ecm(-1)</i>                       |                 |        |         | -1.112***        | -37.44 | 0.000   |
| $R^2$                                | 0.71            |        |         |                  |        |         |
| Equ.2: Dependent variable <i>efp</i> |                 |        |         |                  |        |         |
| <i>rwe</i>                           | -0.005*         | -1.69  | 0.092   | -0.005**         | -1.65  | 0.099   |
| <i>edy</i>                           | 0.003*          | 1.89   | 0.059   | 0.003*           | 1.90   | 0.058   |
| <i>fgb</i>                           | -0.003**        | -2.01  | 0.044   | -0.004*          | -1.94  | 0.053   |
| <i>ypc</i>                           | 0.002           | 1.03   | 0.304   | 0.002            | 1.10   | 0.272   |
| <i>ypc</i> <sup>2</sup>              | -0.0003         | -0.68  | 0.499   | -0.0003          | -0.66  | 0.508   |

|                       |       |      |       |           |        |       |
|-----------------------|-------|------|-------|-----------|--------|-------|
| <i>constant</i>       | 0.289 | 1.28 | 0.199 | 0.331     | 1.21   | 0.227 |
| <i>ecm(-1)</i>        |       |      |       | -1.193*** | -35.44 | 0.000 |
| <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> | 0.72  |      |       |           |        |       |

**Note:** \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

**Source:** Authors' Computation.

### Discussion of Results

Based on the estimated CS-ARDL output for Equation 1, renewable energy does not have the individual strength to trigger environmental sustainability. However, the result for Equation 2 reveals that with the inclusion of foreign debt and financial globalisation, renewable energy consumption encouraged ecological sustainability both in the short and long term.

Based on the predictions from Equation 2, it thus indicates that renewable energy decelerates environmental risks and provides green and sustainable energy means for African countries. This finding aligns with empirical works such as Chien (2022), Khan et al. (2022), Miao et al. (2022), Kartal et al. (2023), and Wang et al. (2022) for N-11 economies, BRICS nations, NICs USA, and G7 and E7 countries, respectively. These studies revealed that renewable energy usage promotes ecological protection. Conversely, the result contradicts submissions in Esquivias et al. (2022), Cakmak and Acar (2022), and Shayanmehr et al. (2023) for Asian emerging countries, oil-producing economies, and countries with lower emissions, respectively. These studies confirmed renewable energy consumption's insignificant or reduced effect on environmental quality.

However, the outcome of this study demonstrates that renewable energy aid energy demand by producing a safe transition from brown energy means to sustainable and eco-friendly sources. Thus, accelerating renewable energy use diminishes the negative impacts of energy consumption on the environment. Also, renewable energy aids the reduction of dependence on energy imports and other fossil fuels, thereby promoting a cleaner environment. Consequently, improving the consumption of renewable

energy sources is a sure means to environmental sustainability in the short and long-term periods. Aside from the fact that renewable energy sources are abundant in the wind, solar, sun, waste, and Earth's heat, they are replenished by nature. Their sustained use yields minute to no atmospheric pollutants or GHG emissions.

The positive effect of external debt on environmental sustainability indicates that the former aggravates ecological risk. Thus, the implication is that foreign borrowing prioritisation for factors that can promote environmental sustainability is lacking. This outcome supports findings by Akam et al. (2021), Sadiq et al. (2022), Batmunkh et al. (2022) and Farooq et al. (2023) for HIPC, BRICS countries, Central Asia countries, and OIC countries, respectively, that debt stock deteriorates ecological sustainability. In contrast, the result opposed the findings in Sadiq et al. (2022), Bese and Friday (2022), and Zeraibi et al. (2023) for BRICS countries, Turkey, and emerging economies, respectively. As previously noted, governments rarely borrow, especially those in the developing world, to pursue green economic growth. Instead, it is common to deploy external debt for social and economic infrastructures such as roads, dams, transportation systems, housing, factories, etc., which serve as economic growth catalysts.

However, as in many countries, the citing and construction of these projects often neglect environmental sustainability, thereby creating deforestation, biodiversity loss, soil pollution, air pollution, and water pollution. For instance, studies such as Nyangena et al. (2019), Qayyum et al. (2021), Younis et al. (2021), and Yang and Khan (2022) for East African countries, South Asian economies, BRICS countries, and IEA member countries, respectively concluded that urban growth



significantly results in ecological degradation. Similarly, studies such as UNCTAD (2020) and Aladejare and Nyiputen (2023) have found that the quest for industrialisation exacerbates poor environmental quality in African economies due to ineffective ecological protection measures. Hence, environmental sustainability cannot be assured when countries fail to use external borrowing for green economic growth and development.

The inference that financial globalisation exacts an adverse effect on ecological sustainability is plausible. It aligns with findings in extant studies such as Ulucak et al. (2020), Adebayo (2022), Kihombo et al. (2022), Ramzan et al. (2023), and Hasan and Du (2023), for emerging economies, E7 economies, WAME countries, United Kingdom, and China, respectively. However, the result contradicts submissions in Zia et al. (2021), Yang et al. (2021), Sadiq et al. (2022), Akadiri et al. (2022), and Bashir et al. (2023) for China, GCC nations, BRICS economies, India, and top-10 manufacturing economies, respectively. However, the positive output implies that as financial globalisation increases, it enhances ecological sustainability. This effect may relate to the fact that financial globalisation can assist countries in their transition from brown energy to other energy sources that integrate green and clean energy sources into the countries' national energy mix (Kirikkaleli et al., 2022). Also, financial globalisation can produce a green technology spill-over effect capable of mitigating environmental atrophy.

Consequently, since financial globalisation decreases the ecological degradation of African countries, financial globalisation is, thus, an essential mechanism necessary for terminating the tradeoff between economic growth and environmental degeneration. Furthermore, technological diffusion emanating from a sustainable rise in foreign direct investment inflow (FDI) to African countries may be another reason for the eco-friendly role of financial globalisation in these nations. Moreover, when FDI and efficient

technology are available to boost economic production, limited resources or input are used in the production process. Thus, this measure will aid the reduction of environmental pollution since advanced technology can yield more output using less input.

Although earlier studies have suggested the significance of economic growth for environmental degeneration (Bhat et al., 2021; Li et al., 2021; Usman et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2022; Hassan et al., 2022), the CS-ARDL output in Table 8 reveals otherwise for both estimated equations. Economic growth accelerates energy demand for a higher industrial drive. Hence, more resources for the energy needs required to sustain economic growth are deployed. However, how substantial the effect of economic prosperity on ecological sustainability is, relies on the size and productivity of the real sector in the country. Many African economies are still in their early stages of development, depending on the production of primary commodities for growth and relying primarily on imports for finished industrialised goods. Also, the implementation of import substitution policy in most African countries is slow due to capital shortage. In such a situation, economic growth's environmental impact may be insignificant. The implication of this effect further accounts for the insignificance of the squared economic growth, invalidating the EKC hypothesis in African countries. Thus, the invalid EKC hypothesis supports extant studies such as Lin et al. (2016), Aladejare (2020), Tachega et al. (2021), and Ouedraogo et al. (2022) for African countries.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Since the last decade, ecological preservation has become a critically debated topic in developing and developed nations. Hence, to ensure environmental sustainability, countries and international bodies have been canvassing for measures that support severe restrictions

to protect the Earth's biodiversity. Without such an approach, sustaining the ecological quality needed for sustainable growth and development will be a mirage if current GHG levels are not tamed. Hence, this study's goal is two-fold: to determine the sole effect of renewable energy consumption on ecological sustainability and secondly, to identify the roles of external debt and financial globalisation in the renewable energy-ecological sustainability association for 44 African countries. Second-generation estimation techniques were employed and deduced inferences from the CS-ARDL method used in the study. The study empirically demonstrated that renewable energy is insignificant for ecological sustainability without debt stock and financial globalisation. However, the inclusion of both variables revealed that while renewable energy and financial globalisation accelerated ecological sustainability, external debt worsened it in the short and long-term periods.

Based on the study findings, some policy implications are proposed. First, given the productive benefits of renewable energy use to human and environmental well-being, policymakers must execute clean energy portfolios by restricting brown energy use by considering introducing a significant amount of carbon tax or emission permit and incentivising businesses to adopt green technologies. This measure will ensure that renewable energy growth and investment are explored for sustainable development—a pollution-free economy, and enhanced human living conditions. Also, countries should be intentional in incorporating and implementing renewable energy transition paths in their national energy policy to promote low-emission energy systems.

Second, with the possible harmful effect of foreign debt stock on the environment, policymakers should begin to borrow for ecological sustainability consciously. One such way is to invest in green transportation, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, manufacturing, and land use. When the public sector channel foreign debt to this green ventures, ecological quality will be enhanced since debt stocks are invested in infrastructures

and assets that cut down on carbon emissions and improve resources and energy efficiency, and equally accelerate the reduction of biodiversity loss. It is also necessary to maintain impeccable accountability in the disbursement of the borrowed funds to avoid misappropriation, corruption, and ecologically-degrading investments.

Third, since financial globalisation is eco-friendly, policymakers should be particular about enhancing trade and financial relations that are not just FDI boosting, but environmentally friendly. By encouraging the growth of such association, FDI inflows to the continent are bound to rub off positively on domestic financial markets by complementing finance for environmental protection and the transfer and production of green technologies. Accordingly, countries must imbibe international sustainable environmental guidelines that promote stringent ecological regulations when seeking international capital projects. Policymakers will need to constrain projects with outdated technologies from entering the economy by implementing heavy dumping duties. At the same time, tax holidays and other incentives to encourage inflows of efficient capital goods are essential. This approach will improve export capacity and facilitate environmental sustainability in producing goods and services.

Future African studies can determine the role of human capital in renewable energy, external debt, financial globalisation and ecological sustainability relationship. This study could not capture human capital due to data incompleteness and unavailability for some African countries, hence its constraint.

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**Table 9:** 44 study countries

|         |                |         |        |
|---------|----------------|---------|--------|
| Algeria | Congo Republic | Lesotho | Rwanda |
|---------|----------------|---------|--------|



|                            |               |            |              |
|----------------------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| Angola                     | Cote d'Ivoire | Liberia    | Senegal      |
| Benin                      | Egypt         | Madagascar | Sierra Leone |
| Botswana                   | Eswatini      | Malawi     | South Africa |
| Burkina Faso               | Ethiopia      | Mali       | Sudan        |
| Burundi                    | Gabon         | Mauritania | Tanzania     |
| Cabo Verde                 | Gambia, The   | Mauritius  | Togo         |
| Cameroon                   | Ghana         | Morocco    | Tunisia      |
| Central African Republic   | Guinea        | Mozambique | Uganda       |
| Chad                       | Guinea-Bissau | Niger      | Zambia       |
| Congo, Democratic Republic | Kenya         | Nigeria    | Zimbabwe     |

**Source:** Authors' compilation.

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## LEGAL DISCOURSE ON RIGHT TO LIFE AND SAFE UNPOLLUTED ENVIRONMENT IN NIGERIA

**ThankGod Okeokwo**  
**Gadzama Christopher Linus**

Faculty of Law

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [barrthankgodokeokwo@gmail.com](mailto:barrthankgodokeokwo@gmail.com); [gadzamabob@gmail.com](mailto:gadzamabob@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The right to life is a basic right given to humans and all mankind naturally as being humans. Right to life is a constitutional right enshrined under section 33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. This makes it a fundamental right. It is guaranteed under chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution as part of the fundamental rights provided for under that chapter. But the right to life is first a natural right: given to humans at birth. It is not first conferred to man by law but rather it existed with human in their first essence. Right to safe unpolluted environment is a complementary right to the right to life because humans live in an environment that makes for their survival and livelihood. Right to safe unpolluted environment is deemed an inalienable right tied to the right to life and livelihood. The constitution of Nigeria has set grounds for the derogation from the right to life which did not include the taking of life vide pollution of the human environment. Doctrinal research method was adopted in this paper, the constitution, judicial decisions and paper of learned authors were consulted as primary and secondary reference sources for this paper. This paper assert through its findings that right to life include right to safe unpolluted environment and recommended that individuals should be allowed to enforce their rights to safe unpolluted environment.

**Keywords:** Human right, life, pollution, doctrinal research, livelihoods, Nigerian Constitution

### Introduction

The right to life is a right which accrue to humans as being humans. It is a basic right given to humans by nature-naturally. In the Nigerian context, the right to life is a constitutional right also enshrined in section 33 under chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended; this makes it a fundamental right. But the right to life is first a natural right: given to humans at birth. It is not first conferred by law to man but rather it existed with human in their first essence. Right to safe unpolluted environment is a complementary right to the right to life because humans live in an environment that is safe and unpolluted for their survival and livelihood.

The denial of the right to safe unpolluted environment is a denial to the right to life itself and thus a violation of the right to life. The Courts both at Hague, in the case of *Akpa v RDC* (2013) and in Nigeria in the case of *Mobil v FIRS* (2021) are in agreement that the right to life includes the right to safe unpolluted air, land, water, biosphere and atmosphere and there interrelations with one another. The major polluters of the human environment in the Nigeria's Niger Delta region are oil and gas companies with the aid of Acts of the National Assembly under the instruments issued by the Petroleum Minister (sections 104&107 Petroleum Industry Act 2021). The petroleum exploration and exploitation can be done in an environmentally friendly manner as it is done

in Netherlands, Canada and Great Britain. The practice which allows the Minister to grant licence or permit to flare gas is contended to be contrary to the constitution of Nigeria and thus void in line with the recent positions of the Court on gas flaring as a violation of human right to life. It is argued that the right to life includes the right to safe unpolluted environment that engenders satisfactory/sustainable development.

### **Conceptualising Right to Life and Right to Safe Unpolluted Environment**

Certain concepts such as the right to Life, derogations from right to life, fundamental human rights or Natural rights, concept of safe environment and the concept of a protected environment shall be examined in this sub-heading in order to give us proper and clear insights of what they entail in connection to this paper. There are methods of how a Court should interpret the Constitution of a nation when saddled with the duties or responsibilities to adjudicate over the actions of the government, corporations and individuals and vice versa. These methods include: original meaning, judicial precedent, pragmatism, moral reasoning, structuralism, historical practices etc. The Court is charged with interpreting laws from the ordinary meaning or the plain meaning of the text, it examines the objective meaning of the text in the legal document(Oshoio, 2019); or the original meaning from its root words or how the people understood the words that had been called to question as at the time it was passed into law; by precedents set by superior courts or courts of coordinate jurisdiction(Garba, 2019); it does interpret words by the balancing of the future cost benefit of such interpretation or by the mischief the word or phrase or clause was made to cure; or the lessons it is made to teach or the structure-the relationship among the arms of government in reference to the word or phrase or clause(Okere, 1987); and,

historical practices and antecedents in relation to past events on the word(Murrill, 2018).

For the proper interpretation of the right to life as closely tied to the right of safe unpolluted environment, this paper adopts the theory of judicial precedent in analysing the position or attitude of Courts to the full exercise (by citizens) of their rights to life in a satisfactory environment sustainable for human development (Art 24, African Charter). This theory is adopted following the position of the African Commission on Human Rights and the Court of Appeal of Nigeria on the effects of air pollution and other environmental degradation on the right to life enshrined in Article 24 of the African Charter and section 33 of the Nigerian Constitution. The evolution from life to the right to life is a great achievement of constitutional civilization (Enabulele, 2014). The constitutional system has made possible the right to life based on life, and thus the right to life serves as the constitutional basis for the sanctity of life as the premise of basic rights (Rakowski, 1994). As the basic law of the state, the Constitution stipulates the development goals of the state, procedures for the exercise of state power and basic rights of citizens, which embodies human dignity, freedom and a happy life (Chapter IV, Nigerian Constitution 1999). The concept features five elements: the sanctity of life, the significance of life, the preciousness of life, the inevitability of life, and the fragility of life (Hyneman & Shore, 2013). Moreover, the concept refers to not only to respect for the life of those who live, but also respect for the life of the deceased (Torzilli, 2000).

The derogation from human rights refers to a temporary suspension of certain rights recognized in human rights instruments or constitution (Hafner-Burton & Helfer & Fariss). It is the right of states to depart from their treaty obligations in certain exceptional circumstances as it enables the government resort to measures of extraordinary but temporary nature during a state of emergency (Ali, 2013). The constitutional derogations

under section 45 of the 1999 Constitution provides for the restriction and derogation from the fundamental rights guaranteed in sections 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of the constitution in limited circumstances. That restriction on rights exists only with respect to a law that is reasonably justifiable in 'a democratic society' and is applicable in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health, or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons (section 45, Nigerian Constitution 1999). As the foundation upon which other laws rest, the Constitution have provided limitations or exceptions to the fundamental rights it created in recognition of a acceptable limits in a just and fair democratic society (section 33&45, Nigerian Constitution 1999). Unless for the reasons provided by the Constitution, it would amount in unreasonable unjustifiable act to violate the fundamental rights provided under the Constitution particularly the right to life: which is the most sacred of all rights (Ajogwu, 2014).

The idea of rights was originally embedded in the concept of natural law which is the principles of natural right and wrong or natural justice in the wider sense (Hearn, 1884). This idea of natural law eventually gave birth to the concept of natural rights. A right is an interest, respect for which is a duty, and the discharge of which is a wrong. There are four kinds of rights in a wider sense as rights, powers, liberties and immunities (Pound, 1915). In explaining this, the court in *Uwaifo v Attorney General, Bendel State* (1983) noted that there are rights in the strict sense, when the law limits the liberty of others on my behalf; when a right corresponds to a duty, which is recognized, and enforced by law, it is a perfect right. Those that are not enforceable are called imperfect rights (Bingham, 1913). The main focus has always been with those rights which are recognized under the constitution of nations and are often termed human rights (Terry, 1916). The court in *Ransome-Kuti v Attorney General* (1985) stated that

fundamental right is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilized existence and what has been done by our constitutions since independence is to have these rights enshrined in the constitution so that the rights could be "immutable to the extent of the 'no immutability' of the Constitution itself" (Olomojobi, 2019).

According to the court in *Asemota v Yesufu* (1982), fundamental right is an undoubted inalienable right, which corresponds to a *jus naturale*. It is the greatest right, and when it is contained in the constitution of a nation, it enshrines a people's expression of political and civic and or civil rights endowed by nature; but only to the extent that the strictness or largeness of modern systems of government does permit. Furthermore, the Court in *Igwe v Ezeanochie* (2010) held that fundamental rights is a right derived from natural or fundamental, or constitutional law. Summarily, human rights are commonly understood as inalienable fundamental rights to which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being (Igwe, et al. 2019). Environment connotes surroundings or conditions in which organisms live; consisting of air, water, land, weather, etc (Kumar, 2018). It is that in which humans and others live. It is the living sources for all the living and non-living things including plants, animals, biotic and non-biotic and their interrelations with one another (Science Direct). It is from the environment that all the essential necessities of life are derived (Moenne-Loccoz et al, 2015). Section 37 of the National Environmental Standard and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act 2007 as amended, defined environment to include: water, air, land and all plants and human beings or animals living therein and the inter-relationships, which exist among these or any of them. Section 61 of the Environmental impact Assessment Act defined 'environment' to mean the components of the earth and

includes- a) land, water and air, including all layers of the atmosphere; b) all organic and inorganic matters and living organisms; and c) the interacting natural systems that include components referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b).

Protection of the environment would include the prevention from fundamental harm or radical hurt to the earth, land air water fauna and flora, biotic and non-biotic and their interrelationship in the atmosphere and biosphere. This is so because there cannot be right to life when the environment upon which human life should function had been destroyed (Chu&Karr, 2017). A Judge of the International Court of Justice had said:

The protection of the environment is... a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a *sine qua non* for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this, as damage to the environment can impair and undermine all the human rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments (Gabgikovo-Nagymaros Project Hung v Slovk 1997:92).

Sustainability of the air, land, water, fauna and flora and other biotic and non-biotic is their retention of their natural courses and patterns specially their unique features and functions in strata *in situ* for the common good of the present and future generations (Gann, et al. 2019). The natural courses of any aspect or feature of the environment should not be radically changed that it affects the relationship between that aspect or features of the environment and other aspects or features which are dependent on it. Once the environment is altered by human activities, authorised by government or law, it amounts in violation of the basis upon which life and the right to life exist (Shelton, 2006).

### Research Methodology

The foundation for the discourse on right to life is the Constitution of the Federal Republic

of Nigeria which provided for the right to life under section 33. The Constitution, under Chapter II, enshrined that the responsibilities of Government at all levels would include to protect the human environment in the country pursuant to section 13 thereof. Section 20 of the said Constitution made provisions for the environment, including the air, land and water. However, section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution ousted the powers of the Courts from entertaining any matter or question arising from Chapter II of the Constitution unless such question or matter had been legislated upon by the National Assembly or a State House of Assembly. Other materials deployed included the case-laws both local and foreign decisions of Courts. Other information are sourced from article journals and online as well as offline materials. The paper adopted the doctrinal method because it is most suitable for the research and answers to the discussions intended.

### Research Findings and Discussion

#### Right To Life: Right to Safe Unpolluted Environment

The constitution of Nigeria in section 33 guaranteed that every person has the right to life. Nobody, including the government, has the right to take the life another or group of persons other than by means provided for under the constitution. It follows that any means to take life other those prescribed by the constitution is unconstitutional, null and void. Right to life exist for humans in a living, liveable and life-enabled environment. Humans are created to live in an environment made up of air, water, plants, fishes, grasses and biotic as well as non-biotic. Human lives may not exist without air or, and, water. If air and water are basics for human life then, a destruction or pollution of the air and or water is a direct violation of the right to life.

There are two main causes of unsafe and polluted environment in Nigeria. They are the government of the one part and the

multinational corporations. The government, in the context of this paper includes the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary while the multinational corporations will include their partners and joint ventures' associates. The government make laws that authorises its institutions/agencies to permit or license gas flaring (section 104(1)(b)Petroleum Industry Act) and excuse oil spills on the grounds of vandalism(Isaiah v Shell). In the case of *Friday Alfred Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell* (2013), the Court in Hague held to the effect that until 2013, Nigerian case law had no precedent in which an operator like Shell was held liable for damage resulting from an oil spill based on a tort of negligence, because the operator had violated a general duty of care to prevent sabotage of its oil pipeline or oil facility by third parties. This is so, despite section 11 (5) (b) of the Oil Pipelines Act 1956 which placed responsibility of protecting the pipelines on the operator/ licensees/lessees. The Nigerian government would interpret every oil spill to mean that there was vandalism even where there are records that the oil multinational have never done servicing or replaced some of its oil pipelines since 1958 when oil was found in commercial quantity in Nigeria.

An African perspective was given to the meaning of 'satisfactory environment' by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the case of *SERAC v Nigeria* (2001) when it held:

The right to a general satisfactory environment as guaranteed under Article 24 of the African Charter or the right to a healthy environment, as it is widely known, therefore imposes clear obligations upon a government. It requires the State to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources (*SERAC v Nigeria* 2001:10).

That Court emphasised the need for Nigerian government to desist from directly

threatening the health and environment of their citizens. The rights to life and satisfactory environment envisage a responsible and objective government with laws, regulations and policies to protect their citizens and not threaten the very root of their existence (Ebeku, 2003). The foundation on which the right to life consist is the environment on which the human life exist and the healthiness of the environment. This will include water, air, land and fauna etc. It is argued that this should inform the Courts in arriving at their decisions on right to life in relation to environmental protection and enforcement in Nigeria.

Contrary to the Constitutional duties of the Legislature (sections 4,13&20, Nigerian Constitution 1999) and as if the legislative duties of the Nigeria's National Assembly included to take Nigerians lives through air pollution, in 2021 Petroleum Industry Act, it enacted under section 105 that the Commission in charge of Upstream sector of the petroleum operations in Nigeria should take penalties for gas flaring pursuant to the Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations 2018. It is argued that this provision of the PIA 2021 is contrary to the rights of Nigerians to life enshrined under the section 33 of the Constitution (Hung. v Slov). Section 105 of PIA and all other similar provisions are contended to be contrary to the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right to life as it violate safe air and breathe for Nigerians in the exercise of their right to life.

Further to this, the Court of Appeal, in determining whether flare penalties were part of deductible tax, in the case of *MOBILE v FIRS* (2021) held inter alia that gas flaring was contrary to the fundamental right to life of Nigerians and constitutes gross violation of the environment in which life itself consist. In explaining the import of section 3 of the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 1979, Obande Festus Ogbuinya, J.C.A. delivering the Leading Judgment said inter alia:

It is discernible from the collective provisions of the AGRA that there was no

programme/scheme for associated gas which mingled/mixed up with crude oil prior to 1979. The AGRA was promulgated to cure that defect by compelling companies, involved in oil production, to fashion out schemes/programmes for the utilisation or re-injection of associated gas. It also provides it in its Section 3, which is the subject of interpretation, for cessation of gas flaring or its existence with the censor of the Minister of Petroleum Resources through the instrumentality of his certificate. The reason is not far-fetched. Gas flaring heats up the atmosphere and occasions climate change with its caustic consequences. It creates inhospitable environment/milieu as it inflicts unbearable heat to man and expose him to flood of health hazards. It constitutes a serious danger to the marine ecosystem. Hence, its continuance in Nigeria has to receive the Minister's superintendence pro bono publico. That is a sure way to dethrone/banish the mischief inherent in gas flaring which was indiscriminate before the birth of the AGRA (*Mobil v FIRS* 2021).

Gas flaring itself is contrary to the constitution of Nigeria and the African Charter. However, if gas must be flared, it should be done after the fulfilment of the condition precedent which is certification by the minister (*Mobil v FIRS*, 2021). This paper had argued that the certification for gas flaring contravenes citizens right to safe and unpolluted air/environment; yet, the multinationals do not comply with the requirement for certificate to flare in most cases as explained by the Court of Appeal in Mobil case above.

### **Some Judicial Perspectives on Right to Unpolluted Environment**

In *Urgenda Foundation v The State of Netherlands* (2018) the case was filed to challenge whether the State had a duty to impose further reduction on greenhouse gas emissions above the limit already established in the Dutch climate policy. The Court in Netherlands held that the State should be concerned with mitigating measures geared at reducing greenhouse emission within the

limits already set, not above it, for the common good of the citizens. It furthered that the State's options are limited by the principles of private-law and the principles of fairness to the future generations. The Court urged that it is an established fact that climate change is a global problem and therefore requires global accountability. Every State party to the global commitments must and should keep to the minimum emission requirement on the bases that 'prevention is better than cure'. The Court concluded that the State has a duty of care to take mitigating measures to protecting the air and the effects on the life of its citizens.

It is argued that the facts might be different but the principle to take for Nigerian Courts are that State should be held accountable for domesticated treaties and international instruments it acceded to and national policy documents, on one hand; and, on the other hand, the multinational companies must be held to account for their actions which exceeds the limits for time within which it should respond to environmental damage, clean-up standards and methods as well as the adequacies of the clean up and consequences for failure to adhere to the laws, regulation and national policy of Nigeria. Those limits should be interpreted as the irreducible minimum requirements for the oil and gas companies in Nigeria whenever the Courts are saddled with the responsibility to interpret such policy, regulations or laws. The Court, it is argued, should maintain the posture of improving and protecting private citizens, their lives and livelihood, and the Nigerian environment against multinationals (sections 13&20, Nigerian Constitution, 1999)

In *Gbemre v SPDC* (2005), the matter was instituted by Mr Jonah Gbemre for himself and on the behalf of the Iwherekhan Community of Delta State Nigeria against the SPDC, NNPC and the Attorney General of the Federation. The issue was whether gas flaring violated the Plaintiffs right to life and healthy environment? The Federal High Court in Benin Edo State agreed with the Plaintiff that flaring

of gas constituted a breach of their fundamental human rights and ordered SPDC and the Nigerian government to cease gas flaring. The Court further held that the fundamental right to life and dignity of human person contained in the Constitution inevitably includes the right to clean, poison-free, pollution-free healthy environment; that the continued flaring of gas by the oil producing companies on the authorization by the federal government was a gross violation of the fundamental human rights enshrined in the Constitution. That the flaring of gas in the Community without complying with section 2 (2) Environmental Impact Assessment Act is illegal and violates their fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It finally held that section 3(2)(a)&(b) of AGRA 1979 and the Regulations made thereto as inconsistent with sections 33 & 34 CFRN 1999 as amended and Articles 4,16 &24 of African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act and are therefore unconstitutional, null and void.

The Courts have successfully linked the relationships which exist between the human environment and the human life. The existence of the human life and the right to life will be defeated if there is no right to safe unpolluted environment (*SERAC v Nigeria case*). The constitution of Nigeria contemplates that the National Assembly or the Courts shall in the discharge of their duties for the nation provide for a safe unpolluted environment. It is not a new idea, it had been muted by International Courts (*Hung v Slovak*) like the Indian Court (Krishnakumar, 1999), the Courts in Hague(Friday Akpan's case) and American Courts. Treaties and Charters of civilised nations had provided for this feat: humans live and have their being in an environment which comprises of air, water, land, plants and animals as well as biotic and non-biotic which if altered beyond proportion would defeat the essence of life and the right to life (Moenne-Loccoz et al, 2015).

## Conclusion and Recommendation

The right to life includes the right to safe unpolluted environment satisfactory for human development (*SERAC v Nigeria*). The right to life is enshrined in section 33 of the Nigerian Constitution and Article 24 of the African Charter provided for right to environment. Both laws are applicable in Nigeria and as such solidified the right to life and safe unpolluted environment envisaged by the constitution. The attitude of the Nigerian Courts have advanced the argument and put paid to it that right to life included right to safe unpolluted environment (*Mobil v FIRS*). It is therefore recommended, that any law which is contrary to the constitution should be declared void to the extent of such inconsistencies (section1(3), Nigerian Constitution).

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## CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY IN NIGERIA

**Upa Callistus Terungwa**  
**Tsavhembra Lubem**

Department of Geography  
College of Education, Katsina-Ala, Benue State, Nigeria  
Email: upacallistus@gmail.com; lubem91@gmail.com



### Abstract

The paper examines causes and consequences of environmental degradation and implication for environmental sustainability in Nigeria. The environment can no longer be viewed as an entity separate from the economy. Environmental degradation is of many types and has many consequences. To address this challenge a number of studies have been conducted in both developing and developed countries applying different methods to capture health benefits from improved environmental quality. Minimizing exposure to environmental risk factors by enhancing air quality and access to improved sources of drinkable and bathing water, sanitation and clean energy is found to be associated with significant health benefits and can contribute significantly to the achievement of the development goals of environmental sustainability, health and development. The paper provides mitigation measures of environmental degradation such as purchase recycled products, conserve water, do not litter or throw waste into inappropriate places, conserve energy, join an awareness group, talk with others about the impacts of environmental degradation and as well practice agricultural regenerative farming system. The paper recommends that with sound planning, public awareness and community participation, future environmental degradation can be prevented

**Keywords:** Causes, sustainable development, environment, climate change, planning

### Introduction

Environmental degradation is a wide-reaching problem and it is likely to influence the health of human population greatly. Environmental degradation is the deterioration of the environment through depletion of natural resources such as air, water and soil; the destruction of ecosystems and the extinction of wildlife. Environmental degradation may be defined as any change or disturbance to the environment perceived to be deleterious or undesirable. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2006) defines environmental degradation as *“The reduction of the capacity of the environment to meet social and ecological objectives, and needs”*. The primary cause of environmental

degradation is human disturbance. The degree of the environmental impact varies with the cause, the habitat and the plants and animals that inhabit it. Humans and their activities are a major source of environmental degradation (Wikipedia.com, 2024). Worldwide the greatest effects on the health of individuals and populations result from environmental degradation and social injustice (Martin, 2003). Causes include overpopulation, air and water pollution, deforestation, global warming, unsustainable agricultural and fishing practices, overconsumption, maldistribution of wealth, the rise of the corporation, the Third World debt crisis, and militarization and wars (Swati, Neelam and

Rajan, 2014). Mining is also a destructive development activity where ecology suffers at the altar of economy. Scientific mining operations accompanied by ecological restoration and regeneration of mined wastelands and judicious use of geological resources, with search for eco-friendly substitutes and alternatives must provide sensational revelation to the impact of mining on human ecosystem (Chauhan, 2010).

Consequences include increased poverty, overcrowding, famine, weather extremes, species loss, acute and chronic medical illnesses, war and human rights abuses, and an increasingly unstable global situation.

The major causes of the environmental pollution are modern urbanization, industrialization, over-population growth, deforestation among others. There are two types of air pollutants: Primary pollutants are those that directly contribute to air pollution. Sulfur dioxide emitted from factories is the main pollutant. Secondary pollutants are formed as a result of mixing and reaction of primary pollutants. Smog is a secondary pollutant resulting from the mixing of smoke and fog (Satsita, Elina and Aishat, 2023). Environmental pollution refers to the degradation of quality and quantity of natural resources. Different kinds of the human activities are the main reasons of environmental degradation. This has led to environment changes that have become harmful to all living beings. The smoke emitted by the vehicles and factories increases the amount of poisonous gases in the air. Mostly, we can see pollution in urban areas where population is increasing rapidly. The waste products, smoke emitted by vehicles and industries are the main causes of pollution. Unplanned urbanization and industrialization have caused water, air and sound pollution. Urbanization and industrialization help to increase pollution of the sources of water. Similarly, the smoke emitted by vehicles and industries like Chlorofluorocarbon, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide and other dust

particles pollute air, and another cause of environmental degradation is sound pollution (Swati, Neelam, and Rajan, 2014). The main causes of sound pollution are vehicles, loud speaker, mill industries among others. The excessive use of natural resources diminishes these resources and creates imbalance of the environment and as such, results in the over consumption of natural resources. Deforestation, over use of pesticides, chemical fertilizer and insecticides, congested housing or unmanaged urbanization, industrialization and production of litters, sewages and garages among others are the major reasons to deteriorate quality of the environment. Deforestation provokes the wildlife and other organism to the verge of extinction. The forest areas have been cleared for agricultural land, settlement and to collect the useful herbs. This results in environmental degradation.

Global warming is another result of environmental degradation. The temperature of the earth is rising warmer and warmer and due to rise in temperature, the polar icecaps melting and the ice colder regions are not thick as it was before (Swati, Neelam and Rajan, 2014). Many species are lost day by day due to various activities of the human beings. The life of the creature will be in danger if environment goes on deteriorating in the same way.

## **Causes of Environmental Degradation**

### **Air pollution**

Air pollution is unfortunately the common cause of environmental degradation. Pollution introduces contaminants into the environment that can maim or even kill plant and animal species. Industry and automobiles are the primary and secondary contributors to air pollution worldwide (Kay, 1999). Air pollution can be defined as the occurrence of chemical compounds in the atmospheric air that are toxic and present at concentrations that may be injurious to animals, vegetation, buildings, and humans (Prince, Ugochukwu and Chibuzo,

2020). Broadly speaking, air pollution suggests the presence of chemical compounds in the air, which are not present originally but have resulted in the decrease in the quality of air.

A reduction of air pollution is expected to reduce the global burden of disease from respiratory infections, heart disease, and lung cancer (Mark and Morey, 2000). As air quality is a major concern for both developed and developing countries, a large number of empirical studies attempting to monetize the benefits to health generated by improved air quality have appeared in the literature worldwide (Kyriaki and Phoebe, 2009). For every gallon of gasoline manufactured, distributed, and then burned in a vehicle, 25 pounds of carbon dioxide are produced, along with carbon monoxides, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and particulate matter; these emissions contribute to increased global warming (Martin, 2003; Mark, 1997).

A recent, dramatic example occurred with the large wildfires in Canada, which have had significant environmental impacts extending far beyond the country's borders (Vilcins, Rebecca, Jin-Ho & Siti, 2024).

The main conclusion from the literature review is that some forms of air pollution, notably inhalable particulate matter and ambient lead, are serious matters for concern in the developing world since they are associated with severe health damages in monetary terms (Martin, 2003).

### **Water pollution**

Microbe contamination of groundwater due to sewage outfalls and high concentration of nutrients in marine and coastal waters due to agricultural runoff are among the most serious threats. Contact with unsafe drinking or bathing water can impose serious risks (both acute and delayed) to human health. While tap water is subject to treatment and is required to meet detailed testing and purity standards, it is not always disinfected of diarrhea inducing microorganisms, as illustrated by waterborne disease outbreaks

such as that caused by *Cryptosporidium* in Milwaukee in 1993, which affected over 400,000 people. Agriculture significantly contributes to water pollution through the runoff of pesticides, fertilizers, and animal waste, which can contaminate rivers and lakes, causing algae blooms and oxygen deprivation (Shyman, 2024).

Today 40% of waters are unfit for fishing or swimming, and levels of mercury in fish in 40 states. Discharge of untreated sewage is the single most important cause for pollution of surface and ground water in the India (Pradip, Ajim, Anwar and Zhou, 2020).

Pradip, Ajim, Anwar and Zhou (2020) in a National Resources Defense Council study of the quality of bottled water found out that approximately one-fifth of samples exceeded bacterial purity guidelines and/or safe levels of arsenic or other synthetic organic chemicals. Between 25% and 40% of bottled water was merely repackaged municipal tap water (Pradip, Ajim, Anwar and Zhou, 2020). Effluents are another by-product of industries which poses threat to the environment, leather and tanning industries, petroleum industries and chemical manufacturing industries create major waste products which are released directly into nearby streams without treatment, creating river pollution and causing harm to aquatic life (Amicus Journal Staff, 2000).

### **Toxic pollutants**

Waste is considered toxic if it is poisonous, radioactive, explosive, carcinogenic (causing cancer), mutagenic (causing damage to chromosomes), teratogenic (causing birth defects), or bioaccumulative (that is, increasing in concentration at the higher ends of foodchains). Sources of toxic chemicals include improperly disposed wastewater from industrial plants and chemical process facilities (lead, mercury, chromium) as well as surface runoff containing pesticides used on agricultural areas and suburban lawns (Jerry, 2024).

Additionally, 2.2 billion pounds per year of pesticides (eight pounds per citizen) are sprayed on our crops (Natural Resources Defense Council Staff, 1995). Annual world production of synthetic organic chemicals has grown exponentially since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The vast majority of artificial chemicals have never been screened for toxicity. Chemical manufacturers are not required to prove safety; instead the legal burden is on the government to prove that a product is dangerous, and testing only done after a substance has been impugned. Certain pesticides that are illegal in the United States are used in other countries on food which is then imported back into the US, exposing Americans to the same health risks faced by individuals in those other countries (Swati, Neelam, and Rajan, 2014). Fertilizers and pesticides used in agriculture have been found in rivers, lakes and ground water. Flooding worsens water pollution problem, as it washes and moves all sorts of solid garbage and contaminated soils into rivers and wetlands.

### **Deforestation**

Tropical forest constitutes seven percent of world land surface area, yet contains over 50% of all plant and animal species. Half of all tropical forests have been destroyed. Additionally, 20–50% of global wetlands have been destroyed (54% thus far in the US, with an additional 115,000 acres/year), (Sierra Club Staff, 2000). Loss of old growth forest has recently particularly affected the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia, known as the ‘Brazil of the North’, an allusion to the devastation wrought by the unsustainable, rapacious logging practices of multinational corporations in the Amazon (Swati, Neelam and Rajan, 2014). Deforestation is proxied by the expansion of agricultural land. This is because agricultural land expansion is generally viewed as the main source of deforestation contributing around 60 per cent of total tropical deforestation (Sierra Club Staff, 2000).

The highest rate of deforestation is found in tropical rainforests. Nowadays, trees cover 31% of the planet’s land surface. One-third of the forest cover that existed before agriculture was developed has been lost, with the previous century accounting for half of that loss (Lai, 2022).

Increasing frequency and intensity of fires due to anthropogenic climate change, enhanced by forest fragmentation and weed invasion, is predicted to result in transition of large areas of forest to woodland or savannah (Williams, Ford, Rosauer, Silva, Mittermeier, Bruce & Margules, 2011).

### **Solid waste pollution**

Trash and garbage is a common sight in urban and rural areas. It is a major source of pollution. Indian cities alone generate more than 100 million tons of solid waste a year (Swati, Neelam, and Rajan, 2014). Street corners are piled with trash. Public places and sidewalks are despoiled with filth and litter, rivers and canals act as garbage dumps. Cities and towns have waste collection employees. However, these are unionised government workers and their work performance is neither measured nor monitored. Some of the few solid waste landfills, near major cities, are overflowing and poorly managed. They have become significant sources of greenhouse emissions and breeding sites for disease vectors such as flies, mosquitoes, cockroaches, rats, and other pests.

Waste management is not properly done in most towns in Nigeria. Most parts of urban areas do not benefit from public waste disposal services, which makes residents sort for other options such as burying or burning their waste therefore disposing it haphazardly.

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Waste management is not properly done in most towns in Nigeria. Most parts of urban areas do not benefit from public waste disposal services, which makes residents sort for other options such as burying or burning their waste therefore disposing it haphazardly (Sylvester, 2021).

It was observed that residents in many urban areas of Nigeria do not carry out efficient solid- waste management practices. They dispose their waste in burrow pits, road sides, and drainages. This finding is consistent with the work of Ogwueleka (2003) in Nsukka Nigeria, who reported that people dump waste at any vacant plot, public space, and river or burn them in their backyard, thereby polluting the air. Babayemi and Dauda (2009) reported a high waste generation rate in Abeokuta without a corresponding efficient technology to manage the wastes

### **Global Warming**

“The foremost evidence for worldwide climate change has been global warming.” It is one of the important factors contributing to environmental degradation and disasters. Evidence indicates that the Earth’s climate system is warming in a way that has no precedent in the history of human civilization. The continuing temperature acceleration might break the balance of a human ecosystem that has been long established at a lower temperature. The latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (2023) estimates a rise in the global average surface temperature from 1990 to 2100 of between 1.8° C and 4° C, although it could possibly be as high as 6.4° C. The sea level has risen between 1993 and 2003 at a rate of 3.1 millimeters per year due to melting polar ice caps and seawater expansion (due to warmer climate); rainfall patterns have been changing with increased droughts in some areas and heavier rain in others; glaciers and snow melting have been increasing water in rivers at certain times; winds are increasing in power and cyclones are shown to be increasing in

frequency; and ocean temperatures have been rising.

Global warming is likely to influence the average weather patterns by gradual changes in weather patterns and “increased variability of extreme weather events associated with changes in surface temperature and precipitation. In the last few decades, ninety percent of natural disasters have been caused by climate-related natural hazards; and there is scientific evidence that most of them have their roots in global warming (Swati, Neelam, and Rajan, 2014). The effects of warming and drying in some regions will reduce agriculture potential and undermine “ecosystem services” such as clean water and fertile soil. Thus, the environmental impacts as a result of global warming have a deleterious effect on the living environment of large populations, which ultimately leads to mass migration(Swati, Neelam, and Rajan, 2014).

### **Drought, Desertification, and Water Scarcity**

Drought and water scarcity is the third main climate change impact that may significantly contribute to climate-related migration. Droughts, desertification, and water scarcity are likely to increase because of global warming. These phenomena are projected to affect about one-third of the world’s current population. Droughts are likely to displace millions of people all over the world, affecting food insecurity and human livelihoods. Sea level rise will extend areas of salinisation of groundwater and estuaries, resulting in a decrease in freshwater availability for humans and ecosystems in coastal areas. (Swati, Neelam, and Rajan, 2014). Moreover, changing precipitation patterns create pressures on the availability of clean water supplies. Although water is considered a renewable resource, in many parts of the world, water resources have become so depleted or contaminated that they are unable to meet ever-increasing demands. The challenges are more acutely felt in developing countries where 95% of the world’s new

population is born each year (United Nations, 2007). The over-dependence of rural communities on fuel wood to meet their energy requirements has contributed to massive deforestation and biodiversity loss, leading to soil erosion, land degradation and water shortages through the situation of water sources, rivers and dams (United Nations, 2007).

### **Consequences of Environmental Degradation**

Environmental degradation is a result of socio-economical, technological and institutional activities. Degradation occurs when earth's natural resources are depleted. The resources which are affected include water, air and soil (Swati, Neelam, and Rajan, 2014). The degradation also impacts our wildlife, plants, animals and micro-organisms. Our land, water and soil are compromised when people exhaust resources or release harmful chemicals into the air. Deforestation, wasting resources, and pollution all add to the demise of an environmentally-sound and safe planet. When factories produce harmful chemicals and toxic waste into bodies of water, humans suffer. Pesticides and fertilizers can also get into a region's water system and pollute it. Drinking water is contaminated. People are highly affected by the degradation of our planet and these unhealthy practices cause the illnesses, death in children and adults. As humans dump waste products, use chemicals, and over fish in the oceans and seas, areas of beauty such as coral reefs are damaged. At times the destruction is so great that it cannot be reversed. We are killing our planet and the consequences are tremendous.

### **Mitigation Measures**

There are ways which can help to decrease degradation in our environment. Some of these include: • Purchase recycled products • Conserve water • Do not litter or throw waste into inappropriate places • Conserve energy • Join an awareness group • Talk with others

about the impacts of environmental degradation (Swati, Neelam, and Rajan, 2014).

According to Philippe (2023) regenerative farming is an agricultural practice that focuses on restoring the health of the soil and reversing environmental damage. This practice works to rebuild soil fertility, increase biodiversity, and reduce the use of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. Regenerative farming also works to improve water retention and reduce water runoff, which can help to reduce soil erosion and improve water quality. Through the use of cover crops, crop rotation, and other practices, regenerative farming helps to improve soil structure, increase organic matter, and promote healthy microbial activity in the soil.

In addition to improving soil health, regenerative farming also works to restore biodiversity by increasing the number of beneficial insects, birds, and other wildlife. This helps to create a more balanced ecosystem that can better resist pests and diseases. By reducing the use of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, regenerative farming also helps to protect waterways from contamination.

**Tree Planting:** Planting trees is an effective way to prevent environmental degradation. Trees absorb carbon dioxide and other pollutants from the air, helping to reduce air pollution. They also provide shade and shelter, helping to reduce the urban heat island effect and evaporation. Trees also help to reduce soil erosion by stabilizing the soil with their roots.

**Savings & Loan Opportunities:** Savings and loan opportunities can be an effective tool in preventing environmental degradation. By providing access to capital for projects that promote sustainability, or that simply provide families with a non-destructive means to grow financially and overcome poverty.

**Spiritual Renewal:** This spiritual renewal can lead to stewardship: more mindful consumption, greater respect for the



environment, and more sustainable practices. Additionally, it can inspire us to take action to protect the environment, such as engaging in conservation efforts, reducing waste, and advocating for environmental policies.

### Conclusion and Recommendation

Environmental degradation is one of most urgent of environmental issues. Depending upon the damage, some environments may never recover. The plants and animals that inhabited these places will be lost forever. In order to reduce any future impacts, city planners, industry, and resource managers must consider the long term effects of development on the environment. With sound planning, public awareness and community participation, future environmental degradation can be prevented. So, to live happy and prosperous life we must conserve our environment and should emphasize on Environmental Degradation and its effects.

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## CULTURAL HYBRIDIZATION OF WASTE DISPOSAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION METHODS IN WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

**Godwin Etta Odok**

**Doris Lami Madugu**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [godwinodok2000@yahoo.com](mailto:godwinodok2000@yahoo.com)



### Abstract

This study examines factors influencing waste disposal and environmental sanitation practices among the Jukun people of Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State. Waste management is the process of collecting, transporting, processing, disposing and monitoring of waste materials. The study adopted the descriptive cross-sectional research design which involved a sample size of 400 respondents selected from the total population of 374, 800 persons. Data in the study were analyzed using descriptive statistics of frequency counts and percentages. The study results emphasized that modern waste disposal methods coexist harmoniously with traditional waste disposal methods in Wukari Local Government Area. Also, open burning emerges as a commonly practiced traditional waste disposal method which has become a cultural norm. The study's results underscore the importance of understanding cultural contexts in designing effective waste management strategies within Jukun communities in Wukari Local Government Area. The study concludes that waste disposal and environmental sanitation practices in Wukari Local Government Area are influenced by cultural norms, community engagement strategies, and enforcement mechanisms. Overall, the study emphasizes the importance of culture-centred interventions, collaborative approaches, and continual evaluation in fostering sustainable environmental sanitation and waste management in Wukari Local Government Area. The study recommends that there is need for the Wukari Local Government Council and relevant community-based organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to develop and implement appropriate environmental education programmes that are culture-specific in Wukari Local Government Area.

**Keywords:** Waste disposal, Jukun, environmental education, public health, culture

### Introduction

Waste management is the process of collecting, transporting, processing, disposing and monitoring of waste materials. The term usually relates to materials produced by human activity and the process is generally undertaken to reduce their effect on human health, the environment or aesthetics. In seeking to explain the different traditional waste disposal methods in Jukun culture; this study examines suitable locations to dispose waste in Jukun culture; identify persons responsible to ensure environmental sanitation within the community in Jukun

culture; evaluate the punishment meted to persons who violate environmental sanitation regulations in Jukun culture. Waste includes all items that people no longer have any use for, which they either intend to get rid of or have already discarded and these include used clothing materials, packing items, garden wastes, old paints containers, vegetables, metals (Daven & Klein 2008). Poor waste management has been a major problem to human health and existence, affecting both rural and urban areas. A clean environment influences good health and good health

further affects the productivity of man. Therefore, it can be said that a good and clean environment invariably affects the wealth and economic status of the nation. There are various methods of waste disposal including land filling, which involves burying the waste in abandoned or unused quarries, mining voids or burrow pits and covering it with layers of soil. Incineration involves subjection of solid organic wastes to combustion at a very high temperature of about 10,000 so as to convert them into residue or gaseous products. Open dumping is where waste can be dump on open land or sea. Composting, this is an aerobic, biological process of degradation of biodegradable organic matter. Hog feeding, this involves feeding animals like pigs with left over materials of waste. Mechanical destructor, this involves the use of machines to destroy waste materials. Recycling of waste which means taking waste materials and transforming them into raw products; resulting in saving natural resources, saving energy, reducing disposal costs, reducing harmful emission to air and water, saving money and creating jobs.

Banga (2011) has shown that awareness and knowledge of waste disposal is influenced by many factors. In their own study, Ayodeji, Ifegbesan and Soluade (2018) revealed that the waste management awareness level, knowledge and practices of secondary school teachers in Taraba State and it showed that teachers were aware and knowledgeable about waste management even though they possessed negative waste management practices. There seems to be appreciable awareness and knowledge about waste disposal among people in Nigeria but most of them are only aware of the crude and traditional methods and are oblivious of the modern methods such as incineration and recycling. Momoh and Oladebeye (2010) believed that the attitude of people towards waste management can be affected by their level of knowledge and awareness of waste management. They reported that homes with

waste bins engage more in proper storage of wastes than homes without waste bins. Study has also revealed that attitudes toward recycling and waste management are not significantly influenced by gender, employment and educational statuses (Momoh & Oladebeye, 2010).

About 1.3 billion tons of wastes are generated globally, and about 0.035% of this global wastes come from Nigeria (Orhorhoro, Ebunilo & Sadjere, 2017). Interestingly, households generate about 85.8% of Nigerian wastes (Orhorhoro, Ebunilo & Sadjere, 2017). It is estimated that an average Nigerian in the urban or rural areas generates about 0.49 kg of solid waste per day with household and commercial centres contributing almost 10% of total urban waste burden (Francisco, 2018). However, about two thirds of wastes are dumped indiscriminately on the streets and in the drains thus posing serious environmental health hazards (Orhorhoro, Ebunilo & Sadjere, 2017). Human wastes are great contributors of environmental health hazards. Poor waste practices lead to contamination of edible products thereby increasing the burden of infection and diseases among citizens.

Poor waste management and disposal could lead to various diseases, infections and infestation and these include fly transmitted diseases such as myiasis, diarrhea, typhoid, cholera. Rodent transmitted disease such as Lassa fever, leptospirosis, murine typhus. Mosquito borne diseases such as malaria, yellow fever, filariasis and dengue hemorrhagic fever (Sobsey, Khatib, Hill, Alocilja & Pillai, 2006). Nevertheless, gases like methane, carbon dioxide, hydrogen Sulphur and mercury vapour emitted from land fill sites can constitute air contaminants and pollution. Waste management and disposal is usually complicated in the absence of storage facilities (such as waste bins with tight fitted covers). Without these there is usually the littering of refuse around the houses and public places.

In Wukari, waste disposal and environmental sanitation present a complex scenario. It often

faces challenges with inadequate waste management infrastructure, leading to open dumping and littering of wastes. Wukari residents rely on informal waste pickers for recycling. There are no known government initiatives promoting waste separation and recycling in Wukari Local Government Area. However, enforcement and infrastructure development remain key areas for improvement (Goulart Coelho, Lange & Coelho, 2017).

Traditional waste disposal and environmental sanitation practices among the Jukun people of Wukari Local Government Area are deeply embedded in cultural norms. This include techniques such as composting organic waste for agricultural purposes, using natural materials for packaging, or employing controlled burning of certain types of waste. Most often in this context, waste management involves traditional communal efforts (Goulart Coelho, Lange & Coelho, 2017; Smith 1996). In attempts to understand the cultural motivations of waste management practices among the Jukun people of Wukari Local Government Area, this paper discusses cultural factors that influenced waste management and environmental sanitation practices among the Jukun people of Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State, Nigeria. The paper is divided into four major parts. The first part reviewed the literature on issues around traditional solid waste management practices across Nigeria. The second part discussed the theoretical orientations within which analyses in the paper occurred. The third part of the paper explained the methodological approach through which data for the paper emerged. The fourth part of the paper discussed the study's findings which expound the cultural hybridization of waste management and environmental sanitation practices among the Jukun people of Wukari Local Government Area. The paper concluded by emphasizing the importance of culture-centred interventions, collaborative approaches, and continual evaluation in

fostering sustainable environmental sanitation and waste management in Wukari Local Government Area. Thus, it was recommended that there is need for the Wukari Local Government Council and relevant community-based organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to develop and implement appropriate environmental education programmes that are culture-specific in Wukari Local Government Area.

### **Traditional Solid Waste Management Strategy (TSWMS) in Nigeria**

Most often, the process of waste management starts with waste generation. At this stage, waste characterization seldom takes place. The second stage of waste management is followed by the collection of these wastes either in bags or receptacles; and then waste transportation; and finally, to waste disposal sites. Each of these stages has its benefits and challenges. In traditional solid waste management, waste generation and characterization is a fundamental step taken for effective waste management. In a study by Sha'Ato et al. (2007) that revealed the waste generation profile of Makurdi in North-Central Nigeria. It was reported that the bulk of the solid waste generated in Makurdi originated from households than from commercial, institutional and industrial premises. The wastes here consist of majorly putrescible materials, ash, dust and sand. In a similar study in Abuja, Nigeria ((Bassey et al., 2006); results showed that solid medical wastes constitute the sizeable volume of wastes generated by health outfits and hospitals in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The study emphasized that of the total solid waste generated daily, 26.5% was hazardous in nature and waste segregation was found not to be practiced by any of the hospitals sampled in Abuja, Nigeria. Similarly, Fadipe et al. (2011) pointed out that medical wastes in Osun state are not being properly disposed of and as such, pathology wastes such as unclaimed dead bodies, placentas, umbilical cords are being dumped into unlined

pits and other wastes in open dumps. A comparative analysis of municipal solid waste (MSW) composition in three local government areas in Rivers State revealed that waste generation rate was 0.45, 0.98 and 1.16 kg per capita, per day for Emougha, Obio/Akpor and Port Harcourt Local Government Areas respectively, respectively (Babatunde et al., 2013). The most prominent categories of wastes that were identified in the study were organic waste, paper and nylon. Mean percentage composition was 59, 65.5, 65 respectively for organic waste; 6, 11 and 13% for paper; and 14, 16 and 12% for nylon in Emougha, Obio/Akpor and Port Harcourt Local Government Areas respectively. Over the years, Nnaji (2015) noted that the rate of generation of plastics, waterproof materials and diapers in Nigeria has assumed an upward trend. Most food wastes were found to constitute close to 50 percent of overall municipal solid wastes in Nigerian cities (Nnaji, 2015; Aliyu, 2010). Due to the dysfunctional state of many municipal waste management authorities, many cities in Nigeria have been overrun by open dumps (Nnaji, 2015). Nnaji (2015) advocates that there is need for both governments at all levels and individuals to adopt holistic and sustainable waste management strategies in order to safeguard public and environmental health. Also, sustained cooperation should be developed among all key actors (governments, waste managers, public health workers and residents) to implement economic, sustainable, and reliable waste management systems in Nigeria (Olukanni & Mnenga, 2015).

Aliu et al. (2014) and Ogwueleka (2009) had noted that waste collection and disposal are the major problems faced by developing countries in solid waste management. Also, these constitute the most difficult operational problems faced by most urban areas in Nigeria. Udoh and Inyang (2016) in their study showed that common solid waste collection problems in Nigeria range from singular dumpsites which usually result to inherent

routing issues; singular type of waste receptacle used for all categories of waste; size of waste bins not considered for overpopulated areas leading to opened receptacles, and overflow of wastes which subsequently serves as a breeding ground for rodents, fleas, vermin and mosquitoes.

Olukanni et al. (2016) identified local factors affecting solid waste collection in Nigeria as ranging from poor management infrastructure; poor attitudes to waste management; weak policies; lack of sufficient funds to power the waste management sector; household economic status and adhoc location of most waste management facilities.

In tackling these challenges, Egbu and Okoroigwe (2015) noted that the collection of urban household solid waste traditionally rests on government agencies designated with such responsibilities. Adding that for effective waste collection, household patronage of informal private solid waste collectors, as against government provided community/street collection containers were to be encouraged. Similarly, Aliu et al. (2014) revealed several strategies that have been applied for efficient municipal solid waste management in developing societies, they advocated for strong positive public-private partnership as a waste collection policy framework to solve solid collection problems in Nigeria. Olukanni and Mnenga (2015) argued that there is no investment presently made on the existing development plan to initiate a modern waste collection system thereby calling for innovative remedies to curb the problem. Hammed et al. (2016) and Oloruntade et al. (2014) believed that other remedies to the underlining problems surrounding the collection and transportation of solid wastes in Nigeria had been identified to include: the integration and collaboration of all stakeholders through broad-based sensitization and communication of effective and sustainable waste management as well as the need for sustainable waste management (SWM) cost-sharing between the government

and the people, enforcement of sanitary laws and adequate fund allocation for all concerned agencies, the involvement of private sector participation (PSP), and awareness campaigns. In similar manner, Ayantoyinbo and Adepoju (2018) identified street traffic congestion as a major problem of solid waste transportation and logistics in Nigeria's urban areas.

After waste is generated, collected and transported, the final step in the management process is the disposal of the waste. In some Nigerian cities and rural areas, the status of waste dumpsites, the continual emergence of illegal dumpsites has been as a result of a failed waste management system (Nnaji, 2015). Illegal dumpsites result to loss of aesthetic beauty, pose a danger to human health and the environment, causing the spread of diseases and the pollution of the entire environment (Momodu et al., 2011). For example, Ayotamuno and Gobo (2004) noted that Port Harcourt, the capital city of Rivers State was once celebrated as the Nigerian garden city because of its clean environment, beautiful vegetation and serene nature. However, this is no longer the case as there now exist pockets of refuse dumps littering in several areas of the once beautiful city

According to Nnaji (2015), more than 50 percent of residents of Maiduguri in Northern Nigeria and Ughelli in Southern Nigeria dispose of their waste in open dumps. Although open dumpsites disposal method is a commonly adopted method of disposal in Nigeria and other developing countries, which involves people disposing of their waste on open grounds most often indiscriminately, they are generally unsanitary, unsightly and smelly, attracting rats, insects, snakes and flies (Udoh & Inyang, 2016). Onwughara et al. (2010) reported other nonobvious implications of open dumpsites such as landfill gases and leachate which contributes to global warming and urban ozone problem thereby harming both humans and the natural

environment. Similarly, Aluko et al. (2003) reported characteristics of leachates found at dumpsites at Ibadan, Nigeria and the serious problems they pose to the land and water around them. Dumpsites in the southern part of Nigeria are largely unsuitable owing to the highly waterlogged characteristics of the region (Leton & Omotosho, 2004). This calls for geological assessment of areas before designing dumpsites.

Although, there are many other forms and methods of waste disposal outside landfilling, such as composting (Sha'Ato, 2007), waste reuse, source reduction and recycling (Longe et al., 2009) and incineration (Somorin et al., 2017; Onwughara et al., 2010), the option chosen should be beneficial to the environment and should require less energy, less resource use and limited pollution rate. As observed by Kofoworola (2007), the treatment of waste in Nigeria rarely occurs; thus, collected waste that are transported to dumpsites are burnt most often to reduce the volume of waste which results in air pollution and the release of harmful gases to the atmosphere. To this effect, Longe et al. (2009) advise the adoption of waste reduction, recycling and reuse as an alternative.

#### Constraints and Challenges of Traditional Solid Waste Management in Nigeria

Amasuomo and Baird (2016) noted that the overall management of solid waste in Nigeria is poor. Various studies (Oyeniya, 2011; Oguntoyinbo, 2012; Amuda et al., 2014; Olukanni et al., 2016) have highlighted various challenges facing SWM in Nigeria across various states. Some of these challenges include inadequate environmental policies and legislations (Agunwamba, 1998; Nzeadibe & Anyadike, 2012; Ezeah & Robert, 2014), which points out loop holes in policies and non-existence of policies in some states towards waste management. Although good policies exist, implementation remains a challenge. Other challenges include poor funding, low level of government support,

limited environmental awareness, inadequate facilities, corruption, politics, inappropriate technology, urbanization and low public participation (Ayotamuno & Gobo, 2004; Kofoworola 2007; Imam et al. 2008; Ogwueleka, 2009b; Solomon, 2009).

Amalu and Ajake (2014) revealed that public awareness and participation is one of the remedies to the problems of waste management in Nigeria, they advocate for the need for community education programmes to adequately educate the people on environmental issues. Ezeah and Roberts (2014) revealed that there exist low levels of public education on municipal solid waste among the sample population in Abuja, as such, proposed a sustained public education on waste prevention, management and reuse. In the same line, Nwosu and Okoye (2019) proposed a framework for sustainable public participation in waste management. As it is evident in various other studies, (Wahab & Kehinde, 2014; Amuda et al., 2014; Maiyaki et al., 2018), where they promote public participation, non-governmental participation, private sector participation and stakeholders participation in waste management over the years, the problem of solid waste management still exist.

Uwadiwegwu (2013) argues that effective solid waste management can also be achieved through citizen mobilization and environmental education, strengthening of public agencies, a responsible government, logistics and infrastructural improvement, legislation, appropriate technologies, monitoring and surveillance. Agunwamba (1998) advocates the need for a holistic programme commonly ignored in waste programmes that integrates all the economic, technical, cultural, social and psychological factors in conjunction with the adoption of a more modern management practice so as to achieve efficiency in waste management.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The exploration of traditional methods of waste disposal and environmental sanitation among the Jukun people of Wukari Local

Government Area, Taraba State can be understood through the lens of cultural ecology and environmental anthropology. Cultural ecology examines the relationship between culture and the environment, emphasizing how cultural practices are adapted to and influenced by the natural surroundings. Environmental anthropology, on the other hand, studies the ways in which different societies perceive, interact with, and manage their environments.

By applying Steward's cultural ecology framework, researchers can delve into the intricacies of Jukun waste disposal practices, considering the ecological constraints and opportunities that have influenced the development of these practices over time. Additionally, the insights from environmental anthropology can provide a nuanced understanding of the cultural beliefs and social dynamics that underpin the Jukun people's approach to environmental sanitation. This combined theoretical framework contributes to a holistic comprehension of the relationship between culture, ecology, and waste management practices within the specific context of the Jukun community in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State.

Cultural ecology posits that human societies adapt their behaviours and practices to their environment. It explores how cultural systems shape and are shaped by the ecological context in which they exist.

In the exploration of traditional waste disposal methods among the Jukun people, one influential scholar in cultural ecology and environmental anthropology is Julian Steward (Adeleke, Akinlabi, Jen & Dunmade, 2021). Julian Steward's work in cultural ecology emphasizes the adaptive nature of cultures to their environments. His concept of "cultural ecology" underscores the dynamic relationship between culture and the environment, with cultures evolving in response to environmental conditions (Adeleke, Akinlabi, Jen & Dunmade, 2021).

Environmental anthropology examines the ways in which cultures conceptualize and



interact with their environment. It considers how cultural beliefs, norms, and practices influence environmental behaviours. The theory explores the cultural significance attached to certain disposal methods and how traditional beliefs and social norms shape waste management practices and environmental cleanliness.

### Research Methodology

The cross-sectional survey research design was adopted for this study. The population of the study consists of residents in Wukari Local Government Area, which is estimated at

329,669 (NPC, 2022). In determining the sample size for the study, the Taro Yamane formula was adopted where the sample size was calculated to be 400 respondents. The random sampling technique was used to select respondents across the ten legislative wards in Wukari Local Government Area. The questionnaire was the main instrument for data collection in the study. The data obtained from the study were analyzed using simple percentages and data were presented in tables and narrations.

### Socio-Demographics Characteristics of Respondents

| Variable                            | Number of Respondents | Percentage |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| <b>Sex</b>                          |                       |            |
| Female                              | 179                   | 46.61%     |
| Male                                | 205                   | 53.39%     |
| <b>Age</b>                          |                       |            |
| 16 – 21                             | 126                   | 32.81%     |
| 22 – 27                             | 184                   | 47.92%     |
| 28 – 32                             | 60                    | 15.63%     |
| 33 and above                        | 14                    | 3.65%      |
| <b>Marital Status</b>               |                       |            |
| Single                              | 237                   | 61.72%     |
| Married                             | 105                   | 27.34%     |
| Divorced                            | 27                    | 7.03%      |
| Widow/Widower                       | 5                     | 1.30%      |
| <b>Educational Qualification</b>    |                       |            |
| No formal education                 | 2                     | 0.51%      |
| Primary education                   | 7                     | 1.79%      |
| Secondary education                 | 6                     | 1.54%      |
| <b>Occupation</b>                   |                       |            |
| Student                             | 235                   | 79.39%     |
| Farming                             | 4                     | 1.35%      |
| Public/Civil Servant                | 100                   | 33.78%     |
| Artisan/Driving/Tailoring/Carpentry | 40                    | 13.51%     |
| Unemployed                          | 10                    | 3.38%      |

### Field Survey, 2024

Table 1.1 above shows the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. altogether, a total of 384 respondents responded to the administered questionnaire. Out of this total number of respondents, 46.0% of the

respondents were female (179 out of 384), while 54.0% were male (205 out of 384). This indicates a slightly higher representation of males in the sample compared to females. The study sample comprises individuals across

different age groups. The majority of respondents, 47.7%, fall within the age range of 22 to 27 years (184 out of 384). The age group of 16 to 21 years represents 32.6% of the sample (126 out of 384). There are fewer respondents in the older age groups, with 15.5% of respondents were aged 28 to 32 years (60 out of 384) and 3.6% of respondents were aged 33 years and above (14 out of 384).

Majority of respondents in the study, 61.4%, were single (237 out of 384). Married respondents account for 27.2% of the study's

sample (105 out of 384), while divorced respondents make up 7.0% (27 out of 384). Widow/widowers and separated respondents were 1.3% (5 out of 384) and 2.6% (10 out of 384) respectively. Majority of respondents, 95.6%, have tertiary education (369 out of 384), indicating a highly educated sample. For the occupational distribution of respondents, 60.8% of respondents were students (235 out of 384). Public/civil servants account for 25.9% of the sample (100 out of 384), while artisans represent 10.4% (40 out of 384).

**Cultural Hybridization of Waste Management and Environmental Sanitation Practices among the Jukun People of Wukari Local Government Area**

| Waste Disposal Methods in Jukun Culture  | Strongly Agree | Agree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree | Total | Percentage (%) |
|--|----------------|-------|----------|-------------------|-------|----------------|
| Open burning is a commonly practiced waste disposal method in Jukun culture.   | 190            | 179   | 9        | 6                 | 384   | 100.0          |
| Community in Jukun culture manages waste collectively through designated individuals/groups, community cleanup events, and communal waste bins     | 67             | 216   | 71       | 30                | 384   | 100.0          |
| There are specific cultural or traditional beliefs influencing waste disposal practices in Jukun culture   | 180            | 150   | 50       | 4                 | 384   | 100.0          |
| Modern waste disposal methods, such as municipal waste collection services, coexist with traditional waste disposal practices in Jukun communities | 200            | 174   | 6        | 4                 | 384   | 100.0          |

**Field Survey, 2024**

As revealed in table 2.1, a substantial number of respondents indicate that open burning is commonly practiced a method of wastes management and environmental sanitation in Wukari Local Government Area. Furthermore, there is a strong consensus that waste management is a collective effort which involves individuals and community groups. Cultural influences on waste disposal practices were well acknowledged in the study, highlighting the significance of traditional beliefs in shaping community behaviours. Interestingly, respondents overwhelmingly agree that there is a cultural hybridization of

waste management and environmental sanitation methods in Wukari Local Government Area where modern waste disposal methods coexist harmoniously with traditional practices, indicating a flexible approach to waste management in the area. These findings underscore the importance of understanding cultural contexts in designing effective waste management strategies within Jukun communities, balancing tradition with modernity for sustainable solutions.

The study results highlights a complex interplay of actors and institutions responsible for environmental sanitation within Jukun

culture. While the government is perceived as primarily responsible, there is also recognition of the role played by local authorities, traditional leaders, community groups, and organizations. This multi-faceted approach underscores the collaborative efforts involved in addressing waste management and environmental sanitation challenges.

Respondents hold diverse perspectives regarding the effectiveness of punishment for sanitation violations. While punishments are acknowledged, opinions vary on their deterrent value. However, there is consensus on active community participation in enforcing sanitation regulations, although concerns exist regarding the consistency and fairness of punishment application.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

This study underscores the complex interplay of factors influencing waste management, including cultural norms, governmental roles, community engagement, and enforcement mechanisms. Overall, the study emphasizes the importance of hybridized interventions, collaborative approaches, and continual evaluation in fostering sustainable environmental practices and public health outcomes within Wukari Local Government Area.

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## WASTE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND PREPONDERANCE OF FLOODS IN BARNAWA, KADUNA SOUTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA

**Balogun Joseph Olabode**

**Wali Itopa Ibrahim**

Urban and Regional Planning Department

Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria

Email: [jobalogun@abu.edu.ng](mailto:jobalogun@abu.edu.ng); [balogunjoe70@gmail.com](mailto:balogunjoe70@gmail.com)



### Abstract

Floods in Nigeria had done more harm without any notice of benefits. In the last 3 decades, Nigerian cities have experienced great physical development, in terms of building, manufacturing industries and others without any appreciable infrastructures such as drainages, roads and canals to support them. These have made floods to be a serious challenge that plague many Nigerian cities. Thus, this research study investigates the causes and impacts of flood in Banawa Area of Kaduna Kaduna State, Nigeria, and proffer recommendations to avert the future occurrence of flood in the area. The results of the research will expose Nigerian government to the strategies of mitigating any occurrence of flood, as well as enlighten the public on how to guide against the occurrence of flood. 166 questionnaires were administered to the residents of Banawa area to know the causes and impacts of flood in the area. The findings of this research show that there are poor waste management practices among the residents of Banawa. They engaged in indiscriminate waste dumps which have blocked the inadequate drainage available. There is high rate of building construction along water channels which usually results to floods. Many lives and properties have been destroyed by floods.

**Keywords:** Assessment, climate change, floods, infrastructure, drainage

### Introduction

The vision of Nigeria to be among the first top twenty nations with leading economy by the year 2030 may be a mirage, if lives and properties are not safe from the frequent occurrence of flood in the country. Flood is one of the major factors that prevent Africa's population from escaping poverty level (Action Aid, 2006). A flood results when a stream runs out of its confines and submerges surrounding areas (Stephen, 2011). Similarly, Kates (2008) defines flood as an overflow of an expanse of water that submerges land. European Union (2007) sees flood as a temporal covering of land by water, not covered by water before the incidence. Though, flood may be temporal as believed by the European Union, but the effects may not be temporal when such

occurrence claims several lives and properties. Flood not only affects the victims, but also has a great gross effect on the national economy of the country where poverty level rises due to the incidence. Halley (2001) identifies the major cause of flood in Africa to be inadequacy of drainage. On the contrary, the major cause of flood in Nigeria has been identified to be excessive rainfall (Wetch, 2007; Taiwo, 2008; Akanin and Bilesanmi, 2011; Aderogba, 2012a and 2012b). Meanwhile, flood usually occurs when there is a continuous downpour of rain for a long period,

while resulted excess water has capacity beyond what available drainage can easily convey, due to its inadequacy or blockage of the drainage.

There are three schools of thought about the preponderance of floods all over the globe especially in the tropics (Dow, K., & Dowing, T. (2006). The first is of the opinion that there is global warming and climate change that is directly and or indirectly increasing the amount of rain and ice melting that is increasing the amount of runoff. In this case, the only source of water that results in great floods, in West Africa, and indeed, south western Nigeria, will be rain water. The second school of thought is of the view that there have been a lot of abuses heaped on the physical environment of man; and that the environment is only responding to the abuses heaped on it. The abuses include but not limited to poor planning of the physical environment, poor management of wastes, inadequate drains for the built-up areas and others. The third school has it that it is the combination of global warming, climate change, and the abuses of man on the environment that are the causes of prolonged and torrential showers of rains and the resultant runoff that led to devastating floods in America, Europe and Africa –including Nigeria; and south western Nigeria. The facts behind the three schools are yet to be thoroughly researched and confirmed, (Dow and Dowing, 2006 and Kersh and Simon 2005).

The effects of flood are not wholly negative as painted by many researchers, but also have its positive impact. Although flooding, generally, is a bane of most people, floods can be quite beneficial. Actually, nature benefits more from natural floods than from not having them at all (Abowei and Sikoki, 2005). The thing that makes natural floods a disaster is when flood waters occur in areas populated by humans and in areas of significant human development. Otherwise, when left in its natural state, the benefits of floods outweigh the adverse effects (Bradshaw *et al.*, 2007). The higher the flood waters from the river, the better the harvest for that year (Bariweni, P., Tawari, C., & Abowei, J. (2012). In the last 20 years, Nigerian cities have experienced great

physical development, in terms of building, construction and reconstruction of roads, offices, markets and stores, manufacturing industries and others without any appreciable infrastructures such as drainages, roads and canals to support them (Aderogba, 2012c); and these have made floods to be a call for concern in the country. Floods experienced in Nigeria had done more harm in Nigeria without any notice of benefit. From the report of National Emergency Management agency (NEMA) in 2012, between June and September 2012, over 63 lives were lost and about 600 Nigerians were displaced. The report also declared that over one million Nigerians may die due to the effects of floods before 2015, if no precautionary measures are not taken. Havoc caused by the flood incidence of Kaduna River in Kaduna, Nigeria in 2018 are still cause of sorrow for many victims, where several lives were lost and properties worth millions of Naira went into air, people who were bourgeois became proletariat in a twinkling of an eye.

There is an urgent need to evaluate the causes of flood, and also diagnose ways to avert its future occurrence in Nigeria. There are many questions that people are concerned about in Nigeria. Is government really enforcing laws guiding people from indiscriminate dumping of wastes; is it inadequate drainage facilities that are responsible for flood; are the public not well enlightened on the effects of flood while they carry out various activities that result to flood, like building along the water channels, indiscriminate dumping inter alia. This research is to answer the research question: “What are the causes and impacts of flood in Banawa Area of Kaduna, Kaduna State, Nigeria, and proffer recommendations to avert the future occurrence of flood in the area.” In attempting to answer the research questions, four objectives set for the study are to: examine the socio-economic characteristics of the inhabitants, identify the possible causes of flood, determine the overall effects of flood



and to proffer solutions on how to mitigate future occurrence of flood in the study area.

### **Extreme Climate Events in the Global South**

The poor in the society have been identified to be the most of the victims of flood, by having no choice, but to end up living in flood prone areas (Lutz *et al.*, 2008). In the view of Stephen (2011), the loss of life due to flood is lower in the developed countries compared to the developing countries. The assertions of Stephen (2011) and Lutz *et al.* (2008) appeared to be right because in developing countries, there are absence of effective zoning regulations, flood controls, emergency response to infrastructure and early warning systems. Bangladesh is a developing country and one of the most susceptible countries to flood disasters in the world. Up to 30% of the country has been covered with flood waters. In 1991, more than 2000 lives were lost due to flood in Bangladesh (Stephen, 2011). The poor in either developed or developing countries usually reside where the value of land is cheap, like river banks which are flood prone areas, thereby endangering their lives due to flood. Floods all over the world in the recent time have been related to the occurrence and reoccurrence of prolonged heavy rain (Welch *et al.*, 2007; Christopherson, 2007; Action Aid, 2006; Adeaga, 2008; Aderogba, 2011; Wright, 2011; Pilgrim and Cordery, 2003). Climate change has been the resultant effect of prolonged heavy rain across the globe that usually results to floods. Climate Change is an attributed cause of flooding because when the climate is warmer it results to; heavy rains, relative sea level will continue to rise around most shoreline, extreme sea levels will be experienced more frequently (Bariweni *et al.*, 2012).

Most of the recent deadly floods have happened where the population has increased more. Due to the population increase, there is also an increase in human settlements in floodplains (Hardoy *et al.*, 2001; Douglas *et al.*, 2008). Human activities such as dam

construction, irrigation, bridges and others have negatively impacted on free flow of water in the drainage channels, rivers and streams. Particularly at the urban centers, construction of roads, buildings, factories, manufacturing plants, bridges and culverts, farmlands and others have reduced drainage channels and erosion passages and or diverted the natural courses of the flow of water (Aderogba, 2012). For instance, in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, flood risk has strongly increased because of the fast growth of the city in flood prone areas (Nchito, 2007). This is also the case of Alexandria in Egypt (Klein *et al.*, 2003), Ibadan in Nigeria also experienced great damage in 2012 flood, the Senegalese capital, Dakar, and the Burkina Faso's capital, Ouagadougou, strongly affected by the 2009 flooding. Poorest people, in particular, often have a limited choice and ended up living in high flood risk zones, such as riverbanks and coastlines, unaware of the risk and unprepared to react to floods (Lutz *et al.*, 2008).

The case of urban flooding in Kaduna, a non-coastal city in Nigeria is a typical example of man-made flood disaster. Kaduna has been afflicted by very devastating flood incidents since 1983, when Kaduna rivers drowned houses of those living on its banks. During flooding water is contaminated. Clean drinking water becomes scarce. Unhygienic conditions and spread of water-borne diseases result. People, buildings, infrastructure, agriculture, open recreational space and the natural world are at risk. In extreme cases flooding may cause a loss of life. Torrential rains pushed rivers over their banks, collapsed mud houses and washed away livestock (Adelye and Rustum, 2011). The economy can also be severely affected by flooding. Businesses may lose stock and patronage. Disruption to utilities and transport infrastructure can have knock-down effects on a wider area. Tourism, farming and livestock can equally be affected. Vital infrastructure may also be damaged or disrupted.

Road links, railways, canals etc., may be blocked causing disruption to the wider transport network (Adelye and Rustum, 2011). The beneficial effect of flood is when the river overflows, and the flood waters flow into the banks, sand, silt and debris are deposited into the surrounding land. After the river water subsided and go back to its normal flow, the deposited materials will help to make the land richer or more fertile. The organic materials and minerals deposited by the river water keep the soil fertile and productive (Abowei and Sikoki, 2005). Flooding adds a lot of nutrients to lakes and rivers which leads to improved fisheries for a few years, also because of the suitability of a floodplain for spawning (little predation and a lot of nutrients). Fish like the weather fish make use of floods to reach new habitats. Together with fish also birds profit from the boost in production caused by flooding (Bariweni *et al* 2012).

Flood control according to Bariweni *et al* (2012) refers to all methods used to reduce or prevent the detrimental effects of flood waters. Some methods of flood control have been practiced since ancient times. These methods include: Planting vegetation to retain extra water, the introduction of flood forecasting systems, the building of population awareness and preparedness, urban planning and discouragement of human settlements in flood prone areas, along with the development of local institutional capacities, are effective and socially sustainable actions that should be pursued with priority in the African continent. These actions can appreciably increase the societal capacity to cope with floods, thereby decreasing their overall impact (Giuliano *et al*, 2010). In Europe, remembering the misery and destruction caused by the 1910 Great Flood of Paris, the French government built a series of reservoirs called Les Grands Lacs de Seine (or Great Lakes) which helps remove pressure from the Seine during floods. In India, Bangladesh and China, flood diversion areas are rural areas that are deliberately flooded in

emergencies in order to protect cities (Bariweni *et al*, 2012). Other methods of controlling the effects of flood include: dam construction and river defense. Dams and their associated reservoirs are designed completely or partially to aid in flood protection and control. Defenses as levees, bunds, reservoirs and weirs are used to prevent rivers from overflowing their banks. When these defenses fail, emergency measures such as sandbags or portable inflatable tubes are used. A weir, also known as low head dam, is most often used to create millponds, but on the Humber River in Toronto, a weir was built near Raymore Drive to prevent a reoccurrence of flood damage caused by hurricane.

### Research Methodology

The data used for this research was obtained through both primary and secondary sources. The secondary data were gathered from the 2012 report of NEMA (National Emergency Management Agency) in Nigeria, and other available published and unpublished literature. Primary data were obtained through a set of questionnaires administered to the residents of the study area. The questionnaire was used to obtain the socio-economic data of the residents in Banawa Area of Kaduna. Interview and observation were used to collect information on the causes

and impacts of flood in Banawa. The total number of questionnaires used for this study was one hundred and sixty-six (166), (See Table 1) which was eleven percent of the overall number of houses in the seven selected areas in

Banawa. i.e.  $(11 \div 100) \times 1511 = 166.21$ , approximately 166. The sampling method used for the questionnaire administration was systematic sampling, where the first building was selected randomly, followed by a systematic selection of the next building at an interval of every 8th houses. The data collected from the primary source was analyzed using Scientific Package for Social Scientist (SPSS). Descriptive statistic like

tabulations, frequency counts, percentages, charts and graphs were used to present the research data.


**Table 1: Number of houses in the selected areas and sample size**

| S/N | Selected Area | No of households | Sample size at 11% | No of questionnaires |
|-----|---------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 1   | Faith area    | 231              | 25.41              | 25                   |
| 2   | Morubo        | 185              | 20.45              | 21                   |
| 3   | Narayi        | 228              | 25.08              | 25                   |
| 4   | Mango area    | 220              | 24.2               | 24                   |
| 5   | Papa area     | 192              | 21.12              | 21                   |
| 6   | Fruit market  | 235              | 25.85              | 26                   |
| 7   | Low cost      | 220              | 24.2               | 24                   |
|     | Total         | 1,511            | 166.21             | 166                  |

**Source: Author’s fieldwork, 2022.**

This research was carried out in Banawa Area of Kaduna, Kaduna State in Nigeria. Banawa is located in Kaduna South Local Government which was created from the former Kaduna Local Government in May, 1989. The total population of Kaduna South local government according to the 2006 population census was 164,261 whereby male was counted to be 72,852 and female was 91,403. On account of extensive fertile soil which is suitable for agriculture, the basic occupation of the people is trading and farming. There are pockets of

grass land which are suitable for animal rearing, vast forest reserves and rivers. The people grew variety of crops such as yam, Mango, and vegetables such as Tomatoes, Okra, *Ewedu* and others. Kaduna south local government area is called the fruit and vegetable bowl of the township. Apart from trading and farming, the local government area has also gained tremendously from the services of medium and small-scale industries for processing agricultural products like cassava and tomatoes.



**Figure 1 Kaduna Metropolis.**

Source: Max Lock 2010 and modified. 2021

### Theoretical Framework

Theories are essential bedrock of analysis in any research issues discourse. Hence, it is a systemic way of understanding events and situations. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, the Freire Praxis theory of reflection and action will be used to explain the effect of flood on environment. Freire (2005) speaks of “praxis: reflection and action upon the world to transform it” (p. 15). It’s through this definition that I explore essential dispositions and behaviors in the practice of environmental sustainability serving high chronic environment setting. This is situation that demonstrates “the twin concepts of critique and possibility” (Shields, 2009, p. 5). In other words, how environment confront challenging issues within destroy their sustainability while maintaining hope that actions will lead to social justice outcomes and development.

As Giroux (2003) reminds us, critical discourses are more than just thoughts and ideas, it is an active process of critique leading to social transformation of the environment. For starters, Sergiovanni (1992) speaks of characteristics of a virtuous unique environment. He states that virtuous unique

environment, create aesthetic and conducive environment for leaving. Society over time, begin to become more appreciative of their environment and aware of their own convictions. Such society have a commitment to the immediate environment and work toward in sustaining it.

A relationship built upon mutual trust and mutual benefits. Collins, J, (2001) found that environmental sustainability exhibiting characteristics of ethics of critique are aligned with core tenets of transformative environment. Flood actions of interest include those that ensure it power trending are brought to the barest surface. Injustices related to race, class, and other biases in addressing flood are made visible. There is intentionality in raising the consciousness of flood among the inhabitant on contradictions of effect and outcome. Stakeholders are authentically engaged in decision-making. Barriers are removed to ensure decisions are informed, collaborative, and focused on unity over division. McLaren (2003) draws on Henry Giroux’s distinction between micro and macro-objectives as evidence of critical discourse in the action of environmental sustainability

### Results and Discussion:

**Table 2: Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents**

| Sex                       | Frequency  | Percentage (%) |
|---------------------------|------------|----------------|
| Male                      | 80         | 48.2           |
| Female                    | 86         | 51.8           |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>166</b> | <b>100</b>     |
| Marital status            | Frequency  | Percentage (%) |
| Single                    | 66         | 39.8           |
| Married                   | 88         | 53.0           |
| Widow                     | 12         | 7.2            |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>166</b> | <b>100</b>     |
| Educational Qualification | Frequency  | Percentage (%) |
| Primary school            | 34         | 20.5           |
| Secondary school          | 63         | 38.0           |
| Tertiary education        | 42         | 25.3           |
| No formal education       | 27         | 16.2           |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>166</b> | <b>100</b>     |

Source: Authors fieldwork 2022

The study area, Banawa in Kaduna, Kaduna state Nigeria has more females than males. There is a general belief that women generate waste more than men. Indiscriminate dumping of the generated wastes might have resulted to the blockage of drainage in the study area, as shown in (plate 1). Banawa has drainage, but the drainage has been blocked with

indiscriminate waste dumps. Over 70% of the respondents are not with tertiary education, which indicates that majority of the inhabitants of the study area may not be aware of the consequences of building structures along water channels, importance of tree planting and indiscriminate waste dumps inter alia.



**Plate 1: Improper disposal of waste into the drainage channel causing flood in Banawa Area.  
Source: Authors fieldwork, 2022.**



**Plate 2: Improper disposal of waste into the drainage channel causing flood in Banawa Area.  
Source: Authors fieldwork, 2022.**

The major causes of flood in the study area as indicated by the respondents were eight. Many of the respondents selected more than one options for the causes of flood. The study area has drainage (See Table 3), 92.9% of the respondents were of the opinion that blocked drainage with waste has been responsible for flood in the area, while all the respondents attributed the causes of flood to poor waste management (See Table 3). 89.7% of the

respondents also said, building along water channels is also a cause of flood. Other causes of flood in the study area include; collapsed bridge (84.6%), climate change (38.4%), inadequate drainage channel (96.1%), poor physical planning (92.3%), and other various causes (57.7%) like inadequate trees, ignorance, and poor government intervention inter alia (See Table 3).


**Table 3: Possible Causes of Flood in Banawa Area of Kaduna, Kaduna State, Nigeria.**

| Causes of Flood               | No of respondents | percentages |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| No Drainage                   | 32                | 20.5        |
| Blocked drainage with waste   | 145               | 92.9        |
| Building along water channels | 120               | 89.7        |
| Poor waste management         | 156               | 100.0       |
| Collapsed of bridge           | 132               | 84.6        |
| Climate change                | 60                | 38.4        |
| Inadequate drainage channel   | 150               | 96.1        |
| poor physical planning        | 144               | 92.3        |
| Others (specified)            | 90                | 57.7        |

**Source: Authors fieldwork 2022.**

Six major effects of flood were indicated by the respondents. 91.0% of the respondents said property loss was a major effect of flood in the area as many buildings were drowned already. 25.6% of the respondents were of the opinion that flood also claimed lives in the area. 91.7%

of the respondents indicated that there was economy loss caused by flood in the area. Other effects of flood in the study area include; diseases outbreak (26.9%), building collapse (50.0%) and injury sustained to be (27.6%).



**Figure 2: Possible Impacts of flood in Banawa Area of Kaduna, Kaduna State, Nigeria.**

**Source: Author fieldwork 2022**

It can be deduced from the study that man induced factors such as: location of the buildings on flood prone areas, indiscriminate waste disposal, lack of flood warning system and natural factors which include: rainfall, saturated soil, and dam failure facilitate flooding. The socio-economic characteristics of the inhabitants such as sex, marital status, and educational status have effects on the occurrence of flood in the study area. Despite the fact that majority of the respondents have drainages at the front of their buildings yet flood disaster is a prevalent environmental problem in the area. This is because of the blockage of drainage channel with solid wastes as indicated by over 90% of the respondents. Flood in the study area also causes damage to properties, outbreak of diseases, collapse to structures, damage to vehicles as well as loss of lives. Lack of proper waste management may also contaminate the water sources to transmit environmental diseases such as typhoid, dysentery, while the stagnant water also breeds mosquitoes which cause malaria fever through the anopheles' mosquitoes. During the interview, reconstruction and rehabilitation of buildings, granting of loans to affected resident, production of quality building materials as well as adequate flood warning system has been suggested by the residents as ways in which flood disaster can be mitigated.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

Though flood disaster has diverse impacts associated with it both in developed and developing world. These effects such as economic devastation, property loss, environmental disease and untimely death can be reduced and properly managed by adopting both remedial and preventive action to combat the problem of flooding as both approaches are needed to run concurrently to achieve success in dealing with flood. Also, the above stated measures could be adopted so as to have disaster free environment and to

achieve a safe, conducive, pleasant and aesthetic environment for living and working. To manage the impacts of any future occurrence of flood in the study area and beyond, following measures are suggested. There is need for repair and construction of new drainages. Construction of flood diversion channels which involves the construction of artificial channels along main river channels to divert part of the discharge during flood flows. Governmental and Non-Governmental organizations should set up various information programmes to enlighten the public on dangers of flood disaster. Adequate medical facilities should be provided for the treatment of various environmental diseases emanated from occurrence of flood. Government should provide adequate funding for disaster management bodies and agencies. Regular monitoring of disaster zones should be done by development control of all planning authorities within the area and reduction in building plan approval charges. Government should plant trees and encourage citizens to plant trees. Government should demolish all the structures along the water channels. Dumping of wastes indiscriminately should be a great offence with high fines, and government should make a provision for proper waste management schemes for the public.

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## ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA

**ThankGod Okeokwo**

**Augustina Joshua**

Faculty of Law

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [barrthankgodokeokwo@gmail.com](mailto:barrthankgodokeokwo@gmail.com); [joshテナ22@gmail.com](mailto:joshテナ22@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The environment contains all that humans need for development and it is a basic source for economic materials for mankind. This makes the environment a raw material for development and essential for keeping man alive and productive. In the cause of development some substances and effluences are released into the environment; when they are beyond those which the environment can absorb, it becomes a concern for the environment necessitating calls for environmental protection. As humans grow demographically and scientific advancement birth inventions, need for food for the population and materials for the experiments demand much from the environment. This same environment is what the present and future generations require for their continued existence and survival. The utilisation of the environment in such a way that provides for the present generation and preserves sustenance to future generations is said to be sustainable utilisation of such environmental resources. Therefore, this article is focused on the measures for environmental protection and enforcement in Nigeria. Doctrinal methodology is adopted in consulting Petroleum Industry Act 2021 and Sock Holms Conference instruments for data in this article. It was found that environmental protection measures included administrative, adjudicatory, environmental and health based. It recommended that environmental impact should be done before, during and after activities that is likely to endanger the environment; decommissioning and abandonment should be a stage by stage strategic plan followed all the way during the winding up of production activities in any well or field.

**Keywords:** Measures, environment, protection, enforcement, sustainability

### Introduction

Environmental protection is a right that vest in the public or group for the benefit of the generality of the society. It is generally noted among the third generation rights in jurisprudence of rights globally. Public institutions vested with protection of the environment may sometimes await the violation of environment before it takes statutorily vested steps at mitigating such infraction against the environment. The challenge then is that Agencies charged with environmental protection becomes reactionary instead of being proactive in preventing violations of the environment

through powers vested in them by their establishing Act. Where governmental agencies fail or neglect or refused to carry out its functions under the law, would the citizens become helpless? The law has made provision for mandamus: which is to compel government agencies to do what the law mandates them to or to vest such powers or functions in individuals or group to perform such governmental function as though it was such agencies doing it. Therefore, until environmental protection is chartered under chapter four of the Nigerian Constitution, groups and individuals can fine succour in the

Court to enforce, on behalf of Agencies those laws or regulations made to protect the Nigerian environment.

This paper will discuss powers vested in Agencies like the Nigerian Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Commission and the Nigerian Petroleum Midstream and Downstream Regulatory Authority for environmental protection and enforcement. It identifies those particular powers or functions and aligns them as measures for environmental protection and enforcement under the Petroleum Industry Act 2021. It further highlights the necessity for compliance and requirements for civilised enforcement of environmental laws and regulations without recourse to self-help.

### **Conceptualising Environmental Protection Enforcement**

Environmental protection measures are strategies put in place by agencies which are charged with environmental protection in limiting, regulating or enforcing environmental laws or regulation: it is the limit beyond which activities for human development should not go (Ijaiya & Joseph 2014). Measures for environmental protection under the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) 2021 are embedded in the objectives, functions and powers of the institutions established by the Act; for instance, the Minister, the Commission for the Upstream Petroleum Sector and the Authority for the Midstream and Downstream Sectors (Deloitte, 2021).

Some of the measures include: issuance of lease, licences, permits; certificates for environmental compliance; inspections; searches; seizures; arrests; sealing; notice of violation; notice of revocation of lease, licence or permit; (Ijaiya & Joseph, 2014) revocation order; recourse to courts for civil penalties for violation; injunctive relief to require compliance; (Thompson, 1987) criminal sanctions for violations; citizen's suits (Roberts & Dobbins, 2016) to enforce the statutes in the absence of effective government enforcement (Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, 1992). For the purposes of this article, the measures are

categorised into five (5) namely: the Administrative, the Enforcement, the Adjudicatory, the Health and the Environment. 'Measures' can be described as a plan or course of action taken to achieve a particular purpose, aim and objective. In the Petroleum Industry Act 2021 are several of those plans or courses of actions which are purposed to achieve environmental protection for the human environment in Nigeria.

### **Environmental Law Enforcement**

Commanding compliance with environmental laws or regulations is the essence of enforcement: to protect or remediate within the instrumentality of the law. When an agency is satisfied that there is likelihood of breach or actual of any provisions of a law or regulation then it may enforce those laws or regulations bringing about order and preservation of the environment. Enforcing is requiring those subject to the law or regulations to comply with directives enacted or agreement entered. Where the law provide that no company should flare without license or certificate or permit; or, where a regulation require environmental remediation plans for example, every agreement entered with the agency on such plans can be enforced against the company or persons with whom it was entered. For enforcement not to amount to self-help, it may require an enforcement agency to approach the Court with necessary application. It may collaborate with heads of Courts to provide special procedures for quick and seamless enforcement.

### **Research Methodology**

This paper adopts doctrinal method of research data sourcing. The paper rely on laws and regulations as its primary source while books and journals service the purposes of secondary data. This is suitable for legal research as discussions are mainly based on decided cases, legislations and subsidiary legislation. Opinions of authors available in

books and articles may provide supplementary data in explaining some issues discussed.

## **Measures for Environmental Protection and Enforcement in Petroleum Industry, Nigeria**

### ***Administrative Measures***

Administrative measures are those functions, objectives, powers, regulatory and policies responsibilities statutorily assigned the institutions (for example, the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission or the Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority) established in the Act which may be performed without recourse to Court or other adjudicatory authority. The administrative measures (Thapa, 2020) for the protection of the environment under the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) 2021 include but not limited to the following: Issuance of lease, licences, permits, certificates; revocation of lease, licences, permits and certificates.

#### **a. The Issuance of Lease, Licences, Permits, Certificates**

The administrative measures for the protection of the Nigerian environment as envisaged by the PIA are to be administered by the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (the Commission) under section 7 or the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (the Authority) under section 32 as well as from other enabling sections of the PIA 2021 respectively. Section 7(d) for example, provides for the technical administrative functions of the Commission thus: “administer, monitor and enforce compliance with the terms and conditions of lease and licences granted and permits and authorisations issued to a company in respect of upstream petroleum operations” (Resolution Law Firm, 2021). The Authority under section 32 (i) have the technical administrative function to *inter alia* “grant, issue, modify, extend, renew, review, suspend, cancel, reissue or terminate licences, permits and authorisations for midstream and downstream petroleum operations” ( Resolution Law Firm, 2021). It is not in doubt

that the Commission or the Authority, depending on their sphere of influence in the petroleum industry, can issue lease or authorization in the cases of the Commission or authorisation respectively and licences and permits. It is argued that the sustainability of the Nigerian environment from the effects of petroleum operations depend largely on patriotic enforcement of the administrative measures intended for environmental protection.

Licences and lease or authorisation and certificates have time limits within which they were to lapse under whatever medium they were acquired: usually through the Petroleum Production Contracts or Risk Sharing Contracts or by Concession. It can also be constituted by way of Petroleum Exploration Licence, Petroleum Prospecting Licence, Petroleum Mining Lease. And there are conditions to be met under the Regulations made by each institution before, during and or condition-precedent for renewal of such licence or lease or permit or certificate. Those conditions under sections 7 and 32 of the PIA are to serve as measures, plans, and deliberate course of action for the protection of the human environment in Nigeria. It is argued that they are not for monetization purposes alone, it was not meant to provide for the budget of the nation at the detriment of the life and environment of the human citizens. Section 32 (j) for instance, provides that the Authority shall “monitor and enforce compliance with the terms and conditions of licences, permits and authorisations issued by the Authority”; and, section 7(d) provided that the Commission shall “administer, monitor and enforce compliance with the terms and conditions of leases and licences granted and permits and authorisations issued to a company in respect of upstream petroleum operations”(section 7(d)PIA).

For every lease or licence or permit or authorisation or certificate issued by the Commission or Authority there are conditions which are either statutorily provided for under

the PIA or administrative regulations made in furtherance of the powers vested in the Commission or Authority by the PIA 2021. Part of the conditions for the issuance of licence or lease or permit are that the company commits itself in writing to conduct petroleum operations in an environmentally acceptable and sustainable manner (Elumelu, 2007) flowing from the objective of the Commission which included to conduct upstream petroleum operations in an environmentally acceptable and sustainable manner (Section 6(d)PIA).

Conditions of environmental acceptable practices are to be fulfilled by the company on the consequences of losing the licence to revocation or review would ensue where such company conducts its activities contrary to environmental acceptable practices. Where companies do not comply with requirements for environmental protection under any lease, license or permit, the Commission or the Authority are under obligation by sections 7 and 32 to review such licence or permit or lease; such discretion being exercised judicially and judiciously (Ekhaton, 2016). It is furthered that where the Commission or Authority failed or neglected to perform their duties and functions effectively and effectually under the aforementioned provisions, citizens can demand through *mandamus* that such institution be mandated to do their duties under the fiat of the Court of law in Nigeria. This accords with the principles on which the Conferences on Human Environment are built and strengthens the fundamental rights to life of the citizens of the country under responsible public institutions.

### **The Revocation of Lease, Licences, Permits and Certificates**

Revocation of lease, licence or permit as the case may be is a consequence for non-compliance by the company of any or all conditions stated in the lease or licence or permit for the period (Adefunsi, 2007) it was made to operate under the PIA. The powers of

the Authority to review, suspend, cancel, reissue or terminate licences, permits and authorisations for midstream and downstream petroleum operations under section 32(i) is an enforcement measure for the protection of the environment (Bademosi, 2024). Where the company failed or neglected to comply with environmentally friendly conditions provided in the lease or licence, the Authority would exercise its non-discretionary powers to revoke such licence or lease or authorisation in the interest of the Nigerian environment. It is argued that the exercise of the powers of the Commission or the Authority for the protection of the environment under the Petroleum Industry Act is one to be taken judiciously and judicially with applicable international laws and best practices (Kassim-Momodu, 2022) at it. Similarly, international instruments like the Rio de Janeiro 1992, the United Nations Convention on Climate Change 1992 and Kyoto Protocol 1998 all has Nigeria's commitment to it or are being ratified. These international instruments for practices in the petroleum industry would serve petroleum where the relevant petroleum operations Agency of government did not avert its mind to an important condition in a license or lease or permit or certificate but becomes aware of such necessary condition for the best interest of the environment in the cause of the performance of the conditions already created. Such petroleum Agency, it is argued, can add such condition(s) into existing conditions already given by it under the Act.

The powers to revoke is non-discretionary in the view of this article because it is statutorily(section 32(i)PIA) provided that upon the violation of a condition or conditions for which a lease or licence is issued, such violations should be visited with revocation of such licence or permit as the case may be. The circumstance with the operations of the oil and gas companies in Nigeria had always been those of negligence to environmental conditions and deliberate pollution practices because of their supposed cost of

environmental friendly practices (Faure, 2020). The position of the law is now trite that when the statute provides the mood of doing a thing, the doing of that thing becomes mandatory where the statute deployed the word “shall”. Put in another way, the word shall as used in section 32 of the PIA is mandatory: section 32 (i) reads “The Functions of the Authority shall be to ... terminate licences, permits and authorisations for midstream and downstream petroleum operations”. It follows therefore, that the exercise of the discretion of the Authority or Commission to terminate licence or lease or authorisations on the grounds of violations of the environmental protection conditions under such licence or lease or authorisation is mandatory and not optional to the Agencies.

A licence or lease or authorisation would not be said to have complied with the petroleum law if it does not make conditions for the protection of the environment (Martuzzi, et al., 2004:7). For instance, gas flaring (sections 104(1)(a-c)&107 PIA) under the Petroleum Industry Act 2021 is statutorily conditioned upon emergency; pursuant to an exemption granted by the Commission; as an acceptable safety practice under established regulations; where it is required for facility start-up; or for strategic operational reasons, including testing. It is the position of this article that the exemption to be granted should not be done to make non-sense of the human life, health and environment (*Center for Oil Pollution Watch v NNPC*, 2019). The Commission or Authority must note the provision of the Constitution that the duties of the Government or its Agencies are to protect the Nigerian land water air plants biodiversities and their interactions (section 20 of the Nigerian Constitution) with other biotic which permit to flare would destroy, literally. The licence to flare should not be granted at all, not to day, not tomorrow, in Nigeria following the position of the Court of Appeal in *Mobil v FIRS*, 2021) where that Court held that gas flaring was or is not only an economic

sabotage but a violation of the right of Nigerians to life and dignity of their person. This article is persuaded that the Commission or the Authority cannot and should not grant flare permits or authorise flare or venting unless for a short period for operational reasons like testing of facility or acceptable safety practice or for start-ups operations. This, in the view of this article, is the proper interpretation that should be afforded a combined reading of sections 33 and 34 of the Constitution and sections 104 (1)(a-c) and 107 of the PIA 2021.

### **Enforcement Measures**

Enforcement measures are geared towards ensuring compliance with the law and regulations under the Petroleum Industry Act 2021. Section 7 (a) PIA provides that the Commission is empowered to enforce laws and regulations with respect to the Upstream sector of the petroleum industry. This, it does vide inspections, searches, seizures, arrests, sealing, notice of violations and notice of revocations etc. Section 32(j) PIA empowered the Authority to enforce and monitor compliance with the terms and conditions of licences, permits and authorisations issued by the Authority. Monitoring compliance implied data collections and collations for the determination of the propriety of a permit or licence or lease or certificate as the case may be. When the Agency issued licence or permit, it has the corollary responsibility to ensure compliance with the terms of such licence, permit or lease. These aforementioned provisions re-emphasized that the Agency has both administration and enforcement powers over the licence or permit or authorisation which emanated from them to the company in the petroleum operations. It had been argued that enforcement of all administrative powers are appropriately done if they are carried out with the aid of Court Orders in each circumstance and for the overall interest of the objectives of the legislation.

Enforcement measures like inspections, searches, seizures, arrests, sealing (Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee, 2002) may, in the operation of the petroleum industry, affect the rights of the company or their premises or business; it is therefore, desirable that Commission and Authority gets the necessary *ex-parte* orders from Courts of competent jurisdiction to ensure civilised application of the provisions of the PIA. Inspection is done to see physically if the conditions provided in an authorisation had been complied with. If adequate notice is given as to time and date of the inspection, it is argued that it could be done without recourse to Court. It is where the company or body refused to comply with the notice for access to inspect the facility or facilities named in the notice that the Commission or Authority may have recourse to the Court.

Searches are a preventive measure for the protection of the environment where the Agency has on good grounds information that a violation is eminent if it does not search a premises; the Agency may need have recourse to the Court for Search Warrant to prevent that which if it is done may be environmentally hazardous to the environment or those which if not reversed may constitute irreparable damage to the human environment (OECD, 2004). Sealing of a premise or facility deployed for a reason not consistent with the conditions and terms of a licence might be sealed-up to prevent further violations or until that which is made wrongly is corrected. Sealing is deployed at times to nip at the bud that which could have had more impact but for the sealing. It is a temporary measure that required Court's intervention for it to hold for a longer time. Seizures and arrest constraints rights from when the action is taken and so recourse should be had to the Court for its operation. To seize or arrest without warrant may not be right for the purposes of ensuring compliance with a licence or lease or any such authorisation without recourse first had to the Courts.

### **Adjudicatory Measures**

When anything is required by law or regulation to be determined and issues arise from such determination; or when anything is to be enforced under the PIA Act and the procedure adopted for its implementation is called to question; then, all of such things may require the intervention of the Courts (Gilford, 1976) if the doing of it would not be seen as self-help. It would require the intervention of the Court for enforcement of penalties and compensations for violations of the any petroleum operations provisions in the licence or lease or authorisation (Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, 1973). Penalties are imputations of crimes that required judicial examination and proof by the administrative bodies before such penalties can be implemented (Gellhorn, 1970) in line with the Constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused person till proven otherwise (*NOSDRA v Mobil*, 2018).

Injunctive Reliefs (Leshy, 1977) can only lie through the Court over the actions which if not stopped or reversed would be injurious to the objectives and purposes of the law or regulations (Murdock & Turner, 2012). It is a veritable tool in environmental protection to command the doing or reversing to status quo and undo that which was done (Murari, 2020). It can be deployed for the purposes of remediation of the environment where the activities of the company had caused damages to the environment beyond what can be estimated like flaring of gas or incidences of oil spillage under facilities in their control (*Gbemri v Shell*, 2005). Mandamus can be granted an individual or group to enforce on behalf of an agency of government that which the agency had failed or neglected to do (American Immigration Council, 2021). It can be deployed on a licence or lease by the Commission or Authority to compel the performance of conditions or provision in the licence or lease which the Agency deemed fit to compel such a company to so do (Kalu, et al., 2020).

### Health Measures

The Petroleum Industry Act pursuant to sections 7 (c) and 32 provides for the Commission and the Authority in the exercise of their respective powers to *inter alia* enforce health measures (Ekenga & Masan & Adetoun, 2021). It is argued that the understanding should be that the Commission and Authority would make regulations or enforce regulations intended to protect the health of both workers at the fields of operations and the health of the entire citizenry from activities which goes on in the petroleum industry (Pona, et al., 2021). Activities like gas flaring are proven to endanger the health of citizens across the areas where such activities take place. Health measure enforceable by the Commission or Authority should include unpolluted air, uncontaminated water bodies either by oil spills or unauthorised discharge of effluents, plant and biodiversity conservation and forest preservation.

Nigeria is gradually being condemned to desolation and bareness by sustained and unmitigated pollution of its air, land and sea. Sometimes one wonders what will be the state of health of Nigerians in the next few years given the sustained and worsening nature of the scourge (Urhie, et al., 2020). A medical doctor, Mfon(2016), during his research on the “Effects of Gas Flaring on the Lung Health of Ibeno Community Residents, Ibeno LGA, Akwa Ibom State, South-South Nigeria” found through empirical investigation that gas flaring contribute to the lung disease death of the people of Ibeno in Akwa-Ibom State Nigeria. The Court of Appeal had held that gas flaring is a violation of the citizens rights to life(Mobile v FIRS 2021) and dignity of their human person. These scholarly and judicial positions are to the effect that the objectives of the Commission or the Authority should be to preserve the health and safety of the citizens in line with extant laws and best practices in the petroleum industry. The author was of the view that air pollution caused by gas flaring is a global problem associated with negative

impacts on the environment as well as respiratory morbidity and mortality. It has been estimated that air pollution contributes to 6% of total mortality.

This clinical evidence explains the responsibility placed on the Commission and the Authority not to violate Nigerian air with flare permits and licences because of the known health implications. For the author, sulphur dioxide, acts as a pungent suffocating irritant gas on the upper respiratory tract under moderate exposure, which could lead to the damage of the respiratory system. These sulphur compounds also affect visibility, reduction of sunlight, unpleasant smells, irritation and smarting in the eyes, nose and throat (Etuonovbe). The author had explained that the effects of air pollution on human health in Nigeria results in death related to respiratory diseases; loss of eyesight and other physical irritations on the human body. Other scholars who wrote on the devastating effects of gas flaring as a major source of air pollution in the Niger Delta and parts of Nigeria said: Air pollution is the discharge of any harmful substance into the air, which can cause minor health problems, including burning eyes and nose, itchy irritated throat, and breathing problems to significant health problems including chronic respiratory diseases or mortality (Pona, 2021:6). The authors explained that air pollution caused by gas flaring had reduced the life expectancy and quality of air of those who reside around the flare stacks and extraction activities (Pona, 2021). This article had argued that the effect of gas flare permits or licence are death (murder committed by the issuing authority) on the long run against the citizens and residence of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and therefore, contrary to section 33 of the Constitution. Consequently, the powers of the Commission or the Authority to exempt(section 107 PIA) companies and grant them flare permits under PIA is contrary to the Constitution and by virtue of section 1(3) of

the Constitution should be declared null and void to the extent of such inconsistencies.

### **Environmental Measures**

Section 7 (c) PIA 2021 confers on the Commission the functions of ensuring and monitoring health measures and standards in the upstream sector of the petroleum industry. The Commission should have plans and practices below which operators in the upstream petroleum sector should not go below. This can be ensured through regulations geared at the general environmental wellbeing and not a particular field of operation. Under the NESREA Act, environment was defined to include land, water and air, all layers of the atmosphere; all organic and inorganic matters and living organisms; and the interacting natural systems and their relationships with one another (section 37 NESREA Act). The environment is the whole atmosphere and their inhabitants both biotic and non-biotic; and inter/intra relationships that exist between and or among them (Joy & Anderson, 2008) without which humans cannot exist. Therefore, the regulatory agency should establish, monitor, regulate and enforce health measure and standards in the upstream, midstream and downstream sectors of the petroleum industry for the comprehensive health of all facets and constituents of the environment.

The environmental measures would include to manage the petroleum reserves and installations as well as exploration, development and production activities within the onshore, frontier, shallow water and deep offshore acreage with the view to establishing and monitoring standards that are environmental friendly during prospecting and production and down the value chains and all activities connected to it.

### **Commercial/Economic Measures**

The commercial economic factors are essential for the protection of the environment (Makinde, 2021) as envisaged by

sections 6 (a) & 8 PIA 2021. The powers to review commercial aspects activities and cost studies are plans under the Act for the preservation of the environment (OECD, 2004). Where proper cost studies are carried out to determining the cost for utilisation or reinjection, it would assist the Commission or Authority in fixing penalties for gas flare to commensurate or be higher than what should have been deployed to gas utilisation. It is argued that the intension of the legislature here was for an independently cost studies funded by the Commission or Authority devoid of inputs by the companies or company operating in the understudied area or field. The other side of the measure is in the approval and review of field development plans. Field development plans contains cost implications, viability of the field to commercial production, environmental challenges and how it could be fixed, the method of fixing or abating those identified environmental or human health challenges associated with the field (Eweje, 2006). The Commission can approve or disapprove field development plans where it does not meet international best practices or standards set by the Commission or where the methods for abating or fixing the challenges associated with production is of little value to human environment. There is also the view that regardless of the economic benefits associated with the extraction of natural resources, the health implication of these industrial emissions should be foremost if the main reason behind the much professed economic growth is for human development as this will not be achieved if we have most of the human population in an ailing condition due to pollution related diseases which are the leading causes of deaths in most countries. Researchers have demonstrated that a wide variety of development opportunities exist in countries which do not necessarily follow global trends since countries currently exist with the same life expectancies as the UK and the US, but with a small fraction of their carbon



emissions (and incomes); therefore prioritizing economic growth at the expense of climate stability seems less and less defensible (Jerumeh & Ogunnubi & Yusuf, 2015).

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The article had recommended the following: the powers of the institutions over the participants in the petroleum industry should not prioritise money over and against the sustainability of the human environment. The environment should be utilised in a manner that it does not lose its value for the future generations; environmental impact should be done before, during and after activities that is likely to endanger the environment; decommissioning and abandonment should be a stage by stage strategic plan followed all the way during the winding up of production activities in any well or field; the protection of the human environment should be made a human right under the Nigerian constitution.

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**PART X:**  
**INSECURITY, ETHNIC IDENTITIES AND BELONGING**

# 49

## ETHNIC IDENTITY CRISES AND WOMEN DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN SENATORIAL DISTRICT OF TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

**Agbor Anthony Odo**

**Emmanuel Jikini**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [tajdgood@gmail.com](mailto:tajdgood@gmail.com), [jikiniemmanuel2019@gmail.com](mailto:jikiniemmanuel2019@gmail.com)



### Abstract

This study seeks to examine the effects of ethnic identity crises on the socio-economic development of women in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State. Its objectives seeks to examine the extent to which ethnic identity crises impedes on the economic development of women within the study area, to ascertain the relationship between ethnic identity crises and sexual violence on women and to assess the level to which ethnic identity crises enhances the prevalence of discrimination against women. These objectives were based on the assumption that, the Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State is majorly a patriarchally dominated geopolitical zone, where the social, political, economic and cultural rights and Privileges of women are grossly marginalized. The study adopted the feminist theory and relied on the descriptive survey design as a methodology for gathering data across the five Local Government Areas within the zone. A sum of two hundred and fifty respondents were examined via questionnaire. The study, revealed that, statutorily the role of women in politics, administration and economic development is grossly undermined. In addition, to the fact that, during cases of ethnic identity crises, women are grossly victimised; as they do not only suffer the loss of families but are often subjected to cruel and discriminatory acts that exposes them to becoming victims of sexual violence and economic marginalization. The study's recommendations were therefore anchored on the need for women's inclusion in all spheres of human endeavour without gender variances even during and after incidents of violent conflicts.

**Keywords:** Ethnicity, sexual violence, gender, women development

### Introduction

Identity crises is seemingly an age long issue that is still visible in most developed and developing societies; Nigeria, not exempted. The outcome of these crises according to Women Environmental Programme (WEP, 2013), accounts for heightened cases of internally displaced persons (IDP), loss of lives and wanton vandalisation and destruction of properties. The causes of identity crises have been variously attributed to factors often related to politics, economic and cultural variances. As society constantly count their loses, while dreading the violent consequences of these crises, it tends to negate the impacts of the violent conflict on the economic, cultural and political disposition of the feminine gender. Buhaug, Cederman, Rod and Weidman (2018), opined that women are often

disproportionately affected by incidence of violent conflicts; as besides losing their spouses and siblings, they are also exposed to sexual violence with little or no access to resources or essential services. According to Ibrahim (2017), the resilience and potentiality of women towards the significant growth of their society as a result of gender parity and cultural practices have been undervalued and when exposed to violent conflicts, their systemic vulnerability further negates their relevance and seemingly impedes on their economic and social wellbeing (Kandiyoti, 2013).

Although, women's development and involvement in the spheres of administration forms a vital aspect of the strategic plan towards sustainable economic growth and political

emancipation in Nigeria, their fate like many women in patriarchally dominated societies, have been historically undermined, as they have limited access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities, beside been subdued through gender-based violent acts and culturally discriminatory practices (Adewale & Raimi, 2019). Despite the efforts by Civil Society Organisation towards addressing the issues bordering on gender parity, through the development of Policies and programs directed at enhancing women's access to education, healthcare, and leadership roles, the level of compliance to these policies by relative components of the society, still leaves much to be desired (Odigbo & Adeniran, 2020).

Considering the fact that the Nigerian government has ratified the international agreements aimed at promoting gender equality, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (UN Women, 2020), it is obvious that the progress rate recorded by both global and Nigerian government is fraught with persistent challenges as women continue to face wage gaps, limited representation in leadership positions, and exposed to cultural norms that perpetuate unequal gender roles. In Nigeria vis-a-vis Wukari Local Government Area in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State, factors such as religious beliefs, socio-economic disparities, and ethnical/regional variations contributes to the complexities of women's development efforts (Daramola, 2017).

According to Adeyemi & Akinlabi (2021), the attempts by various initiatives have recorded some positive changes in the socioeconomic and political placement of women in Nigeria. But these success stories appear to be short-lived as incidence of insecurity seemingly reverts the status of women to being in their traditional role of gross dependency on their male counterparts. This study, which is built on the assumption that, Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State, is majorly a patriarchally dominated geopolitical zone, where the social, political, economic and cultural rights and roles of women are grossly marginalized, seeks to examines the effects of identity crises on the socioeconomic dispositions of women in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State.

### **Conceptual Clarification**

#### **Ethnic Identity Crises:**

Ethnic Identity Crises which is also regarded as inter-ethnic conflicts or intergroup conflicts depicts conditions of hostilities, tensions and differential treatments of humans on the basis of prevailing cultural, economic, political, religious or social inclinations. According to Fearon & Laitin (2003), ethnic identity crises is condition of social conflict that emerges as a result of varying group competition over scarce available resources, political power and recognition of cultural supremacy. Doudou & Mialocq (2015), views it as a condition that encompasses intricate dynamics of identity, power and resources among distinct cultural groups with historical affinity society. In agreement with Doudou et'al (2015), Ogundiya et'al (2020), described ethnic identity crises as conflicts factors propelled by economic disparities, power tussles and political interests. Accordingly Adeleke & Ayeni (2020) opined that ethnic identity crises arises from subtle tensions to violent confrontations; such that significantly impedes on the social cohesion and development of affected areas. In essence, ethnic identity crises are social conditions that destabilizes the social stability, unity and development of existing cultural formations in society.

#### **Women Development:**

Women Development as concept depicts social conditions that ensures and enhances the growth, recognitions and strategic positioning of the female folk in the stream of societal activities. As a concept, it is often times referred to as female development, feminine development and/or women empowerment. Odigbo and Adeniran (2020) averred that women development seeks to address issues that fosters gender parity through the formulation of policies and execution of programmes that would enhance women access to education, healthcare and leadership positioning in society. Adewale and Raimi (2019), views women development as an advocacy and or agitation eliminating gender based violence, all forms of discriminations against women and the social recognition of women within the spheres of education, economy, healthcare and politics as well as administrative sectors of society. In essence, women development relatively speaks to factors designed towards the social recognition and positioning of women in the scheme of societal growth and development.

### **Causes of Identity Crises in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State.**

Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State, comprises of five (5) Local Government Areas namely: Ussa, Takum, Donga, Ibi and Wukari respectively. Takum Local Government Area was carved out of Wukari Local Government Area in 1976 and she is bordered by the Cameroons to the South, Ussa to the West and Donga to the North. Ussa Local Government Area was carved out of Takum Local Government Area in 1996, Donga Local Government Area seats between Wukari, Takum and Ukum Local Government Area in Benue State. Ibi Local Government Area was part of the Muri-Emirate with a Sarki as a paramount ruler and located on the South Bank of River Benue, while Wukari Local Government Area shares a tripartite feature as she is a Local Government Area, the Administrative Headquarters of Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State and the seat of the Chief and Head of Taraba State Council of Chiefs the Aku-Uka of Wukari. The senatorial district, besides the visibility of settlers, boasts of an array of tribes and ethnic groupings that share a common history and ancestry. These tribes and ethnic groups include; the Wapan, Wanu, Ichen, Kutep, Chamba, Kpanzon, with a historical link with the Tiv, Hausa and Fulani people.

The senatorial district is predominantly agrarian and survives on large scale crop farming, livestock herding and trading. According to the National Population Commission's projection (2021), the district has a population projection of One Million, Sixty Eight Thousand, Three Hundred and Sixty Seven People (1,068,367) excluding males and females that are below eighteen years (18) of age. These ethnic groupings in their dynamism, seemingly thrive on rich exclusive cultures that are highly patriarchal and apparently responsible for the violent conflict condition prevalent therein. According to Umar (2017), historical grievances arising from competition for scarce economic resources, particularly disputes over land and traditional headship are causative factors to the incessant crises situations within the senatorial district. Nwankwo (2013), opined that the variance in ethnic identity with its stereotyping and prejudicial cultural as well as political contents, creates mistrust, misunderstanding and propagates divisive narratives responsible for the prevalence of ethnoreligious conflict in Southern Taraba. Odoemelam & Nwoga (2014), think that the

identity rivalry is as a result of heightened political marginalization and resource deprivation of specific ethnic groups believed to be indigenes. In agreement with Umar (2017), Salawu & Isitor (2015) streamlined the disparities to factors arising from the agitations over limited resources, ownership and control of the economy. Herein, land is considered as the major determinant of the conflict.

Terhemen (2015), on a different note, considers the interwoven nature of religion with ethnic identity as instrumental to the cultural divisiveness that promotes ethnic identity crises in Southern Taraba. Herein, the spread of Islam and Christianity across the once exclusive cultural enclave of the defunct Kwararafa Kingdom is considered to have created variances with untold negative impact on the people and the land. Considering all these aforementioned factors responsible for the heightened identity crises prevalent in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State, the expectation would have been that security networks would have found a strategic way of quelling the unending conflict and assuage its consequences. But Odoemelam & Nwoga (2014), enumerated that the weak governance structure with its antecedent effects on security apparatus exacerbates the conflict situations within this area. According to them, when the instruments of government politicise and sectionalise the process of maintaining law and order, they are bound to fail in addressing feuds and consequently rival parties may resort to self-help measures which might be detrimental to the general wellbeing of the affected people. It is on this premise, therefore, that this paper takes into consideration the plight of women as a result of the incessant identity feud in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State.

### **Effects of Ethnic Identity Crises on Women's Development**

Ethnic identity crises in Nigeria has profound and differentiated effects on women's development, as it systematically shapes their lives in varying dimensions. Adewale & Raimi (2019), affirmed that these crises aggravates gender disparities and vulnerabilities, hindering progress towards gender equality and overall empowerment of women in the society. Accordingly, the effects of these crises are multifaceted. It ranges from physical and psychological trauma to economic disruption and social exclusion. Terhemen (2016),



claimed that ethnic identity conflicts often lead to increase in cases of Gender Based Violence (GBV), particularly against women. This is so because sexual violence is used as a weapon of war to demoralize communities and exert dominance. Accordingly, women become targets of rape, abduction, and forced marriages, causing immense physical and psychological suffering. Consequently, Gender Based Violence erodes women's sense of security and dignity, hindering their active participation in education, economic activities, and decision-making processes. This form of conflict-induced displacement disproportionately affects mostly women and children: this is so because women are often responsible for seeking refuge, caring for family members, and ensuring their well-being in precarious conditions (Nwabunwanne, 2016).

Ogundiya, Oluwakayode & Ajetomobi (2020), asserted that displacement of persons as a result of ethnic identity feud disrupts access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities, thus perpetuating cycles of poverty and vulnerability. In furtherance to this, they also affirm that the livelihoods of women are equally disrupted and this leads to reduction in income and economic autonomy; forcing women to seek low-paying jobs which further deepens their level of marginalization and economic deprivation. The psychological toll of inter-ethnic conflicts on women is severe. Exposure to violence, loss of family members, and displacement leads to trauma, anxiety, and depression. The resulting mental health challenges hinder women's capacity to engage in education, economic endeavour and community activities, hampering their overall development (Adeleke & Ayeni, 2020).

Conflict zones often lack basic services, exacerbating challenges for women. Health facilities are destroyed, access to reproductive health services is compromised, and educational opportunities are curtailed. This further restricts women's access to quality healthcare, education, and skills development, perpetuating gender disparities. Women's underrepresentation in conflict resolution mechanisms limits their ability to influence peace processes and reconstruction efforts (UN Women, 2020). Despite their unique insights and experiences, women are often excluded from decision-making spaces, sidelining their contributions to building sustainable peace.

Ethnic identity conflicts in Nigeria and by extension, Southern Senatorial District of Taraba, have dire effects on women's development. It perpetuates gender inequalities and vulnerabilities; thereby undermining the opportunities of women to be involved in government and governance. Apparently, addressing the effects of these conflicts on women, requires targeted interventions that prioritize their safety, economic empowerment, access to services, and participation in peacebuilding processes. This may be achieved by recognizing and creating awareness on the unique challenges faced by women in conflict settings, using the study area in this paper as a case study.

To achieve this, the paper shall carry out a discourse on the following thematic areas: the effects of ethnic identity crises on the economic development of women, ethnic identity crises and the prevalence of sexual violence on women, and ethnic identity crises and the prevalence of discrimination on women in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State.

### **Effects of Ethnic Identity Crises on the Economic Development of Women**

Ethnic identity crises, often fuelled by ethnic differences and historical grievances, have been a persistent challenge in various regions of the world. These conflicts bring about a range of negative consequences on women, a significant portion of the affected population bear a disproportionate burden, particularly in the economic sphere. This section of this paper examines the multifaceted effects of ethnic identity crises on the economic development of women, focusing on key areas such as livelihoods, access to resources, and entrepreneurship. Accordingly, this form of conflict clearly disrupts economic activities and livelihoods, leaving women particularly vulnerable. Research by Stewart (2008) highlights that in conflict-affected areas, women often experience a decline in income-generating opportunities due to the destruction of infrastructure and markets. Similarly, human and property displacement and insecurity can limit their ability to engage in agricultural activities, small-scale businesses, administrative functions; thereby, affecting their economic self-sufficiency (Verwimp et al., 2009). The forced displacement of populations in conflict zones has severe economic implications for women. McPeak and Doss (2006) argue that displacement disrupts

women's access to their primary income sources, often land and agricultural activities. Women, particularly those who head households, may lose their land rights and struggle to regain access to livelihoods upon return, hindering their economic recovery level and progression.

A study by Charron (2017) in South Sudan underscores that women are often disproportionately affected as they become primary caregivers for displaced family members, limiting their ability to engage in income-generating activities. Charron's research underscores how inter-ethnic conflicts disrupt the economic stability of South Sudanese refugee women. As families are displaced from their homes, women often become the primary caregivers for their families, responsible for ensuring their well-being. This shift in roles can have a profound impact on women's ability to engage in stable and more efficient income-generating activities. Herein, the displacement experience significantly hinders women's access to livelihoods and makes them subservient to masculine chauvinism.

Ethnic identity conflicts can also exacerbate gender disparities by limiting women's access to resources. Nussbaum and Glover (2017) revealed that, women may face greater challenges in securing property rights and access to land, a vital asset in many agrarian societies. This has long-term implications for their economic well-being as land ownership and control often determine economic opportunities and social status. Research by Mampilly (2011) underscores that during conflicts, property, and land ownership records are often destroyed, leading to disputes and challenges in establishing ownership. Women, who may have relied on customary or informal systems for property rights, often find themselves at a disadvantage for lack legal tender or proof of ownership owing to the fact that culturally, women particularly within the study area, are not allowed or do not have the right to outrightly possess or own properties independently.

Gray and Mueller (2012), noted that when families are displaced as a result of ethnic feuds, women and their children are often left vulnerable to land dispossession and property loss. Women may be excluded from decision-making processes related to property, leading to their disenfranchisement. Quisumbing, kumar and Behman (2014) argued that in conflict-affected areas, customary laws and practices may

disproportionately favour male inheritance and property rights, leaving women marginalized. These norms can persist even after conflicts have ended, perpetuating gender-based property disparities.

Women's entrepreneurship can be a powerful driver of economic development, but in times of ethnic identity conflicts, their potentials are hindered. Quisumbing and Kumar (2011) argued that in conflict-affected regions, women's entrepreneurial activities may decline due to insecurity, loss of assets, and limited access to credit. This curtails their ability to contribute to economic recovery and development. Adeleke and Ayeni (2020) in exploring the intricate relationship between ethnic identity conflicts and women's empowerment in Nigeria; with a focus on the gender-specific dimensions of conflicts, revealed that the socioeconomic relevance of women are undermined and women become vulnerable and endangered, and this hinders their contributions to nation building.

Although, Quisumbing and Kumar (2011) argued that women may employ various strategies, such as forming women's groups or engaging in small-scale trading within refugee camps, to support their families and generate income, these initiatives underscore the potency and determination of women's contribution to sustained ventures that could enhance development within their social environment. In essence, ethnic identity crises further deepens the social vulnerability and marginalization of women in society.

### **Ethnic Identity Crises and the Prevalence of Sexual Violence on Women**

Ethnic identity crises often result in severe human rights violations, with women majorly sexually violated and abused. The crises situation besides promoting sexual violence against women, often results in severe physical and psychological harm, thereby perpetuating cycles of trauma, stigma, and marginalization; as women are exposed to the risks of being used as weapons of war through acts of gender-based violence (Doudou & Mialocq, 2015). Hossain, Zimmerman and Watts (2014), indicated that women in conflict zones are at a higher risk of experiencing sexual violence, including rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage. The breakdown of law and order during conflicts can create an environment where violent culprits act with impunity.

Human Rights Watch (2012) reported that armed groups may deliberately employ sexual violence as a tactic to terrorize and displace communities, particularly those of rival ethnicities. Women are targeted not only for their own suffering but also as a means to destabilize and demoralize the opposing group. Sexual violence during conflicts inflicts severe physical and psychological trauma on women. Which according to Johnson, Scott, Rughita, Asher, Ong & Lawry (2008) have long-lasting consequences, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depression, and physical injuries. This trauma can hinder women's overall well-being and hamper their ability to engage in productive activities or access support services. Besides the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Sexual violence survivors are often faced with stigmatization and marginalization within their communities. Bartels, Scott, Learning, Mukwege, Lipton and VanRooyen (2013) asserted that the shame and stigma associated with sexual violence can lead to social exclusion and further victimization. Such victimization may lead to suicide and may even turn the victim into an offender on the long run. In essence, Women who are victims of sexual molestation may practically struggle to reintegrate into their communities with the hope of still impacting goodwill to society, but without adequate support networks, may relapse and become a menace to society.

### **Ethnic Identity Crises and the Prevalence of Discrimination on Women**

Ethnic identity feud often result in profound social upheaval, and women are particularly vulnerable to various forms of discrimination in this context. This form of conflict exacerbates existing gender disparities and often leads to the widespread discrimination against women. Mazurana, Parlevliet & Oosterom (2013), revealed that women may face discrimination in having access to resources, such as food and shelter, as well as increased vulnerability to Gender Based Violence. Discrimination can take various forms, including exclusion from decision-making processes and unequal access to education and healthcare services, not exempting denial of right to be gainfully employed as well as right to possess and/or own properties. Ethnic Identity crises frequently marginalize women, particularly in decision-making processes related to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

According to Charron (2017), women are often excluded from peace negotiations and governance structures, limiting their ability to influence policies and decisions that directly affect their lives.

Human Rights Watch (2018) reported that sexual violence is frequently used as tactics of war, with women as primary victims. This violence not only inflicts physical and psychological trauma but also reinforces gender-based discrimination and inequality. This discrimination and inequality often results in forced displacement of victims and more often exposes women to further discrimination and vulnerability. Gray and Mueller (2012) noted that women may become heads of households in displacement settings, facing additional challenges in accessing resources and protection. Discrimination can persist in refugee camps, affecting women's access to education, healthcare, and livelihood opportunities (Jacobsen, 2002). In essence, the rights and privileges of women are predisposed to heightened oppression, subjugation, denial, cruelty, brutality and even death during cases of ethnic identity crises. Most vulnerable class of women under this circumstances are those involved in inter-ethnic or inter-religious marriages.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Drawing inference from the global position that theories are precepts that guides and/or provides understanding to social phenomenon through its analytic, interpretive and logical sequencing of facts, this study herein adopts the feminist theory as a means of linking scholarly works to the findings of this paper.

### **Feminist Theory**

Feminist theory, is an evolving sociological perspective, that critically examines the intricacies of gender dynamics, power structures, and societal inequalities. Derived from the recognition of historical and contemporary gender-based disparities, feminist theory is but an attempt to uncover, challenge, and transform the underlying norms, practices, and systems that perpetuates gender inequality. This theory seeks to scrutinize how gender intersects with other social categories such as race, class, and sexuality and therein provide a comprehensive lens to analysing the complexities of human societies (Hooks, 1984).

The basic assumptions of the feminist theory revolves around the desire to critically challenge

traditional societal norms and power structures into recognizing gender as a socially constructed phenomenon rather than a fixed biological attribute, so as to uncover and rectify the pervasive gender-based inequalities (Hooks, 1984; de Beauvoir, 1949). This perspective unveils the patriarchal underpinnings that have historically dominated societies, asserting that patriarchal systems perpetuate unequal power dynamics between genders (Crenshaw, 1989). Moreover, the theory's core assumption is enriched by the concept of intersectionality, which acknowledges the simultaneous impact of multiple identities like race, class, and gender in shaping individuals' experiences of oppression (Crenshaw, 1989). These assumptions collectively drive feminist analysis, motivating a critical reevaluation of societal norms and practices into fostering a pursuit of gender equality, social justice and fair treatment of the feminine gender in all spheres of society.

In relation to issues of ethnic identity crises, the feminist theory offers a critical lens through which an understanding of how the effects of violent conflict impedes on the development of women can be analysed. It underscores the ingrained power dynamics that fuel gender-based violence during conflicts. As a sociological perspective, it unveils the reality that women often become targets of sexual violence and exploitation, not as random acts, but as deliberate expressions of power and control during incidence of violent crises. It posits that ethnic identity crises, intensifies women's vulnerability and impedes on their development through physical and psychological trauma (Sen, 1999, Terhemen, 2015).

Feminist theory also reveals how conflicts magnifies existing structural inequalities, particularly in economic spheres. Taking into cognizance the agrarian nature of the study area, it is no gain stating the role of women in agriculture production and sustainability within this geopolitical zone. However, when faced with violent conflicts, this role makes them particularly susceptible to economic disruptions, social displacement; thus making them vulnerable and endangered (Ogundiya, Oluwakayode & Ajetomobi, 2020). As economic activities falter, women's livelihoods suffer gross marginalization as the dominant patriarchal culture, while counting their loses as a result of crises, deliberately ignore the inclusion of women and their properties. Worse situation abound in cases where a woman is

involved in inter-ethnic marriage, she becomes completely an outcast and is exposed to all forms of maltreatment and may even lose her life in times of ethnic crises. This is exemplified in the cruelty meted on Tiv or Jukun women that are married to either Tiv or Jukun men during the recent Jukun-Tiv crises.

The theory sheds light on the intricate connection between conflict and women's reproductive health. The disruptions caused by ethnic identity crises in relation to healthcare, indicates that it hinders women's access to reproductive health services, thereby resulting to maternal health risks and even maternal death (Adewale & Raimi, 2019). A critical evaluation of the rate of maternal health complications leading to maternal mortality within the senatorial district, it is likely to link the outcome to incidence of ethnic rivalry.

Similarly, this theory underscores women's often-overlooked roles as agents of peace and reconciliation. Despite their marginalization, women frequently play pivotal roles in conflict resolution and community peace-building efforts (Adeleke & Ayeni, 2020). This perspective challenges the conventional narrative that portrays women solely as victims, highlighting their capacity to influence positive change. Integrating women's perspectives into conflict resolution processes is crucial for sustainable development and lasting peace (UN Women, 2020). Herein, the peaceful demonstration by Wukari Women that took place in 2014 in Wukari during the ethnoreligious conflict between the natives (Jukun) and the Hausa/Fulani (Muslims), which was believed to have brought to a halt the bloody conflict cannot be overemphasised.

The theory's concept of intersectionality is paramount in understanding how ethnic conflicts uniquely affect different groups of women. Black feminism and other intersectional perspectives reveal that women's experiences are shaped by the convergence of various identities, such as ethnicity, class, and gender (Combahee River Collective, 1977). These multifaceted identities interact in complex ways, determining the specific challenges women face in conflict-affected regions. Intersectional analysis is essential for crafting comprehensive policies and interventions that address the diverse needs of women and contribute to their holistic development. The application of feminist theory to the effects of ethnic identity crises on women's development

unveils the power dynamics, structural inequalities, and multifaceted challenges that women experience. By focusing on gendered experiences and perspectives, this theory provides a nuanced understanding of the ways conflicts intersect with women's lives. This insight is crucial for crafting interventions that recognize women's agency, mitigate vulnerabilities, and pave the way for gender balancing and overall sustainable development in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State.

**Research Methodology**


The research design adopted for this study was the descriptive survey design as postulated by Neuman (2013). This design allows for data collection using descriptive characteristics, opinion polls, behaviour and attitudes of respondents. The study setting is the five Local Government Areas in the Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State. The

dominant means of economy within this zone is Agriculture. The zone is majorly patriarchal with an almost exclusive culture. She shares borders with Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and the Cameroons. Their religion is a blend of Traditional worship, Christianity and Islam. Their system of marriage allows for inter-ethnic connectivity and their social affinity with settlers makes them susceptible to constant communal and ethnic crises. The study Area according to the National Population Census (2021) has a population projection of One Million, SixtyEight Thousand, Three Hundred and Sixty Seven People (1,068,367) cutting across Ibi, Ussa, Donga, Takum and Wukari Local Government Areas respectively. However, for the purpose of convenience, the sample size for the study shall be two hundred and fifty (250) respondents; with each Local Government Area producing fifty (50) respondents respectively.

| S/N. Clusters | Population       | Sample Size |
|---------------|------------------|-------------|
| 1. Donga      | 208,768          | 50          |
| 2. Ibi        | 132,257          | 50          |
| 3. Takum      | 211,115          | 50          |
| 4. Ussa       | 142,582          | 50          |
| 5. Wukari     | 373,645          | 50          |
| 6. Total      | <b>1,068,367</b> | <b>250</b>  |

Source: Authors Compilation, 2024.

**Effect of Ethnic Identity Conflict on the Livelihood of Women in Southern Taraba**




Field work 2024

The pie chart above revealed that, 42% of the respondents feels it leads to loss of property, 15% claimed it led to displacement of people, while 43% claimed it enhances the loss of economic opportunities. This by implication suggest that,

ethnic identity crises contributes highly to the loss of economic opportunities for women in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State.

**Does the Crises affects the Income Generating Status of Women in Southern Taraba?**




Field Work 2024

The pie chart above revealed that 46% of the respondents where in the affirmative, 44% were in

the negation and 10% were not certain. The implication herein is that ethnic Identity Crises affects the income generating status of women in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State.


**The Effects of Ethnic Identity Crisis on Business Ventures owned by women**



**Field work 2024**

The pie chart above revealed that, 18% of the respondents claimed that it restricts access to market, 40% where of the view that it leads to lack of capital to boost business ventures and 42% claimed that it creates a state of insecurity for businesses owned by women. By implication, ethnic identity crises has untold effects on business ventures owned by women in Southern Taraba Senatorial District.

**Are women exposed to sexual violence during ethnic identity crises?**




**Field work 2024**

The pie chart above revealed that 38% of the respondents where in the affirmative, 41% where in the negation, and 21% preferred not to provide any answer to the question. By implication herein, women are not exposed to sexual violence during

ethnic identity crises in Southern Taraba Senatorial District.


**Types of Sexual Violence Experienced by Women during Ethnic Identity Crises**



**Field work 2024**

The pie chart above revealed that, 29% of the respondent identified rape as a prevalent sexual violence experienced by women during ethnic identity crises, 27% claimed women are exposed to sexual slavery and 44% asserted that forceful marriage is the commonest type of sexual violence linked to ethnic identity crises. By implication therefore, women mostly experiences forceful marriage during ethnic identity crises.


**Are Women Exposed to Stigmatization and Social Exclusion as a result of Sexual Violence experienced during ethnic identity crises?**



**Field work 2024.**

The pie chart above showed that, 33% of the respondents where in the affirmative, 38% where on the negation and 29% preferred not to answer. This by implication indicates that women are not exposed to stigmatization and social exclusion as a result of sexual violence experienced during ethnic identity crises.


### Are Women Exposed to Gender Dis-crimination during Ethnic Identity Crises?



**Field work 2024**

The pie chart above showed that 53% of the respondents were in the affirmative, 30% were in the negation and 17% preferred not to answer. This by implication indicates that women are exposed to gender discrimination during ethnic identity crises.


### What Form of Gender Discrimination do Women Experience during Ethnic Identity Crises



**Field work 2024**

The pie chart above showed that, 41% of the respondents feel women are excluded from decision making during ethnic identity crises, 29% feel the crises restricts women access to resources and 30% claims women are exposed to verbal abuses during ethnic identity crises. The implication herein is that, women are excluded from decision making particularly during ethnic identity crises in Southern Taraba Senatorial District.

### What form of Social Amenities are Women mostly Denied, during Ethnic Identity Crises



**Field work 2024**

The pie chart above revealed that, 30% of respondents feel that women suffer inaccessibility to effective education during ethnic identity crises, 6% claims women are denied access to healthcare facility and 64% were of the opinion that women suffer denial of access to gainful employment due to ethnic identity crises. By implication, women are denied access to gainful employment in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State.

The study data revealed that, 30% of respondents feel that women suffer inaccessibility to effective education during ethnic identity crises, 6% claims women are denied access to healthcare facility and 64% were of the opinion that women suffer denial of access to gainful employment due to ethnic identity crises. By implication, women are denied access to gainful employment in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State.

In broad terms, the study findings which were derived from the objectives of the study, were built around the assumption that, Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State is majorly a patriarchally dominated geopolitical zone, where the social, political, economic and cultural roles of women are grossly marginalized. In this regard, findings from the study, revealed that, ethnic identity crises contributes highly to the loss of economic opportunities for women in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State; as it does not just undermine the business ventures of women but grossly impedes on their income generating status thereby negating their potentiality to effectively contribute to the sustainable development of Southern Taraba Senatorial District. This by implication affirms the assumption that, ethnic identity crises impedes on the economic

development of women within the study area. This findings was supported by scholarly works of (Buhaug et'al 2018; Ibrahim 2017 & Kandiyoti 2013), which claimed that, the resilience and potentiality of women towards the significant growth of their society as a result of gender parity and cultural practices have been undervalued and when exposed to violent conflicts, their systemic vulnerability further negates their relevance and outrightly impedes on their economic and social wellbeing.

On the issue of exposure to sexual violence during ethnic identity crises in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State, the findings revealed that though women are not recorded to have been exposed to sexual violence, there are observable indications that certain degree of sexual violence is been meted on women as a result of ethnic identity crises. For instance, Most women are forced into marriage as deterrent for relating with the other divide of the crises and interestingly, this is not recorded as violence upon the womenfolk or forms of stigmatization because of the prevalent patriarchal lineage system operational within the study area which in turn had overtime established a double standard cultural practices among the women without minding the social exclusive implication of their actions. In buttressing this point, Hossain, Zimmerman and Watts (2014), depicted that women in conflict zones are at a higher risk of experiencing sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage. In line with Human Rights Watch (2012) armed groups may deliberately employ sexual violence as a tactics to terrorize and displace communities, particularly those of rival ethnicities. Herein women are targeted not only for their own suffering but also as a means to destabilize and demoralize the opposing group. Accordingly, Johnson, Scott, Rughita, Asher, Ong & Lawry (2008), opined that sexual violence during conflicts inflicts severe physical and psychological trauma on women; thus creating a post traumatic stress disorder with long lasting consequences and according to Bartels, Scott, Learning, Mukwege, Lipton & VanRooyen (2013), the shame and stigma associated with this condition on women may result in social exclusion; hence the reason why women shy away from reporting cases of sexual violence besides existing patriarchy.

On the issue of gender discrimination during ethnic identity crises, it was revealed that

womenfolk or gender were grossly exposed to gender discriminations as they are mostly denied access to effective education, available resources, employment opportunities, verbally abused and not allowed to take part in decision making during and even after ethnic identity crises because of gender variance and cultural belief pattern which clearly undermine and negates the role of women in societal development within the zone. This finding was supported by the works of Mazurana, Parlevliet & Oosterom (2013), who posited that, women faces discrimination in having access to resources, such as food, education and shelter during ethnic identity crises. In the same thought, Human Rights Watch (2018) reported that sexual violence is frequently used as tactics of war, with women as primary victims. This violence not only inflicts physical and psychological trauma but also reinforces gender-based discrimination and inequality. This discrimination and inequality often results in forced displacement of victims and more often exposes women to further discrimination and vulnerability.

Based on outcomes of the field study as reflected in the pie charts, the findings of the study therefore, affirmed the assumptions that, Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State is majorly a patriarchally dominated geopolitical zone, where the political, economic and sociocultural rights and privileges of women are grossly marginalized. This study examines the effects of ethnic identity crises on women development in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State. Its objectives sought to examine the extent to which ethnic identity crises impedes on the economic development of women within the study area, to ascertain the relationship between ethnic identity crises and sexual violence on women and to assess the level to which ethnic identity crises enhances the prevalence of discrimination against women within the study area. The study, after series of literature review, adopted the feminist theory and relied on the descriptive survey research methodology for data collection and analysis. A total of two hundred and fifty respondents formed the sample size that was used to represent the population size of the five Local Government Areas that forms Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State. The outcome of the field survey, revealed that statutorily, the role of women in politics, administration and economic development is grossly undermined; as could be viewed from the impacts of the crises on women's



livelihood, business ventures and even denial of the right to effective education and gainful employment. In addition, to being grossly victimised; as they do not only suffer the loss of families but are often subjected to cruel and discriminatory acts that exposes them to becoming victims of sexual violence such as rape, sexual slavery and forceful marriage: a condition that psychologically destabilizes the women and make them socially handicapped, dependent and incapable of effectively contributing to development in society.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This study is a social mirror that reflects on the age long and prevalent social status underpinning the inactive disposition of women to development in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State. The study was able to establish that existing exclusive patriarchal cultural disposition of the people of Southern Taraba, plays a major role in the unequal, discriminatory treatment meted on women within the study area. It further revealed that, as a result of this sustained patriarchy, women within the study area have been stereotyped, stigmatized and relegated to the background; such that most of them exhibits double standard behaviour that creates inferiority complex and further undermine their development potentials in society.

In a nutshell, until the rights and privileges of women are culturally, politically and economically recognized and empowered within Southern Senatorial Districts of Taraba, their unalloyed contribution towards ensuring peace, unity of purpose and overall sustainable development would be utopian and by extension ethnic identity rivalry would persist.

On the issue of the effect of ethnic identity crises on the economic development of women in Southern Senatorial District of Taraba State, the study recommended for the enactment of a policy allowing access to own properties and be certified to control and manage available resources. By these it is expected that women would stand a chance of being compensated in the case of damage of loss accruing from ethnic identity crises.

On the issue of constant exposure to sexual violence during ethnic identity crises, the study recommended that, Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) and Non Governmental Organisations

(NGOs) should form a coalition that would consistently advocate for the rights and privileges of Women through advocacy campaigns, Sensitizations and Awareness creation on the adverse effects of Gender based Violence such as rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage. That the Geneva convention protocol on the protection of vulnerable class of people be streamlined to address consciousness of the people regarding the treatment of victims and vulnerable people.

And on the issue of discrimination against women the study recommended for a cultural reorientation such that will create a shift from the existing patriarchy from promoting an all inclusive traditional system; where the rights, privileges and status of women would be recognized and respected. This will empower the women towards productive contributions in societal development.

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## SOCIO-POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NASARAWA STATE NIGERIA

**Namo Johanna Akerewe<sup>1</sup>**

**Bala Iranyang Shamaki<sup>2</sup>**

**Gani Ishaya Kate<sup>3</sup>**

<sup>1&3</sup>Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [joanj4real@yahoo.com](mailto:joanj4real@yahoo.com); [ganikate0@gmail.com](mailto:ganikate0@gmail.com)

<sup>2</sup>Registry Department

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [balaira2013@gmail.com](mailto:balaira2013@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The history of human existence is replete with one form of violence or another. Violence is always being used as a weapon by some people to realize or achieve certain ends. This article argues that Nigerian socio-political process is characterized by violence such as thuggery, intimidation, molestation and assassination. Against the prevalence of Socio-Political violence, this research examined the determinant factors responsible for the outbreak of socio-political violence in Nasarawa State and Nigeria at large. The researcher used the frustration-aggression theory as its theoretical framework because the frustration aggression theory is used due to its aptness in providing a systematic explanation of the basic variables which this study investigates. Relevant information gathered from primary sources involved the use of structured questionnaire and oral interviews were conducted among the electorate locals. The findings of this paper reveals that; ethno-religious consideration, lack of political will by government in implementing committee recommendations have impacted negatively on the entire electoral process in the fourth Republic in Nasarawa State and by extension Nigeria. Based on these findings it is recommended that there should be more enlightenment campaigns to sensitize Nigerians on the dangers of Socio-political violence.

**Keywords:** Political violence, enlightenment campaigns, locals, frustration

### Introduction

It can be said with some degree of accuracy or certainty that one type of violence or another is to be found in every human society. In other words, even the advanced countries and developing countries alike are not immune to violence (Ayodele:2006). In Nigeria, violence is commonly used as a political tool to achieve the perpetrators' selfish ends. This usually occurs during elections when one government is about to hand over power to another. The use of violence during elections has become a

common feature of the Nigerian electoral process.

Before Nigerian independence in 1960, Nasarawa State was part of the Northern Region in the three region structure of 1954. Ethnic sentiments coupled with other factors plunged Nigeria into civil war. Gowon, a young general, barely 34 years of age and from a minority Christian tribe in Plateau State, dismantled the three regions established by the colonial administration in 1967 (world Watch Research: 2016). He created twelve states

of the three regions, one of which was the Benue-Plateau state, reducing the influence of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony over indigenous tribal communities in the Middle Belt region. The 1976 military government of General Murtala Muhammed created 19 states out of the existing 12 federal states and the Nasarawa region became part of Plateau State, a predominantly Christian state.

In 1996, intense military politics led to the creation of more states by General Sani Abacha, and Nasarawa State was carved out of the present Plateau State.

Nasarawa State is made up of 13 Local Government Areas (LGAs): Akwanga, Awe, Doma, Karu, Keana, Keffi, Kokona, Lafia, Nasarawa, Nasarawa-Eggon, Obi, Toto and Wamba (WorldWatchResearch:2016).

Nasarawa State shares common boundaries with Benue State to the south, Kogi State to the west, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja to the north-west, Kaduna and Plateau States to the north-east, and Taraba State to the south-east (Nasarawastate.gov.ng:2023). With over 30 ethnic groups in the state, Nasarawa is described as being the melting pot of ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. The major ethnic groups are Alago, Eggon, Gbagyi, Gwandara, Egbira, Migili, Kantana, Rindere, Fulani, Hausa, Kanuri, Tiv, Afo, Gade, Nyanpka, Jukun, Mada, Ninzam, Nankere, Bassa, Agatu and Kuler among others (ibid). Nasarawa State has a population of 1,869,377 According to the 2006 National census figures (National Population Commission:2006).

The joy that followed the creation of Nasarawa State was short-lived. A few months after its creation, Nasarawa State was drowned in orgies of violence. Bloody clashes erupted between Igbira and Bassa in Toto LGA over chieftaincy with political undertone (Ugwu, Anthony & Enna: 2015).

In the wake of several notable outbreaks of political violence during elections, the topic of political violence has become increasingly important among both scholars and practitioners. Growing interest in the challenges and prospects of political violence has led to an increasing number of publications that examine the causes and

consequences of such violence as well as potential policy solutions (Bekoe 2012; Claes 2017; Kovacs & Bjarnesen 2018).

Nasarawa State also has a history of violence surrounding elections. Sporadic outbursts of violence occurred in advance of the Fourth Republic 1999 polls, when Nasarawa was listed among twelve states declared 'hot spots' of potential unrest by the authorities (Daily Trust, 2011).

In general, there is a perception that the conduct of the 1999-2019 elections was an improvement on previous electoral cycles (Human Rights Watch, 2019), Compared to the 2003 voters' register, there was an increase of approximately 40% in registered electors in Nasarawa State in 2019 (EU Election, Report: 2019).

Findings have shown that the Nigerian type of democracy is conditioned by certain environmental factors that tend to water down the democratic principles. Factors like religion, zoning etc. – where citizens especially the politicians or people that control government take into consideration which religion, tribe or from which zone one comes from, these have some effects on even the kind of policies the make in curtailing political violence.

Nasarawa state became a notorious global conflict spot, when news broke that about 74 officers and men of the Nigerian Police, as well as other security agents were killed during an operation in Alakyo village in Lafia Local government area of the state (Enna:2014). This condemnable tragedy, was however: only the climax of unreported killings, invasions, murders, arsons and intense bloody ethnic conflicts between and involving the Eggon, Alago, Tiv, Mighili, Mada, Gwandara, Bassa and Fulani (Enna, 2014;p14).

There has always been a repeated scale of violence and political or religious rift between the Christian and Muslim on the one side and the Eggon ethnic nationalities and Alago, Bassa, Koro (mighili) on the other side in lafia LGA of Nasarawa state. Cases of Nasarawa

Ombatse militia crisis, the indigenous tiv and hausa Fulani crisis, the Nasarawa State house of Assembly impeachment saga where political thugs attack honourable members at plenary amongst others are still fresh in our memory. According to Campbell (2010), this has often resulted to sectarian violence and lack of political stability.

### **History of Political Violence in Nigeria**

The word “violence” defies any precise, commonly, accepted definition. The concept often serves as a catch all for every variety of protest, militancy, coercion, destruction, or muscles flexing which a given observer happens to fear or condemn. (Anifowose 2006:1).

Political violence can be defined as any random or organized act of threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process (IFES 2002:3).

Political violence in Nigeria could be said to be obscene. In the words of Popoola (2004) the horrifying and distasteful scenario which has characterized the electioneering process in Nigeria since independence in 1960 is that of violence. In a similar assertion, Awonusi (2004) noted that by the dawn of independence, violence had emerged as one of the features of electoral campaigns. The above statements are justified by the fact that all elections in the country so far are marred by one type of violence or another.

Ugoh (2004) also opined that election malpractice and violence have been burning issues in both the developed and developing societies. Their trademark include riots, thuggery, looting, kidnapping, arson and political assassinations. In a retrospective analysis, Ugoh asserted that even the 1959 elections on the eve of the nation’s independence had some reported cases of violent incidents before, during and after the elections. Political parties employed or hired thugs to intimidate their political opponents.

Political violence was at its peak before, during and after that 1964 general election. The situation became uncontrollable after the 1965 Western regional election.

The situation in the region which was christened “WETE” could be described as anarchy, a state of lawlessness. The situation came to a climax when the military came in to save the situation. Thus, political violence was one of the main reasons why the military terminated the first republic. The 1979 general election did not go scot free as many people lost their lives across the country before, during and after the exercise.

The 1983 general election witnessed one of the worst political violence in the history of the nation. According to Ugoh, the violence which greeted the election resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and properties. He added that dissatisfaction with the results of the election reflected in the level of protest and violence from all over the country. Intra-ethnic clashes were reported Southeast in which many people lost their lives and property worth millions of naira destroyed. There was also inter ethnic violence between the Igbo and Kanuri tribes in Borno State when the presidential candidate of a political party was denied entry into the state. In a nutshell, the 1983 general elections were marred by irregularities and violence to the extent that both the local and foreign press criticized the conduct and outcome of the election.

Contributing, Olorode (1987) asserted that there was no doubt that law and order had virtually broken down well before the election of 1983. The situation, he continued, was similar to that of 1965 of Western region election. The situation at that time was thought to be what one can describe to be a state of incipient civil war. That is, the 1983 ruling class was not significantly different from that of 1965.

The 1993 election which should have escaped the scourge of violence had the orgy of the hallmark of Nigerian elections following its annulment. According to Popoola (2004)

the freest and fairest election in Nigeria took place in 1993, and yet it ended in serious violence when the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida annulled the election. Even in the 1999 election, as observed by Ugoh, the malpractices witnessed were a replica of the 1979/1983 elections. All the political parties were allegedly involved in massive rigging, hiring of thugs and conniving with security agents to perpetrate electoral malpractice, chaos and violence. There was also alleged use of thugs and security agents by the ruling party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to harass opposition party members.

Furthermore, as the elections of 2003 approached, people became apprehensive and anxious because of the past experience. Before the election, replica of the past started to manifest. A number of violent incidents were reported in many parts of the country ranging from assassination to arson, to thuggery, killing of party supporters.

For instance, Chief Bola Ige, the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice was killed in cold blood on December 23, 2002. His sudden death was not unconnected with the political violence. Other pre- 2003 incident of this nature include, Chief Uche Ogbonnaya an ANPP senatorial candidate in Imo State. Chief Harry Marshal, an ANPP chieftain in Rivers State met his untimely death in his home at Abuja on March 6, 2003. Others include Alhaji Ahman Pategi, PDP chairman in Kwara State. Mr. Dele Arojo a PDP governorship aspirant in Ogun State and Mr. Theodore Emeka Agwatu, principal secretary to the Imo State Government (Ekiran, 2006).

Many political rallies witnessed bloodshed, rioting, arson and chaos. For instance a political rally in Kwande Local Government Area of Benue State left seven people dead while dozens of others were seriously injured. As the election dates drew nearer, more bloodshed were reported across the country. The Punch Newspaper of 16, 2003 reported that there was a fresh outbreak of violence in Nembe, a coastal town in Bayelsa State in

which twenty people lost their lives while many more were missing and other sustained serious injuries.

Political violence has been a major road-block to democratic stability in Nasarawa state. Some scholars have made attempt to conceptualize political violence.

Political violence are a sum total of violence that are associated with the political process. It could come from within or outside the country, and manifests in various forms. A summation of the array of definitions in the literature see political violence as the use or threat of physical act or a considerable destructive use of force carried out by an individual or group of individuals within a political system against another individual or group of individuals and/or property, with the intent to cause injury or death to persons and/or damage to property, and whose objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances implementation and effects have political significance, that is intended to modify the behaviour of others in the existing arrangements of a power structure; or directed to a change in the politics, systems, territory of government and hence also directed to changes in the lives of individuals within societies (Honderich, 1989; Anifowose, 1982; see Edigin and Obakhedo, 2010).

In Nasarawa state, elections have been accompanied with election violence since her creation. Just like the incidence that took place few months after her creation that led to the bloody and violent conflict between the Tiv and some ethnic groups in Awe, Keana, and Obi Local Governments of the state, that led to the gruesome beheading of the Sarkin Azara, Alh. Musa Ibrahim on the 12th of June, 2001. This suggests that, electoral violence cuts across different segments of the electoral process commencing from the registration period to post-election period.

The Nasarawa state political violence has attracted the attention of the court also, but not with meaningful results. Concerted efforts

by both the Federal and state Governments (though well meaning) have been unable to effectively mediate the Nasarawa crises. Two panels of inquiry have been set and the implementation of their findings appears to only ignite further conflicts and violence. There have also been heavy security presence and semi-state of emergency declared by the state government at different times in violence and post violence periods. As institutions formed by political processes, political actors and stakeholders in the state have succeeded in pitching the Federal and state Governments against themselves. In this face of palpable cross-road, it is noteworthy to recall that one of the panels strongly recommended the ADR option and strategies (Nasarawa State Government, 2014).

### **Theoretical Framework**

In order to ensure systematic and logical explanation of the subject matter a theoretical framework is needed to serve as a guide to this research study. In respect of this research the “frustration-aggression theory” was used as its framework. When the frustration-aggression hypothesis was developed, frustration was defined as “an interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in the behavior sequence” (Dollard et al., 1939). The basic premise was that individuals would become frustrated if they were kept from the satisfactions they expected due to their goal-directed behavior. General support for the notion that frustration leads to aggression has been found. For example, early studies have provided evidence that frustrating scenarios produce aggressive responses from participants (Buss, 1963). Additionally, studies have found frustration has been demonstrated to elicit anger and verbal aggression from subjects (Kulik & Brown, 1979).

The emotional reaction to frustration can be defined as perceived frustration (Storms & Spector, 1987). Thus, modeling frustration as an emotional reaction spurred from a

frustrating event is more appropriate than arguing that a frustrating event directly impacts behavioral reactions. Frustration aggression theory is one of the early aggression theories. It was first proposed by a group of Yale psychologists in 1939. The original theory made two bold claims: (1) aggression always precedes frustration, and (2) frustration always leads to aggression. The original theory has undergone two important revisions: one by Neil Miller in 1941, (*Psycholrev* 48 (4):337-342, 1941) One by Leonard Becowitz in 1989 (*Psychol Bull* 106 (1):59, 1989). The adoption of the frustration aggression theory is informed due to its aptness in providing a systematic explanation of the basic variables which this study investigates. It should however, be noted that, the elite theory has been flawed by some scholars as been unnecessarily conspiratorial and provocative (Sambo, 1999; Olurewene, 2008).

### **Research Methodology**

The research has been conducted predominantly using mixed methods of qualitative and quantitative data gathering. The qualitative method used extracts evidence through the examination of primary sources, e.g. historical documents, archives, interviews, newspaper reports and written sources. It permits the observation of violent incidents where they happen, and allows flexibility in observing and explaining the violence on the evidence of different actors: victims, security officials, policy makers and opportunists. The qualitative method is supported by using the quantitative approach which is deployed to generate numerical data and statistics from a large sample of the population. Using face-to-face interviews, physical observation and telephone interviews, it is possible for the quantitative method to reconstruct (in measurable data and structured pattern) the number of persons injured or missing in Nasarawa State during the period under review.



### Socio-Political Determinants of Conflicts in Nasarawa State

A common adage says “there is no smoke without fire”, events and things do not just happen. People make things happen. History is a bye product of human behaviour.

Some data portraying some socio-political determinants are gotten and explored through the simple percentage method which was mainly utilized for the effective understanding of the study. This research made use of tables for data presentation using simple percentage technique. The statistical table was used to indicate responses gotten from the field survey carried out as a result of this research, this is because it will be very easy to understand the facts presented in a table form and equally, it avoids unnecessary details and repetitions.

In view of the above, the research made use of data gotten from 395 individuals who responded from the field survey. The statistical table below was used to indicate responses gotten from the field survey carried out as a result of this research, this is because it will be very easy to understand the facts presented in a table form and equally, it avoids unnecessary details and repetitions.

**Table 4.1: Indicating Respondents gender Statues from questionnaires**

| Responses | Frequency | Percentage (%) |
|-----------|-----------|----------------|
| Male      | 176       | 70.4           |
| Female    | 74        | 29.6           |
| Total     | 245       | 100%           |

**Source:** Field Survey September, 2023.

In the **table above as earlier** indicated that a total of two hundred and fifty (250) questionnaires were distributed and two hundred and forty five (245) were retrieved. Out of this number 176 constituting (70.4%) of the respondents were male while 74 (29.6%) were females.

**Table 4.1.1 Indicating Respondents gender Statues from interview**

| Responses | Frequency | Percentage (%) |
|-----------|-----------|----------------|
| Male      | 75        | 50             |
| Female    | 75        | 50             |
| Total     | 150       | 100%           |

**Source:** Field Survey September, 2023.

In the **table above as earlier** indicated that a total of one hundred and fifty (150) individuals were interviewed with questions emanating from the questionnaires with 50 individuals each drawn from (Awe, Lafia and Nasarawa) divided into 25 males and 25 females per Local Government Area. Out of this total number of individuals interviewed 75 (50%) of the respondents were male while 75 (50%) were females.

The data gotten above from the field interviewed was 100 percent because it was conducted on one on one basis with the various individuals respondent.

So Political violence does not just fall from the sky, there are some underpinning antecedents. From observation and research, Political violence is rooted in the following among others:

#### Politicians:

These are individuals who cannot win election but want to win by all means. Furthermore, election results are changed in favor of a particular political party at the detriment of other parties. This is usually the case when incumbent governments want to retain power by all means. For instance no incumbent federal government has ever been defeated in any election in Nigeria. The declared results of federal general elections of 1983, 1999, 2003, and 2015 are cases to point. More often than not, supporters of some political parties are denied the exercise of their voting rights by the powers that be at the polling booths. All of the above always lead to electoral violence in Nigeria. Violence is also caused by unpopular politicians who usually

employed political violence through paid thugs to turn the table in their favour.

#### **Natural Tendency:**

Research and experience show that some individuals are naturally prone to violent behaviour due to their upbringing. There is no doubt that individuals who have been exposed to violence from infancy will most likely perfect the culture of violence at a latter stage of life. Researchers of human behaviour assert that people who have been exposed to violence will more likely than those who have not been exposed to violence to employ violent strategies to manage conflict either on the micro or macro level. Ugoh (2004;).

#### **Cultural Trait:**

Some cultures are said to be prone to and committed to the use of violence to maintain or achieve a desired goal. In a similar vein the pattern of child rearing in some societies endorse violence. Most children in such a culture have at one time or another been slapped by either or both parents at least in a minor way. Such action meets the approval of the society and it is not even thought of as violence against the child since it is by the parents (Anderson and Sabatelli, 1999:45). Children with this type of upbringing are a ready tool in the hands of violent god fathers at a later stage of life particularly for political ends.

#### **Political Intolerance:**

Most political parties in power are intolerant of opposition. They put all necessary and all possible machinery to frustrate opposing parties or even to eliminate them. Ugoh (2004:164) maintains that this is the order of the day in many African countries. To him, the result is one party system. Here in Nigeria, the opposition parties are only vocal without any effectiveness. The ruling party usually intimidates and silence them. For instance Ugoh recalled that when Chief Obafemi Awolowo went to the Northern

region to campaign for his party candidates, he was attacked and an attempt was made to set his helicopter ablaze.

#### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The overall idea that gave birth to this paper is the need to redirect the state from a culture of political violence to a culture of peace towards sustainable empowerment and development. This calls for possible alteration of power or elite structure within the state which has always rendered all efforts towards resolving this conflict abortive. The political and local power elites have severally hijacked any process geared towards resolving the lingering conflict. The change of policies as advocated by this work involves a lot of enlightenment and civic awareness with specific focus on gender issues, the youth, and the disadvantaged groups who must change their myopic or utopic values for reality. The situation is so dire that prompting the extreme which entails allowing leadership from bottom-up in the peace process will equally be modest so long as it allows peace to return. It is time to let the masses evaluate and reevaluate their relationship and contract with their political and local leaders. This paper strongly recommends the ADR as a policy option for the Nasarawa State endemic and deep-rooted political violence.

Deceit and unfulfilled promises by political leaders discouraged a number of Nigerians from participating in election and other political activities. Falade (2008) argued that politicians make series of promises during election campaign. Most of these promises are not fulfilled after they had been voted in to power. As a result of this, some voters lose interest in election. One of the respondents interviewed during the 2011 election expressed that "I have come to the sun to suffer even though I am not benefiting anything from the government...I don't even have confidence in them because they have been failing us generally" (Adelakun, 2011).

Many political parties mobilize violent groups to guarantee security to candidates, party officials, campaign meetings and related activities during election periods. Most post election violence is linked to political parties in terms of mobilization, engineering and heightening. Incidents of violent protests and arson tend to be instigated, organized and backed by associates and supporters of opposition or losing parties, party leaders and candidates against alleged electoral irregularities and stolen victories. Political parties' violence linkage has constructed a regime of public distrust, disgust, apathy and antipathy concerning the political process and political elite. Nigerians have become disillusioned and alienated from the political process. A culture of political violence has been constructed. This has meant that not only is confidence being lost in the electoral process, but a growing political cynicism may be emerging. There has been delegitimation of governments that acquired power through dubious elections pervaded by violence.

In conclusion, this research work observed that, Since the beginning of the fourth Republic, the academics and the civil societies have paid serious attention to the practice of democracy in Nasarawa State and are much more concerned about its consolidation. It is observed in this paper that Nigeria's democracy is shallow and has failed to take deep roots because political parties are deficient and have been unable to play their expected role in strengthening the foundation of democratic consolidation. There is a galaxy of ways that Nasarawa state could use to curb political violence and strengthen democratic governance. They include: constitutional amendment; electoral reform; pressure from civil society groups through agenda-setting; change in the character of the elite; political education.

It has been argued at several fora that the significance and utility of political education cannot be over-emphasized. This is because political education as it were is the conduit-pipe through which the political cultural values

and behavioural patterns of the society are imbibed and internalized political socialization. In any case, since Nigerians tend to be very religious, religious books emphasize the need for acquisition of knowledge as an instrument for guiding and girding against the wiles of the enemy in all societies, Nigeria inclusive. Therefore, there is the need for Nigerians to have a fore and deeper knowledge of causes, manifestations, dimensions, consequences and ways of curbing the phenomenon.

Since education has been identified as the launch-pad of a nation-state's development agenda, political education constitutes a herculean task for the several agents of education in Nigeria; namely: the family; peer groups; schools (primary, secondary, and tertiary); religious institutions; civil society organizations and the fourth estate of the realm (the mass media).

Therefore, Nigerians should know the dynamic nature of our politics, and the emerging trends that shape the political culture and determine the direction of political socialization, and in relation to electoral violence, should learn, imbibe and internalize the political sociology of electoral behavior education. This would help the nation to either make or mar its emerging democratic order.

This aspect explains the law section that was written in either the constitution or electoral act that states the nature of punishment for youth involvement in political violence or any social vice. It is believed that all countries have a written law that explain the nature of punishments, if anyone found to be involved in social vice acts; but, the problem is that the article of the law seems to be missing or neglected in the democratic process. On the other hand, other laws that have been left out in either the constitution or the electoral acts need to be established and inserted into such books. Therefore, this study has intended to remind the existing state government about the current situation of political violence and the nature of the punishment that was highlighted in the constitution or in the

electoral act. Even if there is a high turnout of youth education in the state, which is high literacy amongst the youth, but fail to secure a job the tendencies of youth restiveness, is high. This means that without job creation then poverty will remain with the people and the social problem will continue. So, there is a need for the Nasarawa state government to provide policies that can solve the problem of poverty in the state and by extension in Nigeria. Nasarawa state Government and societal efforts is another influencing factor in mitigating youth restiveness in the society, both commitment can help in tackling the problem violent group activity or the high rate of the youth involvement in the society. The government has all the means of fighting those social problems whilst the society or community knows those who have involved themselves in such acts. So, each of the two has a vital role to play in solving the problem in the state. There should be a comprehensive electoral reform in which all faith stakeholders including civil society organizations and international funders and observers should ensure that the quality and credibility of elections in Nigeria are not compromised in order to ensure the epitomic expression of popular choices.

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# 51

## POTENCY OF MOTOR PARKS IN CHECKMATING INSECURITY IN NIGERIA

**Kamnan Moses Adure**

**Alexander Elimian**

Department of History and Diplomatic Studies  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria



### Abstract

One of the challenges that has bedeviled Nigeria in recent times is the spate of insecurity in the country. Indeed Nigeria has witnessed some security infractions since independence. However, the safety of lives and properties in the country has continued to worsen during the past decade. There are issues related to insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, and robbery that have claimed many lives and properties. While the government has continued to invest a lot of resources to curtail this menace, the unfortunate trend has continued to manifest with a growing tendency. This paper aims to examine how motor parks could be adapted to play a synergic role in the fight against insecurity in the country. Engaging this institution is important because motor parks have become an essential part of the transport system in Nigeria, and the parks are distributed all over the length and breadth of the country. These motor parks are arguably the most common avenue for 'first contact' for people traveling from one destination to another. Accordingly, it is the contention of this paper that security agencies need to educate people in the motor park communities on the need to be security conscious. There is also the need to ensure security surveillance and checks at motor parks to forestall infractions. Once there is a synergy between security agencies and the motor parks, the institution will be poised to contribute to the fight against security breaches in the country.

**Keywords:** First contact, touts, insecurity, motor parks, robbery, kidnapping

### Introduction

The last decade has been marked by an aggravation in the spate of insecurity in Nigeria. There have been growing cases of insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, and robbery, which have threatened the peace of the country. The global terrorism index released in 2020 suggested that Nigeria consecutively remained in the third spot, the fifth time in a row (from 2015 to 2020). The effect of these security infractions on the nation has been so alarming that many economic activities are even threatened. It is difficult to determine who has been worst hit by the continued deteriorating security situation in the country. This is because a number of both combatant and civilian Nigerians have either been harmed, injured, or killed as a result of the

continued insecurity arising from these violations. Even those who are not direct victims have been affected in one way or the other.

Apart from the wanton destruction of lives and properties, the heightened insecurity in the country has also compelled the Nigerian government to allot large amounts of resources to defense in a bid to safeguard the sovereignty of the nation. For instance, out of the 2013 budget of 4.987 trillion 950 billion was allocated to national security. In 2014, 968.127 billion representing 20% of the total budget was allocated to defense by President Goodluck Jonathan. On the whole, defense spending in the country rose above 8 trillion in 7 years (2013 - 2020).

While this paper also commends the existing measures that have been put in place by the government to check insecurity, it is plausible to note that desperate times also require people to take desperate measures. This is where the need to explore the potency of motor parks in checkmating the spate of insecurity in the country is also necessary. Considering that the road transportation system is the most commonly used method for the movement of humans and goods in Nigeria, there is a need to beam searchlights on the motor parks to see how they can contribute to checkmating any potential security infraction.

### **The Road Transport System and Motor Parks**

Movement is an important activity in the course of human development. It is not in error, therefore, that man is naturally endowed with the ability to move, albeit within a limited environment. Before men began the practice of sedentary settlement, they moved from place to place in search of food and water. During this period, the basic means of transport was the human feet. Eventually, people learned to use animals for transport. They domesticated donkeys and horses and were known to have delineated and maintained convenient routes for easy movement. The invention of the wheel in Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq) in 3,500 BCE marked a watershed in the history of modern transportation. However, the wheel alone, without any further innovation, would not have done much for mankind. Rather, it was the combination of the wheel and axle that made early forms of transportation possible including carts and chariots. As we have it today, transportation systems have evolved through various historical epochs.

Concerning the road transport system, Faulks has noted that the face of the sector changed with the introduction of the gasoline-powered internal combustion engine by Karl Benz and Gottlieb Daimler in 1885 and 1886 respectively. Since then, there has been

technological advancement in the manufacture of sophisticated vehicles that have steadily compressed the gap between time and space, making it possible for men to cover long distances within relatively short periods.

In the case of present Nigeria, one of the most viable means for the movement of human beings and goods is the road transportation system. This mode of transportation has gained prominence over others including air, rail, and water systems owing to its flexibility. Whereas just a small proportion of the Nigerian population can afford air transport, even where it is available, road transport is comparatively affordable to many Nigerians because of the relatively low charges and accessibility. Road transport vehicles also penetrate interior villages where there are neither air nor water transport services. Again, the railway system which could have been more advantageous has only crisscrossed only few areas. Even at that, the system has remained moribund for several years.

Because of the viability of the road transport system, the institution of motor parks which serves as its hub of activities has also gained prominence. This essential component of the road transport system (motor parks) is distributed all over the length and breadth of the country and is arguably the most common avenue for 'first contact' for people traveling from one destination to another. They serve as loading spots for passengers as well as goods. All intending passengers are expected to board vehicles at these spots which serve as originating or transit points for their journeys. Equally, the last point of discharge of passengers is motor parks, in which case they could be referred to as destination points for commercial vehicles conveying passengers and luggage.

Aside from the obvious business of loading and dropping (alighting) intending passengers and goods by motorists, motor parks also constitute avenues for the conduct of several

other economic and social activities in Nigeria. It is worth noting that the nature of fencing being used at these motor parks is not linear. Stalls are usually built around the parks for the sale of goods and provision of services. Hawkers also converge on the motor parks for the sale of different items. A conglomeration of these economic and other activities like political mobilization, and social awareness creation and integration at the motor parks has in the long run affected society generally.

The implication of the aforesaid is the centrality of commercial motor parks in both economic and social activities. They usually develop into central places wherever they are established. However, most of the existing literature in the country tends to undermine this important facet of Nigerian society i.e. the study of motor parks. Indeed, even the works that focus on economy and intergroup relations, where motor parks play vital roles, have paid negligible attention to the centrality of transportation particularly motor parks in these phenomena. This is indicative that the institution of Motor Park in Nigeria, including the masses providing services therein (often placed at the lowest level of social strata), have suffered marginalization even within the realm of scholarship. It is against this backdrop that this study has undertaken to assess motor parks as an important aspect of the social and economic history of Nigeria. Premium here is placed on examining how these motor parks could be employed in a synergic relationship with security agencies to checkmate the spate of insecurity in the country.

### **The Potency of Motor Parks in Checkmating Insecurity**

Effective exchange can only be made possible with the aid of a viable transport system. It is transportation that plays the role of changing the location of people as well as goods. In the case of Nigeria, this paper has already established that the road transportation system is the most viable for the movement of passengers and goods.

Equally established is the central role that is played by motor parks in the road transport industry where they serve as the engine room. Generally, the parks have been identified as hubs of economic and social activities. This has made those spots become places of daily convergence for many people.

However, the problem of lack of adequate security is one major issue that has militated against the smooth operation of most of the motor parks in the country. According to Zaki Gowon, government authorities over the years appear not to be favorably disposed to the provision of security at the motor parks. While it has been observed that large numbers of people congregate at the motor parks daily, it is not customary for personnel of any conventional security agencies to be assigned to the parks. No reason has been adduced to this other than the low attention of the government to the plight of motor parks in Nigeria. As a result of what might be considered negligence on the part of the government, shop owners and members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) usually organize and put in place efforts to secure motor parks within their domains. At the Vandeikya motor park, for instance, Night guards are usually hired to provide security at night. They are paid monthly stipends from the proceeds of the daily dues collected from drivers and contributions from shop owners. In 2018, for instance, the average amount that was paid to a night guard for each month was ₦10,000.00. In the daytime, members of the motor park communities watched each other's back. Meanwhile, stealing is highly prohibited at the motor parks. Any member of the community who is found guilty of stealing is normally expelled from the park.

Notwithstanding the efforts of some stakeholders at the motor parks to ensure security, the non-presence of conventional security personnel has often created holes for security breaches. For instance, two persons purported to be criminals were lynched at the



Adikpo motor park in 1992. Similarly, a Gboko-bound passenger was trailed and robbed of his money at the Tse-agberagba motor park in September 1998. In all the cases, it was blamed on the inability of the government to station security personnel at the motor parks. There are also instances where criminal elements disguised themselves as travelers only to rob other passengers in the course of their journey. One such incident occurred in 2001 when some Makurdi-bound passengers from Tse-agberagba Motor Park were robbed by co-travelers at Kyoor, a village in Konshisha local government area of Benue state. This could have been averted if there had been a proper screening and profiling of passengers by security agents before takeoff at the motor park.

Apart from the security issues that have been mentioned, motor parks are increasingly being used as avenues for the supply of arms and ammunition in the country. For instance, a driver with the Benue Links company (name withheld) is currently serving his jail term over the transportation of arms and ammunition. The driver was said to be conveying a waybill from Makurdi to Lagos which content included one AK47 as well as some ammunition. He was arrested by some police officers on a routine stop and search and charged to court where he was convicted. Similarly, it was reported on 9<sup>th</sup> September 2019 how troops of Operation Whirl Stroke arrested 19 suspects led by Dauda Alara and Adrew Imbwise while conveying arms and ammunition from Nassarawa to Benue state. While these arms and ammunition were concealed in passengers' goods, the absence of security checks at the motor park provided the perpetrators with the opportunity to travel with the weapons. Though they were later apprehended in the course of their journey, it is most likely that a good number of such journeys involving the movement of arms and ammunition could have been completed successfully given that even the personnel manning the checkpoints

mostly rely on guesswork and tip-off from members of the public.

The point to note from the foregoing examples is that criminal elements in the country have often taken advantage of the non-presence of security checks at the motor parks to engage in illicit supplies of weapons to criminals in Nigeria. This has made access to weaponry relatively easy for criminals who have continued to inflict harm on the country. Coping this menace requires a synergic approach that must involve government, security agencies as well as the people who are involved in the daily conduct of activities at the motor parks. It is against this backdrop that the paper has proposed the following remedial measures to position the motor parks to contribute to the fight against the rising insecurity in the country:

- a) The government should consider the establishment of police posts across all the motor parks in the country where security personnel could be stationed for surveillance and checks.
- b) Security agencies should in conjunction with public transporter unions organize regular workshops and training sessions to provide security tips for membership of the motor park communities and as well train them on security consciousness.
- c) The government should provide functional security scanners across all motor parks to enable security agents to thoroughly screen all luggage at the park before they are loaded into vehicles. If this is done the problem of concealing weapons either in passenger goods or waybills will be controlled.
- d) There should be a total prohibition of street loading. All commercial vehicles conveying passengers and goods should be properly documented at the motor parks to ensure compliance with security standards before they are allowed to pass. Regular checkpoints on the highway should be mandated to check documents to confirm places of take-off of every commercial

vehicle before they are allowed to proceed. This will ensure that the details of every passenger are properly captured on the manifest and can be traced easily in case of any infraction. Furthermore, the prohibition of street loading would also checkmate and help to curtail the emerging security challenge of the “One Chance” drivers, which have claimed several souls already. For instance, it was widely reported over social media platforms on 3<sup>rd</sup> May 2024 how a young lady, Kadoon Louisa Iornumbe, was allegedly pushed down from a moving vehicle around Mpape junction in Abuja by a "One Chance" vehicle. This would have been avoidable if she had

boarded the vehicle from the park and proper checks were conducted on the vehicle. Unfortunately, she lost her life in the incident.

- e) There should be a total ban on the sale and consumption of alcohol, as well as narcotics at the motor parks. This is because the trend also poses a security challenge. At the Tse-agberagba motor park in Benue state, for instance, the sale of alcohol at the park has become very common such that several shops are dedicated to the sale of either beer, spirits, or local gin. The table below shows that 30 percent of the shops within the motor park were engaged in the sale of alcoholic drinks in 2018.

**Table 1: Shops at Tse-Agberagba Motor Parks**

| S/NO | Name of Shop Owner  | Business Activity     |
|------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 1    | I G Eze             | Beer Parlor           |
| 2    | Sam Kusodi          | Beer Parlor           |
| 3    | Aondoaseer Nachiya  | Fertilizer            |
| 4    | Rimigius Ogbu       | Beer Parlor           |
| 5    | Bagu Bem            | Provision Store       |
| 6    | Joseph Mary Ikele   | Building Materials    |
| 7    | Peter Calvin        | Beer Parlor           |
| 8    | Ako Osu Emmanuel    | Agency Banking        |
| 9    | Terzulum Ivekper    | Building Materials    |
| 10   | Tarzoho James       | Provisions Store      |
| 11   | Anthony Eze         | Provisions Store      |
| 12   | Mwuese Tiza         | Food Vendor           |
| 13   | Bem Akende          | Tailoring             |
| 14   | Wanger Aondoakura   | Bags Shop             |
| 15   | Happy-Joe Igba      | Barber Shop           |
| 16   | Iorumba Gbudo       | Provisions Store      |
| 17   | Madam Patience      | Provisions Store      |
| 18   | Blessing Sunday     | Hot Drinks Joint      |
| 19   | Nancy Akpensongun   | Tailoring             |
| 20   | Kwagher Ioramber    | Food Vendor           |
| 21   | Aernyam Jacob       | Tailoring             |
| 22   | Eunice Ivuriyo      | Food Vendor           |
| 23   | Daniel Anyom        | Beer Wholesale        |
| 24   | Alaka Sule          | Beer/Hot Drinks Joint |
| 25   | Aguttico Charters   | Charter Union         |
| 26   | Wandoo Ageen        | Beer Parlor           |
| 27   | Christian Akpashibi | Beer Parlor           |
| 28   | John Hough          | Tailoring Shop        |
| 29   | Emmy 4 Real         | Photo Studio          |
| 30   | Christian Chukwu    | Patent Medicine Store |

**Source:** Personal Field Research 2018

As could be seen, out of the thirty (30) functional shops at the Tse-agberagba motor park in 2018, nine (9) of them were dedicated to the sale of alcoholic drinks. Although Debam has argued that the trend did not constitute any challenge since drivers were not allowed to drink on duty, yet it is difficult to accept his position. According to him, if any driver was found to be under the influence of alcohol, he was not allowed to embark on any journey. His vehicle was either trans-loaded or handed to another driver to convey the passengers. However, the non-availability of any alcoholic testing device at the motor parks during this period raised doubts about the capacity of the management to determine if a driver was under the influence of alcohol or not. More so, Charles Ude has observed that some of the drivers bought sachets of alcoholic drinks at the parks only to take them in the course of their journeys. Though there is no empirical evidence to show how the consumption of alcohol affected the performance of the drivers, it is also difficult to argue that it had no negative effect on their jobs. There have been several cases of careless driving/speeding which have sometimes resulted in accidents. Furthermore, the sale of alcoholic drinks at the motor parks often attracts criminal elements who ordinarily would have no business at the parks. Beer parlors are in some cases used by criminals to relax and spy on travelers before transmitting information for their possible attacks. This is in addition to the nuisance that the so-called joints constitute to the motor parks. There are cases where people have become intoxicated with alcohol and disturbed the peace of other members of the motor park community. Korgba has narrated how a passenger who was under the influence of alcohol attempted to drag the steering in one of his journeys from Tse-agberagba to Gboko. It took the intervention of other passengers in the car to prevent the drunk from dragging the vehicle off the road. The sale of alcohol at the motor parks also promoted

such social vices as vulgarity, hooliganism, vagrancy, and prostitution at the motor parks.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

Part of the main contribution of this paper is the explanation that the institution of motor parks is a viable agent that can be synergized to bring about useful changes in Nigeria. The paper has shown how a conglomeration of both economic and social activities at the motor parks has encouraged the daily congregation of large numbers of people at these spots. This has not happened without positive changes in the economy and social life of Nigerians. However, there are strong indications that government authorities in Nigeria have continued to undermine the significance of motor parks in turning around the fortunes of society. This is a result of the wrong notions held against the institution. Before now, it was common to assume that the motor park community is simply an assemblage of hooligans in society. This is even responsible for some derogatory names that are used to subsume individuals who operate at the parks. Having established the viability of the motor parks in this study and also shown how they could be harnessed to tackle even the most daring challenge of insecurity that has bedeviled the country today, it is recommended that policymakers direct efforts towards surmounting the inadequacies of the parks for effective collaboration in the fight against insecurity in Nigeria.

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## ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN JOS, PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA

**Geoffrey Nanbal Shipurut**

**Gani Joshua**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria



### Abstract

This paper discusses ethno-religious violence and its implication on educational activities in Jos, Plateau State. The paper used a descriptive, cross-sectional survey research design. A sample size of 400 respondents was selected from the total population of 1,260,200 using the Tare Yamane formula. Questionnaires were distributed to 400 respondents who were randomly selected across Jos North, Jos South, and Jos East LGA. Interviews were also conducted with six key informants to complement the data gathered from the questionnaires. Responses from the questionnaires were analyzed using descriptive statistics of frequency counts and percentages. Quantitative data were analyzed while outlining the key point presented by the key informant. The paper revealed that ethno-religious violence affects educational activities in Jos Plateau State. Educational activities in Jos often undergo hardship as a result of ethno-religious violence. The paper recommended that governments at all levels should develop a crises management plan that have both short time and long-time goal. The short time goal should focus on keeping security personnel close to schools in vulnerable areas in order to ensure quick response to emergency security issues. The long-time goal should focus on relocating the schools away from crisis ridden areas.

**Keywords:** Ethno-religious, violence, education, crisis management plan

### Introduction

In Nigeria, violent conflict among ethnic and religious groups is widely experienced. Even communities in the south east Nigeria with a relatively homogeneous population had experienced violent conflict in Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo (for example Aguri-Umuleri communal conflict in Anambra). (Ibenwa & Uroko, 2020). The Northern Region of Nigeria seems to be one of the hotspots for violent conflict. Across ages, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Benue, Niger, Kano, Adamawa, Taraba, Plateau state and a host of others have shared their bitter experiences of violent ethnic and religious conflict. The study by Soomiyol and Fadairo (2020) discovered that a lot of schools are often destroyed during ethno-religious violence, making it mandatory for interested students to trek long distances

to attend schools in nearby communities. Similar to this, insecurity in the country's north have damaged numerous educational facilities, including classrooms, administrative buildings, ICT equipment, tables, chairs, and desks (Ogunode, Ahaotu & Obi-Ezenekwe, 2021). For instance, in 2016 Human Rights Watch stated that Boko Haram has destroyed nearly 1,000 schools and displaced 19,000 teachers. Attacks in northeastern Nigeria between 2009 and 2015 resulted in the destruction of over 910 schools and the closure of at least 1,500 others (HRW, 2016). During times of crisis or insurrection, school buildings and facilities are destroyed. Rebels have set fire to numerous secondary schools. Facilities at schools start to become inadequate (Oluyomi, & Grace, 2016).

In addition, many children in the affected areas are out of school as they are taking refuge in IDP camps and other shelters with their parents. This leads to loss of valuable school time which have negative consequences on self and national development. In some other areas, school compounds (especially primary and secondary schools) are used as Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs) camps (Effiong & Owolabi, 2022). Hence, school activities are temporarily suspended which affects learning process. According to International Crisis Group (ICG) (2018) report, 6 and 35 primary schools were converted to IDP camps in Benue and Nasarawa state respectively while 24 state nomadic schools were shut down in Benue state due to conflict. Many parents have made the decision to keep their kids at home rather than risk having them killed or abducted from schools where there is no guarantee of safety.

Jos is unarguably one of the most volatile places in the country (Taylor & Shelley, 2019). The city has suffered the siege of insecurity for many years which has manifested in incessant and recurring ethno-religious violence within the state. The state of insecurity has become worrisome and disturbing considering the high rate of killing that has befallen the area in recent time. The situation deteriorated to the point that there is no year, that Jos does not witness a heavy bloodbath occasioned by ethnic and religious conflict (Gwaza, Dakum & Bogoro, 2015).

Thus, the violence in Jos might have resulted in loss of lives and properties as well as succeeded in fracturing the Christian/Muslim relationship in Jos. It may have equally hindered genuine national integration as Jos is a melting pot of Nigeria. The resultant effects of ethno-religious violence on educational activities Jos which is the focus of this paper may be enormous. It could be that it has pervades all the sectors of the education, breeds insecurity, discrimination, mutual mistrust and retards educational development. Thus, in a society

where there is a high level of intolerance among the various ethnic and religious groups as well as lack of public enlightenment on how settlers/indigene can have respect for cultures of the various ethnic and religious groups, ethno-religious violence becomes the order of the day. Similarly, in a society where there is constant interference by political leaders on almost every issue that requires mutual understanding among the various ethnic groups through their religious leaders, ethno-religious violence continues to intensify and educational activities suffer setback. It is against this background that this paper examined ethno-religious violence and its implication on educational activities in Jos, Plateau State.

ICG (2018) report that violent conflict caused the closure of 24 state nomadic schools in Benue state and the conversion of 35 primary schools into internally displaced person (IDP) camps in Nasarawa and Benue states, respectively. However, following the persistent violent conflict in Jos, it could be that the educational system in Jos might have suffered similar repulse, which this study is expected to address. Schools in Jos may have been grossly affected; hence, peeping into the effect of ethno-religious violence on education and the levels of education mostly affected is necessary. This paper looks beyond the temporary closure of schools to find out whether there is a short supply of educational materials and manpower in various areas of specialization across sectors of education as a result of ethno-religious violence in Jos. The paper also dwells on finding out if ethno-religious violence led to the loss of lives of teachers and students, disruption of the academic calendar, damage to educational infrastructure, and the turning of schools into refugee camps, as there is a paucity of knowledge on the effect of ethno-religious violence on this important variable. Thus, it is on this note that this paper examines the impact of ethno-religious violence on the educational activities of Jos, Plateau State.

According to Okanezi and Ogeh (2023), the effects of violence and conflict on education in Nigeria cannot be fully explored. We can only speculate about the detrimental repercussions of this development on our educational system; they are difficult to justify. The writers went on to say that the North is already in collapse. Reviews of the occurrence and its effects on Nigeria's already dysfunctional basic education system, in which 13 million youngsters are not in school and instead walk the streets, hawk, take animals for grazing on private property, and other activities, are rife (Editorial, 2022). No longer are educators and students free to lecture without constantly scanning their surroundings to spot potential criminals. Both instructors and students struggle to learn in these kinds of environments. It follows that there is a risk to our children's future and to education in this area. (Lawal, Tukuru, Samson, & Aodu, 2021). Due to the insecurity in Nigeria, the governments of some states have decided to close all of their educational institutions in order to stop such attacks. Because of insecurity, Borno State issued an order for the closure of all educational facilities. According to Human Rights Watch (2016), public secondary schools in Maiduguri, the state capital, only reopened in February 2016 after internally displaced people, or IDPs, who had occupied the majority of the schools, were relocated. Borno, one of the most affected states, has seen school closures at all levels in 22 out of 27 local government areas for at least two years.

In the words of Ogunode et al. (2021), the issue of insecurity in Nigeria has resulted in the deaths of numerous professional teachers, raising concerns about how violence in the country is influencing educational institution administration. Because to this statute, fewer teachers are needed to effectively manage schools, particularly in the country's north. Professional teachers in Nigeria have died as a result of insecurity, especially in the country's north. According to Ogunode et al. (2021),

since the insurgency began in 2009, Boko Haram is believed to have killed 2,300 teachers in the northeastern region of Nigeria. This implies that since the education sector would have to deal with the issue of insufficient skilled teachers, the quality of education will decline.

The widespread devastation of infrastructure in Nigeria is another impact of conflict on the management of education. To carry out instructional programs, school administration is dependent on the availability of infrastructure. Insurgencies and members of Boko Haram have damaged numerous school facilities in the northern region of the country, including classrooms, administrative buildings, ICT equipment, tables, chairs, and desks (Ogunode, et al, 2021). According to a 2016 Human Rights Watch study, Boko Haram has destroyed nearly 1,000 schools and displaced 19,000 teachers. Out of 260 school sites, the Education Needs Assessment discovered that 28% had been damaged by gunshots, shelling, or shrapnel; 20% had been purposefully burned on fire; 32% had been looted; and 29% had military or armed groups nearby. Attacks in northeastern Nigeria between 2009 and 2015 resulted in the destruction of over 910 schools and the closure of at least 1,500 others (HRW, 2016). During times of crisis or insurrection, school buildings and facilities are destroyed. Rebels have set fire to a number of secondary schools. School infrastructure deteriorates (Oluyomi, & Grace, 2016).

Similar to this, Onwumah (2014) claims that authorities are frequently forced to close schools and change the school calendar due to ethno-religious conflict. Even when there isn't a direct impact on the campuses, universities may close due to fear of things getting worse. Exams scheduled in conjunction with public unrest are frequently canceled or postponed in both public and private educational establishments. Because of insurgencies, several northern states of Nigeria did not hold the unified tertiary matriculation examination

(UTME) in 2013. Many pupils wind up dropping out of school and becoming a burden on society as a result of the extended unauthorized holidays that are caused by social turmoil. As a result, they are readily drawn into heretical movements, enlisted as zealot leaders' followers, or exposed to political thuggery by dishonest lawmakers. A few of them had become prisoners, died, or suffered severe injuries. Given the extensive and grave consequences mentioned above, it is reasonable to assume that if these conflicts are not swiftly and forcefully resolved, the future of the younger generation may be in danger.

Soomiyol and Fadairo (2020) were of the view that lots of schools are destroyed during conflict, making it mandatory for interested students to trek long distances to attend schools in nearby communities. This makes most of the youths, who are the major source of farm labor, unavailable for farm activities during the week as they come home late from school. In areas where schools are present, they are in poor condition; the school buildings are dilapidated; it lacks qualified teachers as most of the teachers run to other perceived safe communities to find employment; it also lacks the essential facilities and equipment to impart the desired knowledge on the students who should serve as agents of agricultural innovation transfer (Soomiyol & Fadairo, 2020). Moreover, a large number of kids in the impacted areas miss school since they are joining their parents in IDP camps and other relief facilities. As a result, significant educational time is lost, which is detrimental to both individual and societal growth. According to Duru (2014), there are certain other places where school compounds, particularly those of primary and secondary schools, are utilized as camps for internally displaced people. Thus, the learning process is impacted when school activities are momentarily stopped. Six and 35 primary schools in Benue and Nasarawa states, respectively, were turned into IDP camps,

while 24 state nomadic schools in Benue state were closed as a result of war, according to a study released by the International Crisis Group (ICG) for 2018.

## **Theoretical framework**

### **Frustration-Aggression Theory**

Yate (1962) and Berkowitz (1963) enlarged and refined the frustration-aggression paradigm, a theoretical framework created in 1939 by John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, O. H. Mowrer, and Robert Sears.

According to Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939), the general tenet of frustration-aggression theory is that all people have basic wants that they strive to fulfill and that any attempt by individuals or organizations to obstruct these requirements will result in violent reactions. In other words, frustration naturally leads to aggressiveness. When a person or group's legitimate desires are denied, either directly or indirectly, as a result of the way a society is structured, the resulting frustration can drive these people or groups to express their anger through violent acts against those they believe to be to blame for their misfortune (Yate, 1962; Berkowitz, 1963).

People often turn to someone they can blame for not reaching their goals or someone with whom they can vent their emotions when expectations are not met by achievement. Furthermore, hostilities can be deflected and directed at other objects, or aggressiveness transferred to different objects, when it is not possible to vent aggression toward the true source of frustration.

As demonstrated by the Niger Delta, conflicts between Christians and Muslims, the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB), the Hutus or Palestinians in Rwanda, etc., frustration is defined as the emotion we experience when we do not achieve what we want or when something stands in the way of achieving a desired goal (William, 2015).

According to this theory, when someone's wants are denied by another person or group,



it can cause anger and frustration, which can then result in the ethnic and religious violence that is currently plaguing Nigeria. The amount of violence between various ethnic and religious groups in Jos has recently escalated to the point that it should worry the entire country. People of all social strata have been abducted and banditry has resulted from the frustration. Not even the powerful and their bodyguards escape abuse, kidnapping, or murder. The spread of sophisticated weapons worldwide as a result of the aggression poses a serious threat to the safety of people and property in urban and rural areas.

However, the theory has face criticism for blaming aggression only on frustration. The theory failed to acknowledge the fact that aggressiveness is not necessarily a product of frustration. Furthermore, the theory fell short of providing an explanation for why certain political leaders, motivated by self-interest, utilize their influence to incite violent conflict between different ethnic and religious groups. According to critics, an individual who is irritated by aggression can be calmed by social norms, law and order, ethics, morality, and values.

### Research Methodology

The research adopted descriptive cross-sectional survey research design. It's used both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection which include the use of questionnaire and interview schedule. A sample size of 400 respondents was selected from the total population of 1,260,200 using the Tare Yamane formula. Questionnaires were distributed to 400 respondents who

were randomly selected across Jos North, Jos South, and Jos East LGA.

The study also employs key informant interviews (KII) to complement the questionnaire and to enable the researcher to get first-hand information on the reality of ethno-religious violence in Jos Plateau State. The key informant interview (KII) seeks information from six (6) key informants, which include traditional rulers and religious leaders. That is, the researcher purposefully selected one (1) traditional ruler and one (1) religious leader from each local government area. Responses from the questionnaire were computed in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21. Descriptive statistics of frequency count and percentages were used to analyze the data. Similarly, thematic analysis was used to analyze qualitative data collected via key informant interviews. That is to say, the response from the key informant interview was discussed while outlining the key point presented by the key informant.

**Table 1: Proportionate sample size for each study stratum**

| LGA          | Total population | Proportionate sample |
|--------------|------------------|----------------------|
| Jos north    | 642,200          | 204                  |
| Jos south    | 458,100          | 145                  |
| Jos east     | 159,900          | 51                   |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>1,260,200</b> | <b>400</b>           |

Source: field survey 2023

This part of the study discusses the findings generated from the study using the data gotten from the questionnaire and the key informant interview. The findings are logically discussed as follows:

**Table 2: Educational activities is affected by ethno-religious violence in Jos Plateau**

| Response          | Frequency  | Percentage   | Mean  | SD     |
|-------------------|------------|--------------|-------|--------|
| Strongly agree    | 226        | 58.9         | 4.462 | 0.7464 |
| Agree             | 131        | 34.1         |       |        |
| Undecided         | 12         | 3.1          |       |        |
| Disagree          | 10         | 2.6          |       |        |
| Strongly disagree | 5          | 1.3          |       |        |
| <b>Total</b>      | <b>384</b> | <b>100.0</b> |       |        |

Source: Field Survey, 2023.

From the above table, 58.9% indicated strongly agree, 34.1% indicated agree, 3.1% indicated undecided, 2.6% indicated disagree, and 1.3% strongly disagree. Thus, it could be seen from the result that the majority of the respondents strongly agree that educational activities are affected by ethno-religious violence in Jos. This implies that educational activities often suffer as a result of ethnic and religious violence in Jos Plateau State.

**Table 3: Respondents rating of the impact of ethno-religious violence on educational activities in Jos Plateau State**

| Impact       | Frequency  | Percentage   |
|--------------|------------|--------------|
| Low          | 14         | 3.6          |
| Average      | 90         | 23.4         |
| High         | 280        | 72.9         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>384</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

**Source: Field Survey, 2023.**

From the above table, 3.6% indicated low, 23.4% indicated average, and 72.9% indicated high. However, it could be seen from the result that the majority of the respondents revealed that the effect of ethno-religious violence on educational activities in Jos Plateau State is high.

**Table 4: Distribution of respondents by effect of ethno-religious violence on educational activities in Jos, Plateau States**

| Effect  | Frequency  | Percentage   |
|---|------------|--------------|
| Loss of lives of teachers and students                          | 72         | 18.8         |
| Negatively affected supply of stationeries/educational material | 31         | 8.1          |
| Disruption of academic calendar                                 | 52         | 13.5         |
| Relocation/transfer of qualified teachers to other place        | 21         | 5.5          |
| Temporary closure of schools                                    | 96         | 25           |
| Educational infrastructure damaged or destroyed                 | 68         | 17.7         |
| Turning of schools to refugee camps                             | 41         | 10.7         |
| Others  | 3          | 0.8          |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>384</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

**Source: Field Survey, 2023.**

From the above table, 18.8% indicated the loss of lives of teachers and students, 8.1% indicated it negatively affected the supply of stationery and educational materials, 13.5% indicated disruption of the academic calendar, 5.5% indicated the relocation or transfer of qualified teachers to another place, and 25% indicated the temporary closure of schools. 17.7% indicated educational infrastructure damaged or destroyed; 10.7% indicated the turning of schools into refugee camps; and 0.8% identified other major effects such as traumatization of students, particularly primary and secondary school students. However, it could be seen from the result that the majority of the respondents revealed that ethno-religious violence led to the loss of lives of teachers and students in Jos.

Findings from the key informant interview added flare to the impact of ethno-religious violence on educational activities in Jos Plateau State. One of the interviewees, who is 57 years old, stated that:

The violence that began on September 7 and 8, 2001, in Angwan Rogo extends to the Jos University neighborhood. Numerous university employees and students lost their lives during that tragedy. Because of the scarcity of housing in the area, some staff members and students are forced to reside in Angwan Rogo, which makes them particularly vulnerable to violent attacks (KII/6/6/2023/ Religious leader, Jos North).

Another interviewee who is 61 years old expressed that:

I know of a primary/secondary school that was destroyed during 2010 crisis. Although some

people said that hoodlums used the crisis period to loot the school properties, the truth remains that all this occur because there was no peace so even school properties including students and staffs must suffer (KII/7/6/2023/Traditional ruler, Jos North).

The above submission is in line with the findings as indicated in Table 4, wherein it was found that ethno-religious violence leads to the loss of lives of teachers and students as well as the destruction and looting of school properties by hoodlums in Jos.

**Table 5: Distribution of respondents by level of education that mostly suffered from ethno-religious violence in Jos, Plateau States**

| Level of education | Frequency  | Percentage   |
|--------------------|------------|--------------|
| Primary school     | 147        | 38.3         |
| Secondary schools  | 117        | 30.5         |
| Tertiary schools   | 120        | 31.2         |
| <b>Total</b>       | <b>384</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

**Source: Field Survey, 2023.**

From the above table, 38.3% indicated primary schools, 30.5% indicated secondary schools, and 31.2% indicated tertiary schools. Thus, it could be seen from the result that the majority of the respondents revealed that primary school is the level of education that is mostly affected by ethno-religious violence in Jos. This result is consistent with the argument made by Ogunode et al. (2021) that secondary school education is one of the educational levels that is most frequently targeted in Nigerian educational institutions. For instance, the writers assert that 276 schoolgirls from Government Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State, were kidnapped by the Boko Haram group in April 2014.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The research concluded that ethno-religious violence affects educational activities in Jos Plateau State. Educational activities in Jos often undergo hardship as a result of ethno-

religious violence. The respondents viewed ethno-religious violence as having had a negative effect on the supply of stationery and educational materials, the loss of lives of teachers and students, the disruption of the academic calendar, the relocation or transfer of qualified teachers to other places, the temporary closure of schools, the damage or destruction of educational infrastructure, and the turning of schools into refugee camps. This result support the claim made by Onwumah (2014) that authorities are frequently forced to close schools and change the academic calendar due to ethno-religious violence. Exams scheduled in conjunction with public unrest are frequently canceled or postponed in both public and private educational establishments. Due to insurgencies, several northern regions of Nigeria did not hold the unified tertiary matriculation examination (UTME) in 2013. Many students become unruly members of society and drop out of school as a result of the extended unauthorized holidays that are caused by social turmoil. As a result, they are readily drawn into heretical movements, enlisted as zealot leaders' followers, or exposed to political thuggery by dishonest politicians. A number of them had died, suffered injuries, or gone to prison. The aforementioned complex and far-reaching issues suggest that if these conflicts are not swiftly and forcefully resolved, the future of the younger generation may be at risk. Having considered the findings from the study, the following measures are recommended to avert the future recurrence of ethno-religious violence in Jos Plateau State.

In order to address the issue of ethno-religious violence in Jos, the government ought to move from a conflict resolution model to one that prioritizes conflict prevention. In order to successfully navigate this new process, the government must take a more proactive and dedicated approach to ensuring that every local government unit has sufficient and capable security, capable of swiftly responding to any kind of social unrest that has

the potential to turn into ethno-religious violence at any time or place.

In order to create a network for the prevention and management of conflicts, there should be strong and functional platforms that bring together leaders from the traditional, religious, youth, and female sectors; representatives from civil society and human rights organizations; security personnel; and government officials. In most conflict-ridden communities, traditional and religious leaders seldom get together to talk about what causes ethno-religious violence and how to avoid it in the future, which makes this suggestion essential. As a result, leaders frequently exacerbate the problems they are meant to tackle rather than being part of the problem or the ones to start it.

To mitigate the causes of ethno-religious violence and its impact on educational activities in Jos, Government should develop a crises management plan that have both short time and long-time goal. The short time goal should focus on keeping securities close to schools in vulnerable areas in order to ensure quick response to emergency security issues. The long-time goal should focus on relocating the schools away from crisis ridden areas.

Governments and non-governmental organizations must develop policies that support education by requiring and subsidizing it, particularly for basic and secondary education. This will assist in producing a new generation of citizens aware of the consequences of altering ancestral identities. People can learn about many nonviolent conflict resolution techniques through education, including restorative justice, which promotes forgiveness over the use of force, communication, negotiation, and reconciliation.

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**Iliyasu Biu Mohammed**

**Hannah Itopa Emmanuel**

Department of Public Administration

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [biu@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:biu@fuwukari.edu.ng)



### Abstract

This paper examines the lingering insurgency in north-east Nigeria which has metamorphosed into banditry and kidnapping amongst other organized crimes confronting the sustainable development agenda of the Nigeria state and citizens and the sub-Saharan Africa region. It questions the Nigeria political leaders decision to downsize military confrontation against insurgents and their adoption of ‘soft power’ approach of deradicalization. Relying on secondary documents, this paper uses a SWOT analysis within the sustainable development goals (SDGs-16 peace, justice, and strong institutions) basis to examine the deradicalization program of former insurgents in north-east Nigeria. The paper presents a core argument within the theoretical frames of Niccolo Machiavelli’s dictum that ‘it’s better to be feared than to be loved’ within global experiences and cases to posit that the only ‘repentant insurgents’ are the ‘dead ones’.

**Keywords:** Deradicalization, insurgent, peacebuilding, soft power, sustainable development

*“It is better to be feared than loved, if you cannot be both” Niccolo Machiavelli 1532*

### Introduction

The trajectory of sustainable development in any society is driven by the prevailing social order and peace agenda pursued by its leaders and followers. Before the advent of colonial administration by the European adventurers in Nigeria, indigenous kingdoms, empires, and decentralized states existed in their defined social orders and peace agendas. These social entities became the basis for the creation of Nigeria in 1914 by the British colonial administration, to serve ‘their’ narrow interest. This era was similar across Africa, Asia, Latin America, North America etc. The conquest of the British empire as other ‘colonial power’ across continents of the world came through lethal and ‘soft’ (diplomatic) power. The anticipated resistance against colonial regimes followed the pattern of ‘maximum’ – lethal force seen in the creation of the law enforcement agents, loyal and created to work despite the indigenous natives

as majority. This consistency resonates with the arguments of Hobbes (1588-1779) through his written philosophical work the “Leviathan”. This is a mythological, whale-like sea monster that devoured whole ships. Hobbes likened the leviathan to government, a powerful state created to impose order. Hobbes began Leviathan by describing the state of nature where all individuals were equal. Every person did what he or she needed to do to survive.

As a result, everyone suffered from “continued fear and danger of violent death” He thought that the life of man in a state of nature would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Thus, he made a defense of the absolute power of kings. This disposition remained the signature notes of many colonial administration until their last strongholds gained political independence in Africa and beyond, ie. South Africa in the 1990s. This monopoly of power by the state in the Nigeria

context is on the decline and taking the posture of a failing state. Herbt cited in Kaldor (2007) argues further that many African states never enjoyed state sovereignty in the modern sense that is 'unquestioned physical control over the defined territory, but also an administrative presence throughout the state'. This draws a corollary with Kaldor's observation that one of the key characteristics of failing states is the loss of control over and fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion. The ascension and steadfast remnants of insurgency groups in north-east Nigeria in the first decade of the millennium and beyond affirms this assertion. The failure of the state ie. Nigeria armed forces and its security architecture to contain Boko haram and its affiliates of Islamic insurgency groups has expanded the net of organized crimes ie, kidnapping for ransome and rituals, banditry, cyber crimes with high propensity spreading around the west Africa and Sub-Saharan regions.

This paper in its broad and specific objectives examines the justification of Nigeria's government deradicalization program to insurgents against contrary arguments within theoretical lens, for punishment as better deterrent to downsize and eliminate terrorism and other organized crimes. To attain this core objective are two research questions:

- i. What is the deradicalization policy and program to address insurgency in mostly north-east Nigeria?
- ii. To what extent has the Nigeria government deradicalization program reduced insurgency occurrence within the SWOT analysis lens?

### **Conceptual Clarifications**

#### **Deradicalization**

According to Kruglanski et al. (2019) several terms are used to refer to the phenomenon of deradicalization, including 'desertion,' 'demobilization,' 'defection,' 'rehabilitation,' 'reconciliation,' 'dialogue,' and 'disengagement.' The main reason for the use of different terms in different societies seems to be a realization of

the socio-political activities attached to each term. But two of these terms, deradicalization and disengagement, are used more frequently. The former is mainly used in Asian societies, and the latter in European ones.

Deradicalization and disengagement can be defined as the process of individual and collective withdrawal. Disengagement refers to a behavioural change, whereas deradicalization implies a cognitive shift, i.e. a fundamental change in understanding. Kruglanski pointedly notes further that the 9/11 terrorist attacks triggered the global war on terror led by the United States. Many terrorists were killed, captured, and imprisoned. But, ironically, prisons themselves became centres of radicalization and recruitment.

Imprisoned terrorist leaders and activists successfully used their interaction with other prisoners to motivate and bring them into the fold of their respective groups. This led to the recognition that the war against terror is a war of ideas as well, which cannot be won solely through killing and arresting terrorists, collecting intelligence, or securing borders. It was realized that efforts were needed to eliminate hatred, intolerance, and extreme interpretations of religion. In that context, deradicalization and rehabilitation programs have been launched in many parts of the world.

In specific terms, deradicalization or rehabilitation program is generally seen as "an important and effective strategy to combat terrorism and extremism." Several countries have developed such programs to win the hearts and change the minds of the radicals (Kruglanski et al 2019, Noor & Hayat 2009). Expectedly, the Nigeria government having fought its own war on Islamic insurgency and terrorism using lethal force in the new millennium since 2008 upwards adopted a 'soft' power approach by the initiation and pursuit of a deradicalization policy and program. Glazzard, in the United States (U.S) Institute of Peace (2023) report provides succinct insights to Nigeria's violent extremism challenges as he stated that the Northeastern

Nigeria, particularly the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, has long been prone to insecurity and conflict, being a product and fallout (my emphasis) of the region's marginalization and relative political and economic neglect.

Following historical narratives, the USIP, report (2023) states that Boko Haram emerged as a heterodox religious sect in Borno in the early 2000s. Following the failure of an attempted uprising in 2009, it transitioned to being a guerrilla movement, terrorist organization, and insurgent force, embroiling the Nigerian armed forces and those of neighbouring states in an increasingly indiscriminate conflict that drew in Nigeria's neighbours in the Lake Chad Basin. By 2015, Boko Haram had become the world's most lethal terrorist group, controlling swaths of territory in the three northeastern states and neighbouring countries. The group is estimated to have killed around 35,000 to 50,000 in Nigeria, the majority of whom were killed in Borno State; and the UNDP has estimated that the wider conflict has displaced over three million people and contributed to the deaths of 350,000 in the Lake Chad Basin. Despite an intensifying security response, including a state of emergency in the northeastern states, Boko Haram became stronger territorially and militarily, so much so that in 2014, the federal government recognized that restoring a measure of security using military force alone would be impossible.

Furthermore, the USIP report notes that both the federal government and its international supporters had mandated an approach that complies with human rights and based in the rule of law, but this perspective must contend with a lack of compliance with human rights in the armed forces, which are accustomed to mounting kinetic (lethal force) responses to security threats. Nigeria's national security strategy originally aimed to treat all levels of Boko Haram and all

categories, including offenders, detainees, and volunteers.

The National Security Corridor (NSC) program from 2014 to 2015 sought directly to disengage Boko Haram fighters and members at all levels by promoting defection and processing military detainees in a rehabilitation program. However, the federal government altered course somewhat after public opposition to what was seen as favourable treatment for insurgents still engaged in a violent conflict. This opposition to the deradicalization program becomes the basis to consider the contrasting arguments rather than interrogating in-depth the program process and its outcomes. Aside the socio-economic advantages of the suggested extermination violent extremist groups and their members, theoretical arguments in global context are discussed.

### **Conflict Transformation**

Conflict transformation refers to "approaches that seek to encourage wider social change through transforming the antagonistic relationship between parties to the conflict" (Buckley-Zistel 2008:21 cited in Haider, 2011). In addition, it is process and structure-oriented with an emphasis on social change. Haider observes that conflict scholars and practitioners, such as Burton, Galtung, Lederach and Mitchell, have emphasised that peace agreements and peace processes will produce only a fragile peace in the absence of fundamental social change and transformation. Thus, they opined that in attaining conflict transformation there should be dialogue based on empathy, non-violence and joint creativity or escalation to violence.

Within the ambit of the Nigeria context in seeking to attain a conflict transformation in putting down the Islamic insurgency group Boko haram and their minions there has never been any known peace agreements but an attempt of peace process through the Federal government deradicalization program.



However, the nature of the warfare, and fallout from the violent conflict perpetuated by insurgency groups has shrunk the space for creativity on both sides. The composition of insurgency groups membership come within the complexity of religion is driven by widespread unemployment and poverty created by the socio-economic structures within the Nigeria state. It is within this dimension that the Federal government deradicalization policy and program can gain footholds as a process towards conflict transformation.

### **Peacebuilding**

Peacebuilding, as defined by the United Nations (2009 cited in Haider 2011), involves “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development”. In specific terms, the UN adds that peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. Relatively, the component of peacebuilding should carry the instruments of reconciliation as noted by Lederach cited in Bloomfield et al. 2003. These peacebuilding instruments are healing, truth-telling, restorative justice, and reparation. However, the asymmetrical nature of the insurgency warfare and other associated organized crimes makes it incongruent with conventional warfare and likewise the rules of engagement and the options for peacebuilding and even matters of reconciliation.

Hence, the National Security Corridor (NSC) program from 2014 to 2015 which sought directly to disengage Boko Haram fighters and members at all levels by promoting defection and processing military detainees (USIP, 2023) in a peacebuilding rehabilitation program is

faulted to be not a thoroughly planned and executed deradicalization policy and program which is debateable. This could resonate with Bloomfield et al (2003) observation that violent conflict produces a wide variety of offenders – men and women, state and non-state actors, local and foreign individuals and organizations, general and foot soldiers who miss out in the peacebuilding process ‘advertently or inadvertently’ (my emphasis).

### **Sustainable development**

Even in utopian paradigm, the concept of development remains the desire and expectation all societies regardless of their existing contradictions. It is this urge that drives the pursuit for development to sustainability mode in whatever context. This could be the obvious reason the institutional vehicle known as the sustainable development goals (SDGs) is relevant to this paper discourse. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), otherwise known as the Global Goals, are a set of objectives within a universal agreement to end poverty, protect all that makes the planet habitable, and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity, now and in the future. The goals were adopted by all member states of United Nations formally in 2015, for the period 2016–30 to address the overwhelming empirical and scientific evidence that the world needs a radically more sustainable approach. The goals provide a well consulted framework that is sufficiently scientifically robust, politically acceptable, and publicly intuitive. The goals provide us with our best chance of ensuring the necessary collaboration and alignment as we implement global approaches to securing a fair, healthy, and prosperous future for ourselves, our children, and grandchildren (Morton et al. 2017). In specific terms the sustainable development goals (SDGs) is projected primarily to achieve the following summarised objectives.

- i) Eradicate poverty and hunger, guaranteeing a healthy life.

- ii) Universalize access to basic services such as water, sanitation and sustainable energy.
- iii) Support the generation of development opportunities through inclusive education and decent work.
- iv) Foster innovation and resilient infrastructure, creating communities and cities able to produce and consume sustainably.
- v) Reduce inequality in the world, especially that concerning gender.
- vi) Care for the environmental integrity through combatting climate change and protecting the oceans and land ecosystems.
- vii) Promote collaboration between different social agents to create an environment of peace and ensure responsible consumption and production (Hylton, 2019; Saner et al., 2019 cited in Mensah, 2019)

In the sustainable development goal 16 the focus is on institutionalizing participatory and deliberative democracy to achieve peace, justice, and strong institutions. Herein, this goal will have a 'trickle down' effect to boost public trust, bridge divides, make government more inclusive, and deliver more equitable and effective outcomes. The corollary brings to the fore the government non-involvement of enough stakeholders ie, civil society organizations at different strata and individuals representing segments of the local society where insurgency has occurred to be part of the deradicalization policy and program.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Putting forward an appropriate theory for this study maybe mainly by the context of the Nigeria experiences. Some social scientist scholars argue that theories cannot suffice for matters of reconciliation and peacebuilding. Obviously, multidimensional phenomenon as violent extremism and extremists originate and thrive on different pedestal of human

factors. A brief review of theoretical views here may justify the choice of theory for this paper. Mbah (2014) in describing the elite theory as postulated by Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca in 1939 posits that elites are people who have some distinct qualities by which they are differentiated from the general mass of people. Thus, Mbah argues that the democratic system must rely on the wisdom, loyalty, and skill of their political leaders and not on the population at large. In the Nigeria context and geo-political experiences, the elites have fallen short of expectations many times and leaving behind them the tension of a fragile and failing state. This resonates with the public choice theory that originated from Buchanan and Tullock (1962). The tenet of the theory holds that:

1. Public officials (politicians, bureaucrats, individuals etc. seek and maximize their personal interest.
2. Decisions made by public officials are guided by their own self-interest.
3. The individual is the unit of analysis.
4. Limited government role is preferred through such measures as privatization and contracting (outsourcing).
5. Stricter control on bureaucrats through the executive or legislature.

These highlighted tents strongly describe the elite class in Nigeria and suggest reasons why the war against terrorism and violent extremist is prolonged.

Murshed and Tadjoeeddin (2007) referring to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) greed and grievance theory state that civil wars stem from the greedy behaviour of a rebel group in organising an insurgency against the government. Greed is about opportunities faced by the rebel group. The opportunities can be disaggregated into three components: financing, recruitment, and geography. The most common sources of rebel finance are the appropriation of natural resources, donations from sympathetic diasporas residing abroad, contributions from foreign states (hostile to

the government) or multinational companies interested in the region.

A mixture of all this description can be found in different proportions in the Nigeria insurgency experiences. Thus, this paper's justifiably choice of Niccolo Machiavelli's political leadership style (subsumed in transformational leadership theory) in his thesis write up 'The Prince' (1513) cited in Shafritz et al. (2007). Machiavelli's makes analogy of the quality of a great leader with the comparism of the lion and the fox in the 'Prince' (1532) thus:

A prince being thus obliged to know well how to act as a beast must imitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognize traps and a lion to frighten wolves.

This statement is the basis for the Machiavelli leadership style postulation which posits that "it is better to be feared than loved" as a leader. He argues that one ought to be both feared and loved but as it is difficult for the two to go together. However, he adds that it is much safer to be feared than loved when a choice and situation demands. Shafritz et al. (2007) provides the corollary herein with the former president of the United States of America, George Bush Jr. and his choice of war over diplomacy in the fallout from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with United States (U.S) decision and response with a war on Iraq and anywhere where the suspected terrorist was found across the world, Afghanistan, Pakistan etc.

In the Nigeria context on the war against violent extremist since 2009 four presidents have had to superintendent - Umaru Yar dua (2007-2010), Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), Muhammadu Buhari (2015-2023) and Bola Ahmed Tinubu (2023-Till date). This paper opines that the political leaders involved thus far in the war on violent extremist and terrorist are yet to demonstrate the expected 'Midas touch'.

### **Deradicalization Policy and Programme in North-East Nigeria**

The late 20th century and the new millennium saw the advent of what Kaldor (2007) and other scholars across multi-disciplines describe as 'new wars' in global lens and experiences. Conflicts gravitating to violence and mass destruction of different sorts and dimensions after World War II have featured around the globe. The confrontations have metaphorized from conventional warfare to asymmetrical modes to even non-combat (physical combat) in nature to ideological and cyber digital modes that require similar and higher responses from state and non-state actors. One of such events of violent conflict was the September 11, 2001, attacks on United States of America soil, referred to as the 9/11 terrorist attacks that triggered the global war on terror led by the United States (Kruglanski, et al. 2019). Notably, many terrorists were killed, captured, and imprisoned. But, ironically, prisons themselves became centers of radicalization and recruitment. Imprisoned terrorist leaders and activists successfully used their interaction with other prisoners to motivate and bring them into the fold of their respective groups (USIP, 2023, Kruglanski et al. 2019).

Invariably, this led to the recognition that the war against terror is a war of ideas as well, which cannot be won solely through killing and arresting terrorists, collecting intelligence, or securing borders. It was realized that efforts were needed to eliminate hatred, intolerance, and extreme interpretations of religion. In that context, deradicalization and rehabilitation programs have been launched in many parts of the world. A deradicalization or rehabilitation program is generally seen as "an important and effective strategy to combat terrorism and extremism." Several countries have developed such programs to win the hearts and change the minds of the radicals (Kruglanski et al.,2019).

As expected, the Nigeria political leadership of the Federal government along with regional

political leaders (ie. Governors) in north-east Nigeria toed this line of deradicalization program for the Boko harm insurgent combatants and their affiliates. The prolonged nature of the warfare against religious extremists mainly in north-east Nigeria demanded changes in the peacebuilding strategies and the tinkering with the calls for amnesty and reconciliation as a means an end. Osungboye (2021) corroborates that, despite the various efforts of the government to end the insurgency activities, it has not succeeded in doing so, and hence, Boko Haram activities continue. Noting further, that the sect has successfully carried out 1,639 offensive attacks on villages, towns, churches, mosques, motor parks, government offices, and international institutions (Akubo and Okolo, 2019 cited in Osungboye 2019). Due to the insurgency activities, over 37,000 armless civilians have been killed and more than 2,500,000 have been displaced (CFR, 2020 cited in Osungboye 2019) and still counting (my emphasis).

Apart from the insecurity challenges caused by insurgency activities, there are also economic and monetary ramifications. For instance, many local and foreign investors that have age-long businesses in northeastern parts of the country have relocated to other parts of the country while a good number of investors have left the country (Adegbami, 2013; Attah and Mokwenye). Despite this obvious atrocities, emotional dynamics, grievances, and the logical demand for justice which fundamentally drives peacebuilding, the Nigeria political leaders embraced the idea of radicalization of religious extremists in north-east Nigeria.

Barkindo and Bryans (2016) observe that the Nigerian de-radicalisation programme shares many similarities with the European models in terms of design however they differ considerably in terms of the scale of former combatants, challenges to re-integrating them, and capacity issues which makes recidivism measures even more problematic. They noted further that Nigeria's de-radicalisation initiatives have their roots in the government's 2014 National Security

Strategy, which called for an expansion of a 'soft approach' which would include a countering violent extremism programme which has a three component - strategy of counter-radicalisation, communication, and deradicalisation.

This includes the official de-radicalisation programmes which have been developed in prisons and other government-run facilities, the policy of amnesties being offered to former Boko Haram combatants as part of Operation Safe Corridor, and in local initiatives and informal efforts to re-integrate former Boko Haram combatants into communities. Relatedly, the Nigerian prison de-radicalisation programme was publicly launched in 2014, as part of a countering violent extremism (CVE) programme to also include community-based counter-radicalisation and strategic communications and reached the end of its first phase of development and implementation in April 2016 (Barkindo and Bryans, 2017). Drew and McGroarty, (2015) corroborate that in 2015, hundreds of Boko Haram members were in detention, with forty-seven having taken up the government's safe passage offer of prison sentences with counselling support in the de-radicalisation programmes. While Ochulo (2017) concur that since then the number of Boko Haram defectors in prisons, and specifically the rehabilitation programmes, has supposedly increased exponentially to an estimated 800 members. This forgone discussion provides the basis to undertake the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) of the federal government of Nigeria deradicalization policy and program in north-east Nigeria against insurgency and extremist violence.

#### **SWOT Analysis Strengths**

- Adoption of non-lethal military engagement (soft/diplomatic power)
- Downsized casualties and collateral damage
- Local, National, West Africa regional and international cooperation/support. ([www.thecable.ng/tinubu-recieves-egyptian-pakistan-envoys-seeks-](http://www.thecable.ng/tinubu-recieves-egyptian-pakistan-envoys-seeks-)

collaboration-to-end-violent-extremism/) The attempts to strengthen the federal government’s deradicalization policy and program came to fore as Nigeria’s current democratic president, Bola Tinubu sought collaboration with Egypt and Pakistan to end violent extremism through global cooperation when he received their newly appointed envoys. He stated thus: “we must do more to stop extremists. We need to enhance our collaboration and exchange of ideas and knowledge in these areas,” ... (Mom, 2024).

### SWOT Analysis Weaknesses

- Issues of human rights violation not addressed on both sides.
- weak retributive justice against suspected and confirmed perpetrators/extremists of mass violence.
- Unstable relationship with civil society
- Dealing with several unknown and splintered radical extremist groups
- ‘Repentant Boko Haram terrorist’ relapse into violence (Abdullahi, 2024). The Zagazola Makama, a counter-insurgency publication focused on the Lake Chad region (2024) narrates how terrorists suspected to be ‘repentant insurgents’ dressed in military uniforms invaded Kasuwan Fara area in Maiduguri, burnt down all structures at the security checkpoints and attempted to release eight of their members in custody at the Kasuwan Fara divisional police office ([www.thecable.ng/boko-haram-terrorists-burn-down-ndlea-ncs-checkpoints-in-borno/](http://www.thecable.ng/boko-haram-terrorists-burn-down-ndlea-ncs-checkpoints-in-borno/))

Aside undermining the peacebuilding attempts in north-east Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, this resonates with the theoretical underpinnings of this paper that ‘it is better to be feared than to be loved’. Likewise, this suggest that the Nigeria government deradicalization policy and program requires urgent re-structurization and overhaul of policy strategies within regional and global frames.

### SWOT Analysis Opportunities

- Collaboration with local communities affected by insurgency in north-east Nigeria.
- Regional collaboration in the Lake Chad and Sahel region of Africa
- Exploring global collaboration with countries with similar experiences and global organizations partnership. ([www.thecable.ng/tinubu-recvies-egyptian-pakistan-envoys-seeks-collaboration-to-end-violent-extremism/](http://www.thecable.ng/tinubu-recvies-egyptian-pakistan-envoys-seeks-collaboration-to-end-violent-extremism/))

### SWOT Analysis Threats

- Unstable government policy and programs i.e. democratic elections that usher new political leaders in Nigeria comes with attempts to ‘be new’ and maybe ‘do government business differently’.
- Winning ‘hearts’ in insurgency affected communities in north-east Nigeria requires additional retributive and restorative justice measures and appropriate memorialization as part of the peacebuilding framework.
- Poor collaboration and coherence amongst security agencies in Nigeria and in the Lake Chad and Sahel regions. De Coning (2007) cited in Haider (2011) identified four elements of coherence:
  - i) Agency coherence: consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency
  - ii) External coherence (harmonisation): consistency among the policies pursued by various external actors in each country context.
  - iii) Internal/external coherence (alignment): consistency between the policies of the internal and external actors in each country context. The peacebuilding and security architecture in place provides the fundamental basis and significant component for sustainable development.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The subject matter of deradicalization policy and program in Nigeria remains relevant to the broader perspective of securing lives and properties in its simplest form by the political leadership across regions and local communities with direct contact with the violent extremists in north-east Nigeria where they have their strongholds. Intuitively, the seeming failure of the Nigeria political leadership to use military (kinetic/lethal force) to end the incursion of Boko haram and its affiliate groups in mainly northern Nigeria, has bolden and widen the network for banditry, and widespread network of organized crimes ie. Kidnapping for ransom, ritual killings, and cyber frauds/crimes.

The options of 'soft (diplomacy) power' with the Federal government of Nigeria offering amnesty and undertaking the deradicalization policy and program was rather hasty for a warfare still in progress. Probably, due to the delicate nature of the Nigeria nation-state the previous presidents from 2009 in the confrontation with violent extremist have rather used the Machiavelli leadership approach else where rather than 'crushing' the hydra headed monster – Boko haram and their affiliates the north-east region of Nigeria and the neighbouring Lake Chad and Sahel region of West Africa. The Nigeria government, specifically the political leadership across the legislative National Assembly and Executive arms at regional and national levels should reconnect with local communities affected by violent extremists – insurgents. This is aside reparation projects ie. Rebuilding houses, providing back sources of livelihoods etc, victims and non-victims within these communities should be part of the deradicalization policy and program planning and implementation. A deliberate memorialization program in partnership with civil society organizations (CSOs) and development partners should be held yearly or bi-annually with communities affected by violent extremist. The absence of this deliberateness is a gap in the healing,

peacebuilding, and reconciliation framework. In addition, the rehabilitation and deradicalized Boko haram combatants and affiliates should be part of a non-judicial truth-telling process with victims, like in the Rwanda case. The Nigeria government deradicalization program should be reviewed with the aim for inclusion of more state and non-state actors. The need to further disaggregate identified violent extremist for the purpose of 'serving justice' and avoiding future re-occurrence as being witnessed now especially after the immediate past Nigeria government under General Muhammadu Buhari (Rtd) declared that 'Boko harm' had been technically defeated, only for their operations to resurrect and expand to wider networks across the north-west, north-central regions of Nigeria and the Lake Chad and Sahel regions. The Nigeria government currently has no option on this matter but to do the needful. In this context, "It is better to be feared than to be loved".

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**PART XI:**  
**LAW, PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND ASSET OWNERSHIP**

Jabir Lawal Kankia

Business Administration Department  
Al-Qalam University, Katsina, Katsina State, Nigeria  
Email: Jabirlawalkankia1@gmail.com



### Abstract

After sales services are activities that take place after the purchase of the product by customers and are devoted to supporting customers in the use and disposal of goods. The study explores the significance of delivering high-quality service experiences, such as reliability and empathy, to meet evolving customer expectations and foster long-term relationships. Drawing on empirical research and theoretical frameworks like the SERVQUAL model, the study underscores the importance of continuous innovation, customer-centricity, employee training, and data security in driving after-sales service excellence. Moreover, collaboration among stakeholders and transparent communication are essential for building and maintaining customer trust. The study concludes with recommendations for businesses to prioritize innovation, customer feedback integration, employee training, seamless integration, data security, and collaboration to drive sustainable growth and success in today's dynamic marketplace.

**Keywords:** After sales service, customer satisfaction, innovation, sales strategies

### Introduction

The role of customers in any business cannot be underestimated and every business has the prime objective of satisfying its existing customers and of attracting new customers. Customer satisfaction is so fundamental that, it cannot be regarded as a separate function in business. Innovative after-sales service is the process of developing and implementing new or improved ways of delivering value to your customers after they purchase your products or services. After-sales service holds immense relevance in contemporary business strategies, playing a pivotal role in shaping customer satisfaction, brand loyalty, and overall business success. One of the key aspects of this relevance lies in the enhancement of customer satisfaction. By providing comprehensive and innovative after-sales services, businesses can address customer needs, resolve issues promptly, and ensure a positive post-purchase experience. Satisfied customers are more likely to become brand advocates, contributing to positive

word-of-mouth marketing and building a favourable brand image.

Moreover, innovative after-sales services contribute significantly to customer loyalty. In an era where consumers have abundant choices, companies that go beyond the transactional phase and invest in ongoing support and services tend to foster deeper connections with their client. This, in turn, leads to increased customer loyalty, encouraging repeat business and creating a foundation for long-term relationships. Customer retention is crucial for sustained business growth, and effective after-sales services play a pivotal role in achieving this objective.

From a competitive standpoint, after-sales services provide a unique opportunity for companies to differentiate themselves in the market. Brands that offer innovative and tailored post-purchase support gain a competitive advantage by standing out among their peers. In a study by Michael E. Porter on

competitive advantage, it is emphasized that companies need to create and sustain superior performance through unique value propositions, and innovative after-sales services can contribute significantly to achieving this.

The relevance of after-sales services is also closely tied to the overall brand image and reputation. Companies that consistently deliver on their promises and provide excellent post-purchase support build a positive brand perception. Aaker's work on brand building highlights the importance of strong brands in influencing customer perceptions and preferences. The positive brand image cultivated through effective after-sales services contributes to customer trust and loyalty. Furthermore, after-sales services enable companies to adapt to changing market dynamics and customer preferences. With the rapid pace of technological advancement and shifts in consumer behaviour, businesses that embrace innovation in their after-sales offerings can stay agile and responsive to market trends. Christensen's concept of disruptive innovation underlines the need for companies to evolve with changing technologies and customer demands, and after-sales services become a crucial arena for such adaptability.

Implementing innovative after-sales services, while promising numerous benefits, can also pose various challenges for businesses. One significant issue revolves around the cost implications associated with introducing novel services. Investments in technology, training, and infrastructure can strain financial resources, making it crucial for companies to carefully balance the potential returns against the expenses (Lovelock & Gummesson, 2022). A second challenge lies in convincing customers to adopt these new after-sales features. Resistance to change is a common phenomenon, as highlighted by Everett Rogers' Diffusion of Innovations theory, emphasizing the importance of understanding and addressing customer adoption challenges (Rogers, 2021).

Businesses need effective strategies to communicate the value proposition and benefits of the innovative after-sales services to win over hesitant customers.

Integration with existing systems is another potential issue, particularly when introducing sophisticated technologies or services. The complexity of incorporating these innovations into current operational processes can lead to disruptions and operational challenges (Tidd & Bessant, 2020). Striking a balance between innovation and seamless integration is crucial to avoid disruptions to day-to-day business activities. Data security and privacy concerns represent a significant challenge, especially when collecting and utilizing customer data for personalized after-sales services. Aligning with principles such as Privacy by Design (Cavoukian, 2020) is essential to ensure that data handling practices adhere to regulatory standards and customer expectations. A related challenge is the need for employee skills and training to support the implementation of innovative after-sales services. Noe et al. (2022) emphasize the importance of investing in human resources and training programs to equip employees with the skills necessary to deliver and support these new services effectively.

Moreover, customer resistance to technology is a common hurdle. Some customers may prefer traditional after-sales support, leading to potential dissatisfaction if not handled properly (Venkatesh et al., 2023). Striking a balance between leveraging technology for efficiency and catering to diverse customer preferences is crucial for successful implementation.

The risk of overcomplicating services is another challenge that businesses must navigate. Berry and Parasuraman (2021) caution against overwhelming customers with too many features, as it can lead to dissatisfaction. Maintaining a balance between innovation and simplicity is essential to ensure that customers can easily understand, adopt, and benefit from the new

after-sales services. Consistency in service delivery across various customer touchpoints poses an additional challenge. Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry (2021) stress the importance of managing customer perceptions and expectations to deliver quality service consistently. Maintaining this consistency becomes increasingly complex with the introduction of innovative after-sales services, requiring careful planning and execution.

Efforts to address issues with innovative after-sales services involve collaborative actions by various stakeholders, including businesses, customers, and regulatory bodies. One crucial effort is a commitment to transparency and communication by businesses. By clearly communicating the value proposition, data usage policies, and benefits of innovative after-sales services, businesses can build trust with customers, mitigating concerns related to privacy and adoption (Donthu & Gilliland, 2020). Customers, as key stakeholders, play an essential role in resolving issues through their active participation. Efforts to enhance customer education and awareness contribute significantly. Businesses can implement customer training programs, provide user-friendly guides, and utilize customer feedback mechanisms to understand their preferences and concerns (Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Malhotra, 2021). Actively seeking customer input helps in tailoring after-sales services to meet their expectations, addressing potential challenges related to adoption and satisfaction.

Regulatory bodies and industry associations also have a role in addressing issues with innovative after-sales services. Establishing and enforcing robust data protection and privacy regulations ensures that businesses adhere to ethical standards and protect customer information. Regulatory frameworks provide a foundation for businesses to navigate the complexities of data security and privacy concerns (Culnan, 2020). Collaboration

among businesses, technology providers, and educational institutions is crucial to address challenges related to employee skills and training needs. Establishing partnerships that facilitate ongoing training and skill development ensures that employees are well-equipped to handle innovative after-sales services effectively. Industry collaboration contributes to a skilled workforce that can navigate the complexities of new technologies and services (Bughin et al., 2021).

To address integration challenges, businesses need to collaborate with technology providers and invest in interoperability standards. Creating open and standardized interfaces allows for seamless integration with existing systems and minimizes disruptions (Bughin et al., 2020). Industry collaborations and partnerships play a pivotal role in setting and adhering to these standards. Additionally, a focus on customer feedback mechanisms and continuous improvement efforts by businesses is crucial. By actively seeking input from customers and incorporating their feedback into the development and enhancement of after-sales services, businesses can address issues related to complexity, inconsistency, and overall customer satisfaction (Reichheld, 2023).

Enhancing customer satisfaction serves as a crucial strategy to address various challenges associated with innovative after-sales services. In the face of customer resistance and adoption challenges, a customer-centric approach proves instrumental. By involving customers in the development process and actively seeking their feedback, businesses can create a sense of inclusion and value. Clear and transparent communication is equally vital to convince customers of the value proposition of new after-sales features. Providing user-friendly guides and tutorials ensures customers understand the benefits, managing their expectations and increasing overall satisfaction.

Addressing data security and privacy concerns becomes possible through a

commitment to personalization and customization. Leveraging customer data responsibly for tailored after-sales services helps build trust. By clearly communicating how data is utilized to enhance the customer experience, businesses can mitigate privacy concerns and enhance overall satisfaction. Similarly, investing in comprehensive training programs for employees addresses the skills and training needs associated with the introduction of innovative services. A knowledgeable and skilled workforce contributes to effective customer support, further enhancing overall satisfaction. To address the integration challenges and potential disruptions associated with innovative after-sales services, a proactive approach to issue resolution is critical. Providing robust customer support channels and mechanisms for reporting issues allows businesses to acknowledge and resolve customer concerns promptly. Lastly, continuous improvement based on customer feedback proves indispensable in justifying initial investments and ensuring that after-sales services evolve to meet changing customer expectations. This paper is aimed to Evaluate the Current After-Sales Service Practices; Assessing the effectiveness of existing after-sales service strategies across various industries and identifying common shortcomings or areas for improvement. Identification of Customer Expectations: Investigating customer expectations regarding after-sales service and determining key factors that influence satisfaction and loyalty.

**Employee Training and Empowerment:** Assessing the role of employee training and empowerment in delivering exceptional after-sales service experiences and their impact on customer satisfaction and loyalty. Overall, the significance of this study lies in its potential to drive business success, improve customer relationships, and foster long-term growth through the development and implementation of innovative after-sales service strategies.

### **Understanding Determinants of Customer Satisfaction and Loyalty**

Customer satisfaction and loyalty serve as fundamental drivers of business success,

shaping customer behavior, influencing purchasing decisions, and impacting overall profitability. Understanding the determinants of customer satisfaction and loyalty requires a holistic examination of various factors spanning product quality, service delivery, brand reputation, and emotional engagement. Scholars and practitioners alike have explored these factors extensively, drawing on frameworks such as the Kano model and the SERVQUAL model to delineate key dimensions of satisfaction and service quality. The Kano model, developed by Noriaki Kano, categorizes customer satisfaction into three main categories: basic needs, performance attributes, and excitement factors. Basic needs encompass essential features that customers expect as standard, while performance attributes directly correlate with satisfaction levels. Excitement factors, on the other hand, are unexpected delights that can exceed customer expectations and foster loyalty. Similarly, the SERVQUAL model, proposed by Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry, identifies five dimensions of service quality—reliability, assurance, tangibles, empathy, and responsiveness—that influence customer perceptions and satisfaction levels.

Measuring customer satisfaction and loyalty requires robust methodologies capable of capturing nuanced customer perceptions and behaviors. Common approaches include surveys and feedback mechanisms, customer reviews and ratings, analysis of purchase behavior, customer retention and churn rates, and calculation of customer lifetime value. These metrics provide valuable insights into customer sentiment, preferences, and loyalty levels, enabling businesses to identify areas for improvement and tailor strategies to enhance customer experiences.

Strategic implications of understanding customer satisfaction and loyalty are profound, guiding organizational decision-making and resource allocation. Key best practices include

fostering a customer-centric culture, investing in employee training and development, continuous improvement, personalization and customization, innovation and differentiation, transparency and communication. By prioritizing customer satisfaction and loyalty and implementing strategic initiatives to enhance customer experiences, businesses can cultivate enduring relationships with customers, drive repeat business, and achieve sustainable growth in today's competitive marketplace.

Balinado et al. (2021) conducted a study to examine the factors influencing customer satisfaction in automotive after-sales service at Toyota Dasmarinas-Cavite Philippines, utilizing the SERVQUAL approach. Through structural equation modeling (SEM), they assessed several SERVQUAL dimensions—tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy—in relation to customer satisfaction. The findings revealed that among these dimensions, only reliability and empathy significantly correlated with customer satisfaction, while tangibles, responsiveness, and assurance did not exhibit significant relationships. The study emphasizes the critical importance of delivering high-quality service to meet customer expectations, thereby fostering trust and loyalty towards the company. It suggests that focusing on aspects such as reliability and empathy is crucial for achieving high levels of customer satisfaction and ultimately enhancing customer retention and loyalty, leading to increased profitability and competitive advantage for the company (Balinado et al., 2021).

The study conducted by Shafiq, Khan, Ali, and Asim (2023) aimed to delve into the intricate relationship between service quality, innovation, and customer loyalty, with a particular focus on the mediating roles of customer commitment and satisfaction. Set in the context of Pakistan, the researchers undertook a quantitative investigation to address this issue. They gathered primary study material through a survey questionnaire administered to approximately 369 individuals, all of whom were Pakistani citizens actively engaged in online purchases.

Utilizing structural equation modeling (SEM) for hypotheses testing, the researchers uncovered a robust positive correlation among several key variables. Specifically, they found significant links between service quality, service innovation, market orientation, customer commitment, customer satisfaction, and customer loyalty. This comprehensive analysis sheds light on the intricate dynamics at play within the realm of service quality, innovation, and customer loyalty, particularly in the context of online transactions in Pakistan.

In addition to presenting their findings, the researchers also addressed various aspects of their study's limitations and potential future implications. They critically discussed the constraints encountered during the research process and highlighted avenues for further exploration. Furthermore, the paper delves into the practical and theoretical implications of their findings, offering valuable insights for both academia and industry practitioners navigating the complex landscape of service quality, innovation, and customer loyalty. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of consumer behavior and loyalty dynamics, offering valuable insights that can inform strategic decision-making and marketing efforts in the digital age.

The study conducted by Haryadi, Haerofiatna, and Alfarizi (2022) investigates the influence of after-sales service on customer loyalty, mediated by customer satisfaction, in response to the growing demand for advanced technology and complex human needs. Carried out at PT. Tunas Toyota Cilegon Banten, the research involved a population of 1102 individuals, with a sample size of 150 respondents. Questionnaires were administered using an interval scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) Partial Least Squares (PLS) was employed for data analysis. The findings of the study reveal significant impacts, indicating that after-sales service positively influences consumer loyalty

and customer satisfaction, with the latter acting as a mediator in enhancing consumer loyalty. This research contributes valuable insights into the dynamics of after-sales service, customer satisfaction, and loyalty, particularly in the context of PT. Tunas Toyota Cilegon Banten, and offers implications for businesses aiming to enhance customer retention strategies in response to evolving technological and consumer demands.

In their study titled "Influence of Aftersales Service Strategies on the Competitive Advantage of Automotive Companies in Kenya," Muchiri, Kiriri, and Kaluyu (2023) aimed to assess the impact of aftersales service strategies on the competitive advantage of automotive companies in Kenya. Employing an explanatory research design, the study targeted 400 members of the top management team, including CEOs, functional managers, and senior managers, drawn from 63 automotive companies in Kenya. Utilizing a census approach, the study encompassed all 400 top management team members. Data collection was conducted through questionnaires, and the hypothesis was tested using multiple linear regression analyses. The findings revealed a moderate correlation ( $r = 0.556$ ) between aftersales service strategies and the competitive advantage of automotive companies in Kenya, with 30.9% of the variance in competitive advantage explained by these strategies ( $R^2 = 0.309$ ). The study concluded that automotive companies in Kenya that engaged in aftersales service strategies, such as utilizing customer feedback, promptly responding to customer demands using agile methodologies, providing quality service, and offering warranties, were better positioned to enhance their competitive advantage in the market (Muchiri et al., 2023).

In Vadavadagi's study (2022) published in the *International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research*, the focus lies on the critical interplay between customer satisfaction and brand loyalty, recognized as pivotal concerns for businesses navigating today's fiercely

competitive market landscape. With an aim to delve into this relationship, the study employs a convenient random sampling survey involving 100 respondents. Through empirical investigation, the research highlights the substantial impact of customer satisfaction on fostering brand loyalty. Furthermore, the study unveils the significant roles played by product and service quality in influencing brand loyalty, elucidating how customer perceptions of these dimensions contribute profoundly to overall satisfaction. Vadavadagi's findings underscore the importance for managers to prioritize product and service quality as foundational elements in not only bolstering customer satisfaction but also in cultivating enduring brand loyalty and enhancing brand image, thereby offering added value to customers in the highly competitive market milieu.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Service Quality (SERVQUAL) model is a multi-dimensional research instrument for assessing and measuring service quality, designed to capture consumer expectations and perceptions of a service along five dimensions (tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy) that are believed to represent service quality. SERVQUAL is built on the expectancy-disconfirmation paradigm, which, in simple terms, means that service quality is understood as the extent to which consumers' pre-consumption expectations of quality are confirmed or disconfirmed by their actual perceptions of the service experience.

The SERVQUAL model, developed by A. Parasuraman, Valarie Zeithaml, and Leonard Berry in 1985, is a seminal framework for assessing and measuring service quality. The model is based on several key assumptions about the nature of service delivery and customer perceptions. First, it assumes that service quality is multidimensional, encompassing various aspects of the service encounter that contribute to overall customer satisfaction. Second, the model posits that customers evaluate service quality based on their perceptions of service

performance relative to their expectations. Third, it assumes that customer expectations are shaped by past experiences, word-of-mouth communication, and marketing communications. Finally, the model suggests that service quality is a function of the gap between customer expectations and perceptions across five dimensions: reliability, assurance, tangibles, empathy, and responsiveness.

The SERVQUAL model can serve as a guiding framework for businesses seeking to enhance customer satisfaction and loyalty. By applying the dimensions of service quality to after-sales support initiatives, companies can identify areas for improvement and align their strategies with customer expectations. For instance, innovative after-sales service strategies can focus on enhancing reliability by ensuring consistent and timely resolution of customer issues, leveraging automation and technology to streamline support processes and minimize downtime. Additionally, businesses can bolster assurance by investing in employee training and empowerment, equipping frontline staff with the knowledge and tools to address customer concerns effectively and professionally. Moreover, tangibles in after-sales service can be enhanced through the implementation of user-friendly digital interfaces, self-service portals, or mobile applications, providing customers with accessible and convenient channels to access support resources. Demonstrating empathy in after-sales interactions involves actively listening to customer feedback, acknowledging their concerns, and offering personalized solutions that cater to their unique needs and preferences. Finally, responsiveness is critical in after-sales support, with businesses striving to provide prompt and proactive assistance to customers through various communication channels, including live chat, email, phone, and social media.

### **Research Methodology**

The study is purely based on secondary source of data, books, journals, and other secondary materials were used to document and analyse customer satisfaction and loyalty through innovative after sales service strategies.

### **Results and Discussions**

The findings from the study provide valuable insights into the dynamics of customer satisfaction, loyalty, and the impact of innovative after-sales service strategies across various industries and contexts. Balinado et al. (2021) demonstrated the significance of after-sales service quality, particularly in the automotive industry, where reliability and empathy emerged as key determinants of customer satisfaction. This underscores the importance of delivering high-quality service experiences to meet customer expectations and foster trust and loyalty. Shafiq et al. (2023) expanded on these findings by exploring the intricate relationship between service quality, innovation, and customer loyalty in the context of online transactions in Pakistan. Their study highlighted the positive correlations among service quality, innovation, customer commitment, satisfaction, and loyalty, emphasizing the importance of continuous innovation in driving customer engagement and loyalty. Similarly, Haryadi, Haerofiatna, and Alfarizi (2022) provided insights into the impact of after-sales service on customer loyalty, mediated by customer satisfaction, at PT. Tunas Toyota Cilegon Banten. Their findings underscored the role of after-sales service in enhancing customer satisfaction and loyalty, particularly in response to evolving technological and consumer demands. Lastly, Muchiri, Kiriri, and Kaluyu (2023) examined the influence of after-sales service strategies on the competitive advantage of automotive companies in Kenya, highlighting the positive correlation between these strategies and competitive advantage. Overall, these empirical studies underscore the critical role of innovative after-sales service



strategies in driving customer satisfaction and loyalty across diverse industries and contexts.

The findings from the studies discussed provide significant insights into the importance of innovative after-sales service strategies in driving customer satisfaction, loyalty, and competitive advantage across various industries. Firstly, the study by Balinado et al. (2021) underscores the critical role of after-sales service quality, particularly in the automotive sector, where factors like reliability and empathy emerged as key determinants of customer satisfaction. This highlights the need for automotive companies to prioritize high-quality service experiences to meet customer expectations and cultivate trust and loyalty.

Expanding on this, Shafiq et al. (2023) shed light on the intricate relationship between service quality, innovation, and customer loyalty, particularly in the context of online transactions. Their findings emphasize the positive correlations among service quality, innovation, customer commitment, satisfaction, and loyalty. This suggests that continuous innovation in after-sales services is essential for driving customer engagement and fostering long-term loyalty, especially in the rapidly evolving digital landscape.

Furthermore, Haryadi, Haerofiatna, and Alfarizi's (2022) study adds to this discussion by highlighting the significant impact of after-sales service on customer loyalty, mediated by satisfaction, at PT. Tunas Toyota Cilegon Banten. Their findings underscore the role of after-sales service in enhancing both customer satisfaction and loyalty, particularly in response to evolving technological and consumer demands. This suggests that companies must invest in innovative after-sales services to effectively meet the changing needs and preferences of customers, thereby strengthening their loyalty and retention. Lastly, Muchiri, Kiriri, and Kaluyu's (2023) study on the influence of after-sales service strategies on the competitive advantage of automotive companies in Kenya provides valuable insights into the link between after-sales strategies and market positioning. Their

findings reveal a positive correlation between after-sales strategies and competitive advantage, highlighting the importance of these strategies in differentiating companies in the market and attracting and retaining customers. Overall, the discussion of these findings underscores the critical role of innovative after-sales service strategies in driving customer satisfaction, loyalty, and competitive advantage across various industries. Companies must prioritize continuous innovation in their after-sales services to meet evolving customer expectations, foster trust and loyalty, and gain a competitive edge in the marketplace.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

In conclusion, the study highlights the pivotal role of innovative after-sales service strategies in enhancing customer satisfaction, loyalty, and competitive advantage across diverse industries and contexts. These findings underscore the importance of prioritizing high-quality service experiences, such as reliability, empathy, and continuous innovation, to meet evolving customer expectations and foster long-term relationships. By investing in innovative after-sales services, companies can not only cultivate trust and loyalty among customers but also differentiate themselves in the market and gain a competitive edge. However, it's essential for businesses to address challenges such as cost implications, customer adoption, integration, data security, and employee training to successfully implement these strategies. Overall, the research emphasizes the significance of after-sales service excellence as a key driver of business success and sustainability in today's dynamic and competitive marketplace.

To enhance the effectiveness of innovative after-sales service strategies, several recommendations emerge from the findings. Firstly, a commitment to continuous innovation is paramount, where businesses should prioritize the integration of emerging technologies like AI and IoT to streamline processes and adapt to evolving

customer needs. Secondly, adopting a customer-centric approach is essential, necessitating active solicitation and incorporation of customer feedback to tailor services accordingly. Thirdly, investing in comprehensive employee training and empowerment ensures frontline staff are equipped to deliver exceptional service experiences, thereby bolstering overall service quality. Moreover, ensuring seamless integration of new services with existing systems and processes, along with prioritizing data security and privacy, is crucial to build and maintain customer trust. Transparent communication regarding the value proposition and data usage policies further enhances customer confidence.

Collaboration among stakeholders, including businesses, customers, and regulatory bodies, facilitates knowledge sharing and best practice dissemination, driving innovation in after-sales services. Lastly, continuous monitoring and evaluation of initiatives help identify areas for improvement and measure the impact on customer satisfaction, loyalty, and competitive advantage, ultimately fostering sustainable growth and success in the marketplace.

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## PRE-POST ANALYSIS OF NAIRA REDESIGN POLICY ON MICRO-SCALE ENTERPRISES IN NORTHWEST NIGERIA

**Mariam Isiaka, Muhammad Sulaiman**

**Abubakar Mika'il Aminu**

Department of Economics

Federal College of Education, Zaria, Nigeria

*misiaka25@gmail.com/smuhammad1981@gmail.com*



### Abstract

This study examined the effect of Naira redesign policy on micro-scale enterprises in north-west, Nigeria. Primary data were collected through structured questionnaires and interviews. A multi-stage sampling approach was used to select 990 owners of micro scale enterprises from 18 local government areas across Kaduna, Kano, and Katsina states. Descriptive statistics and Wilcoxon signed-rank test were employed to analyze the data. The socio-economic characteristics revealed that the majority of respondents were male (81%), married (69.80%) and had some level of education. However, a significant portion (86.26%) did not belong to any relevant business association, and 62.93% had no access to credit, with the few who did relying mostly on informal sources. Most were engaged in businesses related to the buying and selling of foodstuff, snacks and drinks. The results indicated that micro-enterprise owners experienced declines in sales, employment, income and consumption expenditure by -28.27%, -35.13%, -33.85%, and -30.23%, respectively, due to the policy. Major problems included the shortage of new Naira notes, poor financial internet services and rise in cost of doing business. The null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) was rejected, concluding that the introduction and implementation of the Naira redesign policy significantly impacted the activities and wellbeing of micro-enterprises in the study area. The study recommends comprehensive orientation of citizens about potential policies prior to implementation, the provision of efficient and reliable financial internet services, imposing severe penalties on those who misuse policies for personal gain and extending the period for swapping old and new Naira notes.

**Keywords:** Naira redesign policy, micro-enterprises, sales, employment, consumption

### Introduction

The private sector in Nigeria encompasses a wide range of businesses that differ in various aspects such as size, industry, ownership, workforce, and technology usage. When formulating national policies aimed at fostering private sector growth, it is essential to tailor these policies to suit the specific requirements of each type of enterprise. In Nigeria, non-farm micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) play a significant role in terms of employment generation, contributing to more than 25% of the total employment figures. Additionally, these enterprises make a

substantial contribution to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), accounting for approximately 20% of it. On the other hand, large enterprises, while fewer in number within Nigeria, have a disproportionately large impact on the GDP. This is primarily because they tend to be more capital-intensive and focused on export activities compared to MSMEs (National Policy on MSMEs, 2020).

The aforementioned is supported by findings of World Bank (2021) where it stated that, on a global scale, micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) typically make

up around 40% of a country's GDP, provide employment for over 50% of the workforce, constitute 90% of all businesses, and face an unmet financing gap of \$5.2 trillion annually. According to a report by the Bank of Industry in 2021, Nigeria is home to approximately 41 million MSMEs. These enterprises play a pivotal role in the Nigerian economy by contributing 48% to the national GDP, accounting for 96% of all businesses, 90% of establishments in the manufacturing and industrial sectors, employing 84% of the workforce, and representing 7% of the country's total exports. The government has formulated numerous national policies throughout the years to tackle different sectors of the economy. Many of these policies have ramifications for the advancement of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). It is imperative to consider these implications when shaping a new policy specifically targeted at MSMEs (National Policy on MSMEs, 2020). Nigeria's performance in human capital development is among the lowest on a global scale, as indicated by its ranking at 150 out of 157 countries in the 2020 Human Capital Index published by the World Bank. The country is confronted with significant developmental challenges, which encompass the imperative to reduce its reliance on oil exports and revenues, broaden the sources of foreign exchange, bridge the infrastructure deficit, establish robust and efficient institutions, address governance issues, and enhance public financial management systems. Inequality, both in terms of income distribution and access to opportunities, remains notably high, and this has had adverse effects on efforts to alleviate poverty. The scarcity of employment opportunities lies at the heart of the elevated poverty rates, regional disparities, and social and political unrest. Furthermore, the persistent rise in inflation has had detrimental effects on the well-being of households, and the price hikes observed from 2020 to 2022

have driven more Nigerians into poverty (World Bank, 2023).

According to Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (2022), nearly half of Nigeria's population, specifically 46.4%, were identified as experiencing multidimensional poverty. Additionally, an extra 19.2% of the population, which translates to 37.6 million individuals, were categorized as being at risk of multidimensional poverty. In line with the most recent information derived from the National Bureau of Statistics' household survey for 2018-19, a substantial portion of Nigeria's populace, approximately 40%, or 82.9 million people, reside at or below the poverty threshold. The National Poverty Reduction with Growth Strategy, NPRGS, (2021) stated that, the national poverty line has been set at N137,430.00, and individuals residing in households where the annual consumption expenditures per capita fall below this threshold are deemed poor according to national criteria. When considering the overall figures, it becomes evident that 72 percent of those in extreme poverty are situated in the North East, North West, and North Central regions, with the remaining 28 percent residing in the Southern regions. Within the North East, poverty is primarily driven by violent conflicts associated with Boko Haram, whereas in the North West and North Central regions, factors such as criminal violence, banditry, farmer-herder conflicts, and communal violence are the principal contributors to poverty.

Nigeria, as an emerging economy and the largest one in Sub-Saharan Africa, experienced a GDP growth rate of 3.4% in 2021, marking a notable increase compared to the 1.92% recorded in 2020 (Olurounbi, 2022). It could be contended that this improvement in GDP growth can be attributed to the actions of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), given that they represented 96.90% of all businesses, contributed 46.31% to GDP, and accounted for 87.90% of total employment in 2020 (National Bureau of

Statistics, 2021). The significance of MSMEs in fostering the growth of any economy is widely acknowledged due to their ability to boost industrial production and improve the well-being of the population. In virtually every economy, micro-businesses constitute a substantial portion of all enterprises and are responsible for generating the majority of employment and private sector output (Atinuke & Abayomi, 2019). In light of the aforementioned paragraphs, this paper attempts to examine the effect of Naira redesign policy on micro-scale enterprises in north-west, Nigeria.

### **Conceptual Clarifications**

#### **Nano, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises**

According to United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UNDESA, (2019), Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) are defined as follows: micro enterprises typically have 1 to 9 employees, small enterprises range from 10 to 49 employees, and medium-sized enterprises have 50 to 249 employees. However, it's important to note that the specific definitions of MSMEs can vary from one country to another, considering factors like turnover and assets in addition to the number of employees. MSMEs hold a significant role in any economy as they are the primary creators of new jobs in many nations, driving innovation and sustainability within the private sector. In emerging markets, there are approximately 365-445 million MSMEs, with around 25-30 million classified as formal SMEs, 55-70 million as formal micro-enterprises, and 285-345 million as informal enterprises.

When considering national policies, businesses can be categorized based on several factors such as their size, sector, organizational structure, number of employees, technology use, and geographical location. These factors are interconnected in intricate ways, and understanding how they relate to each other is essential for comprehending the characteristics, performance, issues, and obstacles faced by enterprises. From a policy and planning standpoint, size is often the most feasible

criterion for classification (SMEDAN, 2015). These enterprises are defined within the context of Nigeria as follows:

#### **Nano-enterprises**

Nano-businesses encompass a diverse range of solo entrepreneurs and home-based enterprises, including makeup artists, event planners, battery chargers, independent dispatch riders, vendors, call centre agents, fashion designers, vulcanizers, dry cleaners, corner shop owners, individual retail marketers, repair specialists, painters, business centre operators, and market traders, among others. These businesses play a significant yet often overlooked role nationwide. However, based on classification, they are unlikely to meet the criteria set by the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency (SMEDAN) for micro-businesses, which represents the lowest classification category (Olubiyi, 2021).

#### **Micro-enterprises**

Micro enterprises in Nigeria are defined as businesses that employ between 3 to 9 individuals and have an annual turnover ranging from N3 million to less than N25 million. These types of enterprises are the most prevalent in Nigeria, constituting a substantial majority with a total of 38,413,420 out of 39,654,385 MSMEs in existence as of 2020 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021; Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency, 2021).

#### **Small enterprises**

Small enterprises are defined as businesses that have a workforce ranging from 10 to 49 employees and achieve a turnover that exceeds N25 million but falls below N100 million (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021; Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency, 2021). According to SMEDAN (2015), small enterprises are characterized as businesses whose total assets, excluding land and buildings, range from above five million Naira but do not exceed fifty million Naira. Additionally, these enterprises employ a

workforce of more than ten but do not exceed forty-nine employees. They are often organized and represented by professional and trade associations.

### **Medium enterprises**

Medium enterprises are defined as businesses that have a workforce ranging from 50 to 199 employees and generate a turnover exceeding N100 million but less than N1 billion (National Bureau of Statistics, 2021; Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency, 2021). According to SMEDAN (2015) medium enterprises are characterized as businesses with total assets, excluding land and buildings, ranging from above fifty million Naira to not exceeding five hundred million Naira, and they employ a total workforce ranging from 50 to 199 employees. These enterprises are primarily concentrated in specific sectors, including manufacturing, transportation, information and communication technology, agro & agro-allied, and oil & gas. They tend to have a relatively high level of organization and connectivity within their respective industries.

### **Empirical Review**

Anthony, Kashim, Emmanuel and Ibrahim (2020) examined the impact of government policy and insecurity factors on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) productivity in Nigeria. The research employed multinomial logistic regression, and the findings revealed that the practice of multiple taxation by the government led to increased costs for SMEs, as evidenced by the variable "Hikes in product price" with a statistical value of  $X^2 = 6.163$  and  $p < 0.05$ . This increase in costs had a significantly negative effect on the productivity of SMEs. Furthermore, government programs aimed at fostering the growth of SMEs were found to be ineffective in substantially enhancing their productivity in the nation. Additionally, the study determined that insecurity did not have a significant adverse impact on SMEs' productivity in Nigeria. Therefore, the research underscores that multiple taxation poses a significant detriment to SMEs' productivity in

the country and emphasizes the need for more effectively crafted policy initiatives.

In a study conducted by Michael (2022), the impact of the Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) monetary policies on the viability of Nigerian SMEs was investigated. The results revealed that while higher lending interest rates were linked to a decrease in SME growth, factors such as money supply, commercial bank loans, advances, and bank reserves were positively associated with SME growth. The research ultimately concluded that the effectiveness of monetary policy plays a vital role in determining the success of SMEs in Nigeria. Consequently, the interplay of these factors is essential for the survival of SMEs in the Nigerian context.

Ndife and Egungwu (2022) conducted a study focusing on the relationship between financial deepening and the performance of small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) in Nigeria. The study's findings indicated several positive and significant effects: an increase in money supply relative to the gross domestic product had a positive effect on retail trading; a rise in credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP also positively influenced retail trading; market capitalization as a ratio of GDP showed a positive impact on retail trading, and greater financial savings as a ratio of GDP positively affected retail trading. In summary, the research concluded that financial deepening has a favorable impact on retail trading within the Nigerian context.

### **Research Methodology**

Nigeria is located in the tropical zone of West Africa between latitudes 4°N and 14°N and longitudes 2°2'E and 14°30'E and has a total area of 923,770 km<sup>2</sup> (FAO, 2005). The study was conducted in the North-West (NW) of Nigeria. The zone consists of seven states namely: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara (National Population Commission and International Classification of Functioning, 2014). As of 2017, this region comprised approximately 25% of Nigeria's

population, with a total of more than 48,942,307 million individuals, establishing it as the most densely populated zone in the nation (NBS, 2017).

The study utilized a multi-stage sampling technique. Initially, Kaduna, Katsina, and Kano were purposively selected due to their shared boundaries, similar ecosystem, common agricultural produce, livestock, and comparable micro-scale business activities. In the second stage, Kaduna North, Kano South, and Katsina South zones were also purposively selected for the same reasons. In the third stage, six Local Government Areas (LGAs) were randomly chosen from each of the selected state zones. Finally, fifty-five micro-scale enterprise owners were randomly selected from each LGA, resulting in a total sample size of 990. This sampling technique, known as Multistage Nonfinite Population (MNP) or  $n$ -omega ( $n\omega$ ), was adopted to account for the large population size in the study area, following the approach pioneered by Louangrath (2014).

The study employed a survey method, utilizing well structured questionnaires distributed among the owners of micro-scale enterprises in the study area.

The objectives of this study were achieved using the following tools of analysis: (i) Descriptive Statistics and (ii) Wilcoxon signed-rank test.

It was employed to have summary description of the data collected in the study area. It involved the use of tables, charts, figures, percentages, maximums, minimums, averages, range, standard deviation, coefficient of variation among others.

The Wilcoxon signed-rank test, a non-parametric statistical test, was employed in this research to assess and compare the means of two sets of paired samples. Notably, this test is robust and does not rely on any assumptions regarding the data distribution. In the context of this study, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was utilized to evaluate the means of two paired samples from micro enterprises, both of which exhibited non-normal distributions. This application of the Wilcoxon

signed-rank test was appropriate and enabled the research to draw accurate conclusions concerning the distinctions between these two paired samples.

## Results and Discussion

### Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Respondents

Table 1 presents the socio-economic characteristics of owners of micro enterprises in the research. The findings indicate that approximately 81% of the owners of micro enterprises were male, averaging 40 years of age and 69.80% were married, with an average household size of 6 individuals. This suggests that a significant portion of the owners of micro enterprises are responsible for providing for their dependents, such as spouses and children. Additionally, due to the cultural and religious context of the study area, women typically observe purdah and therefore have limited involvement in managing most enterprises in the study area. The findings also indicate increased participation of young individuals in carrying out micro enterprises in the study area. Roughly half of the respondents (49.19%) possessed only secondary education while the smallest proportion (29.19%) had received tertiary education. This indicates that a majority of the owners of micro enterprises are literate. It was also discovered that most of the owners of micro enterprises have prior experience in operating businesses, with an average business experience of approximately 8 years. This finding aligns with the research conducted by Hussaini, Oladimeji, Sanni and Abdulrahman (2019), Aruwayo, Ahmed and Muhammad (2019), Sulaiman, Magaji and Abdullahi (2018) as well as Osuafor and Nwankwo (2017).

The findings further indicate that the majority of owners of micro enterprises (86.26%) were not affiliated with any pertinent business cooperative society or association. It is widely recognized that membership in

relevant cooperative societies or associations offers numerous advantages, including access to information for enhancing productivity, sources for obtaining cheaper inputs, insights into new business techniques and updates on market conditions, among others. These benefits contribute to increased efficiency, optimized productivity and consequently enhanced profitability. Therefore, it is likely that most respondents in the study area did not have the opportunity to enjoy these advantages associated with membership in relevant cooperative societies or associations. Additionally, the results show that approximately 63% of business owners lacked access to credit and for those who did, it primarily came from informal sources within

the study area. This suggests that access to credit for expanding business activities was extremely limited and challenging in the study area. This situation could be attributed to the low educational attainment of many respondents, which likely hindered their access to credit from formal sources, as well as their lack of affiliation with any relevant cooperative society or association where they could receive proper guidance on accessing credit. This is consistent with the findings of Girei, Saingbe, Ohen, and Umar (2018), who conducted a study on the economics of small-scale maize production in Toto LGA of Nasarawa state and found that 56% of respondents had no access to loans in the study area.

**Table 1:** Socio-economic characteristics of the micro-enterprises owners

| Variable                          | Range       | Freq | %     | Mean  | Max | Min | CV    |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|------|-------|-------|-----|-----|-------|
| <b>Gender:</b>                    | Male        | 799  | 80.71 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Female      | 191  | 19.29 |       |     |     |       |
| <b>Age:</b>                       | 20-30       | 18   | 1.82  | 39.55 | 64  | 28  | 28.35 |
|                                   | 31-40       | 295  | 29.80 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | 41-50       | 367  | 37.07 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | 51-60       | 253  | 25.56 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Above 60    | 57   | 5.76  |       |     |     |       |
| <b>Marital Status:</b>            | Single      | 76   | 7.68  |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Married     | 691  | 69.80 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Others      | 223  | 22.53 |       |     |     |       |
| <b>Household Size:</b>            | Less than 5 | 172  | 17.37 | 6.39  | 22  | 2   | 33.48 |
|                                   | 5 – 10      | 713  | 72.02 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Above 10    | 105  | 10.61 |       |     |     |       |
| <b>Educational Level:</b>         | Informal    | 71   | 7.17  |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Primary     | 143  | 14.44 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Secondary   | 487  | 49.19 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Tertiary    | 289  | 29.19 |       |     |     |       |
| <b>Business Experience:</b>       | 0 – 5       | 96   | 9.70  | 8.47  | 28  | 4   | 22.62 |
|                                   | 6 – 10      | 267  | 26.97 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | 11 – 15     | 359  | 36.26 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Above 15    | 268  | 27.07 |       |     |     |       |
| <b>Membership of Association:</b> | Member      | 136  | 13.74 |       |     |     |       |
|                                   | Non-Member  | 854  | 86.26 |       |     |     |       |



|                                       |                   |     |       |      |    |   |       |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-----|-------|------|----|---|-------|
| <b>Years of Membership (n = 136):</b> | Less than 5       | 21  | 15.44 | 6.91 | 11 | 2 | 14.83 |
|                                       | 5 – 10            | 103 | 75.74 |      |    |   |       |
|                                       | Above 10          | 12  | 8.82  |      |    |   |       |
| <b>Access to Credit:</b>              | Yes Credit        | 367 | 37.07 |      |    |   |       |
|                                       | No Credit         | 623 | 62.93 |      |    |   |       |
| <b>Source(s) of Credit (n = 367):</b> | Informal sources  | 208 | 56.68 |      |    |   |       |
|                                       | Commercial banks  | 93  | 25.34 |      |    |   |       |
|                                       | Gov credit scheme | 34  | 9.26  |      |    |   |       |
|                                       | NGOs              | 19  | 5.18  |      |    |   |       |
|                                       | Others            | 13  | 3.54  |      |    |   |       |

### Micro Enterprises according to Business Clusters

The results presented in Table 2 of the findings indicate that the owners of micro enterprises in the study area were categorized into six clusters based on their business activities: (i) foodstuff enterprises, which accounted for 26.97% of the respondents, (ii) fruits & vegetable enterprises, comprising 6.36%, (iii) bakery & restaurant enterprises, representing

7.17%, (iv) snacks and drinks enterprises, comprising 10.61%, (v) animal husbandry enterprises, with a share of 9.19% and (vi) non-food enterprises, making up 39.70%. This indicates that the majority of the owners of micro enterprises were involved in businesses related to the buying and selling of non-food products, followed by foodstuff in the study area.

**Table 2:** Distribution of owners of micro enterprises according to business clusters

| Business cluster                      | Frequency  | Percentage (%) |
|---------------------------------------|------------|----------------|
| (i) Foodstuff enterprises             | 267        | 26.97          |
| (ii) Fruits & vegetable enterprises   | 63         | 6.36           |
| (iii) Bakery & restaurant enterprises | 71         | 7.17           |
| (iv) Snacks and drinks enterprises    | 105        | 10.61          |
| (v) Animal husbandry enterprises      | 91         | 9.19           |
| (vi) Non-food enterprises             | 393        | 39.70          |
| <b>Total</b>                          | <b>990</b> | <b>100</b>     |

### Pre-Post Analysis of Naira Redesign Policy on Micro Enterprises

The examination of the wellbeing of micro enterprises and their owners in the study area utilized pre-post analysis, as detailed in Tables 3 and 4 of this research. The findings indicate that during the pre-Naira redesign policy period, owners of micro enterprises in the

study area generated an average total daily sales or service value of ₦387,680, whereas this figure decreased to ₦278,100 in the post-policy period. Consequently, there was a notable decline of 28.27% in the average total daily sales. This suggests that the Naira redesign policy had a negative impact on micro enterprises, resulting in a reduction in the

volume of goods and services transacted daily in the study area by approximately 28%. Moreover, this led to additional adverse implications:

- (a) The average daily income of micro enterprise owners decreased by 33.85%, dropping from ₦78,487 to ₦51,920. This indicates a negative shift in the lifestyle of the respondents;
- (b) The Naira redesign policy adversely affected the employment rates of micro enterprises in the study area. On average, the number of individuals employed by these enterprises decreased by 35.13%, dropping from around 7 people to just 5 people. Hence, the policy resulted to an

increase in the rate of unemployment in the study area, and

- (c) Furthermore, the average daily consumption expenditure decreased by 30.23%, decreasing from ₦5,673 to ₦3,958. This indicates a reduction in the amount of money spent by micro enterprise owners on selves and their families due to the Naira redesign policy in the study area. Additionally, it can be inferred from the results that the level of savings by micro enterprise owners also decreased. This is evident as respondents retained approximately 70% of their daily consumption expenditure, while earning approximately 66% of their daily income during the post-policy period.

**Table 3:** Effect of Naira redesign policy on micro enterprises

| Variable                                | Micro Enterprises |             |            |
|---|-------------------|-------------|------------|
|   | Pre-Policy        | Post-Policy | Margin (%) |
| Average Sale/Work (₦/day)               | 387,680           | 278,100     | -28.27     |
| <b>Max</b>                              | 563,458           | 311,278     |            |
| <b>Min</b>                              | 82,346            | 49,580      |            |
| <b>CV</b>                               | 23.82             | 28.17       |            |
| Average Employment (number)             | 7.43              | 4.82        | -35.13     |
| <b>Max</b>                              | 17                | 9           |            |
| <b>Min</b>                              | 3                 | 1           |            |
| <b>CV</b>                               | 21.87             | 18.63       |            |
| Average Income (₦/day)                  | 78,487            | 51,920      | -33.85     |
| <b>Max</b>                              | 123,569           | 87,502      |            |
| <b>Min</b>                              | 16,505            | 9,890       |            |
| <b>CV</b>                               | 34.03             | 29.50       |            |
| Average Consumption Expenditure (₦/day) | 5,673             | 3,958       | -30.23     |
| <b>Max</b>                              | 14,870            | 10,200      |            |
| <b>Min</b>                              | 4,800             | 3,100       |            |
| <b>CV</b>                               | 28.31             | 31.02       |            |

**Wilcoxon Signed-rank Test Results**

Table 4 presents the ranking of variables within micro enterprises in three categories: negative (indicating that post-policy activities were lower than pre-policy), positive (indicating that post-policy activities were higher than pre-policy), and ties (indicating that post-policy activities were equal to pre-

policy). The majority of micro enterprise owners received a negative rank, indicating a decrease in their activities, including volume of sale/work, income generation, employment rate, and consumption expenditure, as a consequence of the Naira redesign policy in the study area.

The table also reveals the impact magnitude of the policy on these enterprises using the Cohen (1988) formula and guidelines for effect size. Micro enterprise owners experienced a small effect size ranging from 0.26 to 0.35, respectively. This suggests that the implementation of the Naira redesign policy has a negative effect on these enterprises in the study area.

**Test of Research Hypothesis**

The study tested the hypothesis stating that there is no significant difference between pre

and post-policy activities and the wellbeing of micro enterprises in the study area. However, the results presented in Table 5 indicate that the null hypothesis (H0) should be rejected. This is because the p-values of all variables in micro enterprises were found to be less than 0.05 (p<0.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that there is indeed a significant difference between pre-policy and post-policy activities and the wellbeing of micro enterprise owners in the study area.

**Table 4:** Results from Wilcoxon signed-rank test of micro enterprises

| Micro Enterprises               | Mean       |             | Standard Deviation |             | Ranks    |          |      | n   | Two-Tailed (α = 0.05) |         | r    |
|---------------------------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|----------|----------|------|-----|-----------------------|---------|------|
|                                 | Pre-Policy | Post-Policy | Pre-Policy         | Post-Policy | Negative | Positive | Ties |     | Critical Value (Z)    | p-value |      |
| Sale/Work (N/day)               | 387,680    | 278,100     | 92,345.38          | 78,340.77   | 708      | 213      | 69   | 990 | -11.569               | 0.000   | 0.26 |
| Employment (number)             | 7.43       | 4.82        | 1.62               | 0.90        | 663      | 33       | 294  | 990 | -13.794               | 0.000   | 0.31 |
| Income (N/day)                  | 78,487     | 51,920      | 26,709.13          | 15,316.40   | 686      | 251      | 53   | 990 | -12.904               | 0.000   | 0.29 |
| Consumption Expenditure (N/day) | 5,673      | 3,958       | 1,606.03           | 1,227.77    | 672      | 21       | 297  | 990 | -15.574               | 0.000   | 0.35 |

**Main Problems Linked to the Naira Redesign Policy**

The findings presented in Table 5 outline the key difficulties faced by micro enterprise owners as a result of the introduction of the new Naira redesign policy in the study region. These results were derived from descriptive statistical analysis as follows:

The most prevalent problem found in the study area was short supply of the new Naira notes, despite directives from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to commercial banks to ensure their distribution. This resulted in a significant scarcity of the new notes, attributed partly to political factors and the impending general elections. The second major problem stemming from the policy was poor financial internet services, making electronic transactions difficult for individuals.

This led to various problems such as delays in monetary transfers, inability to access personal bank account information and balances and transaction reversals, among others

The results from the table also highlight rise in difficulties of doing business as the third major problem. This problem made business operations somewhat challenging, resulting in fluctuating prices for goods and services. Businesses tended to charge higher prices for goods and services when payments were made through electronic transfers, while lower prices were applied for cash payments. The short period allocated for swapping between the old and new Naira notes, as well as the rise in financial fraudulence, were ranked as the fourth and fifth main problems in the study area. These challenges

contributed to long queues at banks and the circulation of counterfeit Naira notes by fraudsters, exacerbating the difficulties faced by businesses and the general public.

**Table 5:** Main problems linked to the naira redesign policy

| Problem                                | *Frequency | Percentage | Ranking         |
|--|------------|------------|-----------------|
| Short supply of the new Naira notes    | 772        | 77.98      | 1 <sup>st</sup> |
| Poor financial internet services       | 703        | 71.01      | 2 <sup>nd</sup> |
| Rise in difficulties of doing business | 674        | 68.08      | 3 <sup>rd</sup> |
| Short period of swapping               | 617        | 62.32      | 4 <sup>th</sup> |
| Rise in financial fraudulence          | 358        | 36.16      | 5 <sup>th</sup> |

\*NB: Multiple responses were allowed during the survey

### Conclusion and Recommendations

It can be concluded that the introduction and implementation of the new Naira redesign policy have resulted in a downturn across various activities of micro enterprises within the study area. Based on the study's findings, governments should ensure comprehensive communication with citizens regarding any proposed policies prior to their implementation, enabling better understanding of the policy and its consequences. There should be the provision of efficient and dependable financial internet services, particularly in rural regions, by the government and other stakeholders is crucial to facilitate electronic transactions. The government should consider issuing licenses to private individuals or entities to establish additional microfinance banks. This measure would help alleviate congestion in commercial banks and streamline financial transactions. Stringent penalties should be imposed on individuals who exploit policies for personal gain, irrespective of their status. This approach would mitigate the adverse impact of such policies on the general population. The federal government should extend the period for swapping between old and new Naira notes to at least one year, thereby easing the business environment

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## SOCIAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT AND PARLIAMENT IN NIGERIA

**Namo Samson Atari<sup>1</sup>**

**Namo Johanna Akerewe<sup>2</sup>**

**Jacob Angel Emobweseh<sup>3</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Private & Commercial Law  
Faculty of Law, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
Email: [namosamson.u@gmail.com](mailto:namosamson.u@gmail.com)

<sup>2</sup>Department of Political Science  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
Email: [joanj4real@yahoo.com](mailto:joanj4real@yahoo.com)

<sup>3</sup>Email: [kaigamajacob@yahoo.com](mailto:kaigamajacob@yahoo.com)



### Abstract

Courts have broad powers to punish persons who offend the Court, interfere with legal proceedings, or disobey Court orders. Contempt is used both to protect the rights of litigants in Courts and to punish a wrong committed against the parliament or the Court itself. This paper examines the social and legal implications of the varieties or forms of contempt of court and parliament in Nigeria. The paper adopted a doctrinal method by utilizing both primary and secondary sources. The findings were that the Courts today rarely justify the exercise of the contempt power on the grounds that it protects the integrity of the judge and institution. Instead, protection of the authority, order and decorum of the court is the usual reason given for the use of the contempt power. In addition, the Court uses contempt proceeding to protect the rights of the litigants using the Court to settle a dispute. It was concluded in this paper that even though the offence of contempt of court is for the preservation of the power and dignity of the court, it must not be used to harass and intimidate counsels or litigants. Therefore, where there is need for the court to use its power of committal for contempt against itself or the parliament, it must be for the restoration of sanctity.

**Keywords:** Contempt, court, Judge, authority, parliament, proceedings

### Introduction

The law of contempt of court and parliament refers to any conduct that tend to bring the authority and administration of the law and the parliament or legislature into disrepute or to prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation or parliamentary session/sitting. It is an essential adjunct of the rule of law (Ikoni:2024). Contempt of court and parliament is the established name given to the species of wrongful conduct which consists

of interference with the due administration of justice or disobedience to orders of court and rights and privileges given to parliament in a democratic setting. It is an essential adjunct of the rule of law (Ikoni:2024).

Parliamentary reporters must be well acquainted with parliamentary proceedings. Also, they must know the names and functions of the various officers of the parliament e.g. House Majority Leader, House Minority

Leader, Chief Whip, Speaker, Mace Bearer, etc. Like court stories, all statements made by Members of Parliament (MP) must be accurately quoted or explained. The reporter must always remember that resolutions, rules and amendments are adopted while bills are passed and laws are enacted.

### **Conceptual Clarifications**

For a proper understanding of the topic of this conference paper, it will be worthwhile to proffer definition of some key words in the topic, and in this case court, contempt of court and contempt of Parliament. It is therefore important to grasp its meaning in order to unraveling what it entails despite the prospect and challenges that might be encountered.

### **The Concept of Court**

A Court is a governmental body consisting of one or more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes and administer justice (Black's Law Dictionary: 2015). In other words, a Court is a permanently organized body, with independent judicial powers defined by Law, meeting at a time and place fixed by law for the judicial public administration of justice (William: 1931). An order on the other hand is a written direction or command delivered by a court or judge. The word generally embraces final decrees as well as interlocutory directions or commands (Black's Law Dictionary: 2015).

Note that, while an order may under some circumstances amount to a judgment, they must be distinguished, owing to the different consequences flowing from them, not only in the matter of enforcement and appeal but in other aspects, as, for instance, the time within which proceedings to annul them must be taken. Rulings on motions are ordinarily orders rather than judgments. The class of judgments and of decrees formerly called interlocutory is included in the definition given in contemporary usage of the word 'order' (Freeman: 1925).

Courts in Nigeria may be classified in several ways. For example, they may be

classified into Federal courts and state courts or, superior courts and inferior courts or courts of record and court other than courts of record.

### **The Concept of Contempt of Court**

The concept of contempt of court like all other concept defies a general acceptable or unified definition. Contempt of court can be defined as: any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct court administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity, committed by a person who does an act in wilful contravention of its authority or dignity, or tending to impede or frustrate the administration of justice or by one who, being under the court's authority as a party to a proceeding wilfully disobeys its lawful orders or fails to comply with an understanding which he has given (NOUN:2019). Contempt is a noun and means the act or state of despising; the condition of being despised. It also means a conduct that defies the authority or dignity of a court or legislature. In ordinary language, contempt means any feeling that somebody or something is without value and deserves no respect at all (Oxford dictionary: 2018).

The summary power of the courts in Nigeria to punish contempt of their authority had its origin in the law and practice of England where disobedience of court orders was regarded as contempt of the King himself and attachment was a prerogative process derived from presumed contempt of the sovereign (Fox 1908).

As law-abiding and responsible citizens, journalists are expected to respect the courts in the course of their official duties. However, in the past there have been altercations between journalists on the one hand and judges and magistrates on the other over contempt.

### **The Concept of Contempt of Parliament**

Just as the court could punish anyone for obstructing its proceedings or trying to bring administration of justice into disrepute, the



parliament has the power to punish any person for an act or omission that tend to obstruct either Houses of the Parliaments (Senate or House of Representatives) and the State Houses of Assembly in the discharge of their duties. The parliament also has the power to punish for contempt any insult or attack on the person of any member of parliament (MP) for words spoken or opinion raised on any matter debated in the House or in the precincts of the House.

Simply put, contempt of parliament is any act or words that tend to obstruct or impedes either Houses of Parliament in the performance of its functions or any acts or words which tend to intimidate or influence members of either House in the discharge of their duties. Members of Parliament (MP) enjoy immunity against what they say during parliamentary proceedings, the disclosure by the press of such statements may lead to contempt of parliament.

The law also forbids journalists and any of the media generally to engage in obscenity. Obscenity refers to words, thoughts, magazine and pictures that are against good morals. Mr. Justice Sachs as cited by Daramola (1999) once defines obscenity to mean "filthy, indecent, offensive to modesty or decency, expressing or suggesting lewd thoughts". Obscene publications are simply those publications that are likely to deprave and corrupt those who are likely to read, see or hear it, or corrupt public morals or outrages public decency.

### **Empirical Review**

Although, the power of the court to punish for contempt of court and Parliament had its initial authority from the "inherent powers" of a superior court of record, there are other statutes that conferred power on the courts to punish for contempt in Nigeria. The literature review on the framework for the offence of contempt of court and parliament in Nigeria shall therefore be discussed with reference to

the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the Criminal Code Act and the Penal Code Law.

#### **i. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.**

The term 'judicature' means the system of administration of justice (Deluxe encyclopedia: 2018). According to the Black's Law Dictionary, judicature is the action of judging or of administering justice through duly constituted courts (Black's law dictionary: 2019, pg. 922). Judicial power is therefore 'the authority vested in courts and judges to hear and decide cases and to make binding judgment on them; the power to construe and apply the law when controversies arise over what has been done or not done under it.'" The term 'judicial power'" also refers to the types, levels and hierarchy of courts whose responsibility it is to interpret and apply the law, including the Constitution, statutes and regulations, jurisprudence and leading precedents. The judiciary also provides processes to resolve disputes. It administers the law impartially between individuals, and between persons and public authorities. Within the proper limits of their judicial function, judges also guarantee the observance, protection, and attainment of human rights. Judges ensure that all people are securely governed by the Rule of Law and equal justice under law.

Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the judicial powers are vested in both Federal and State courts.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, by section 6(1) of the Constitution, "the judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the Courts to which this section relates, being courts established for the Federation." In the same vein, by section 6(2) of the Constitution, "the judicial powers of a state shall be vested in the Courts to which this section relates, being courts established subject as provided by this constitution, for the state."

<sup>1</sup> . See section 6 of the CFRN, 1999, as amended.

By section 6(3) of the Constitution, the courts to which this section relates, established by the Constitution for the Federation and for the States, specified in subsection (5) (a) to (f) of this section shall be the only superior courts of record in Nigeria; and save as otherwise prescribed by the National Assembly or by the House of Assembly of a State, each court shall have all the powers of a superior court of record. Although the Constitution empowers the National Assembly or any House of Assembly of a State to establish courts other than those to which this section relates (Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution).

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) also made provisions for *inherent powers* of the court to do justice in the exercise of the judicial powers granted the Court. This is provided for in section 6(6) (a) and (b) of the constitution which provides that:

The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section:(a) shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law; (b) shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.

It is clear from the provisions of section 6 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), that the judicial powers for the purpose of administering justice are vested in the courts. The courts of law that are duly established, have over several centuries been given the task, though arduous, to administer justice between persons or between person and government or arms of government or institutions with less rancour and much satisfaction.

## ii. Penal Code Law

The Penal Code Law (1960), also make

provision for the offence of contempt of court. To this end, section 155 of the Penal Code provides that:

Whoever intentionally offers any insult or causes any interruption to any public servant while such a servant is sitting at any stage of a judicial proceedings shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with a fine which may extend to 20 pounds or both.

It could therefore be seen that the power of the court to punish for contempt is not only a matter of inference from the inherent powers of the court to do justice but is constitutionally recognized in Nigeria and derived from the provisions of both Criminal Code Act and Penal Code Law. In other words, if the courts are to do justice, they need power to administer it without interference or affront, as well as to enforce their own orders and to punish those who insult or obstruct them directly or indirectly in the performance of their duty or misbehave in such a manner as to weaken or lower the dignity and authority of law.

## Public Analysis on Contempt of Court and Parliament

The power of a judge to punish for contempt of court is a remnant of the power of English royalty. Today, courts have broad powers to punish persons who offend the court, interfere with legal proceedings, or disobey court orders. Contempt is used both to protect the rights of litigants in the courts and to punish a wrong committed against the court itself. From the analysis and some of the decisions of court in this presentation, some limits have been placed on the contempt power to the point that before criticism of a court may be punished by contempt, it must be shown that the criticism created a clear and present lawyer of the likelihood of interference with the administration of justice, not the ego or personality of the presiding judge.

In the eyes of the public the offence of contempt of court and Parliament is a serious

one and it is necessary not only for the protection of the courts of justice and House of Parliament but also for the preservation of and the administration of justice. There is therefore need for reform of the law of contempt of court. However, since criminal contempt is a creature of statute, the maximum sentence for contempt committed for instance under S.133 of the criminal code is three months imprisonment. In civil contempt, it does not seem clear what limit has been placed on the court's power of punishment whether the punishment be a fine or imprisonment or both. It is worthy of note that in most cases of civil contempt, the court usually adopt the same method of punishment for criminal contempt.

Acts that constitute contempt of courts are:

- i. **Physical Violence on the Judge:** Assaulting a judge is a grave impediment in the administration of justice that can occur anywhere in the world. It amounts to attacking the very citadel on which justice stands. Thus, assaulting a judge, or attempting to assault a judge will be treated as a most serious contempt of court. Personal outrages against a judge, however, have not been very common, and in the main have been restricted to person (usually the accused having just been found guilty) throwing missiles at the judge.
- ii. **Interruptions of Court Proceedings:** Acts exhibited or words spoken to interrupt court proceedings constitute an interference or hindrance of due administration of justice and thereby amount to contempt.
- iii. **Taking of Photographs in the Court:** Taking of photograph can in general be contempt just as much as any accompanying story. The rule is that publication of the photograph of a defendant is not likely to be contempt provided there is no argument about his identity. But if the case hinges on witnesses identifying the defendant in

court or at an identity parade, as a man who committed the crime to use a picture of the man would clearly be contempt. Thus, it has been held that "it is contempt of court to publish a photograph of the person charged with a criminal offence where it is reasonably clear that the question of the identity of the accused person with the criminal has arisen, or may arise, and such publication is calculated to prejudice a fair trial.

- iv. **Disrespect for the Court:** It is not clear whether the mere showing of disrespect for the court will amount to contempt of court or is simply an instance of discourtesy. However, the courts have been apt in admonishing disrespectful behaviours. For example, it will be disrespectful, but not necessarily contempt for a party or counsel to fail to bow before the court or to stand up when the court is rising. In the same vein, it may not be disrespectful to the court to read newspaper inside the courtroom but could be discourtesy to the presiding judge.
- v. **Disobedience of Orders of Court:** Disobedience of injunctive orders, particularly in labour disputes, has been a fruitful source of cases dealing with contempt of court.

One of the difficult human endeavours to report is politics and parliamentary proceedings. To be working as a beat reporter for parliamentary proceedings therefore, requires more carefulness and dedication. It is just like walking on a tightrope. One wrong step, you are in for a charge of libel.

What makes the parliament or legislature difficult to report is that members of both bodies are constitutionally immuned of being charged to court for libel for any libelous statements made on the floor of the House whereas a reporter who reports such Libelous statements, stands the risk of being jailed if he is found guilty on a charge of libel. Where the problem really lies is that in many parliamentary proceedings, members make

defamatory statements. Since they know that they are constitutionally immuned, they feel free to say anything they like. While the parliamentarians are free to say anything they like and can get away with it, the reporters are not so free. What that boils down to is that a reporter who is assigned to report parliamentary proceedings must weigh the members' utterances very well with a view to sifting the chaff from the grain. All libelous statements made by members on the floor of the House must be eliminated in the story.

Alternatively, the reporter may correctly quote the person who made the statement concerned since it is already on tape. In other words, although one may not be a television or radio reporter, yet one is expected to be equipped with a tape recorder when covering parliamentary proceedings for your newspaper. This is essential in developing countries such as Nigeria and other African countries where a statement made by a government functionary a moment ago can be denied an hour later.

This is good advice not only for beat reporters for parliament or legislature but also for beat reporters for courts and political campaigns. On the everyday routine of parliament proceedings, the beat reporter concerned should endeavour to get to the parliament arena on time. He should listen well to the statements made or being made by each MP. He needs to note down any obscure point in his reporter's notebook. At the end of the day's proceedings, he should contact the House Speaker or House Majority Leader or the sponsor of the bill concerned for further clarification. Chairmen of relevant standing Committees may also be contacted for help. In addition, he could get a copy of the House's Record Books and check for the necessary facts in it.

Parliamentary reporters must be well acquainted with parliamentary proceedings. Also, they must know the names and functions of the various officers of the parliament e.g. House Majority Leader, House Minority

Leader, Chief Whip, Speaker, Mace Bearer, etc. Like court stories, all statements made by Members of Parliament (MP) must be accurately quoted or explained. The reporter must always remember that resolutions, rules and amendments are adopted while bills are passed and laws are enacted.

Examples of acts that constitute contempt of parliament are legion. Some of them include the followings:

- a) Disobedience to the rules of and orders of a legislative House or its officers;
- b) Creating disturbances or the disruption of the proceedings of the house;
- c) Knowingly given false evidence before the legislative house or its committee;
- d) Refusal to answer questions put to one by a committee of the house or failure to attend the house of committee when requested to do so;
- e) Influencing any members or officer of the house by way of bribe, reward or benefit;
- f) Publication reports which falsely or scandalously defines a legislative House or any committee.

It should be noted that the above instances are not conclusive. Thus, anything done within the precinct of the legislative house that offends it in whatever form may be regarded as contempt of parliament. Contempt of court is aimed at maintaining the sanctity of courts so that they can adequately discharge their constitutional duty of dispensing justice.

There is the presumption in favour of journalist to report or disseminate information to the public without any interference or restriction. However, this presumption is rebuttable especially when it comes to the reporting of proceedings in the court. The presumption as to the unrestricted right of the journalist to report or pass on information is found in section 39 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. According to that section of the law "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without

interference. This presumption is often referred to as the right to freedom of expression and the press. Every responsible citizen, lawyers, journalists, etc. is duty bound to respect the courts.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This Paper is situated in professional ethics of journalism. Ethics is the study of human actions in respect to their being right or wrong. The actions of individuals and social groups supply the subject matter of ethics. There are two types of action - the voluntary - those which we do intentionally and actions that are involuntary. Ethics studies voluntary actions, those that we carry out with sufficient knowledge and choice (Daramola, 1999). Ethics makes a systematic study of our moral ideals and goods, our motives and our patterns of good and bad conduct. In a nutshell, ethics deals with the issue of right living.

Mass Communication (Journalism) ethics is a form of applied ethics or professional ethics that examines ethical principles and moral or ethical problems that arise in the course of news reporting and publishing. It applies to all aspects of journalism practice and is relevant to the conduct of individuals and newspaper organizations as a whole. Applied ethics is a field of ethics that deals with ethical questions in many fields including mass communication.

Journalism, like other professions has ethics guiding members and a disciplinary body that enforces ethics. Some of the ethics in the profession are sanctionable by the disciplinary body of the profession while others only attract condemnation. Ethics of journalism are, therefore, the dos and dont of the profession.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

At the inception of this paper, it was noted that the law of contempt could be applicable to court or to a legislative house. In this paper, although our emphasis was on the contempt of court, it is worthy of note that contempt of

a legislative house is aimed at protecting the independence and integrity of the house. Contempt of a legislative house is constituted by any act or omission which obstructs or impedes either House of Parliament in the performance of its functions or any members or officers, or more generally, by indignities offered to the House reflecting on its character or proceedings. In Nigeria the law that confers power on the Legislative House to punish any person who defies their privileges or otherwise shows contempt is the Legislative House (Power and Privileges) Act.

Happily, the Nigerian press has been given latitude of freedom by section 39 (1999) constitution (page) and more importantly, section 22 (1999) constitution (Page). 'The section in question empowers the press to monitor governance and hold government accountable to the people. The extent to which the press has used the constitutional provision is wide. Another law that has strengthened the hand of the press is the Freedom of Information Act which was passed and There is no gainsaying the fact that the Nigerian press has done very well to act as watchdog of government. It is on record till today, that it was the record till today, that it was the Nigerian press that exposed the first speaker of the House of Representatives, Alhaji Ibrahim Salisu Buhari in 1999 of forged University of Toronto certificate. The scandal led to the resignation of the speaker. The press also exposed the discrepancies in the name of the first president of the Nigerian Senate, Evan (or Evans) Enwerem. That disclosure forced the senate president to vacate the office. It is also gratifying to note that it is the Nigerian Press that exposed the former National Chairman of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDF), Chief Olabode Ibiyinka George of misappropriation of funds and corrupt practices in the management of the Nigeria Port Authority. The case against Chief Olabode George by the Economic and Financial Crimes commission led to his trial and conviction to two years jail term.

In news writing and reporting, journalists should put the ethics of the profession and laws guiding the profession at the back of their minds. They should as well understand and respect the national interest of their country.

Generally, every Court has traditional power to inflict punishment against recalcitrant party (section 6(6) 1999 CFRN as amended). Thus, the law of contempt is the judge law and the power to punish for contempt is the judge's power. In exercising this power however, the judges are always reminded of the need to treat the matter with utmost caution.

Although the offence of contempt of court is a serious one and it is necessary not only for the protection of the courts of justice but also for the preservation of and the administration of justice, there is not enough guidelines as to what form the punishment should take. There is therefore need for reform of the law of contempt of court. However, since criminal contempt is a creature of statute, the maximum sentence for contempt committed for instance under S.133 of the criminal code is three months imprisonment. In civil contempt, it does not seem clear what limit has been placed on the court's power of punishment whether the punishment be a fine or imprisonment or both. It is worthy of note that in most cases of civil contempt, the court usually adopt the same method of punishment for criminal contempt.

It is interesting to note that in both civil and criminal contempt, the court can order the contemnor to be kept in prison custody until he purges himself of the contempt. It is also important to note that it is possible for the court to pardon a contemnor. Thus, a contemnor whose conduct is unintentional and who purges himself of the contempt by a sincere apology and credible explanation should be pardoned. Also, a court will pardon and discharge a contemnor if he acts unintentionally and from a mistaken belief or misconception of the law thereby flouting a court's order. It must be emphasised that in all

cases of contempt proceedings unless the rules of fair hearing have been observed the conviction will be set aside.

The consequence of contempt of court by a party to any proceedings and the exceptions thereto is stated by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of *The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. & Anor V. Chief Isaac Obort-Ntito Torshi & Others (2023)5 NWLR*, where the Court stated that:

It is generally correct that a person in contempt of an order of Court is precluded from being granted any reliefs while he persists in the contempt. An exception to this settled principle of law is where the person against whom the order is made has challenged the validity of the order by way of an appeal or other application. He cannot be proceeded against for contempt or declared a contemnor until the issue of the validity of the order is settled one way or the other by a court of competent jurisdiction (Ekun JSC: 2008).

Bearing the above pronouncements in mind, there is need to refer to some peculiar traits of some judges which often spur some counsel or litigants into some form of conclusions. If a judge descends into the arena by asking too many damaging questions certainly it would be utterly stupid for counsel or parties to such a case not to reassess their position.

Much as the journalist goes out to gather news for dissemination purpose, he should always abide by the ethics of the profession as laid down, in the Nigeria Union of Journalists ethics and other international associations of Journalists. He must be accurate and fair in his writing.

**i. Truthful, fair and accurate information:** A journalist is expected at all times to tell the truth no matter how bitter. He should be fair by ensuring that news, comments and criticism are balanced.

There shall not be exaggeration; information should be accurate without falsification or distortion.

**ii. Publication Prejudicial to Fair Trial:** In its widest sense, anything which amounts to

an improper interference with the due administration of justice constitutes contempt. But probably the most serious interference is a publication which jeopardizes the fair trial of a matter. It is therefore necessary that every trial is a fair trial. A fair trial here means one conducted free from prejudice and in which the court tries the case impartially after considering all the available evidence which has been properly submitted. But what is "prejudice" and fair trial"? At its simplest, the word prejudice is synonymous with the word "impair", but in order to understand what sort of publication will prejudice a fair trial, the notion of a "fair trial has to be explained.

It is interesting to note that in both civil and criminal contempt, the court can order the contemnor to be kept in prison custody until he purges himself of the contempt. It is also important to note that it is possible for the court to pardon a contemnor. Thus, a contemnor whose conduct is unintentional and who purges himself of the contempt by a sincere apology and credible explanation should be pardoned. Also, a court will pardon and discharge a contemnor if he acts unintentionally and from a mistaken belief or misconception of the law thereby flouting a court's order. It must be emphasized that in all cases of contempt proceedings unless the rules of fair hearing have been observed the conviction will be set aside.

Similarly, journalists are expected to respect the copyright of others. Copyright here refers to the exclusive right of the owners of an invention or author to control his original work. It extends to the control of the reproduction, broadcasting, publication, adaptation, communication, public performance, or any translation of his work. Copyright is also known as property or intellectual right. It covers every literary, musical, artistic,

cinematograph work, and sound recording. The purpose of the law of copyright is to protect authors and inventors against theft and piracy of their original work. Copyright expires seventy years from the end of the year in which the author or inventor dies.

- iii. **Rectification of Harmful inaccuracies and right of reply to criticism:** Journalists should rectify promptly harmful inaccuracies in the media, ensure correction and apologize to the offending party. Journalists should apologize to persons criticized when the issue is of sufficient importance.
- iv. **Information should not be obtained by crooked means:** Journalists should not obtain information, photographs and other illustrations by crooked means such as paying or offering bribe to obtain information of public interest.
- v. **Intrusion into private grief and distress:** It is unethical for any journalist to intrude into private grief and distress except for overriding public interest.
- vi. **Protection of confidential information:** As a cardinal rule, journalists should not disclose confidential sources of information. The reason being that such source might be endangered.

In the United Kingdom, the press is forbidden by defense notices not to disclose the whereabouts of certain military arms, armament or strategic military information from being aired or published. This law as may apply in Nigeria is meant to protect national security and our sovereignty as a nation-state.

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**Adamu Mohammed<sup>1</sup>**

**Abubakar Ahmed<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science, Federal University Gusau,  
Zamfara State, Nigeria

Email: *mohdshiwidi@gmail.com*

<sup>2</sup>Department of Social Sciences, Federal Polytechnic Bida,  
Niger State, Nigeria

Email: *nmaa058@gmail.com*



### Abstract

The return to democracy in the early 1990s ushered in a new and high expectations by Nigerian citizens but which was confronted with myriad of socio-economic and political upheavals such as incessant pipelines vandalism and oil theft in the Niger Delta region. The growing concern for the incessant oil pipelines vandalism in Nigeria include the pervasive poverty and frustration in the Niger Delta, and Nigeria at large, corruption and sabotage within the oil sector. There was also frightening unemployment among the educated youths which force some of them to take to oil pipeline vandalism, oil theft and kidnapping for ransom etc. Externally speaking, there was the international dimension of pipeline vandalism whereby some Nigerians connived with foreigners to steal crude oil in the country. Operation of illegal refineries in some parts of the Niger Delta encourages pipeline vandalism. Poor Security management around pipelines facilities due to inaccessibility of many areas in the Niger Delta region and the menace of pipeline vandals and oil thieves. The paper also highlights the danger of environmental degradation and thereby impoverishes the people. The paper recommend among others, that the federal government should initiate dialogue with the stakeholders in the Niger Delta region so as to break a truce.

**Keywords:** Crude oil, vandalism, Niger Delta, kidnapping, illegal refineries

### Introduction

Nigeria has a single economy that is heavily reliant on the oil industry to survive. Crude oil production is essential to Nigeria's economy and is a key component of both its present and future. In actuality, more than 90% of Nigeria's exports, foreign exchange earnings, and more than 70% of total revenue come from oil and gas resources in the Niger Delta region. Increases in crude oil output or other factors, according to Anifowose in 2012, have a direct impact on Nigeria's financial base and development initiatives. The Nigerian economy is based primarily on oil. With daily

revenue from petrodollars in the millions, it is the nation's principal export. Sadly, illicit bunkers and refining are stealing the same resources.

As was already mentioned, Nigeria is home to four oil refineries with a combined capacity of over 470,000 barrels of crude oil. These refineries produce 190,000 barrels per day in Port Harcourt, 140,000 barrels per day at Warri, 280,000 barrels per day at Port Harcourt, and 110,000 barrels per day at Kaduna. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation is responsible for operating and

managing the refineries. The oil fields, refineries, and export/storage terminals are all connected by a network of pipelines totaling about 3000 kilometres (1800 miles).

Amuwo (2009) defined oil terminals as complex installations or equipment used primarily for the storage and transportation of crude oil and related products. According to reports, Nigeria has six main oil terminals throughout the study period, including those in Bonny, Brass River, Escravos, Forcados, and Qua iboe.

The frequent tragedies that occur in Nigeria's pipelines have garnered attention on a global scale. The negative effects on people and the environment are endless and include animal and human mortality, air, water, and soil pollution, the eradication of ecosystems, and the loss of infrastructure and property. It is seen to be the most practical method for moving massive amounts of gas and liquids, though. Oil theft, militant activity, unintentional accidents due to oil transportation, environmental damage, and other issues have all been brought on by Nigeria's tremendous oil production and potential.

Since 2000, the Nigerian government has made a number of commitments to develop infrastructure, including roads through the oil-producing delta, additional refineries in oil-producing towns, relief for the people living in the oil-producing regions, and a halt to oil imports. The Development Commission of the Niger Delta (NDDC) was founded in 2001 to achieve this goal (NDDC, 2006). The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) continued to import oil products twenty years after there had been no refinery built. According to major national media in Abuja, Lagos, and Osun, some dubious items supplied by NNPC in February 2022 have begun to create mechanical issues in automobiles. Nigerians have managed to survive this predicament, but because the government finds it challenging to maintain existing refineries, local refineries' products have

become supplements to imported goods. Similar to this, the governor of Rivers state, Wike, was busy dismantling certain local refineries with the promise of constructing modular refineries while other areas of the state were also waiting in lines for vehicles to buy petrol. By the end of February 2022, 150 or so nearby refineries had been destroyed (Badmus, 2010).

The following observations emphasize the key components of the suggested problem: First, despite having plenty of resources available, the government is unable to maintain the refineries that are currently in operation. Second, when the government's efforts through the NDDC fell short, the youth were driven to establish refineries in order to survive. Thirdly, the government of Nigeria may construct 20 refineries if one is constructed each year. This indicates that the Nigerian government is not focused on ensuring the wellbeing of its people. As a result of the research above, this work will use the frustration aggression theory's lenses to conduct an in-depth interview with participants in order to make potential proposals for a permanent solution to crude oil pipeline vandalism.

This study will look at crude oil pipeline vandalism and how it affected the operation of crude oil terminals in Nigeria between 1999 and 2018. The study will discuss concerns about pipeline vandalism and how the state's institutional architecture can aid in resolving such intricate security issues. In addition, the study will concentrate on analyses of democratic effectiveness, emphasizing open local political contests, the method of political decision-making, and the forms of local political participation, as well as addressing crude oil pipeline vandalism that has detrimental effects on human security for the years 1999 to 2018.

The results will give policy makers and planners knowledge on pipeline vandalism's prevalence, ecological effects, and human effects in Nigeria as well as sustainable

methods to minimize it. Finally, it will aid other academics and researchers in conducting additional research in this field.

The study aims to demonstrate the relationship between pipeline vandalism and the functioning of crude oil terminals in Nigeria between 1999 and 2018. The majority of the research on pipeline vandalism does not fully examine the connection between pipeline vandalism and the operation of crude oil terminals in Nigeria from 1999 to 2018.

In this section, the researcher will attempt to locate the research within the mainstream of previous related studies with a view to making a useful contribution to a further understanding of the research area. Furthermore, the exercise will involve the exposition and critique of existing ideas in the areas of pipeline vandalism, conflict, management and pipeline terminals operations in Nigeria, as well as the empirical studies and theoretical framework.

### **The development of pipelines**

Since their establishment many years ago, pipelines have existed. There are still a number of objectives that cannot be understated, even though they are not as common and widespread as they are now. The use of this pipeline system dates back to 3000 BC, when the Egyptians first utilized copper pipes to transport water. Particularly in the 19th century, the pipeline sector started to expand more rapidly and productively. All emerging and developing countries have a great deal of interest in it because it is the only way to carry chemical elements, such as hydrogen or other viscous and significant liquids like crude oil. The pipeline transport system was widely dispersed by the 20th century, and research interest grew at a fairly sporadic rate. The entire length of the transmission pipeline was around 3,500,000 kilometers as of 2007. While other pipelines are used for the transportation of oil and other petroleum products, this high-pressure pipeline system is primarily utilized for the transfer of natural gas.

### **The vandalism of oil pipelines**

The history of the vandalism is rooted in a broad sentiment of annoyance among people who profit from the enormous earnings produced by the Niger Delta region since 1956. For instance, Nigeria is the fifth largest supplier of crude oil to the United States and the seventh largest oil exporter worldwide. Given the undeveloped, subpar, environmental deterioration, and pitiful infrastructure in the area, residents there see oil as a curse rather than a blessing. Eteng (2007) shows how the simultaneous cascading explosions and pipeline explosions have endangered both human life and property across the nation. Therefore, oil reveals that corrosion, followed by damage done by people as a result of their own poverty and unemployment, is the primary cause of pipeline vandalism. This explains why it has been difficult to stop pipeline rupture operations and the number of actors has increased due to economic reasons.

### **Manifestation of vandalization**

The coalition of the Niger Delta Organization in the Diaspora (CNDOD), cited in Eteng (2007), stated the following in its comments on the "dangerous oil and gas pipelines in the Niger Delta": "From 1976 onward, under the government of General Olusegun Obasanjo, pipelines have been built in the Niger Delta to transport oil to Kaduna in the far north of Nigeria. Since then, pipelines all around the region have confined the Niger Delta. Because of their age, many pipelines need regular maintenance. They were also taken by skilled thieves who were shielded by barons or godfathers since they were millionaire criminals. Eteng (2007) went on to list five important causes for the country's rising pipeline vandalism incidents. These consist of:

- i. The predominance of unemployment and poverty
- ii. The rise of the destructor barons or godfathers
- iii. Eteng (2007) further argues that while these five factors are continuously doing a great

deal of harm to communities, it is the poor people who bear the consequences of environmental degradation because they are the ones who live in the areas. This is because they are the ones who inhabit the areas. The defect of security equipment. They are also the majority of the displaced people in the area. In fact, the official report of the government and multinationals frequently fails to take into consideration the underlying socio-economic reality.

### **Processes for Detecting Pipeline Threats**

The methods for identifying pipeline threats are mostly based on the threats' characteristics. To identify various pipeline hazards, multiple technologies are used. Therefore, a number of technologies would need to be combined in order to construct a reliable threat detection system. The following is a list of some of the threat detection technologies now in use:

#### **Construction worker and external interference detection**

One of the biggest reasons for pipeline failures in the US is accidents brought on by construction workers near pipes. Construction work, pipeline rights surveillance, satellite surveillance, public awareness campaigns, and a single call system are frequently employed in the US to reduce pipeline mishaps. Other techniques include fiber optic sensors that are buried along the pipeline and sound monitoring devices. (2015) Ambituuni. It is vital to identify the weapons that these organizations use for their evil deeds and to develop methods for spotting the individuals in order to detect terrorists, vandals, and thieves.

However, Adla, bazzi, and Al-Tuwaijri (2013) reported that in Nigeria, explosives including dynamite, rifles, knives, and other sharp objects are among the weapons used by thieves and vandals during pipeline attacks. Axes and explosives are also used by the vandals to make holes in tanks or containers so

they may steal fuel. Terahertz imaging, neutron scattering, X-ray scattering, and millimeter wave imaging (MMW) are among the technologies used to find metal weapons and 38 non-metal explosives. The electromagnetic wave length of THz radiation is about 10 times shorter than that of MMW radiation, and terahertz detection has about ten times better spatial resolution than MMW systems (Ambituuni, 2015). The Terahertz technique can identify things at a good defensive range of 0.5 km. The majority of dangerous explosives and weaponry share a common trait.

Additionally, as this study noted, video detection options are yet another excellent tool for identifying terrorists and vandals. Video footage of vandalism activities near pipelines can be recorded using stationary cameras installed on tall poles or mobile cameras carried by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These are instantly downloaded to the Internet in order to provide base stations access to them for analysis. The study will go into further detail about the design of a video-based threat detection system for pipelines. Surveys and analyses indicate that the TPI is increasing in Nigeria and other emerging oil-producing nations. TPI has had a detrimental effect on the economies and oil and gas supply chains of these nations (Ambituuni 2015).

#### **Natural disaster detection**

Scientists have highlighted the possibility of earthquake and landslide prediction by analyzing seismic data, although precise forecasts are not yet attainable, as further discussed by Ambituuni (2015). As a result, the majority of projections are still based on speculation. When rocks are under stress, they start to change physically and start to transmit seismic waves at varying rates. Its electrical resistance and magnetic characteristics also start to change. Some waves, like Rayleigh and Infrared waves, are produced and propagate just prior to an earthquake. Due to human hearing thresholds of less than 20 Hz, most

animals can hear them, but human ears cannot.

### **Corrosion detection**

There are several different types of corrosion, including uniform attack, pitting, intergranular or exfoliation, crevice corrosion, crystalline corrosion, galvanic corrosion, and stress corrosion. Visual, electronic current, ultrasonic, radiography, thermography, robotics and automation, data fusion, and sensor fusion are a few of the methods used to detect corrosion. As will be explained below, pipeline systems are frequently utilized to detect corrosion using a pig and eddy current.

### **Pipeline monitoring techniques**

Cost-benefit evaluations, assessments of the effects of pipeline installation on the environment and socioeconomic conditions, and health and safety issues are typically included in the design stage. These focus on both the project's viability and its sustainability after installation, in addition to both.

Adla, bazzi, and Al-Tuwaijri (2013) recommended that it is essential to look at technical variables such efficiency, maintenance, accessibility, construction, and environmental friendliness in order to prevent or decrease pipeline failures by choosing the optimal routes. It is well known that pipeline failure has been influenced over time by leaks, pipeline corrosion, wax precipitation, and environmental pollution. However, recent evidence indicates that pipeline sabotage, theft, and vandalism have surpassed other causes of pipeline failure (AL-kadi, AL-tuwaijri, & AL-omran 2013).

External interference, also known as TPI, includes theft, destruction, and pipeline sabotage, which are currently thought to be some of the main reasons of pipeline failure. This claim is supported by statistics, as detailed by Ambituuni (2015). Research on pipeline monitoring has received a lot of attention in this context over the past ten years. To stop pipeline breakdowns, many different

technologies have been employed. The majority of pipeline monitoring technology in the past relied on leak detection concepts since there was little external human influence.

However, maintaining pipelines free from outside interference has grown to be a significant difficulty and has recently sparked an increase in study interest. Pipelines can be above ground, below ground, or underwater; as a result, monitoring for the pipeline's safety can provide a variety of issues. There are several pipeline monitoring techniques currently in use, including alternating current impression (IACC), continuous fiber optic sensors embedded close to the pipe, satellite surveillance, cathode protection monitoring, phone calls prior to drilling, and satellite surveillance (Adla, bazzi & Al-Tuwaijri, 2013). The development of the wireless sensor network (WSN), however, has subsequently piqued researchers' interest because this technology appears to be very promising for the monitoring of pipelines. The following is a list of some of these monitoring techniques:

### **Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)**

Due to their low cost and comparatively high dependability, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are currently the most widely used technology for monitoring oil pipelines. It is one of the best methods for finding leaks. The usefulness of the wireless sensor in monitoring pipeline hazards was demonstrated by AL-Kadi et al. (2013). A typical WSN node is made up of radios, transceivers, power sources, microcontrollers, digital signal processors (DSPs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), and digital signal processors (microcontrollers).

WSNs can be divided into two primary categories: structured and non-structured. Dense sensor nodes can be seen in unstructured WSNs. On-the-spot field deployment of sensor nodes is possible. When deployed, neither the network nor reports are processed. Due to the large number of nodes,

network maintenance, including network management and failure detection, is challenging in unstructured WSNs. However, all or some of the sensor nodes are deployed in a pre-planned manner in a structured WSN. A structured network has the benefit of allowing for the installation of fewer nodes at a cheaper maintenance and management expense. Fewer nodes can now be deployed, and the ad hoc deployment can reveal regions because nodes are positioned at predetermined locations to give coverage (Ambituuni, 2013).

The key benefit of WSN is that it is more dependable and secure than other wired connection monitoring methods. When an attacker disrupts any link and shuts down the entire system, the monitoring system with the wired connection is easily vulnerable. The research by AL-kadi et al. (2013) demonstrates that WSN is a useful technique for keeping an eye on underground pipes and groundwater. Support for real-time operation is regarded as another key advantage over competing approaches. Even though WSN is more efficient than other monitoring systems, there are still certain issues with power and band width/speed.

In order to make it possible to track and monitor multi-media events including video, audio, and images, the Multimedia WSN (MWSN) is proposed. The MWSN is made up of numerous inexpensive sensor nodes with cameras and microphones. Wireless connections link these sensor nodes together so that data can be extracted, processed, correlated, and compressed. To ensure coverage, multi-media sensor nodes are placed strategically across the surroundings. High bandwidth needs, high energy consumption, quality of service (QoS), data processing and compression methods, and layer design are some of the issues faced by multimedia WSNs. High bandwidth is needed to offer multimedia content, such as video streaming (Ambituuni, 2013).

### **Fibre optic method**

According to Adla et al. (2013), fiber optic technologies for pipeline monitoring are considered to be reasonably cost-effective and effective pipeline protection systems. They provide a user-friendly and dependable pipeline protection and monitoring system with excellent investment returns. Although expensive to install, the fiber optic technology is utilized to monitor long-distance pipeline networks. Thus, pipeline monitoring systems are implemented using the already-existing fiber optic connections close to the pipeline. Depending on the perceived hazard, distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) using fiber optics can detect pipeline threats with an accuracy of 1–10 meters up to as far away from the pipeline as 250 meters. Fibre optics supports distributed sensing and has 47% high precision and sensitivity, good temperature performance, and immunity to electromagnetic interference (EMI).

### **Acoustic sensor method**

Acoustic pipeline monitoring techniques can be used to find pipeline leaks brought on by corrosion, unintentional ruptures, and external damage. These damages could be the result of intentional external interference by thieves or vandals, or impacts on pipelines from land-moving equipment during construction projects. According to AL-kadi et al. (2013), the removal of liquids from pipelines results in tube vibrations that are caused by acoustic vibrations that produce acoustic waves. Acoustic sensors can be included into portable devices used by humans monitoring pipelines or intelligent pigs traveling through pipelines for leakage detection and localization.

### **Satellite monitoring method**

Satellites are small bodies that orbit around bigger bodies. These objects are referred to be natural satellites since they circle the Sun and the Moon, respectively (Ambituuni 2015). Since the 1990s, research into satellite-based

pipeline monitoring techniques has advanced rather significantly. The Joint Industrial Project (JIP) Satellite surveillance for pipeline surveillance was sponsored by numerous pipeline operators in 1996.

Some pipe-line managers in Europe and the US showed how satellite pipe-line technology worked and whether it was practical in 1999. Following a preliminary evaluation of the satellite's capabilities, three pipeline monitoring satellites, including optical imaging satellites and radar satellites, were launched in the United States and Europe in 2000. Long-distance pipelines, including the Western Gas Transmission Pipeline, the Shanghai Natural Gas Pipeline, the Lanzhou-Chengdu-Chongqing Pipeline, and the Port Jujubes Pipeline, among others, are currently using GPS satellite positioning technology (AL-kadi et al., 2013).

High-resolution optical satellite pictures and satellite synthetic opening radar (SAR) are two technologies utilized for pipeline monitoring. The pipeline monitoring method has the benefit of being appropriate for long-distance pipeline monitoring. Darkness and cloud cover are also present.

### **The Niger Delta Conflict**

Instead of its wealth in natural resources, the Niger Delta region is well-known for its violence. There are several reasons why the conflict exists, but it has a lengthy history that has been compounded by interactions between government officials and the mindset and operational strategies of multinational oil firms (Bedairi 2012). Understanding the dispute's many phases is necessary to put the conflict in perspective. Conflict is divided into five main stages, with stage one being: before a battle. When party objectives are at odds with one another, an open conflict results. The sides are attempting to conceal the disagreement from the public at this point, but contacts between them are being hampered. The confrontational phase, or second stage, is where the conflict is made clear. This is characterized by sporadic disputes, low

degrees of violence, alliance-seeking on the side of the parties, resource mobilization, tensions in interpersonal relationships, and party division. Phase three: This is the point in the dispute where it is most obvious. This is the stage of war and fierce combat in violent conflicts, where there is death and injuries. Small arms and light weapons are used indiscriminately, and there is widespread population displacement (Achebe et al., 2012).

The fourth stage is the last one. A cease-fire may be proclaimed, one party may submit, or the government or other third-party intervention forces, which are more powerful than the warring parties, may interfere to force an end to the fighting. One side always wins and the other loses. Now that there has been less violence, it is possible to start a conversation or look into other dispute resolution options. Phase 5: During this post-conflict phase, there is no longer any or much less violence. At this point, the disagreement's underlying causes are dealt with; otherwise, the conflict may recur.

The fifth phase of the Niger Delta conflict has now begun, but its roots can be traced back to the historical school, contemporary school, establishment school, dialectical materialism, and reactionary school (Bensaleh 2013). These different schools' philosophies can be summed up as follows: Historical Institute: The 1916 Minerals Regulation and the 1945 Minerals Act, which monopolized the region's resources by transferring all Nigerian mineral oils to the Crown, are credited by this group as having ignited the Niger Delta conflict. After the slave trade, the oil palm trade, the infamous Akassa raid, and the Trade Treaty that followed the Nigerian fusion in 1914, the fight broke out.

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The acts of the late Isaac Adaka Jasper Boro, who spearheaded the initial attempt at independence by proclaiming the "Republic of the Nigerian Delta," are credited by modern schools of thought with sparking the conflict. Others have connected the war to the development activity of oil discoveries and Nigeria's oil wealth, including James Jephthah, a member of the Nigerian Niger Delta Peace and War Resolution Committee. The culmination of this was a group of young men's trip to Abuja, Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory, to witness the government's development of oil wealth at the expense of the Niger Delta, where wealth has been created since 1956, when oil was first discovered in Oloibiri (a city in Bayelsa in the Niger Delta), which was modified to resort to a capitalist system.

The establishment school blames Nigeria's current federal system, the country's diverse ethnic groupings, and the dispute over the region's oil wealth for the violence. It was thought that government policies, such as the distribution formulas, were created to favor the majority of the tribes rather than the Niger Delta because succeeding governments tended to be made up of members of the majority of the delta's tribes. This approach has exacerbated poverty in the area, fueling animosity and escalating violence. Currently, the locals have a great deal of animosity, hostility, and suspicion for one another as well as the bulk of the tribes and their allies. The federal government's and its transnational allies' division-and-rule policy has made the situation in the country even more unstable.

### **Dialectical Materialism**

According to political scientists like Claude Ake, the conflict is the result of a class struggle for economic resources in the Niger Delta region between the federal government and its organs, which are run by the majority tribes of the nation and the minority tribes of the region (Roger & Alex, 2009). They contend that the prohibition of weapons in the area is a result of the use of force by the federal government and international oil firms. They draw attention to the fact that the following factors sparked the conflict:

First, the realization that the Niger Delta is capable of supporting development, as demonstrated by the presence of all contemporary socio-economic amenities at the flow stations of international oil companies operating there, about a kilometer from the impoverished oil communities; second, during the "One Million-Man March" in support of General Sani Abacha's regime in 1995, Nigerian Delta youths learned that oil revenues worth billions of naira could be used to accelerate economic development;

Thirdly, Nigeria's poor management of public monies is clearly to blame for the ruling elite's exponentially expanding riches. Apart from enhancing the people's material circumstances, the school property will withstand the severe fights. Reactionary education: According to this school, the war is a reaction to the violence that later administrations inflicted on the area. They adhered to the belief that, according to Roger & Alex (2009), correctly cites Fanon and 1963, those who made peaceful change impossible also made violent change inevitable.

There is pressure from unmet expectations, unfulfilled requirements, or unsatisfying wishes or needs, according to A Framework for Determining the Compensation of Damages Caused by Contamination on the Wetlands. If this is not stopped in a timely manner, it causes frustration, frequently towards groups that are seen as sources of suffocation, as the Niger Delta's initial excitement and hopes that they



would automatically be entitled to the benefits of being communities that produce oil are considered legitimate. According to Roger & Alex (2009), the discovery of oil has also raised expectations for the development of modern, civilized infrastructure in the region, including piped water, power, basic and secondary schools, hospitals, and better equipment for fish and animals. At the end of the day, highways will be constructed connecting the hamlet to the rest of the nation. Additionally, it is anticipated that more individuals would have the chance to find employment as oil corporations start to integrate ideas that incorporate social responsibility into how they conduct their business. However, neither the oil firm nor the government appear to be able to embrace these common social expectations amid ongoing denial and discontent. The development of human capital was one of the most difficult disappointments (Tanimu, 2009).

Oil firms and Nigerian states have protested against the region's ongoing neglect and lack of significant advancements in oil resources since the discovery of oil there. These protests aim to demand the repeal of regulations and laws that regulate the use of land and mineral resources, as well as the management of resources and the maintenance of environmental justice in the area. Numerous civil society organizations have come forward to voice their opposition to environmental deterioration and demand that oil giants improve their CSR practices (Tanimu, 2009).

At this time, militant groups who frequently start confrontations in the area use environmental deterioration as a launching pad for their activities. The protest against criminal neglect, marginalization, oppression, environmental destruction, economic, social, and political despair, or to put it another way, frustration with the oil-producing communities and neighboring communities of the Niger Delta, is at the core of the region's struggle (Christina & Aaron 2013). The current form of the Niger Delta conflict, according to

Chineme & Chiemelie (2013), is the result of the dynamic interaction between multiple conflicts, factors that have either worked in concert or separately to tip the scales in favor of conflict.

#### **Activities of Multi-National corporations**

In the oil-rich Niger Delta region, the oil business has led to social displacement and intercommunal conflict. Although the Niger Delta States are directly impacted by oil and gas production, other communities are also negatively impacted by the industry's operations. Oil and gas exploration is a type of environmental degradation, according to NNPC (2009), which is highlighted in Christina & Aaron's (2013) work. Fish stocks suffer immediate and long-term damage as a result of oil pollution, which also harms fish, their food sources, and their larvae. Additionally, oil pollution contaminates well water and harms fishing gear. Waste discharges and oil spills both seriously harm agricultural land.

The host community is where the majority of the negative environmental effects of the oil industry are concentrated. Some impacts, however, have global ramifications. Global warming is a result of the use of gas. As a result of oil production, the Niger Delta region and its neighbors suffer from environmental deterioration, which robs people of their means of subsistence, as well as other economic and social issues. The impact of environmental issues on the nation as a whole and, in particular, the people of the Niger Delta region has been described by Delano (2007). The extent of environmental harm brought on by the region's oil and gas drilling has far exceeded expectations.

The Niger Delta community of Erovie suffered tragedy in 1999 when toxic waste from Shell oil operations poisoned the locals. Locals in Erovie started experiencing health issues soon after Shell's oil company pumped one million liters of sewage into a defunct oil well there. Many people who eaten local produce or drank water from nearby ponds

experienced nausea, vertigo, stomach pain, and coughing. In just two months, this unknown illness claimed the lives of 93 people. One year following the onset of health issues, independent testing conducted by two universities and three other laboratories in Nigeria revealed that the chemical was harmful (Christina & Aaron 2013). All analyses showed that the garbage included dangerous amounts of lead, zinc, and mercury.

Environmental issues brought on by non-oil and oil operations are present in the Niger Delta. Other environmental issues unrelated to oil production include flooding, invasive species, degradation of agricultural land, extinction of aquatic life, and insufficient sanitization and waste management. Oil-related environmental issues include, among others, oil spills, gas spills, and canal dredging. The Oloibiri oil find in 1956 marked the beginning of an unbroken period of environmental turmoil in the Niger Delta. Oil spills have become frequent and destructive in the Niger Delta as a result of equipment malfunctions and sabotage. 5,187,14 barrels, or 14.2%, of the 115 oil spills that Shell's Western Operations documented in 2001 were recovered (Mamdani & Fatou, 2002).

Since 1989, there have been an average of 221 spills each year in the SPDC's operational region, resulting in a total annual spillage of 7,350 barrels (Onosode, 2003). Other global oil companies also release oil into the Niger Delta's environment. Additionally, according to statistics on oil spills, 2,796 spills totaling 2 105,393 barrels of oil occurred between 1976 and 1990. Six record-breaking oil spills between 1976 and 2001 resulted in the loss of 3 million barrels of oil, with more than 70% of the spill not being recovered. The Bayelsa State and the Delta States were among the 300 individual occurrences that resulted in an estimated 2,300 m<sup>3</sup> of oil spilling, according to the World Bank's report from 1995. Rivers, fisheries, and farmland loss have all had a negative impact on people's lives.

International standards are not being met by multinationals operating in the region. Oil corporations, for instance, light gas in the area using the open tube flare technique. The same corporations have not employed this strategy in developed nations because it is outdated. More than accepted flare kinds, such those on land with sandy banks, open pipe flares harm the ecosystem. The majority of black smoke associated with open pipe types comprises potentially dangerous materials produced from incomplete combustion products, such as dust and different-sized carbon particles. Along with seismic and construction activities by oil corporations, the twin evils of oil and gas leaks have affected the local economy of communities that produce oil, leading to confusion at the job and increased poverty (NDDC 2006).

It is impossible to overstate the negative effects of environmental contamination in this area. Many contend that the numerous environmental harms brought on by oil exploration and extraction have simultaneously sparked a number of conflicts in the area. Unquestionably, the oil leak has a negative impact on land and water, and productivity in agriculture and fisheries is dropping. Long-term crop and marine life damage results from the immediate effect, which decreases soil nutrients and contaminates water. The historic gas fires in Nigeria are related to the oil spills. Nigeria produces more gas than any other nation in the world, according to Osuka's observation in 2007. Nigeria consumed 5.0 billion cubic feet of gas between 1958 and 1999, according to data. This is 85% of the total.

#### **Theoretical Framework:**

This study is based on frustration aggression theory. Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, and Sears' 1939 frustrated aggressiveness theory.

### **Research Methodology**

In this study, the researcher will employ both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. The quantitative data will be obtained through survey by administering questionnaires. The questionnaires are self-administered to the sample respondents. The questionnaire will consist of two sections (A & B). Section A covers the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents while section B was designed in line with the research objectives to address the basic variables which the study interrogates. Close ended questions will also be used in the questionnaire which will allow the respondents to pick a particular option from a wide range of options available.

In this study, the primary method of data collecting is the qualitative component. The situations, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs, and experiences of a group of people can all be understood, explained, explored, discovered, and clarified with the aid of qualitative research methodologies. Deductive logic, as opposed to inductive logic, is also the foundation of the design, making it flexible and emergent in the operationalization of the notions of pipeline vandalism and its implications on crude oil terminal operations in Nigeria. The research methodology will enable the researcher to choose participants with expertise in the area of the study (Creswell, 2014). To investigate how pipeline vandalism affects Nigerian crude oil terminal operations, the study will specifically use descriptive and historical/narrative design. In descriptive design, narratives are used to listen to ideas and information about the relevant field of research both passively and actively. This technique, which is crucial for qualitative research, is frequently utilized to learn more about historical occurrences, cultural moments, and other connected issues (Creswell, 2014). As a result, the design will aid the researcher in gathering the necessary data from participants based on their familiarity

with and firsthand knowledge of pipeline vandalism, particularly in the Niger Delta.

Nigeria is the study country. The geography spreads across 36 states and 923,769 km<sup>2</sup> of land, 13,000 km<sup>2</sup> of which are covered by water. Nigeria, with a population of over 200 million, is a resource-rich country, with crude oil serving as the backbone of its economy. The oil-producing states in Nigeria are Cross River, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Ondo, Rivers, Delta, Bayelsa, Imo, and Edo.

The Sweet Bonny Light crude oil produced has a low sulphur content, and most crude oil production activities take place in the Niger delta basin. The NNPC-owned and -operated oil fields, refineries, and export/storage terminals are all connected by a 3000 km (1800 mi) oil pipeline network.

All of Nigeria's oil production, as previously mentioned, is centered on the Niger delta area, where all of the major terminals are also situated. The Qua iboe terminal, which is situated in the Niger Delta on the eastern bank of the Qua iboe river, is one of the six major oil terminals. NPA and Chevron Nig Ltd. jointly run the Escravos terminal, which is situated in the Niger delta region.

### **Findings and Discussions**

Major environmental beneficiaries like the UN and the Nigerian Government are destroying the environment in host communities without a sustainable program plan because there are omnipresent environmental risks associated with the general insecurity experienced by the vulnerable people of the Niger Delta and because their livelihoods are entirely dependent on their interactions and relationships with the environment. This is due to the fact that the security of the Niger Delta is typically determined by how it interacts with its surrounding environment, as well as its structures and borders. Any unwarranted interference with or obstruction of this relationship constitutes a danger to, breach of,

or deprivation of security, which leads to assault.

Importantly, according to Zerihoun (2016), some psychologists took up the challenge and developed the frustration aggression theory (FAT), which is now a well-known theory. According to the widely accepted FAT hypothesis, challenges to achieving objectives cause anger and violence. (2015) Bay Butt Therefore, conflict is a result of frustration brought on by blockage, betrayal, interference, neglect, failure, lack, discrepancy, or the space between expectations and expectations of needs in the Niger Delta, according to the theory of frustration-aggression.

A "want-get-ratio" is how Van Dam & Langendoen (2003) refer to this concept. Punch Newspaper (2013) defines relative exploitation as the gap between what is expected of human values and what is possible for him to value in his essay *Why Men Rebel*. To put it another way, Badmus contends that "people tend to be aggressive when what they get falls short of their expectations" (Badmus 2010). Because of this, the Saro-Wiwa-led Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) protested the MOC's and the Government's unjustified involvement in the harmonious coexistence of Ogoni land and its natural environment. Massive environmental damage (violence) and the irreparable allocation of Ogoni territory for oil exploration appear to be the results of this interference's culmination.

As a result, according to Chika Izuora (2016), MOSOP directly filed a petition with Shell and other MONOCs because the government disregarded it. MOSOP wanted an increase in power over upcoming oil exploration as well as \$10 billion in accumulated royalties and environmental damage compensation. This unique conflict analysis process proposed by Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, and Sears is known as "transferred aggression theory" or "frustration displacement theory," according to Creswell (Creswell 2003). According to the theoretical process, weak victims frequently direct their

aggressiveness toward soft objects that are significant to either the aggressor or the aggressed.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Increased security measures by delta oil corporations and military pressure from joint task forces (JTFs) in the Niger Delta, it was noted in a 2012 statement to the International Crisis Group, aided opportunists from the delta looking for weaker targets in the west. According to Colombo et al.'s confirmation (2009, p. 324), "given the framework of Nigeria's relative strength in the context of the administration of the Niger Delta, this often leads to a "frustration relocation." As a result, the Government and other groups in the area, who are typically unaffected, are the targets of militia groups' activities. This explains why Niger Delta insurgents target oil installations for destruction as well as to gain income for their organizations.

Foreign oil employees have thus been impacted by militant techniques of migrating to violence or dissatisfaction, making them easy victim for kidnapping, hostage-taking, and abduction. Although it is a terrorist approach, this tactic has been quite successful in turning the international media into an advocate for the Niger Delta and a worry for their kidnapped compatriots. However, a critical analysis of the Movement for the Liberation of the Niger Delta (MEND)'s operations revealed, as stated by Jawhar et al. (2007), that MEND was not involved in the abduction of hostages for ransom, but rather used the hostage-taking as a way to garner attention from around the world, especially from the nations of the missing foreign oil workers.

Anifowose (2012) thinks that since Ken Saro-Wiwa died in pursuit of a just cause, the militants have received a free pass. Horowitz (1985) claimed that no blood theory could be utilized to study bloody occurrences than frustration aggression theory, which was

supported by the thesis of frustration aggressiveness. In other words, Saro-Wiwa lost his life as a result of misapplying a notion of a bloodless phenomenon to a bloody reality. This is yet another justification for using the theory in this study's analytical framework. Hunger, resentment, environmental damage, a lack of work possibilities, and a lack of long-term plans by the state and federal governments for young people in host communities are the primary causes of the illegal refinery.

Another reason is that the host communities want to manage the oil resources and construct refineries to provide young people with jobs similar to how the Yoruba and Hausa exploit the gold, granite, and asphalt in their states. These findings are consistent with the literature review and the underlying theory of the study.

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## ENTREPRENEURIAL RESOURCEFULNESS AND PERFORMANCE OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE (SMEs) IN WUKARI, TARABA STATE

Nwokah Emmanuel<sup>1</sup>

Awuse Godwin Nwobueze<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Business Administration  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
Email: [vcoffice4me@gmail.com](mailto:vcoffice4me@gmail.com)

<sup>2</sup>Department of Accounting, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
Email: [godwinawuse@gmail.com](mailto:godwinawuse@gmail.com)



### Abstract

This work examined the relationship between entrepreneurial resourcefulness and performance of SMEs in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State with a view to improve and manage small businesses owned by young start-ups. The survey research design was adopted with the target population of 96 owners of SMEs. The sample size of 77 respondents was determined using Taro Yamane formula and Cronbach Alpha to measure the degree of reliability with the aid of SPSS version 21. Data were collected through primary source (questionnaire). A structured questionnaire designed in five-point Likert rating scale format was adopted for the collection of data. Out of the 77 questionnaires administered, the researcher was able to retrieve all 77 copies. Simple Linear regression analysis was adopted for the test of hypotheses via SPSS Version 21. The findings revealed that there is a significant relationship between entrepreneurial resourcefulness, and performance (sustainability, profitability and expansion) of SMEs. The study concluded that entrepreneurial resourcefulness is a determinant of performance of SMEs. The study recommended amongst other things that government should engage owners of SMEs especially the young start-ups in training programs to enhance entrepreneurs' resourcefulness and strategic decision-making skills. These programmes will provide practical insights into leveraging on available resources effectively and fostering a proactive mindset for improving entrepreneurial resilience for small business owners.

**Keywords:** Entrepreneurs, resourcefulness, performance, SMEs, decision making

### Introduction

Globally, SMEs play a vital role in driving economic growth and progress. In recent years, the study of their performance has gained increasing relevance. This is particularly true for emerging nations where SMEs hold immense importance (Prasanna, Jayasundara, Naradda Gamage, Ekanayake, Rajapakshe, & Abeyrathne, 2019). The majority of businesses fall into the SMEs category and contribute significantly to reducing unemployment and fostering economic development worldwide (Prasanna *et al.*, 2019). According to Ndubisi, Zhai, & Lai, (2020), approximately 90% of

enterprises and a majority of the workforce belong to this category. In emerging economies, formal SMEs alone can account for up to 40% of the GDP, and when considering informal SMEs, their impact is even more significant (Ndubisi *et al.* 2020). However, the rate at which SMEs fall and fail becomes a worrisome syndrome that requires investigation.

According to Ibini, Henry, & Olanye, (2020), the economy of Nigeria over the years, in SMEs has occupied a crucial and irreplaceable position in the business, thus it will not be



astonishing to find widely discussions surrounding the prospects and challenges of entrepreneurs in the key sector of the economy as the country struggles with the nascent naira swap which has caused untold disruption to businesses as well as hardship.

Despite their significance, SMEs in Nigeria encounter various obstacle, such as restricted finance access, insufficient infrastructure, poor management approaches, and scarcity of entrepreneurial skills (Ene & Ada, 2021). Capabilities refer to the resourcefulness, skills, and assets that entrepreneurs possess to navigate various challenging circumstances they encounter (Juan & Guadalupe, 2014). According to Juan and Guadalupe, (2014), one of the key factors that determine the existence and performance of SMEs is the resourcefulness of their entrepreneurs. Resourcefulness, in this context, signifies an entrepreneur's ability to adapt to their surroundings and extract positive outcomes from them (Powell & Baker, 2011; Ibini et al., 2020). According to them, resourcefulness entails the capacity to transform unexpected challenges into opportunities for effective SMEs management. It also signifies an entrepreneur's skill in efficiently utilizing available resources to ensure business operations continue even in challenging conditions (Oluchi & Victor, 2023). However, the degree to which young start-ups are taught entrepreneurial resourcefulness is the bane of this investigation.

Similarly, learning from past setbacks, which enhance an entrepreneur's confidence and preparedness, it is crucial to recognize that entrepreneurs need resources to sustain business operations during both favorable and unfavorable times. Business resources, spanning from human and non-human assets, are critical for realizing business goals. Therefore, their availability and sufficiency are pivotal for SMEs (Ibini *et al.*, 2020). Importantly, friends, family, acquaintances, social networks, peers, and financial/non-financial institutions are integral sources for

obtaining the resources necessary to keep the business running, even when faced with difficulties (Ibini et al., 2020). However, drawing funds has become a difficult and challenging problem facing SMEs.

Vuong & Napier, (2014) and Brush, Edelman, and Manolova, (2008) have argued that during the process of being resourceful and seeking resources, it is important to acknowledge that the entrepreneur's credentials and reputation play significant roles in securing resources for operational continuity, especially during challenging periods. However, whether their argument is true or not calls for further investigation. Ibini et al. (2020) argued that the accumulation of various resource types is closely linked to the likelihood of achieving sales. This implies that entrepreneurs must forecast the sales of their products or services before deciding how to acquire resources, whether through gifting, borrowing, lending, or leasing, as appropriate. However, personal observation and experience has shown that within Wukari LGA, small businesses fail at random largely due to poor training, unavailability of capital and poor management of businesses or mismanagement of funds, insecurity, crisis situations and lack of resourcefulness.

The inadequate attention given to entrepreneurial resourcefulness presents a significant challenge for SMEs, which collectively contribute to or hinder an entrepreneur ability to adapt, persevere, and thrive in the face of challenges in Nigeria as applicable in Wukari LGA. Entrepreneurs appears to face significant hardships before developing resilience which ought not to be, however, SMEs constantly face unpredictable changes in knowledge, community, environment, financial, political, and market trends, which requires them to constantly adapt their business strategies to match these trends. Similarly, entrepreneurs often pursue risky ventures as opportunities for potential gains, but they also face the risk of encountering difficulties if they approach

these challenges without proper guidance and training. This is the reason SMEs fails within short period of establishment.

Also, the increasing rate of business failures among SMEs in Nigeria is a cause for concern, especially considering the scarcity of cash or inadequate resources to fund them and their inability to face competition. These challenges have had a negative impact on the operations of SMEs in Wukari. Hence, this paper is aimed at examining the entrepreneurial resourcefulness and sustainability of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Wukari.

### **Entrepreneurial Resourcefulness on Sustainability of SMEs**

Entrepreneurial Resourcefulness is the ability to effectively and creatively utilize available resources, whether physical, intellectual, or situational, in order to achieve a particular goal or solve problems. It involves finding innovative solutions, adapting to different situations, and making the most use of limited or challenging circumstances. A resourceful individual is proactive, flexible, and capable of thinking outside the box to make efficient use of the resources at their disposal.

During the process of being resourceful and seeking resources, it is important to acknowledge that the entrepreneur's credentials and reputation play significant roles in securing resources for operational continuity, especially during challenging periods (Vuong & Napier, 2014). Brush, Edelman, and Manolova (2008) and Ibini et al. (2020) argued that the accumulation of various resource types is closely linked to the likelihood of achieving sales. This implies that entrepreneurs must forecast the sales of their products or services before deciding how to acquire resources, whether through gifting, borrowing, lending, or leasing, as appropriate. Oluchi and Victor, (2023) agreed that being resourceful or resilient necessitates that entrepreneurs focus on attainable goals rather than mere aspirations, as this guides their cost-and-benefit analysis of their decisions and actions,

both before and during precarious times. The meaning is that those who did not only survived but thrived during times of recession, economic downturns, natural disasters, and unforeseen events were not necessarily the ones with the greatest financial wealth but rather those who displayed the most resourcefulness (Bill, 2014). Therefore, possessing all the necessary resources, be they financial, physical, material, or human, does not inherently ensure the success of SMEs operations, instead, it is the capacity to effectively harness these resources in the face of challenges such as competition, unfavorable economic policies, and economic downturns that matters (Akeke, Eno, & Eyo, 2018). Achieving this requires creativity and innovation. A resourceful entrepreneur possesses the skill to find practical solutions to real-world problems. This resourcefulness enables SME operators to prepare adequately and enhance their business management by systematically integrating all the necessary managerial skills into their operations (Akeke et al., 2018).

### **Performance of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)**

Organizational performance is an ability in an organization to accomplish its goals by using capital effectively and efficiently (Daft & Marcic, 2013). Organizational Performance according to them relates to the efficiency and effectiveness of the business organization in terms of growth, expansion, sales volume, numbers of customers, profitability etc. Accepting organizational goals and strategies are the first step towards understanding organizational performance. Performance entails the real yield or after-effects of a company as estimated against its planned yields (goals or objectives). According to Saha, Shashi, Cerchione, Singh, and Dahiya, (2019), argues that the term "performance" is too vague to be defined precisely. They observed that when comparing average performance across settings, industries, or companies

within an industry, it is important to keep in mind that these factors are likely to vary (Garavan, McCarthy, Clarke, Carbery, Gubbins, & Saunders, 2021). As a result, several businesses have developed performance measuring models like the Balanced Scorecard (Khan *et al.* 2018). But a well-performing business may be one that achieves its goals via the development and implementation of a value-creating strategy (Al-Surmi, 2019).

Oluchi and Victor (2023) examined the relationship between entrepreneurial resilience and growth of small and medium enterprises in Port Harcourt. Objectives of the study were to examine how dimensions of entrepreneurial resilience such as proactiveness and resourcefulness enhance measures of growth in terms of sales growth and business expansion. The survey research design was adopted. The target population for this study comprised of 316 owners and employees of some selected SMEs in Port Harcourt, Rivers State. The sample size of 175 respondents was determined by using Krejcie and Morgan sample size determination table. Data were collected through primary (questionnaire) and secondary (textbooks, journal articles and internet) sources. A structured questionnaire designed in four-point Likert rating scale format was adopted for the collection of data. Out of 175 questionnaires administered, the researcher was able to retrieve 152 copies. Spearman Ranking ( $r$ ) was used for the test of hypotheses via SPSS Version 23.0. The findings revealed that there is a significant relationship between entrepreneurial resilience (proactiveness and resourcefulness) and growth (sales growth and business expansion) of small and medium enterprises in Port Harcourt. The study concluded that entrepreneurial resilience has a favorable outcome on growth of small and medium enterprises in Port Harcourt as it reveals that entrepreneur's proactiveness and resourcefulness are veritable resilient components to combat with adversity, internal and external to the business, as it promotes effective sales growth and business expansion.

The study recommended amongst other things that management of small and medium enterprises in Port Harcourt should create new fits between demand and supply towards identifying new opportunities in line with perceived disruption and delving into it to enhance effective operations and sales growth as the turbulence emerge; Creating a good social network is a source to acquire resources in times of difficulty. Thus, entrepreneurs should improve their social network base as they will help during perilous times by directly or indirectly providing resources for entrepreneurs thereby improving their business expansion.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This work is based on the *theory of thriving*. The theory was postulated by Haight, Barba, Courts, and Tesh, (2002). Since then, the theory has evolved from a gerontologic theory to a life span theory. It was believed that the theory was originally based on the concept of failure to thrive (FTT) in older adults (Newbern & Krowchuk, 1994) and infants (Lobo, 1992). According to the reviews, thriving is now applicable to many life span issues. However, for the purpose of this study, the theory of thriving will be discussed in respect to entrepreneurial resourcefulness, resilience and performance of SMEs. According to Haight et al. (2002), the assumptions of this theory states that: Humans grow and change, humans are open, freely choosing beings, humans are in mutual process with the environment and creating patterns of relating. It also believes that thriving is an open process humans experience throughout the life span either positively or negatively. Therefore, thriving is a process of human-environment interactions, meaning that humans can describe their own experiences in ways that enhance knowledge of human thriving; hence synergy occurs when all elements of thriving come together.

The implication of the above theory is that entrepreneurs will thrive through continuous mutual process with the human and

nonhuman environment. The human and nonhuman environments provide for companionship, support variety, diversity, harmony, spontaneity, and the opportunity for mutual interactions to facilitate thriving (Haight et al., 2002). The theory bears it that the uniqueness or exclusiveness of an entrepreneur's reaction to disaster, misfortunes, adversities, harsh situations, economic downturn, disturbances, and/or demanding situations affects and make them underperform; while being assisted with the aid of using training, resourcefulness, sustainability, support given to them as a result of self-experience, tenure, schooling and exposure (cognitive, reflective, emotive, and non-secular assets), plus interpersonal reports and expectations; socio-economic, and cultural views would increase their drive for success (Chukuigwe & Opara, 2020).

Correspondently, thriving explores numerous views in the wish of looking for solutions to why positive entrepreneurs thrive following a disaster or demanding situations at the same time as others fail. It is why, it has been noted that an entrepreneur's ability to thrive over time is primarily shaped by their resourcefulness, proactiveness, competitive advantage, standards, efficiency, and vigor. These factors collectively regulate an entrepreneur's response to challenging circumstances and disruptions. It is important to note that as entrepreneurs grow in the midst of adversities and misfortunes it is expected of them to be resourceful and resilient so as to make their enterprises perform. Therefore, the theory of thriving can be applied to SMEs, by focusing on strategies and factors that enable these businesses to not only survive but to thrive and make a positive impact on the local communities. Thriving SMEs can contribute to economic sustainability by creating jobs and generating income for the local population. This, in turn, will help reduce unemployment and poverty levels in Wukari. It will also create an environment that supports their growth, innovation, and sustainability which requires a

combination of economic, regulatory, and social factors to enable these businesses to prosper and, in turn, contribute to the overall well-being of the communities.

### **Research Methodology**

The study adopted survey design aided by questionnaire which was administered to selected small and medium enterprise owners and staff. The descriptive survey design was suitable owing to the fact that the study investigated the feeling of several SMEs.

Wukari Local Government Area is in Taraba state, Northeast Nigeria and has its headquarters in the town of Wukari. The local government share borders with Ibi, Donga and Gassol local government areas. It has an area of 4,308 km<sup>2</sup> and, as of the 2006 census, a population of 241,546 with the majority of the people being member of the Jukun ethnic group. The widely spoken language in Wukari local government area include Jukun and Hausa while Christianity and Islam are the commonly practice religion in the area.

The population of this study is SMEs in Wukari LGA. However, the target population covered the 8 districts in Wukari LGA: Wukari District, Auyi District, Rafin Kada District, Chonku District, Kente District, Gidan Idi District, Arufu District, and Bantaje District. There are about 12 SMEs owners selected per district giving a total population of 96. Hence, a sample size of 77 was derived and used using the Taro Yamane (1964) formula.

This study only used primary data to achieve its objectives. The primary data was obtained through the administration of questionnaires to the owner and staff of the selected SMEs in Wukari LGA. The questionnaire was administered and collected personally.

Both descriptive and inferential statistical tools were used to analyze data for the study. Descriptive data was analyzed using table and percentage to group the reaction of respondents to the question asked. The inferential statistical tools that was used to

test the hypothesis of the study is simple linear regressions with the aid of statistical package for social sciences SPSS version 21.

hypothesis if p-value is less than 0.05 level of significance.

**Decision Rule for Hypotheses Testing**

Accept null hypothesis if p-value is greater than 0.05 level of significance and reject null

**Results and Discussions**

Responses from respondents based on Entrepreneurial resourcefulness

**Table 1: Responses on entrepreneurial resourcefulness is a key driver of sustainability for SMEs.**

|       |                   | Frequency | Percent      |
|-------|-------------------|-----------|--------------|
| Valid | Strongly Agree    | 9         | 11.7         |
|       | Agree             | 43        | 55.8         |
|       | Undecided         | 7         | 9.1          |
|       | Disagree          | 9         | 11.7         |
|       | Strongly Disagree | 9         | 11.7         |
|       | <b>Total</b>      | <b>77</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

**Source: Field Survey 2023**  
 The above table 1 shows the responses from the respondents on the “Entrepreneurial resourcefulness is a key driver of sustainability for SMEs.” the study revealed that 9 (11.7%)

strongly agreed, 43 (55.80%) agreed, 7 (9.1%) Undecided, 9 (11.7%) disagreed, while 9 (11.7%) strongly disagreed. This implies that majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

**Table 2: Responses on the ability to make efficient use of available resources is critical for SMEs sustainability.**

|       |                   | Frequency | Percent      |
|-------|-------------------|-----------|--------------|
| Valid | Strongly Agree    | 15        | 19.5         |
|       | Agree             | 37        | 48.1         |
|       | Undecided         | 7         | 9.1          |
|       | Disagree          | 9         | 11.7         |
|       | Strongly Disagree | 9         | 11.7         |
|       | <b>Total</b>      | <b>77</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

**Source: Field Survey 2023**  
 The above table 2 shows the responses from the respondents on the “The ability to make efficient use of available resources is critical for SMEs sustainability.” the study revealed

that 15 (19.5%) strongly agreed, 37 (48.1%) agreed, 7 (9.1%) Undecided, 9 (11.7%) disagreed, while 9 (11.7%) strongly disagreed. This implies that majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

**Table 3: Responses on resourceful entrepreneurs can identify and influence opportunities for sustainability in challenging environments.**

|       |                   | Frequency | Percent      |
|-------|-------------------|-----------|--------------|
| Valid | Strongly Agree    | 2         | 2.6          |
|       | Agree             | 50        | 64.9         |
|       | Undecided         | 9         | 11.7         |
|       | Disagree          | 8         | 10.4         |
|       | Strongly Disagree | 8         | 10.4         |
|       | <b>Total</b>      | <b>77</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

**Source: Field Survey 2023**

The above table 3 shows the responses from the respondents on the “Resourceful entrepreneurs can identify and influence opportunities for sustainability in challenging environments.” the study revealed that 2

(2.6%) strongly agreed, 50 (64.9%) agreed, 9 (11.7%) Undecided, 8 (10.4%) disagreed, while 8 (10.4%) strongly disagreed. This implies that majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

**Table 4: Responses on a lack of entrepreneurial resourcefulness can hinder the long-term sustainability of SMEs.**

|              |                   | Frequency | Percent      |
|--------------|-------------------|-----------|--------------|
| Valid        | Strongly Agree    | 17        | 22.1         |
|              | Agree             | 35        | 45.5         |
|              | Undecided         | 9         | 11.7         |
|              | Disagree          | 7         | 9.1          |
|              | Strongly Disagree | 9         | 11.7         |
| <b>Total</b> |                   | <b>77</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

**Source: Field Survey 2023**

The above table 4 shows the responses from the respondents on the “A lack of entrepreneurial resourcefulness can hinder the long-term sustainability of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs.” the study

revealed that 17 (22.1%) strongly agreed, 35 (45.5%) agreed, 9 (11.7%) Undecided, 7 (9.1%) disagreed, while 9 (11.7%) strongly disagreed. This implies that majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

**Table 5: Responses on SMEs that prioritize resourcefulness are more likely to withstand economic downturns.**

|              |                   | Frequency | Percent      |
|--------------|-------------------|-----------|--------------|
| Valid        | Strongly Agree    | 22        | 28.6         |
|              | Agree             | 30        | 39.0         |
|              | Undecided         | 7         | 9.1          |
|              | Disagree          | 9         | 11.7         |
|              | Strongly Disagree | 9         | 11.7         |
| <b>Total</b> |                   | <b>77</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

**Source: Field Survey 2023**

The above table 5 shows the responses from the respondents on the “SMEs that prioritize resourcefulness are more likely to withstand economic downturns.” the study revealed that 22 (28.6%) strongly agreed, 30 (39.0%) agreed, 7 (9.1%) Undecided, 9 (11.7%) disagreed, while 9 (11.7%) strongly disagreed. This implies that

majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.

**Test of Hypothesis**

**HO<sub>1</sub>**; There is no significant relationship between entrepreneurial resourcefulness and sustainability of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Wukari.

**Table 6: Coefficient<sup>a</sup>**

| Model                             | Unstandardized Coefficients |            | Standardized Coefficients | t     | Sig. |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------|------|
|                                   | B                           | Std. Error | Beta                      |       |      |
| 1 (Constant)                      | 1.597                       | .495       |                           | 3.225 | .002 |
| 1 Entrepreneurial resourcefulness | .579                        | .109       | .519                      | 5.290 | .000 |

a. Dependent Variable: Performance

The table 6 show the coefficient table of entrepreneurial resourcefulness on sustainability of SMEs in Wukari LGA. From the above table entrepreneurial resourcefulness has a coefficient of 0.579, T value of 5.290, and a p-value of 0.000 which is less than the 5% level of significant. From the coefficient table, it shows that entrepreneurial resourcefulness has strong statistical influence on sustainability of SMEs. This implies that if SMEs increase their level of resourcefulness there will be an increase in sustainability by 0.579.

The analyses of data revealed that there is a significant relationship between entrepreneurial resourcefulness and sustainability of SMEs in Wukari LGA. This support the finding of Juan-Carlos and Guadalupe (2014) that resourcefulness is the capabilities, skills and resources the entrepreneur possesses to control the different adverse conditions they have to face. Essentially the overall strength in an entrepreneurial venture is in resources. This implies that resourcefulness is an appropriate measure of entrepreneurial resilience and influences the performance and sustainability of SMEs in general.

### Conclusion and Recommendation

Based on the findings of the study, the study concludes that entrepreneurial resourcefulness is a determinant of performance of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State. Hence, recommends that government should engage owners of SMEs in training programs to

enhance entrepreneurs' resourcefulness and strategic decision-making skills. These programs can provide practical insights into leveraging on available resources effectively and fostering a proactive mindset for improving entrepreneurial resilience for business owners.

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**PART XII:**  
**THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (4IR), BLUE ECONOMY  
AND WASTE MANAGEMENT**

**Sakeena Audu**

Department of Political Science and Defence Studies  
 Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria  
 Email: [sakeena.audu@aun.edu.ng](mailto:sakeena.audu@aun.edu.ng)

**Abstract**

Nigeria's vast maritime domain, stretching over 853 kilometers of coastline along the Gulf of Guinea, is crucial to the nation's economic prosperity and security. However, the region has grappled with severe challenges such as piracy, armed robbery at sea, illegal fishing, and environmental degradation, which have hampered the sustainable exploitation of its maritime resources. The blue economy, characterized by sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, encompasses diverse sectors such as fisheries, aquaculture, tourism, and maritime transportation. By harnessing the potential of blue economy sectors, countries can unlock economic opportunities while safeguarding marine ecosystems and promoting social equity. By investing in green infrastructure such as mangrove restoration, coral reef protection, and coastal wetland conservation, coastal communities can mitigate the adverse effects of coastal erosion, storm surges, and sea-level rise, while simultaneously supporting sustainable fisheries, tourism, and maritime trade. This paper examines Nigeria's efforts to enhance maritime security and promote a thriving blue economy through a comprehensive policy framework and regional collaborations. The methodology or source of data was based on content analysis centred on information derived from secondary sources. Findings revealed that by prioritizing community-based approaches, capacity-building initiatives, and livelihood diversification strategies, blue economy projects can contribute to poverty alleviation and social empowerment while safeguarding marine ecosystems. The paper recommends that for Nigeria to fully harness the potential of the blue economy, the country must strengthen its institutional capacity, enhance inter-agency coordination, and foster regional and international cooperation. Investing in capacity building, stakeholder engagement, and the adoption of advanced technologies is crucial for effective implementation and enforcement of policies and regulations.

**Keywords:** Coastal-resilience, maritime security, sustainable development, prosperity

**Introduction**

Nigeria, a coastal nation endowed with vast maritime resources, has been grappling with maritime insecurity and the underutilization of its blue economy potential. However, this strategic asset has been undermined by a myriad of security challenges, including piracy, armed robbery, illegal fishing, and environmental degradation, posing significant threats to the nation's economic growth and sustainable development. In response, the Nigerian government has taken proactive measures to address these challenges through maritime security initiatives and the adoption

of the blue economy concept, a paradigm shift that seeks to promote the sustainable use of ocean resources while fostering economic growth and environmental preservation (Bassey, 2020).

Nigeria's maritime domain has been plagued by a multitude of security challenges that have hindered the nation's ability to harness the full potential of its maritime resources. One of the most pressing issues has been the prevalence of piracy and armed robbery in Nigerian waters, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea (Patil et al, 2016). These illegal

activities have posed severe threats to maritime trade, fishing operations, and offshore oil and gas installations, directly impacting the country's economy and the safety of seafarers. Furthermore, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing has emerged as a significant challenge, depleting Nigeria's marine resources and undermining the livelihoods of local fishing communities. The indiscriminate exploitation of these resources has not only compromised food security but also contributed to environmental degradation and biodiversity loss within Nigeria's territorial waters (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2015).

Environmental pollution, particularly from oil spills and discharges from maritime activities, has further exacerbated the challenges faced by Nigeria's maritime domain. The Niger Delta region, home to the country's oil and gas industry, has been disproportionately impacted, with adverse effects on marine ecosystems, coastal communities, and the overall sustainability of the blue economy (Okafor-Yarwood, 2020). Recognizing the gravity of these challenges, the Nigerian government has taken proactive steps to enhance maritime security and promote sustainable ocean governance. One notable initiative is the establishment of the Integrated National Maritime Strategy (INMS), a comprehensive framework that aims to coordinate the efforts of various stakeholders, including government agencies, maritime security forces, and international partners (Anejionu et al, 2015). The INMS has facilitated the deployment of maritime security assets, such as patrol vessels and aircraft, to combat piracy and armed robbery in Nigerian waters. Additionally, it has fostered collaboration with regional and international organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), to enhance information sharing and capacity building (Basse, 2020). Moreover, the Nigerian government has strengthened its legal and regulatory frameworks to address maritime security challenges more effectively. The Suppression of

Piracy and Other Maritime Offences Act (2019) and the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract Act (2019) have been enacted to combat piracy, armed robbery, and illegal fishing, while promoting transparency and accountability in the oil and gas sector (Okafor-Yarwood, 2020).

Nigeria has recognized the importance of transitioning towards a blue economy model, which seeks to promote sustainable economic growth while protecting the marine environment (Okafor-Yarwood, 2020). This paradigm shift aligns with the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 14, which emphasizes the conservation and sustainable use of oceans, seas, and marine resources. The Nigerian government has taken steps to integrate the blue economy concept into its national development strategies, such as the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) and the Nigeria Agenda 2050 (Okafor-Yarwood, 2020). These initiatives aim to diversify the country's economy beyond its traditional reliance on oil and gas, by leveraging its maritime resources in sectors such as fisheries, aquaculture, maritime transportation, and eco-tourism. Furthermore, Nigeria has actively participated in regional and international initiatives that promote the blue economy, such as the African Union's 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) and the Commonwealth Blue Charter (Okafor-Yarwood, 2020). These collaborative efforts seek to foster knowledge sharing, capacity building, and the development of best practices for sustainable ocean governance and the blue economy (Okafor-Yarwood, 2020).

While Nigeria has made significant strides in addressing maritime security challenges and embracing the blue economy, several obstacles remain. Limited resources, insufficient capacity building, and inadequate infrastructure pose challenges to the effective implementation of maritime security initiatives (Basse, 2020). Furthermore, the lack of coordination among various stakeholders and the prevalence of corruption have hindered progress in some areas. Regarding the blue economy, Nigeria faces

challenges in balancing economic growth with environmental protection, particularly in sectors such as offshore oil and gas exploration and coastal development (Okafor-Yarwood, 2020). Additionally, the lack of comprehensive data on marine resources and ecosystem services poses difficulties in effective policymaking and resource management. Despite these obstacles, opportunities exist for Nigeria to strengthen its maritime security and blue economy initiatives.

## Conceptual Clarifications

### Maritime Security

Maritime security refers to the measures taken to safeguard the seas, oceans, and waterways from various threats, including piracy, terrorism, illegal trafficking, environmental hazards, and conflicts. It encompasses a range of activities, policies, and technologies aimed at ensuring the safety and security of maritime transportation, commerce, and resources. This includes protecting vessels, ports, offshore installations, and coastal areas, as well as enforcing laws and regulations related to maritime activities. Key components of maritime security include surveillance and monitoring, law enforcement, international cooperation, intelligence sharing, and the development of strategies to address emerging threats. Effective maritime security is essential for promoting global trade, economic development, environmental protection, and regional stability, as well as safeguarding the interests of coastal states and the international community at large (NIMASA, 2022).

### The Blue Economy

The blue economy refers to the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and environmental sustainability. It encompasses a wide range of industries and activities, including fisheries, aquaculture, shipping, tourism, renewable energy, biotechnology, and marine research. Central to the concept is the recognition of the ocean's vast potential as a source of food, energy, minerals, medicines, and ecosystem services. The blue economy seeks to balance economic development with the conservation

and responsible management of marine ecosystems, ensuring that benefits are equitably distributed and that future generations can also benefit from ocean resources. It emphasizes innovation, technology, and collaboration between governments, businesses, academia, and communities to unlock the economic value of the ocean while preserving its ecological integrity. Sustainable practices, pollution prevention, and climate resilience are integral to realizing the full potential of the blue economy while safeguarding the health of marine ecosystems (Onuoha, 2012).

### Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts political sentiment analysis to help explain the variables of the study as political sentiment analysis is a specialized application of sentiment analysis focused on interpreting and categorizing opinions expressed in political texts, speeches, social media, and other communication forms. This analysis has become crucial in understanding public opinion, predicting election outcomes, and shaping political strategies. Leveraging advanced computational techniques, political sentiment analysis offers a nuanced view of the political landscape, providing insights into voter behavior, policy reception, and media influence (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).

At its core, political sentiment analysis involves the systematic examination of textual data to identify sentiments or opinions. The process generally encompasses the following steps and gathering data from various sources such as social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook), news articles, political blogs, and transcripts of speeches or debates; considering the context in which opinions are expressed. Political texts often contain complex and nuanced language that requires sophisticated models capable of understanding sarcasm, irony, and domain-specific jargon (Scott, 2014). Governments and political parties often use sentiment analysis to assess public reaction to policies and legislative actions. This real-time feedback mechanism allows policymakers to

adjust their strategies and communications accordingly. Political sentiment analysis represents a powerful tool in the modern political landscape, offering detailed insights into public opinion and aiding strategic decision-making. While it faces several challenges, ongoing advancements in computational techniques and NLP hold promise for more accurate and reliable analysis. As the field evolves, it will undoubtedly play an increasingly pivotal role in understanding and shaping political dynamics.

Nigeria's maritime sector is a critical component of its economy, given the country's extensive coastline and strategic position along the Gulf of Guinea. Maritime security and the blue economy are pivotal in harnessing the potential of Nigeria's marine resources, ensuring safe and secure maritime activities, and fostering sustainable economic growth (Ajayi, 2019).

Political sentiment analysis can be instrumental in assessing and enhancing Nigeria's maritime security and blue economy initiatives in several ways; by analyzing sentiments expressed in social media and other public forums, policymakers can gauge public support or opposition to maritime policies and blue economy projects. Understanding public sentiment helps in tailoring communication strategies and addressing concerns effectively, fostering greater public engagement and support. Sentiment analysis can help in evaluating the impact of existing policies and initiatives. For instance, analyzing the sentiments surrounding anti-piracy measures or new regulations in the fishing industry can provide insights into their effectiveness and areas needing improvement (Olajide & Akinlolu, 2016). Various stakeholders, including local communities, businesses, and international partners, express their opinions and feedback on maritime policies. Sentiment analysis can aggregate and interpret these opinions, helping policymakers understand stakeholder perspectives and incorporate their feedback into decision-making processes. The media plays a significant role in shaping public opinion. Analyzing the tone and sentiment of media

coverage on maritime security and blue economy topics can reveal the media's influence on public perception. This information can guide media engagement strategies to ensure balanced and accurate reporting.

Political sentiment analysis offers a powerful tool for understanding and shaping public perception and policy effectiveness in Nigeria's maritime security and blue economy sectors. By leveraging these insights, policymakers can enhance engagement, improve policy outcomes, and foster sustainable development in Nigeria's maritime domain. As the field evolves, it will increasingly contribute to informed, data-driven decision-making in the complex and dynamic context of maritime governance and economic growth.

### **Western Influence on Nigeria's Blue Economy**

The concept of the blue economy has gained global recognition, and Nigeria has not been immune to the influence of Western nations and international organizations in shaping its approach to this emerging paradigm. This influence has manifested in several ways: Policy and Regulatory Frameworks Western nations and organizations, such as the European Union and the World Bank, have played a crucial role in promoting sustainable maritime policies and regulatory frameworks. Through technical assistance and capacity-building initiatives, they have supported Nigeria in developing robust legal and institutional structures to govern its blue economy activities. For instance, the World Bank has provided financial and technical support for the implementation of the Integrated National Maritime Strategy, which aims to strengthen Nigeria's maritime governance, enhance maritime safety and security, and promote sustainable use of marine resources (Scott, 2019).

Technology Transfer and Capacity Building Partnerships with Western countries and multinational corporations have facilitated the transfer of advanced technologies and expertise to Nigeria's maritime sector. These

collaborations have focused on areas such as maritime surveillance, port infrastructure development, and sustainable fisheries management. For example, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) has partnered with various international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to enhance maritime security and combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Investment and Project Financing Western nations and international financial institutions have played a vital role in financing major infrastructure projects related to Nigeria's blue economy. These investments have aimed to improve port facilities, coastal protection, and the development of supporting industries, such as shipbuilding and offshore energy exploration (Ajayi, 2019). The World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Investment Bank have provided significant funding for projects like the Nigerian Ports Authority's Infrastructure Development Program and the Coastal Erosion Risk Management and Climate Resilience Initiative.

Research and Innovation Collaborations Partnerships between Nigerian research institutions and Western universities and research centers have facilitated knowledge exchange and scientific collaborations in areas critical to the blue economy. These collaborations have focused on topics such as marine biotechnology, coastal ecosystem management, and sustainable aquaculture practices. The Nigerian Institute for Oceanography and Marine Research (NIOMR) has established collaborations with renowned Western institutions, including the University of Southampton in the United Kingdom and the University of Miami in the United States, to enhance research capabilities and promote knowledge transfer in marine sciences. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Alignment Western nations and international organizations have played a pivotal role in promoting the adoption of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

including those related to the blue economy. These goals emphasize sustainable use of ocean resources, conservation of marine ecosystems, and responsible consumption and production patterns. Nigeria has aligned its blue economy strategies with the relevant SDGs, such as SDG 14 (Life Below Water) and SDG 13 (Climate Action), to ensure its maritime activities contribute to global sustainability efforts and attract international support and recognition (Olajide & Akinlolu, 2016).

While Western influence has undoubtedly shaped Nigeria's approach to the blue economy, several challenges remain. These include ensuring effective implementation of policies and regulations, addressing issues of corruption and transparency, and mitigating environmental degradation and overfishing. Additionally, Nigeria must navigate the complexities of balancing economic development with environmental sustainability, ensuring equitable distribution of benefits from blue economy activities, and fostering inclusive growth that empowers local communities and indigenous populations. Despite these challenges, the blue economy presents numerous opportunities for Nigeria to diversify its economy, create employment opportunities, enhance food security, and promote sustainable development. By leveraging its strategic location, abundant marine resources, and collaborations with Western partners, Nigeria can position itself as a regional leader in the blue economy (Nwalozie, 2019).

The influence of Western nations and international organizations on Nigeria's emerging blue economy has been multifaceted, ranging from policy and regulatory support to technology transfer, investment, and research collaborations. While this influence has been instrumental in shaping Nigeria's approach, the true success of the blue economy lies in the nation's ability to effectively implement sustainable practices, foster inclusive growth, and strike a balance between economic development and environmental conservation. As Nigeria continues to navigate the complexities of the blue economy, it must leverage its partnerships with Western stakeholders while

also asserting its sovereignty and aligning its strategies with national priorities. By doing so, Nigeria can harness the full potential of its maritime resources and position itself as a regional leader in the sustainable utilization of ocean-based industries.

### **Maritime Security Challenges in Nigeria**

Maritime security is a critical issue for Nigeria, a country with a vast coastline and a significant reliance on maritime trade and resources. Nigeria's maritime domain faces a multitude of challenges that threaten its economic interests, environmental sustainability, and national security. The maritime security challenges in Nigeria as enumerated by Olajide & Akinlolu (2016) are discussed below:

**Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea:** Nigerian waters, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, have been plagued by piracy and armed robbery at sea. This region has become a hotspot for maritime crime, with a significant number of incidents involving hijackings, kidnappings, and attacks on ships and crew members. These criminal activities not only endanger lives but also disrupt maritime trade, lead to increased insurance premiums, and deter foreign investment.

**Oil Theft and Illegal Bunkering:** Nigeria's oil and gas industry, a critical component of the nation's economy, is severely impacted by illegal activities such as oil theft and illegal bunkering. Organized criminal groups tap into pipelines and siphon off crude oil, which is then sold on the black market. This practice not only results in substantial revenue losses for the government but also poses environmental hazards and compromises the integrity of oil infrastructure.

**Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing:** Nigeria's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone are vulnerable to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities. Foreign vessels often engage in overfishing, depleting marine resources and

threatening the livelihood of local fishing communities. IUU fishing also undermines sustainable fisheries management and contributes to the depletion of fish stocks.

**Maritime Terrorism and Insurgency:** The presence of militant groups and insurgents in the Niger Delta region poses a significant threat to maritime security. These groups have been known to attack offshore installations, disrupt shipping activities, and engage in kidnapping and hostage-taking. Their activities not only jeopardize the safety of maritime operations but also undermine the stability of the region.

**Environmental Degradation and Pollution:** Maritime activities, such as oil spills, illegal dumping of waste, and ballast water discharge, contribute to the degradation of Nigeria's marine environment. Oil spills, in particular, have had devastating consequences for coastal ecosystems, impacting marine life, and affecting the livelihoods of coastal communities that rely on fishing and other maritime-related activities.

**Inadequate Maritime Domain Awareness and Surveillance:** Nigeria's vast maritime domain poses significant challenges in terms of monitoring and surveillance. Limited resources, outdated equipment, and inadequate coordination among various agencies hinder the ability to effectively detect and respond to maritime security threats promptly.

**Transnational Organized Crime:** Nigeria's maritime domain is susceptible to transnational organized crime, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and smuggling of arms and contraband. These illicit activities not only undermine maritime security but also have broader implications for national security and the rule of law.

### **Blue Economy Initiatives in Nigeria**

The Nigerian government has taken significant steps to embrace the blue economy concept and develop a comprehensive policy framework. In 2020, the Federal Ministry of Transportation launched the "Blue Economy

Initiative," aimed at promoting sustainable maritime development and harnessing the country's maritime resources. This initiative encompasses various sectors, including shipping and port operations, fisheries and aquaculture, offshore oil and gas exploration, maritime tourism, and marine renewable energy (Bassey, 2020).

One of the key focus areas of Nigeria's blue economy initiatives is the fisheries and aquaculture sector. With a coastline stretching across nine coastal states and abundant inland water resources, the country has the potential to become a major player in the global fish market. The government has implemented policies to promote sustainable fishing practices, develop aquaculture infrastructure, and support local fishing communities. The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) has played a crucial role in this effort, collaborating with international organizations and stakeholders to enhance the management of fisheries resources. Additionally, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development has launched programs to support small-scale fish farmers and promote the adoption of modern aquaculture techniques (NIMASA, 2022).

Nigeria's strategic location along the Gulf of Guinea positions the country as a potential maritime hub for the West African region. The government has prioritized the development of world-class port infrastructure and efficient shipping operations to facilitate international trade and attract foreign investment. Initiatives such as the Deep Blue Project, led by NIMASA, aim to combat maritime insecurity and piracy, ensuring safe and secure shipping lanes along the country's coastline. Also, the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) has undertaken massive modernization efforts, including the development of new terminals and the acquisition of advanced cargo handling equipment, to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of Nigerian ports. As a major oil-producing nation, Nigeria recognizes the importance of sustainable offshore oil and gas

exploration within the blue economy framework. The government has implemented stringent regulations and safety standards to mitigate the environmental impact of offshore operations and promote responsible resource extraction (NIMASA, 2022). Collaboration with international organizations and the adoption of best practices in offshore drilling, spill prevention, and environmental monitoring have been prioritized. As well, the government is exploring the potential of offshore renewable energy sources, such as wind and wave power, to diversify the country's energy mix and support the transition towards a low-carbon economy.

With its rich cultural heritage, diverse coastal landscapes, and abundant marine life, Nigeria possesses significant potential for maritime tourism development. The government has identified this sector as a key component of its blue economy strategy, aiming to attract domestic and international visitors while promoting sustainable tourism practices. Initiatives such as the development of coastal resorts, eco-tourism projects, and the preservation of natural habitats are underway. Moreover, the government is exploring opportunities for cruise tourism, leveraging the country's strategic location along major shipping routes.

Recognizing the importance of human capital and stakeholder engagement, Nigeria has placed a strong emphasis on capacity building and collaboration within its blue economy initiatives. The government has partnered with international organizations, academic institutions, and private sector stakeholders to provide training, research, and knowledge-sharing opportunities (NIMASA, 2022). Furthermore, the involvement of local communities and indigenous groups has been prioritized to ensure inclusive and sustainable development. This approach aims to empower coastal communities, promote traditional knowledge, and foster a sense of ownership and responsibility towards the sustainable management of marine resources.



### **Challenges and Opportunities in Implementing Maritime Security and Blue Economy Initiatives in Nigeria**

While Nigeria has made significant strides in addressing maritime security challenges and embracing the blue economy, several obstacles remain. Limited resources, insufficient capacity building, and inadequate infrastructure pose challenges to the effective implementation of maritime security initiatives (Bassey, 2020). Furthermore, the lack of coordination among various stakeholders and the prevalence of corruption have hindered progress in some areas.

Regarding the blue economy, Nigeria faces challenges in balancing economic growth with environmental protection, particularly in sectors such as offshore oil and gas exploration and coastal development (Okafor-Yarwood, 2020). Additionally, the lack of comprehensive data on marine resources and ecosystem services poses difficulties in effective policymaking and resource management.

Despite these challenges, opportunities exist for Nigeria to strengthen its maritime security and blue economy initiatives. Leveraging public-private partnerships and fostering collaboration with international organizations and development partners can provide access to resources, expertise, and best practices. Furthermore, investing in research and development, as well as capacity building for stakeholders, can enhance knowledge and promote sustainable practices in the maritime domain (Okafor-Yarwood, 2020).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Nigeria's maritime domain represents a strategic asset with immense potential for economic growth and sustainable development. However, the prevalence of security challenges, such as piracy, armed robbery, illegal fishing, and environmental degradation, has undermined the nation's ability to fully harness its maritime resources. To remedy these issues, the Nigerian government has implemented maritime

security initiatives and embraced the blue economy concept, recognizing the importance of sustainable ocean governance and the sustainable use of marine resources. Through collaborative efforts with regional and international partners, strengthened legal and regulatory frameworks, and the integration of the blue economy into national development strategies, Nigeria has taken significant strides towards enhancing maritime security and promoting sustainable economic growth. However, challenges remain, including limited resources, inadequate infrastructure, and the need to balance economic growth with environmental protection. As Nigeria continues to navigate this complex landscape, it is imperative to foster cross-sectoral collaboration, invest in capacity building, and prioritize research and data-driven policymaking. By addressing these challenges and capitalizing on opportunities, Nigeria can unlock the full potential of its maritime domain, ensuring a secure and sustainable blue economy for generations to come.

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## ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF WASTE DISPOSAL PRACTICES IN IBADAN, NIGERIA

**Khadijat Abdulquadri<sup>1</sup>**  
**Balogun Joseph Olabode<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1&2</sup>Department of Urban and Regional Planning  
 Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria.



### Abstract

Waste generation is inevitable in every human society, although methods of disposal may differ from region to region especially developing and developed nations, yet waste disposal is generally necessary. This study therefore investigated waste disposal practices among residents of Ibadan, Oyo State. It was observed that (44.4%) and (32.4%) of the residents dumped their household refuse with government and private waste collectors respectively, but majority utilized improper waste disposal methods such as dumping in rivers (10.3%), roadsides (14.8%), open dumpsites (20.4%), gutter (9.3%), and open-air burning (33.3%). Larger proportion (97.5%) of the respondents strongly agreed that indiscriminate waste dumping has inimical environmental implications such as flooding, disruption of aesthetic beauty, disease, river pollution among others. In order to bring the situation under control, the respondents prefer the full involvement of the government waste collection agency instead of private waste collectors. It is therefore recommended that government waste collector should be empowered to penetrate more traditional core areas for more effective waste collection.

**Keywords:** Waste, improper, open-air burning, flood, disease

### Introduction

Human population is currently on the rise everywhere around the world especially Africa, and Nigeria in particular might possibly experience rapid population growth in some years to come (World Population Prospects, 2017). From time immemorial human beings have been known for leaving behind residues or wastes from their various activities, hence the larger the population the most likely the amount of waste generated (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015). Waste is a major environmental challenge of all times and is a serious threat to environmental aesthetic beauty and health especially in regions where they are not properly managed (Fellman *et al.*, 2005; Hettinger, 2007).

Huge tons of municipal wastes are generated globally on daily basis. While some

regions might be managing their waste properly, several others especially the developing nations are perceived unable to manage their huge urban waste. It has been observed that much garbage are usually left uncollected in the streets, polluting the environment (Nyang'echi, 1992; Zia *et al.*, 2008).

Municipal solid wastes are unwanted materials mainly consisting of household wastes and are therefore referred to as household garbage (Ramachandra *et al.*, 2018). The rapid growth of the world's population, urbanization, the socioeconomic development, and the improvement of living standards has raised the municipal solid wastes' generation globally (Karak *et al.*, 2012). Their quantity has increased over the years in the developing countries. Waste

management faces many difficulties from the technical and the organizational sides. Facing this reality, open landfills (dumpsites), open-air burning, dumping on water bodies amongst many other indiscriminate disposal methods have become the only available way for their elimination (Pastor *et al.*, 2012).

Indiscriminate dumping of refuse has been observed to be very detrimental to the environment (Ejaz *et al.*, 2010; Eche *et al.*, 2015; Cogut, 2016). In that, many flood episodes in Nigeria were observed to be caused by improper waste management, where in most cases the available drainages are often blocked by waste (Yongsi *et al.*, 2008). In recent decades, open landfill is still worldwide and very common means of municipal solid wastes' removal especially in developing countries where it is perceived to be the simplest and most economical waste disposal practice (Breza-Boruta *et al.*, 2016). These open landfills have led to serious sanitary risks in that insect vectors of a lot of diseases are harbored within (Yongsi *et al.*, 2008). They also constitute nuisance and considerable environmental impacts by the production of both leachate (confirmed to be a conveyor of heavy metals, organic matter, and pathogenic bacteria which has been known to cause pollution of soils, surface water, and ground water), and biogas whose emissions can increase greenhouse effect and global warming, particularly the highly flammable methane and hydrogen which can lead to fire or explosion if not properly managed (Aronsson *et al.*, 2010; Deng *et al.*, 2017). Open burning of waste is a common practice in several places around the world. It has been observed to be prevalent in rural areas all over the world. Worldwide scientific research has decisively showed that burning of waste at landfills produces a wide range of toxic substances lethargic to the environment and its health (Cogut, 2016). Recent research demonstrates that backyard burning of waste

can increase the risk of heart disease, intensify respiratory ailments such as asthma and emphysema and cause rashes, nausea, or headaches, damages in the nervous system, kidney or liver, in the reproductive and development system (Igoni *et al.*, 2007, Babayemi and Dauda, 2009; Cogut, 2016). In order to enhance the formulation and or implementation of proper waste management policies towards reducing or possibly eradicating indiscriminate waste dumping, this study therefore, considers it reasonable to investigate household waste disposal practices amongst residents of Oluyole local government area of Oyo state. Towards creating awareness on the need to properly manage household waste, for cleaner and healthy environment.

#### **Material and Method**

Oluyole area of Ibadan in Oyo state was designated for the study (DMS Coordinates 7R" 13 '59. 99" N 3R" 52' 0.01" E) has its domain in Idi-Ayunre. The local center Area which consist of Wards and villages such as Ekefa, Seko, Ayegun, Idi-Iroko, Idi-Osan, Egbeda-Atuba, Muslim Ogbere, Odo-Onanla, Okanhinde, Latunde, Olomi/Olunde, Orisunbare, Onipe, Ojo-Ekun, Aba.Nla. This local area is one of the oldest local governments in Ibadan, Oyo state which was created in 1976. It has a landmass of 629km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 202,725 at the 2006 census ([www.oyostate.gov.ng](http://www.oyostate.gov.ng)). This area shares its boundaries with four local areas within Ibadan which are southwest, southeast, Ona Ara and Ido. The age group in the area is as follows (0-4 years – 78,135; 15-64 years – 118,145; 65+ years – 7,181). The total number of males according to 2006 census as obtained was 102,371 while 101,090 were recorded for the females ([www.oyostate.gov.ng](http://www.oyostate.gov.ng)). It is a mixed settlement comprising low, medium and high-density residential areas. Dominant occupations in this area are trading, public services Artesian and farming.



**Figure 1:** Map showing the study Area.

**Source:** Map data, 2023


The study was descriptive by design and it utilized quantitative method for data collection. Using a well-structured, cross-sectional questionnaire, distributed by a trained extension officer to a hundred and fifteen (115) households randomly selected. The questionnaire has five different sections which provided information on household and demographic characteristics, Types of waste, Waste disposal methods, perceived consequences of improper waste disposal and proposed solutions. The questionnaire was designed based on the objectives of the study and review of available literature. The study area was purposively selected because it is an ideal combination of the low, medium and high-profile community/households where all classes of respondents could be found. The data were analyzed using SPSS, version 16 (IBM, Chicago, IL, USA). Descriptive statistics were used for the variables.

## Results and Discussion

### *Types of waste in the study area*

In Figure 2, the percentage of waste types generated in the study area were presented as follows; bottles/can/paper was 60.2%, while food debris was 51.9%, plastics was 38% and clothing materials had the least that is 25%, all these were categorized as domestic waste. Although, this work does not look into other categories of waste, it could still be considered in tandem with the estimate made by (Adewumi *et al.*, 2005) that domestic waste was the highest in quantity amongst waste

categories generated in Ibadan metropolis. Gwedu (2003) observed that waste generation was directly related to population distribution within the city and that the inner core area generated highest volume of solid waste, this might be attributed to the absence of waste collectors either private or government in such areas, as considerable number amongst the respondents in the inner areas reported that waste collectors do not come to their areas.




- FOOD DEBRIS= 51.9%
- PLASTICS= 38%
- BOTTLE/CAN/PAPER= 60.2%
- CLOTHING MATERIALS= 25%

**Figure 2:** Types of waste in the study area

### **Waste Disposal Practices in the study area**

Figure 3 shows the common waste disposal practices in the study area. The largest proportion (44.4%) of the respondents disposed their waste with government waste collectors. 32.4% of the respondents chose waste management agencies owned by private individuals. 33.3% were involved in

open burning of waste. 20.4% of the respondents dumped their waste on open dump sites. 14.8% leaves their waste along roadside. 10.3% dumps waste on Rivers or any water bodies while 9.3% dumps waste in gutter. Although certain proportion of the residents patronizes private and Government agencies, improper waste management was still very rampant as evident in the pictures (Plates 1 and 2). Although the largest proportion of the residents and respondents affirmed their awareness about the environmental menace of indiscriminate waste dumping yet, they were engaged in such inimical practices. This might be due to the necessity of waste disposal. Majority dump their waste in undesigned areas such as gutter, roadside, open dumpsites, this was also observed amongst poor Ibadan residents by (Ogungbuyi, 2013). The waste disposal practices identified in the study area is in consonance with the work of (Oguntayo and Obayelu, 2013) who in their project identified Government/dumpsite waste collection, landfill/burning, dumping into river/drainage and roadside as the most prominent waste disposal practices in Ibadan. Most of the residents complained of the untimely intervention of both private and Government waste collectors. This slow intervention pace might be attributed to the long distance and nature of most of the core areas. Omole *et al.* (2013) also affirmed that residents in the core areas often walked long distance before having access to waste container or collection points.



**Percentage**

1. RIVERS DUMPING, 2. PRIVATE COLLECTOR,
3. OPENDUMPSITES, 4. ROADSIDE DUMPING,
5. GOVERNMENT COLLECTOR, 6. GUTTER DUMPING, 7. BURNING

**Figure 3:** Waste disposal practices in the study area



**Plate 1:** Waste disposal on river canal/drainage at Eleyele (Field Survey, 2023)




**Plate 2:** Pollution of water by waste at River Ogunpa (Field Survey, 2023)

### **Awareness on the environmental menace of indiscriminate waste dumping**

Figure 4 reveals that a very significant number of the respondents are aware of the environmental implications of indiscriminate dumping of waste as 91.7%, 88%, 91.7% and 91.7% respectively agreed that dumping waste indiscriminately can cause flooding, water pollution, disease, and disrupt Environmental aesthetic beauty. 2%, 3.7%, 0.9% and 1.9% disagreed that indiscriminate dumping can cause flooding, water pollution, disease, and disrupt Environmental aesthetic beauty respectively. While 6.5%, 7.4%, 5.6% and 0.5% are not aware that flooding, water pollution, disease, and disruption of Environmental aesthetic beauty can be caused respectively by indiscriminate dumping. Despite this awareness by a vast majority there is still a need to bring to the fore, the findings by (Szymanski *et al.*, 2018) that discovered that improper waste management has caused bad odor, food contamination, breeding of mosquitoes, cockroaches and flies leading to disease epidemics such as malaria and cholera. Dumping of waste on water bodies can also be toxic to fishes and if such fishes are consumed can lead to food poisoning.

Ogungbuyi (2013) also discovered that improper waste management has led to human-induced menace such as flooding because of the blockage of water ways and river canals. Ogunbode *et al.* (2013) observed that larger percentage of the population have now resulted into open burning of waste, and this act has been observed to be very deleterious to the environment and its health. Dumping of household products, pesticides and other materials create a danger to public health and the environment and also the incomplete combustion of waste during open burning contributes to air pollution and climate change (National Environmental Engineering Research Institute, 2010). Lee *et al.*, (1995) also reported that Small Particulate matter is usually released to the environment through waste burning and this has the ability

of entering into lungs and thus cause respiratory problems, such as asthma and inflammation of the airways.



**Figure 4:** Awareness of respondents on the effect of indiscriminate waste dumping

Another poisonous element released into the environment during waste burning (especially through burning of wood, coal, etc.) is polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). These hydrocarbons were reportedly able to cause cancers, genetic mutations and birth defects (Valavanidid *et al.*, 2008).

### **Proposed Solution to indiscriminate waste Dumping**

In Table 1, larger percentage (69.4%) of the respondents strongly agreed that Government organizations should take charge of waste collection, 16.7% partially agreed while 8.3% disagreed with that notion, 25.0% disagreed that Private waste management companies should be allowed to take full charge of waste management 41.7% and 20.4% respectively strongly and partially agreed that the total involvement of private individuals will help reduce or eliminate indiscriminate dumping of waste. Higher preference for government waste collectors was recorded and according to many of the respondents, this was because their waste was collected free of charge especially when they carry their waste to collection points. Although, many of them

attested to the effectiveness of private companies yet preference for them was low, this might be attributed to their charges. Oguntayo and Obayelu (2013) also realized this during their own research work that 10% of waste producers employed the service of

private waste collectors with an average monthly pay of 2,000 Naira while 41% used Government waste services with average monthly charge of 500 Naira. Private waste collectors collect waste from clients who are willing to pay for their service,

**Table 1:** Perception of respondents on solution to indiscriminate dumping of waste

| Individual Ideas  | Strongly Agree (%) | Partially Agree (%) | Disagree (%) |
|---|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Waste Collection should be fully handled by the Government  | 69.4%              | 16.7%               | 8.3%         |
| Waste collection should be handled by private organizations | 41.7%              | 20.4%               | 25.0%        |

Source: Fieldwork 2023

### Conclusion and Recommendation

It was observed during the course of this study that most of the respondents in the study area manage their waste improperly. Vast majority are aware of the environmental implications of indiscriminate waste dumping. Moreover, larger percentage of the respondents prefers government refuse collectors to their private counterparts. Government waste collector should widen their scope to cover more areas especially the traditional core areas of Ibadan. More importantly. Public education and awareness on the important use of the environment and waste disposal methods should be well delivered to the general public in order to keep the environment safe for living and recreation.

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## IMPLICATIONS OF PAUL WARREN TAYLOR'S PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY IN NIGERIA

Ogar Emmanuel Ogbeche  
Azubuike Charles Ifeanyichukwu

Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria



### Abstract

Ever since the creation of living things, each species has had the freedom to live in a place most convenient for its survival. But in recent times, human beings have deprived some living things (including fellow humans) of their habitats and access to natural resources thereby resulting to unsustainable environment and loss of biodiversity. It is in a bid to proffer solution to these challenges, that Paul Warren Taylor in his Work, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics* proposes the principle of Distributive Justice. His ethical principle of Distributive Justice is a way of maintaining balance between human beings and non-human living things, which can be achieved through toleration and accommodation as ways of accepting that non-human living things have independent inherent worth and deserves to be given moral consideration. The act of extending moral status by moral agents (human beings) to animals and plants species for the fact that they have lives too is the center of Taylor's ethics of Biocentric Egalitarianism. Therefore, this work asserts that Taylor's principle of Distributive Justice is tenable, and will help to promote Environmental Sustainability and Biodiversity especially in Nigeria. Of course, applying the prescribed methods of permanent habitat allocation, common conservation, environmental integration and rotation will help to curtail the indiscriminate displacement of the less privileged human beings and the destruction of animal and plant's habitats. Hence, the objectives of this work are to evaluate Taylor's Principle of Distributive Justice and assessing its tenability. The study adopted the qualitative research design and the philosophical methods of critical analysis and evaluation.

**Keywords:** Distributive justice, environment, ethics, habitats, natural resources

### Introduction

One of the major issues challenging our contemporary society is the issue of equity. It is obvious that in most places in Nigeria, the act of equitable distribution of resources among people and communities has been easier said than done. And this is intrinsically a pitfall on the concept of justice and its popular definition as fairness. The fact that it has been a difficult thing among the human species makes it a big challenge to accommodate non-human human living things in the natural environment, let alone extending moral status to them. Paul Taylor made positive effort not only to call on moral agents to respect nature by deriving duty from their attitudes, but also,

to ensure that the available natural resources are shared equally or fairly among living things. This is to enable the least among humans and other living things to live in their natural states.

The concept Environmental Sustainability is an offshoot of the concept of Sustainable Development which was first articulated in the Brundland Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987). It also came along the history of Environmental Ethics which emerged in the early 1970s with incessant push from some serious-minded environmentalists, that philosophers should consider the philosophical dimensions of environmental problems. Hence,

environmental sustainability became the object or a part of Environmental Ethics. This development was to affirm the fact that, a call from the environmentalists is like a call from a watch dog on people to question the causes and problems of environmental degradations. It is glaring that over the years, human activities in the environment have been focused on satisfying the basic interests and immediate taste of the human species, thereby neglecting the interests and values of non-human living things. This is the point where Taylor's principle of Distributive Justice becomes relevant in order to enable human beings give consideration to non-human living things.

The morality is that, when all the environmental conditions are favourable and human beings turn to treat other living things with the interests of the present and future generations of all species in mind, there will be sustainability. Therefore, the ethics of environmental sustainability implies that, human beings should treat the environment as if the resources therein are limited. This is because, it is an ethics built on the rationale that the earth's natural resources are not unlimited and that we must use and conserve the resources in a way that will permit the future use of them. In the words of Francis Iroryakpo and Victor Ogan, "Environmental sustainability is the responsibility to conserve natural resources and protect global ecosystems to support health and well-being, now and in the future." For the sake of sustaining the environment, Taylor's principle of Distributive Justice, can help Nigerians to cultivate the attitude of considering individual species as parts of the living biosphere by accommodating them and treating them as ends in themselves rather than as mere means to an end.

### **Taylor on Distributive Justice**

The principle of Distributive Justice is the fourth of priority principles in Taylor's ethical system. This is found in the third chapter of his

master piece *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*. In this ground breaking work, he employs five priority principles to tackle conflict situations likely to be encountered by moral agents in their duties towards the environment. Here, he argues based on his biocentric ethics, which implies that all living things have interests and the principle of Distributive Justice helps when the basic interests of human and non-human beings are equal and important. It also sets criteria for the allotment of resources to all living things. According to Taylor, "The principle of Distributive Justice requires that when the interests of the parties are all basic ones and there exists a natural source of good that can be used for the benefit of any of the parties, each party must be allotted an equal share. A fair share in those circumstances is an equal share." Although, there is no fairest way of equal distribution among living things, but Taylor sees it as a necessary natural phenomenon. He expects moral agents to be responsible in discharging their moral duties while applying the principles outlined in his ethical system, especially, the principles of distributive justice, minimum wrong and restitutive justice. So, while talking about our relationship with non-human living things, we have to consider two important factors; the fact that the wild animals and plants concerned with are not in themselves harmful to us, and that we are not under any necessity to kill them in self-defense. The fundamental reason for these is that, "since they are not "attacking" us, we can try to avoid or eliminate situations where we are forced to choose between their survival and ours."

In practical situations, Taylor approves that the principle of Distributive Justice requires us to devise ways of transforming situations of confrontation with non-human living things into situations of mutual accommodation whenever it is possible to do so. In this way, we can equitably share the beneficial resources of the earth with other members of the community of life. Therefore, our aim is to

make it possible for wild animals and plants to carry on their natural existence side by side with human cultures. Also, he makes tremendous effort to see that non-human living things are included in the moral realm, such that some actions towards them could be morally permissible while some might not be permissible. Besides, to be morally minded in a way that adjustments can be made in circumstances where human relationship with animals and plants is at stake. For him, there are circumstances where equal treatments are inevitable and moral agents ought to develop approaches to make the earth, a home for all. He opines that, "such approaches consist in our transforming situations of rivalry and competition into patterns of mutual accommodation and tolerance."

#### **Taylor on Methods of Distribution**

In the tasks of accommodating and tolerating as means of equitable distribution of the earth natural resources among living things, Taylor proposes four methods for accomplishment. These methods are in favour of both human beings and non-human living things; where each species-population will have a place to live, either permanent or temporal, and assess available resources in order to survive. These are: permanent habitat allocation, common conservation, environmental integration and the method of rotation.

#### **Permanent Habitat Allocation**

This is the common policy of wilderness preservation which is supposed to be adopted everywhere in the world. It entails setting aside certain land and water areas of the earth's surface to be forever wild. Taylor avers that, "The justification for such a policy lies in the fact that only by means of it can at least some of the world's wild communities of life continue their existence in a more or less natural state and so receive their share of the benefits of the earth's physical environment." Obviously, the concepts of inherent worth and

moral rectitude of animals and plants informed Taylor's writing on the attitude of respect for nature. He sees the allocation of the earth's resources to non-human living things on permanent basis as a singular sign of giving them respect and considering their good equal to human's good. This imply that, non-human living things should not be deprived of the natural resources such as land and water, as these remains the means of their livelihood. Meaning that, to possess a land or water is to have the first means of livelihood. On this view, Etim avers that, "To deprive one of land is to deprive one of the very means of sustenance."

#### **Common Conservation**

Taylor's method of common conservation demands that resources should be shared and used by both human beings and non-human living things. For him, "If people have built a town in a desert or other area where there is a very limited supply of water, the policy of common conservation would mean that humans share the water supply with other species-population that need it for their survival." The rationale is that human beings should not take the available basic amenities to solve their own needs alone, since other living things need them too. The idea of common conservation also extends to the avoidance of unnecessary pollutions of the environment in order to make it habitable; a common home for a common good. So, Taylor makes an inclusive attempt to reduce human environmental selfishness. His method of common conservation seeks also to address human inhumanity to fellow humans with regard to equal sharing of the earth's natural resources. For him, "Common conservation dictates that, if we are to distribute the benefits of nature to all who deserve them, we must make available to non-human species as well as to other members of our own species the things they and we need to fulfil basic interests."

### **Environmental Integration**

In Taylor expression, environmental integration is the deliberate attempt to fit human construction and development into natural surroundings in a way that preserves the ecological integrity of a region as a whole. This method recognizes that human constructions and developments such as, office buildings and stores, factories and warehouses, hotels and motels, houses and apartment complexes, airports and highways, schools and libraries, bridges and tunnels and other large-scale human developments are planned and sited with the view to avoiding serious ecological disturbance and environmental degradation. His rationale behind the method of environmental integration is that, "When artificial ecosystems are laid out in natural surroundings, the boundaries areas can be planned so that the various animals can pass across them and some wild trees, shrubs and other plants can propagate themselves on both sides of the boundary. Certain species-populations may then create their own habitats in the physical environments that have been set out by humans for their own purposes."

Besides, there are some measures that can be adopted by human communities to sustain environmental integration, these are: Ensuring that, natural drainage systems are kept intact and some other things are allowed to flourish naturally, That construction is controlled and in certain places, prohibited, Encouraging small-scale technology instead of large –scale, Avoidance or restriction of artificial fertilizers or chemical pesticide in order to encourage organic farming, Discouraging pollution and enhancing proper waste management, Consuming non-renewable resources economically and developing techniques for the use of renewable ones. Precisely, the essence of environmental integration is to ensure that, certain places used by wild-life species-populations as habitats are not destroyed.

### **Rotation**

Rotation or the act of taking turns is another method of fair distribution of earth's benefits among different species in the natural environment. According to Taylor, "The rule is that whenever possible (that is whenever it can be done consistently with all other valid ethical principles applicable to the situation) we should allow the species-populations of a wild biotic community their chance of receiving benefits from inhabiting a particular sector of the earth's natural environment if we humans have also benefited, for a period of time, by fulfilling our interests in that place." The principle of distributive justice here demands that there should be an act of taking turns in having access to favourable environments, and that both humans and non-human living things should do so. The idea of rotation has great implication on biodiversity and environmental sustainability; reason being that the conditions given by Taylor will help to secure accommodation for all species at different times and places. The method of rotation goes with some cautions which are based on some instances where it can be readily applied. One of these instances is, when certain minerals are needed to be mined for the manufacturing of machines and curing diseases, it can be done in such a way that such ecological area may retain its natural state by restoration.

### **Environmental Sustainability in Nigeria and its Problems**

The state of Environmental Sustainability in Nigeria keeps degrading every year irrespective of the policies on ground. Instead of insisting on sustainable environment, we consciously and unconsciously degrade the environment on daily basis. We have not reach the level of sustaining our environment adequately because, we have failed over time to change our attitudes towards nature; attitudes of not ploughing but to plunder, not sharing but to have it all. There has been actually little or no consideration for the least

ones and non-human living things, and this has bedeviled our minds in such a way that we hardly believe that a sustainable environment depends on a reach biodiversity. Below are some of the major environmental problems in Nigeria.

### **Indiscriminate Bush Burning**

In most part of Nigeria, citizens engaged themselves in burning bushes around the communities and farm lands. This happen especially during the dry season and for many reasons. Some people do this in search of bush meat, some, for the purpose of farming and some, for no reason. It is important to note that different plant and animal species inhabit in such lands and that they have to live, reproduce, grow and develop naturally as the human species do. But the problem with bush burning is that, it deprives them of their natural habitats and also take the lives of their old and young ones. Owing to the fact that, the existence of different plant and animal species is paramount to biodiversity and environmental sustainability, the incident of indiscriminate bush burning in Nigeria is inimical to non-human living things and has resulted to shortage of life forms and unsustain environment around us.

### **Deforestation in Nigeria**

It is common in most parts of Nigeria that human beings often go into the forest areas in search of fire woods, woods for constructions, herbs and animals for food, medicine and scientific experimentations. These activities have not been properly managed and controlled, and these have resulted to the high level of deforestation. It is worthy to note that, while human beings build all types of houses to live, most plants and animals used the forested areas of the earth as their place of living. Therefore, the act of deforestation does not only leave them homeless, but also send them to extinction and death. This scenario has been the major cause of loss of biodiversity in most part of the country. And it reveals the

inability of the human species to recognize that there are lives outside the human life and that these lives deserve the right to occupy certain parts of the earth to live in their natural states.

### **Unregulated Farming Activities**

The different farming activities in Nigeria remain as threats to both human and non-human lives. It is obvious that both subsistence and commercial farming are being done with the application of science and technology, in quote, "the use of destructive machines and chemicals to cultivate the land for livelihood." Destructive in the sense that, the machines and chemical does not help to sustain the lives of non-human living things when there are applied in both land and water. Besides, unregulated farming activities in Nigeria does not end with the application of harmful substances but extends to the use of farm animals by commercial farmers to graze all over places. This singular act by some group has cause the destruction of lives and crops in some parts of the country, and it has also been a serious threat to the natural environment. In the real sense of things, environmental consciousness should inform human beings (both leaders and the led) that there should be regard or respect for every living thing in the environment and there should be strict demarcation of land and water for each one to live and sustain its species community.

Due to the high level of individualism or the pursuit of self-satisfaction, most people in Nigeria turn to do or acquire whatever their powers can afford without considering the effects of their actions to humans and non-human living things. Farmers in particular do not care about what harm is done to the environment and most people especially the poor and other living things are affected. Farm animals are being used by humans to graze openly and destroy habitats and crops as in the cases of Taraba, Benue and Plateau states. On the effect of open grazing, Kingsley and Charles noted that, "There are several

environmental challenges involved in open grazing and these challenges are on the high due to the continuous demand for livestock products and the reliance of several persons on livestock for their livelihoods.” This factor stands against Taylor’s method of permanent habitat allocation. Because, in Nigeria, no part of the land is made special for any species as one can bear witness to the fact that, citizens destroy forest reserves and habitats, and they make little or no effort to restore and conserve nature.

### **Environmental Pollution in Nigeria**

Pollution is another serious Environmental problem in Nigeria, it has been common in both urban and rural areas. The land and water pollutions are currently major threats to both human and non-human lives, as there has been lack of regard for human well-being and the existence of other living things in the natural environment. We can talk about the oil spill in the South-South geo-political zone, large livestock farming in the Northern geo-political zones which is at the bridge of extending to all the states of the federation, the wide-spread application of harmful chemicals to land and water for the purposes of cultivating crops and fishing and waste disposal from both households and industries. These have never been put under control in most parts of the country, and there stands as major ways of depriving non-human living things of their natural habitat, and also means of making the environment unhealthy for human beings, resulting to the reduction of life span and death.

### **Climate Change in Nigeria**

The most serious environmental problem in Nigeria is climate change. This has been caused by land degradation, flooding, unstable rainfall, droughts, increasing temperatures and others. It has been a continues problem because, we have paid little or no attention to the causes and effects of it and yet we continue bear the burden. Most people think

that climate change is entirely a natural phenomenon, and by this, they lack the knowledge of the fact that human activities in the natural environment have been the major cause of it. This has affected the quality of life, both of human and non-humans, as there are many who have been infected with different sicknesses, and also animals and crops not growing properly in their natural states. According to the Daily Trust News Paper, “The Nigerian Meteorological Service (NiMet) issues a warning about rising temperatures, especially in the north, which can lead to an increase in hospital admissions for elderly patients, neonates, and children due to heatstroke, cardiovascular, respiratory and cerebrovascular illnesses.” So, the impact of climate change is speedily going to all parts of Nigeria and affecting our economy, education, food security and the rest.

### **Implications of Taylor’s principle of Distributive Justice on Environmental Sustainability in Nigeria**

Owing to the environmental problems discussed above, it is obvious that the application of Taylor’s principle of Distributive Justice to sustain the Nigeria environment is a necessary action, and it can afford the following implications:

#### **(a) Equitable Access to Available Natural Resources**

With the four methods of accomplishing the principle of Distributive Justice within Taylor’s environmental ethics, it is possible for moral agents or citizens of Nigeria to share the available natural resources such as land, water and mineral deposit among citizens and communities. By implication, areas or people that have been marginalized and treated unjustly with regards to the distribution of resources will be given equal opportunities to them without being exploited. Worthy of note is that, Taylor’s environmental concern which hint on respect for nature and the attachment of moral status to living things was influenced

by Immanuel Kant's notion of respect for persons. So, if there is respect for persons or lives in general among Nigerians, there will be equitable distribution of resources. Besides, environmental injustice will be curtailed, and identity, social inclusion and sustainable development will be celebrated in Nigeria.

It seems that most people in Nigeria either bears ignorant or are less concern about the environment. Consequently, these principle suggests that, people should be aware of the need to sustain the environment by accommodating all living things. However, the task of creating awareness to ensures the preservation of the environment is on the government, corporate and private organizations, religious and traditional leaders through their environmental policies and implementations. This is because, environmental policies can help to address issues such as; land, air and water pollutions, climate change, waste management, biodiversity protection and wildlife and endangered species. So, the creation of awareness through the eyes of Taylor's principle of Distributive Justice can take Nigerians out of selfishness, environmental ignorance and improve in us the spirit of fairer sharing of the earth's natural resources for a sustainable environment.

#### **(b) Change of Human Behaviours toward the Environment**

Taylor's principle of Distributive Justice will help to change human behaviour and reduce the negative impacts on our natural environment. On human impact on biodiversity, "The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) published their 2018 Living Planet Report in October, revealing stark findings about humanity's impact on the environment, animal populations, and animal habitats, and the likelihood of extinction for a number of species if human actions and attitudes toward the Earth and its resources do not change now. So, this stand to bring caution to human activities in the environment, and when combined with the Taylor's methods of environmental integration and rotation, Nigerians can handle situations where the

interests of humans and non-human living things are at stake. And this will depend on the act of being fair in the sharing of resources among living things to encourage biodiversity and the environmental sustainability. Hence, biodiversity and sustainability will be like fruits in season to the principle of Distributive Justice. Therefore, Taylor's principle of distributive justice calls on individuals in Nigeria to come out of environmental ignorance, to be law abiding and take positive actions that will influence the lives and behaviours of both the present and future generations.

#### **(c) Sharing of the burdens and Benefits of environmental Sustainability**

It is obvious that the burdens of environmental protection and the rich benefits of it are commonly shared among people and communities. This reiterate Taylor's notion of interdependency that exist among living things. So, distributive justice would ensure that environmental responsibilities and burdens such as; waste management, pollution control and other sustainable practices would be equitably distributed. Likewise, environmental goods such as; healthy habitats, clean air, safe water and food would be enjoyed by all. This could involve targeted interventions and policies by the authorities to handle the needs of marginalized communities. Therefore, environmental sustainability will be encouraged when moral agents apply the principle of distribution in a fair manner, with different places either created or allowed other human beings and animals and plants to live.

#### **(d) Participation and Decision-making in the Distribution Process**

The principle of Distributive Justice placed responsibility on all citizens especially, stakeholders, including local communities and ethnic groups who are expected to contribute in the decision-making processes as regard to environmental management and sustainability. In this development, the interest of all living things would be considered and the idea of



exploitation for selfish gain would be defeated. In Nigeria, the implication of Taylor's principle of distributive justice mainly affect the disadvantaged and marginalized areas or people. And these are the ones who bear the burden of environmental degradation and have limited access to natural resources. These people including rural and urban dwellers who are not well to do, suffers disproportionately from the negative impacts of unsustainable development and resource exploitation. And this can be clearly seen in the experiences of the poor ones in the South-South geopolitical zone, where oil mining take place and their counterparts in some parts of the North, who are being deprived of the land from where they cultivate crops and have their livelihood. There is need to embrace Taylor's principle of distributive justice in order to enable all citizens participate in process of sustaining the environment and in making decisions concerning it.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The application of Taylor's principle of Distributive Justice is necessary for environmental sustainability in Nigeria. This is because, in most parts of the country, some human beings and animals and plants have little or improper accommodations for sustenance due to injustice in the distribution of resources. So, it calls for environmental justice for all living things especially, human being who enjoys the rich benefits of biodiversity. Obviously, sustainable environment depends on respect for human life and the lives of diverse things in nature, and this is the sure means Nigeria can account for Identity, Social Inclusion and Sustainable Development. Therefore, it is only when the human society in Nigeria realize the need for equitable distribution of the earth's

resources among living things that we can account for Environmental Sustainability. In this regard, this paper approves that, human developments and cultures can continue while we accommodate the least among us and other living things. Also, that restitution should be made to sustain those who have been displaced or affected by environmental degradations and climate change.

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**Ulokwe Moses Ezinwanne**

Department of Economics

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [ulokwemosesezinwanne@gmail.com](mailto:ulokwemosesezinwanne@gmail.com)



### Abstract

There are radical implications for Sustainable Development in contemporary society as the world teeters on the threshold of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). The Fourth Industrial Revolution refers to the variety of novel technologies that merge the physical, digital, and biological worlds, influencing all fields, economies, and sectors, and even questioning notions of humanity. On the other hand, Sustainable Development is that which satisfies current needs without jeopardizing the capacity of future generations to satiate theirs, cutting across four distinct areas: human, social, economic, and environmental—known as the four pillars of sustainability. This study utilizes relevant literature to examine the impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) on Sustainable Development, focusing on the UN Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals with Nigeria as a case study. It analyzes the convergence of novel technologies with the four pillars of sustainability and identifies key driving forces, implications, and areas for policymakers' attention in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Fourth Industrial Revolution, sustainable development, technologies, UN

### Introduction

In a rapidly changing world, adapting to change is essential. Those who embrace change (new technologies, trends, and shifting social dynamics) are more likely to thrive and benefit from the opportunities that arise from this rapid evolution. Information technology has become the main driving force for the sustainable development of nations. The world has experienced a revolution of economies from mechanical-based to the most recent digitalization of economies, as characterized by the 4th industrial revolution. The need to understand and shape the new technology revolution, which deals with the transformation of humankind, is one of the numerous diverse challenges the world faces today. The world is witnessing the beginning of a revolution that is essentially changing the way people live, work, and relate to one another. The world has yet to fully grasp the speed and breadth of this new revolution.

The first United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development was geared toward

continually increasing growth at the start of the 1970s, which led to the world's interest in environmental changes. Since then, much attention have been paid to the impact of economic growth and technological innovations on social and ecological elements. Considering that the effects of the Second Industrial Revolution on the environment were registered more than half a century after the revolution, the question of the implications of the Fourth Industrial Revolution on the environment, society, and future generations is completely legitimate.

Current work on the impact of the fourth industrial revolution on sustainable development is scarce and complex. Hence, its complexity made researchers to tackle individual elements such as sustainable value creation within the whole value chain (Kiel, 2017), early assessment of the impact on corporate social sustainability (McWilliams et al., 2014), and the new approaches in macroeconomic management and policy

creation in the light of technological changes (Đuričin et al., 2018). Despite multiple approaches to addressing the topic, there is currently a unanimous view that the long-term impacts of the Fourth Industrial Revolution on sustainable development are still unclear.

### Theoretical Overview of the Fourth Industrial Revolution

Industrialists have started talking about the Fourth Industrial Revolution since the 90s, predicting human civilization will be geared toward the internet in the near future. It did not take long for the revolution to go full-fledged, with many breakthroughs in technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, the Internet of Things (IoT), autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, the blockchain, biotechnology, and so on (Thornhill, 2017). The extent and depth of

these changes are a sign of transformations in entire production, management, and governance systems (Sentryo, 2017).

This Fourth Industrial Revolution is significantly different from the previous industrial revolutions, which liberated humankind just merely from animal power, made mass production possible through the division of labour, and brought digital capabilities to the world. It is characterized by various new technologies that are fusing the physical, digital, and biological worlds, cutting across economies and industries, and even challenging ideas about what it means to be human, ubiquitous, mobile supercomputing, intelligent robots, self-driving cars, and neuro-technological brain enhancements. Genetic editing is one of the way in which Industry 4.0 is changing our lives.

Table 1: Technological Drivers of Industry 4.0 and Areas of Application

| Technology Driver | Field   | Area Of Application                                     |
|-------------------|---|---|
| a. Physical       | Autonomous Vehicle                                | Logistics, agriculture                                  |
|                   | 3D Printing                                       | Automotive, Aerospace, Medical                          |
|                   | Advanced Robotics                                 | Industry in General, Services                           |
|                   | New Materials                                     | Industry in General                                     |
| b. Digital        | Internet of Things (IoT)                          | Industry in General (Smart Factory), Services, Security |
|                   | Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning | Finance, Security, Services                             |
|                   | Big Data and Cloud Computing                      | Business in General                                     |
|                   | Digital Platforms                                 | Sales, Sharing Economy, Gig Economy                     |
| c. Biological     | Genetic Engineering                               | Agriculture, Medicine                                   |
|                   | Neurotechnology                                   | Medicine, Marketing, Military                           |

Source: Schwab, K. (2016). *The Fourth Industrial Revolution*. Switzerland. World Economic Forum, and Li, G. Hou, Y. Wu, A. (2017). Fourth Industrial Revolution: technological drivers, impacts, and coping methods. *Chinese Geographical Science*, 27(4): 626–637.

### Historical Development of Industrial Revolutions

The Industrial Revolution was a process of change from an agrarian and handicraft economy to one dominated by industry and machine manufacturing. This process began in Britain in the 18th century and, from there, spread to other parts of the world. Although used earlier by French writers, the term

*Industrial Revolution* was first popularized by the English economic historian Arnold Toynbee (1852–83) to describe Britain’s economic development from 1760 to 1840 (*Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2017). The first industrial revolution used water and steam to mechanize production, the second used electric energy to create mass production, and

the third used electronics and information technology to automate production.

Today, a fourth industrial revolution is underway, which builds upon the third revolution and the digital revolution that have been taking place since the middle of the last century. This fourth revolution with exponential expansion is characterized by

merging technology that blurs the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres to completely uproot industries all over the world. The extent and depth of these changes are a sign of transformations in entire production, management, and governance systems (Sentryo, 2017).




Fig.1 Pictorial representation of the different Industrial Revolutions and their effects

### The First Industrial Revolution

By the early 1800s, the First Industrial Revolution was underway. The invention of the steam engine ushered in a new age of manufacturing and precision engineering and reduced industrial reliance on animal and human labour.

### The Second Industrial Revolution

About a century later, the growing use of petroleum and electric power meant that machinery could be leaner and less cumbersome. The Second Industrial Revolution was driven by assembly lines and mass production processes, many of which are still in use today.

### The Third Industrial Revolution

Third Industrial Revolution kicked-off the middle of the 20th century with the inventions of computers. This saw the early development of factory automation and robotics, as well the era witnessed the use of the first computerized business systems that were built to manage and analyze data.

### The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0)

AI is at the heart of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, allowing manufacturers to not only gather all that data but also use it to analyze, predict, understand, and report. Industry 4.0 is characterized by a many technologies. It is defined by the seamless integration of several systems, tools, and innovations.

### The Fourth Industrial Revolution in Nigeria

According to Inwalomhe (2018), Nigeria missed out on the First Industrial Revolution, which is widely regarded as the shift from total reliance on animals, human effort, and biomass as primary sources of energy to the use of fossil fuels and mechanical power. Nigeria also missed out on the Second Industrial Revolution, which occurred between the end of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century and brought major breakthroughs in the form of electricity distribution, both wireless and wired

communication, the synthesis of ammonia, and new forms of power generation. Nigeria again missed out on the Third Industrial Revolution, which began in the 1950s with the development of digital systems, communication, and rapid advances in computing power, which have enabled new ways of generating, processing, and sharing information. Nigeria is about to miss out on the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which can be described as the advent of “cyber-physical systems” involving entirely new capabilities for people and machines. Those who are agitating for restructuring are focusing on the components of the First Industrial Revolution in the 21st century. While these capabilities are reliant on the technologies and infrastructure of the Third Industrial Revolution, the Fourth Industrial Revolution represents entirely new ways in which technology becomes embedded within societies and even our human bodies.

In Nigeria, the impact of this inevitable tide is getting clearer, like a rising sun. The mode of trade is being changed from the conventional mode of buying and selling within a brick-and-mortar store to e-commerce. Start-ups like Jumia, Konga, Mall for Africa, Olx, Jiji, and others have revolutionized trade. In the process, new jobs have been created, and many old ones have disappeared as a result of automated processes. Furthermore, automated manufacturing, which requires very few humans, as seen in the Dangote-Sinotruk initiative, a joint venture that aims to locally produce 10, 000 commercial vehicles annually with very few employees, is an indication that Nigeria is not entirely idling away from the trend, but the efforts are minimal and not commensurate with our counterparts the world over. With Industry 4.0, every aspect of the production chain, like the turning over machine, filling machine, inspection line, debugging workshops, and finished products, is to be handled by high-tech devices. Adepetun (2018) states that for Nigeria to partake fully in the next industrial revolution, which is the fourth, local content development must be a priority.

#### **Sustainable Development:**

Sustainable Development is another important point that needs to be critically addressed as we progress. It is seen as an organizing principle that aims to meet human developmental goals while also enabling natural systems to provide necessary natural resources and ecosystem services to humans. It can also be said to be a development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.

There are different levels of sustainability analysis, moving from the standpoint of microeconomic subjects to the macroeconomic dynamics related to sustainability. The concept of sustainable development focuses mainly on the balance between economic development, environmental protection, and social well-being for the future generation. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by all United Nations members in 2015, created 17 world Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They were created with the aim of enabling "peace and prosperity for people and the planet," while tackling climate change and as well working to preserve oceans and forests. The SDGs emphasize the interconnected environmental, social, and economic aspects of sustainable development by putting sustainability at their center.

The first group of eight Sustainable Development Goals was published following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations (2000) and is known as the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. These goals were the foundation for the Development Agenda 2030, which was adopted on September 25, 2015, under the name *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. The lists of targets and indicators for each of the 17 SDGs were published in a UN resolution in July 2017. Each goal typically has 8–12 targets, and each target has between one and four indicators used to measure progress toward reaching the targets, with an average of 1.5 indicators per target. The short titles of the 17 SDGs are: No poverty (SDG 1), Zero hunger (SDG 2), Good health and

well-being (SDG 3), Quality education (SDG 4), Gender equality (SDG 5), Clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), Affordable and clean energy (SDG 7), Decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), Industry, innovation, and infrastructure (SDG 9), Reduced inequalities (SDG 10), Sustainable cities and communities

(SDG 11), Responsible consumption and production (SDG 12), Climate action (SDG 13), Life below water (SDG 14), Life on land (SDG 15), Peace, justice, and strong institutions (SDG 16), and Partnerships for the goals (SDG 17)




Fig. 2 The Sustainable Development Goals

### Goal 1: No Poverty

SDG 1 is to end poverty in all its forms everywhere. Achieving SDG 1 would end extreme poverty globally. No Poverty aims to eradicate every form of extreme poverty including the lack of food, clean drinking water, and sanitation. Achieving this goal includes finding solutions to new threats caused by climate change and conflict. SDG 1 focuses not just on people living in poverty but also on the services people rely on and social policy that either promotes or prevents poverty. One of its indicators is the proportion of the population living below the poverty line.

### Goal 2: Zero Hunger (No Hunger)

The goal of SDG 2 is to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture. The indicators for this goal are the prevalence of undernourishment, severe food insecurity, and stunting among children under five years of age.

### Goal 3: Good health and well-being

SDG 3 is to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. Important indicators here are life expectancy as well as child and maternal mortality.

### Goal 4: Quality Education

SDG 4 is to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. The indicators for this goal includes attendance rates at primary schools, completion rates of primary school education, participation in tertiary education.

### Goal 5: Gender Equality

SDG 5 is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Indicators include representation of women in national parliament or local deliberative bodies.

### Goal 6: Clean Water and Sanitation

SDG 6 is to ensure the availability and sustainable management of water and

sanitation for all. Its indicators as well includes the percentages of the population that uses safely managed drinking water and has access to safely managed sanitation.

#### **Goal 7: Affordable and Clean Energy**

SDG 7 is to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all. One of the indicators for this goal is the percentage of the population with access to electricity.

#### **Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth**

SDG 8 is to promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all. Important indicators for this goal include economic growth in less-developed countries and the rate of real GDP per capita, rates of youth unemployment and occupational injuries or the number of women engaged in the labour force compared to men.

#### **Goal 9: Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure**

SDG 9 is to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation. Indicators for this goal include the proportion of people who are employed in manufacturing activities, those living in areas covered by a mobile network, or have access to the internet.

#### **Goal 10: Reduced Inequalities**

SDG 10 is to reduce income inequality within and among countries. Important indicators are income disparities, aspects of gender and disability, as well as policies for migration and mobility of people.

#### **Goal 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities**

SDG 11 is to make cities and human settlements safe, resilient and sustainable. Its indicators are the number of people living in urban slums, the proportion of the urban population who has convenient access to public transport, and the extent of built-up area per person.

#### **Goal 12: Responsible Consumption and Production**

SDG 12 is to ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. The number of national policy instruments to promote sustainable consumption and production patterns is one of its indicators.

#### **Goal 13: Climate Action**

SDG 13 is to take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts by regulating emissions and promoting developments in renewable energy.

#### **Goal 14: Life Below Water**

SDG 14 is to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development.

#### **Goal 15: Life on Land**

SDG 15's goal is to protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems; sustainably manage forests; combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, and halt biodiversity loss. The proportion of remaining forest area, desertification, and species extinction risk are examples of indicators of this goal.

#### **Goal 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions**

SDG 16 is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. Rates of birth registration and the prevalence of bribery are two examples of indicators included in this goal.

#### **Goal 17: Partnership for the Goals**

SDG 17 is to strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. Increasing international cooperation is seen as vital to achieving each of the 16 previous goals.

#### **Fourth Industrial Revolution and Sustainable Development**

The development of science and technology plays major role in achieving SDG targets by improving the efficiency and

effectiveness of new and more sustainable development methods. Investments in green technology, efficient and effective processes, safer materials, and improved performance and outcomes are some of the results of such development. These actions show how technological applications and developments have been utilized to comply with the principles of social, economic, and ecological welfare.

However, the impact and outcomes of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are yet to be fully understood, hence, only few of them will be deliberated by given an insight into the possible interaction of Industry 4.0 technologies and Sustainable Development.

On the aspect of SDGs 1 and 2; No poverty and Zero Hunger respectively, the Fourth Industrial Revolution has different impacts on them. While there are no predictable solutions for poverty, world hunger can be tackled in different ways. For instance, the development of AI and AV will enable farmers to use resources more efficiently and increase future outputs (Schwab, 2016; Li, 2017), the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) is currently used in some parts of the world for technology-assisted farming (Tripicchio et al., 2015). World hunger can as well be reduced through genetically modified crops, plants, and animals used in agriculture to increase resilience and yield and even include healing properties in their genomes. This can be achieved through the help of genetic engineers.

Internet of Things has played an essential role in monitoring women's health during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond, addressing the specific needs of pregnant women and women raising infants in socially disadvantaged areas (Diccion and Duran, 2021). Wearable devices with silicon bandgap temperature sensors have been developed to enable self-monitoring and provide valuable insights for ensuring good health and well-being, which aligns with SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-Being). These solutions' collaborative

design enables multiple teams to collaborate and scale their impact in combating COVID-19 and providing routine care during pregnancy as needed.

The contribution(s) of Industry 4.0 is yet unknown on the aspect of quality education (SDG 4), which its major goals are to reduce the number of illiterates and making primary education available and accessible to all. Although there exist digital platforms that enable better quality and availability of education, its contribution to the regions without infrastructure for Industry 4.0, where the main focus for SDG 4 is, is limited at best and nonexistent at worst.

There might be a major setback in achieving gender equality (SDG 5) as the technologies does not discriminate. Hence, experts suggest that the "destruction effect" on jobs will hit both male and female workers. However, the male workers will be displaced in the first phase, female workers will be substituted further down the line by AI in jobs that are predominantly female, such as jobs at call centers, retail, and administration.

There will be lesser water used in production, and consequently, less wastewater is produced. This is as a result of the contribution of Industry 4.0 toward better water management and availability of clean water and sanitation (SDG 6) which is highlighted by additive manufacturing (3D printing) since the process does not use water for cooling or lubrication. The Internet of Things and smart grids on the other hand, has great contribution on energy savings (SDG 7) in the production process.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution has a negative impact on economic growth (SDG 8), as agreed mostly by many authors. This has an observed evidence since the global economy before the 2008 crisis was growing by 5% a year, while today the growth is around 3%. This, according to them, is due to the deflationary impact it has on structural unemployment, caused by the destruction effect on current jobs (Schwab, 2016).



Smart factories, as a product of Internet of Things and big data analytics has an intensive impact on Sustainable industrialization (SDG 9), because they are the foundation for reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. At the same time, the invention of new materials in combination with 3D printing and new business models is leading toward the full use of the power of recycling and renewables and their integration in the circular economy.

It is as well observed that Industry 4.0 hurts the reduction of inequalities in the world; between and within countries (SDG 10). Though its technologies have the potency for widespread of positive effects, there is still limitations. Firstly, Industry 4.0 means transformation from labour-intensive production toward capital intensive production. This is to the benefit of capital-rich countries and individuals, while lesser countries and individuals will be left behind, hence the gap will increase. Subsequently, smart factories, as the primary representative of Industry 4.0, will be located within smart cities, leaving rural areas empty and increasing the gap between regions.

All aforementioned technologies will enable effective use of resources, smart waste and energy management, resource usage, and a circular economy. All these are a positive step toward smart and Sustainable cities (SDG 11).

Responsible Consumption and Production (SDG 12) is probably the goal that Industry 4.0 puts closest to completion. Big Data, cloud computing, and digital platforms are enabling customers to have a completely customized product. Customers will have unlimited options, and at the same time, producers will have a continually growing data pool, real-time interaction, and automatized production, which will increase the efficiency of resource consumption, reduce waste, and increase customer satisfaction.

Unlike the SDG 11, Climate action (SDG 13), preservation of life below water (SDG 14), and life on land (SDG 15) will all benefit from the

above listed technologies but in a quite different way(s). This is achieved through better water and waste management, reduced amounts of CO<sub>2</sub>, increased efficiency of resource usage, and the implementation of circular economy principles

Lastly, the only segment of SDG 16 and 17 that can have significant benefits from Industry 4.0 is institutions, i.e., stronger, independent, and transparent institutions can be enabled through the efficient use of blockchain technology.

### **A Call for Policymakers' Intervention**

The state of affairs and the balance of power have been greatly changed by Industrial revolutions for centuries long now. With every innovation, adaptations need to be made to maintain the advantage every level. The Fourth Industrial Revolution is not quite different with this regards. For Nigeria to fully harness the benefits of 4IR for sustainable development, she must boost digital development, or they will become losers of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Traditionally, Nigerian governments are slow to adapt to changes. The pace of the changes brought by the new digital technologies is simply too fast and complex for a traditional linear and top-down approach. Hence, they will have to pick up the pace. Policy processes will need to shift from a focus on individual problems to an interdisciplinary approach such economic, social, and ecological aspects of development that treats problems as interrelated. Hence, an agenda that promotes digital transformation and addresses necessary policies relating to education, entrepreneurship, e-commerce, and infrastructure must be fully implemented.

Amongst others, some elements where changes and adaptations will be necessary includes Industrial development, the monetary and fiscal system, security and procreancy, education, and social welfare.

Industrial development will have to change totally. This will enhance Nigerian entrepreneur not only compete locally but against unknown entities in other parts of the world. This can be achieved through 4IR-compatible policies that promote entrepreneurial experimentation which are essential to supporting the survival of technologically driven enterprises.

Data available in the cloud if properly unguarded, can cause a significant risk to real-world security due to terrorism threats. With respect to that, significant topic of security and privacy will have to be addressed due to the increasing interconnection of the world. Data collection, processing, and reselling of personal data rules are not widely accepted, which in term leaves the world vulnerable to cybercrime and other related consequences.

Monetary agencies will have to include and assess the effects of new technologies such as blockchain, which “gave birth” to cryptocurrencies, which caused turmoil in the international currency markets. In the same vein, fiscal policy will have to tackle the challenges caused by digital platforms and new business models.

On the aspect of education, an effective policy which will call for complete change towards education should be made due to changes in the labour market. This is as a result of destruction of existing jobs and creation of new of new ones, which is caused by the technologies of Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Policymakers as well will have to reevaluate their approach toward social security and retirement, which caused structural unemployment and the demographic tendency of the aging population as a result of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which are unsustainable under current conditions in the long run.

### Conclusion and Recommendation

The Fourth Industrial Revolution is leading toward new technologies and innovations,

which are changing the approach toward all aspects of human existence. These technologies are changing the way of doing business through smart, informed, and sustainable solutions, which are increasing productivity, and reducing costs while at the same time reducing waste and pollution. The impacts are spreading to human well-being as well. Better medical solutions will be available to every patient, increasing health and life expectancy and reducing mortality at the same time. Currently, the impact on the environment is the most discussed positive impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

However, just like every revolution, the Fourth Industrial Revolution has its challenges. The destruction and capitalization effects are increasing the pressure on the labour market and policymakers to transform the regulation and organization of multiple segments, including education, social security, and retirement. Subsequently to the aforementioned, the most concerning problem that needs special attention in the light of Industry 4.0. is the rate by which inequality rises..

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**PART XIII:**  
**GENDER, CHILD PROTECTION, SEXUALITY AND IDENTITY**

# 63

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC CORRELATES OF SEXTING BEHAVIOUR AMONG YOUTHS IN ABIA STATE, NIGERIA

Ogochukwu Favour Nzeakor<sup>1</sup>

Philip Nnameziri Ndubueze<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, School of General Studies  
Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, Umudike, Abia State, Nigeria  
Email: [nzeakor.ogochukwu@mouau.edu.ng](mailto:nzeakor.ogochukwu@mouau.edu.ng)

<sup>2</sup>Department of Sociology (Criminology and Security Studies)  
Federal University, Dutse, Jigawa State, Nigeria  
Email: [pnndubueze@gmail.com](mailto:pnndubueze@gmail.com)

### Abstract

There is no gainsaying the truism that the Information and Communication ridden society exposes individuals to all manner of attacks that not only ubiquitous but harmful. Sexting is among the emerging cybercrimes that has raised profound security concern around the world. However, it appears that the contributing factors have not been fully explored, and this has perhaps contributed to its prevalence. Adopting cross-sectional variant of survey design- using questionnaire as the main instrument of data collection, we adopted multistage cluster, systematic, and random sampling techniques to select 1,080 internet users aged between 18 to 30 years in Abia State, Southeastern Nigerian. We discovered that: there was a significant negative association between fathers' level of education and their children's passive sexting behaviour ( $\chi^2 = 3.776, p = 0.05, df = 1, r = -.08$ ) in the sense that more of youths from lowly educated fathers engaged in or suffer more passive sexting than youths from highly educated fathers. However, the association between fathers' level of education and their children's active sexting behaviour one hand; and the association between mothers' level of education and their children's passive and active sexting behaviour were not significant. Again, the associations between mothers' income level and their children's passive and active sexting behaviour in one hand; and the association between fathers' income level and their children's passive and active sexting behaviour were insignificant. We recommend among others a closer monitoring, mentoring and educating youths from lowly educated parents aimed at boosting their self-esteem which would prevent them from being a soft target for sexting.

**Keywords:** Sexting, socioeconomic factors, parenting, active sexting, passive sexting

### Introduction

There is no gainsaying the truism that the Information and Communication ridden society exposes individuals to all manner of attacks that not only ubiquitous but harmful (Mali, 2008; Siegel, 2010; Gercke, 2012; Olusola, Ogunlere & Semiu, 2013; Malby, Mace, Holterhof, Brown, Kascherus & Ignatuschenko, 2013; Ndubueze, 2017;

Nzeakor, Nwokeoma & Ezeh, 2020; Internet Crime Complaint Centre, 2021; Nwoke, Nzeakor, Nwoha, Ugwu, Uba-Uzoagwa, & Ikenegbu, 2021; Nzeakor, Nwoha & Nwoke, 2022; Nzeakor, Nwokeoma, Hassan, Ajah, & Okpa, 2022; Okpa, Ajah, Nzeakor, Eshiotse & Abang, 2022). Indeed, it doesn't really matter whether one uses the Internet or not because

more of individuals personal data could be kept someplace on a networked computer. So, by all means, every individual is a potential victim of cybercrime attacks (Jaishankar, 2010; Wall, 2010; Nzeakor et al, 2022). The implication of the above is that cybercrime attacks victimization is now global social problem (Smartsev, 2020).

Sexting is a variant of emerging cybercrimes that has raised profound security concern around the world (Ahiataku, 2016; Balogun & Olatunde, 2020; Klepper, 2011; Lithwick 2011; Souza & Lorde, 2020). This is not only because of its high prevalence (Madigan et al., 2018; Mori et al., 2020; Kolawole & Ayen, 2018; Lee, Crofts, Salter, Milivojevic & McGovern, 2013; Olatunji et al., 2019; Ouytsel, Punyanunt-Carter, Walrave & Ponnet, 2020); sexting is associated with other health risk behaviours like sexually transmitted diseases, environmental and personal factors such as pornography, substance use, bullying, and suicide (Gordon-Messer et al, 2013; Jonsson et al., 2015; Lenhart, 2009; Olatunde & Balogun, 2017). Other studies have also revealed that young people who sext are more likely to indulge in high-risk sexual urges and seek the fulfilment of their sexual desires shortly after exchanging sexual messages with their partners (Lenhart, 2009; Olatunde & Balogun, 2017). What is more, young people who engage in online sexual behaviour like sexting are more likely to have problematic family backgrounds, and other problem behaviour syndrome (PBS) like educational underachievement, sexual and physical abuse, substance abuse, smoking, precocious sexuality and early pregnancy, suicide attempts, sensation seeking, and unemployment (Haramlambos & Holborn, 2008; Lee, Crofts, Salter, Milivojevic & McGovern, 2013; Rice et al., 2014).

In the same vein, studies have reported that adolescent sexting is significantly associated with sexual activity, multiple sexual partners, lack of contraception use, delinquent behavior, internalizing problems, and

substance use. It was equally opined that the associations between sexting and multiple sexual partners, drug use, smoking, and internalizing problems were stronger in younger compared with older adolescents (Ahiataku, 2016; Mori, Temple, Browne & Madigan, 2019).

What is more, many factors have been associated with sexting behavior including parental bonding (Benotsch, Snipes, Martin, & Bull, 203; Ofole, 2018); fear of missing out (Rey, Ojeda, Casas, Mora-Merchan & Elipe, 2019); low self-esteem and peer association (Olatunji et al., 2019); male sex, previous sexual intercourse, problematic phone use (Aboluwaji, Ayinmoro & Fred, 2020; Balogun & Olatunde, 2020); age (Lee, Crofts, Salter, Milivojevic & McGovern, 2013); and others.

Meanwhile, one major takeaway from the above narrative is that sexting is an enduring and debilitating social problem in the world today. However, it appears that the contributing factors have not been fully explored, and this has perhaps contributed to its prevalence. For instance, a closer review of the factors of sexting behavior, especially in Nigeria, reveals that while personal and situational factors like parental bonding, fear of missing out, low self-esteem, sexual history, and others have been disproportionately explored; the understanding of other sociocultural and environmental factors remain nascent. That said, the knowledge of the association between the parental socio-economic status and sexting behaviour in adolescent, especially from the southeastern part of Nigeria, is still unexploited. Granted that studies like Benotsch et al. (2013) have reported a negative correlation between sexting behaviour and living with both parents, but the factor of socio-economic status of parents was not captured. This would be fully explored in the extant study. The present article would build on the previous works as well as providing empirical explanations to the relationship between parents' socio-economic status and sexting behaviour among

adolescents in Abia State of South Eastern, Nigeria.

### Conceptual Clarifications

**Active sexting:** This refers to generating, creating, showing, posting, sending, or forwarding of such material (Barrense-Dias, Berchtold, Surís & Akre, 2017; Temple & Choi, 2014).

**Passive sexting:** This refers to desiring, receiving, asking for, or being asked for sexually explicit material (Barrense-Dias et al., 2017; Temple & Choi, 2014).

**Sexting:** The elements of sexting include: actions (sending, receiving, and forwarding); media types (text, images, and videos); sexual characteristics; and transmission modes (Barrense-Dias et al., 2017). It is therefore defined as the sending, receiving or forwarding of sexually characterized text, image, or video via any of the ICT devices.

**Socioeconomic status (SES)** is an economic and sociological combined total measure of a person's work experience and of an individual's or family's economic and social position in relation to others. When analyzing a family's SES, the household income, earners' education, and occupation are examined (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2018). It is also described as the social standing or class of an individual or group, often measured as a combination of education, income, and occupation (APA, 2007).

### Factors of sexting

Mori, Temple, Browne and Madigan (2019) in examining the association of sexting with sexual behaviors and mental health among adolescents, found that adolescent sexting is significantly associated with sexual activity, multiple sexual partners, lack of contraception use, delinquent behavior, internalizing problems, and substance use. The associations between sexting and multiple sexual partners, drug use, smoking, and internalizing problems were stronger in younger compared with older adolescents. This study focused more on the

consequences of sexting, and not necessarily on the factors. In the same vein, Souza and Lorde (2020), while focusing on relationship between sexting and gender violence among young people, failed to examine the SES of the parents on sexting. In the study, they concluded that sexting is not an a priori risk factor. According to them, the risk is related to variables such as the content of the messages, when it expresses violence, and age of the practitioners, indicating that the younger the age the greater the risk. They equally opined that there are modalities related to gender violence, such as revenge pornography and slut-shaming, but these contents are not inherent to sexting.

On the other hand, while Ofole (2018) found that there is a perfect negative relationship between parental bonding and sexting behavior ( $r = -.704, p < 0.05$ ) and a moderate inverse relationship between body image and sexting behavior ( $r = -.444, p < 0.05$ ) in Lagos Island, failed to highlight the influence of the parental SES on both parental bonding and sexting itself. In the same vein, Olatunji, Ayodeji, & Oniye (2019) found that sexting behaviour is prevalent among undergraduates and low self-esteem and peer association were significant determinants.

### Sexting trend

The incidence of sexting ranged between .9% and 60% partly depending on the definition, meanwhile the incidence is higher for passive than active sexting. For instance, Barrense-Dias et al. (2017) found a higher prevalence of passive sexting (18.5%–22.3%) than of active sexting (3.5%–18.5%). In this regard, Ahiataku (2016) found that the prevalence rate is higher among female than males. Though, the author did not specify which of the categories of sexting- active or passive- was the incidence higher among females. In an apparent intervention, Houck, Barker, Rizzo, Hancock, Norton, and Brown (2013) reported a higher passive sexting among females. Meanwhile, the author like



Temple and Choi (2014), and Souza and Lorde (2020) posited that there was no association between sexting and risky sexual behavior. This is however contrary to the conclusion of Barrense-Dias et al. (2017), who concluded that sexting is associated with age, gender, race, sexual behavior, romantic relationships, risky behaviors, online activity, psychological difficulties, and social pressure.

On the other hand, Rey, Ojeda, Casas, Mora-Merchan, and Elipe (2019), reported that although sexting has a clear emotional impact on adolescent, it does not appear to generate a negative impact among those involved, at least in the short run statistical models found that for boys and girls were similar. In addition, some differences in emotional impact by gender were found, girls feeling more depressed and annoyed in secondary sexting, and boys more active regarding both types of sexting. Just like Rey et al. (2019), Mori et al. (2020) found that sexting is a common behavior among emerging adults. This was concurred by Madigan et al. (2018) who concluded that the prevalence of sexting has increased in recent years and increases as youth age. The prevalence of non-consensual forwarding of sexts was also frequent in emerging adults at 15.0% ( $k = 7$ ; CI 6.9–23.2). In the same token, Balogun and Olatunde (2020) found that sexting was prevalent among postsecondary school young persons in Ibadan. However, they associated sexting with male sex- contrary to Ahiataku (2016)'s submission- previous sexual intercourse, and problematic phone use. Meanwhile, none of the studies above shades light on the trend, pattern and factors of sexting in Abia State, Southeastern Nigeria. And this is the gap the current study hopes to fill.

### **Socio-economic status and sexting**

Findings regarding the relationship between sociodemographic factors like gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status and sexting are quite inconsistent (Klettke, Hallford, Mellor, 2014; Van Ouytsel, Van Gool,

Ponnet, & Walrave, 2014). In this regard, Yépez-Tito, Ferragut and Blanca (2019) found that sexting was not related to SES, rather it was found to be more predominant among boys, late and middle teenagers, and those in a romantic relationship. In these segments, wanting to have sex was the main motivation for sexting, whereas joking with people was the main reason endorsed by girls and early adolescents. It is therefore necessary to examine the accurate relationship between SES and sexting in Abia State, Nigeria.

### **Socio-economic status and parenting**

Though a number of empirical studies have documented associations between SES and parenting practices, it is a consensus among scholars that the relationship between parenting and socioeconomic status is a complex one (Roubinov & Boyce, 2017). For instance, in comparison with higher SES family environments, parenting within low SES family environments has been observed to be stricter and more disciplinary (Hoffman, 2003) with greater levels of instability (Evans, Gonnella, Marcynyszyn, Gentile, & Salpekar, 2005) and more instability in the daily family routines (Evans, 2004; Fiese, Rhodes, & Beardslee, 2013). Other authors like Repetti, Taylor, and Seeman (2002) have reported a possible association of low socioeconomic status with risky family features, including pronounced family conflict, poor support, and vulnerability to family violence. Study has equally reported parenting as a mediator of the association between socioeconomic factors and child outcomes. In this sense, a meta-analysis has found a negative parenting partially accounted for the relation between poverty and children's mental health symptoms, particularly among male offspring (Grant et al., 2003). It has also been documented that low SES in childhood is associated with negative early family relationships that culminate in poorer health effects later in life (Lehman, Taylor, Kiefe, & Seeman, 2009). Again, the socioeconomic conditions within which a

family lives may powerfully influence parenting through its effects on parental mental health and via differential access to resources. Parents' childrearing knowledge and cultural values may also vary along a socioeconomic gradient, with downstream effects on parenting. What is more, both socioeconomic influences and parenting can autonomously shape children's health and growth (Roubinov & Boyce, 2017). However, the exact relationship between SES and sexting, especially in Abia State, Nigeria is still very nascent. Again, it is not yet known whether sexting prevalence would be higher among children of high SES parents or otherwise.

### **Theoretical Framework**

There are a number of theoretical choices available in the study of cybercrime in general, and sexting behaviour in particular (Oblad, 2020). Such theoretical choices include: Social Bonding Theory (Hirschi, 1969); intergroup emotion theory (Jones, Manstead & Livingstone, 2011); choice theory (Verecio, 2017); social dominance theory (Sidanius, Liu, Shaw & Pratto (1994); and routine-activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979). However, RAT has been applied to cyber aggressive research like sexting more often than most frameworks (Beran & Li, 2005; Holt & Bossler, 2008; Navarro & Jasinski, 2012; Arntfield, 2015; Nzeakor et al, 2020; Nzeakor et al, 2022; Oblad, 2020). In this respect, Nzeakor et al (2020) applied RAT in examining the potentiality of using increased public awareness to reducing cybercrime victimization experiences. Frye et al. (2014) applied RAT in examining the situational factors that predict bystander intervention behaviors in IPV. Leili (2019) equally utilized RAT in exploring three different types of online victimization involving women: stalking, dating violence and sexual violence. It has also been used to explain motivation for cyberstalking (Reyns et al., 2011); and importance of parental influence (Dehue et al., 2008). It has

equally been utilized to identify where victims are being targeted, methods used by cyber victims as well as to help find risk factors among victims, patterns that prevention specialists can identify and warn others with (Nzeakor et al, 2020; Oblad, 2020).

RAT would therefore be adopted as the theoretical orientation in this study. This is because its central schema that emphasizes the necessity for a motivated perpetrator, an identified target and lack of surrounding safeguards or guardianship (e.g., lack of bystander, monitoring, authority figure) helps to explain the rising incidence of sexting, and the factor of parents' socioeconomic status.

The major premise of Routine Activity Theory as propounded by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson (1979) holds that the volume and distribution of predatory crime (like the domestic violence) are closely related to the interaction of three variables: the availability of suitable targets (victims); the absence of capable guardians (parental bonding or control); and the presence of motivated offenders (perpetrators). The theory places a rationally motivated offender within an environmental context and explains how these two link up and lead to crime occurrence. This approach to understanding crime was the result of an observation by Cohen and Felson that a crime rise following World War II may in fact have been resulting from a societal transformation whereby the patterns of daily life were being fundamentally altered triggering new opportunities for crimes to be committed. Cohen and Felson opined that crime was an offshoot of the convergence in space and time of offenders and targets in the absence of a capable guardian (quality parental control and influence) (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981; Cohen & Felson, 1979; Tench, 2019). In this regard, information society, where information and communication technology is a norm, has fundamentally altered daily life, and therefore created opportunities for cybercrime in general and sexting in particular.

## Research Methodology

The study adopted cross-sectional variant of survey design- using questionnaire as the main instrument of data collection. The area of the study was Abia State, Nigeria. Abia is a state in the South-eastern part of Nigeria. The capital is Umuahia, and the major commercial city is Aba, which was formerly a British colonial government outpost in the region, and is also one of the most populated areas in Nigeria (National Population Commission, 2006; Niger Delta Region Land and People, 2009; Umuahia, 2017). The general population of this study comprised all the potential Internet users in Abia State which was put at 2,845, 380. The target population comprised of Internet users, males and females, aged 18 to 30 years old, residing in the 4 selected LGAs in Abia, which was put at 1,010,635 (National Population Commission, 2006).

Sample size of 1,111 was initially selected based on published tables of sample (see appendix), however the sample size of 1,080 was actually selected based on the sampling procedure (see the section on sampling procedure below). To obtain the study sample, probability sampling technique was adopted. In this sense, multistage cluster, systematic, and random sampling techniques were all adopted (Babbie, 2008). At the first stage, primary sampling unit, Abia State was clustered into 4 LGAs of Aba South, Osisioma Ngwa, Umuahia North, and Umuahia South. At the second stage, wards in the LGAs were listed, and systematic sampling technique with a random start was utilized in selecting 6 wards- totalling 24wards. At the third stage, polling units in the selected wards were listed and systematic sampling technique with a random start was equally utilized in selecting 5 polling units each- totalling 120 polling units (Nigeria Decide, 2019). At the fourth stage, since there was no comprehensive list/sampling frame of both housing units and households, unlike in the preceding stages, random sampling technique was utilized in selecting 9 housing units from each of the 120

selected polling units- totalling 1,080 housing units. At the final stage, random sampling technique was equally utilized in selecting a respondent from each of the selected housing units until the 1,080 sample size was completed. Only housing units containing 2 or more respondents was qualified to be sampled.

For data collection, questionnaire was used to elicit information from both potential and actual sexting practitioners and victims. The justification for surveying both victims and perpetrators was based on the fact that a given individual could be both victim and perpetrator at the same time. The field data was analysed using relevant descriptive and inferential statistics from the SPSS software version 23.

From the socio-demographic data, the result shows that most of the participants of the survey were singles (97%) and of Christian religion (98%) as juxtaposed to the few of them who were married (3%) and of other religion (2%). It also indicated that more females (381%) than males (33.7%), and more students (93%) than working class (7%) participated. Finally, most of the participants completed secondary school (84%) followed by those who completed OND (6%) and Bachelors/HND (6%), while very few of the participants completed Postgraduates degrees (4%). Meanwhile, age bracket 20 (25%) was the modal age bracket followed by age 21 (23%), age 22 (18%), age 23 (9%), and age 19 (8%). Other age brackets like 24, 27, 28 and 30 were less represented as the per centage hovered around 17%.

Active sexting was measured by asking the respondents "whether they have created, showed, posted, sent, or forwarded any sexually explicit or pornographic material in the last 12 months?". On the other hand, passive sexting was measured by asking respondents whether "they have received or asked for any sexually explicit or pornographic material in the last 12 months?". In case they admitted, they were further asked "what was their relationship with the person with options

ranging from ‘friends’, ‘colleagues’, ‘strangers’, ‘spouse’, etc (they were equally instructed to list all that apply if more than one option applied). The respondents were equally demanded to provide other details about the sexting victim(s) or practitioner(s) as the case may be. In this, they were demanded to provide their sex, frequency of occurrence, and platform of occurrence.

The socioeconomic status of their parents was measured by asking respondents to provide details of their parents’ education level attended and completed, types of trade/occupation engaged, and the type of building owned or lived in. The details about their parents estimated income in a month were equally obtained.

**Objective 1a: To examine the relationship between the parents’ education level and passive sexting behavior of their children.**

Table 1: *Distribution of Respondents by their Mothers’ Level of Education and their Passive Sexting Behaviour*

|                      |            |  | Mothers' Level of Education Completed |                 | Total     |
|----------------------|------------|--|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|
|                      |            |  | Lowly Educated                        | Highly Educated |           |
| Passive<br>Behaviour | Sexting No |  | 255 (65%)                             | 130(71%)        | 385(67%)  |
|                      | Yes        |  | 136 (35%)                             | 54(29%)         | 190(33%)  |
| Total                |            |  | 391(100%)                             | 184(100%)       | 575(100%) |

Test Statistics:  $\chi^2 = 1.670$ , level of significance:  $p = .196$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $r = -.05$ .

Table 1 shows that of 575 youths who participated in the survey, majority (68%) of them came from lowly educated mothers, while little above 3 in 10 (32%) of them came from highly educated mothers. Then, of 391 who came from lowly educated mothers, about 4 in 6 (65%) of them did not experience passive sexting, while about 2 in 6 (35%) admitted having experienced passive sexting. What is more, of 184 of them who came from highly educated mothers, about 7 in 10 (71%)

of them did not experience passive sexting, while almost 3 in 10 (29%) did.

Though it appears that more youths (35%) from lowly educated mothers engaged more in passive sexting than youths (29%) from highly educated mothers but the association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ ; it also represented a small-sized effect  $r = -.05$ . We therefore conclude that there was an insignificant association between mothers’ level of education and their children’ s passive sexting behaviour.

Table 2: *Distribution of Respondents by their Parents’ (Fathers) Level of Education and their Passive Sexting Behaviour*

|                      |            |  | Fathers' Level of Education Completed |                 | Total     |
|----------------------|------------|--|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|
|                      |            |  | Lowly Educated                        | Highly Educated |           |
| Passive<br>Behaviour | Sexting No |  | 255 (64%)                             | 130(73%)        | 400(70%)  |
|                      | Yes        |  | 141 (36%)                             | 49(27%)         | 175(30%)  |
| Total                |            |  | 396(100%)                             | 179(100%)       | 575(100%) |

Test Statistics:  $\chi^2 = 3.776$ ,  $p = 0.05$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $r = -.08$

Table 2 shows that of 575 youths who participated in the survey, almost 7 in 10 (69%) of them came from lowly educated fathers, while little above 3 in 10 (31%) of them came from highly educated fathers. Then, of 396

who came from lowly educated fathers, about 4 in 6 (64%) of them did not experience passive sexting, while little below 2 in 5 (36%) involved in passive sexting. What is more, of 179 of them who came from highly educated fathers,

little above 7 in 10 (73%) of them did not experience passive sexting, while fewer than 3 in 10 (27%) did.

We therefore conclude that there was a significant negative association between fathers' level of education and their children's

passive sexting behaviour,  $\chi^2 = 3.776, p = 0.05, df = 1, r = -.08$ .

In this sense, more of youths (36%) from lowly educated fathers engaged in passive sexting more than youths (29%) from highly educated fathers

**Objective 1b: To examine the relationship between the parents' level of education and their children's active sexting behavior**

Table 3: *Distribution of Respondents by their Mothers' Level of Education and Active Sexting Behaviour*

|                          |     |           | Mothers' Level of Education Completed |                 | Total     |
|--------------------------|-----|-----------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|
|                          |     |           | Lowly Educated                        | Highly Educated |           |
| Active Sexting Behaviour | No  | 258 (66%) | 129(70%)                              | 395(69%)        |           |
|                          | Yes | 133 (34%) | 55(30%)                               | 180(31%)        |           |
| Total                    |     |           | 391(100%)                             | 184(100%)       | 575(100%) |

Test Statistics:  $\chi^2 = 0.967, p = 0.32, df = 1, r = -.04$ .

Table 3 shows that of 575 youths who participated in the survey, majority (68%) of them came from lowly educated mothers, while little above 3 in 10 (32%) of them came from highly educated mothers. Then, of 391 who came from lowly educated mothers, about 4 in 6 (66%) of them did not experience active sexting, while about 2 in 6 (34%) experienced active sexting. What is more, of 184 of them who came from highly educated mothers, about 7 in 10 (70%) of them were not

involved in active sexting, while 3 in 10 (30%) of them were involved active sexting.

Though more youths (34%) from lowly educated mothers engaged more in active sexting than their counterparts (30%) from highly educated mothers, however such association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it also represented a small-sized effect  $r = -.04$ .

We therefore conclude that there was insignificant association between mothers' level of education and their children's active sexting behaviour.

Table 4: *Distribution of Respondents by their Fathers' Level of Education and their Children Active Sexting Behaviour*

|                          |     |           | Fathers' Level of Education Completed |                 | Total     |
|--------------------------|-----|-----------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|
|                          |     |           | Lowly Educated                        | Highly Educated |           |
| Active Sexting Behaviour | No  | 257 (65%) | 130(73%)                              | 395(69%)        |           |
|                          | Yes | 139 (35%) | 49(27%)                               | 180(31%)        |           |
| Total                    |     |           | 396(100%)                             | 179(100%)       | 575(100%) |

Test Statistics:  $\chi^2 = 3.345$ , level of significance:  $p = 0.7, df = 1, r = -.08$ .

Table 4 shows that of 575 youths who participated in the survey, almost 7 in 10 (69%) of them came from lowly educated fathers, while little above 3 in 10 (31%) of them came from highly educated fathers. Then, of 396 who came from lowly educated fathers, about 4 in 6 (65%) of them were not involved in active sexting, while about 2 in 6 (35%) were involved in active sexting. What is more, of 179

of them who came from highly educated fathers, little above 7 in 10 (73%) of them were involved in active sexting, while less than 3 in 10 (27%) were involved in active sexting.

Though more youths (35%) from lowly educated fathers engaged more in active sexting than youths (27%) from highly educated fathers, however such association

was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it also represented a small-sized effect  $r = -.08$ .

We therefore conclude that there was insignificant association between fathers' level

of education and their children's active sexting behaviour.

**Objective 2a: To find out whether there is association between parents (mothers)' income level and sexting behavior of their children**

Table 5 *Distribution of Respondents by their Mothers' Income Level and their Passive Sexting Behaviour*

|                      |            |           | Mothers' Income Level |               | Total     |
|----------------------|------------|-----------|-----------------------|---------------|-----------|
|                      |            |           | Lowly income          | Middle Income |           |
| Passive<br>Behaviour | Sexting No | 302 (67%) | 83(66%)               | 395(69%)      |           |
|                      | Yes        | 148 (33%) | 42(34%)               | 180(31%)      |           |
| Total                |            |           | 450(100%)             | 125(100%)     | 575(100%) |

Test Statistics:  $\chi^2 = 0.022, p = 0.9, df = 1, r = .01$ .

Table 5 shows that of 575 youths who participated in the survey, almost 8 in 10 (78%) of them came from low Income mothers, while just little above 2 in 10 (22%) of them came from middle income mothers. Then, of 450 who came from low Income mothers, 4 in 6 (67%) of them were not involved in passive sexting, while about 2 in 6 (33%) did experience active sexting. What is more, of 125 of them who came from middle Income mothers, almost 4 in 6 (66%) of them did not

experience passive sexting, while almost 2 in 6 (34%) of them did experience passive sexting. Though it appears that more youths (34%) from middle Income mothers engaged more in passive sexting than youths (33%) from low Income mothers, however such association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it equally represented a small-sized effect  $r = .01$ .

We therefore conclude that there was insignificant association between mothers' Income level and their children's passive sexting behaviour.

Table 6: *Distribution of Respondents by their Fathers' Income Level and their Passive Sexting Behaviour*

|                      |            |           | Fathers' Income Level |               | Total     |
|----------------------|------------|-----------|-----------------------|---------------|-----------|
|                      |            |           | Lowly income          | Middle Income |           |
| Passive<br>Behaviour | Sexting No | 264 (69%) | 128(67%)              | 392(69%)      |           |
|                      | Yes        | 121 (31%) | 62(33%)               | 183(31%)      |           |
| Total                |            |           | 385(100%)             | 190(100%)     | 575(100%) |

Test Statistics:  $\chi^2 = 0.085, p = 0.8, df = 1, r = .04$ .

Table 6 shows that of 575 youths who participated in the survey, 4 in 6 (67%) of them came from low Income fathers, while just about 2 in 6 (33%) came from middle income mothers. Again, of 385 who came from low Income fathers, almost 7 in 10 (69%) of them were not involved in passive sexting, while about 3 in 10 (31%) did experience passive sexting. What is more, of 190 of them who came from middle Income fathers, 4 in 6 (67%) of them did not experience passive sexting,

while 2 in 6 (33%) of them did experience passive sexting.

Though it appears that more youths (33%) from middle Income fathers engaged more in passive sexting than youths (31%) from low Income fathers, however such association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it equally represented a small-sized effect  $r = .04$ .

We therefore conclude that there was insignificant association between fathers' Income level and their children's passive sexting behaviour

Table 7: *Distribution of Respondents by their Mothers' Income Level and their Active Sexting Behaviour*

|                          |     |  | Mothers' Income Level |               | Total     |
|--------------------------|-----|--|-----------------------|---------------|-----------|
|                          |     |  | Lowly income          | Middle Income |           |
| Active Sexting Behaviour | No  |  | 303 (67%)             | 84(67%)       | 395(69%)  |
|                          | Yes |  | 147 (33%)             | 41(33%)       | 180(31%)  |
| Total                    |     |  | 450(100%)             | 125(100%)     | 575(100%) |

Test Statistics:  $X^2 = 0.001, p = 0.9, df = 1, r = .01$ .

Table 7 shows that of 575 youths who participated in the survey, 78% of them came from low Income mothers, while 22% of them came from middle income mothers. Then, of 450 who came from low Income mothers, 4 in 6 (67%) of them were not involved in active sexting, while about 2 in 6 (33%) did experience active sexting. What is more, of

125 of them who came from middle Income mothers, 4 in 6 (67%) of them did not experience active sexting, while 2 in 6 (33%) of them did experience active sexting.

There was insignificant association between mothers' income level and their children' s active sexting behaviour.

Table 8: *Distribution of Respondents by their Fathers' Income Level and their Active Sexting Behaviour*

|                          |     |  | Fathers' Income Level |               | Total     |
|--------------------------|-----|--|-----------------------|---------------|-----------|
|                          |     |  | Lowly income          | Middle Income |           |
| Active Sexting Behaviour | No  |  | 264 (69%)             | 128(67%)      | 392(69%)  |
|                          | Yes |  | 121 (31%)             | 62(33%)       | 183(31%)  |
| Total                    |     |  | 385(100%)             | 190(100%)     | 575(100%) |

Test Statistics:  $X^2 = 0.085, p = 0.8, df = 1, r = .04$ .

Table 8 shows that of 575 youths who participated in the survey, 4 in 6 (67%) of them came from low Income fathers, while just about 2 in 6 (33%) came from middle income mothers. Again, of 385 who came from low Income fathers, almost 7 in 10 (69%) of them were not involved in active sexting, while about 3 in 10 (31%) did experience active sexting. What is more, of 190 of them who came from middle Income fathers, 4 in 6 (67%) of them did not experience active sexting, while 2 in 6 (33%) of them did experience active sexting.

Income level and their children' s active sexting behaviour.

We found as follows:

Though it appears that more youths (33%) from middle Income fathers engaged more in active sexting than youths (31%) from low Income fathers, however such association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it equally represented a small-sized effect  $r = .04$ .

1) That there was an insignificant association between mothers' level of education and their children' s passive sexting behaviour. Though it appears that more youths (35%) from lowly educated mothers engaged more in passive sexting than youths (29%) from highly educated mothers but the association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ ; it also represented a small-sized effect  $r = -.05$  ( $X^2 = 1.670$ , level of significance:  $p = .196, df = 1, r = -.05$ ).

2) That there was a significant negative association between fathers' level of education and their children' s passive sexting behaviour,  $X^2 = 3.776, p = 0.05, df = 1, r = -.08$ . In this sense, more of youths (36%) from lowly educated fathers engaged

We therefore conclude that there was insignificant association between fathers'

- in passive sexting more than youths (29%) from highly educated fathers.
- 3) That there was insignificant association between mothers' level of education and their children's active sexting behaviour ( $X^2 = 0.967, p = 0.32, df = 1, r = -.04$ ). In this regards, though more youths (34%) from lowly educated mothers engaged more in active sexting than their counterparts (30%) from highly educated mothers, however such association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it also represented a small-sized effect  $r = -.04$ .
  - 4) That there was insignificant association between fathers' level of education and their children's active sexting behaviour. ( $X^2 = 3.345$ , level of significance:  $p = 0.7, df = 1, r = -.08$ ). Though more youths (35%) from lowly educated fathers engaged more in active sexting than youths (27%) from highly educated fathers, however such association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it also represented a small-sized effect  $r = -.08$ .
  - 5) That there was insignificant association between mothers' Income level and their children's passive sexting behaviour ( $X^2 = 0.022, p = 0.9, df = 1, r = .01$ ). In this sense, though it appears that more youths (34%) from middle Income mothers engaged more in passive sexting than youths (33%) from low Income mothers, however such association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it equally represented a small-sized effect  $r = .01$ .
  - 6) That there was insignificant association between fathers' Income level and their children's passive sexting behaviour ( $X^2 = 0.085, p = 0.8, df = 1, r = .04$ ). In this sense, though it appears that more youths (33%) from middle Income fathers engaged more in passive sexting than youths (31%) from low Income fathers, however such association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it equally represented a small-sized effect  $r = .04$ .

- 7) That there was insignificant association between mothers' income level and their children's active sexting behaviour ( $X^2 = 0.001, p = 0.9, df = 1, r = .01$ ).
- 8) That there was insignificant association between fathers' Income level and their children's active sexting behaviour ( $X^2 = 0.085, p = 0.8, df = 1, r = .04$ ): though it appears that more youths (33%) from middle Income fathers engaged more in active sexting than youths (31%) from low Income fathers, however such association was insignificant,  $p > 0.05$ , it equally represented a small-sized effect  $r = .04$ .

### Discussion of Findings

From the analysis, we discovered that there was a significant negative association between fathers' level of education and their children's passive sexting behaviour in the sense that more of youths from lowly educated fathers engaged in or suffer more passive sexting than youths from highly educated fathers. However, the association between fathers' level of education and their children's active sexting behaviour in one hand; and the association between mothers' level of education and their children's passive and active sexting behaviour were not significant. What is more, the associations between mothers' income level and their children's passive and active sexting behaviour in one hand; and the association between fathers' income level and their children's passive and active sexting behaviour were insignificant. This may mean that the lowly educated parents are less sophisticated in the use of the ICT devices through which the sexting is being committed, therefore could not provide the necessary guardianship that should have prevented their children from being victims of sexting. This is partly incongruence with Olatunji, Ayodeji and Oniye (2019) who opined that sexting behaviour is prevalent among undergraduates and low self-esteem and peer association were significant determinants. In this regard, low self esteem among the youths



from low educated parents may equally be a factor. The finding has helped in shaping the finding of Houck, Barker, Rizzo, Hancock, Norton, and Brown (2013) who reported a higher passive sexting among females. It could equal be that the factor of being born into a lowly educated parent is a contributory factor.

The finding, while invalidating the conclusion of Yépez-Tito, Ferragut and Blanca (2019) who found that sexting was not related to SES; has validated the finding of Fiese, Rhodes and Beardslee (2013) who opined that parenting within low SES family environments witness greater levels of instability; and more instability in the daily family routines. The finding equally aligns with the position of authors like Repetti, Taylor, and Seeman (2002) who reported a possible association of low socioeconomic status with risky family features, including pronounced family conflict, poor support, and vulnerability to family violence. Study has equally reported parenting as a mediator of the association between socioeconomic factors and child outcomes. The authors equally concluded that parents' childrearing knowledge and cultural values may also vary along a socioeconomic gradient, with downstream effects on parenting. What is more, in implying that the lowly educated parents may be less sophisticated in the use of the ICT devices through which the sexting is being committed, and therefore could not provide the necessary guardianship that should have prevented their children from being victims of passive sexting; the finding aligns with the theoretical orientation, RAT. The major premise of Routine Activity Theory is that the volume and distribution of predatory crime (like sexting) are closely related to the interaction of three variables: the availability of suitable targets (victims); the absence of capable guardians (ICT educated parents), and the presence of motivated offenders (active sexting perpetrators).

## Conclusion and Recommendations

We therefore conclude that though there was a significant negative association between fathers' level of education and their children's passive sexting behaviour in the sense that more of youths from lowly educated fathers engaged in or suffer more passive sexting than youths from highly educated fathers. However, the association between fathers' level of education and their children's active sexting behaviour one hand; and the association between mothers' level of education and their children's passive and active sexting behaviour were not significant. What is more, the associations between mothers' income level and their children's passive and active sexting behaviour one hand; and the association between fathers' income level and their children's passive and active sexting behaviour are insignificant. Stemming from the above, we recommend a closer monitoring, mentoring and educating youths from lowly educated parents aimed at boosting their self-esteem which would prevent them from being a soft target for sexting. Increasing the ICT awareness level of the lowly educated parents is equally recommended in order to equip the parents as capable guardians. This is because it is suspected that the lowly educated parents may not be too well-informed with the ICT gadgets through which sexting is perpetrated.

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## INFLUENCE OF PARENTING STYLES ON CONDUCT DISORDER AMONG SECONDARY SCHOOL ADOLESCENTS IN KEFFI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, NASARAWA STATE NIGERIA

Alexander William<sup>1</sup>

Adekola Tolulope Oluwatosin<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [alexanderwilliam362@yahoo.com](mailto:alexanderwilliam362@yahoo.com)

<sup>2</sup>Department of Mental Health,

University of Abuja Teaching Hospital, Abuja, Nigeria

Email: [tosinadekola58@gmail.com](mailto:tosinadekola58@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The study investigated the influence of parenting styles on conduct disorder among three hundred and seventy nine (379) secondary school adolescents in Keffi, Nigeria. The study adopted a cross section survey design. The participants were selected using stratified random sampling method. The participants responded to two sets of research instruments which are: Parental Styles Scale and Conduct Disorders Questionnaire. Five hypotheses were stated and tested. Pearson Product Moment Correlations, Multiple Linear Regression Analysis and Independent Sample t-test were used for data analysis. The results shows that authoritative parenting have no significant influence on conduct disorder [ $r(377) = -0.053, P > 0.05$ ]. Authoritarian parenting style have no significant influence on conduct disorder [ $r(377) = -0.067, P > 0.05$ ]. Neglectful parenting style have significant influence on conduct disorder [ $r(377) = 0.216, P < 0.05$ ]. Permissive parenting style have no significant influence on conduct disorder [ $r(377) = -0.032, P > 0.05$ ]. The study also found that there is no statistically significant difference between male and female students on conduct disorder [ $t(377) = -0.642, P > 0.05$ ]. In conclusion, this study reveals the influence of parenting styles on conduct disorder among secondary school adolescents in Keffi, Nigeria. On the basis of the findings, it was recommended among others that, parents should spend time with their children because it can reduce the probability of developing conduct disorder among the secondary school adolescents.

**Keywords:** Conduct Disorder, Parenting Style, Adolescents, Keffi

### Introduction

Adolescence is a period of transition from childhood to adulthood. It is a period that the child encounters numerous problems from all areas of his growth and development such as physical, mental, social, psychological, cultural and spiritual growth problems. Such is the difficulties that confront the emerging child into adulthood that some psychologists that describes it as a period of “storms and stress”. This period varies from society to society as a result of cultural variations and level of modernization. Generally, adolescents' period

commences between ages of 11 or 12 years to 18 or 21 years. Girls begin transition earlier than boys, about 11-12 years. Boys start between 12-14 years. It is a fact to reckon with that the youngest mother in the world was 9 years old and in America, a 10-year-old was able to deliver her baby, normally without surgical intervention.

The influence of parenting styles at adolescents' stage is very crucial. This is because parents play tremendous roles in adolescents' transition to adulthood as well as

the academic achievement of the adolescents. The family unit is considered as one of the most influential components of a child's academic achievement due to the fact that the family is the first source of internal education for a child (Sumari, Hussein, & Siraj, 2010). Parenting Styles involves combination of acceptance and responsiveness on one hand and demand control on the other. Baumrind (2001) defined Parenting Style as a psychological construct representing standard strategy that parents use in their children. Baumrind further outlined four types of Parenting Styles: authoritarian, authoritative, neglectful and indulgent. Authoritarian Parents are parents who have strict ideas about discipline and behaviour, while authoritative Parents encourage their children to be independent but still place limit and control on their action. Neglectful Parents are uninvolved in their children's lives. Lastly indulgent Parents are highly involved with their adolescents but place few demand or control on them. Parents are the ones saddled with the responsibility of taking care of their adolescents until they are capable of taking care of themselves. Erickson, (2001) opined that parents have vested interest in the social behaviour and academic performance of their adolescents. Social behaviour is an interaction of an individual with others and the acquisition of the ability to behave in accordance with social expectation.

Thompson (2008) postulated that adolescents acquire a sense of right and wrong partly through Parenting Styles as well as in everyday conversation with parents, who convey simple lessons about people's feelings, the consequences of breaking rules and what it takes to be a good boy or a good girl. Discipline is very important when given by parents to their children; discipline is aimed at the total development of adolescents to become responsible people in the society. Onyechi and Okere (2007) stated that, adolescence stage requires parental love, care, warmth and serious attention to adjust

adequately to environment in which they live. Generally, the social behaviour of the adolescents depends on the style of parenting. Utti (2006) observed that parenting is a major vehicle in socializing the child.

Conduct disorder on the other hand refers to behavioural problems amongst adolescents with great difficulty following rules and behaving in a socially acceptable way (American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP, 2013). These youths may often be stigmatized by their peers, adults, and/or agencies as "bad" or delinquent, rather than having a mental disorder. Conduct disorder is defined by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5, 2015) as repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior by a teenager in which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are violated (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). According to the DSM-5 (APA, 2013), these behaviours fall into four main groupings: aggressive conduct that causes or threatens physical harm to people or animals, nonaggressive conduct that causes property loss or damage, deceitfulness or theft, and serious repetitive violations of rules.

Although the cause of Conduct disorder is unknown, some researchers believe that a combination of environmental, genetic, psychological and social factors play a role (Burke, Loeber, & Birmaher, 2002). Environmental and social factors such as a dysfunctional family, school failure, abuse, trauma, a family history of substance abuse, peer acceptance, and inconsistent discipline and/or parenting also contribute to the development of conduct disorder (Patterson & Fisher, 2012). In this study, we focused on parenting style as a social contributing factor to Conduct Disorder.

The rising level of antisocial behaviour among adolescents in Keffi is a serious cause of concern. For example, in the months of March and April 2021, groups of adolescents who called themselves "Yan Shara", wielding

knives, sticks and other dangerous weapons paraded different locations within Keffi at night assaulting and inflicting serious body harms to innocent residents. There are also other groups such as “Yan Daba” and several other unnamed cult groups who without doubt exhibit antisocial vices such as, substance use, drugs abuse, stealing, rape and many more. Furthermore, within the school, antisocial behaviour has been a major concern in the education system, because it affects peers, teachers and parents and leads to wastage of time (Shamsies, Lawrence & Hood, 2003; Sailor, 2010). Clark (2013) noted that antisocial behaviour among students is a major challenge to the education sector because it interferes with school progress. Tremendous studies reached consensus that, parenting is one of the fundamental root cause adolescent antisocial behaviours.

Although a child can choose how to behave irrespective of what style of parenting the parent chooses to use, research clearly shows that parenting practices are one of the best predictors of adolescent antisocial behaviour (Johnson, 2016). Different styles of parenting practices can affect positively or negatively the behaviour of the growing child as parents differ in the way they handle their children. Parents may be loving or rejecting, controlling or indulgent, involved or uninvolved, punishing or non-punishing. It is indicated that this kind of difference in parental handling is likely to be reflected in the personality of children and may contribute to the development of antisocial behaviour.

Based on the argument above this study sought to find out the influence of Parenting Styles on conduct disorder of both male and female adolescents in Secondary Schools in Keffi Town, Nasarawa State, Nigeria.

### **Empirical Review**

Studies have identified several factors associated with children outcomes whether positive or negative. This section presents brief review of empirical studies pertaining to the

role of parenting styles (authoritarian, authoritative, permissive and neglectful) as they relate to antisocial behaviour.

### **Authoritarian Parenting and Adolescent Antisocial Behaviour**

According to Janssens, (2015), harsh ways of controlling the childlike verbal and physical punishment are mostly associated with negative behaviours in children as they grow up. Authoritarian parents are cold and harsh to the children to the extent that they do not negotiate anything with them. Because of their parents being too aggressive, their children learn that being aggressive is the only way of communicating and therefore they become aggressive towards their peers (Richards, 2015). If the parent is too harsh and does not give the child room to make decisions and mistakes, the child might start to disobey their parents as a way of reacting to the harshness of their parents (Murray & Farrington, 2010). Less support from the parent and more negative control leads to increased risk of conduct disorder (Wabishet & Lauween, 2016). Most studies on authoritarian parenting indicate that this type of parenting style is harmful for the development of a child and it results to conduct problems in later life (Thompson, Hollis, & Richards, 2003). A meta-analysis by Leschied, Chiodo, Nowicki and Rodger (2008) suggests that conduct problems might in future manifest as criminal behaviour in children. This parenting style might make a child try to commit suicide as a way to escape from their harsh parents (Tunde-Ayinmode & Adegunloye, 2011). In a study which examined paternal parenting styles and its relationship with antisocial behaviours among 339 male secondary school adolescents aged between 15 to 18 years in Yobe Umar, Redzuan and Hamsan (2017) reported that there is a significant positive relationship between paternal authoritarian parenting style and adolescent antisocial behaviours. This suggests that increasingly paternal authoritarian parenting behaviour is detrimental and pushes

the adolescent towards exhibiting antisocial behaviour. This finding echoes several other researchers (Moghaddam et al., 2014; Kiran, et al., 2018; Ruguru, 2019)

### **Authoritative Parenting and Adolescent Antisocial Behaviour**

Several studies have provided evidence that the combination of high levels of parental warmth (responsiveness) and strictness (demandingness) represented the best parenting strategy; the authoritative style of parenting (Garcia & Gracia, 2009). Thus, the negative relationship between authoritative parenting and antisocial behaviour has been corroborated by the work of various researchers (Ruguru, 2019; Umar et al., 2017; Moghaddam et al., 2014).

Moghaddam et al (2014) asserted that the best parenting style to lower aggression and its elements is the authoritative style as authoritative parents place more emphasis on independent behaviours. Children who were exposed to authoritative parenting style are less likely to develop problems relating to drug and alcohol abuse, school misconduct problems, and overall delinquency (Simons, Simons, Burt, Brody, & Cutrona, 2005). When compared to authoritarian parenting style, children who were exposed to authoritative parenting style are less likely to be involved in deviant and antisocial activities, including peers who are involved in deviant activities (Wright & Cullen, 2001).

Separate studies conducted by Umar et al., (2017) and Ruguru (2019) also found negative relationship between paternal authoritative parenting styles and adolescent antisocial behaviour among adolescents. On the other hand, a study carried out by Kiran, et al (2018) reported that no significant correlation was found between authoritative parenting style and students' antisocial behaviour among an adolescent sample.

### **Permissive Parenting and Adolescent Antisocial Behaviour**

Hoeve et al (2009) noted that research on permissive style of parenting is often overlooked in favour of authoritarian and authoritative parenting style, leaving a gap in the literature. The available literature on permissive parenting style generally points to negative outcomes (e.g., Kiran et al., 2018; Moghaddam et al., 2016; Hoeve et al., 2009). Permissive parenting style has been found to be related to problematic behaviours in children (Rodríguez & Torrente, 2003). Permissiveness as a factor characteristic has been found to be related to juvenile delinquency (Hoeve et al., 2009). The study by Kiran et al (2018) reported a significant positive correlation between parental permissiveness and adolescent antisocial behaviour. Similar negative relationship between permissive parenting and adolescent antisocial behaviour were reported by Ruguru (2019) and Okorodudu (2010). Dixon (2002) noted that the negative outcomes of permissive parenting style can be attributed to the lack of responsibility expected from children, resulting in dependent children lacking in social responsibility (Dixon, 2002).

Even though most studies suggest that permissive parenting is not ideal, a few studies suggest otherwise. For example, Garcia and Gracia (2009) study conducted among adolescents of Spanish families found that both the permissive and authoritative parenting styles were associated with better outcomes than authoritarian and neglectful parenting. Likewise, a study by Spritz (2011) suggested that permissive parenting is associated with children who are less likely to get involved in deviant and criminal behaviours.

### **Neglectful Parenting and Adolescent Antisocial Behaviour**

Neglectful parenting style is the kind of parenting where parents are not demanding of the child neither are they responsive to the needs of the child. Parents are cold and act indifferent towards the child. They are

uninvolved in the life of a child. Outcomes of this parenting style are children might engage in risky sexual behaviour (Oluwatosin & Adediwura, 2010). The children become delinquents since they are raised in an environment where there are no rules hence and are unable to follow other rules (Widom & Wilson, 2015).

According to Odeunmi (2007), studies have shown that a big fraction of children with antisocial behaviour are from families that children feel neglected and rejected that is the family provides very little parental love or none. Compared to children raised using other parenting styles, adolescents with neglectful parents have been reported to perform worse on all psychological outcomes (Montgomery et al., 2008). In a study which compared antisocial behaviour among the four different parenting styles, Calafat et al (2014) found that neglectful parenting style was associated with the highest level of tobacco and illegal drug use, being alcohol user and lowest academic performance was reported among adolescents. Schaffer et al. (2009) stated that although authoritarian parenting styles do have a negative effect on children, neglectful and permissive parenting styles have a longer lasting negative effect on the growth and development of adolescents, which can relate to the formation of antisocial behaviour.

### **Gender and Antisocial Behaviour**

The majority of studies on gender difference in antisocial behaviour have consistently reported that males demonstrate greater overt aggression and antisocial behaviours than females. Mobarake (2015) examined gender difference in antisocial behaviour among adolescent school students. The finding of the study shows that there was a difference in adolescent's antisocial behaviour between male and female with the results indicating that the male is more likely to show antisocial behaviour than female.

Anestis (2012) examined the potential contribution of gender role in the prediction of

antisocial and somatic symptomatology, the study found that Masculine gender role was positively related to antisocial behaviour, while feminine gender role was negatively related to antisocial behaviour. Gender role did not predict somatization. The study concludes that gender role may be important to the expression of antisocial behaviour.

Coelho, Neves and Caridade (2020) carried out a study which characterized the risk factors for the occurrence of antisocial behaviour, seeking to understand if there are differences between boys and girls. The sample consisted of 65 boys and 20 girls who were referred by the Portuguese Promotion and Protection System due to the display of antisocial behaviours. Gender differences were assessed, with boys exhibiting a higher risk level for antisocial behaviour, adopting more serious behaviours (e.g., impulsive behaviours). Girls engaged in less serious behaviour (e.g., disrespect).

However, some researches had shown that gender is not a significant factor in adolescents' deviant behaviour and subsequent effect on academic achievement (Onyechi & Okere, 2007; Mallum et al., 1999). Sekuku; Rimfat and Ogbonna (2003) noted that until recently male adolescents were by far more involved in deviant acts than female but times have changed, more and more females are now getting involved in deviant acts.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The study is built on attachment theory of Baumrind (2001). The theory considered parenting styles and techniques to be influential on conduct disorder of students. The theory maintained that parenting behaviours is very important in the lives of school students as with children and adolescents. The theory maintained that the more autonomy, demand, and support parents provided, the more students were confident and persistent in achieving their goals in live. The theory therefore found a



direct link between parenting styles and child's sense of mastery of skills. The advocates of the theory posit that parenting styles, dimensions and involvement with their children has impact on adolescent social, cognitive, moral, and emotional development.

### Research Methodology

This study adopted a cross sectional survey research design. The study population consists of 1600 adolescents enrolled in senior secondary classes across 14 secondary schools located in Keffi Local Government Area. Using Taro Yamane's formula, the sample size was determined to be 400 participants. The participants were selected using probability random sampling which gave all the students equal chance of being selected. However, only data collected from 379 participants were analysed and they comprise of 194 males and 185 females. Their age ranged between 13 and 20 years with a mean age of 16.55. all the participants were students in senior secondary and there were more students from SSII (N= 148, 39.1%) than SSIII (N= 118, 31.1%) and SSI (N= 113, 29.8%). Most of the participants practiced Christianity (N= 235, 62%) while 144 (38.8%) practiced Islam (N= 144, 38.8%).

#### Instrument of the Study

Two instruments were adopted for data collection in this study. They are:

#### Parental Styles Scale

The Parental Styles Scale was developed by Baumrind (1971). The scale consists of 20-item to measures the styles of parenting as what participants perceive as the styles or approaches that their parents dominantly use in taking care of them. Responses to each of the parenting styles items will be scored on a 1 to 4 scale, 1= "Strongly Disagree" and 4= "Strongly Agree". Higher scores indicate increasing levels of parenting styles. These include, Authoritarian parenting, permissive parenting, authoritative parenting and negligent parenting style. The scale has internal reliability coefficient of 0.86.

Omoluabi (2002) reported an alpha reliability coefficient of 0.95. The validity was reported by Elusiyan (1994) who obtained a divergent validity of .60 in Nigeria, by correlating the two scales and MMPI which measured different aspect of social interaction.

#### Conduct Disorders Questionnaire

This is a modify item pool instrument adopted from Conduct Disorder Rating Scale developed (Waschbusch & Elgar, 2007) for parents and teachers to rate Conduct Disorder. The items consist of symptoms of Conduct Disorder described in the DSM-IV within the period of 12 months (Lahey et al., 2004). Waschbusch and Elgar (2007) validated the scale in a community study of 1,554 children and parents and in a study of 80 parents and teachers of school children in a treatment programme, age between 5-17 years. They found the parent version of the instrument to showed 78.8% accuracy in identifying Conduct Disorder against a diagnostic interview while the teacher version were significantly associated with observation of antisocial behaviour. It also obtained reliability coefficient of 0.76 and 0.87 respectively. Thus, this 15-items pool was adopted and modified to produce Conduct Disorder Questionnaire to measure conduct disorder among adolescents. The instrument consist of 15-items with 5-point Likert Scale response option 0-4 (0=Strongly, disagree, 1= Disagree, 2= Neutral, 3= Agree and 4= Strongly agree). A pilot study was conducted with 40 participants from Government Secondary School Garaku and obtained the reliability coefficient for Parenting Styles Scale as .721 and Conduct Disorder Scale as .858. Thus, the instruments were found to be valid and reliable for the study.

The data collated were analysed using SPSS V 23. The descriptive statistics used were frequency, percentages, mean and standard deviation these were used to describe the spread of the data across the sample population. The inferential statistics used for

the test of hypotheses Pearson Product-Moment Correlation and regression analysis and independent sample t-test.

**RESULTS**

This section presents the analysis and interpretation of the stated hypotheses in the study.

**Table 1: Summary Result of the Relationship between Authoritative Parenting and Conduct Disorder of School Students in Keffi**

| Variables               | M     | SD     | Df  | r     | P    |
|-------------------------|-------|--------|-----|-------|------|
| Authoritative parenting | 11.68 | 3.168  | 377 | -.053 | .305 |
| Conduct disorder        | 22.84 | 13.158 |     |       |      |

Table 1 shows the summary results of the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation between authoritative parenting and conduct disorder among school adolescents in Keffi town. The results revealed the mean and standard deviation scores for authoritative parenting (M= 11.68, SD= 3.168) and conduct disorder (M= 22.84, SD= 13.158). Further

analysis revealed a no statistically significant  $r(377) = -0.053, P > 0.05$  NS negative relationship between authoritative parenting and conduct disorder among school adolescents in Keffi town. In other words, the hypothesis was not confirmed in this study. This implies that students under authoritative parenting have no significant influence on conduct disorder.

**Table 2: Summary Result of the Relationship between Authoritarian Parenting and Conduct Disorder**

| Variables               | M     | SD     | Df  | r     | P    |
|-------------------------|-------|--------|-----|-------|------|
| Authoritarian parenting | 12.94 | 3.200  | 377 | -.067 | .191 |
| Conduct disorder        | 22.84 | 13.158 |     |       |      |

Table 2 shows the summary results of the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation between authoritarian parenting and conduct disorder among school adolescents in Keffi town. The results revealed the mean and standard deviation scores for authoritarian parenting (M= 12.94, SD= 3.200) and conduct disorder (M= 22.84, SD= 13.158). Further analysis revealed a no statistically significant

$r(377) = -0.067, P > 0.05$  NS negative relationship between authoritarian parenting and conduct disorder among school adolescents in Keffi town. In other words, the hypothesis was not confirmed in this study. This implies that students under authoritarian parenting style have no significant influence on conduct disorder.

**Table 3: Summary Result of the Relationship between Neglectful Parenting and Conduct Disorder**

| Variables            | M     | SD     | Df  | r    | P    |
|----------------------|-------|--------|-----|------|------|
| Neglectful parenting | 11.40 | 2.943  | 377 | .216 | .000 |
| Conduct disorder     | 22.84 | 13.158 |     |      |      |

Table 3 shows the summary results of the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation between neglectful parenting and conduct disorder among school adolescents in Keffi town. The results revealed the mean and standard deviation scores for neglectful parenting (M= 11.40, SD= 2.943) and conduct disorder (M= 22.84, SD= 13.158). Further

analysis revealed a statistically significant  $r(377) = 0.216, P < 0.05$  positive relationship between neglectful parenting and conduct disorder among school adolescents in Keffi town. In other words, the hypothesis was confirmed in this study. This implies that students under neglectful parenting style have the tendency of a significant conduct disorder.

**Table 4: Summary Result of the Relationship between Permissive Parenting and Conduct Disorder**

| Variables            | M     | SD     | Df  | r     | P    |
|----------------------|-------|--------|-----|-------|------|
| Permissive parenting | 13.48 | 3.273  | 377 | -.032 | .534 |
| Conduct disorder     | 22.84 | 13.158 |     |       |      |

Table 4 shows the summary results of the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation between permissive parenting and conduct disorder among school adolescents in Keffi town. The results revealed the mean and standard deviation scores for permissive parenting (M= 13.48, SD= 3.273) and conduct disorder (M= 22.84, SD= 13.158). Further analysis revealed a no statistically significant

$r(377) = -0.032, P > 0.05NS$  negative relationship between permissive parenting and conduct disorder among school adolescents in Keffi town. In other words, the hypothesis was not confirmed in this study. This implies that students under permissive parenting style have no significant influence on conduct disorder.

**Table 5: Summary Results of the Male and Female School Adolescents Scores on Conduct Disorder in Keffi Town**

| Gender | N   | Mean  | SD     | Df  | t      | P    |
|--------|-----|-------|--------|-----|--------|------|
| Male   | 194 | 22.42 | 13.558 | 377 | -0.642 | .521 |
| Female | 185 | 23.29 | 12.747 |     |        |      |

Table 5 shows the mean and standard deviation scores on males and females conduct disorder. The results revealed that, males (M= 22.42; SD= 13.558) and females (M= 23.29; SD= 12.747). Furthermore, the

analysis revealed a no statistically significant;  $t(377) = -0.642, P > 0.05$  difference between male and female students on conduct disorder. In other words, the hypothesis was not confirmed in this study.

### **Discussion of Findings**

The present study investigated the influence of parenting styles on conduct disorder among secondary schools adolescents. Five research hypotheses were tested. The first hypothesis which stated that, there will be a significant influence of authoritative parenting style on conduct disorder among secondary school adolescents in Keffi Local Government Council was not confirmed as statistically significant negative relationship between authoritative parenting and conduct disorder among school adolescents in Keffi town. This finding is consistent with previous studies. It is also consistent with the finding of Baumrind (2013), who opined that authoritative parenting style has a confronting control that is negotiable, can be reasoned, and is outcome-oriented. It is usually directed at specific child's behaviour which the parent wants to be changed by the child. When parents demand a lot from the child, the child works hard to meet their expectation and therefore they are disciplined and they excel in their academics (Cutrona et al., 1994). In this parenting style, the parent is also responsive to the needs of the child. This makes the child feel loved and supported. The support a child gets helps him/her to solve problems they might be facing as they are growing up or interacting with their peers. This reduces the negative feelings, promotes positive feelings (Alegre, Benson & Perez-Escoda, 2014) and reduces internalizing symptoms in the child (Alizadeh et al., 2011; Yap et al., 2015). Similarly, other studies have shown that authoritative parenting contributes to a child's adjustment because it helps child to develop self-control (Wills et al., 2003).

The second hypothesis stated that, there will be a significant influence of authoritarian parenting style on conduct disorder among secondary school adolescents in Keffi Local Government Council, Nasarawa State, Nigeria. This hypothesis was not confirmed in this study. This implies that students under

authoritarian parenting style have no significant influence on conduct disorder. The finding was consistent with Baumrind (2013) who opined that; authoritarian parenting style is the type of parenting style where the parents practice coercive control over their children. Coercive control is a domineering and intrusive parental behaviour. Parents use threats and make unreasonable orders to their children by setting rules and expect them to be followed without questions. They do not explain the rules to their children and often utilize punishment than discipline. Furthermore, Janssens (2015) opined that; harsh ways of controlling the child like verbal and physical punishment are mostly associated with negative behaviours in children as they grow up. These parents are cold and harsh to the children to the extent that they do not negotiate anything with them. They are very controlling and they do not trust their children to make decisions for themselves. In this phase of life, the adolescent is seeking to identify who they are and what they want in future. Because of their parents being too aggressive, their children learn that being aggressive is the only way of communicating and therefore they become aggressive towards their peers (Richards, 2015). If the parent is too harsh and does not give the child room to make decisions and mistakes, the child might start to disobey their parents as a way of reacting to the harshness of their parents (Murray & Farrington, 2010). Less support from the parent and more negative control leads to increased risk of conduct disorder (Wabishet & Lauween, 2016). Most studies on authoritarian parenting indicate that this type of parenting style is harmful for the development of a child and it results to conduct problems in later life (Thompson, Hollis, & Richards, 2003). A meta-analysis by Leschied, et al (2008) suggests that conduct problems might in future manifest as criminal behaviour in children. This parenting style might make a child try to commit suicide

as a way to escape from their harsh parents (Tunde- Ayinmode & Adegunloye, 2011).

The third hypothesis stated that, there will be a significant influence of neglectful parenting style on conduct disorder among secondary school adolescents in Keffi Local Government Council, Nasarawa State, Nigeria. The hypothesis was confirmed in this study. This reveals that students under neglectful parenting style have the tendency of a significant conduct disorder. The finding was consistent with Oluwatosin and Adediwura, (2010) who opined that; neglectful parents are cold and act indifferent towards the child. They are uninvolved in the life of a child. Outcomes of this parenting style are children might engage in risky sexual behaviour. Wildom and Wilson (2015) opined that the children become delinquents since they are raised in an environment where there are no rules hence and are unable to follow other rules.

Similarly, Matthys and Lochman (2010) stated that neglectful children are likely to take alcohol and abuse other drugs as they try to escape from the reality. Prior to adolescent, a child had made sense of the safety of the world with how reliable and caring its caregiver was. If they were not reliable and caring the child learns not to trust the world hence compromising the next stages in life. During adolescent, a child struggles to form an identity and they do this by being independent of their parent and if the parent is not there then the child has to find a way of forming their identity.

The fourth hypothesis stated that, there will be a significant influence of permissive parenting style on conduct disorder among secondary school adolescents in Keffi Local Government Council, Nasarawa State, Nigeria. The hypothesis was not confirmed in this study. This implies that students under permissive parenting style have no significant influence on conduct disorder. The finding was consistent with Milevsky, et al (2007) who opined that; Permissive parenting is when the parent is more responsive to the needs of their

child and they do not demand a lot from their children. Few or no rules are set for the children to follow and they do not insist on the rules being followed. Parents are lenient with their children's behaviour and do not insist on their children taking any responsibility. They have a low expectation of self-control and of maturity. Permissive parenting is associated with poor behavioural tendencies in children. Furthermore, (Harris et al., 2017) stated that when a child grows into an adolescent, he/she prefers relationships that are outside the family circle.

Similarly, Peckham and Morgan-Lopez (2006) opined that, these adolescents have poor relationship skills with other people for they expect others to treat them as their parent did and if not they easily get frustrated for things have always worked to their favour hence develop an impulsive behaviour and might start to consume alcohol. Also Sanders (2013) said that, when things do not work for them they are prone to taking substance and abusing drugs. Parent's supervision is important to the child at this point in life where they are learning to be more independent. Wang, Stone, Deveaux, Li and Lunn (2015) opined that, when there is low parental monitoring, sexual risk behaviours and peer risk involvement are high. If an adolescent has no supervision and is allowed to do whatever, whenever they want they do not learn to obey rules and to socialize with others becomes difficult.

The fifth hypothesis states that, male adolescents will significantly display conduct disorder than the female adolescents. The result was confirmed using Independent Sample-test the hypothesis was confirmed were it revealed a no statistically significant;  $t(377) = -0.642, P > 0.05$  difference between male and female students on conduct disorder. This is consistent with the study of Acharya (2012) who opined that male and females differ in their parenting styles. Differences were formed in the mothers and fathers styles of parenting. In a similar vein

Salami, Patterson and Fisher (2012) opined that, Male adolescents exhibit more aggressive behaviours, such as fighting, vandalism, and theft, while women more often seem to show relational aggressions that imply a deterioration of relationships with others, emotional manipulation, and a higher tendency to deceit, truancy, and prostitution.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, it is suggested that parents should be continuously involved with their children and should also make out time to understand their behaviour. Children conduct should not be taken for granted in respective of their gender differences, a lot of this conduct problems can be prevented at the early stage of parenting. The society or community have a lot to benefit from observable and concerned parenting role if put in the right perspective.

The study recommends that parents should opt for authoritative rather than authoritarian parenting style. Also, parents should spend time with their children because it can reduce the probability of developing conduct disorder among the secondary school adolescents. Furthermore, adequate monitoring, control, supervision irrespective of the gender, dialogue, communication, explanations and establishment of good and cordial relationships between parents and adolescents could enhance positive and effective parenting.

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# 65

## CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTERGENERATIONAL SEX (AKA BLESSER OR SUGAR DADDY) IN WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

**Daikwo Onazi Lucy**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [enelucy@yahoo.com](mailto:enelucy@yahoo.com)



### Abstract

This research work investigates the causes and consequences of inter-generational sex in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State, Nigeria. Using descriptive statistics, in addition, the work attempt to study the practice of inter-generational sex in Wukari, the prevalence, the motivating factors and how to manage the consequences. The main consequences of inter-generational sex in wukari is Sexually transmitted disease/HIV. Questionnaires were distributed to the age group of 20-29 years old. According to the data there is a relationship between the prevalence of inter-generational sex and poverty in Wukari Local Government Area. The respondents are made up of both singles, married and divorce women and also young men and it also consist of primary, secondary and tertiary educational respondents. The major motivating factors of inter-generational sex in Wukari are financial benefit, poverty, peer pressure unemployment and loneliness. The solution to this social vices include youth empowerment, employment, establishment of a well-articulated National youth policy, propagate moral reorientation, sporting and recreational services.

**Keywords:** Intergenerational, sex, blessers, sugar daddies, national youth policy, STDs

### Introduction

Rukandema (2004) defines inter-generational sex as a sexual relationship between a man and a woman with at least ten years' difference in age. This definition seems to leave out the case of same sex relationships though. Montgomery (2008) however corrects this definition by referring to inter-generational sex as a sexual relationship in which one person is significantly older than the other without specifying the sexual orientations in such relationships. He however adds that such relationships are overwhelmingly characterized by adult men having sexual relationships with female partners ages 15 to 19. He specifies that inter-generational sex can take place outside or within a marital relationship. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2003) defines generation as the average

interval of time between the birth of parents and the birth of their offspring.

Many studies have defined the consequences of inter-generational relationships. Montgomery (2004), for example gives the consequences as vulnerability to HIV infection because older men are more likely to have or have had other partners, including spouses, and therefore are more likely to have been exposed to HIV and STIs than their male counterpart. Due to the power imbalance in the relationship, the girls are unable to negotiate for condom use and so engage in unprotected sex. Unplanned pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases are a great risk.

Motivations for inter-generational relationships have been widely described. According to Rukandema (2004) the benefits for these girls are

often as little as a plate of chips, a mobile phone, clothes or cosmetics.

Broendel (2004) says that some of the girls depend on their older partners for basic needs school fees, textbooks, health care, or food. Others, however, want luxury items they could not otherwise afford - fashionable clothes, cell phones, dinners at restaurants and trips to the hair salon, ambitions directly linked to peer pressure. Other factors that may push young women to engage in such relationships include poverty and family pressure. Such kinds of relationships are known to be short lived and always secretive (CBS news, 2004). They however carry with them a variety of risks and perceived 'benefits' and is a worrying social behavior.

Studies has revealed that inter-generational relationships are largely premised upon material gains, the greater the economic asymmetries between partners and the greater the value of a gift, service, or money exchanged for sex, the less likely the practice of safer sex (Luke, 2003; Wojciki, 2005). In this regard, intergenerational sex is similar to transactional sex because sex is exchanged for money and other materials, but the concept of intergenerational sex is clearly differentiated from commercial sex or prostitution. The former is based on material support mainly through relationships with 'sugar daddy or sugar mummy' (Moore & Biddlecom, 2006). In Nigeria, young people aged 15-24 years old contribute significant number to the new HIV infections with the majority of those infections occurring in young women and girls. From NARHS 2007, HIV prevalence rate among young women is approximately 2.5 times that of young men within the age group.

It is observed that teenage girls in wukari L.G.A prefer older male in marriage and sexual intercourse due to economic reasons. As such there is a competition for married men among teenagers. This is as a result of the economic benefit attached to dating older men or married old men in wukari L.G.A of Taraba

State without knowing the consequences attached to it

Once young women attend the teen age they are faced with several problems and pressures, young women are subject to a variety of social and financial pressures, social pressures to fit in with and look like their peers, and financial pressure to maintain this image. The competition in the society therefore, provides the perfect breeding ground for inter-generational relationships. Older men have recognized and capitalized upon this thereby initiating and perpetuating relationship with the girls (Rukandema, 2004).

One thing that is not clear is whether girls engaging in inter-generational sex understand the consequences. The girl child goes through a lot of challenges in the African communities before she finally gets through to the adult stage such as rape, sexual harassment, intimidation, teasing and threats, Poverty, war and long journeys to school put girls at additional risk (Action-aid International, 2004). It is therefore expected that the girls who make it to the adult stage must have persevered the harsh environment and challenges in which they have been brought up to make it to their present position to understand the risks of engaging in dangerous sexual relationships such as sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancies which may lead to dropping out of school among others and hence are more likely to know how to prevent HIV infection, to delay sexual activity and to take measures to protect themselves.

Inter-generational sex among teenagers in wukari LGA is a big problem because it has increased the rate of HIV and STIs due to the blessing attached to it. Young girls hardly go for HIV and hepatitis 'B' test before saying yes and engage in an unprotected sex with the opposite partner.

Inter-generational sex has increased the rate of Divorce among married men and women in wukari L.G.A; it encourages domestic violence especially to young women where the men practice dictatorship due to

the fact that they control everything in the home and even the bride is seen as a commodity rather than a partner. Some girls go as far as engaging in all sorts of diabolic means to attract sugar daddies or blessers as they are called.

Inter-generational sex in general among the female of Wukari is yet to be understood. This is a big problem because it is only by understanding the motivations (whether social or economic) and consequences that the harm from the practice can be mitigated. This study will therefore attempt to understand in detail the causes and consequences relationship among the young female in Wukari.

This study therefore seeks to find out whether the girls engaging in inter-generational sex understands the consequences of this practice and how they manage those consequences when they arise. It would also be important to understand if the wukari girls take any preventive measures to guard themselves from the consequences

### **Inter-generational sex and HIV infection**

Evidence from the literature clearly links intergeneration sex with high HIV infection in young women. Young women who engage in sexual relationship with older men are more likely to have HIV infection compared to their male counterparts who do not. A study in rural Rakai, Uganda (Kelly, 2021) analyzed the relationship between HIV prevalence and the age of adolescent girls' primary sexual partner, whether marital or non-marital. In a multivariate analysis, among girls aged 15 -19, the adjusted relative risk of HIV infection doubled among those reporting a most recent sexual partner 10 or more years older, compared to those with partner 0-4 years older. Among young women 20 – 24, the adjusted relative risk of HIV infection was 24 percent greater, and among young women aged 25 – 29, it was 9 percent lower. Additional results suggest that 12.4 percent of the HIV prevalence in girls aged 15 – 19, and 5.1 percent in young women aged 20-24, can be attributed to relationships with men 10 or

more years older, largely within marital relationships.

Another study in rural Zimbabwe (Gregson, 2022) also finds a significant positive effect of age difference, with most recent marital or non marital partner; on HIV infection for all adolescents aged 17 – 24. In a multivariate analysis, the authors conclude that a one-year increase in age difference between partners is associated with a 4 percent increase in the risk of HIV infection.

In a related analysis of the effect of age difference between partners in town urban cities in Africa.

Kisumu, Kenya and Ndola, Zambia, Glynn (2021) find a significant positive association between larger age difference with husband and HIV infection. The authors reported that for girls with less than a four-years age difference with their husbands, none are infected with HIV, whereas 38 percent in Kisumu and 34 percent in Ndola are infected if the age difference with their husbands is four years or greater.

In Nigeria, young people aged 15-24 years old contribute significant number to the new HIV infections with the majority of those infections occurring in young women and girls. From NARHS 2017, HIV prevalence rate among young women is approximately 2.5 times that of young men within the age group. This disproportionate rate of HIV infection in young women is similarly found in many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, data show that in general young women age 15-24 in sub-Saharan Africa are three times more likely to be infected with HIV than young men of the same age (UNAIDS, 2016). In Zambia and Zimbabwe, young women are four and five times respectively more likely to have HIV infection compared to their male counterparts (UNAIDS 2024).

### **Adolescence, Youth and Sexuality**

Adolescence has been defined by the WHO as being between the ages of 10 and 19 years, and youth as between 15 and 24 years. (Cook

et al, 2003) Since this study focused on young female aged between 19 years and 24 years, by WHO definition therefore the literature will be based on both the youth and adolescence

According to Nordfjell, (2017), everybody is born with the ability to experience feelings of lust, for intimacy and to become sexually aroused. However, the way people express sexuality and love will differ according to age, gender role, power, upbringing and education, social environment and expectations, self-awareness and self-esteem, opportunities and health status.

Engaging in sexual relations with older partners is gradually a norm for adolescent and young female.

Barbara, (2018) emphasizes that the age of sexual partners is significant because age differentials are thought to correspond to power differentials in sexual relationships, and a girl with less power than her partner is less able to set the terms of sexual activity and reproduction. Data on spousal age differences, which show that adolescent girls' husbands are often considerably older, suggest that unmarried girls' sexual partners are also likely to be older. The age gap between sexual partners has become a salient concern in developing countries where the incidence of STDs, including HIV infection, is greater among adolescent girls than among adolescent boys. There is evidence that where AIDS is commonplace, older men deliberately seek out younger girls in order to reduce the likelihood of becoming infected with HIV.

### **Prevalence of Inter-Generational Sexual Relationships.**

According to Nordfjell, (2017), in his studies have shown that 46% of girls and 37% of boys between the age of 15 and 19 years in Sub-Saharan Africa have had sex. Further analysis of Demographic and Health survey data from 14 countries in the region showed that at least 15% of girls reported having unprotected sex with older male before their fifteenth birthday.

It is worth noting that sexual activity is high among adolescents and youth in Kenya and it begins early (Rosemary and Martin, 2018). In addition, data indicate that 8 out of 10 young people have had sex before age 20. This forms the bulk of school going adolescents.

A study from rural Uganda (Nordfjell, 2017) reports that 8.5 percent of girls (aged 15-19) most recent partners are 30+ years old, which translates into an 11 year or greater age difference. In addition, only 2.5 percent of girls' partners are 35- 39 years old (the oldest age group of partners reported by girls), which is between a 16 and 24-year age difference. A study in Kenya finds 4 percent of girls (aged 15-19) most recent partners are 30 or more years old. (Luke and Kurz, September, 2022). In reports by two projects that conducted in-depth interviews with all girls who presented for induced abortion at urban hospitals in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, one project reported 73 percent of girls' (aged 15-19) partners (most often the partner with whom they became pregnant) were over 30 years old, and 27.5 percent were over 40 years old (the latter statistic revealing age differences of at least 21 years). This is an indication that there appears to be a small proportion of relationships that displays age differences greater than 10 years

### **Reason or motivation for inter-generational sex**

Studies from a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa indicate a range of reasons given for young women engaging in transactional and inter-generational sex. These vary from willingness to engage in wanted relationship ("consent") to coercion and violence and from sex for survival to sex for upward economic mobility. (Hope, 2020). The motivations for adolescent girls to engage in sexual relationships with older men are therefore varied and overlapping, including, strategies to obtain love and affection, a marriage partner and monetary gifts. (Luke and Kurz 2022,)

However, gifts and other financial benefits is the major motivation while extreme household poverty as a motivator of sexual activity is often less described. (Luke and Kurz, 2022). It has been observed that in Kenya, financial gain is the biggest incentive for engaging in cross generational relationships (Longfield, Glick, Waithaka and Berman, 2023). Women seek financial support to buy luxury goods, but sometimes they need money for school fees, household items, and other essential needs. (Denise A. Hines et al, 2020). Luke and Kurz, (2022) concur that financial reasons are the main motivations uncovered for girls to engage in sexual relationships. For example, in Swaziland, 20 percent of girls interviewed reported being sexually active because of financial reasons and in Rural Tanzania, 52 percent of female primary school students reported the reason for having sex was for money or presents. In Kenya, school children aged 11-16 years told researchers that the normal age for initiating both dating and sex was 11-15 years of age, but that the norm was for boyfriends to be at least 2-4 years older than the girls. This age difference was preferred by girls because of the greater financial capacities of older boys and men. (Nordfjell, 2020).

A study in Zambia found that virtually all sex among children was associated with some form of gift or payment to the girl. (Nordfjell, 2020). Young people generally understand the offering of gift as an invitation or, more commonly, an obligation for sex. They regard sex as a valuable commodity that is not to be given away for free. Girls were expected to elicit money from their peers in exchange for sex as well as from older men. It therefore means that gifts are not accepted unless the receiver planned on reciprocating with sex.

According to Catherine and Ellen, (2020), older adults, including people who are married, pressure young people for sex. Most commonly, it is older men (*sugar daddies*) who want to have sexual relationships with young girls. Sometimes too, there are older women

(*sugar mummies*) who want to have relationships with young boys. Often, the adults give gifts, money or special treatment to the young person. The adult might give money for school fees, clothes or sweets. If the adult is someone like a school teacher or a bus driver, he might promise to give good marks or to give free rides. But none of these gifts are really free. After sometime, the adult wants "payment" for the gifts he or she provided. Usually the young person had to "pay" through sex.

Poverty seems to be a major issue for female adolescents who get involved with adult males. Adolescent mothers whose partners are older come from significantly lower social status than adolescents mother whose partners are of the same age. (Denise A. Hines et al, 2006). Children of families with lower educational and economic levels have been found to be more likely to be at sexual risk. (Adamchack, 2020). The young girls tend to get involved with older men for several reason, including that the adult men can provide them with financial security, material things and prestige among their peers, and that because some of the adolescents may already be mothers, adult men, as compared to boys their own age, can provide them with the financial security that they need for themselves and their children (Denise A. Hines et al, 2006). In addition to issues of poverty, many of these adolescent come from homes where there is a history of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and/or neglect, or where there are other issues, such as drug or alcohol abuse, that make for a chaotic home environment. In fact, the more disadvantaged the teen's family-of-origin is, the more likely the teen is to become involved in statutory relationships.

In the numerous studies done to find the motivations behind these relationships, Luke and Kurz, (2022) state that the other motivations to engage in sexual relations with older partners is to find love, and eventually, a spouse. For instance, some girls may desire to become pregnant because they think having a

baby will bring meaning to their lives or motivate their partners to marry them. (Adamchack , 2020). In addition, parents often pressure girls to form relationships with older, established partners that may lead to marriage, or at least where the partner can support their daughter if she becomes pregnant unintentionally. However, families can also protect youth from behavioural risks, living with both parents, having positive family dynamics feeling supported by parents and other adult family members and experiencing proper supervision by adult family members all seem to protect young people from taking risk. Parental values also influence young people, parents and elders who communicate with young people about their values regarding sex have been found to protect the youth form a variety of risk. (Adamchack, 2020).

In addition (Longfield, 2023), contends that pressure from peers to “fit in” and from family members to secure financial assistance from older partners can compel women to engage in relationships. If youth believe their friends have sex, smoke or use alcohol or drugs, they are more likely to engage in those behaviors (Adamchack, 2020). In addition, men appear to pressure young women into relationships by “bribing” them with gifts and pursuing them until they concede.

According to Sharon (2021), a young girl maybe seduced by the attention of an older man who is able to offer her money, gifts

dinner, drugs and even a car. The girl may be desperate to get out of her life situations, especially if she is abused or neglected. She may believe that an older man, more mature male can give her advice about her life. He may represent an opportunity to escape from her current circumstances. Family members may not discourage the relationship, especially since these relationships appear consensual. The relationship may quickly intensify into a sexual encounter. There may be no opportunity for discussions about sex, contraception or consequences. Despite these problems, a girl may feel secure in the relationship. There is also the emotional motivation where young women who are orphans or who live in households that do not provide sufficient emotional support are more likely than other women to seek older partners (Kim, 2023). Furthermore, young girls need fathers to love, nurture and protect them (Sharon, 2020). Unfortunately, many young girls are raised in homes without fathers; others may only receive sexual attention from their fathers. Paternal absence, abuse or dysfunction leaves young girls in a position easily exploited by older males. Abused girls may be tricked or forced into having sex with older men. Because a caring male role model is absent from her life, a young teen girl will turn to another older male in an attempt to fill that void.

**Results and Discussions**

**Motivating Factors of Inter-Generational sex in Wukari**

| <b>Variables</b>                       | <b>Frequency(f)</b> | <b>Percentage (%)</b> |
|--|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Poverty                                | 149                 | 43.7                  |
| Emotional motivation                   | 106                 | 31.1                  |
| Peer group pressure /financial benefit | 86                  | 25.2                  |
| <b>Total</b>                           | <b>341</b>          | <b>100%</b>           |

**Field work 2022**

It is common among those living in abject poverty line i.e 1dollar a day 43.7%, emotional motivation constitute 31.1%, this occur due lack of care from parent and caregivers. While

25.2 engage in it due to peer group pressure, some girls engage in intergeneration sex because of financial gain even when some are not really poor it serves as an added advantage and means to live an extravagant life with.

**How did you manage Physical Abuse, Emotional and verbal Abuse**

| Variables                   | Frequency(f) | Percentage (%) |
|-----------------------------|--------------|----------------|
| Fight back                  | 158          | 46.3           |
| Use Area Boys to fight back | 86           | 25.2           |
| Ask Peers for help          | 97           | 28.5           |
| <b>Total</b>                | <b>341</b>   | <b>100%</b>    |

**Field work 2022**

Most of the respondent always fight back, 28.5 ask their peers for helps it is no longer a hidden

relationship between them as some peers are aware of it.

**How did you manage unwanted pregnancy/STDs**

| Variables          | Frequency(f) | Percentage (%) |
|--------------------|--------------|----------------|
| Use Condom         | 86           | 25.2           |
| Abortion           | 158          | 46.3           |
| Keep the Pregnancy | 97           | 28.5           |
| <b>Total</b>       | <b>341</b>   | <b>100%</b>    |

**Field work 2022**

From the above table it is reveal that 25.2% use condom, majority of the girls opt in for abortion But from the above its found out that most of the respondents used condom about 41.1%, ask for help from peers 17.7% and while 13.0 report to parents and run away in order to manage the consequences of the inter-generational sex in wukari.

From the result obtain from the field it was found out that the rate of prevalence of inter-generational sex in wukari is high. Many of the unmarried girls are in an intimate relationship with men that are 7-15 years older than them and it was also discovered that many girls are in relationship with men ten years older than them and what motivate them to engage in inter-generational sex relationship is financial benefits, and then followed by poverty, the pressure from their peers is also a motivating factor. It was found out that Sexually transmitted disease/HIV are the most common consequences, then Unwanted pregnancies, followed by Abortion, and then dropping out of studies and physical violence are the least. We discovered that in attempt to manage the consequences of inter-generational sex majority of the people in wukari do not use condom, some of the girls

asked their peers for help to fight back when confronted by wives or previous girl friends , some girls fight back when attacked by lovers wife or ex lovers, while others report to the police or even went as far as organizing area boys to fight for them.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

Having established an understanding of poverty and the prevalence of inter-generational sex in wukari, it can be concluded from the findings of this study that poverty and peer pressures influences the practice of inter-generational sex in wukari and that sexually transmitted disease/HIV, Unwanted pregnancies, Abortion, dropping out of studies and Physical violence are repercussions that people who engaged on inter-generational sex face. On the basis of findings of the study, the following recommendations were presented to curb this social vice call inter-generational sex. There is need for the creation of awareness on the danger of intergenerational sex and empowerment for women/girls in Wukari Local Government Area. Efforts should be concentrated on activities that will enable the girl child express their potentials and reduce dependency on their parent and male

counter parts for financial benefit. Parents/caregivers should check the kind of company their children keep to encourage positive friendship and provide emotional support for the girl child. Institution such as religion bodies need check and restore back morals in the society.

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## A DIACHRONIC ANALYSIS OF GENDER INEQUALITY AND CHALLENGES OF WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN NIGERIAN POLITICS

**Geoffrey Nanbal Shipurut**  
**Dankano Chonwa Danasabe**  
**Ogura Usman Umar**  
**Mohammed Abdullahi**  
**Ako Ojoma**

Department of Sociology  
 Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria  
 Email: *geoffreynanbee@gmail.com, chonwadankan@gmail.com*



### Abstract

The discrimination against women in the political arena has continued to intensify despite global and internal awareness on the need for immediate response to women's political plights. Societal derogatory ideologies which are consolidated by culture and religious beliefs continued to promote the marginalization of women within the Nigerian society. Likewise, gender disparities in the provision of education, employment and general recognition in other spheres of life continue to promote gender inequality in the political arena and also incite male chauvinism. The paper examines the factors that militate the active participation of women in Nigerian politics. The paper used a documentary method which included secondary sources. Data were analyzed using content analysis method. Findings indicate that the level of women participation in politics is poor as men continue to dominate the women even in the 2023 general elections. The paper concludes that women are not given political impetus and this continue to be an impediment to the Nigerian society. The paper recommends that educating women should be paramount to governments at all levels in Nigeria.

**Keyword:** Gender, inequality, women empowerment, political participation

### Introduction

The growing debate by scholars and intelligentsia about the role of women in politics globally is an issue that has generated controversies than resolving the perceived gender inequalities in terms of participation in politics of nation states, be they advanced or developing. Several arguments have cropped up about the place of women in politics over the years. Thus while the conservative theorists (Arowolo & Aluko, 2010) argued that the actual role of women and in fact, female folks generally ends in the kitchen, the liberalists (Yetunde, 2012; Erunke, 2013), have variously opined that women's political process as those of their male counterparts,

and hence, such responsibilities cannot be washed away in the societal scheme of things. Opinions are however divided on whether the role of women is predominantly in the home fronts or whether women can also engage meaningfully in other socio-economic and political activities like their male counterparts, thereby contributing their own quota in the sequence and development of the polity. This and several arguments about the place of women in global vis-à-vis Nigerian politics have flooded gender discourses as it contributes to the level of women involvement in politics at whatever level of analysis.

Nonetheless, as women make up about half of Nigeria's population, they ought to be important members of the community. In many Nigerian communities, women are restricted to and encouraged to fulfill the traditional duties of housewifery and motherhood. Strong traditional patriarchal value systems encourage sexually segregated roles and work to impede women's progression and political participation in these societies. Women's social and economic standing in society is determined by the gender roles that are ascribed to them, and this directly affects how many of them participate in political institutions and elected bodies (Luka, 2017).

The marginalization of women in society has been sustained by African unfavorable views that are rooted in culture and religion. Likewise, the lack of equal opportunities for education, work, and recognition in other areas of life for men and women has exacerbated gender inequality in politics and encouraged male chauvinism (Dibia, 2014). Therefore, women have been the most marginalized, abused, exploited, and impoverished group in society. Women are frequently regarded as a minority group, given a specific position in the social hierarchy, barred from pursuing occupations or positions of authority in public life, and perceived as naturally weak, dependent, and submissive (Mba, 2016). Elsewhere, the research by Agbalajobi (2010) revealed that poor societal development results from a country's incapacity to engage women in politics. That is to say, there is a connection between poor development of Nigerian society and gender inequality. Thus, there is a risk that the exclusion of women from governance will lead to a waste of human resources, a weakened democracy, and a hindrance to national progress. It is therefore tempting to contend that increased poverty, slower economic growth, poorer governance, and a lower standard of living in the nation are all caused by gender inequality.

Though women more recently, have made little impact to the development of Nigerian political system and some are still in governance today like (Kofo Bucknor- Akerele, Kema Chkwe, late Dora Akunyili, Mobolaji Osomo, Oby Ezekwesili, Ngozi Okonji-Iweala, Ndidi Okereke, Patricia Etteh, Diazani Allison-Madueke, Sadiya Umar Faruq, Dame Pauline Tallen, Maryam Katagum, Sharon Ikeazor etc.), men have always been the dominant in the political structure with women playing sedentary roles as inferior and subordinate partners. Even when women are deeply involved in the highest level of decision-making in Nigeria, their involvement may be superficial, grossly inadequate and lacks the moral justification for effective representation. It is possible however, for women to change the order that keeps them in positions that limit their development both as individuals and as a group (Luka, 2017). It is on this background that this paper presents the diachronic analysis of the performance of women in Nigerian election from 1999-2023.

### **Election Participation in Nigeria**

In Nigeria, the mobilization and election of political office depend heavily on money. On this subject, Nwankwo and Surma (2018) contended that substantial financial support is necessary for contesting for political office in Nigeria. Unfortunately, most women lack the financial clout to significantly outperform their male colleagues. Furthermore, women seldom ever save money because they constantly spend their earnings on household goods, their kids, and sometimes even their spouses. Women encounter difficulties in securing loans from financial institutions due to the issue of collateral security, as it is often held that men are typically the property owners and women lack personal funds. Either their in-laws, their husbands, or their dads own the money.

According to Luka (2017), the majority of women's low educational attainment makes them the least qualified for political office. The

majority of literature views this as one of the consequences of colonialism, in which men were given preference over women. Furthermore, because of the long-held notion that an educated male child is more advantageous to the family than a girl child who will eventually be married off, some conservative parents would rather their male children receive an education than their female child. Luka, 2017).

Osimen, Anegbode, Basil, and Oyewole (2018) were of the view that most cultures grant women little or no participation in public life, and this is true of both Islam and Christianity. Cultural norms dictate that women should be quiet, obedient, virtuous, and hidden from public view. In most Nigerian communities, women are considered as inferior to males, treated like second-class citizens, as weaker sexes, as child bearers, as the primary caregivers, etc. Women who enter politics are frequently perceived as easy-going, obstinate, pushy, and frequently resort to "bottom power," the word used to describe the practice of using one's body to win favor.

In a similar vein, elections in Nigeria have consistently featured some degree of violence since democracy was restored. In Nigerian politics, there is often political violence before, during, and even after elections. That said, this clarifies why Ngara and Ayabam (2013) proposed that women were still subjected to various forms of violence, intimidation, dehumanization, threats, blackmail, and other forms of physical harm by their male counterparts in an attempt to dissuade them from actively participating in politics.

Further, Kolawale, Abubakar, Owonibi, and Adebayo (2012) contended that early socialization put girls at a disadvantage, which in turn diminished their confidence to engage in public life, particularly political activity. "This is men's work," "You are not a man and stop acting as such," and "Women are to be gentle and mild who can only engage in feminine type of work" are just a few of the insults their mothers would constantly bestow upon them.

Women are raised to view men as superior to them. This belief fosters a lack of trust in them, allowing most women to believe that men are inherently better and that any woman involved in politics must be a prostitute, a wayward, aggressive, stubborn, easy-going woman, or a woman of easy virtue (Kolawal et al., 2012).

Kolawal et al. (2012) go on to say that it is extremely difficult for a wife and mother to participate in political activities because of the set times for meetings and other events. Caucus sessions to deliberate political strategies for the pre- or post-election periods are strange and unsuitable for responsible, family-oriented women, the author noticed. Women are frequently expected to take care of their families and children during the scheduled times. As a result, in order for a woman to actively engage, she must make some concessions to her social and familial obligations, which society may find unacceptable. The practice of scheduling meetings at strange times and having endless political programmes is a clear sign that men are actively working to prevent women from taking an active role in politics.

It is unlikely that the Nigerian women will be elected to important posts within their political party. Nomination to compete for any elected seats is always determined in large part by the party's governance structures. According to Luka (2017), women hold a number of insignificant positions in political parties, the most unimportant of which are women leaders whose purpose is to encourage women to vote for men. As a result, they frequently fail to advocate for women's interests during nominations, which causes women to be marginalized throughout elections.

In a similar vein, women tend to favor their male colleagues over other women in elected office. This may be the consequence of envy, jealousy, or the perception that women are generally quite harsh on one another and seldom assist one another. Ngara and Ayabam

(2013) claim that despite their numerical advantage, women lack confidence in each other's leadership potential and would prefer to vote for or support a man over another woman to win an election. Analogously, the majority of family members, including spouses, forbid women or wives from actively engaging in politics. Family support, in terms of finances and social standing, is lacking for female political contenders. Additionally, female candidates and other electoral activities consistently receive inadequate media coverage, which discriminates against them and likely favors their male counterparts. Together with a number of other issues, these make it challenging for Nigerian women to participate actively in politics, especially when running for electoral office.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Societies, according to the functionalist viewpoint, are intricate systems whose components cooperate to foster stability and unity. This method primarily concentrates on the social structures that influence society as a whole and examines it from a macro-level perspective. According to Giddens (2005), this theory postulates that gender inequality is a social system in which a specific population segment is clearly responsible for certain labor acts and another segment is clearly responsible for other labor acts. It also suggests that gender inequality exists as an effective means of creating a division of labor.

In 1937, George Murdock conducted a thorough investigation that looked at more than 200 pre-industrial communities worldwide. Murdock observed that duties pertaining to hunting and combat were typically required of men. These jobs necessitated living in harsh conditions away from home, sometimes for weeks or months at a time, and having strong physical attributes. On the other hand, women were typically expected to take care of the home and cook. Women's nurturing, more delicate nature made these tasks better suited for them. As a

result of their physical characteristics, Murdock came to the conclusion that these cultural parallels. Many civilizations naturally assign activities requiring physical strength to men since they are typically bigger and stronger. Societies naturally allocate women tasks linked to child care because they are softer and more likely to give birth to children (Giddens, 2005). Functionalist theory explains the beneficial reason for gender role which is important to our study. Meanwhile, critics from feminist theory claim that the gender roles outline by the functionalist are discriminatory and should not be upheld. The theory failed to explain the suppression of women within the society. This elicits the need to explore conflict and feminist theory.

Conflict theory holds that social groupings' struggles for supremacy over limited resources define society. According to conflict theory, gender is best understood in the context of men trying to hold onto their privilege and power at the expense of women. Consequently, it is possible to view men as the dominant group and women as the subservient group..

German sociologist Friedrich Engels used a Marxist approach to study gender roles and family structures. Engels proposed that the proletariat role played by women may be replicated in the home, with the owner-worker relationship that exists in the labor force. This resulted from women's reliance on men to get paid. According to modern conflict theorists, women who earn a living gain influence inside the family and establish more democratic political structures, even though they may still be responsible for the majority of household chores (Haralambos, Holborn & Heald, 2004).

### **Research Methodology**

The research design adopted for this study is ex-post facto research design. This research design is useful in the study of gender inequality and the challenges for women political participation in Nigeria because the variables under study have occurred already.

The method of data collection for this study is documentary method, which is the use of secondary sources, such as textbooks, journals, conference and seminar papers, internet sources, magazines and newspapers. The study also explored the use of content analysis as a method of data analysis.

### Women Participation in Nigerian Politics

The general elections held in the country in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023 saw only few women elected into various

offices. Several women contested both the gubernatorial and presidential elections but none has ever won. However, in the Senate of 1999, women occupied 3 seats out of total of 109 representing just (2.8%). In the House of Representatives, out of a total of 360 seats, women won 13 representing 3.6%. Out of 978 contestable seats in the 36 Houses of Assembly, men occupied 966 leaving only 12 seats for women, a percentage of 1.2%. See table below:

**Table 1: Percentage of the seats won by men and women in 1999 election**

| Office                  | No of Seat available | Men/Percentage | Women/Percentage |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Senate                  | 109                  | 106 (97.2%)    | 3 (2.8%)         |
| House of Reprs          | 360                  | 347 (96.4%)    | 13 (3.6%)        |
| State house of assembly | 978                  | 966 (98.8%)    | 12 (1.2%)        |

Sources: Adapted from Egwu (2015).

In 2003, there was improvement in women representation compared to 1999. The number of women in the senate increased to 4 (3.7%) as men occupied 105 out of 109 seats. In the House of Representatives, men occupied 318 out of

339 leaving women with only 21 seats, a percentage of 6%. The number of women in the state House of Assembly also increased with women having 39 seats out of 951 seats representing 4%. The table below depict this:

**Table 2: Percentage of the seats won by men and women in 2003 election**

| Office                  | No of Seat available | Men/Percentage | Women/Percentage |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Senate                  | 109                  | 105 (96%)      | 4 (3.7%)         |
| House of Reprs          | 339                  | 318 (94%)      | 21 (6%)          |
| Deputy Governor         | 36                   | 34 (94.45%)    | 2 (5.55%)        |
| State house of assembly | 951                  | 912 (96%)      | 39 (4%)          |

Sources: Adapted from Egwu (2015).

In 2007 there was further improvement in women representation in elective positions. In the senate, women occupied 9 out of 109 seats, a percentage of 8.3% as men occupied 100 representing 91%. In the house of representative, the number increased in 2007

as women occupied a total of 25 seats, a percentage of 7%. Furthermore, out of 990 contestable seats in the 36 houses of Assembly, men occupied 936 representing 94.5% leaving only 54 seats for women, a percentage of 5.5%. See the table below:

**Table 3: Percentage of the seats won by men and women in 2007 election**

| Office                  | No of Seat available | Men/Percentage | Women/Percentage |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Senate                  | 109                  | 100 (91.7%)    | 9 (8.3%)         |
| House of Reprs          | 358                  | 333 (93%)      | 25 (7%)          |
| Deputy Governor         | 36                   | 30 (93.94%)    | 6 (16.6%)        |
| State house of assembly | 990                  | 936 (94.5%)    | 54 (5.5%)        |

Sources: Adapted from Egwu (2015).

In the year 2011, the number of women in representative positions decreased. Out of the 109 senators who emerged winners at the polls, only 7 were women representing 6.4% while men occupied 102 seats with 93.6%. Similarly, there was significant drop in the

number of successful candidates into the House of Representatives. Out of 360 available seats, women won only 19 seats representing 5.28% while men occupied 341 with 94.72%. The table below depict this:

**Table 4: Percentage of the seats won by men and women in 2011 election**

| Office                  | No of Seat available | Men/Percentage | Women/Percentage |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Senate                  | 109                  | 102 (93.6%)    | 7 (6.4%)         |
| House of Reps           | 360                  | 341 (94.72%)   | 19 (5.28%)       |
| Deputy Governor         | 36                   | 35 (99.91%)    | 1 (0.09%)        |
| State house of assembly | 990                  | 978 (98.79%)   | 12 (1.21%)       |

Sources: Adapted from Egwu (2015).

In the Senate of 2015, women occupied 8 seats out of total of 109 representing just (7.34%). The number of women in the House of representative decrease to 14 (5.3 per cent)

out of 360 members. in the 36 Houses of Assembly, men occupied 930 leaving only 60 seats for women, a percentage of 6.1% out of 978 contestable seats. See table below:

**Table 5: Percentage of the seats won by men and women in 2015 election**

| Office                  | No of Seat available | Men/Percentage | Women/Percentage |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Senate                  | 109                  | 101 (92.66%)   | 8 (7.34%)        |
| House of Reps           | 360                  | 346 (96.11%)   | 14 (3.89%)       |
| Deputy Governor         | 36                   | 32 (88.9)      | 4 (11.1)         |
| State house of assembly | 990                  | 930 (93.9)     | 60 (6.1%)        |

Sources: Adapted from Egwu (2015).

The 2019 elections did not present a vastly different picture in the number of women who are representing their constituencies. In the senate, women occupied 7 out of 109 seats, a percentage of 6.42% as men occupied 102

representing 93.58%. Similarly, the number of women in the house of representative also decreased to 11 representing 3.06%, while in the state house of assembly, women occupied just 36 seats out of 954 representing 3.63%. (INEC, 2019).

**Table 6: Percentage of the seats won by men and women in 2019 election**

| Office                  | No of Seat available | Men/Percentage | Women/Percentage |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| President               | 1                    | 1 (100%)       | 0 (0%)           |
| Vice president          | 1                    | 1 (100%)       | 0 (0%)           |
| Governor                | 36                   | 36 (100%)      | 0 (0%)           |
| Deputy Governor         | 36                   | 32 (88.89%)    | 4 (11.11%)       |
| Senate                  | 109                  | 102 (93.58%)   | 7 (6.42%)        |
| House of Reps           | 360                  | 349 (96.94%)   | 11 (3.06%)       |
| State house of assembly | 990                  | 954 (96.36%)   | 36 (3.63%)       |

Sources: Database of the Independent National Electoral Commission 2019

### An Appraisal of the 2023 General Elections in Nigeria

Nigeria's inability to execute many treaties and legislation that it signed, intended to guarantee women's participation in politics, has been further highlighted by the outcomes of the 25 February presidential and National Assembly elections. For the National Assembly elections, a total of 18 political parties filed 380 female candidates: 92 for the Senate and 288 for the House of Representatives. Just three of the ninety-two candidates (or 8.4%) who ran for the 109 senate seats were successful. They are Ireti Kingibe of the Labour Party (LP) from the FCT; Idiat Adebule of All Progressives Congress (APC) from Lagos West District; and Ipalibo Harry Banigo of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) from Rivers West District (INEC, 2023).

Similarly, out of the 286 women who contested for seats in the House of Representatives, only 15 was declared winners

with eight from the APC; four from PDP, and one each from LP, APGA and YPP. Oby Orogbu, LP; Maureen Gwacham, APGA; and Chinwe Nnabuife of YPP won their House of Representatives' seats in Anambra State. Ebikake Enenimiete of PDP won in Bayelsa while Blessing Onuh and Regina Akume of APC won in Benue State. Zainab Gimba won in Borno under the APC, Erhiatake Ibori-Suenu of PDP won in Delta State; Miriam Onuoha, Ogbara Kafilat and Adewunmi Onanuga of the APC won in Imo, Lagos and Ogun states respectively. Beni Lar and Boma Goodhead of the PDP emerged winners in Plateau and Rivers State, while Fatsuma Talba and Khadija Ibrahim of APC won their contests in Yobe State. The only female presidential candidate, Chichi Ojei of the Allied People's Movement, secured only 25,961 votes from the 24,025,940 total valid votes cast in the election (INEC, 2023). The table below depict this:

**Table 7: Percentage of seats won by men and women in 2023 election**

| Office                  | No of Seat available | Men/Percentage | Women/Percentage |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|
| President               | 1                    | 1 (100%)       | 0 (0%)           |
| Vice president          | 1                    | 1 (100%)       | 0 (0%)           |
| Governor                | 36                   | 36 (100%)      | 0 (0%)           |
| Deputy Governor         | 36                   | 29 (80.55%)    | 7 (19.44%)       |
| Senate                  | 109                  | 106 (97.24%)   | 3 (2.75%)        |
| House of Reps           | 360                  | 345 (95.83%)   | 15 (4.16%)       |
| State house of assembly | 990                  | 945 (95.45%)   | 45 (4.54%)       |

Sources: Database of the Independent National Electoral Commission 2023

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The paper concluded that women are poorly represented in Nigerian politics since the return to democratic rule in 1999 to 2023 and therefore, recommended that any democratic government that holds power should place a high priority on educating women because, as we all know, an educated woman educates a society. Additionally, a quality education helps women overcome feelings of inferiority and gives them the courage and self-assurance to stand up to men in politics. In order to eliminate any obstacles that either directly or indirectly discourage women from entering

the political sphere, political parties should review their internal policies and processes. In addition, women should be given preference in a set amount of elective and appointed jobs at the federal, state, and municipal levels of government. Some African nations—Rwanda being a prime example have experienced this.

The use of money during elections should be criminalized, with both the provider and the recipient facing legal repercussions. Women activists and organizations should be in the forefront of this fight against corruption and bribery. Legal funds should be established by the government to support female politicians

in their campaign loans and to combat election misconduct in any form at all political levels. They will be able to pursue their political goals unhindered thanks to the funding. Additionally, it will support women's financial status growth to increase involvement. In order to serve as deterrents, political stakeholders should make sure that cultural and religious practices that discriminate against women are prohibited and that those who continue them face just punishment. To prevent discrimination against women's participation in public life, customary and religious institutions should also be reformed. This will support the breakdown of patriarchal systems that uphold the disparity in power between men and women in society. It is recommended that women vote for other women, particularly if the candidate is reputable. When it comes to politics and other governance-related issues, they shouldn't introduce "feminine jealousy."

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## DECOLONIZING THE PERFORMATIVE REPRESENTATION OF COLONIAL CHILD PUNISHMENT IN COMTEMPORARY NIGERIAN SOCIETY

**Martin Okwoli Ogba**

Department of English and Literary Studies  
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria



### Abstract

There has been a descriptive and predictive discourse on how social media skits are reshaping audience consumption, participation, expectation, and production of entertainment. None has focused on Mama Tao's comedy, an online performance comedy that has em-plotted the whipping of children which is a continuation of colonial mode of punishment in Africa. This work will examine Mama Tao's comedy with the aim of decolonizing the performative representation of colonial child punishment. It begins by tracing the history of whipping as a colonial legacy. It is argued in this paper that the culture of going physical in raising children contrary to public opinion is a colonial legacy. Some scholars have argued that "far too many parents argue that 'whupping' children is a distinctly black tradition. This belief, however heartfelt, is wrong". In Taoma's humour skits, she is often seen spanking/slapping her children as a way of getting them to do the right thing in the hope that through humour children viewers would learn to do the right thing. The children are often left in deep fear and confusion after the slap and often go back to repeat similar unacceptable behaviours earning them more slaps. The skits most reflective of the spanking actions will be used to illustrate the inefficacy of this method of child upbringing. The paper concludes that a return to precolonial African child upbringing where children are seen as reincarnations and are therefore revered and treated with much respect, thereby requiring an indigenous mode of discipline, is the best option for child raising today.

**Keywords:** Colonial, shanking, child discipline, morals, modernity

### Introduction

While some parents still believe it can lead to short-term improvements in behaviour, studies show spanking is no more effective than non-physical punishment like setting firm limits, establishing unwanted consequences and the use of didactic folklores which are more African. Straus and Donnelly have defined Corporal punishment as "the use of physical force with the intention of causing a child to experience pain, but not injury, for the purpose of correcting or controlling the child's behavior" (3). In details they said:

The phrase "pain, but not injury" helps to distinguish corporal punishment from physical abuse: our subject is socially acceptable and legal corporal punishment. The phrase "with the intention of causing a child to experience pain" distinguishes

corporal punishment from acts that have other purposes but may also cause pain, such as putting an antiseptic on a cut. It also makes explicit the fact that causing pain is intentional, not incidental. This point may seem obvious, but it is salutary to emphasize, since our culture leads people to focus on why the child was hit, rather than on the fact that hitting hurts (3).

The most frequent forms of corporal punishment are spanking, slapping, grabbing, or shoving a child "roughly" (with more force than is needed to move the child). When one applies this definition to specific acts in order to identify corporal punishment, many questions arise: How did corporal punishment creep into our child rearing culture? What was

the child rearing methods before the adoption on this? Why does it still persist in our society today?

### **Spanking the Child: a Colonial Legacy**

Stacey Patton has argued that “far too many of us will even argue that whupping kids is “a black thing,” as if it’s behavior we are genetically predisposed to and can’t change. But corporal punishment is not a black thing” (12) and that Europeans brutalized their own children for thousands of years prior to crossing the Atlantic to the New World and colonizing Africa (1). She explains that Historians and anthropologists have found no evidence that ritualistic forms of physical discipline of children existed in precolonial West African societies prior to the Atlantic slave trade. West African societies held children in a much higher regard than slave societies in the Atlantic world, which placed emphasis on black bodies as property, not as human beings. West Africans believed that children came from the afterlife, that they were gods or reincarnated ancestors who led profoundly spiritual lives and held extraordinary mystical powers that could be harnessed through ritual practice for the good of the community. In fact, it was believed that coercion and hitting a child could scare off their soul.

Similarly, Sonia Vohito has argued that “The beating of children was brought to this continent through missionaries and missionary schools, and the custom became entrenched across the continent. Pre-colonial means of discipline should be remembered and applied, she said. “We need to get back to traditional practices of how children were raised”, teaching values through storytelling and illustration.

In the same vein, Carol Bower argues that “From all the records that we can find, physical discipline of children was not in African culture before slavery,” she said. “The missionaries, the colonisers and the slave traders are what brought corporal punishment to Africa” (87). For Wessel van den Berg corporal punishment “was exacerbated by the slave trade and by colonial influence on slave-dependent countries. In South Africa, it was exacerbated by the apartheid regime” (241).

Is it an African tradition to spank or beat children? And does it produce responsible adults? Now Studies show that hitting children contributes to domestic and community violence and can even reduce children’s intellectual capacity. “When children are exposed to violence in the home, there’s a high possibility for a boy when he grows up, to become a perpetrator and for a girl when she grows up, to become a victim” (Isabel Magaya 10). Murray Last opined that “It has nonetheless been argued that, as a gross generalisation, in ‘traditional’ Africa adults did not commonly beat their own children, either in punishment or in anger. Beatings did of course happen, but often it was other family members who did the beating; or else it was done ritually, as part of harsh rites of initiation into adulthood” (361). Last further explains that Purely verbal violence-scolding and swearing at an erring child-is by contrast reportedly commonplace. Its aim is to cause maximum shame and to humiliate through scorn and through making others laugh at the victim’s expense. The story could be retold, the phrases teasingly called out, by young and old alike. But the worst form of such verbal violence was a parent’s curse, and it was not inflicted lightly. It was oral, not corporal, punishment, then, that promised lasting pain; no strength was needed to inflict it, and it was much harder to run away from. In the same vain Jelliffe has argued that “The code of values of the particular community, including basic acts of courtesy and complicated kinship behaviour, are impressed on the child by songs and folk stories and by the use of proverbs and sayings”(4).

Paul Ocobock has also explained that

Corporal punishment, the infliction of physical pain and injury on an individual believed to have committed wrongdoing, was commonplace throughout Kenya’s colonial encounter. European settlers bruised houseboys and harvesters with steel-toed boots to instill a sense of station in Kenya’s racial hierarchy. Schoolteachers “broke” pupils’ backs to mold their minds. African chiefs conducted forced labor to the cadence of the kiboko (whip or cane) urging

young men to dig roads faster and carry goods farther. African fathers raised walking sticks to correct absent-minded herdsboys. Colonial magistrates sentenced thousands of young Africans to caning for crimes ranging from bicycle theft to breach of contract. Today, the citizens of an independent Kenya continue to wrestle with the decision to spank (29).

He explains that In Kenya and elsewhere in Africa, as Africans came into increasing contact with Europeans, the diversity of individuals and institutions laying claim to this form of violence expanded. Colonial governments relied on corporal punishment to broadcast their authority, often through military barracks, schools, courts, and penal institutions. Colonial courts were especially devoted to physical violence as a method of discipline and alternative to imprisonment, fines, or other forms of punishment.

#### **Mimicry and the Whipping Tradition**

In his essay *Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse* Homi Bhabha theorized that “the success of colonial appropriation depends on a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its strategic failure, so that mimicry is at once resemblance and menace”(127). What this means is that “the inferiority complex created in black people who have accepted the culture of another country as their own will cause them to imitate the codes of their colonizers” (Fanon 55).

When people are colonized, their traditions and practices are supplanted by imitations of those of the colonizer. Parts of the indigenous culture as elemental as food, clothing, and recreation tend to disappear, because they are either hidden or replaced, thereby removing that culture from history. The subject matter of postcolonial literature is marked by its concern for ambiguity or loss of identity. Mimicry in colonial and postcolonial literature is most commonly seen when members of a colonized society (say, Indians or Africans) imitate the

language, dress, politics, or cultural attitude of their colonizers (say, the British or the French).

In this case, this study focuses on analyzing the Mama Tao’s action of spanking/slapping her children is an imitation of colonial legacy. The imitation of spanking/whipping becomes ambivalent here because been a colonial legacy, it has remained almost permanently with us while the colonisers hardly spank their own children. Infact they have established laws against this. But Africa/Nigeria has taken the imitation of this colonial legacy to another level by internalizing it into our child rearing culture. It has therefore become a resemblance of a colonial practice on one hand and a menace due to its ineffectiveness on child rearing in Nigeria on the other.

#### **Findings and Discussions**

##### **Teni the Detective**

Here, Tao brings home her boy friend who disguises as a lady. She introduces her as Patricia, the best student in her class. Iya Tao is at once impressed that her daughter associates with brilliant students. Tao’s younger sister Teni suspects a foul play owing to the comportment of Patricia who appears a bit restless. She tries to raise a flag but she is immediately asked to shut up by their mother who was rather too excited to see Tao associate with the most brilliant student of her class. Teni goes ahead to unveil Patricia who turns out to be a man. Shocked at the scenario, Mama Tao slaps her daughter’s boyfriend Patricia who immediately sinks into confusion.

The humour here lies in the unmasking of Patricia Tao’s boyfriend by Teni and Mama Tao’s surprised reaction. Ordinarily, Tao’s boyfriend ought not to have gone to the extent of disguising as a lady just to be able to visit Tao, but the fear of spanking/slap, a colonial legacy makes the children to go the extra mile to be able to enjoy each other’s company which by the way appears platonic and harmless. The colonial legacy of spanking therefore creates a void between Tao and her mum. Tao is unable to discuss relationship issues with her mum and is therefore more likely to make mistakes as she

may lack the vital sex education she needs from her mum.

In Nigeria most parents frown at teenagers going into relationships in the form of boyfriends and girlfriends. For them, courtship is a colonial legacy. Parents will rather have their children, (especially female children) go into marriage without any form of courtship. Courtship is almost like a taboo among most Nigerian parents that is why Tao had to go as far as disguising her boyfriend to have him welcomed. So because of the fear of physical spanking, the Nigerian child cannot have relationship conversation with the parent. He or she misses out on vital sex education which they out to enjoy from an open relationship with their parents.

#### **Taaoma – Who Invented This?**

In this, a guest who is about to leave the house decides to give Tao and her brother Tayo money for provision. Their mum Mama Tao tells the visitor not to bother about doing that. But the guest insists and gives her children some token. Immediately the guest leaves, mama Tao demands that her children hand her the money given to them by the guest. Tayo declines his mum's request. Tao tries to protest Mama Tao's request but she is immediately given a sound lap. Mama Tao asks her "who has been feeding you in this house?".

The humour here rests in the irony/hypocrisy of Mama Tao's behavior who initially tells the guest not to bother about giving her children anything only for her to demand the money from her children. And attempt to resist her request earns Tao a slap. Her action here is akin to many parents in Nigeria who though want guests most often to give their children money, but try to put up a not so desperate attitude towards money by showing a bit of refusal. This is intended to teach the children to be cautious in accepting gifts from strangers (Discipline) no matter how much they might be in need of such gifts. Mama Tao therefore believes that the best way to teach a

child such discipline is by spanking in the form of her signature slap.

#### **Taaoma – Shopping with Mum**

In this skit, Mama Tao goes shopping with her daughter Tao. Tao appears too excited and touches almost everything she sees in the supermarket. Her mum cautions her not to be too touchy and to be very careful. She had barely finished when Tao picked a bottle of wine to show her. Mistakenly, the wine falls off Tao's hand. The bottle is completely shattered and Tao immediately receives a thunderous slap from her mum. The mum quickly tries to explain to the store keeper that her daughter smashed the bottle of wine out of mistake. The keeper insists that they must pay thirty five thousand naira for the damages. Left with no option, mama Tao pays for the damages and she openly vows to deal with Tao when they get back home. For fear of getting more slaps, Tao refuses to join the mum in the car opting to go back home by foot.

#### **Taaoma – African Mums at their Best**

In this skit, Tao tells her mum that she wants a Textbook for school which is sold at the cost of four thousand naira. The mum immediately rebukes her that her demands for school materials is becoming too frequent and must cut down. Tao wonders why the mum would be complaining when she is not the one who pays for the books but her dad Kunle. Mama Tao takes her to Kunle her husband and inflates the price of the text book to seven thousand Naira to the surprise of Tao. Kunle gives her the money and in turn she gives Tao four thousand naira. An attempt to protest the dishonest act earns Tao a slap. The humor in this situation lies in the irony of the situation. Mama Tao who was suppose to be teaching her daughter Tao moral behavior like honesty, was in fact teaching her dishonesty, how to get extra money fraudulently by inflating the costs of what she needs. The protest from Tao earns her a slap from her mum. Slap, been a colonial legacy here, is used to put tao in check to

ensure that she doesn't protest the dishonest behavior from her mum.

### Caught in the Act

In this skit, Mama Tao visits her friend Iya Chidinma with her daughter Tao. They were offered slices of bread and BAMA butter to cream it. Usually parents in Nigeria caution their children against taking edibles from strangers unless they are permitted to do so by their parents. Mama Tao tries to use sign language to make Tao reject the offer but Tao fails to decode this. She accepts the bread and BAMA butter and begins to devour it voraciously to the disgust of her Mum. Mama Tao decides to buy the same BAMA Butter for her daughter who appears to love it so much. Tao devours the butter at once something she was meant to take at intervals. This of course infuriates Mama Tao who cautions her daughter on the dangers of eating without control. Tao fails to heed this advice and goes back to Iya Chidinma to demand for more butter. Mama Tao intercepts her doing this and immediately serves her a sound slap on the cheek. Tao screams and appears a little confused after this.

Iya Tao's action here is typical of Nigerian parents who frown at their children accepting food items from strangers. The fact that her daughter Tao goes back again and again in demand for the butter shows the inefficacy of this method of child upbringing. The whipping method; a colonial legacy has been internalized by Mama Tao to an extent that even when it is morally wrong, she still deploys this method in silencing her daughter.

### Conclusion and Recommendation

The paper draws on varied ideas of traditional African disciplining of children to decolonise the child upbringing behavior in Nigerians as represented in Taoma's comedy skits as well as calling to question the efficacy of this colonial method in raising the African child. This article should be viewed as an attempt to bring attention to how postcolonialism has affected child rearing practices in the country. It is recommended that a return to precolonial

African child upbringing where children are seen as reincarnations and are therefore revered and treated with much respect, thereby requiring an indigenous mode of discipline, is the best option for child raising today.

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### Videos

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3. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xt\\_Q5N4vhtU](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xt_Q5N4vhtU)
4. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHikZr8GsfS>
5. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ef2ipHFSmOk&t=3s>.

**Tanko Shawulu Paul<sup>1</sup>**

**Fillah Simon Bodi<sup>2</sup>**

**Nucha Gambo Suntai<sup>3</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Criminology

Army University, Biu, Borno State, Nigeria

<sup>2&3</sup>Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution

Taraba State University Jalingo, Nigeria

Email: *fillahsamson@gmail.com*



### Abstract

The significance of gender mainstreaming in the resolution of conflicts and peace-building cannot be over emphasized. However, the torments resulting from conflict affect men and women differently and their subsequent roles in peace process also differ. This paper examines the role of women in peace-building efforts in Nigeria. The gender theory forms the theoretical lens for the paper. Gender theory holds that all social differences between men and women are the result of oppressive stereotypes and should be eliminated so that men and women participate in every activity of society. Essentially, the theory proposed looking at masculinity and femininity as sets of mutually created characteristics shaping the lives of men and women. Findings in this paper established that women in Nigeria are persistently and consistently excluded from decision making in peace negotiations and are not the first to be consulted on matters related to the maintenance and promotion of peace. The continued exclusion and relegation of women has resulted in failed peace talks and initiatives in Nigeria. The paper concludes that exclusion of women from the peace process has contributed to the failure of peace treaties in bringing about lasting peace in terms of economic, social and political justice for all. The paper recommends the empowerment of both men and women in the Nigerian society in the act of governance and peace building.

**Keywords:** Peace negotiations, gender, masculinity, femininity, Agenda for Peace

### Introduction

West African women like women all over Africa are faced with the direct reality of violent conflicts in the sub region. Gender discrimination which is manifests in the exclusion of women from decision making processes, especially in matters that affect their lives, is obviously evident in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes. Women are persistently and consistently excluded from decision making in peace negotiations and are not the first to be consulted on matters related to the maintenance and promotion of peace. Their continued exclusion and relegation has

resulted in failed peace talks and initiatives to address key issues for women like redress for human rights violations and abuses suffered in pre and post conflict times. Exclusion of women from the peace process has contributed to the fact that peace treaties have seldom brought peace in terms of economic, social and political justice for all.

Though there is a growing international consensus on the significance contribution that women's equal participation with men in peace process could make in maintaining peace and security both locally and internationally, the agitation for inclusion of

women in such peace process is not mere participation but to have a direct influence on peace and security policies or peace promotion and violence prevention measures

### **Conceptualizing peace building**

The idea and the practices of peace building are not new. Due to how ubiquitous the term peace building has become within the vocabulary of the UN, National governments, and even nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), Adekeye Adebajo (accessed 5/5/2014) pointed out that there are three frameworks for understanding peace building.

Each of the views contains important nonnative assumptions about the nature of peace and about the identity and motivations of peace builders. According to the liberal framework, peace building is understood to be part of a global project of liberal governance, promoted by international and regional institutions and other actors. An Agenda for Peace reinforced these ideas. It tends to focus on political and economic liberalization as key elements in the transformation of war-torn societies. Peace building as stabilization shares the liberal concern with order, but rather than focusing its attention on order within states, it sees peacebuilding as being primarily concerned with maintaining the international status quo. The view has become increasingly important since the 9/11 attack on the United States, and the subsequent global "war on terror". This view acknowledges the multitude of activities conducted under the peace building umbrella, the rationale for these activities is to maintain global security and stability. The position of peace building as social justice was put forward by people who believe that the previous two views place undue focus on maintaining order and global status quo. Structural violence is the problem to be addressed through peace building, and peace building therefore involves programs to

encourage inclusive access to resources and institutions, to empower marginalized groups, to end discrimination against women and other disadvantaged groups, and to redistribute income and land ownership. In other words, peace building focus on reaching the condition of "positive peace"

According to the British army (1997:2), peace building usually involves:

Actions which support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlement in order to redress the causes of conflict. These mechanisms to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction.

Boutros-Ghali in his *An Agenda for Peace* categorized peace building into two: Pre-conflict and post conflict peace building. According to him, pre-conflict peace building includes such measures like '[de] militarisation, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development.' Similarly, Rechler (1997:61) sees pre-conflict peace building as: Preventive measures that aim to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor; to promote and implement human rights and the rights of the minorities, and to promote durable development and the realization of a just and fair social order in which there is no discrimination based on race or sex Monsuru Adegboyega Kasali (2006). (karama 2004: 12) cited by Okoro, K. N. (2013) similarly agreed with previous definition he said that peace building as a major concept in conflict resolution and management can be defined as a means of preventing the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of armed conflict as well as emergencies in a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human right mechanism.

Therefore, the process of peace building

encompasses all the stages of conflict, from the pre-conflict to the post conflict phase, with aim of laying the basis for sustainable peace in conflict tom society. Feminist peace researchers are evidently curious about meanings attributed to peace building, especially as it relates to women. Proceeding from the basic premise that senior policy-making men's usage of the term, like that of Boutrous Ghali in 1992, deferred from that of women, Mazurana and Mckay (cited by Akpan, F. et al 20014) conducted a gender analysis of the meaning of peace building at the UN, NGO, and grassroots levels. Based on that understanding and the contextualized and process-oriented nature of women's grassroots peace building efforts they developed this broad concept concerning peace building: peace building includes gender-awareness and woman empowering political, social, economic and human rights. It involves personal and group accountability and reconciliation processes that contribute to the reduction or prevention of violence. It fosters the ability of women, men, girls, and boys in their own cultures to promote condition of nonviolence, equality, justice, and human rights of all people, to build democratic institutions, and to sustain the environment (Akpan, F. et. al. 2014).

### **Women and Peace Building**

At the 2005 World Summit, world leaders reaffirmed the important role of women in conflict prevention, resolution and peace building. They called for the full and effective implementation of the Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security and, for the first time, accepted the inter-linkages across development, peace and security and human rights.

This new resolve for integrated approaches to peace building became a core rationale for the creation of the Peace building Commission (PBC). In making gender equality the PBC's only thematic mandate, a new doctrinal imperative was created for ensuring

systematic attention and resources to advancing gender equality within transitional recovery, reintegration and reconstruction efforts. (Hennie 2000). Indeed, the reality for women in post-conflict situations has grown increasingly brutal as the scourge of HIV/AIDS accumulates and interacts with the effects of poverty, natural disasters and environmental degradation. Today, women in the aftermath of crisis have perilously little protection or access to services, justice, economic security or citizenship. Delivery to meet basic needs and safeguard fundamental rights is unrepentantly lacking. A recent assessment of the United Nations Development Programme's work in crisis prevention and recovery exposed an exhaustive failure to integrate a gender perspective into the United Nations (UN) system's approach to early recovery, transition and reintegration. Justice and security sector reform is the arena in which women's needs are greatest and gaps in response most glaring. Despite increasing violence against women in conflict's aftermath, their protection typically receives less attention than higher profile street crimes, homicides, political corruption, gangs, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) initiatives.

Although recent attention has been given to rape and sexual torture as weapons of war, these very same violations - when committed after a ceasefire - and often by the very same perpetrators, tend to be recast in peace-building processes as private, domestic concerns. Most often, women's security is considered a 'human rights' or 'women's issue' rather than a security sector imperative. Yet undeniably, in many post-conflict settings, the formal security institutions charged with women's protection, namely the military, civilian police and even peacekeepers, are sometimes among the perpetrators of violence against them and fail to serve as accountability institutions to which women can turn for redress and security. Within and across post-conflict situations, there are sharp



inconsistencies in the support provided by the international community to women's machineries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In transitional recovery, women's increased care-burdens and the gender specific impacts of macro-economic, labour and social protection policies are largely unaddressed.

The considerable variance in the standards of basic and emergency health services provided to women in different countries is often associated with the ideology, funding source and/or political affiliation of the funding partners. As a relatively new field, unmet demand and huge gaps persist in knowledge on gender and peace building and in how it is created and used intellectually, politically and in meeting practical needs. From management skills to infrastructure, technical expertise to resources, capacity is lacking within women's peace building institutions, and within and outside of government and the multilateral system. In the context of peace processes there is a systematic absence of gender expertise, conflicting UN positions on women's human rights issues such as quotas and emergency reproductive health care, and an under-representation of women in decision-making. In the few cases where consensus on gender issues had been reached at the early stages of negotiations, implementation has been thwarted by the absence of public support and sufficient resources. Unequivocally, involving women and gender expertise in peace building activities is essential for reconstituting political, legal, cultural and socio-economic and social structures so that they can deliver on gender equality goals.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The gender theory forms the theoretical lens for this paper. This theory holds that all social differences between men and women are the result of oppressive stereotypes and should be eliminated so that men and women participate in every activity of society in statistically equal members (os://daleoleary.

wordpress.com.) Essentially, this theory proposed looking at masculinity and femininity as sets of mutually created characteristics shaping the lives of men and women. Gender theory stresses that gender inequality is not an individual matter, but is deeply ingrained in the structure of societies. Gender inequality is built into the organization of marriage and families, work and the economy, politics, religions, the arts and other cultural productions and even embedded in the very language we speak. The import of this is that society places some roles specifically for men while others are seen to be for women and this attachment is done based on sex differences. However, gender theorists see this differently. They argue that their common humanity supersedes their procreative differentiation.

### **Mainstreaming Gender**

The gender equality and women's empowerment mandate is universally agreed on by states and encompasses all areas of peace, development and human rights. The mandates on gender equality derive from the United Nations Charter, which unequivocally reaffirmed the equal rights of men and women. The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action endorsed gender mainstreaming as a critical and strategic approach for achieving gender equality commitments. The resulting Platform for Action mandates all stakeholders in development policies and programmes, including UN organizations, Member States and civil society actors, to take action in this regard.

According to the 1997 ECOSOC agreed conclusion defined gender mainstreaming as: "The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so

that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetrated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.” As such, gender equality is the overarching and long-term development goal, while gender mainstreaming is a set of specific, strategic approaches as well as technical and institutional processes adopted to achieve that goal.

### **Importance of gender mainstreaming**

Gender mainstreaming enable government to carrying both women and men together in decision making process. It has also help in given voice to women. Gender mainstreaming can be achieved through equitable distribution of position and resources in the society. It can also be achieved through empowerment of both men and women in the society in the act of governance and peace building.

### **Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action**

The fourth World Conference on Women popularly referred to as the Beijing Conference held in 1995 made a great contribution in bringing the issue of women in peace and conflict studies particularly in the area of participation. The declaration calls for the participation of women in conflict resolution at the decision making levels through promotion of participation in all forums and peace processes at all levels. It calls for the integration of gender perspectives in the resolution of conflicts and maintenance of gender balance in the nomination or promotion of candidates for judicial and other relevant positions in all relevant international bodies such as the International Court of Justice, tribunals etc. The Platform made a case for women equal participation with men in conflict prevention and peace processes. The Beijing conference deals extensively with such issues under the strategic objectives and actions on “Women and Armed Conflict”, It declares that peace is inextricably linked with equality between men and women in development. It highlights that violations of human rights of women in situations of armed

conflicts are violations of fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. Among other violations it specifically condemns ethnic cleansing as a strategy of war, rape including systematic rape of women in conflict situations and creation of a mass influx of refugee and displaced persons. It calls for the punishment of perpetrators of such crimes.

### **UN Resolution 1325**

Decades of women’s struggle to bring about their effective participation in conflict resolution and promotion of lasting peace culminated in the adoption of Resolution 1325 by the UN Security Council on October 31, 2000, this was a watershed for decades of women’s struggle peace building participation all over the world. Summarily, Resolution 1325 reiterates the importance of bringing gender perspective to the center of attention in all United Nations conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, peace keeping, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. It calls for increased representation of women, particularly at decision making levels, increased consultation with women, and attention to the special needs of women and girls for example, in refugee situations. . It emphasizes the respect for human rights of women and girls and the need to draw attention to violence against women and girls and calls for an end to impunity and the prosecution of those responsible for crimes related to sexual and other violence against women and girls. The resolution furthermore requests that the UN incorporate gender perspectives in negotiation and implementation of peace agreements.

A debate preceding the adoption of the resolution posed the question, if warlords can be brought to the peace table, why are women not present?(Mongela, 2004). Peace without the full participation of women, the UN evinced is unsustainable. Recognizing the potential of women’s contribution to the prevention of conflict and peacebuilding The resolution demands that member states take effective measures to promote women’s rights,

including increasing women’s representation at all levels of decision-making. The resolution highlighted 5 priority areas for nation states to develop National Action Plans (NAP)

Principles of the United Nations Security Council Resolution is Often referred to as the 5P’s, the emphasis of the resolution is on women’s **Prevention** from all forms of violence one way of doing this is to strengthen the utilization of existing laws as well as enact l ones and also reinforce preventive performance by strengthening women’s roles and contributions in conflict resolution. **Participation** - take special measures to ensure the participation at all levels of peace process as well as involve men and youths in dissemination and enlightenment. **Protection**- of women and girls human rights during conflict. **Promotion** - of gender perspective on all issues regarding conflict resolution and peace processes. Prosecution- this pillar is to ensure that all perpetrators of violence against women and girls are brought to book and punished. I want to conclude this section of this paper with a quote from Ambassador Gertrude Mongela, former member of parliament in Tanzania and Secretary General of Beijing Conference.

“ the participation of women not only provides equal opportunity on pratical level... Addressing gender issues is an important strategy in stimulating development, in alleviating poverty, and strengthening good governance. The main reason for this is that development can only be sustainable where its material benefits are fairly distributed, especially to those most in need, most disadvantaged and most vulnerable and these vulnerable people are often women”. (Mongela, 2004)

Resolution 1325 remains the cornerstone for any peace building work aimed at the inclusion and protection of women. "It recognizes for the first time the role of women in conflict--not as victims, but as actors in the prevention and resolution of conflict and in equal participation

in peace building and decision-making. Furthermore, Resolution 1325 has been strengthened by four supporting resolutions, which were adopted by the Security Council in 2008 and 2009 which all focus on three key goals:

- Resolution 1325 (2000) Strengthening women’s participation in decision making
- Resolution 1889 (2009) Complements 1325, by “calling for the establishment of global indicators to measure progress on its implementations.
- Resolution 1820 (2008) calls for an end to sexual violence and impunity.
- Resolution 1888 (2009) focuses on strengthening leadership, expertise and other institutional capacities within the United Nations and in member states to help put an end to conflict related sexual violence.
- Resolution 1960 empowers the Secretary General to identify and take action against countries suspected of committing patterns of sexual violence and calls for the establishment of monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements specific to conflict-related sexual violence.

These five goals are designed to drive women’s work on peace and security issues.

### **The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa**

Africans understand the connection between gender and peace more cogently perhaps than any other people. In July2003, heads of state and government of the African Union adopted the far reaching Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa. It offers, thus far, the most comprehensive protection to African women of any international or regional human rights instrument.(King 2005, p27). Calling for an end to all forms of violence against women in the public and private spheres, it addresses equality in marriage before the law and the rights to participate in political and decision making processes. The

protocol goes so far to express the right to peace, including the right to participate in the promotion and maintenance of it. The protocol sets forth economic and social welfare rights, including equal pay for equal work, maternity entitlements, and recognition of the economic value of women's work. The Protocol has been described by Human Rights Watch as "breaking new ground in international law" because of its comprehensive coverage of women's human rights issues.

### **Women as mass mobilisers for social justice**

A very important traditional tool that women use to broker peace all over the country is to threaten that they march naked on the streets. Immediately this threat is announced, even the government listens. This threat was executed in the 1920s during the Poll tax law for education problem in Aba, Eastern Nigeria. The women came out in a peaceful demonstration to appeal to the colonial administration to repeal the law. Their request was ignored. It was then they came out naked. The colonial administration had no option but to repeal the law Yomi Oruwari (2006). The role women play in mobilizing to take action for social justice is a dimension of peace building. In several occasions, the enormity of the circumstances forces the women to march around town naked to protest on injustice or the other. It is also known that women tends to discourage their husbands, sons and brothers from taking part in conflicts to enable them pursue their businesses unhindered as they are in most cases the "breadwinner" in the area.

The role played by the Ugborodo and Gbaramatu women of Delta state in 2002, over the alleged illegal occupation of the oil rich area by the multinational oil companies, (Okpovo, 2002 cited by Ogege S) shows the possibility of a meaningful resolution of conflict. In these case, the effect of oil exploration had produced debilitating effects on the people whose traditional occupation is fishing and farming. The deep-seated neglect

and marginalization of the area by the government and oil company's in supporting of human development; infrastructures and provision of basic social amenities has resulted in the local people forming militias that often stage violent protest against the government and the oil company's in the region with women being at the receiving end of the several conflicts that have characterized the region. The women became widows, they were sexually assaulted, raped and became a weapon of conflict in the hands of the ethnic militia and the Nigeria security forces who were supposed to protect citizens from both internal and external invasions.

The Ugborodo and Gbaramatu women of Delta and Warri respectively took action by staging a peaceful protest in front of Shell Petroleum Development Company Headquarters in Warri and Chevron Nigeria Ltd respectively some were half naked, singing, dancing and preventing personnel and vehicles movements in and out of the complex. They held Chevron captive for ten days all operations had to be put off while the negotiation was going on, and the company was forced to declare 'force majeure'. Part of the resolution entailed a signing of an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the women that stressed Chevron's commitment in community development projects and economic empowerment programs in the area.

Recently, when Boko Haram abducted girls from GSS Chibok Borno State 14, 2014, the aggrieved mothers and other indigenes of Chibok, Borno states staged a protest to demand the immediate rescue of the more than 200 secondary school girls abducted. Similarly women protested around the world (from Los Angeles London) and in other parts of the countries in Nigeria took to the street to demand that more to be done to secure their release.

### **Mainstreaming and Gender and peace building in Nigeria**

In Nigeria, there are prevailing concerns such as religious and cultural bias against women participation in politics; Low membership in political parties and party structure; the hostile political environment are not responsive to women needed interest and creates imbalance in the political sphere. Women who constitute about half of the population have been continuously sidelined in public life to the extent that they never held more than 15% of elective offices (see table 1 statistics of elective positions) compared to what obtained in other nations of the world, particularly in developed nations. Comparism of women representation in 2003 and 2007 general elections Olurode (2011) noted that Nigeria lags far behind in women political participation index on the African countries saying, "Nigerian women have about the worst representation of 5.9% in the national legislature when compared to most other African countries example Uganda (34.6%), South Africa (43.2%), Ethiopia (27.7%), Cameroon (20%), Niger (12.3%) and DR Congo (8.0%)". The issue being that women in Nigeria face a lot of odds when they contest against men. For instance, It is an abomination for women to claim equality with men especially in decision making programme such as politics or wanting to head a man under any circumstance, it's a taboo.

The fact that women do not have same productive resources as men and most work of women goes unrecognised. According to the United Nations, of the three quarters of all economic activities in developing countries ascribed to men, women actually perform 53 percent of the work featuring prominently in the informal sectors of most economies in Africa. Nigeria is where women are not considered fit and proper to own and engage in any meaningful investment that will allow them grow financially independent. Many women still lacked access to decent work and face occupational segregation, low access paid

jobs, where a man and a woman have the same qualification, the man would likely be hired by most employers for unknown reasons even when occasions have proved that women are better managers of wealth and resources. Gender in Nigeria report for 2012, the British council and the United Kingdom Department for International Development noted that women economic opportunities remain very constrained. That "women in Nigeria earn less than men, even within the same sector; women and men access to productive assets such as land, credit, technology and information are different. So are the outcomes of their productive activities." Although the gender division of labour within cultural contexts , superimposes on the structure of production within activity units, the assignment of gender roles however has not proceeded with a simultaneous assignments of resources.

Therefore entitlement structures which are similarly skewed by gender, determine the allocation of (productive) resources. Trade and entrepreneur activities have continued to be engendered in the form of access, control and remuneration, while commercial agriculturist and traders (mainly men) supply their commodities to big national, regional and international markets. The smaller entrepreneurs (mainly women) are left to supply the local villages and rural markets. In urban areas commercial and trade activities of men and women are of different scales. Credit facilities for entrepreneurship development also appear to be skewed, with policies of micro finance targeted at women and that of high-capital finance targeted at men. Studies have shown that while both men and women participate in micro and small enterprises (MSC) as well as small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and though the women are more in the MSE and SMEs, the structure of these enterprises favours men in terms of profitability, types of product, size of business and so on. In the industrial sector, especially the informal sector, the participation of woman has always been stronger than that of men. Several patterns distinguished male and

female owned or female dominated SME activities, indicating a strong need for gender sensitivity in planning for SME growth. Women enterprises are concentrated and dominated in more traditional manufacturing activities such as dress making, grass and cane work as well as retail trading. The implication is that there are still institutional barriers to woman full participation in economic empowerment especially through trade. However, the Nigeria Labour Congress instituted a National women commission and has adopted a gender policy to guide economic activities, employment in both the public and especially the private sector in Nigeria.

Women suffered (and still) suffer degrading treatment. Women were considered second-class citizens and in some instances, treated with contempt and derision. Worst yet, in matters that affect them directly and intimately, they were hardly consulted. Social exclusion of women gravely affected their collective lives in more ways than one. It caused disharmony in marital life, frustration and desperations. Women were considered inferior and their participation at all levels of government, discouraged. In fact, some communities considered it a taboo for women to take active roles in governance. Many qualified women were forced to play minor roles in the margins or were frustrated out of governance. This was in spite of several institutional conventions and treaties that encouraged woman participation in economics, politics and governance.

#### ***Ensuring Women, Gender Equality in Nigeria***

Poverty and Economic Empowerment: By ensuring equal access of woman and man to critical resources and reduce extreme poverty among women including ensuring gender equitable access to capital and large scale investment opportunities; remove gender discriminatory practices on access to landed properties; facilitate women's access to improved technology; building women's entrepreneurial skills. Involve women in the

execution of empowerment programmes. Government should enhance the business environment through provision of infrastructures and accounting for the value of women's work in Gross Domestic product (GDP). Building the capacity of the women and men in low poverty group on investment opportunities, by enlightenment on investment opportunities, provide access to institutional credit facilities. Supporting and encouraging the development of small , medium and large scale enterprises, and provide extension services for those in poverty group to enhance information.

#### ***Employment and Labour Issues***

Building the human capital of women to allow comparable opportunity in the modern labour market by encouraging equal access to education and skill acquisition for women to increase their participation at the managerial level, also making vocational education and adult literacy programmes available to all. Eliminate all discriminatory practices against the employment of women in the public and private sectors of the economy, i.e. by eliminating all gender-based discriminatory practices in recruitment, wages and promotion, with particular reference to the private sector. Personnel policies and practices must comply with the principle of equitable representation of both sexes. And all forms of gender based exploitation of work, ensure effective implementation of national and international labour laws, Ratification of ILO Convention on Equal Treatment for men and women workers. Government should create reward system for organizations in the public and private sector of the economy that operates based on gender equity and equality principles.

#### ***Empowerment of women in politics***

Increasing the level of women participation in politics, there is need for sensitization of women to political participation, creating enabling environment for women to

participate in politics by economic empowerment and adequate education of women for political participation. Eradicate all discriminatory policies against women, by reviewing the structure and operational guidelines of political parties. Financial support should be provided for women political aspirants. To increase the number of women in elective position and decision making process, then Affirmative action in politics (30% of political posts to be reserved for women). And also reform the existing traditional structures which exclude women from participating in decision-making.

### **Women and peace building in traditional African setting**

African traditional societies assigned to women the role of educator. Such education is the type that starts from the cradle and was effected by means of a variety of activities in which the children participated. Thus the most general implication in all the studies of peace is the understanding that peace is not born but made and that the culture of peace in traditional African societies was implanted in a child through responsible upbringing and socialization undertaken and supervised by mothers. Indeed the central message in these studies is that peace building was taken seriously in traditional African societies and that it is established, little by little, in young minds and moulded in the behavior and personality of the young through the agency of the mother

In traditional African communities, girls are trained in their responsibilities as women and that the elderly women were responsible for these training. Each child is exposed to a variety of songs, stories, proverbs and saying directed by the mother or aunts and conveyed at the fireplace or after the evening meals. The songs, stories, proverbs and saying contain simple but clear messages and moral teachings aim at conveying the implication of greed, conflict and rivalry and try to project to the children what is expected of them as sons

and daughters in family and community relationship. Certain myths given to children in those days were meant to emphasize the fact that to avoid war can sometimes be an act of good leadership. For instance, women in the traditional Igbo society were transmitters of social and cultural values to their progeny and to the future generation. The implication of this type of educational system and method is slightly underscored in the fact that peace is not born but made and that the culture of peace was ingrained in the child through responsible upbringing.

### **Mediatory role played by traditional African women, Nigeria case**

The mediatory role of women starts at home or family level, being the nucleus of the society. As a result, girl-child are educated quite early of age to prepare them to fulfilling this role. In Nigeria, the Igbo traditional system of education for the girls enabled them to supplement the roles played by their mothers by settling petty quarrels among their siblings. Among the Igbo people of Eastern Nigeria, just like most African traditional societies, the first wife in a polygamous marriage was the chief peace mediator in the family.

She was responsible for restoring peace and tranquility in a situation of conflict between the husband and other wives or husband brothers. She also ensures that there exists perfect harmony between the younger-in-laws and their wives. According to Nwoye (2008) and Mohammad (2003) cited by Okoro, Kingsley N. (2013), one of the fundamental principles upon which the African society is built was the sacred character of respect given to the elderly and particularly women and as such they played key roles in the crises management in the society.

In a situation of manifest conflict in the traditional society, the older women of the clan would go to meet the opposing clan and interpose themselves between the fighters in

order to make them see reason. If their entreaty seems ineffective, the women usually threatened to expose their nakedness or practically go down on their knees. In either case, the gesture signified a curse for those who bore the responsibility for such grave acts, owing to the enormity of respect the women commanded in those days, the warring parties will put down their weapons before the fateful acts were accomplished by these women.

### **Consolidatory role of women in peace building**

In a situation of armed conflict, women played both active and passive roles in the restoration and consolidation of peace in Igbo land. The women at this point become the initiator and agent of covenant relationship between the opposing parties. A pact usually operated in the resolution of conflict caused by a murder of a member of a clan member, when required, a female mediator was quickly sent to the family of the victims. If the mediation was effective, the two families meet to break the strong beard of cut water yam, which signifies eternal sorority. In conflict resulting to bloodshed in the traditional Igbo society, the custom require that serious pacifying steps be taken to broker peace between the two warring clans. A traditional ceremony, known as 'blood money reparations' was organized between the two clans.

In this ceremony a marriage involving the two clans was conducted. Here the women play significant role in this ritual of peace mediation and consolidation. The marriage arrangement was always between a man that lost his brother or close relative in the conflict and a girl from the opposing side. The aim of the marriage rite was to heal the wound of war and cement a relationship between the warring clans. The general which among Igbo people is 'where blood is shed, it must be soaked with birth fluid'. The implication of this action is that the married women, who now

becomes a type of 'peace offering' will give birth to sons, who will fill the void created by the, mean, who perished in the conflict.

Furthermore, the marriage was designed to be an impregnable source of bond to the groups and thus minimize the possibilities of another conflict between the two clans (Nwoye 2008 31 also cited by Okoro, K.N (2013)

### **Advisory role of traditional peace initiative**

Women in traditional society play advisory role behind the screen. According to Nwoye (2008) within this structure, women played the more unobstructive, yet leading substantive role, both in their families and within their own circle. There is a general revelation that in almost all Igbo communities, women exercised considerable influence over their husbands. However, such influence was forced to remain discreet as it was a controversial issue in the society, which could see it as weakness on the part of her husband. As a result, the wife was usually discreet in public but becomes the most influential adviser of her husband in the intimacy of the bedroom. In the Igbo traditional society, there was this practice, now antiquated where after sharing a family meal, the traditional wife reserved a small dish called, 'bed dish' which she gave to her husband at bedtime. It was during this time of intimate meal that confidential conversations took place between husband and wife. This piece of advice would greatly influence the decisions, which the husband would later take. Sometimes within the system, when a husband was faced with problem, he would not take immediate decision until the confides in his wife's wise council. (Mathey 2003) cited by Okoro, Kingsley N (2013).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The role of women in peace building in Nigeria cannot be over emphasized. It is a common knowledge that in conflict situations women



suffer the most alongside their children. However, when it is time for conflict resolution and peace building, only the men are involved as members of delegations to negotiate peace. The relegation of women to the background even in matters that affect them directly like peace and security emanate from home or the private domain into the general *society* (Sheila 1999, and Sheritima 2001 cited by Ogege S. 02009).

The general believe everywhere is that a woman's place is in her husband's home that is where they feel she can displace the entire God given talent that she has. Most cultures in those days believe that training a woman was just a waste of time and resources that is why a woman is educated up to the primary level and stop while her brothers go further to the higher institution. But time has shown that educating a woman is no mere waste of time and those parents who did it have lived not to regret it. In our homes today women are the ones who see to it that things are managed well and that things go the way it ought to go, this type of passion that this women have in managing their home's is what they carry to their work place to work with. Irrespective of their relegation, the women folks have tried in various ways in averting, checking and halting otherwise threatening situations to peace and security in Nigeria. The women in Nigeria should be encourage not only in peace building but in politics, civil society role as that will provide lasting solution to the problems of conflict and instability in our country. Women be encouraged to participate actively in politics by allocating certain position to them, they should also be encourage to participating in economic activities, managing business such

as banking sectors ,oil and gas , security etc that promote peace building in the society.

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**PART XIV:**  
MAINSTREAMING SOCIAL INCLUSION AND SECURITY AMONG  
DISADVANTAGED GROUPS

# 69

## UNVEILING PARENTAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS GIRLS' EDUCATION IN BAYARA COMMUNITY, BAUCHI STATE, NIGERIA

**Diqson Bishugad Yunana**

Department of Sociology/Anthropology  
University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria  
Email: [diqsonyunana@gmail.com](mailto:diqsonyunana@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The issue of educating girls, which is prevalent in numerous developing nations including Nigeria, has posed a challenge. The Nigerian girl child faces obstacles due to cultural norms that hinder her ability to compete with her counterparts in more developed nations. Extensive research has indicated a significant correlation between girls' literacy rates and religious and traditional misconceptions. Given Nigeria's strong religious orientation, a large portion of its population adheres strictly to religious scriptures such as the Bible or Quran. Consequently, many households believe that girls should not receive education on par with boys, and in some cases, not receive education at all. This research examines the parental perspectives on the education of girls in Bayara Community, situated in the Bauchi Local Government Area of Bauchi State, Nigeria. Primary data were collected via field surveys to evaluate the parents' perceptions regarding the significance of educating the girl-child. The outcomes reveal that 80.8% of parents in Bayara Community acknowledge the necessity of educating their daughters. Furthermore, 66.7% express a preference for providing higher education to their female offspring. Additionally, 62.5% of parents do not agree with the notion that educating male children holds greater importance than educating female children. Contrary to prevailing beliefs, the findings suggest a predominantly positive attitude among parents in Bayara Community towards educating girls, challenging the common assumption of negative attitudes towards girl-child education in northern Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Perception, education, girl-child, attitude, parent

### Introduction

Education is widely acknowledged as a fundamental human entitlement and a significant catalyst for socio-economic advancement. Nevertheless, in numerous societies, particularly in places such as Bayara Community, Bauchi State, and northern Nigeria, disparities between genders persist in terms of access to education, with girls frequently encountering substantial obstacles when it comes to enrollment and retention in schools. Despite concerted efforts to foster gender parity in education on a global scale, deeply ingrained cultural norms, socio-economic factors, and systemic challenges continue to hinder progress, especially in rural communities. Within this context,

comprehending parental attitudes towards the education of girls emerges as an essential area of investigation. Parents play a pivotal role in shaping the educational pathways of their offspring, yet their beliefs, perceptions, and decisions concerning the education of girls remain relatively unexplored within the Bayara community. By revealing the underlying factors that influence parental attitudes towards the education of girls, this study seeks to contribute to the formulation of targeted interventions and policies aimed at promoting gender equality and enhancing educational outcomes for all children in this particular region.

The fact that education is the cornerstone of a purposeful productive human existence and development is indisputable. Education is the process that helps individuals to achieve an all-round development so as to function optimally in the society. Schooling is therefore an essential activity which all children should have the opportunity to participate in, so that they are equipped for future endeavours. Educational attainment is a key component of children's success as adults in multiple areas – including the labour market and later childrearing. Education, especially of the girls is widely regarded as one of the key strategies to bring about basic change in empowering and building human socio-economic capital. International comparisons shows a 1% increase in the number of girls with secondary education (UNESCO, 2014).

No child should therefore be denied the opportunity to be literate considering its importance. It is in this light that Abu-Saeed & Abu-Saeed (2012) asserts that literacy is an essential ingredient for obtaining personal, community and societal development and growth. In 2006, United Nations Educational and Cultural Organisations (UNESCO 2016) observed that individuals with literacy and numeracy skills are more productive, understand family planning and enjoy better quality of life. A child's educational attainment is strongly influenced by characteristics of his/her parents, such as their own educational attainments, economic resources, and expectations.

The importance and connection of education to the development of any society is apparent. The international community and governments all over the world have made commitments for citizens to have access to education because they have known the importance of education to human and societal development. Global education patterns are changing within formal education systems, from primary to tertiary levels, opportunities are expanding, literacy levels are improving and enrolment is rising. Data

indicate that progress toward gender parity at primary school level continues, yet the gap between boys and girls remains wide. An estimated 35 million girls of primary school age and 37 million girls of lower secondary school age were not enrolled in school in 2009, narrowing their horizons and undermining their potentials to contribute to society (UNESCO, 2012).

Gender-based discrimination in education is both a cause and a consequence of deep-rooted disparities in society. Poverty, geographical isolation, ethnic background, disability, traditional attitudes about their status and role all undermine the ability of women and girls to exercise their rights. Harmful practices such as early marriage and pregnancy, gender-based violence, and discriminatory education laws, policies, contents and practices still prevent millions of girls from enrolling, completing and benefitting from education (UNESCO, 2012). Nigeria, like other countries of the world, signed the major international declaration on education in 1990 (Chibiko, 2000). Many developing countries face serious economic pressures and this always gives little room for designing and initiating programmes to improve girl-child education. ActionAid (2011) asserted that some measures could be taken to redress gender inequality in educational enrolment and completion in spite of the financial limitations. Clear imbalances against the girls in enrolment, attendance and completion rates in all levels of education in Nigeria, especially in the northern parts the country due to socio-cultural and religious factors abound (UNESCO, 2014).

In the Bayara Community, located in Bauchi State, Nigeria, there remains a significant focus on the issue of girls' education. Notwithstanding global initiatives to foster gender equality in education, enduring inequities persist, particularly in regions deeply ingrained in traditional norms and cultural beliefs. In this particular scenario,

parental attitudes are instrumental in shaping the educational journeys of young girls.

The central challenge lies in the complex interaction of cultural and societal norms embedded in the fabric of the Bayara Community. Here, deeply ingrained beliefs often prioritize boys' education, placing girls in a subordinate position within the educational sphere. These entrenched norms create significant obstacles to girls' educational opportunities, hindering their academic advancement and socio-economic empowerment. At the heart of this issue is the profound influence of parental attitudes on educational participation. Negative attitudes towards girls' education can manifest in various ways, leading to lower enrollment rates, higher dropout rates, and compromised academic performance among girls in the Bayara Community. The impact of these attitudes extends beyond the individual, affecting the overall development and prosperity of the community.

The importance of understanding parental attitudes towards girls' education in the Bayara Community is highlighted by recent academic research. A study by Abdullahi et al. (2023) emphasized the widespread influence of cultural norms on parental views of girls' education in northern Nigeria. Additionally, research by Okeke and Ibrahim (2022) stressed the necessity of targeted interventions to address socio-cultural barriers to girls' education in Bauchi State.

In order to effectively address this pressing issue, it is imperative to pinpoint the underlying factors influencing parental attitudes towards girls' education. By utilizing findings from recent empirical studies, like those conducted by Abdullahi et al. (2023) and Okeke and Ibrahim (2022), policymakers and stakeholders can design evidence-based strategies customized to the socio-cultural context of the Bayara Community. These strategies need to incorporate initiatives that question gender stereotypes, encourage

community participation, and establish supportive environments for girls' education.

### **Challenges of Girl-Child Education in Nigeria**

A series of studies have highlighted the challenges facing girl-child education in Nigeria, particularly in the Bayara community, Bauchi State. Yise (2020) and Ajufo (2019) both underscore the negative parental attitudes towards girls' education, with Yise specifically noting the early marriage of girls as a significant barrier. Similola (2022) further emphasizes the role of cultural and religious beliefs in perpetuating these attitudes, while Titalayo (2019) highlights the need for improved communication within families, particularly on sensitive topics like sex education. These studies collectively underscore the need for targeted interventions to address these challenges and promote girls' education in the Bayara community. Education may be viewed as the process of learning to live as a useful and acceptable member of the society. It involves the development of one's intellectual and moral potentialities as well as provides practical skills for seeking livelihood. In spite of the relevance of education to humanity, it has not been fully accepted by some parents most especially in northern Nigeria where the girl-child is faced with quite a number of problems among which of course is the problem of equal educational opportunity. The girl-child has little or no access to education as a result of the negative perception parents have on the education of the girl-child. United Nations Development Programmes (National School Census, 2006), asserted that for every 100 persons in the urban areas who were illiterate, over 63 were female, while the remaining 37 were male. Nationwide, an illiteracy level of 34 percent was recorded with female accounting for over 63 percent of the figure. Available data on national statistics on school enrolment shows a gender ratio of 57.43 in favour of boys (Ocho, 2005). While some southern states have attained parity such as Lagos State, 50

percent, Rivers 50 percent, the gap in the north ranges between 34 percent in Kebbi State and 44 percent in Borno State (Okeke & Njoku, 2008). Some parents faulted the western education as being immoral and unreligious. Therefore, they would rather send their female children to hawk than to attend school. Osita (2007) identify the following as factors militating against female education: poverty, illiteracy, early marriage, to mention a few. According to Williams (2002), some parents believed that women's place is the kitchen that is why they see no need of educating the girl-child. The ill-informed parents do not know that the girl-child of today is not just the woman of tomorrow but a mother and leader who exerts a great deal of influence on her husband, children and the larger society.

Seeing the danger posed by the negative perception of the girl-child education, Connected Development (2017) asserts that a birth cannot fly with one wing, meaning that where education is lopsided in favour of male, the other wing (female) will be weak and this may adversely affect the technological and scientific development of a nation. For any nation to achieve meaningful development, technological, scientific and social development, parents must develop a positive perception of the education of the girl-child.

It has been documented that the number of girls in school is lower than that of boys especially in the sub-Saharan Africa (Federal Office of Statistics, 2012). In 47 out of 54 African countries, girls have less than a 50% chance of completing primary school (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Poverty and economic issues, early marriage and teenage pregnancy, inadequate school infrastructure and cultural and religious misinterpretations are some of the main issues that prevent girls from going to school (UNICEF, 2007). However, in recent times there has been rise in the enrolment of girl-child in school. UNESCO (2011) asserted that almost two-third of the world's 792 million illiterate adults are

women. In recent times the girls' enrolment in primary education has been increasing at a faster rate than that of boys (UNESCO, 2012). This paper therefore seeks to address this fundamental question: How do parents in Bayara perceive the education of the girl-child?

### **Theoretical Framework**

To interpret the research data and integrate them within a cohesive body of knowledge, this study has adopted the Structural Functionalist theory. The logic of this framework is anchored on the strength of the perspective and how it helps to explain the girl-child education. Functionalism is adopted because of socio-cultural factors as social facts that constrain people's behaviour. Functionalism focuses on the structures of society and their functional significance (positive or negative consequences) for other structures. The primary concern of functionalism is the large-scale social structures and institutions of society, their interrelationships, and their constraining effects on actors (Ritzer, 2003). A functionalist is concerned with the relationship among the large-scale structures of society, for instance, the educational system and the economic system. The focus is on the functions that each provides for other. For example, the educational system provides trained personnel needed to fill occupational positions within the economy. The economy, in turn, provides such positions for those people who complete the educational process. This allows the educational system and its students to have an objective in mind at the end of the educational process. Although this offers an image of a positive and close-fitting relationship between social structures, it need not necessarily be that way (Ritzer, 2003). Other structures like the family and religion also affect education, especially the girl-child education.

It important therefore, to state clearly that every member of the society is entitled to equality education opportunity irrespective of gender differences. When the girl-child is denied or given little opportunity to acquire

education, the society may not function normal.

### Research Methodology

This study was conducted in Bayara. Bayara is situated in Bauchi Local Government Area of Bauchi State, along Bauchi-Dass road. Bayara community is a small community with an estimated population of about 7,000 people (NPC, 2006). Christianity and Islam are the preponderant religions practiced by the people. Languages spoken in the area include Hausa, Sayanci, and Fulani. The predominant occupations are civil service and farming.

The study design was a descriptive cross-sectional study of the population in question. The study population included both the male and female parents with children of school age in the study area. A cluster sampling technique was used for this study. The entire area was divided into two major clusters. The first cluster was called Unguwar Sayawa and the second cluster was called Unguwar Hausawa. A sample size of 120 was drawn from the two clusters for this study.

Each of the two clusters had different number of streets. Three streets were selected to represent each of the clusters using simple random sampling done by simple balloting. Twenty households were selected from each of the selected streets using systematic sampling procedure. This was done by the researcher standing in the middle of the street and counting three households. The third

household then served as a sample unit until a total of twenty households that met the inclusion criteria were sampled.

A male or female parent who met the inclusion criteria in every household was given a questionnaire to fill. Where the respondent could not understand English language, the researcher interviewed him or her in Hausa language. Where there was more than one parent in a household, simple random sampling was used to select just one parent.

Data gathered was through questionnaire survey and interview where the respondent does not understand English language. A pilot study was conducted among 40 respondents who have children of school age in Kafin Tafawa, a different community. Data was coded and analysed with the computer using the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) software package version 16. Analyses were presented in form of simple frequency tables.

### Results and Discussions

A total of 120 respondents were used for this study. The sex distribution of the respondents shows that majority (64; 53.3%) were male. The remaining (56; 46.7%) were female. This implies that men responded more than women during the research. The distribution of the respondents by religion reveals that the majority 57.7% were Muslims while 43.3% were Christians.

**Table 1: Socio-demographic data of the respondents**

| Respondents data          | Frequency | %    |
|---------------------------|-----------|------|
| <b>Occupation</b>         |           |      |
| Farming                   | 68        | 56.7 |
| Civil Servants            | 50        | 41.6 |
| Other                     | 2         | 1.7  |
| <b>Total</b>              | 120       | 100% |
| <b>Marital Status</b>     |           |      |
| Married                   | 71        | 59.2 |
| Divorced                  | 23        | 19.2 |
| Widowed                   | 26        | 21.6 |
| <b>Total</b>              | 120       | 100% |
| <b>Educational Status</b> |           |      |
| No formal                 | 12        | 10.0 |
| Primary                   | 18        | 15.0 |



|                           |     |      |
|---------------------------|-----|------|
| Secondary                 | 39  | 32.5 |
| Tertiary                  | 51  | 42.5 |
| <b>Total</b>              | 120 | 100% |
| <b>Number of children</b> |     |      |
| Below 5                   | 58  | 48.3 |
| Above 5                   | 62  | 51.7 |
| <b>Total</b>              | 120 | 100% |

**Source: Field survey, 2017**

The above table shows that the majority (56.7%) were farmers while 41.6% of the respondents were farmers. The table also shows that 1.7% of the respondents were into other occupations. The table shows the distribution by marital status of the respondents as follows: 59.2% were married, 19.2% were divorced, and 21.6% were either widows or widowers. The distribution of the

respondents by educational status indicates that 10.0% of the respondents did not go to school, 15.0% of the respondents only attended primary education, 32.5% of the respondents had attended secondary school, and 42.5% of the respondents had tertiary education. This implies that most of the parents have acquired tertiary education.

**Table 2: Respondents' Perception on the advantages of girl-child education**

| Of what advantage is the girl-child education? | Frequency | %    |
|--|-----------|------|
| Little advantage                               | 19        | 15.8 |
| Economic empowerment                           | 43        | 35.8 |
| Socialization                                  | 48        | 40.0 |
| <b>Total</b>                                   | 120       | 100% |

**Source: Field survey, 2017**

Table 2 above indicates that 15.8% of the respondents perceived the girl-child education to be of little advantage to the family. From the same table, 35.5% of the respondents believed that education empowers the girl-child economically. Majority (40.0%) of the respondents believed that education of the girl-child has socialization advantages. This

implies that educated girls socialize well with people and they train their children well. It is believed that women that attended school train their children well and even help them with their work. Education also empowers women economically thereby allowing them to support their families financially.

**Table 3: Respondents' Preferred Level of Educational Attainment for the Girl-Child**

| To what level would you train your daughters? | Frequency | %    |
|---|-----------|------|
| Primary                                       | 12        | 10.0 |
| Secondary                                     | 28        | 23.3 |
| Tertiary                                      | 80        | 66.7 |
| <b>Total</b>                                  | 120       | 100% |

**Source: Field Survey, 2017**

Table 3 shows that 66.7% of parents in Bayara said they would train their daughters to tertiary level of education. The table also shows that 23.3% percent of the respondents said they train their female children to secondary level. Only 10.0% of the parents responded that they would only give the girl-child primary education. From the table above

it is clear that parents in the study area have positive perception of the girl-child education since the majority of the respondents would prefer to send their daughters to institution of higher learning. Those who said they will on train their daughters to primary school might have been influenced by cultural or religious beliefs pertaining marriage.

**Table 4: Respondents’ Responses on whether their Religion allows Women to Work in the Public Organization**

| Does your religion permits women to work in public organizations? | Frequency | %    |
|---|-----------|------|
| Yes   | 86        | 71.7 |
| No  | 34        | 28.3 |
| <b>Total</b>  | 120       | 100% |

**Source: Field survey, 2017**

Table 4 shows that 71.7% of the respondents said their religion allows women to work in the public organisation. 28.3% of the respondents responded that their religion does not permit women to work in public organisation. On whether the women should work in the

kitchen alone, 63.3% of the respondents responded that the women should not be reduced to kitchen workers, while 36.7% of the respondents responded that the women should be reduced to kitchen workers alone.

**Table 5: Respondents’ views on whether the Girl-Child should be use as a Source of Family Income**

| Should the Girl-child be used to augment family income? | Frequency | %    |
|---|-----------|------|
| Yes   | 29        | 24.2 |
| No  | 91        | 75.8 |
| <b>Total</b>  | 120       | 100% |

**Source: Field survey, 2017**

Table 5 above indicates that 75.8% of the parents living in the study area did not agree that the girl-child should be used to augment family income. The table also shows that 24.2% of the respondents said the girl-child should be used to augment their income. The implication here is that only a few (24.2%) of the parents can send their female children to hawk in the instead of sending them to school. Some parents used to see the girl-child as a source of income that is why they use them to augment their income. But with this finding one can say that such negative attitude toward the girl-child is gradually fading away.

child is given quality education, she tends to be more productive to her family and to her community. The northern part of Nigeria is known for having low literate rate for the female. This situation is gradually eroding as parents whose possess the right to send their female children are now beginning to see the benefits of educating the female children. This may not be unconnected to the massive awareness created about the need to give the girl-child equal educational opportunity with her male counterpart.

The findings of this study reveals that residents of Bayara community consider the girl-child education to be of importance to both to the girl and the society as a whole. Majority of respondent believed that educating a girl-child attracts a lot of advantages which include economic empowerment and socialization benefits. Only a few still hold the negative attitudes towards the girl-child education. This findings corroborates the finding of Ngailiankim (1995) when he found that some parents were beginning to have positive attitudes towards the education of the girl-child. When a girl-

The study also revealed that most parents in the study area were of the view of training the girl-child up to tertiary level of education as against the popular notion that parents in the north do not see that need to train the girl-child beyond primary school. This findings confirms the findings Goodluck & Osanyande (2011) where they reported an improvement in the enrolment level of girls in some parts of Nigeria. The importance of educating the girl child cannot be overemphasized considering the relevance of education to human beings.

The study also reveals that majority of parents in the study area believed that there is

no any religious restriction on women concerning working in public organizations. This finding also agreed with the finding Adeyemo (1975) that religion does not outrightly restrict women from participation in public jobs. This is due to the enlightenment parents receive through the media and other fora. It is obvious that the girl-child situation is improving considering the positive attitudes parents are having towards the girls. Preferences is no longer given to the male children alone. Both the male and female children are not considered the same in terms education by most parents.

This study also found that most parents in Bayara nowadays do not see the girl child as a source of income to augment their income. This findings, however contradicts the findings of Ada (19192) where it was found that most parents used their female children to augment family income. That attitudes of parents is gradually changing and that is the reason why many parents in Bayara send their female children to school instead of sending them to the street to hawk so as to raise money to support the family as some ill-informed parents were of the view.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The socio-cultural variables such as religion and early marriage practicing which were seen in the past as some of the major obstacle to female education do not seem to have strong influence on the attitude of parents towards the education of the girl-child in the study area. Perhaps this is due to the campaigns being undertaken by the government and NGOs to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (MDG). The findings of this study established that those socio-cultural beliefs no longer influence the attitudes of parents about the education of the girl-child. According to the findings, most parents in the study area now see female education as very important. Parents have realized the benefits girls stand to gain from schooling and they are willing to

give their daughters the best education possible. The study reveals that only few parents in Bayara community of Bauchi LGA still perceive the girl-child education as negative. Most of the parents now believed that the girl-child education is necessary and very important for sustainable development to be achieved. This implies that most parents in Bayara community have positive attitude towards the education of the girl-child, unlike in the past.

Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended that the government should continue to give maximum support to non-governmental organisations and individuals who are out to liberate people from illiteracy. Traditional rulers and the religious leaders should encourage their followers especially the few ones who still have negative attitude towards female education to accept female education through organizing periodic seminars on education in their villages. The seminars should aim at educating and reorienting the ill-informed parents. The government should adequately fund researches aimed at enhancing the girl-child education as that will expose some hidden impediments to female participation in school.

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## SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN MALARIA TREATMENT AMONG RESIDENTS OF WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, TARABA STATE, NIGERIA

**Godwin Etta Odok**

**Hannatu Habila**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: [godwinodok2000@yahoo.com](mailto:godwinodok2000@yahoo.com)



### Abstract

Malaria remains the single most prevalent life-threatening infectious disease in the world. Within countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria and Taraba State in particular, malaria still constitutes a major public health challenge. Even though malaria is endemic in this region, available epidemiological information suggests that malaria treatment varies across social statuses and peoples. This study examines social constraints leading to unequal structural opportunities for malaria treatment in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State, Nigeria. The study adopts a multi-stage sampling procedure where three (3) political wards in Wukari Local Government Area were purposively selected: Hospital ward, Jibu ward and Puje ward. Quantitative data collection involved the administration of questionnaires to 230 respondents; while qualitative data were collected through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, social mapping and non-participant observations. Qualitative data were content analyzed. The study's major results indicate that about 82.9% of residents in communities of Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba state depend on mai-magani drugs to treat malaria. Findings also established that the social structure of Wukari Local Government Area is characterized by unequal acquisition and accumulation of social capital which forms the basis for social stratification and inequality in the area. The study concludes that consumption of mai-magani drugs by residents of Wukari Local Government Area complicates their health and longevity. Thus, the study recommends that there should be the equitable inclusion and training of primary health care workers in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State to follow up for malaria treatment compliance and surveillance among residents of the area.

**Keywords:** Malaria, social capital, surveillance, *mai-magani*, community nurse

### Introduction

Malaria has troubled humans for thousands of years. The father of medicine, Hippocrates, noted symptoms of malaria-like disease in the 4th century (Carter & Mendis 2002). Vedic literature (1500-800 BCE) called malaria the 'king of diseases' (Carter & Mendis 2002). The ancient Greek historian, Herodotus, wrote that the builders of the Egyptian pyramids were given large amount of garlic to protect them from malaria (Carter & Mendis 2002). Pharaoh Sneferu, who ruled Egypt from 2613-2589 BCE, used bed nets for mosquito bite prevention. Cleopatra VII, the last Pharaoh of Egypt also

used mosquito nets for sleeping (Carter & Mendis 2002).

Malaria is a vector-borne disease in which Plasmodium causative pathogens are transmitted via the bite of the infected female Anopheles mosquito (Meibalan & Marti 2017). Malaria remains the single most prevalent life-threatening infectious disease in the world (WHO 2020). The genus Plasmodium is composed of more than 250 species; however, only five species (Plasmodium falciparum, Plasmodium vivax, Plasmodium ovale Wallikeri, Plasmodium ovale curtisi, and Plasmodium

malariae) are shown to be involved in human-to-human transmission after *Anopheles* bites (Sharp, Plenderleith & Hahn 2020). Three simian parasites (*Plasmodium cynomolgi*, *Plasmodium inui*, and particularly *Plasmodium knowlesi*) are known to be responsible for human malaria (Sharp, Plenderleith & Hahn 2020). Antinori, Galimberti, Milazzo and Corbellino (2012) argued that *Plasmodium knowlesi* is the most common cause of human malaria in Malaysia. However, according to historical texts and medical paleomicrobiological and paleogenetic data, malaria may have played a key role in the history of the Europeans (Sharp, Plenderleith & Hahn 2020). This is as the oldest evidence for the *Plasmodium* parasite (that is *Dominicana* spp) was found dating back to about 30 million years ago in the Dominican Republic (Poinnar, 2005). Sharp, Plenderleith and Hahn (2020) also account that most probably, malaria co-evolved with non-human primates in Africa. They argued that *Plasmodium falciparum* may have emerged from gorilla parasites about 10,000 years ago, while *Plasmodium vivax* may have emerged much earlier from non-specific ape hosts (Sharp, Plenderleith & Hahn 2020).

All through human history, malaria has been a major public health problem. Importantly, the social and economic burdens of malaria treatment impact on loss of man days, and reduction of agricultural, industrial and other productive activities. The epidemiological information of the past few years indicates that the malaria situation in the countries of Sub-Saharan Asia varies considerably from country to country. The first People's Health Plan (PHP) for 1978-1982 accorded top priority to malaria out of 51 priority diseases or health conditions. The second PHP (1982-1986) placed malaria as second priority.

Within Wukari Local Government Area, residents often depend on self-medication from roadside medical vendors (*mai-magani*) to treat malaria. These vendors usually do not provide precise information as regard the

dosage of the drugs they sell, nor do they educate their clients about the side effects of the drugs and which specific physical address their clients can contact them for further information. Drugs sold by these vendors for the treatment of malaria are usually packaged in various forms (in bottles, wrapped in paper, nylon sachet) (Asakitikpi, 2019).

The problems associated with self-medication for the treatment of malaria are enormous. Self-medication has both social and economic consequences for not only for an individual but also the society at large. Burton (2012) argues that self-medication represents inequality to access to proper malaria treatment; thus, self-dedication only gives temporary relief to sickness instead of a permanent cure by suppressing and masking the symptoms only for the sickness to relapse after some time. Paracetamol is one of the most frequently used drugs in self-prescribing situations among residents of Wukari Local Government Area who are allured to using a range of anti-malaria drugs without a doctor's prescription (Abey & Amello, 2005). Although drugs are useful for the treatment of health problems, their excessive use can lead to serious side effects and unfavourable reactions (Jain, 2011). Other studies have been done in the study of self-medication and malaria treatment. But focus on self-medication as a basis for social inequality has not been well interrogated. This paper therefore examines the practice of self-medication as it results in the unequal use of drugs for the treatment of malaria in Wukari Local Government area.

The paper is divided into five major parts. The first part reviewed the literature on issues around Malaria as a global public health problem and associated social inequalities with malaria treatment in Africa. The second part discussed the theoretical orientations within which analyses in the paper occurred. The third part of the paper explained the methodological approach through which data for the paper emerged. The fourth part of the

paper discussed the study's findings which expound the social inequalities and malaria treatment among the people of Wukari Local Government Area. The paper concluded that residents in Wukari Local Government Area patronize *mai-magani* drugs to treat malaria not bordering about the side effects of these drugs. Thus, it was recommended that there should be enlightenment to family and friends through sensitization through educational awareness that will help the people understand the effects of the drug before patronizing them in Wukari Local Government Area.

### **The Burden of Malaria in Africa**

In 2015, 91 countries and territories in the world were reported to have had ongoing malaria transmission (WHO, 2016). An estimated 212 million cases were reported worldwide with an estimated 429,000 deaths (WHO, 2016). Sub-Saharan Africa was home to 90% of these malaria cases and 92% of malaria deaths, globally. "Some 13 countries – mainly in sub-Saharan Africa – account for 76% of malaria cases and 75% deaths globally." Nigeria accounted for up to 29% of the global cases and 26% of the global deaths (WHO, 2016). According to Murray *et al.*, (2012), malaria has claimed over 1.3 million lives between 1971-2015 (including over 900,000 children under five years) in Nigeria; and over 120.7 million reported confirmed cases in the last 60 years between 1955 and 2015 (WHO, 1966, 1983, 1999, 2012, 2015, 2016). Nevertheless, there have been reports of additional cases and deaths besides those confirmed above based on estimations by the World Health Organization (WHO). For example, within five years (2000, 2005, 2010, 2014 & 2015), over 292 million cases and 749,000 deaths have been estimated to occur in Nigeria (WHO, 2015, 2016). Adversely, Nigeria currently spends \$660 million (USD) i.e. ₦132 billion (\$1 = ₦200) annually on the treatment, prevention, and opportunity costs associated with malaria (Entwistle, April 2016).

According to Nigeria Malaria Operational Plan Fiscal Year (NMOP/FY, 2017) the prevalence of malaria in rural populations is three times that in urban populations (12% vs. 36%) and when compared to the highest socioeconomic group, the prevalence of the lowest socioeconomic group is 10 times higher (4% vs. 43%).

Several studies have been carried out on malaria hazards in Nigeria (Evans & Adenomon, 2014; Onyiri, 2015; Adigun *et al.*, 2015, Andrew, 2014; Ayanlade *et al.*, 2013; Efe and Ojoh, 2013; Abdullahi *et al.*, 2013; Nmadu, *et al.*, 2015; Abatan and Babatunde, 2015). Assessments of the spatial pattern of malaria infection in Nigeria indicate that seasonal variations play significant roles in malaria infection in Nigeria. It also shows a high concentration of malaria infections in some states (Andrew, 2014; Ayanlade *et al.*, 2013). Abdullahi *et al.* (2013) observed the effect of some atmospheric variables on malaria prevalence in Kebbi State, Nigeria, as temperature, relative humidity and rainfall all have a strong correlation with malaria. Population-adjusted risk estimates range from 6.46% in Lagos state to 43.33% in Borno from Bayesian geostatistical modelling of 2010 malaria indicator survey data (Adigun *et al.*, 2015). The malaria prevalence varies from 20% in certain areas to 70% in others (Onyiri, 2015). The highest prevalence rates were found in the Niger Delta states of Rivers and Bayelsa, the areas surrounding the confluence of the rivers Niger and Benue, and also isolated parts of the North-Eastern and North-Western parts of the country. (Onyiri, 2015). Modelling of the prevalence of malaria in Niger State revealed that the prevalence of Malaria in Minna, Niger State increased by approximately 6% every month (Evans and Adenomon, 2014). Parasite prevalence ranges from 14% in the South East Zone to 37% in the North West Zone (NMOP/FY, 2017).

Abatan and Babatunde (2015) empirically investigated the patterns and trends of occurrences of malaria cases in Ekiti State of

Nigeria, and observed that interventions do not necessarily reduce malaria cases among hospitals categories in Ekiti State; as poor sanitation, lack of portable water, inadequate immunization and health education, malnutrition all account to malaria hazard. Children who lack sufficient nutrition will experience weakened immunity and strength to fight the infection thereby leading to the severity of the infection of the individual (Abatan & Babatunde, 2015). Despite the low number of malaria vectors found in the Ibadan community, Southwest Nigeria, malaria cases were high. Okorie and Popoola et al. (2014) concluded that the lack of good drainage and sewage system could be contributing to the abundance of malaria mosquitoes around where people live in their study on species composition and temporal distribution of mosquito populations in Ibadan. However, the vulnerable population at malaria risk in Nigeria is given geographically according to the World Malaria Report 2015 (WHO, 2015) and Nigeria Malaria Fact Sheet (2011). Malaria in Africa poses an enormous threat to the global eradication agenda, more so when the resources to combat malaria in Africa are inadequate (Snow, 2015 & Cibulokis 2016). The decline in the burden of malaria observed over the last decade globally has been at a much slower pace in Africa (UNICEF 2021). Noor and Collogues, (2014) asserted that the tropical climate, compounded by poor environmental / living conditions and poverty has been largely implicated in the high transmission of malaria in most African countries.

Malaria is a protozoan infection of the red blood cells caused by *Plasmodium* sp. and spread through the bites of infected female *Anopheles* mosquitoes. Large plantations, and marshy and poorly drained areas as seen in the tropics, as well as agricultural practices including irrigation, encourage the breeding of mosquitoes (Bynum, 2008 and Cater & Mendis, 2002). The Open University, (2017) asserted that the activity and reproduction of

mosquitoes are also influenced by the rainfall, altitude, temperature of the geographical area and other environmental factors, including poor drainage and unauthorized dump sites. From the foregoing, avoiding mosquito bites is a logical primary method of preventing malaria, infection. Oyekale and others (2015) said that, however, the use of mosquito repellent creams, bed nets, window nets and outlet door nets prevent mosquito bites to a reasonable extent and also have the potential to reduce the prevalence of mosquito-borne illnesses, such as malaria. Pryce and colleagues (2018) added that Household aerosolized insecticide spraying has also been observed to reduce malaria prevalence.

Schumacher & Spinelli (2012) are of the view that global intervention programmes to combat malaria include the use of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT), increased coverage with insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) and indoor residual spraying (IRS). The success recorded due to the implemented malaria control and elimination strategies over the last decade has been attributed to these interventions.

In the last 150 million years of malaria parasite evolution, many lineages of malaria parasites evolved and radiated. They parasite most groups of land vertebrates including reptiles, birds and mammals. Molecular evidence suggests that malaria parasitic ancestor was a chloroplast containing free-living protozoan which later adapted to gut living in aquatic invertebrates. This organism probably had obligate sexual reproduction. At a later stage, these pre-malaria parasites became asexual and intracellular and evolved schizogony. Schizogony proliferates their reproductive potential. This schizogony cycle in the RBCs of humans and other vertebrates causes malaria. Following this period, certain lineages of the ancestral malaria parasites evolved two host life cycles with blood-feeding habits. Human biting preferences of malaria vectors probably coevolved with the agrarian revolution in Africa, where low-density and



hunting life cycles shifted to high-density communal living in settlements. This new man-made environment increases the small water collections close to human dwellings. This new situation drives malaria vectors to feed primarily on human blood rather than other mammals and breed close to human dwellings. After originating in Africa, malaria spread to Mesopotamia, the Indian Peninsula and South East Asia between 10000-5000 years ago. It reached India around 3000 years ago. Around 2500-2000 years ago, it reached Mediterranean shores and around 1000-500 years ago, it reached Northern Europe. At the end of the 15th century, it reached the New World and in the mid-18th century, it spread across North America. In America, it was introduced by African slaves. Finally, in the 19th century, it became a pandemic and over one-half of the world's population became at risk of this disease, (Cox, 2010).

In 1718, Italian physician Francisco Torti coined the term malaria (bad air) on the old belief that it is associated with swamp air. Charles Louis Alphonse Laveran, a French army surgeon was the first to report parasites in the malaria patient blood in 1880. Laveran examined blood samples of 192 malaria patients and saw pigment-containing crescents in 148 patients. For this, he was awarded with Nobel Prize in 1907. Camilio Golgi, an Italian physiologist describes two forms of diseases, one with tertian fever and another with quartan fever. He also found that malaria fever is due to rupture and release of merozoites into the blood. For this, he was awarded with Nobel Prize in 1906. In 1890, Giovanni Battista Grassi and Raimondo Filetti first coined two malaria parasites *Plasmodium vivax* and *Plasmodium malariae* that infect humans. Later in 1897, William H. Welch coined another human malaria parasite *Plasmodium falciparum*. Further in 1922, John William Watson Stephens coined the fourth human malaria parasite, *Plasmodium ovale*. In 1897, Ronald Ross discovered that mosquitoes are the vectors of malaria parasites. He also

describes the complex life cycle of human malaria parasites. He published his observations in the "British Medical Journal". Ross does his experiments on *Plasmodium relictum* (malaria parasite of sparrows and crows). For this, he was awarded with Nobel Prize in 1902 (Cox & Mohapatra 2006).

The incidence of malaria varies by weather, which affects the ability of the main carrier of malaria parasites, anopheline mosquitoes, to survive or otherwise. Tropical areas including Nigeria have the best combination of adequate rainfall, temperature and humidity allowing for the breeding and survival of anopheline mosquitoes. The burden of malaria varies across different regions of the world and even within a country. This is driven by the variation in parasite-vector-human transmission dynamics that favour or limit the transmission of malaria infection and the associated risk of disease and death. Of the four species of *Plasmodium* that infect humans *P. falciparum*, *P. vivax*, *P. malariae* and *P. oval*. *Plasmodium falciparum* causes most of the severity and deaths attributable to the disease, which is most prevalent in Africa south of the Sahara, where Nigeria has the largest population.

Country-specific evidence shows that Nigeria has the largest population at risk of malaria in Africa and therefore most vulnerable to the risk of missing the MDGs target. The disease, malaria, is a major health problem in the country, with stable transmission throughout the country. It accounts for about 50 per cent of out-patient consultations, and 15 per cent of hospital admission, and is also prime among the top three causes of death in the country (National Malaria Control Plan of Action 1996 to 2001). More importantly, it is a social and economic problem, which consumed about US\$3.5 million in government funding and US\$2.3 million from other stakeholders in various control attempts in 2003 (World Health Organization, 2005).

Approximately 50% of the Nigerian population experience at least one episode per

year. However, the official estimate suggests as much as four bouts per person per year on average (WHO, 1995 and 2002). The trend is rapidly increasing due to the current malaria resistance to first-line anti-malarial drugs (WHO, 2000). The magnitude of incidence and death due to it is a multiple of all other tropical diseases put together. The above suggests that malaria could be the largest contributor to the total disease burden and productivity losses resulting from major tropical diseases in the country. Evidence on Nigeria given by the Malaria Report 2005 shows that malaria incidence throughout the country had been on the increase over the years ranging between 1.12 million at the beginning of 1990 and 2.25 million by the turn of the millennium 2000 and 2.61 million in 2003.

The use of *Cinchona* (also called fever tree or Peruvian tree or Cardinal tree or Jesuit tree) bark for malaria treatment is 200 years old. Linnaeus named the *Cinchona* tree in 1742 after the countess 'Chinchon' accidentally omitting the "h" in her name. Spanish missionaries first used *Cinchona* bark powder for fever treatment. It was also used by the Quechua Indians of Peru to treat severe chills. Jesuit missionaries take *Cinchona* bark to Europe. *Cinchona* bark contains quinine (plant alkaloids) which has anti-malarial properties. French chemists Joseph Pelletier and Jean Biename Caventou isolated quinine from *Cinchona* bark in 1820. Quinine remains an important and effective malaria treatment worldwide except few observations of quinine resistance. In the 2nd century, the Chinese identified the sweet wormwood (*Artemisia annua*) plant as an effective treatment for malaria. This remedy was lost and rediscovered later as an artemisinin drug by Chinese pharmacologist Tu Youyou in 1972. For this, he was awarded with Nobel Prize in 2015.

Today artemisinin (Qinghaosu) and other artemether groups of drugs are the main defense against drug resistance malaria. Yet there is no reported case of artemisinin

resistance. Another substitute for quinine was Plasmochin (1926) followed by Atabrine (1932). Plasmochine and Atabrine were banned due to their toxicity and side effects such as yellowish skin, psychotic reactions etc. Later anti-malarial drug Resochin (Chloroquine) was discovered in 1930 by Johann Hans Andersag. Chloroquine-resistant *Plasmodium falciparum* and *Plasmodium vivax* were reported later. Sontochin (3-methyl chloroquine) was introduced as a Chloroquine alternate later in 1934. Rich and colleagues (2009), Further Proguanil (pyrimidine derivatives) was discovered during World War II and Mefloquine (4-quinoline methanol) was discovered after World War II. DDT and Pyrethrum are the most famous preventive measures used against malaria in history. Othmar Zeidler synthesized DDT (Dichloro Diphenyl Trichloroethane) in 1874 and later Paul Muller discovered its insecticidal properties in 1939. For this, Muller was awarded with Nobel Prize in 1948. However, DDT was banned in the United States in 1972 due to its carcinogenic effects and threats to wildlife. Pyrethrum is another natural insecticide derived from the flowering plant *Chrysanthemum cinerariaefolium*. It attacks the nervous system of insects.

In the 17th century, clinical indications of malaria were dark pigmentation of a postmortem spleen and brain. Malaria infected half a million men of U. S. troops in the South Pacific during World War II and killed 60000 American soldiers. The US Public Health Service (USPHS) was the first to combat malaria outbreak within the United States. Later CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), was founded in the United States in 1946 and dedicated itself to eradication of malaria in the United States. CDC eradicated malaria by 1951 through a mass campaign that removed mosquito breeding sites and large-scale insecticide spraying. Inspired by with CDC, the WHO (World Health Organization) began a program in 1955 to globally eradicate malaria. Eradication planning was divided into

four successive steps: preparation, attack, consolidation and maintenance. Some countries like India benefited from this campaign, while African countries remain unaffected. Complications such as drug resistance strains of malaria parasites and the harmful effects of DDT make the campaign unfeasible. WHO abandoned this program in 1969 and changed its mission to control malaria rather than its eradication. The World Health Organization (2020), estimates that there were over 200 million cases of malaria with 409,000 deaths in 2019, 90% of which were recorded in sub-Saharan Africa. Stakeholders from around the world met in 2015 and adopted the sustainable development goals (SDG) which has as one of its targets, the complete eradication of malaria globally. In the absence of an effective vaccine, the WHO identified accurate diagnosis and prompt treatment of malaria as being crucial in achieving this target (WHO, 2018).

### Theoretical Framework

Pierre Bourdieu's social capital theory forms the theoretical lens for this paper. Bourdieu introduced the concept social capital in his French version of *Distinction* in 1979 (Adam & Roncevie 2003; Bourdieu 1984). His theory on social capital theory was originally published in French in 1983, and translated into English for the first time in 1986.

The central assumptions of social capital theory are that relationships matter and those social networks are valuable assets. That social capital is assets of social context (the "social" bit) that have productive benefits (the "capital" bit). Social capital includes the store of solidarity or goodwill between people and groups of people. Also, social capital is helpful behaviours resulting from feelings of gratitude, respect and friendship.

Bourdieu's theory of social capital has a relationship with health because of the networks that influence people's behaviours. Applying the theory to self-medication through *mai-magani* and malaria control

among the people, there are influences such as education that are the transfer of knowledge from one generation to another. The knowledge people have towards self-medication is based on the information they have from friends, family members, and social groups, (for example seeking medical advice from close relations and not medical professionals). Status has a role in health due to power and inequality, it gives people the power to decide what network is valuable to be part of or not. This shows that those who are rich can treat themselves properly with the right medications and proper treatment from health professionals but the poor feel otherwise because of a lack of resources or capital and would prefer to go for self-medication without thinking about the control of the treatment. Culture also influences the people of the society. Some people can mix both the traditional and the orthodox treatment at the same time to cure malaria. Finally, the family also influences the health of people. One will likely use experiences in treating malaria, such as giving bits of advice and even prescribing drugs to others not minding the implications of the drugs, if it is overdosed or not rightly taken by the sick person. Once it works on them, they believe it can work on another person. Individuals with access to cognitive and structural social capital had a higher odds ratio for self-rated health compared to individuals with no access to these forms of social capital. That is, for men and women as well as for different educational groups (higher/secondary/basic education). For example, people who said that they trust their neighbour (access to personalized trust, a cognitive form of social capital). This is where more than twice as likely to rate their health as good compared to those who answered that they did not trust their neighbours. Gender also has influences on the health of the people in the society. Applying the theory to self-medication through *mai-magani* and malarial control among the people, women are more likely to have access to self-medication from

their fellow women compared to men because of the social network that exists amongst them and it is strong because it involves face-to-face conversations or direct information. For example, pregnant women and nursing mothers tend to get pieces of advice from their fellows, based on experiences on the drugs to take during pregnancy and also to the child when sick without the right prescriptions from the medical professionals but prefer drugs from *mai-magani*. This indicates that women get involved in self-medication in treating malaria compared to men in the society. The social capital theory did not explain the actions of people who receive this advice from people around them towards self-medication,

### Research Methodology

The research design used for this study was the descriptive survey design. It involved the collection of data from the sample population of the study. Descriptive survey research is an approach for description that blends quantitative and qualitative data to provide relevant and accurate information.

The population of the study consists of residents of Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria with a total of 374,800. Specifically, the study population includes all men and women who are 18 years and above in the ten legislative council wards that make up the Wukari Local Government Area. The study adopted a multi-stage sampling procedure. The first stage involved the purposive selection of three (3) wards out of the ten (10) wards in Wukari Local Government Area. These selected wards were: Hospital ward, Jibu ward and Puje ward. These three wards were purposively selected based on their unique characteristics of accommodating residents from other wards that constitute the Wukari Local Government Area, and they have a blend of both urban-rural characteristics. The second stage involved the use of a simple random sampling technique to select three (3) communities/villages in each of the selected wards, consisting of nine (9) communities/villages for the study. The selected nine (9) communities/villages were: Ando

Lamini, Akata, Byepi, Benkawo, East area, Kinkiso area, Mammara, Wapa Nghaku and Yam market area. Jibu consists of Ando Lamini, Byepi, and Benkawo communities; Hospital ward consists of Akata, Mammara, and Wapa -Nghaku communities and PUJE consists of East Area, Kinkiso, and Yam market communities. The third stage involved the use of cluster sampling, where selected communities/villages were clustered into households and 10% of households in each community/village were conveniently selected for the questionnaire administration. The respondents to the study's questionnaire were one (1) person per household, considered to be heads of their respective households.

Through the snowball sampling technique, key community leaders (one interviewee per ward); community health experts (one interviewee per ward); and the *mai-magani* vendors (one interviewee per ward) were contacted for a semi-structured interview. In all, there were nine (9) semi-structured interviews in the study. There were three (3) focus group discussions (FGDs) with women and men groups in the three selected wards of the study, and one focus group discussion (FGD) for each ward. The study also engaged direct observations that observed events and behaviours relevant to the social life of residents in the selected wards in the study area as it relates to when and how they patronize *mai-magani* vendors to treat malaria.

### Findings and Discussions

This part of the study discusses the findings generated from the study.

#### **Social Inequalities in the Treatment of Malarial through *Mai-magani* vendors in Wukari Local Government Area**

Based on the findings, it revealed that patronage of *mai-magani* drugs is among both genders. The study's results showed that the male and the female patronize *mai-magani* drugs. From one of the interviews the participant affirmed that;

The patronage of *mai-magani* drugs are both the male and the female in treating malaria. The drugs from *mai-magani* can be of used to both the men and the women in wukari community and other part of the societies. **IDI/Akata Area, Hospital Ward/18/06/2023**

The study's results showed that the community groups that patronize *mai-magani* drugs in treating malaria are the elderly persons. The study also revealed that the elderly persons make use of *mai-magani* drugs more than orthodox medicines. This corroborate with the findings of Rivera, Loya and Ceballos (2013), that as a general rule, older populations are more likely to use both conventional drug therapy and herbal medicines. For instances the elderly persons are likely to have higher incidence of chronic disease, which more often than not requires the use of increasingly complex conventional drugs. As such, the potential for herb-disease and herb-drug interactions increases with elderly persons.

#### **How the family and friends persuade the patronage of *mai-magani* drugs in Wukari LGA**

The study's results showed that, the Engagement of trusted symbols in community describe the nature of persuasion to the buyers of *mai-magani* drugs in treating malaria. Theoretically, social network that exist among people influences the patronage of *mai-magani* drugs. Family members and friends have a way of persuading their loved ones on patronizing the *mai-magani* drugs. The conviction one have will results to patronizing the drugs because it is coming from a close relatives or friends.

Relating the study's findings statistics in the African continent, Allen, 'Donnell, Alexander and Clegg (1996) have shown that more than 1 million children die annually from malaria in Africa, a child dies every 30 seconds from malaria in Africa, 70% of deaths occur in

children under 5 years of age Cheesebrough, (2006), and even in the first 6 months of life. Afolabi, Salako, Mafe, Ovwigho, Rabi, Sanyaolu and Ibrahim (2001), a Growing political commitment by African leaders to action on malaria was given a boost by the founding of the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) global partnership in 1998. Less than two years later African Heads of State and their representatives met in Abuja, Nigeria to translate RBM's goal of halving the malaria burden by 2010 into tangible political action. The Abuja Declaration endorsed RBM's goal and established a series of interim targets for the number of people having access to treatment, protective measures or in the case of pregnant women, receiving intermittent preventive treatment to ensure that progress would be made towards the goal and malaria-endemic countries and other RBM partners held responsible. Considerable progress has been made since in Abuja.

Almost 20 African countries have reduced or eliminated taxes and tariffs on insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) to make them more affordable. More than half the malaria-endemic African countries, representing almost half the population at risk have established Country Strategic Plans (CSPs) to achieve the RBM goal and the targets set in Abuja. CSPs are all based on the four technical elements of Roll Back Malaria and the evidence-based interventions associated with them prompt access to effective treatment promotion of ITNs and improved vector control, prevention and management of malaria in pregnancy and improving the prevention of, and response to, malaria epidemics and malaria in complex emergencies. Cheesbrough and Monica (2006), (Arora & Arora; 2008), Countries are now working through local partnerships to develop the capacity to fully implement their CSPs using ongoing health sector reforms and linkages to other initiatives, such as IMCI (Integrated Management of Childhood Illness)

and MPS (Making Pregnancy Safer), to improve access to key interventions.

CSPs have been successful in attracting new resources for malaria control. However, given the projected resource needs for the year 2010, only 20% of the necessary funds will be available locally. African countries, working with their partners and donors, must identify and mobilize resources for the remainder. Countries are looking to a variety of sources to ensure sustainable financing of their efforts to Roll Back Malaria this includes traditional sources of funding, from the national treasury and donor community as well as the exploration of new opportunities through debt relief schemes and the newly formed Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria WHO, Roll Back Malaria (2000).

In sub-Saharan Africa, malaria remains one of the leading and one of the most preventable causes of death. Malaria is a parasitic disease transmitted to humans through the bite of a mosquito Afoakwah, Deng and Onur, (2018). Nevertheless, not all mosquitoes carry the malaria disease. Ghana is home to the female *Anopheles gambiae* mosquito, the most effective malaria vector and the most difficult vector to regulate, Afoakwah, Nunoo, and Andoh, (2015). Alongside *Anopheles gambiae*, the malaria parasite *Plasmodium falciparum* is widespread throughout Africa and causes the most severe clinical manifestations of the disease Afoakwah, Nunoo, and Andoh, (2015). Ghana, Africa has made great strides in its fight against malaria, decreasing case and mortality rates by 50% and 65% between 2005 and 2015; however, malaria is still considered an endemic disease, accounting for around 30% of Ghana's outpatient attendances and 23% of inpatient admissions, Shretta, Silal, Malm, Mohammed, Narh, Piccinini, Bertram, Rockwood, and Lynch, (2020). Progress aside, malaria remains a consistent terror in Africa. Ghana kept its listing as one of the top fifteen malaria-burdened countries across the globe, after a 5% increase in absolute case numbers from 2017-2018 WHO, (2019). In correlation

with most illnesses treated in the healthcare system, prevention is important in combating this disease. Malaria is deemed non-existent in developed countries around the world, yet prevention efforts against this disease from outside nations have begun to plateau. Numerous studies leave out any mention of or elaboration on this plateau of prevention efforts. Multiple studies and investigations have verified effective measures to prevent malaria transmission decades ago through the use of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs), larvicides, and insect repellent sprays Atiglo, Larbi, Kushitor, Biney, Asante, Dodoo, and Dodoo, (2018). Re-prioritizing these and other methods of prevention in underdeveloped nations, beyond current implementation, is vitamin helping the residents of Ghana.

The burden of malaria is greatest among the world's poorest countries. While only 0.2% of global malaria deaths are found in the world's richest population quintile, 57.9% of global malaria deaths are concentrated among the world's poorest population quintile. Similarly, when the burden is measured as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), 58% of the total global burden due to malaria is concentrated among the poorest 20% of the global population, while only 0.2% of total global DALYs are lost by the richest global 20% (Gwatkin & Guillot, 2000). Sachs and Malaney (2002) demonstrate a correlation between the presence of malaria in a country and that country's per capita GDP, arguing that there is an inverse relationship between the two and that malaria causes underdevelopment. Historical evidence is used to argue in support of this causal pathway. Najera (1994) argues that the disappearance of malaria in parts of Europe was associated with economic development related to agricultural expansion rather than vector control or chemoprophylaxis. It has been argued that because the burden of malaria is concentrated in poor countries there is inequity in the allocation of global research funds especially by the pharmaceutical industry, since

domestic purchasing power for new malaria products is very limited (especially for anti-malarial drugs) (Medicines for Malaria Venture, 2001). About 107 countries and territories involving about 3.2 billion people are still at risk of malaria attack as of 2004 (WHO 2005). Again, Bawah & Binka (2005), Present estimates suggest that around 350–500 million clinical disease episodes occur annually. Around 60% of clinical cases and over 80% of the deaths due to malaria occur in Africa south of the Sahara, Alaba (2005). It is the second leading cause of death from infectious diseases in Africa, after HIV/AIDS and is also a leading cause of mortality in under-five children accounting for 20% of deaths and constituting 10% of the total disease burden of the African continent Kabore (2004). According to David (2000), Malaria kills a child somewhere in the world every 30 seconds. Over 90% of the malaria burden occurs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Each year more than 500,000 women die during pregnancy or childbirth (WHO, 2004). Adhanorn, Deressa & Witten (2006), added that Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda account for nearly 50% of the global malaria deaths.

The following can be factors related to malaria burden in the African continent:

i. **Income:** Results from a Nigerian community-based survey suggest a heavier malaria burden on the poor than on the rich. The survey, which took place in four states, demonstrated that individuals with a mean income of below N3000/day (<US\$1/day) were less likely to perceive malaria as a preventable disease, more likely to report having fever presently, and suffered significantly more bouts of malaria per month when compared with individuals earning greater than N3000 per day (CHESTRAD, 2000).

Similar results were obtained in Lao PDR, where investigators used questionnaires to obtain income information from pregnant women in a remote district hospital and

found a difference in malaria prevalence between socio-economic groups, Sychareun, Phengsavanh, Kityivoilaphanh, Prabouasone, Viriyavejakul, Krudsood, Phophak and Looareesuan (2000) 87.5% of women with positive slide parasitaemia were classified as having low income (<50, 00 kip), while only 12.5% were classified as having high income (> 90,000 kip). However, with only 16 women testing positive for malaria and the majority of women sampled - regardless of malaria diagnosis- falling into the low-income category, the results were not statistically significant. Not all income-based studies have been consistent in their results. A study in Ghana compared malaria incidence in two communities, one with a relatively low average income (73,824 cedis/year), and one with a relatively higher average income (138,167 cedis/year) Biritwum, Welbeck and Barnish (2000). Despite lower formal education levels among caregivers and fewer children in nursery, malaria incidence in the poorer community was not significantly different from that in the richer community, though the incidence of ill health, in general, was higher among the poor than the rich. Ghana compared malaria incidence in two communities, one with relatively low average income (73,824 cedis/year), and one with relatively higher average income (138,167 cedis/year). Biritwum, Welbeck, and Barnish (2000), Despite lower formal education levels among caregivers and fewer children in nursery, malaria incidence in the poorer community was not significantly different from that in the richer community, though the incidence of ill-health, in general, was higher among the poor than the rich.

ii. **Education:** In rural Kenya Shulman, Marshall, Dorman, Bulmer, Cutts, Peshu and Marsh (2001), used a similar measure of assets to approximate SES in pregnant women, together with ethnic group and literacy as proxies for SES. The study found

an increased presence of placental malaria among one particular ethnic group, as well as in women of lower socio-economic status and low body mass index (BMI). Clear evidence on the impact of educational levels is scant, but data from the Malawi 2000 DHS reveal that women with lower levels of education were more likely to have fewer than women with higher levels of education Ndawala, Kalanda and Mahy (2000).

- iii. **Sex and gender:** While women are frequently disadvantaged in socio-economic terms, the evidence of this translating into an increased risk for malaria infection is mixed. An additional factor is the ability of women to seek and receive prompt and proper care once infected. Tanner and Vlassoff (1998) argue that: "The combination of epidemiological, social and economic risk differentials means that children and women in areas of high transmission are inevitably the most disadvantaged population sector". In addition, pregnancy is an important risk factor for malaria infection, due to depressed immune status. The recent empirical evidence, however, is less conclusive. In Salaam, Tanzania, for example, malaria-related mortality was shown to be proportionally equal (1:1 ratio) between men and women, though anaemia was an important cause of death only in women. Among children, no consistent sex difference was detected in either malaria-related mortality or anaemia-related mortality Korenromp, Bertherat, Dye and Clarke (2001). A study in Myanmar by Tin-Oo, Pe-Thet-Htoon, Khin-Thet-Wai, Parks and Bryan (2001) provides further evidence of an insignificant sex difference in malaria incidence. Qualitative data were obtained to assess differentials between men and women in their exposure to mosquitoes given their respective night-time activities. Results yielded an equal chance of

contracting malaria, during peak biting time, for men and women.

- iv. **Location and housing type:** Though rural locations appear to experience higher rates of transmission, the relationship between the two is not fully understood. Rural locations can be associated with increased malaria risk for both epidemiological and socioeconomic reasons. Similarly, urban residence can be accompanied by potentially protective socio-economic factors against malaria risk such as education and income, Rashed, Johnson, Dongier, Moreau, Lee, Lambert and Schaefer (2000).

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The presence of *mai-magani* vendors in Wukari is prominent, which makes the patronage of their drugs inevitable individuals and families as the *mai-magani* products are accessible and affordable for treating malaria. And residents of Wukari Local Government Area take to self-medication through *mai-magani* to treat malaria without bothering about the side effects of their decision for self-medication. Again, the finding revealed that the drugs from *mai-magani* vendors do not have a measurement of dosage to be taken in treating malaria, leading to side effects causing other health issues such as liver problems and others. Furthermore, the research showed that most of these *mai-magani* sellers are both men and women but the majority of them are the Hausas, Igbos, Yorubas and Ngas who came from other parts of the country. Thus, this paper recommends that there should be enlightenment for users on the health implications of patronizing *mai-magani* drugs. There is also the need for friends and family members to be appropriately sensitized through educational awareness that will help them understand the effects of the *mai-magani* drugs before patronizing them.



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## FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA

Cinjel Nandes Dickson<sup>1</sup>

Oboromeni Weinoh<sup>2</sup>

Atsifa Audu<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1&3</sup> Department of Public Administration, Federal University Wukari, Nigeria

<sup>2</sup>Department of Public Administration National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN), Abuja

Email: [ncinjel@yahoo.com](mailto:ncinjel@yahoo.com)



### Abstract

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is an Act that gives a person, group, association or organisation the right to access information from government agencies, parastatal, Federal Civil Service, among others. The Act was passed by the Nigerian National Assembly on 24<sup>th</sup> May, 2011 and assented as a law by the President on 28<sup>th</sup> May, 2011. This study seeks to assess the impact of FOIA on democratic consolidation in Nigeria. A cross sectional survey design was employed for the study. The data of the study were generated from array of documentary facts drawn from both published and unpublished materials. Questionnaires and reports were the major instruments utilized. ANOVA was used to test the formulated hypotheses of the study. The study found that FOIA has helped to promote accountability, transparency, responsiveness in governance. The study also found that some contradictions of the sections, non-compliance, and poor culture of keeping record, among others affect the implementation of the Act. The study recommends that the gap in the provision of the Act should be filled through effective compliance and adequate training for FOIA desk officers.

**Keywords:** FOIA, implementation, impact, challenges, democratic consolidation

### Introduction

Freedom of Information (FOI) and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a practice that has evolved in modern time to serve as a check to the traditional system of information management whereby the state hoard and abuses information, and also determine how information should be shared and be disseminated. In the ancient time, most states' activities were tied on the Weberian principle of confidentiality; a principle that allowed the state to keep the information secrete from the public. The Weberian principle borrowed the philosophy from the ancient orthodoxy that promotes ideal such as – "The State is Supreme" and "might is right" (leaders are right)(Ajanwachukwu, 2012). In the ancient time, it was believed that the state

and its rulers are supreme; they are always right and must not account their action. Augusto Hippo and Niccolo Machiavelli in their respective works – "The city of God" and "The Prince" canvassed for the secrecy of the rulers and the activities of the state. This philosophy and the practice were done by almost all states and civilizations. The practice was more pronounced among socialists state than in the capitalist societies. In the socialist state, it was believed that the state should control everything and should not be held accountable (Cinjel & Weinoh, 2022)

It was with the advent of the work of classical philosopher like *John Lock, Jean Baron Montesquieu, Thomas Aquinas*, among others in the 18 century that the activities of the state and its excessive power were moderated and

place under check. Aphorism like- “if you are not informed , you are deformed” by *Henry Ukazu*, “Information is Power” by Shakespeare, “information is transformation” by *Abraham Lincoln* and the *United Nations Charter* on “Freedom of Expression”, among others also contributed to the growth and quest for Freedom of Information (Anukam, 2015)

In 1955, U.S state man and a senate, *John Moss* proposed a bill for the adoption of freedom of information in governance but it was completely rejected. It was much later in 1966 that it was revised and considered for consent by President *Lyndon Johnson*. Many nations borrowed from the practice while some avoided it. World Trend in Freedom of Expression and Media Development Global Report (2023) states that freedom of information is practices in over 100 countries and more than 50 countries and mostly it was the socialist states that choose not to introduce the Act. In Nigeria, there were several moves in 1987, 1994 and 1999 to introduce the Act but to no avail. It was till on 28<sup>th</sup> May, 2011, *Good luck Jonathan* signed the bill and it became an Act of the state (Cinjel & Weinoh, 2022).

The Act in Nigeria empowered its practice by all federal ministries, departments, agencies, commissions and parastatal but courts, congress, states and Local Government Areas were all at the liberty to introduce it or not to in their respective laws. In Nigeria, over 16 states are yet to be domesticated the FOIA into practice. According to Premium Time (2023), 17 states which it mentioned as- Plateau, Nasarawa, Niger, Kogi, Bauchi, Adamawa, Anambra, Kano, Ogun, Osun, Sokoto, Ekiti, Taraba, Akwa Ibom, Imo, Yobe, among others are yet to incorporate it into their state laws (Cinjel & Weinoh, 2022).

The essence of FOIA was not just to provide information but to provide the information in such a way that it will help to deepen democratic practice in a state. The Act in most states has made provision for openness in

governance, transparency and accountability of action of the state to the public. It through the application of the Act, the abuse of office and power, corruption and bad governance by public officers can be checked. The practice, if effectively implemented would help to promote responsive governance, trust, legitimacy and good governance. It is on this context that this study premised (Dunu, 2014).

One of the issues that incite this study is the implementation of FOIA and the level of its compliance in Nigeria. The implementation of FOIA in Nigeria is constrained by high rate of ignorance of the understanding and the content of the act by the citizens and more specifically the public officials. A lot of public officials do not know what it entails; most public servant or officials are ignorance of the existence and its benefits to the state. Most public organization in Nigeria still operates using the principle of Weberian secrecy and acts like the Official Secret Act (OSA) of 1911 and this is a serious constraint to the compliance of the Act

There is also the issue of exception provided in the Act which allows for certain categories of information to be withheld. These provisions are openly misused and have far reaching interpretation that seeks to frustrate the very bedrock of the Act. Although this seems to have been envisage by the Act as subsequent provision allows non-disclosure of otherwise confidential information where public interest outweigh any foreseeable injury; the provisions are still open to judicial interpretation capable of swinging the pendulum either way. Typical examples are what happened in 2009 and 2017 when President Musa Yar’Adua was sick and so also was Muhammadu Buhari and up till the demise of Yar’Adua and the elapse of the administration of Buhari, the illnesses of the two public figures were kept secret despite the several push by media agencies, civil society organization, journalists, among others. This is

unlike what is happening in matured democratic states

Despite its inclusion in the Act, Most records are not properly kept and stored and some that were stored are kept in hard copies; often in rolled bundle or files, some of which sometimes either get torn or eaten up by rodents or insects. This slow down or affect the rate of compliance of the Act. In section 2 (4) of the FIOA, it states that information should be kept and be given in different form including electronically. This is quite different from practice in most organization in Nigeria. It is on this background that this paper seeks to examine how the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has impacted on democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

### **Conceptual Clarifications**

#### **What is Freedom of Information Act?**

The freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is an Act that gives a person, group, association or organization the right to access information from government agencies, parastatal, federal civil service, private and public organizations providing public services, etc. It is a freedom of information act that allowed information in the public sectors organization to be accessed, open, transparent and accountable. Any person, group, association, organization, etc. can make a request for information under the FOIA. The request must be in writing with a clear description of the information being sought, and in compliance with institutional requirements (Dakas, 2009). To obtain information under the FOIA, a request must be made either electronically or by letter in a written form, describing the information sought for, and the preferred format of the response, in as much detail as possible.

#### **Democratic Consolidation**

Democratic consolidation otherwise known as consolidated democracy is nascent concept. It is the maturity of the democratic institutions and the society; it looks at the soundness and stability of the democratic practices and the

little possibility of a return of an authoritarian regime. Democratic consolidation is the process by which a newly established democratic regime becomes sufficiently durable that a return to non-democratic rule is no longer likely (Agarwa, 2006).

Beetham (2014) sees democratic consolidation as the expectations of regime continuity and the process by which a newly established democratic regime become sufficiently durable that a return to non-democratic rule is weakened. It also demands upholding democratic values of popular participation, good governance, inclusive governance, periodic election, legitimacy and many others. It is the process by which a new democracy matures in a way that it becomes unlikely to revert to authoritarianism without an external shock and is regarded as the only available system of government within a country. A democracy becomes consolidated, if it is expected to endure; when political actors accept the legitimacy of democracy and no actor seek redress.

Gunther, Diamandurous and Puhle (1995) outlined stages involved for a nation to achieve consolidated democracy. These are: The fall of the authoritarian regime, good governance, upholding democratic values of popular participation, legitimacy, upholding, sound judicial practice, viable political parties, periodic election, political accountability and transparency, free civil society and existence of functional state.

Linz and Stepan (1996) popularize the phrase. They provide a good introduction to the different components of consolidation, which they refer to as the five reinforcing arenas of consolidation. These are; political institutions, the economy, rule of law, a usable bureaucracy and civil society. Schedler (1998) also conceptualizes democratic consolidation as a process influenced by prior conditions and argues that the tasks and goals of consolidation will be affected by each country's unique starting point.

Diamond (1999) rejects theories that privileged preconditions for the success of consolidation. He also suggests that consolidation may take many different paths. Schmitter and Karl (2001) echoes this view and further stresses that consolidated democracies will not be able, nor should be expected to solve all socio-political problems. Huntington (2003) does not only demarcate the end of a transition using the two-turnover test but also posits that economic prosperity, peaceful transition and previous experience with democracy are all preconditions for successful consolidations.

O'Donnell (1996) also challenges the view that consolidation can only take one path. He pushes this argument further by proposing that imperfect democracies that are not fully and formally institutionalized can also endure. This view is critiqued in Gunther, et al (1996) which argues that certain socio-political practices can prevent and undo consolidation. Moving away from arguments on preconditions, Alexander (2002) presents a theory of consolidation based on the strategic choices of political elites. From the foregoing, it can be deduced that democratic consolidation is the stabilization of democratic process in such a way that non-democratic rule is enfeebled.

### History of FOIA

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is one of the most important legal tools citizens and reporters have and use to promote

transparency and good governance across the globe. FOIA was originally championed by Democratic congressman- *John Moss* from California in 1953 after a series of proposals during the cold war which led to a steep rise in government secrecy. The bill was opposed by *president Lyndon* and every federal agency and department at the time (Ewerem, 2014).

After the issuance of clearer and clarified rules and exemptions for the government agencies, the house passed the bill with 370-0 and the president was left with no option. President Johnson signed it but still had his own concern. On the 4<sup>th</sup> of July, 1966, Johnson decided not to hold public event for the signing which he did for other major bills. Instead, he issued a signing statement when making the bill a law, in which he attempted to undercut the law by focusing on exemptions for national security and FOIA room for interpretation (Gopi, 2016)

Though the 1966 bill was a huge step towards government transparency, FOIA lack the teeth necessary to force government to comply. It wasn't till 1974, after the Watergate scandal and the fight-lipped Nixon administration that congress amended FOIA to become the bill it is today. The senate and the house involved many new equipment, time frames, sanctions for wrongly withheld information, and necessary language waiving fees for journalists and public interest groups (Udombana, 2019).

**Table 1: Major Landmarks in the Historical Development of FOIA**

|      |   |
|------|---|
| 1966 | Sign into law   |
| 1974 | Many new requirement were introduced  |
| 1982 | President Ronald Reagan issue executive order 12356 which created new classification rule |
| 1996 | President Clinton signed into law the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments    |
| 2001 | President Bush issued Executive order 13233 which limited access to former president      |
| 2007 | President Bush sign the OPEN Government Act of 2007                                       |
| 2016 | FOIA first became law   |

**Source:** Culled from electronic frontier foundation, 2024

## **Structure of Freedom of Information Act in Nigeria**

The Freedom of Information Act 2011 was passed by the national assembly on 24<sup>th</sup> may 2011 and was accented by the President Goodluck Jonathan on 28<sup>th</sup> may, 2011. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) supersedes the Official Secrets Act (OSA) originally enacted in 1991, which forbade the unauthorized mystery and exclusion with which public servant cloak the ordinary operations of government and public institutions. It also seeks to change the manner in which public records and information are managed.

FOIA creates for any person a right to Information, whether or not contained in any written form, which is in the custody or possession of any public official, agency or institution. Section 1 and 2 of the FOIA in Nigeria establish the right of any person to apply for information or records in the possession of a public institution. In Nigeria it is not applicable to private companies and states and Local government areas at their discretion to incorporate it. Section 1 and 2(6) also provides that an applicant needs not to have any specific interests in the information sought and can apply to court to compel his release

Under section 2(1) and (2) the Act in Nigeria, a public institution is obliged to ensure that it records and keep Information about all its activities, operations and business and that it properly organizes and maintains all information in its custody in a manner that facilitate public access to such information. In addition, section 2(5) mandates a public institution to update and review information required to be published under this section periodically, and immediately whenever charges occur. Reasons of this is to ensure that relevant pieces of and changes in information are duly brought to the public domain without a prior request for disclosure.

Apart from the duty of a public institution to make information available on

request by any person, it also has the obligation to publish certain information on a regular basis. This information is contained in section 2(3) of the act as follows:-

- (a) A description of the organization and responsibilities of the institution including details of the programmes and functions of each division, branch and department of the institution.
- (b) A list of all
  - (i) Classes of accords under the control of the institution in sufficient detail to facilitate the exercise of the right to information under this Act, and
  - (ii) Manuals are used by employees of the information in administering or carrying out any of the programmes or activities of the institution.
- (c) A description of documents containing final opinions including concurring and dissenting opinions as well as orders made in the adjudication of cases.
- (d) Documents containing:
  - (i) Substantive rules of the institution
  - (ii) Statement and interpretations of the policy which have been adopted by the institution.


To facilitate the capacity of public institutions to proactively disclose information and ensure a smooth operation of the Act, the combined implication of section 2(3)f, 3(4), 3 and 29 (1) of the Act is that such institutions should designate appropriate staff with the responsibility to fulfil this mandate, in addition to managing the entire range of the FOIA process. To this end, the Act provides that every government or public institution must ensure the provision of appropriate training for such officials on the public's right to access to information or record held by it (13). This is explicitly stated in by the guideline on the implementation of the Act (2013) indicating that the effective implementation of the Act

requires each public institution to designate a senior official, who should be of at least Assistant Directors level or its equivalent as the head of a FOI Act unit. The unit is to have a direct responsibility for determining and generally ensuring compliance through the adoption of institutional best practices in the following areas

- (a) Dedicated help/ service lines or online assistance
- (b) Undertaking periodic review of record keeping and maintenance procedures
- (c) Reposting and liaising with the office of the Attorney General of the federation
- (d) Preparation of a record map/chart
- (e) Compliance with the institution's proactive disclosure obligations
- (f) Regular training and training of the staff of the institution on their FOI related obligation.

Despite the salient provisions of the Act and Guideline, there is an apparent lack of awareness of their contents among MDAs. Public Servants generally view persons seeking access to information on their records as adversaries who are out to witch hunt their institutions and so are unwilling to provide the

**Figure I: Illustration of R & J M**



In the figure, the Flower A is looking good and flourishes because it was opened to good environment and was not distracted. Flower B is looking pale and unkempt. Flower A is seen as a society where citizens have access to information and their rights are not abused.

needed information. The exemptions under the Act are covered by section (11-19) and these are:

- (a) International Affairs and Defence
- (b) Law Enforcement and Investigation
- (c) Personal Information
- (d) Professional & Others
- (e) Course or Research Materials

### Theoretical Framework

The study was anchored on Responsiveness and Just Model (RJM) of Governance. The model was propounded in 2022 by *Wechen Smith*. It is one of the models that tried to explain the relationship between an ideal society and democratic consolidation. The model advocates that where there is openness and uprightness in governance, dividends of democracy abound.

The model illustrated the relationship between an ideal society and democratic consolidation using two flowers in a jar. The first one was allowed to stay in an open and serene environment while the second was covered with a plastic on the top. This can be seen in the figure below:

Flower B is seen as a typical society where citizens are denied not just information but many privileges and rights. The tenets of the theory are:

- a. An ideal society is not based on restriction (secrecy)

- b. Where privileges are defined, opened and accessed, democracy thrive
- c. Access to information is critical to realization of an accountable government.
- d. Public bodies hold privileges like information not for themselves but as a custodian of public goods.
- e. Closeness in governance is antithetical to the task of engendering democratic governance.

people, making the former more responsive to the needs of the later and upholds the democratic ideology by promoting openness and transparency in administration.

### Research Methodology

We adopted a cross sectional survey research design as the research design of the study. The study restricted itself within the six (6) geo-political zones of Nigeria. One state in the Zones is selected and the summation of the categories of professionals in the state constituted the population of the study.

We used Bartlett, Kotrlik and Higgins table to determine our sample size which is 320. Simple random technique and systematic sample technique was used for sample distribution. Questionnaire and interview were the major instruments of data collection. The population size and sample allocation can be seen in the table below.

### Relevance of the Model to the Study

Some of the relevance of the model to the study are as follows:

- a. The model provides a nexus between openness in governance and democratic consolidation.
- b. The model was also able to equate information as lifeblood of democracy and a step meant to foster development
- c. The model attempts to bridge the gap between the government and the

**Table 2: States and Geo-political Zones**

| States  | Geo-Political Zone |
|---------|--------------------|
| Plateau | North-Central      |
| Taraba  | North-East         |
| Enugu   | South-East         |
| Osun    | South-West         |
| Kaduna  | North-West         |
| Benin   | South-South        |

Source: 1999 Constitution (as amended)

**Table3: Target Population**

| S/N          | Target                 | Plateau        | Taraba         | Enugu          | Osun           | Kaduna         | Edo            | Total          |
|--------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 1.           | Farmers                | 39,400         | 45,200         | 45,700         | 29,700         | 69,700         | 38,700         | 267,900        |
| 2.           | Teachers               | 17,500         | 13,800         | 16,200         | 16,700         | 57,200         | 18,200         | 139,600        |
| 3.           | Lawyers                | 10,500         | 8,200          | 19,400         | 11,210         | 17,600         | 12,110         | 79,020         |
| 4.           | Business               | 25,900         | 21,400         | 38,100         | 19,213         | 41,200         | 28,900         | 174,713        |
| 5.           | Civil Servants (State) | 17,600         | 14,300         | 24,170         | 15,300         | 49,900         | 21,200         | 142,470        |
| 6.           | Journalists            | 7,800          | 63,000         | 13,600         | 14,800         | 18,300         | 17,500         | 78,300         |
| <b>Total</b> |                        | <b>118,700</b> | <b>109,200</b> | <b>157,170</b> | <b>106,423</b> | <b>253,900</b> | <b>136,610</b> | <b>882,003</b> |

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2023.

**Table 4: Sample Allocation**

| S/N          | State   | Zones         | Target Population | Proportional Sample |
|--------------|---------|---------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| 1.           | Plateau | North Central | 118,700           | 43                  |
| 2.           | Taraba  | North East    | 109,200           | 40                  |
| 3.           | Enugu   | South East    | 157,170           | 57                  |
| 4.           | Osun    | South West    | 106,423           | 39                  |
| 5.           | Kaduna  | North West    | 253,900           | 92                  |
| 6.           | Benin   | South South   | 136,610           | 40                  |
| <b>Total</b> |         |               | <b>882,003</b>    | <b>320</b>          |

Source: NBS, 2023

### Results and Discussions

In this section, data obtained from the field were presented and analyzed using descriptive

statistical tools. We used ANOVA to test the formulated hypotheses.

**Table 5: Bio-Data of Respondents**

| Characteristics               | Categories          | Responses  | Percentage (%) |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|------------|----------------|
| (a) Sex                       | Male                | 180        | 60             |
|                               | Female              | 130        | 40             |
|                               | <b>Total</b>        | <b>300</b> | <b>100</b>     |
| (b) Educational Qualification | FSLC                | 5          | 2              |
|                               | SSCE                | 20         | 7              |
|                               | NCE/ND              | 35         | 11             |
|                               | HND/First Degree    | 100        | 33             |
|                               | PG Qualification    | 140        | 47             |
| <b>Total</b>                  | <b>300</b>          | <b>100</b> |                |
| (c) Profession                | Farming             | 50         | 17             |
|                               | Business            | 70         | 23             |
|                               | Legal Practice      | 40         | 13             |
|                               | State Civil Servant | 50         | 17             |
|                               | Journalism          | 50         | 17             |
|                               | Teaching            | 40         | 13             |
|                               | <b>Total</b>        | <b>300</b> | <b>100</b>     |

Source: Researcher's Survey, 2023.

The table above shows that 180 of the respondents representing 60% were from the male folk while 130 representing 40% were from the female folk. This thus shows that the entire gender category participated in the study.

In the table, 5 representing 2% were holders of FSLC, 20 representing 7% were holders of SSCE, 35 representing 11% were holders of NCE/ND, 100 representing 33% were holders of HND/First Degree and 140 representing 47% were holders of postgraduate qualifications (PGD, Masters and

PhD). What this entails is that most of the respondents are learned and would be able to express themselves and provide the desired information.

The table above also shows that 50 of the respondents representing 17% were into farming, 70 representing 23% were into business, 40 representing 13% were into legal practice, another 50 representing 17% were civil servants from the state, another 50 representing another 17% were journalists and another 40 representing another 13% were into teaching profession.



**Table 6: FOIA and Its Impact on Democratic Consolidation**

| S/N | Items                                    | SA           | A          | U         | D         | SD        |
|-----|--|--------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1.  | It promotes accountability in governance | 200(72%)     | 50(17%)    | 5(2%)     | 10(3%)    | 5(2%)     |
| 2.  | It promotes transparency in governance   | 230(77%)     | 50(17%)    | 5(2%)     | 10(3%)    | 5(2%)     |
| 3.  | Good tool in fighting corruption         | 230(77%)     | 50(17%)    | 5(2%)     | 10(3%)    | 5(2%)     |
| 4.  | Good responsive governance               | 230(77%)     | 50(17%)    | 5(2%)     | 10(3%)    | 5(2%)     |
| 5.  | Encourages citizen participation         | 230(77%)     | 50(17%)    | 5(2%)     | 10(3%)    | 5(2%)     |
| 6.  | Encourages culture of record keeping     | 230(77%)     | 50(17%)    | 5(2%)     | 10(3%)    | 5(2%)     |
|     | <b>Total</b>                             | <b>1,380</b> | <b>300</b> | <b>30</b> | <b>60</b> | <b>50</b> |

**Source:** Researcher’s Survey, 2023

The table above shows that 230 of the respondents representing 77% of the total responses strongly subscribed to the view that the implementation of FOIA promotes accountability in governance, 50 representing 17% also subscribed to the view, 5 representing 2% were indecisive, 10 representing 3% of the respondents opposed the view and another 5 representing 2% of the respondents strongly opposed the view.

In the table also, 230 of the respondents representing 77% strongly supported the view that the introduction of FOIA promotes transparency in governance, 50(17%) respondents also supported the view, 5(2%) of the respondents were not sure of their stands, 10 of the respondents representing 3% of the responses opposed the view and another 5 of the respondents representing 2% strongly rejected the view.

Also in the table, 230 of the respondents representing 77% strongly acknowledged the view that FOIA is a tool in fighting corruption, 50(17%) of the respondents also supported the view, 5(2%) were not sure of their stands, 10(3%) of the respondents opposed the view and other 5(2%) of the respondents strongly opposed the view.

In the table also, 230 of the respondents representing 77% strongly acknowledged the view that FOIA promote responsive governance, 50(17%) of the respondents also supported the view, 5(2%) were hesitant of their view, 10(3%) of the respondents rejected the notion and 5 of the respondents representing another 2% strongly rejected the view.

Also in the table, 230(77%) of the respondents strongly ascribed to the notion that FOIA encourages citizen participation in governance, 50(17%) also supported the view, 5 of the respondents representing 2% were hesitant of their view, 10 of the respondents were not in harmony with the perception and also, another 5(2%) of the respondents strongly opposed the view.

And also in the table, another 230 of the respondents representing 77% of the respondents strongly acknowledged the view that FOIA has encouraged the culture of record keeping that was not long practiced in the public sector, 50(17%) supported the view, 5(2) were not sure of their view, 10(3%) of the respondents rejected the view and another 5 of the respondents representing 2% strongly rejected the view.

**Table 7: FOIA and Its Effect on Democratic Consolidation**

| S/N | Items  | SA           | A          | U         | D         | SD        |
|-----|--|--------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1.  | Ambiguity in some of the provisions                | 250(83%)     | 30(10%)    | 6(2%)     | 7(5%)     | 7(3%)     |
| 2.  | The immunity clause                                | 250(83%)     | 30(10%)    | 6(2%)     | 7(5%)     | 7(3%)     |
| 3.  | The failure to provide sanction for non-compliance | 250(83%)     | 30(10%)    | 6(2%)     | 7(5%)     | 7(3%)     |
| 4.  | Poor culture of record keeping                     | 250(83%)     | 30(10%)    | 6(2%)     | 7(5%)     | 7(3%)     |
| 5.  | Lack of awareness on the content of FOI            | 250(83%)     | 30(10%)    | 6(2%)     | 7(5%)     | 7(3%)     |
|     | <b>Total</b>                                       | <b>1,250</b> | <b>150</b> | <b>30</b> | <b>35</b> | <b>35</b> |

**Source:** Researcher’s Survey, 2023.

In the table above, 250(83%) strongly subscribed to the view that ambiguity in some of the provisions of the Act affects implementation, 30(10%) also supported the view, 5 representing 2% were indecisive, 7 representing 5% refuted the view and another 7 representing another 3% strongly opposed the view.

In the table, 250 representing 83% strongly acknowledged the view that the immunity clause given to higher officers in governance not to disclose some certain information has significant effect on the implementation of the Act, 30(10%) of the respondents also supported the view, 6(2%) were not sure of their stands, 7(3%) of the respondents opposed the view and another 7(3%) strongly rejected the view.

Also in the table, 250 representing 83% of the respondents strongly subscribed to the view that the failure to provide sanction for non-compliance also affect the implementation of the Act, 30(10%) of the respondents also subscribed to the view, 6(2%) were not certain of their stands, 7(3%) of the respondents were not in agreement with the notion and another 7 representing another 3% of the respondents strongly rebutted the view.

**Table 8: ANOVA Summary of Table of Hypothesis One (1)**

| S/N | Source of variation | SS   | MS  | DF | Fcal  | Fr    |
|-----|---------------------|------|-----|----|-------|-------|
| 1   | Between Group       | 3340 | 835 | 4  | 6.776 |       |
| 2.  | Within Group        | 620  | 124 | 5  |       |       |
|     | Total               | 3960 | 959 | 9  |       | 3.376 |

**Source:** Researcher’s Survey, 2023.

**Result:** From the computation above, the *fcal* which was 6.776 is greater than the *fr* which is 3.376. With this, we accept  $H_a$  and reject  $H_0$  and conclude that the implementation of FOIA

In the table also, another 250 of the respondents representing 83% of the respondents strongly attested to the view that poor culture of record keeping in the public domain has significant effect on the implementation of the Act, 30(10%) of the respondents subscribed to the view, 6(2%) were indecisive, 7(3%) opposed the view and another 7 representing another 3% strongly refuted the view. And also in the table, 250 of the respondents representing 83% strongly ascribed to the view that lack of awareness of the content of FOIA has significant effect on its implementation, 30(10%) of the respondents also supported the view, 6(2%) were not sure of their stands, 7(5%) opposed the view.

**Test of Hypotheses**

The formulated hypotheses of the study were tested below. Since we have more than two groups, we used ANOVA to test the variance in their perception on the subject under discussion. It was tested at 10% level of significance.

**H0<sub>1</sub>:** The implementation of FOIA has not deepened democratic consolidation in Nigeria

has deepened democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

**H0<sub>2</sub>:** Several factors have not militated against the implementation of FOIA in Nigeria

**Table 9: ANOVA Summary of Table of Hypothesis Two (2)**

| S/N | Source of variation | SS    | MS   | DF | Fcal         | Fr    |
|-----|---------------------|-------|------|----|--------------|-------|
| 1   | Between Group       | 3880  | 970  | 4  | <b>7.341</b> |       |
| 2.  | Within Group        | 660   | 132  | 5  |              |       |
|     | Total               | 4,540 | 1102 |    |              | 4.127 |

**Source:** Researcher’s Survey, 2023.

**Result:** From the computation above, the *fcal* is 7.34 and is greater than the f-critical which is 4.127. With this, we accept  $H_i$  and reject  $H_0$

and conclude that several factors have militated against the implementation of FOIA in Nigeria.

In the past and before the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan assented the FOIA on 28<sup>th</sup> May, 2011, activities of government were shrouded in secrecy. This has made a lot of public officers to promote incompetency under the guise of secrecy and a lot of corrupt activities thrive. The passage of the bill has strengthened democracy and has brought Nigeria into the league of African nations that have done so. We used ANOVA to test the formulated hypotheses and it supported the notion that it is a prerequisite for the functioning of a modern state. The stated indices – accountability, frequency, responsive governance, tool to fight corruption, among others were all affirmed with significant score. Underscoring the importance of availability of information in the realization of good governance, Dakas (2009) notes that the conduct of governmental affairs in absolute secrecy is antithetical to the task of engendering democratic governance within the framework of transparency and accountability.

The Act offers a lot of good intentions but its implementations were hampered by several factors. The result of our test confirmed that several challenges militated against its implementation. These factors include the ambiguity in some of the provision and its failure to provide requisite sanctions for non-compliance with certain provisions of the law. There were also the challenges of the pervasive culture of not keeping record by public institutions and lack of sufficient will on the part of the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice who is the Chief Implementing Officer of the Act, to ensure the success of the goal of the Act.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The assent of the Nigerian Freedom of Information Act on May 28, 2011 is a good development that will help to sustain and deepen democratic practice in Nigeria. The gains outweigh the bad side and it is a practice

that has helped a lot of countries to realize an effective and accountable government. Just like it is often said, Nigeria is good at introducing good and lofty policies but it is its implementation that is always the issue. This paper has examined FOIA and its impact in consolidating democratic practices in Nigeria. The study established that access to information is critical to the realization of an accountable government and will offer a fresh hope of victory over the old culture of secrecy that had always defined the Nigerian public service.

In this light, the paper recommends that the gap in Sections 2(3), 10 and 29(2) and 3 of the Act that allowed immunity to certain categories of public officers should be corrected. No exception should be given to certain class or group. Adequate sanction should be provided for non-compliance with the provision of the Act especially with the provision of Sections 2(3) and (4) on disclosure of information by public institutions; the sanctions in Sections 7(5) and 10 should be diligently enforced. Adequate training should be regularly provided for FOIA desk officers. The Act should empower the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, as specifically mandated partial implementing officer of the Act, to set up a monitoring team to ensure compliance with the provisions of Section 2 and any other relevant sections of the Act.

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## ELITE CONSPIRACY IN ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Gbaeren Felix Tersoo<sup>1</sup>

Patrick Aondoakaa Tion<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science

College of Education, Katsina-Ala, Benue State, Nigeria

Email: *telixon@gmail.com*

<sup>2</sup>Department of Political Science

Federal University, Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *akaation2006@yahoo.com*



### Abstract

The political upheavals in Nigeria today is associated with increasing ethno-religious violence, insecurity and instability continues to remain distressing. To the extent that, the euphoria that grapple the Nigerian people as the wind of democratic change sweep across the political landscape paving way for the exit of military rule and the return of democratic governance has largely dissipated and is being replaced by a sense of skepticism, disillusionment and despair. Given the harvest of ethno-religious violence and other forms of insecurity in Nigeria which have resulted in an estimated loss of over million lives and unquantifiable psychological and material damages. This paper examines the role of elites in ethno-religious violence in Nigeria. Findings in the paper culminate to reveal that the role of the elites in the promotion of ethno-religious conflicts and violence in Nigeria is obvious and this has worked against peace, stability, unity, integration, fundamental freedom, mass participation in the democratic process, and national security. The paper concludes that elite conspiracy in Nigeria is designed to disempower the Nigerian people and to cover failure in governance, leadership, and none improvement of people's welfare. The paper recommends that the federal government of Nigeria must show commitment to ensure that all reports of previously investigated cases of conflicts and their findings be made public and implemented to avoid re-occurrence.

**Keywords:** Elite, conspiracy, ethno-religious, insecurity, underdevelopment

### Introduction

When Nigeria attained independence in 1960, there were great expectations that the nation would possibly make steady progress along the paths of sustainable peace, democracy and development (Omitola 2009, Agu 2009 as cited in Agu and Ugbudu 2012 p. 75), such expectations and hopes were not misplaced given the abundance of human and natural resources endowed in the nation as captured by (Osaghae 1998, Akinwemi 2004). These were illusions, as it did not take long before these hopes were squandered. Nigeria, created out of a motley of nationalities and

ethnic groups is today Africa's wealthiest nation. It is equally the most highly populated and one of the largest in terms of territory and potentially, one of the world most vibrant economies (Olowu 1997, UNDP 2012). Paradoxically, it is also one of the most politically unstable systems on the continent. (Kura 2004, Hansen 2007, Ogundiya 2009, Alamu 2012 as cited in Agu & Ugbudu 2012 p.75). Since its attainment of political independence in 1960, Nigeria's political landscape, had been plagued by political instability. It has stumbled from one political crisis to another. The declaration of a state of

emergency in Western Nigeria and the suspension of its government in 1962, the boycott of the Federal elections 1963 by the two Southern political parties, Communal riots and the breakdown of civil authority in Western Nigeria following an allegedly flagrantly rigged election in that region 1965, The Tiv riots 1964-1965, the secession attempt of Eastern Nigeria in 1967 followed by a 30 months of bloody civil war that cost millions of lives (Nwankwo 1987, Adejo 2010 as cited in Agu & Ugbudu 2012). Civil disturbances and public protest against election rigging in 1981, the June 12, 1993 crisis. Sharia crisis (2000-2003), in northern states of Nigeria, the Yoruba and Hausa clash in shagamu Lagos, (2003) the Tiv/Jukun conflicts (2000-2003) (2009-2011) (2010-2022). The crisis in Jos plateau (2001-2001, 2008-2012,2022-2023). The invasion of Benue communities by Fulani herdsmen, and recently the Banditry wreaking havoc on the people of Sankera axis. The bombings and assassinations by Boko Haram Islamic religious sector across the country, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Yobe, Kebbi, Gombe, Adamawa, Taraba, Benue, Niger, Kogi, Ekiti, Enugu, Ogun, Anambra states etc. (salawu,2010 Agu & Ugbudu 2012).

The profile of the post-colonial Nigerian state as can be seen from the issue raised above portray a disconnect in the political architecture of the country, (Adejumobi 1991 as cited in Agu & Ugbudu 2012). Specifically, the political environment in Nigeria is a theatre of violence, conflict, and war for primitive accumulation among competing elites. What is in issue is that, the Nigerian ruling elites have used their control of the Nigerian state to accumulate enormous economic resources for themselves. They have in turn used this massive concentration of economic wealth not only to stake claims to power but to permanently control the apparatus of the state power.

Power has therefore, become a top priority in all circumstances to the extent that Nigeria's ruling elites promote, political, ethnic,

religious and communal conflicts in a ceaseless and deadly game of power sweepstake (Jibo 1986). The recent administration has been criticized to be inundated with plethora of challenges ranging from the removal of subsidy at the inception of the administration without due consultation with the relevant stakeholder's and authorities of the effects of such an abrupt action on the citizens. These has resulted in the astronomical increase in the pump price in the premium motor spirit(PMS) (fuel), hike and the prices of stable food. It has exacerbated the inflationary rate the country has been battling with right from the regime of President Muhammadu Buhari. Life has become so unbearable with the masses wallowing in abject poverty. There is paucity of food, resources, infrastructural decay, ideas etc.

Ethnic and religious conflicts seemed to have constituted one of Nigeria's most difficult conundrum that have impugned national integration, stability and development since independence. According to (Salawu 2010) while it is true that, it is not possible to know the exact number of ethno-religious conflicts due to lack of adequate statistical data on this issue, it is interesting to note that about forty percent (40%) ethno-religious based conflicts are credited to the fourth Republic of Nigeria.

The fact that there is a recent increase in the number of ethno-religious conflicts in the country makes it relevant issue of discussion in the contemporary Nigeria and lesson for other nation in the world that are multi-ethnic and multi-religious in their composition. Also because of the violent nature of ethno-religious conflicts, which often take the form of riots, sabotage, assassination, armed struggle, guerilla warfare and session in Nigeria. The level of insecurity in the country no doubt has implication for political and economic development of the country and thus make it an important discussion. In the words of (Agu & Ugbudu 2012) Sixty-four years after independence the Nigerian nation state is at a stage of near collapse as ethno-religious

conflict have become intensified and well entrenched. At the heart of these conflicts and crises, the elites have always played a very dismal role in fueling them in order to further their vested interests. This situation continues to promote insecurity and instability with adverse effects on Nigerian development. It is against this backdrop that, the treaty of this paper intend to interrogate the role of political elites in the promotion of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. The paper is set out to analyses the impact of these conflicts on national stability and development and a theoretical framework identifying possible causes. The third part will examine the role of elites in the promotion of ethno-religious conflicts and violence with the fourth part devoting on the impact of ethno-religious conflicts on national unity, integration, stability and overall development in Nigeria, while the fifth part is the conclusion and suggestions.

### **Conceptualizing Elite Conspiracy and Religious Violence in Nigeria**

Certain concepts are susceptible to different interpretation due to its applicability and usage. In order to clear the ambiguity surrounding its usage and application, we shall devote some measures of time to clarify their usage in these paper. Elite is used here in the paper to mean superior individual members of the ruling class, power holders of a body politics and a group of people with highest indices in their branch of activity (Odofin 2005 as cited in Agu & Ugbudu 2012). The elites are a group of people who exercise directly or are in a position to influence very strongly the exercise of power.

They are considered as the organized political class that shape policy and engage in varying degrees of cooperation, consultation, competition or conflict with each other, (Mosea, 1939 as cited in Lopez 2013). It is therefore reasoned that, all societies, simple and complex, agricultural or industrial, need authorities' with in and spokesman and agents

which are symbols of common life and embodiments of the values that maintain it. Every society has a minority (who rule) that possesses the quality necessary for it ascension to full social and political power. In the words of (Lopez 2012) there are many categories of elites in different professions and disciplines such as, business or commercial elites, educational, traditional and political elites (made up of civilian and military extractions). The focus of this paper is on political elites and their roles in ethno-religious conflicts. The role of the elites, their secret plans and ability to instigate, disrupt peace and promote violence is what is referred to in this paper as elite conspiracy.

Ethnic groups are groups of people characterized by exclusive symbolic formations, values, systems, language, normative behavior and territory (Agu & Ugbudu 2012). Ethnic groups according to Nnoli (1978: p5) are social formation distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries, language and culture being the most important attributes. Ethnicity is a product of interactions between and among people of different ethnic groups. Chazzam et al (1992 p106 as cited in Agu & Ugbudu 2013 p76) define ethnicity as a subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties and aspirations. To them, ethnicity has its foundation in the combined remembrances of past experiences and in common aspirations, values, norms and expectations. Toyo (1986) sees ethnicity as an ideological tool that promotes collective survival and existence of a group. According to (Okolo 2004 p. 330) ethnicity as a social phenomenon can alter its forms, place and role in the life of a society. Like any other phenomenon's it may jeopardize development in general; hence the worse hit is democracy. Ethnicity is a dog in the manger, it hinders democratic consolidation.

Democracy according to Crowther (1998) is a system of government by all the people in a given country. In Nigeria, for instance,

democracy follows the ethnic base of the three (trio) major ethnic groups (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo) since the era of the colonization through the era of the first republic down to the 21<sup>st</sup> century democratic rule. There has been a clear evidence of this trend and the pre-dominant ethnic split between the Muslim north and Christian south. The states within the middle belt are usually in the trajectory swinging to the pendulum arbitration. This dimension to some extent exacerbate acrimoniously tension which affect development, suffice to say that a strong belief of religion, political pattern of spread toes ethnic hate and invectives are traded with unrestrained venom. It is obvious that the direction which ethnicity focuses carries along with it, debris such as religious culture, economic exchange, political instability etc. that hampers sustainable development in general. The inevitable consequences of socio-cultural differences include fears, concerning injustice, hatred, oppression, nepotism, religious riots etc. (Nnoli 1989, Psachoroponlos, 1992, Benabon, 1993, Ake 1996 as cited in Okolo 2004 p,330).

Different ethnic groups consciously or unconsciously form militant groups such as Oodua people's congress (OPC), the Ogoni Youth, the Movement for the Actualization of the sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB), the movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the Mafia's in the Northern Nigeria. Ohaneze representing the Igbo, Afenifene/Oodua people's congress (OPC) representing the Yoruba, Arewa Forum, representing the Northerners not forgetting Boko Haram terrorizing the country without stating clearly its objectives.

These militant ethnic groups have both political and religious objectives at the back of their minds. When any member from either of the groups assumes leadership role, will inevitably ensure that none of his group will suffer. In other words, they will do anything

possible to ensure that members of their ethnic group are placed in sensitive and strategic positions not minding whether they merit such positions, the national interest and the dictates of human rights and faire play in reaction against the winner takes all, marginalized ethnic groups strike and it paralyse all the ethnicities. This is witnessed in the recent incessant invasion of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) the seat of power in Nigeria. This has triggered reaction from a former director general of the state security service (SSS) Mike Ejiofor to proffer solutions to curb the menace. (BBC News, 2024). These ethno-religious crises give rise to hatred and violence, hence, lead to wanton destruction of lives and property.

Violence is one of the concept that is multifaceted with ideological underpinning and for every variety of protest, militancy, coercion, destruction or muscle flexing has its fundamental unanimity. Be that as it may, the paper adopts a working definitions that put forward by Walter (1964) and Agi (1998). Walter (1964) restricts the term to the sense of destructive harm, hence a destructive kind of force. As a generic term Agi (1998) adds that, violence does not only induce physical assaults that cause damage to the person or property, but also the many techniques of inflicting harm by mental or emotional means, it includes psychic and spiritual harm as well as physical damage. The linkage between ethnic and religious violence, thus the coinage ethno-religious violence is therefore connected (Shima 2006 p,18 as cited in Agu and Ugbudu 2012). They highlighted the plausible explanation for this close linkage between the two types of violence which is the congruence in several respects between ethnic and religious identities such that, the two forms of identity are mutually reinforcing rather than exclusive. Religion, etymologically, is derived from the Latin word "religare", which means "to bind together", but rather than bind the people of Nigeria together, religion has divided them along sectarian lines. It is the oxygen of



devious power politics, sectarian politics, mass murder, terror, instability, and the plague of animosity. In Nigeria, the boundary of ethnicity and religion tend to overlap so that quite often religious identity becomes part of an ethnic group's identity (Egwu 2001;24 as cited in Agu and Ugbudu 2012 p. 77).

Ethnicity and religions constitute core for which people are willing to die or kill others. They are themselves ready tools of mobilization by the elite in promoting conflicts and violence. Ethnicity and religions above all tend to determine group definition and perception of power, and where such definitions and perceptions between different groups are irreconcilable, the result is conflict and violence.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The paper adopts elite theory as a theoretical tool of analysis for ease of understanding the workings of the elite in its control and exercise of power. Elite Theory was developed by three proponents, Pareto (1935), Mosca (1939) and Michels (2009[1915]), These authors are usually labelled as "classical elites". However elite theory developed into a vibrant theoretical field, intersecting other theories, such as rational choice theory and political culture theory. (Lopez 2013). The concept of elites' is based on the notion that every society holds a ruling minority, a group that controls and disputes the most important power sources. Not only do elites dispute power (reading different levels of conflict and violence), but now elites also enter the game through different mechanisms of elite recruitment. According to (Lopez 2013) the core of elite theory relies in explaining elite behavior, elite interaction, elite transformation and ultimately, the connection between those instances and state outcomes.

The link between elite behavior and regime change led to a number of authors to almost naturalize elite theory as regime theory (e.g Dogan & Higley, 1998; Higley and Burton, 2006 as cited in Lopez 2013). Yet elite theory is not restricted to the study of regime change and regime support. Although studies do tend to

focus on the political realm, elite researchers often explore power relations inside the market and civil security as well. An important focus within elite research is the emergence of welfare states, a political phenomenon directly related with market regulation and the states' capacity to penetrate society. (Lopez 2013).

Classical and current elite theorists share the ambition of explaining state outcomes through elite behavior. If political sociology is concerned with the relationship between state and society, then, elite theory is based on the assumption that elite action has a causal effect on such relationship. Thus regime types, regime change, liberation, stateless, secularization and many other political phenomena fit within the scope of elite theory. The core of classical elitism is the notion of elite inevitability. Classical elites used the inevitability of elite rule as a premise to counter argue with political liberation and Marxism. They claim that both democracy, (as the government of the people or demos) and socialism (as a classless regime) were impossible outcomes because society is necessarily elite driven.

In the elitist view, elites could only be substituted by another set of elites, meaning that the majority is necessarily ruled by minority. This notion was expressed in Pareto's (1935) law of elite circulation, in Mosca's (1939) notion of political class and in Michels (2009[1915]) Iron laws of Oligarchy. In the words of (Lopez 2013), the principle or law of elite circulation holds that elite's alternate in power as a result of either peaceful or violent competition. In Pareto's (1935) term, history is (and could only be) nothing but a cemetery of elites. The notion of political class, which is currently less frequent in elite studies, defines elites as a class of political rulers in opposition to a mass of followers. The Iron law of Oligarchy synthesizes the notion of elite inevitability formulating it as a natural law.

Consequently, upon the above, elites were often (but not only) defined through capacity personality and skills. For instance, Pareto (1935) distinguished elites between those who resembled The lion (domination by force) and

those who resembled the fox (domination by persuasion and skills), a typology that resembles Machiavelli's political philosophy, Mosca (1939) made mention of material conditions, but also of the intellectual and moral superiority of elites. Current elite theory defines elites as actors controlling resources, occupying key positions and relating through power network (Yaniokoski & Dubrow, 2008). Thus, the state-of-the-art concept of elite is more closely related to the Weberian notion of power, understood as the capability of implementing one's will, even against the will of others (Weber, 2005 [1922]: 696 as cited in Lopez 2013). Power can be achieved through material and/or symbolic resources. Consequently, elites can be defined as those in possession of those resources (Reis & Moore, 2005). This definition does not appear to be that distant from the Marxist notion of the means of production. However, the concept of elite power is not based on economic assumptions. Also elite theory usually conceives the elites as a smaller group than social class.

In addition, elite can emerge among dissident movements and even from dominated classes or group (Dogan & Higley, 1998 as cited in Lopez 2013). As Higley and Burton (2006:7) argue, elites are person's occupying the top of powerful Organizations and movements thus capable of affecting political outcomes both substantially and regularly.

The current concept of elites is often criticized, because the notion of elite emerging from movements and organizations may lead to a vast array of elites sources, contradicting the notion of elites as a small group (Cammack, 1990). This is an important theoretical problem, because elite theory acknowledges that elites may come from anywhere, as long as they find the necessary tools to exercise power. Thus elites may come from the state and the corporate worlds, but also from guerilla unions, the media, NGOs, any kind of social movement and so on. However, elite theory limits elites to a necessary tool, anyone but not everyone could eventually become a member of the elite.

Assumed that people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds lived and also worked side by side in the urban centers, one would have expected a large measure of ethnic understanding and tolerance to evolve. However, this did not come about (Njoku, 2004). Competition for limited job opportunities vitiated inter-ethnic understanding and harmony. Indeed, proximity generated tension and fear of domination and stiffened prejudices. Apart from promoting ethnicity and religion, colonialism brought about regional disparities in terms of development. This according to (Agu and Ugbudu 2012) created region inequalities in development and laid the foundation for ethnic and regional consciousness and divisive tendencies among Nigerians. (Njoku, 2004 p.66) collaborated this assertion where he avers that "The regions were inhabited by each majority ethnic group and was also the home of minority ethnic groups. And each of them was also dominated by one political party which was also the party of the majority ethnic group. This situation exacerbated ethnic cleavages between the majority ethnic groups as well as between each of these majority groups and the minorities in the regions of their dominance". The overall impact of the colonial policy on development of Nigeria was the structural and educational imbalances, ethnic marginalization and domination. There was lopsidedness in the distribution of political power in favor of certain groups as well as the discriminatory manner of appointments in political offices. All these created tension among the various ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria and constitute the political legacy of colonialism.

Suffice to say that right from independence, Nigeria state inherited a weak socio-political structure, a defective and an unbalanced federation. It was evolved with elements of suspicion and an intensification of ethnic and religious consciousness and rivalry; a subverted indigenous ethos of a governance and culture and a parochial leadership that exhibited regional, ethnic and religious orientations above national consciousness

(Dunmoye 2004, Jibo, 2003, Odotin, 2005, Sorkaa, 2006 as cited in Agu and Ugbudu 2012). The Nigerian state is today confronted with deepening crises, these include among others; uneven development, fear of domination which has given rise to the north/south divide, the struggle between the majority and minority ethnic groups, the demand for state creation and federal restructuring, the resurrection of religious fundamentalism, ethnic identities and high level of insecurity in the country.

It is undoubtedly that Nigerian was not partitioned along religious lines at independence, however, religion and ethnic violence has occurred throughout Nigerian history with great manifestations in the decades of the (1980s, 1990s and 2000s) (Kukah 2003, Otite, 2004 and Best 2006 as cited in Agu & Ugbudu 2012). In the words of Bello (2006 p.244) it was in the 1980s and 1990s that Nigeria started witnessing a massive wave of ethno-religious conflicts and violence which grossly undermined social integration, and stability. These began with the Maitatsine uprising in Kano in 1981, in which 4,177 human souls perished. This was followed by the Bulunkutu Maiduguri in 1981, Rigachukun, Kaduna crisis in 1982, Jimeta, Yola in 1984, Gombe in 1984, Kafanchan kaduna in 1987, Zogon Kataf in 1992, Funtua 1993, 1994, Kaduna religious crisis, the September, 1994 Potiskum (Yobe state) religious crisis. The Bauchi state blood bath in July, 1 1995 Christian versus Muslim crisis in Jos 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1996, The Kaduna Polytechnic crisis June 1996, the Kafanchan clash September 6<sup>th</sup> 1996, (Muslims and Christians), the 2002 Miss World pageant protests, the recurrent Jos crisis May 2001, September 2001, November, 2001, January 2002, May 2002, June 2002, August 2002, April 2008, the bombings at St. Finbars church and church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) (Jos) March 2012, by suspected Boko Haram Islamic sector, the suspected herders invasion of Boko's in plateau state, the recent kidnapping, maiming and killing in June,

September, November, December 2023 in Jos. The Madala (Abuja) bombings of St. Theresa catholic church on 25<sup>th</sup> December 2012, the terrorists attack on a United Nation Building in Abuja 2011, the invasion of Tiv communities in Nasarawa state, Makurdi, Guma, Gwer west, Gwer east, Katsina-Ala, Kwande, Apa, Zaki-Biam, Okpokuru etc. all in Benue state, by Fulani herdsmen etc. the growing siege of Boko Haram banditry specialized in Kidnappings of mass of people across the northern region of Nigeria, with threats of militias and bandits spread to other parts of the country shows that, Nigeria is not safe and is on the brinks of disintegration or collapse.

### **Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Violence in Contemporary Nigeria**

Jibo (2003 p,19) argues that, ethnic identity, inequitable allocation of economic resources, the manipulation of religious and political interest, account greatly for some of the factors promoting conflicts and violence. Another factor in the promotion of violent ethno-religious conflict in Nigerian today is the manipulation of region by contending elites in their struggle for power and control of resources. The meaning and significance of the increasingly violent political campaigns built around religious issues and differences is a covert strategy in which contending elites manipulate religion to mystify and cover up the basic realities of existential life in Nigeria. The ruling elites in Nigeria embody, the domination of appropriation over wealth creation, consumption over national production. Far from contributing to the creation of national goods and services or even functioning social and political values and structures, they survive on exploitation shortages and crude accumulation. In the course of the struggle to control resources and power, the elite invoke religious sentiments to cover up and disguise their failures before the people.

According to Abati (2022) evidence abound on the weaponisation of religion, even as the

Nigerian constitution 1999 (as amended) states expressly that “the government of the Federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion”, the resort to violence on the basis of religion, as it has been witnessed over the years in the middle Belt, Southern Kaduna and other parts of the country, the politics of Sharia, and the cruel exploitation of religion by political leaders tells a different story. Abati (2022) further narrated how religion has driven a wedge among Nigerians. This is ironic, for Nigeria, is clearly not of the most religious countries in the world, with every street, every corner boasting of either a church, a mosque, a shrine or a temple. The business of religion is also the most uncreative in Nigeria, with many religious groups noted more for commerce, hustling and mass hypnotism, rather than piety, with a yawning gap between private and public morality, as the people commit atrocities in the name of God. Bishop Hassan Kukah(2022 p.1) said it where he avers thus

It’s time to end Nigeria so that people who want development can go ahead. I have never been as unsure of Nigeria future as I am now....

After independence, in order to build a great nation, each country went to work. But in Nigeria, after independence, our people went to pray and fast.

So, while we were praying, Malaysia came here and took our palm seedlings and build a great factory of it.

While we praying, Singapore went into investment in technology.

While we were praying, India went into ICT (Information and Communication Technology).

While we were praying, China went into massive Industrialization.

While we were shouting Allah Alakuba! UAE went into massive infrastructural development.

While we were binding and casting Lucifer, Japan went into technological development.

While we were speaking in tongues, Denmark went into education of her citizens.

While we were mounting big speakers in our places of worship, USA was mounting man on the moon.

After our prayers, God, being a wise God decided to reward us according to our labor. Since those that went into industrialization, technology, infrastructural development, ICT, education etc. had been rewarded accordingly. It’s only wise God rewards us with our efforts in prayers.

That’s why today, Nigerian pastors are competing in building the biggest churches. That’s why there are more prayer houses and worship places than hospitals and schools. That’s why people rush to prayer houses for medical and business solutions instead of hospitals.

That’s why we don’t do business proposals before jumping into business since we are going to back it up with prayers. And when such collapse, we blame devil.

That’s why it’s a sin to say anything negative about pastors and imams.

That’s why our pastors don’t consider the opinion of engineers while building and blame devil when the building collapsed.

That’s why we always wait for God to do that which ability to accomplish it has already been handed over to us.

That’s why we want our teachers to labor on earth and come to heaven for their rewards. Nigeria is a prayer loving, God fearing nation, Religion has taken the place of technology, infrastructure, education and all.

When we are travelling, we ignore all the necessary road requirements, servicing of our vehicles and pray. And, once we pray, we can put a half fit vehicle on the road and blame our step mother or mother-in-law if anything goes wrong.

That’s why there are more people dying on our road than wild animals in the wilderness. Because, we pray and fast and leave everything to God when God has given us all we need to survive and build a nation....

The easiest way to ignite violence in Nigeria is to play the ethnic or religious card, as in Kafanchan, Kano, Jos, Zango-Kataf, Maitatsine riots, Kano, the slaughter of priest, incessant attacks on churches, etc. many have died for

no just cause: Gideon Akaluka, Mrs Christiana Oluwatoyin Oluwasesin, Deaconess Eunice Ibrahim, Deborah Yakubu Samuel, all made worse since the return to civilian rule in 1999, by “The religion-inspired war” unleashed on Nigeria by Boko Haram and a band of terrorists and their international partners. Nor does it matter whether the perpetrators of violence are educated or not. Abati (2022) sighted a case in University of Ibadan where they occurred a warfare between Christians and Muslims within the university community over the location of a chapel cross, which the Muslims asked to be removed because it was visible from the direction of the university Mosque, and hence allegedly hindering the faith of worshippers, between 1985 and 1984. This became known as the Cross and Crescent crisis in Ibadan. Religion is so sensitive that both Nigerian Muslim and Christians have learnt to live in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion. Such measures and groups as the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), Interfaith Meditation Centre (IMC) and Interfaith Dialogues have not necessarily promoted tolerance enough. The fear of likely domination by the other worsens the situation. Another good example is the recent case where states in the north are prohibiting the existence of churches on campuses. Every election season, religion plays a major role in the selection of candidates, giving rise for the need for zonal ethnic, and religious balancing.

At a point virtually every Christian group in the country, including the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Arewa Christians and Indigenous Pastors Association, and the Christian Global Network kicked against the conduct of general election in this country in recent memory has attracted as much religious sentiment. Ethno-religion has eaten so deep in the fabrics of Nigerians such that it is impossible to do anything in Nigeria without “religion, region or ethnic origin”.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

Ethnic and religious conflict have inflicted a lot of pains and agonies on the people of Nigeria, right from independence. Through mindless and senseless killings, kidnappings, and assassinations that are usually accompanied by these conflict and violence in Nigeria, the north for instance has become a desolate homestead. This conflicts and violence have led to severe distrust and mistrust among communities, hatred, lack of confidence, severe animosity as groups, sworn enemies. In Nigeria today, ethnicity and religion have become veritable instruments used by the elites to further narrow economic and political gains. They therefore capitalize on the prevailing extreme and harsh socio-economic conditions, which have generated hardship and hopelessness to mobilize religious and ethnic sentiments to fight their own cause. The role of the elites in the promotion of ethno-religious conflicts and violence in Nigeria vis-à-vis referred to as elite conspiracy have not just work against peace and stability, unity and integration, fundamental freedom, mass participation in the democratic process, and also against national security. The conspiracy has been designed to cover their failure in governance, leadership, none improvement of people’s welfare and it is a conspiracy designed to disempowered the people. That is why the intractable ethno-religious conflicts and violence in Nigeria today have promoted destruction, homelessness, refugee crisis, internally displaced persons (IDPs), distrust, suspicious, disillusionment and insecurity.

In a modern state, national unity is maintained usually by routine allegiance to the civil authorities, and this is supplemented by ideological exploitation. But in Nigeria, loyalty to the nation is still something of a nebulous concept. This hydra headed monster is to be sought in the country’s colonial history. The colonial government was an autocratic imposition which created a wide gulf between government and the governed. This in turn

resulted in the 'we' (governed) and 'they' (government) mentality still exhibited by the average Nigerian towards civil authorities. The cure for ethno-religious conflicts is even-handed to the government which is the guarantees equal treatment of all citizens and equitable distribution of the resources of the state among its ethnic components irrespective of the ethnic origin of the persons at the helm of affairs.

Secondly, the leadership must ensure that all reports of the previously investigated cases of conflicts and their findings should be made public and implemented to avoid re-occurrence.

Thirdly, the Nigeria leadership must apprehend, try and punish those behind these conflicts no matter their position to serve as a deterrent to others. For no individual or group is greater than Nigeria. Finally, Nigeria should produce modern security gadgets specially designed to assist in surveillance (surveillance camera). This will enable the security architecture to carry out their duties effectively and efficiently.

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## UNDERSTANDING NIGERIAN IDENTITY THROUGH HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS

Attah Jonathan<sup>1</sup>

Mordakai Sule Dansonka<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Social Studies

Federal College of Education, Zaria, Nigeria

Email: *attahzy@gmail.com*

<sup>2</sup>Department of History and Diplomatic Studies

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *dansonkams@yahoo.com*



### Abstract

The Nigerian identity is a complex tapestry woven from centuries of historical, cultural, and socio-political threads. This article seeks to delve into the multifaceted essence of Nigerian identity by examining its roots through historical and cultural contexts. Nigeria, with its diverse ethnic groups, languages, and traditions, presents a rich landscape for exploring identity formation. By tracing back to pre-colonial times, we uncover the foundational elements that shaped the Nigerian identity, from the empires that once thrived to the intercultural exchanges that occurred through intergroup relations. The colonial era introduced significant disruptions, leaving indelible marks on societal structures, cultural practices, and collective consciousness. Yet, amidst these upheavals, resilience emerged as Nigerians navigated through struggles for independence and the complexities of post-colonial nation-building. Moreover, the cultural tapestry of Nigeria reflects a mosaic of traditions, beliefs, and artistic expressions that embody the essence of its people. Language, religion, and rituals further enrich this identity, serving as pillars of communal belonging and individual expression. This is historical research, thus, the method of data analysis employed is the combination of narrative analytical historical approach, and the descriptive analytical historical approach that integrates historical research, cultural studies, and sociological perspectives, this exploration aims to shed light on the nuances of Nigerian identity. It seeks to unravel the layers of influences—internal and external—that have shaped perceptions of self and collective belonging. By understanding the complexities and nuances embedded within the Nigerian identity, we can foster greater appreciation, empathy, and solidarity among its diverse populace and beyond.

**Keywords:** Nigerian identity, history, culture, empathy, self

### Introduction

The Nigerian state is a product of a historical accident that arose out of European adventurism which eventually culminated in the conquest and subsequent colonization of hitherto independent indigenous polities in the Nigeria area. The chronological sequence of events leading to the colonization and establishment of the Nigerian state was shaped in large part by the actions of three

European groups: European explorers, European Christian missionaries, and European traders (Ayandele, 1980). The aforementioned development meant that, through the instrumentality of a Charter, the British colonial powers and colonial administrators swiftly formed a colony and protectorate over Lagos and the Niger territories placing the latter under the control

of the Royal Niger Company. This development according to Chris (2016) can be categorized into epoch, with the first phase which began in the 1900, the second phase was in 1906 and the last and final phase took place on January 1, 1914. In addition, he argues that the last phase created significant difficulties in determining Nigeria's political future in the light of the cultural diversity and ethnic pluralism.

Given the background information provided, it is clear that Nigeria is a nation made up of many different ethnic groups with a rich and varied history and culture. The identity of the people has been greatly shaped by this intricate web of influences. Due to these developments, Nigeria's sociopolitical environment is now dealing with a complicated issue of palpable sociopolitical proportions that frequently shows itself as sociocultural disputes, ethnoreligious intolerance, perceived or actual political marginalization, among many other issues. According to Chris (2016), the majority of these issues are caused by our misinterpretation of the political, religious, and cultural views, values, and inclinations of others. Yet, we all belong to the same political entity that is administered from one center; we have a common currency; one federal constitution; one national anthem; one national team; one national assembly and several other institutions. This study delves into the historical and cultural backdrop of Nigeria and its impact on the intricate tapestry of individual and collective identities within the country. Understanding Nigerian identity development is the goal of this study, which will be accomplished through an analysis of cultural and historical contexts.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The instrumentalist theory of identity served as the theoretical foundation for this investigation. This theory, which maintains that ethnic identities are dynamic in nature, was selected in light of Nigerian cultural characteristics. Nonetheless, they are actively used by a number of players to accomplish particular socio-political and economic

objectives. Instrumentalist theory, according to Hall (1996), refers to identities—individual or collective—that are socially formed and have particular strategic functions within societal contexts. Smith (1991) supported this viewpoint by arguing that identities are flexible and malleable, molded by power dynamics, political agendas, and economic interests rather than set or innate.

In the Nigerian historical and cultural contexts, the instrumentalist theory offers insights into the dynamic nature of identity formation amidst historical and cultural complexities. For example, Okolie (2017) noted that social movements may purposefully acquire identities to further their goals, while political leaders in Nigeria exploit ethnic or religious identities to mobilize support or justify their authority. Similarly, Adegbola (2003) asserts that the processes of modernization and globalization introduce new influences and chances for identity negotiation and redefinition, which further complicate identity dynamics.

Critics of instrumentalist theory argue that it overlooks the deeply ingrained dynamic aspects of identity rooted in shared history, culture, and lived experiences (Kymlicka, 1995). Furthermore, instrumentalist theory runs the risk of oversimplifying complicated identity dynamics by treating them as little more than strategic calculations, according to (Brubaker & Cooper 2000). Despite these objections, instrumentalist theory offers insightful explanations of how historical and cultural heritage information shapes the situational and strategic nature of identity evolution and negotiation in Nigeria.

### **Research Methodology**

This article uses historical methodology as its research approach, and its data analysis strategy combines the descriptive analytical historical approach with the narrative analytical historical approach. The article's descriptive style aids in describing the historical events that took place in Nigeria. The



historical method aids in the critical assessment and examination of incidents or problems pertaining to the topic of this piece using the sources that are accessible.

### **Historical Influences on Nigerian Identity**

Nigeria has seen both times of unity and division throughout its history. Nigeria was the home of several strong kingdoms and empires before the European invasion, such as the Sokoto Caliphate, the Benin Kingdom, the Oyo Empire, and the Kwararafa polity. Nigerian civilization is still influenced by the distinctive political, cultural, and religious systems that these empires created. The political systems, cultural norms, and religious convictions that these empires left behind are still evident today. For instance, the Oyo Empire's emphasis on military might and centralized authority has left Nigerians with a heritage of capable leadership and a strong sense of oneness in the country. The rich appreciation of art and creativity in Nigerian culture can be attributed to the Benin Kingdom's well-known artistic traditions.

Nigerian society underwent tremendous transformation in the 19th century with the entry of European colonists. The chronological sequence of events leading to the colonization and establishment of the Nigerian state was shaped in large part by the actions of three European groups: explorers, Christian missionaries, and traders (Ayandele, 1980). British colonial authority over Nigeria resulted in a number of social, political, and economic institutions that had a significant effect on the nation's historical character. The introduction of Christianity, the acceptance of English as an official language, and the growth of Western education are all clear examples of how colonialism shaped Nigerian historical identity (Afigbo, 1987). These factors have profoundly influenced Nigerian history and identity, generating a conflict between traditional values and Western/modern values (Ajayi & Crowder, 1976).

On the one hand, new concepts and technological advancements brought about by colonialism helped shape Nigerian nationalism. But it also resulted in the suppression of indigenous customs and cultures, which made many Nigerians feel alienated and resentful. On this point, Oyewumi (2003) asserted that the disparities in attitudes between the educated elites and the general public demonstrate the influence of colonization on identity formation. Additionally, the amalgamation of diverse ethnic groups during colonization by the British contributes to an intricate tapestry of identities (Smith, 2006). The experience of colonialism ultimately sparked a wave of nationalist sentiment, which culminated in Nigeria's independence in 1960. The struggle for independence fostered a sense of unity and common purpose among Nigerians, and it helped to shape the country's post-colonial historical identity.

Nigeria has had to deal with a number of issues after colonization, such as economic instability, military takeovers, and disputes based on race and religion. These difficulties have put the nation of Nigeria's cohesion and resiliency to the test. They have also changed how Nigerians see themselves and their role in the world. Nigerian identity has been significantly shaped by historical ethno-religious wars, such as the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) (Nnoli, 1978). Mafe (2011) claims that these conflicts have highlighted racial and religious divides and have occasionally caused a feeling of national fracture inside Nigeria. Nigerian history is complicated due to a combination of factors such as corruption, economic hardships, and ethnic conflicts (Haruna, 1994). These challenges according to Asiwaju (1985) have influenced how people view citizenship and a sense of national identity in Nigeria.

Nigeria has advanced significantly in the post-colonial age despite these obstacles. The nation now boasts a thriving democratic system, expanding economy, and bright and

diversified populace. For many Nigerians, these accomplishments have bolstered their feeling of optimism and pride in their country. Nigeria's past is intricate and varied, and it has greatly influenced the development of the nation's historical identity. Historical processes and antecedents have had a lasting impact on Nigerian historical identity, values, and self-perception since pre-colonial times. Nigerians must first and foremost respect their collective past in order to attain and capitalize on the benefits of unity and diversity. They also need to accept and tolerate the many cultures that exist inside their country. This unavoidable fact emphasizes the value of learning about Nigerian history and culture.

### **Cultural Influences on Nigerian Identity**

More than 250 different ethnic groups call Nigeria home, and each has its own distinct language, customs, and culture. Nigerian identities are shaped in large part by language, religion, and traditional rituals (Babawale, 2010). Its rich cultural heritage, which is exhibited by the numerous ethnic and cultural groups, has greatly shaped its identity. A people's entire way of life is referred to as their culture, which can be either material or non-material. Nigerian identity is more complicated and richer as a result of these various cultural elements. For instance, the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups have a significant impact on the collective identity of the southwestern and southeast, respectively, whereas the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group dominates the northern region (Falola & Heaton, 2008).

Nigerian identity is significantly shaped by culture, particularly through religion and traditions. The cultural traditions of Nigeria comprise a diverse array of activities, ceremonies, and customs that are exclusive to certain ethnic groups. These customs foster a sense of community and shared ideals that strengthen the Nigerian identity. Akinremi (2009) cites marriage rites, naming ceremonies, and holiday festivities as

examples of such traditions that are firmly embedded in Nigerian society and continue to form the country's character. Muslims and Christians make up the majority of the population, with indigenous African religions being practiced by a sizable minority. Religious practices and beliefs have greatly influenced Nigerian politics, social conventions, and morals.

Additionally, language and the arts are essential components of any society's culture and play a big role in defining its identity. According to Adedibu (2016), there are more than 500 languages spoken in Nigeria, which reflects the diversity of the nation. According to Oyetade (2012), the primary languages of Nigeria, like Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo, have been crucial in forming the country's identity by serving as symbols of cultural legacy and fostering relationships and communication between different groups. The Nigerian identity is significantly shaped by the arts. Nigerian visual arts, music, dance, and literature are sources of national pride that have contributed to the strengthening of Nigerian identity both domestically and internationally. According to Ndjio (2011), Nigerian writers like Wole Soyinka and Chinua Achebe have illuminated Nigerian experiences, history, and values through their literary works. Supporting this, Ogunnaike & Folarin-Shaw (2016) assert that Afrobeat music from Nigeria has crossed international boundaries to represent Nigerian culture and identity.

Similarly, Falola (2001) emphasized further that the construction of Nigerian identity is largely dependent on Nigerian values, which are shaped by cultural traditions and conventions. According to him, Nigerian society is infused with ideals like reverence for elders, community, hospitality, and religious tolerance. These principles have influenced interpersonal Nigerians take pride in and are united by their culture, but there are drawbacks as well. Conflicts and tensions have occasionally resulted from Nigeria's ethnic and

religious diversity. It can be challenging to strike a balance between embracing modernity and preserving and advancing indigenous cultures. Nigeria's cultural variety offers chances for progress and development despite these obstacles. The tourism and creative industries have benefited from the nation's rich artistic legacy, which has also helped to drive economic growth. Collaboration and cultural exchange can promote understanding and harmony inside Nigeria as well as internationally.

### **Interplay of Historical and Cultural Contexts in the Nigerian Identity**

Nigeria's cultural customs and history are intricately entwined, greatly influencing the country's overall sense of identity. Nigerian identity is dynamic and always changing due to the interaction of history and culture. The nation's cultural landscape has been shaped by historical events, and its history has been shaped by cultural practices. Understanding the complexity and distinctiveness of Nigerian identity requires an in-depth analysis of historical events, cultural practices, and literary works. This analysis demonstrated the interaction between history and culture. For instance, a common sense of Nigerian nationalism developed as a result of colonialism. However, the nation's variety in terms of ethnicity and religion has moderated this nationalism. Nigerian identity is hence both cohesive and fractured, reflecting the complicated History and culture. Therefore, the following perspective can be used to understand how history and culture have interacted to shape and evolution of Nigerian identity:

*The Colonial Legacy and Nigerian Identity:* Nigerian history underwent significant transformation throughout the colonial era, which also shaped the country's political environment and cultural identity. According to Fayomi (2010), the introduction of European political systems and the imposition of foreign languages like English had a long-

lasting effect on Nigerian history, culture, and the people's self-perception of their country. The struggle for independence, which was primarily driven by ethnic identification, was one way that this self-perception showed itself. Subsequent nation-building initiatives also helped to create a distinct Nigerian identity, which in turn paved the way for ethnic secession during the civil war of 1966.

*Cultural Practices and Nigerian Identity:* Nigerian identity is strongly anchored in its cultural traditions, which include festivals, rituals, and traditional customs. Aliko (2007) provides evidence to support this assertion. He states that significant occasions such as the Durbar festival in the north, the New Yam Festival in the southeast, the well-known Nwonyo fishing festival in Taraba state, and the Argungu fishing festival in Kebbi state are deeply ingrained in Nigerian history and are observed by people of different ethnic backgrounds, fostering a sense of shared cultural heritage. By creating a sense of continuity and belonging, these traditions help to create a collective identity that cuts over racial and geographic divides.

*Literature as a Reflection of Nigerian Identity:* Throughout history, Nigerian identity has been portrayed and represented in literary works in a major way. In the novels "Things Fall Apart," early writer such as Chinua Achebe illustrated how colonialism affected Nigerian identity and culture (Achebe, 1958). Nigerian literature keeps delving into historical developments, sociopolitical realities, and cultural quirks, offering perspectives on the complex and diverse Nigerian identity.

*Educational System and Historical Consciousness:* The educational system in Nigeria is shaped by historical pre-, colonial, and post-colonial influences. The way that Nigerian history and culture are understood and preserved is greatly influenced by these events. In a similar spirit, Nwosu (2013) emphasized that history lessons given in schools have offered the main foundation for

interacting with the past and giving the Nigerian people a sense of national identity. The strengthening of the Nigerian identity through the integration of historical narratives into schooling facilitates the relationship between the contemporary identity and its historical roots.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

Nigeria's identity is deeply entwined with its cultural and historical backgrounds. Nigeria has a distinctive and dynamic national identity that is always changing as a result of its complicated past and rich cultural legacy. The nation's varied ethnic makeup, colonial past, and momentous historical occurrences have molded both individual and societal identities. Comprehending the intricate relationship between history and culture is crucial in order to appreciate the nuances of Nigerian identity. Deciphering the complex knowledge of ethnic variety, colonialism, and important historical events has aided in the growth of the tourist and creative arts sectors, which have promoted economic development.

An overview from the pre-colonial historical antecedents and processes have left a lasting imprint on Nigerian historical identity. Values, and self-perception have been permanently shaped by historical antecedents and processes. Despite the many difficulties associated with Nigerian identity building, the following persuasive ideas and recommendations offer potential solutions.

A national in-depth historical case studies focusing on important eras or events in Nigerian history, such as pre-colonial civilizations, the transatlantic slave trade, colonial rule, and the fight for independence, should be carried out by the federal government through the ministry of culture and tourism. Examining how these occurrences have shaped Nigerian identities and self-perceptions will aid in producing law-abiding citizens.

To find similarities, differences, and the influence of historical and cultural factors on identity formation, the government should

fund and incentivize scholars to compare the identities of Nigerians with those of other African nations or with diasporic communities. This comparative method can shed light on how African identities are interwoven and how complex post-colonial experiences are.

In order to study online spaces, social media platforms, and digital storytelling efforts that support the creation and propagation of Nigerian identity in the digital era, the government should encourage the various media agencies to use digital ethnography. Examine the ways that digital technologies affect language use, cultural practices, and collective memories, and consider the effects these have on the construction and portrayal of identity. This will make Nigerians appreciate their own ancestry and embrace and respect one another's varied cultures by putting these into practice. This inevitable reality highlights how crucial it is to educate yourself on the history and culture of the Nigerian people.

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**Tukura Danladi Kwayi**

**Ifeanyichukwu Micheal Abada**

**Tukura Tino Nashuka**

Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria

Email: *tukurakwayi@gmail.com*, *ifeanyimichealabada@unn.edu.ng*

Department of Political Science, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *tukura.tino88@gmail.com*



### Abstract

Globally, the rapid surge in terrorism and insurgent networks is a result of the spread of ideologies, weapons, and tactics, making it easier for terrorist groups to communicate, recruit, and carry out attacks across borders. Africa, particularly Nigeria has experienced political instability, bad governance, and civil war, allowing extremist ideologies to take hold and for insurgent groups to thrive. Similarly, poverty, growing uprisings, transnational organized crimes, deep-seated ethnic, religious, and sectarian tensions and arms proliferation have fueled conflicts in various parts of Africa, including Nigeria, which Boko Haram terrorists have exploited to recruit members and justified their actions. This has shifted the dynamic of the country's traditional security challenges of armed robbery, smuggling, drug trafficking, and other social vices to killing, kidnapping, destruction of means of livelihood and the displacement of people. The lack of terrain understanding coupled with the internationalization of the Boko Haram terrorist networks impeded the ability of the Nigerian Security Forces to effectively combat the group. Therefore, Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was set up in 2013 to support the Nigerian military in the fight against Boko Haram and protect local communities from attacks by the insurgents. This paper assesses the impacts of the CJTF counter-terrorism strategies in the war against the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North East. Balance of threat theory was used, ex-post-fato research design and the documentary method of data generation were utilized, and content analysis was relied on. The paper found that the CJTF counter-terrorism strategies in the war against the Boko Haram insurgency significantly mitigated the activities of the insurgents in Nigeria's North East. The paper recommended that the Nigerian government mitigate the necessary conditions that promote violent extremism.

**Keywords:** CJTF, counter-terrorism, strategy, war, Boko Haram, insurgency

### Introduction

Since the failure of the Somalian state, Bosnia, Rwanda, and the Libyan state in the years following the collapse of the Berlin wall, through the catastrophe of 9/11, and the onset of a global war against terror, insurgency and counter-measures have continued to

dominate international discourse and headlines. Insurgency and its special tactic 'terrorism' are now viewed globally as the gravest threat to international peace and security (Jackson, 2010, p. 1). Today, the world has entered another period where large-scale

conventional warfare between states is unlikely; at least in principle. But mounting global discontent arising from globalization; the failure of the economic developments to reconcile people's expectations with reality on the ground; high levels of poverty; widespread anger and resentment; environmental decay; corruption; population pressure; weak institutions and bad governance; growing uprisings; transnational organized crimes; and the widespread proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) among others have made insurgency common and strategically significant, and this significance is likely to continue for at least a decade, perhaps longer (Metz and Millen, 2004, p. 1). The term insurgency has variously been conceptualized from contending perspectives and theoretical prisms. Galula (1964) perceives it as a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order. It is revolutionary seeking to radically hijack an existing socio-political order, and unleash divergent value systems, ideologies and orientations.

The magnitude of disaster unleashed by the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in the United States, brought to bear a general recognition that terrorism has no border. Since then, terrorism and insurgency have been on the rise and continued to inflict heart-breaking losses across the globe. In response, various strategies and conferences have been held to put in place countermeasures. For instance, the International Counter-Terrorism Conference (ICTC), and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCTC) were established within the Office of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). In Africa, there is the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) commissioned in 2013, and deployed to assist the Nigerian forces in the fight against Boko Haram

insurgency and protect the local communities from incessant attacks by the group. In Nigeria, there is the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) of 2011, the Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act (TPAA) of 2013, Nigeria's National Security Strategy (NNSS) of 2014, the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTST), of 2014, Counter-Insurgency Centre (CIC), the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy Reviewed in 2016, De-Radicalization Programme Guide (October 2015), the Policy Framework and National Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) August, 2017, (Vanguard, 16 November, 2017 and Ugwueze, 2017, p. 5).

The formation and background of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Nigeria are rooted in the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency and the subsequent efforts by local communities to protect themselves and combat the threat. The Boko Haram insurgency emerged in northeastern Nigeria in the early 2000s, initially as a non-violent Salafist movement advocating for strict Islamic governance (Kura, 2020). However, the group escalated its activities, including attacks on security forces, civilians, and government institutions, leading to widespread violence and displacement of people (Ibrahim, 2019). Faced with the violence of Boko Haram attacks and the inadequacy of government security forces in protecting them, local communities in affected areas began organizing themselves for self-defence (Ajala, 2019). This grassroots response laid the foundation for the formation of the CJTF (Zenn, 2014).

The CJTF officially emerged in 2013 in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, as a coalition of vigilante groups and community volunteers determined to resist Boko Haram's insurgency. Its formation was a response to the failure of government security forces to effectively combat the insurgency (Abubakar, 2016). The CJTF is composed mainly of volunteers from local communities, including youth, elders, and traditional hunters. These volunteers operate under the coordination of community leaders and elders and collaborate

with Nigerian security forces in counter-terrorism efforts (Odoemelam et al., 2016).

The motivations behind joining the CJTF by the locals vary but often include a sense of duty to protect their communities, frustration with the government's inability to address the insurgency, and a desire for revenge against Boko Haram's atrocities. The primary objective of the CJTF was to assist security forces in identifying and neutralizing Boko Haram elements (Mustapha, 2018). Over time, there have been efforts to formalize the CJTF's role and integrate it into the broader security apparatus. In 2014, the Nigerian government announced plans to incorporate CJTF members into the country's security forces, although challenges in implementation persist (International Crisis Group, 2019).

Since its formation, the group have been engaged in security operations and involved in providing security to camps for internally displaced populations. However, in 2016, the CJTF was listed in the annexes of the Secretary-General's Annual Report for Children and Armed Conflict for the recruitment and use of children. Following the listing, UNICEF, in its role as Co-chair of the United Nations Country Task Force for the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave violations against children, worked with the CJTF and Nigerian authorities to develop the Action Plan, which was co-signed on 17<sup>th</sup> September 2017 by the President of the CJTF, Mr Lawan Jaffar, and the UNICEF Country Representative Mohamed Fall on behalf of the UN Country Task Force, including the representatives from the Federal Government of Nigeria and Borno State Government. Through the Action Plan, the CJTF commits to put in place several measures to end and prevent child recruitment and use, identifying and releasing all children within the group's ranks and instructing its members not to recruit or use children in the future (Nnamuchi, 2018).

Over the past few years, the forces of the Civilian Joint Task Force have scored some gains in the fight against Boko-Haram

insurgency, strengthening the hope for the total elimination of insurgency in Nigeria. However, this optimism has been hampered by the group's resilience and persistent attacks. For instance, in 2014, Boko Haram seized more than 29 local government areas in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states about 35,000 square miles; the size of Belgium. The rate of incidents and fatality of attacks have also increased between 2014 and 2015 the bloodiest years that claimed the combined lives of over 11, 000 people (ACAPS Briefing Note, 2016, p. 5). From July 2013 to March 2015, Boko Haram carried out more than 450 attacks in Nigeria's North East, including suicide bombing, killing more than 930 people and wounding 1500 others (Heungoup, 2016).

Also, there was the kidnapping of over 110 Dapchi school girls on 19<sup>th</sup> February 2018 in the Yunusari Local Government area of Yobe State, was part of much empirical evidence that Boko Haram still moves around undeterred. Similarly, between 2016 and 2018 Boko Haram successfully carried out countless attacks from Borno to Adamawa and Yobe among other places. In March 2017, the group released a video vowing to continue its attacks until an Islamic caliphate is established across West and Central Africa. It was against this backdrop that Scholars like Haruna (2018), Fessy (2015), and Jannah (2017), argue that although the joint task force has claimed several successes on the field against Boko Haram, insecurity, destruction of properties and massive displacement of people persist.

It was on the strength of this evidence that some scholars have continued to question the achievement and the impacts of the CJTF on the war against insurgency, and the group's ability to eliminate the threats posed by Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. Against this backdrop therefore, the study goes beyond the façade of journalistic rhetoric and political statements to ascertain whether the deployment of the Civilian Joint Task Force has mitigated the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. It also examines the



impacts of the CJTF counter-terrorism strategies on the war against the Boko Haram insurgent group.

The thrust of this study is to assess the impacts of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) on the war against Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North East. In that regard, this section is dedicated to the review of extant literature to validate salient gaps identified in the background of the study. The review was guided by the themes derived from the research objective.

### **The deployment of the CJTF and Mitigation of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria**

In this section, we shall focus our review on studies that centre on the Boko Haram uprising and activities, including the deployment of the CJTF, and how it has helped to mitigate the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria.

Civilian vigilante groups have emerged as significant actors in the counterinsurgency efforts against Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria. These groups, such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), play a crucial role in complementing the efforts of formal security forces and are often deeply embedded within local communities. Scholars have examined the dynamics of these groups, their impact on counterinsurgency operations, and their relationship with state security forces. Scholars have explored various aspects of the CJTF's deployment, its effectiveness, challenges, and implications for counterinsurgency efforts. For instance, a scholar like Pérouse de Montclos (2019) explores the emergence and impact of civilian vigilante groups like the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in combating Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria. The study examines the dynamics between the CJTF, Nigerian security forces, and local communities, highlighting both the successes and challenges faced by these groups in countering insurgency.

Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (2019) argues that the CJTF, comprising local

volunteers motivated by a desire to protect their communities, has been particularly effective in gathering intelligence, conducting patrols, and providing support to formal security forces in identifying and apprehending Boko Haram militants. Pérouse de Montclos highlights the intricate relationship between the CJTF and state security forces, noting both cooperation and tensions. He posited, however, that the CJTF enhances the operational capabilities of security forces; its members often face suspicion and mistreatment from these forces due to concerns about loyalty and accountability. This dynamic underscores broader issues of trust between state institutions and local communities, which are crucial for sustainable counterinsurgency efforts.

The effectiveness of civilian vigilante groups like the CJTF is also shaped by broader socio-political dynamics in Northeast Nigeria. Abdulraufu Mustapha and Friday E. Odigie (2016) discuss these dynamics in their appraisal of the Nigerian government's counterterrorism policy. They argue that the success of counterinsurgency efforts depends not only on military operations but also on addressing governance deficits, socio-economic marginalization, and grievances that fuel support for insurgent groups like Boko Haram. Despite their contributions to counterinsurgency, civilian vigilante groups face numerous challenges. Pérouse de Montclos (2019) identifies issues such as inadequate training, lack of oversight, and the risk of human rights abuses as significant concerns. Moreover, the proliferation of armed groups, including vigilantes, raises questions about long-term security and stability in the region.

The emergence of civilian vigilante groups like the CJTF reflects a complex interplay of local dynamics and responses to the insurgency. These groups often arise in contexts where communities feel abandoned or marginalized by the state's security

apparatus. As Cyril Obi and Omolade Adunbi (2018) argue in their examination of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the involvement of local actors such as the CJTF is both a response to the failure of state security forces to provide adequate protection and a manifestation of local agency in addressing security challenges. Moreover, the effectiveness of civilian vigilante groups in counterinsurgency is intertwined with broader questions of governance and state legitimacy. Funmi Olonisakin and Eghosa E. Osaghae (2018) analyze the role of regional and international actors in countering Boko Haram and highlight the importance of addressing governance deficits and promoting inclusive development to undercut the appeal of insurgent ideologies. In this context, civilian vigilante groups not only serve as security providers but also as symbols of local resilience and resistance against insurgent forces.

However, the proliferation of armed groups, including civilian vigilante groups, also poses risks to stability and human security. Usman A. Tar and Adewale S. Adekoya (2019) discuss the progress and challenges of the CJTF and MNJTF, emphasizing the need for effective coordination and oversight to prevent abuses and ensure accountability among security actors. They argued that without proper regulation and support, civilian vigilante groups run the risk of becoming sources of insecurity themselves, perpetuating cycles of violence and exacerbating tensions within communities.

As civilian vigilante groups like the CJTF continue to play a significant role in counterinsurgency efforts, it becomes imperative to address their long-term sustainability and integration into broader security frameworks. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (2019) emphasizes the importance of providing adequate training, resources, and oversight to civilian vigilante groups to enhance their effectiveness while minimizing risks of abuse and misconduct.

Furthermore, the experiences of civilian vigilante groups in Northeast Nigeria offer valuable lessons for counterinsurgency efforts in other contexts facing similar challenges. Comparative studies, drawing on insights from other regions grappling with insurgency and community-based security initiatives, can enrich our understanding of the dynamics of civilian vigilante groups and inform the development of more contextually relevant strategies and interventions.

In addition to academic research, policy dialogue, and practitioner insights, engaging with local communities themselves is essential for crafting effective and sustainable approaches to security governance. Abdulraufu Mustapha and Friday E. Odigie (2016) stress the importance of addressing underlying grievances and promoting community participation in decision-making processes as part of comprehensive counterinsurgency strategies. Empowering communities to take ownership of their security not only enhances the legitimacy of security interventions but also builds resilience against future threats.

What seems to preoccupy extant literature in the war between the Boko Haram terrorism and counterinsurgency forces of the CJTF includes highlights of the CJTF operations, the humanitarian crisis caused in the northeast as a result of counterinsurgency operations, massive displacement of people as well as challenges undermining the war against insurgency in Nigeria. From the literature reviewed, scholars have continued to express divergent views on the outcome of the CJTF's operations against the Boko Haram insurgency. However, these scholars failed to empirically validate whether the deployment of the CJTF has mitigated the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria's North East. This is the gap the paper intends to fill.

### **Research Methodology**

This paper adopted the documentary of data collection, utilizing secondary sources. Data generated for this paper were analyzed

using content analysis. Therefore, the paper is a qualitative research.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The paper was anchored on the balance of threat theory developed by Stephen M. Walt in 1985, Barry R. Posen (1984), and Glenn H. Snyder (1991). The theory posits several fundamental assumptions that shape its analysis of state behaviour in the global arena. At the heart of the Balance of Threat Theory is the assumption that states prioritize countering perceived threats to their security. Unlike traditional balance of power theories, which emphasize the distribution of power among states, the Balance of Threat Theory asserts that states' alliance behaviour is primarily driven by their assessments of the threats posed by other states or non-state actors. This perception of threat encompasses various factors, including geographic proximity, military capabilities, offensive intentions, and past aggressive behaviour.

The theory recognizes that the perception of threat is subjective and varies among states. This is why Glenn H. Snyder (1991) argues that states' interpretations of external threats are influenced by a range of factors, including historical experiences, cultural biases, and strategic calculations. Consequently, what one state perceives as a threat may not be viewed as such by another state, leading to divergent alliance patterns and security strategies. Building upon the concept of threat perception, the Balance of Threat Theory acknowledges the role of uncertainty and misperception in shaping state behaviour. According to this theory, states may misinterpret the intentions of other actors or overestimate the level of threat they pose, leading to defensive or preemptive actions that exacerbate tensions and increase the likelihood of war. This idea is explored in depth by Robert Jervis (1976), who argues that cognitive biases and information limitations contribute to misunderstandings and security dilemmas among states.

Balance of Threat Theory also assumes that threats are multidimensional and encompass a range of security concerns beyond military capabilities alone. Stephen M. Walt (1985) for instance, highlights in his work that states consider not only the military strength of potential adversaries but also their intentions, geographic proximity, economic power, and ideological alignment when assessing threats. This broad understanding of threats reflects the complex and interconnected nature of contemporary security challenges.

In summary, the Balance of Threat Theory is grounded in several core assumptions regarding the primacy of threat perception, the subjectivity of threat assessment, the influence of uncertainty and misperception, and the multidimensional nature of threats. These assumptions provide a framework for understanding how states navigate security dilemmas and form alliances in response to perceived threats in the international system.

The justification for the use of the balance of threat theory in this paper stems from the fact that the theory offers insights into understanding the dynamics of alliance behaviour and security strategies in response to perceived threats by nation-states. In the context of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) counter-terrorism strategies in the war against Boko Haram in Nigeria, the theory can be applied to analyze the alignment of various actors, including non-state actors and the formation of alliances to address the threat posed by the terrorist group like the Boko Haram.

This is because the CJTF was formed in response to the perceived threat of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North East. The rural communities felt vulnerable and saw the group's activities as a direct threat to their security and well-being. The balance of threat theory emphasizes that states prioritize countering perceived threats, and in this case, local communities mobilized to confront the threat posed by Boko Haram insurgents.

Indeed, in line with the theory's assumption that different actors may perceive the threat differently, the local communities directly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency view the group as a significant threat; the international community may have nuanced interpretations of the threat. This aligns with the theory suggestion that varying perceptions about threats can influence the formation of alliances and the design of counter-terrorism strategies. Similarly, the Nigerian government's response to the Boko Haram insurgency has been marked by uncertainties and misperceptions, including disagreements over the appropriate strategies to combat the group and concerns about potential collateral damage in military operations. This also supports the balance of threat theory assumption that underscores the importance of addressing such uncertainties and misperceptions to effectively coordinate CJTF efforts and enhance the overall counter-terrorism strategy.

Again, Boko Haram's threat extends beyond its military capabilities to include ideological extremism, socioeconomic grievances, and the destabilization of communities in North Eastern Nigeria. The balance of threat theory recognizes the multidimensional nature of threats and suggests that CJTF strategies should address not only the group's military activities but also its broader impact on society.

In summary, while the balance of threat theory provides a useful framework for understanding the motivations and behaviours of actors involved in counter-terrorism efforts against Boko Haram in Nigeria, it is important to recognize the complex and evolving nature of the conflict. Effective CJTF strategies should take into account the multifaceted dimensions of the threat posed by Boko Haram and seek to address the underlying factors driving its violence.

### **Impacts of the Civilian Joint Task Force Counter-Terrorism Strategies on War against Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria North East**

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) has played a significant role in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria, with its counter-terrorism strategies impacting various aspects of the conflict. For instance, the CJTF has been effective in gathering intelligence at the grassroots level, providing valuable information to security forces about Boko Haram's activities and whereabouts. According to Bitrus Paul Nwankwor et al. (2019), this grassroots intelligence network has been crucial in identifying Boko Haram insurgents and thwarting their attacks. The CJTF's presence has bolstered community resilience against Boko Haram. For example, a study by Obi Peter Nnamuchi (2018) indicates that the CJTF's collaboration with local communities has empowered them to resist Boko Haram's influence and recruitment efforts.

Similarly, the CJTF's operations are highly localized, allowing for more targeted and agile responses to Boko Haram threats. A study by John Campbell and Allen Grane (2018) reveals that this localized approach has been instrumental in securing territories and preventing Boko Haram from regaining control over areas previously held. The CJTF has been instrumental in the liberation of territories previously under Boko Haram control. Research by Ibrahim Liti (2018) shows the CJTF's active involvement in military operations alongside Nigerian security forces, leading to the recapture of key areas from Boko Haram insurgents. Through its community-based approach, the CJTF has contributed to trust-building between local populations and security forces. A study by Idayat Hassan and Jibrin Ibrahim (2017) from the Centre for Democracy and Development highlights how the CJTF's familiarity with local customs and networks has facilitated better cooperation with communities in the fight against Boko Haram.

Furthermore, some CJTF initiatives have focused on de-radicalization and reintegration programs for repented Boko Haram members, preventing recidivism and promoting peace-building efforts in affected communities (Onapajo, 2018).

**Table 1: Territories recovered from the Boko Haram between 2015 and 2018 by CJTF**

| S/N |   | 2015  | 2016   | 2017   | 2018  |
|-----|---|---|--|--|---|
| 1   | <b>LGAs retaken</b>                           | Jere, Askira/Uba, Chibok, Bama, Madaghali, Tarmuwa.   | Mafa, Konduga, Guzamala, Kukawa, Magumeri, Marte, Monguno, Gujba, Abadam, Gubio.   | Dambo, Potiskum, Gombi, Dikwa, Gulani, Mubi North, Mubi South, Ngala, Bayo   | Gwoza, Hong Maiha, Nganzai, Kala/Balge.   |
| 2   | <b>Villages Liberated</b>                     | Ngawumari, Bulabure, Chongolo Gana, Siraja, Zaye Ngusa Mandaka And Lemu Gatha Village, Bosso, Chétimari, Goudoumaria, N'gourti, Kabléwa, Nguel beyli, and Gueskérou | Gol, Zindiya, Burbur, Mangusum, Talala, Ajigin, Doksa, Damasak, Gashigar, Giri 1, Giri 2, Jabulam, Abadam, Mallam Fatori Axis, Firgi, Pulka and Banki, Mokolo, Mandara Mountains, Siyara, Kote, Sigawa, Bulabundibe, Adeleke, Tchatike, Lamukura, Galtha Baba, Galtha Musa, Hashime, Azaya Kura and Azaya. | Bultauri Kura, Bulabili, Ambiya Tasha, Toro, Bara, Njibulwa, Muna, Dalti, Talala/Ajigin, Ngoshe and Bokko, Mayerom, Lake Chad island, Baga-sola, Chad's Tchoukouli island, Yedeseram river, Gwarimari, Bouguirmi, Iga island, Bulakurma, Shatimari, Chukruk, Bulangaje, Disa Moduhum, Njimtulur, Hayaba Gana, and Hayaba Kura. | Bula Jimbam, Waiyaram, Chikin Gudu, Monguno, Faituram, bage, Darfada, uye, Barkin, Lukshe, Luksheba, Marwa, Mulgwailia.wanti, Bama, Bulabulin, Mattari, Kayaderi, Banki, Gamboru, Mandara Mountains, islands of Duguri and Dabar Wanzam and many other border villages with Chad, northern Cameroon and Niger |
| 3   | <b>Estimated size of territories</b>          | 7,567.81 km <sup>2</sup>  | 13,732.08k km <sup>2</sup>   | 11, 490,54 km <sup>2</sup>   | 4,723.23 km <sup>2</sup>  |
| 4   | <b>Population</b>                             | 1, 369,857  | 1, 950,209   | 2,726. 890   | 1, 156, 345   |
| 5   | <b>Demographic distribution in percentage</b> | Male: 8%<br>Female: 22%<br>Children: 50%<br>Aged: 20%   | Male: 11%<br>Female: 15%<br>Children: 45%<br>Aged: 29%   | Male: 6%<br>Female: 19%<br>Children: 25%<br>Aged: 50%  | Male: 4%<br>Female: 12%<br>Children: 26%<br>Aged: 58%   |

**Source: compiled by the researcher with data generated from Segun Adebowale 2016 report, and military update on Boko Haram operation 2018**

As indicated in Table 1 above, the CJTF offensive strategies have flushed Boko Haram out of all their strongholds and dismantled the self-proclaimed caliphates. From 2015 to

2018, more than 29 local government areas and 120 villages in Nigeria have been liberated from Boko Haram occupation.

**Table 2: Showing Number of Captives freed by Various CJTF divisional forces between 2015 and 2018**

| S/N | Liberation Forces                           | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|-----|---|------|------|------|------|
| 1   | Army Headquarters, Special Forces Battalion | 450  | 733  | 500  | 359  |
| 2   | 254 Task Force Battalion                    | 300  | 190  | 640  | 300  |
| 3   | 143 Task Force Battalion                    | 270  | 584  | 365  | 740  |

|    |  |        |       |         |       |
|----|--|--------|-------|---------|-------|
| 4  | 231 Battalion and Armed Forces Strike Force (AFSF) | 868    | 159   | 557     | 490   |
| 5  | 155 Task Force Battalion                           | 120    | 430   | 320     | 150   |
| 7  | Nigeria-Cameroon Border Task Force                 | 800    | 5000  | 11, 650 | 540   |
| 8  | Total Received, Sector 1                           | 1000   | 2400  | 5000    | 670   |
| 9  | 112 Task Force Battalion                           | 980    | 1200  | 2400    | 700   |
| 9  | Total Received, Sector 4                           | 2300   | 4600  | 22,000  | 9,000 |
| 10 | Total Received, Sector 2                           | 3000   | 2200  | 4500    | 5000  |
| 11 | 7 Battalion Task Force                             | 4500   | 1000  | 2500    | 500   |
| 12 | Total Received, Sector 3                           | 22,000 | 50000 | 1,11000 | 40000 |

Source: compiled by the researcher with part of the data generated from: <https://www.thecable.ng/army-rescued-people-boko-haram-captivity>. On 29<sup>th</sup> April 2024

**Table 3: Showing the number of surrendered members of Boko Haram to CJTF**

| S/N | Army Task Force Battalion/Command                  | 2016  | 2017   | 2018  |
|-----|--|---|--|---|
| 1   | 224 Task Force Battalion                           | 120   | 1300   | 200   |
| 2   | 143 Task Force Battalion                           | 80  | 370  | 180   |
| 3   | 231 Battalion and Armed Forces Strike Force (AFSF) | 240   | 310  | 300   |
| 4   | 155 Task Force Battalion                           | 77  | 160  | 55  |
| 5   | Nigeria-Cameroon Border Task Force                 | 20  | 17   | 22  |
| 6   | 254 Task Force Battalion                           | 110   | 20   | 350   |
| 7   | 112 Task Force Battalion                           | 40  | 540  | 140   |
| 8   | Types of Weapon surrendered                        | 12 AK 47 rifle with six magazines containing 159 rounds of 7.62mm (special) ammunition, 9 Dane guns | 11 semi-automatic handguns, 3 double barrels, 30 AK47 rifles, 14 magazines containing 300 rounds of 7.62mm, ammunition, 7 local made pistol, and 8 Dane guns | 3, rocket launchers, 19 AK 47 rifles, 12 Dane guns, 5 double barrels, and 3 shotgun |

Source: compiled by the researcher with data from Nnamuchi, O. P. (2018)

**Table 4: Major Highways reopened by the CJTF**

| S/N | Major Highways                          | Kilometre        | State   |
|-----|---|------------------|---|
| 1   | Maiduguri-Damboa-Biu road               | 187 kilometers   | Borno state   |
| 2   | Maiduguri-Monguno-Baga road             | 157kilometers    | Borno state   |
| 3   | Maiduguri-Dikwa road                    | 86 kilometers    | Borno state   |
| 4   | the Maiduguri-Bama- Gwoza road          | 103 kilometers   | Borno State   |
| 5   | Maiduguri-Mafa-Dikwa-Gamboru Ngala road | 120 kilometers   | Borno State   |
| 6   | The Trans-Saharan Trade Highway         | 972 Kilometers   | Katsina, Kano,<br>Kari, Maiduguri and<br>Dikwa (Yobe and Borno) |
| 7   | Damboa and Bama roads.                  | 85.06 kilometers | Borno State   |
| 8   | Gamboru-Ngala en-route                  | 9.3 kilometers   | Borno State   |
| 9   | Damaturu-Buni Yadi-Biu road             | 76 kilometer     | Yobe State  |

Source: compiled by the researcher with data from Kura, I. U. (2020)

Table 4 above reveals that the impact of the CJTF operations cannot be overemphasized. Before 2016, several major roads especially the Trans-Sahara highway in Maiduguri were blockaded by the terrorist group. At a time, the Maiduguri airport was shut, and out of the six roads that lead to Borno State from other parts of Nigeria, only the Damaturu- Maiduguri road was accessible to commuters. Those closed included the Maiduguri-Damboa-Biu road, the

Maiduguri-Monguno-Baga road, the Maiduguri-Dikwa road, the Maiduguri-Bama-Gwoza road, Maiduguri-Mafa-Dikwa-Gamboru Ngala road, the famous Trans-Saharan trade route that brought traders to Nigeria from as far as Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic, Gamboru-Ngala en-route Sudan and Damboa and Bama roads. These road highways were reopened by the operations of the CJTF.

**Table 5: Distribution of returnee IDPs in Northeast Nigeria facilitated by CJTF**

| S/N | Local Government     | 2016   | 2017   | 2018   |
|-----|----------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1   | Guzamala             | 9,000  | 20,000 | 35,000 |
| 2   | Nganzai, Kala/Balge  | 6,700  | 13,000 | 22,000 |
| 3   | Gubio, Gujba, Abadam | 30,000 | 22,000 | 13,200 |
| 4   | Kukawa               | 10,109 | 28,000 | 9000   |
| 5   | Damboa, Potiskum,    | 8000   | 11,500 | 14,700 |
| 6   | Gombi, Dikwa         | 3000   | 7500   | 900    |
| 7   | Repatriated          | 25000  | 70000  | 50000  |

Source: Compiled by the researcher with data from Campbell and Grane (2018)

According to Campbell and Grane (2018), Six years after they were forced to flee their homes by Boko Haram, many internally displaced persons from the northern part of

Borno State have returned to their communities where they celebrated the 2018 Eid-el-Fitr". The return of the IDPs is traced to the successful operations of the CJTF.

**Table 6: Showing the number of repentant and rehabilitated members of the Boko Haram sect**

| s/n | Category                                 | 2016                              | 2017                                 | 2018  |
|-----|--|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1   | Repentant/surrendered Boko Haram members | 1000                              | 2200                                 | 4500  |
| 2   | De-radicalized                           | 800                               | 2200                                 | 3400  |
| 3   | Rehabilitated                            | 800                               | 1200                                 | 1400  |
| 4   | Vocational skills offered by Defense     | Cosmetology, barbing, shoe making | Tailoring, Carpentry, Bricks laying, | Furniture making, Cosmetology, barbing, shoe making, Tailoring, |

|   |  |    |                                   |  |
|---|--|----|-----------------------------------|--|
|   | Headquarters, Nigerian Army, and MNJTF |    | Cosmetology, barbing, shoe making | Carpentry, Bricks laying, trade, and further re-training by the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) |
| 5 | Graduated and certified ex-terrorists  | 94 | 183                               | 245  |
| 6 | Re-integrated                          | 94 | 183                               | 245  |

Source: Compiled by the researcher with some data gathered from Daily Trust, March 1, 2018

Table 6 above shows that between 2016 and 2018, more than 6400 repentant terrorists have been de-radicalized and rehabilitated. Many have undergone several capacities-building trainings to acquire life-sustaining vocational skills that will equip them towards

reintegration into society and contributions towards national development. In 2016, there were about 94 such people who graduated and were certified. In 2017 and 2018, the number had tripped to about 428 (Haruna, 2018).

**Figure 1: Ex-terrorists under rehabilitation**



Source: Google image

Evidence from Figure 1 above shows that both the kinetic and Non-kinetic strategies deployed by the CJTF in fighting violent extremism in Northeast Nigeria have yielded significant impacts in all ramifications. First, there is no single local Government today under the siege and occupation of Boko Haram. Secondly, thousands of hostages abducted by the extreme sect including some of the Chibok school girls have been freed as a result of CJTF offensives. Thirdly, numerous members of Boko Haram have laid down their weapons and embraced peace as a result of both counter-radicalization and counter-

offensive strategies deployed by the joint task force. Also, hundreds of thousands of IDPs have successfully returned to their ancestral homes following the return to peace in some of the affected areas. Furthermore, many roads in the northeast that were blocked for years due to the constant killing of travellers have been secured and reopened for public usage. Finally, the CJTF through the Nigerian government initiative has successfully graduated several de-radicalized and rehabilitated members of the Boko Haram, and some of them re-integrated back into the society.



**Figure 2: CJTF facilitated Returnee IDPs**



Source: Google image

**Figure 3: Captives rescued by the CJTF**



Source: Google image

Moreover, these operations have killed thousands of Boko Haram fighters and militants. Ajala (2019) argues that 'in the past years, the CJTF has killed more than 25,000 Boko Haram fighters and arrested thousands

more. At the same time, more than ten thousand combatants have surrendered to the task force, which has freed more than 110,500 hostages in the region since January 2016 and destroyed at least 32 terrorist camps.

**Figure 4: Some of the Boko Haram Fighters that surrendered to the CJTF Battalion**



**Source: Google image**

Picture from the figure above shows some Boko Haram fighters that surrender to the operatives of the Civilian Joint Task Force in various offensives carried out by the group

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The emergency of the Boko Haram sect has shifted the dynamic of the security situation in the history of Nigeria. This is because the traditional security challenges of armed robbery, smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and other social vices that hitherto dominated the porous Nigerian borders have transformed into a major threat to not only the national sovereignty of the Nigerian state but also to region stability of the entire sub-Saharan Africa. This prompted the establishment of civilian vigilante groups such as the CJTF to assist the Nigerian security forces in the war against the Boko Haram insurgents.

Civilian vigilante groups like the CJTF represent important actors in counterinsurgency efforts in Northeast Nigeria, embodying the resilience and agency of local communities in the face of insecurity. By leveraging their knowledge, networks, and commitment to protecting their communities, these groups contributed significantly to broader efforts to address the root causes of conflict, strengthen governance structures, and build peace. The CJTF plays a crucial role in counterinsurgency efforts in Northeast

Nigeria. However, their effectiveness and impact are contingent upon cooperation with state security forces, and broader socio-political dynamics, including governance, state legitimacy, and community resilience.

Consequently, the paper concludes that despite significant successes by the CJTF in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency, a total victory does not seem imminent because the underlying factors that breed violence and acts of terror are still much present in the Boko Haram affected areas due to the failure of the Nigerian state to address them.

Therefore, this paper recommended that the Nigerian government, including various governments of states in the North East affected by the threat of Boko Haram insurgency, should channel their resources to mitigate the activities of the Sect, addressing the necessary conditions that allow violent extremism to thrive.

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**Kareem Alidu Olatunji**

Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria



### Abstract

In the recent years, Nigeria has been confronted with insecurity challenges, ranging from religious violence, Boko Haram and ISWAP, banditry, kidnapping, culpable homicide, rape, terrorism, intra and inter-ethnic rivalries, to farmers'/herders conflict and unknown gunmen. This development has adversely affected the national image of the Nigerian state and posed dangers to the peaceful co-existence of multi-ethnic groups in Nigeria. Contrary to the general notion that insecurities in Nigeria were caused by increased poverty, religious intolerance, rising population, rapid urbanization, declining traditional authority and globalization, this paper argues that insecurity in Nigeria is majorly caused by unbridled corruption, nepotism and political exploitation, ineffective leadership and perceived political domination by a particular section of the country. The rising agitation for self-determination by major ethnic groups in the country is a manifestation of the injustice arising from the above factors. The paper further stated that to achieve the desired integration and economic transformation in the country, there is need for strategic alliance among various ethno-religious forces in the country to address the issue of ethnic and nationalistic grievances, religious fanaticism, structural inequalities, political discontent, marginalization and alienation and lopsidedness in political appointments and projects. The paper concluded by making the following recommendations as strategic tools: convocation of an assembly of all ethnic groups in the country to dialogue on the way forwards, effective co-ordination of the state security apparatus, involvement of traditional authorities in crime management, and provision of employment for the growing army of unemployed and aggrieved youths in the country.

**Keywords:** Banditry, insecurity, self-determination, corruption, religion, unemployment

### Introduction

Globally speaking, the issue of insecurity has become a great challenge that seems to have defiled spirited efforts of international community and individual states in the last few decades. Though not a novel phenomenon but its prevalence and intensity in those areas that were hitherto peaceful is a great concern to the security experts and those concerns with societal peace and tranquility. From the Arabian states, the core European nations, North and South American, and recently, the African continent, insecurity has become a great challenge that is tasking both human and material resources. The world over is facing deadly conflict involving armed organisations, including ethno-religious crisis, inter and intra tribal wars, boundary disputes, herder-allied

groups, jihadist, banditry, kidnapping, terrorism and armed robbery (International Crisis Group, 2020).

The worsening insecurity and continued killing of innocent Nigerians by terrorists who are emboldened by the exposed refusal of Buhari led administration to confront the terrorists and bandits even when it knew their locations, aware of their plans remained a nightmare to the populace. It was observed with dismay that our security command and control coordination structure had collapsed under president Muhammed Buhari and surrendered sovereignty over a substantial part of the country to terrorists, and not much has been achieved by the current administration of Bola Ahmed Tinubu (BAT).

The Nigerian state is still suffering from deadly conflict involving many armed organizations, including herder-allied groups, vigilantes, criminal gangs, rapists, kidnappings. From 1980 to 2010, Nigeria witnessed numerous Christian – Muslim and intra-Muslim riots (Ojeme, 2015). Between 2011 and 2015, Kaduna, Taraba, Plateau and Kano states suffered many Boko haram bombing and shooting, notably the 20<sup>th</sup> January, 2012 attacked in Kano city that killed about 185 people (Uzorma & Nwannegbo, 2014). In 2014, after the then opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim from the far Northern Katsina state, lost the presidential election to president Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the Niger Delta, protests erupted in at least fourteen states in the North where over 1000 people lost their lives and 14,000 displaced ( Okoli & Agada, 2014).

Despite security operations and dialogue efforts, a durable peace remained elusive. Violence is continuing rooted in competition over resources between predominantly Fulani herdsman and farmers across the country, both North and South; ethno-religious crisis between Christians and Muslims, disputes over lands and boundaries, perceived political and economic deprivation, Police brutality, armed robbery, unhealthy rivalry among political groups among others (Caleb, 2021; Akinbi, 2015). It has escalated amid a boom in organized crime, including cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom and village attack. Jihadists are also terrorizing the Northeast through Boko Haram, ISWAP, (Eprun, 2018; Olufemi, 2015; Ahmed, 2021).

Commenting on the worsening state of insecurity in the country, the Southern and middle Belt leaders' forum held in Abuja on the 19<sup>th</sup> May, 2020, the forum warned that Nigeria is plunging into state of total disorder and lawlessness, with attacks on innocent people resulting in kidnapping, loss lives and destruction of properties happening in different parts of the country almost daily. The situation has not changed up till today. Sadly,

the federal government and its security agencies are not doing enough to correct the situation, whereby people can no longer travel safely either by road, rail or even by air to Kaduna in particular. The students are not free from menace of kidnapping-from the 276 Chibok girls, Zamfara students, Katsina 280 Students and others across the country (Okoli and Agada, 2014).

Presently, two students of Federal University Wukari were kidnapped and released after payment of undisclosed amount of ransom, while many kidnapping incidences were reported in various part of Taraba state. It is not only frightening but unimaginable that despite the heavy presence of military commands and installations in Kaduna state there could be such challenges, such as bombing of the Kaduna-Abuja train, brazen attack on motorists on the Abuja-Kaduna road, and the recent abduction of one hundred and thirty seven (137) Kaduna school children of LAE School in Kuriga in Chikun Local Government Area. Vanguard of march 28, 2024 reported the abduction and rescue of sixteen (16) Almajiris with a woman taken hostage in Gada local government area of Sokoto state.

### **Conceptual Clarification**

The major concepts involved in this paper are insecurity, banditry, terrorism, kidnapping and ethno-religious violence. Though these concepts are differently conceptualized but the outcomes of these activities are one and the same, insecurity of lives and properties (Caleb, 2021; Akinbi, 2015; Eprun, 2018). According to Caleb (2021) "security is broadly perceived as freedom from danger or threats to an individual or a nation. It is the ability to protect and defend oneself, be it individual or a nation, its cherished values and legitimate interests and the enhancement of well being". Caleb further classified security as: human security and National security, food security etc.

Ighodalo (2012) viewed national security as the appreciation and deployment of state apparatus of coercive force to deal with situation of crisis, nationally or internationally. Human security involves protecting the citizenry from hunger, diseases, poverty, unemployment, natural disasters etc. however, all these can only take place where there is peace and stability. According to the United Nation Development Programme (1997) human security could be defined as protection from hidden and hurtful disruption in the daily activities of homes, offices or communities. That is, security is the state of being safe and secure from danger, it could also be protection from chronic threat such as hunger, diseases and depression. Security is commonly associated with alienation of threat to the survival of individuals or groups. Thus, security can be equated with freedom from present and future danger, harm or anxiety (Ighodalo, 2012).

In countries where appropriate development paradigm is in place and practiced, the citizenry enjoys high standard of living demonstrated by the willingness of government to provide the basic necessities of life in terms of jobs, portable water, electricity, affordable housing, foods, roads among others (Caleb, 2021). Under these conditions, there could be national human security. Where there is security, there is likely to be absence of fear, threat, anxiety, tension and apprehension over loss of life, liberty, property, goals, values among others (Ighodalo, 2012).

From the foregoing, it is clear that security is vital for the development in any human collectivity. The word security has to do with freedom from danger, anxiety and fear, a situation that shows that a country is not exposed to internal sabotage or external attack (Caleb, 2021). In broader sense, security is seen as the struggle to secure the most basic necessities of life such as food, fuel, medicine and shelter. Any social unrest arising from the absence of these facilities can lead to human

security problem (Ushe, 2015). National security is the aggregate of security interests of all individual, communities, ethnic groups and political entities to guarantee safety and security, prosperity of individuals and institutions within a nation (Caleb, 2021). It is the requirement for maintaining the survival of any nation through the use of economic/diplomacy, power projection and political power.

### **Banditry**

Banditry refers to armed violence driven primarily by the criminal intent to steal and plunder (Caleb, 2021; Okoli & Okpalekee, 2014). It is motivated by the quest for economic accumulation. The victims are individuals and communities with material variables. The most common example of rural banditry in Nigeria are armed robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling and village raids. "Banditry means occurrence or prevalence of armed robbery or violent crime. It involves the use of force or threat to that effect, to intimidate a person with the intent to rob, rape or kill. Banditry is a crime against person" (Okolie and Okpaleke, 2014). Nigeria watch (2011) posited that banditry has been a common genre of crime as well as cause of violence of contemporary societies.

### **Kidnapping**

Kidnapping means unlawful detaining a person or persons against their will (including through the use of force, threat, fraud or enticement) for the purpose of demanding for their liberation an illicit gain or any other material benefit, or in order to oblige someone to do or not to do something (Haizen and Horner, 2007). Kidnapping excludes disputes over child custody (UN-CTS M5.5). Hazen and Horner (2007) posited that hostage have been taken for two primary reason: political bargaining and economic gain. This broad classification of kidnapping is very important for understanding the underlying factors for the problem, especially kidnapping for

ransoms. But beyond these broad typologies, persons are kidnapped and abducted by criminals for various reasons and intentions, such as for adoption, begging, camel racing, illicit intercourse, force marriage, prostitution, ransom, revenge, sale, selling body parts, slavery, unlawful activity, murder and for other purpose (NCRB, 2004; Bello & Jamiu, 2017). Kidnapping is a serious crime and has potential transforming into other felonious offenses such as physical violence, financial victimization and murder.

### **Terrorism**

Terrorism is the use of force against person or property to ultimate or coerce a government, a formal organization or a civilian population in furtherance of political, religion or social objectives (Allen, 1986). The African Union (AU) conceives terrorism as “any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or may cause serious injury or death to, any person, any member or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property”. Terrorism has been described as the “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes that are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological. Racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be involved to justify them (United Nations, 1994). The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (Wilkson, 2006). In this definition, there are key elements, violence, fear, and intimidation, and each element produces terror in its victim.

P. Wilkinson distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence in the following ways;

“it is premeditated and designed to create a climate of extreme fear; it is considered by the society in which it occurs as “extra-normal; that is, it violates the norms regulating disputes, protest and dissent; it is used primarily though not exclusively to influence the political behaviour of government, communities, or specific groups” (Wilkinson, 2006). Wilkinson further provides typologies of terrorist movements or groups: Ethno-nationalistic groups, that is, those identified by ethnicity and political motivation; ideological terrorist groups, this includes terrorists groups that want to create a state based on an ideology (e.g a communist state). the other categories are religious-political groups such as Boko haram sect in Nigeria, which aims to create an Islamic republic.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This work is anchored to the theory of “Anomie” as propounded by Emile Durkheim and Robert Merton. The Greek term “Anomie” literally means “without norms” or normlessness. According to Emile Durkheim (1893), Anomie is the outcome of clash in one’s own values and those of the society and one is not clear in what ways to go, how to behave and how to come upon the expectations of the society and also how to mold the environment to suit his expectations. To Durkheim, “Anomie is the counterpart of the idea of social solidarity. Just as solidarity is a state of collective ideological integration, anomie is a state of confusion, insecurity, normlessness. The collective representations are in a decay”.

Robert Merton used the concept of “Anomie” to describe strain which occurs when widely accepted cultural values conflict with people’s lived social reality. In both developed and developing countries-generally held values emphasizes material success, achieved through self-discipline, education and hard work. Accordingly, people who work hard can succeed no matter what their starting point in life. He argued that for many social

groups, it really is just a dream, because disadvantaged groups have only limited conventional opportunities for advancement or none at all (Merton, 1938). Yet those who do not 'succeed' find themselves condemned for their apparent inability to make material progress. In this situation, there is a great pressure or 'strain' to try to get ahead by any means, legitimate (Merton, 1968). Deviance and crime are the products of the strain between cultural values and the unequal distribution of legitimate opportunities.

These theories of Durkheim and Merton aptly described the incidence of insecurity and banditry in Nigeria as groups and individuals involving in the act are doing so to acquire materials needed to succeed in life. As succinctly put by scholars, the phenomenon of insecurity and banditry have been attributed to such factors as unemployment, poverty, economic depression among others (Bello & Jamiu, 2017; Odunbo, Sluthi, Akinyemi andss Momoh, 2017). There is increase of frustrated youths in the country who are been forced to engage in unlawful and criminal activities (including kidnapping, banditry, terrorism, armed robbery) due to lack of work to channel the reservoir of their energy. The need to meet the basic human needs, as posited by Merton (1968) force many of them to engage in many criminal activities as a survival strategy (Bello & Jamiu, 2017; Adesina, 2013). Ritual and spiritual proclivity also identified as the factors responsible for insecurity as people are embarking in "get rich quick syndrome" against the societal value of hardwork (Jegede, 2014; Oyewole, 2016; Odunbo *et al.*, 2017). It has been established that attempt to acquire material wealth by disadvantaged people whose doors of conventional opportunities are shut, and are desperate to succeed in life take to shortcut to achieve their goals not minding the consequences individuals, groups and society at large.

### **Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria**

The factor of post-conflict access to arms and ammunition is pertinent to our understanding of the prevalence of religious violence, kidnapping, armed robbery and other social vices in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa (Okoli & Okpaleke, 2014; Caleb, 2017). The proliferation of weapons in the aftermath of armed conflicts leaves such weapons in the hands of criminals and charlatans who use them to perpetrate criminal religious- cattle rustling, kidnapping, killings, destruction of properties etc. In respect of the Nigerian experience, the emergence of proper armed robbery and violent insecurity in the country is traceable to the after-effects of the civil war that ended in 1970 (Ajayi, 2011). Similarly, the end of Apartheid Engendered conflict of South Africa occasioned a wave of violent crime prominent among which is armed robbery (Orimode, 2011:37).

The issue of criminal impurity, most especially among a particular ethnic groups in Nigeria has been reiterated by analysts as one of the most fundamental factors engendering insecurity in Nigeria. Arinze (2010:1) argued that inability of the Nigerian criminal justice system to effectively sanction crime is responsible for the prevalence of banditry, armed robbery, kidnapping, raping in the country. He also identified unemployment rate among others macro-economic factors, such as volatile inflationary trends as conditions that promote insecurity in Nigeria (Arinze, 2010; Yusuf & Abdullahi, 2020).

Related to the issue of unemployment is the incidence of poverty and socio-economic malaise, which creates atmosphere of livelihood crises in society (Umezi, 2000; Dodo, 2010; Ugumoke, 2011). This predisposes people to sundry tactics of survival which may entail criminal indulgence. The socio-economic factors are reinforced and often complicated by corruption, moral depravity and the culture of materialism. Together, these factors explain the incidence and the prevalence of insecurity in the country.



It is an open fact that what constitute insecurity in Nigeria today is multidimensional social, political, economic and cultural realities of a globalized world from which Nigeria seek to retreat but cannot. Such criminal activities- terrorism, banditry, kidnapping are complex and diverse, with the underlying conditions or factors favourable for their occurrence ranging from increase in poverty, urbanization, globalization, political discontents, cultural imperialism, structural inequality.

Mass poverty and unemployment have combined to create a large army of angry youths in virtually every part of the country which can be employed for any kind of criminal activities (Ugwumoke, 2011; Umezi, 2000; Dodo, 2010). That poverty is a key factor responsible for insecurity in Nigeria cannot be disputed. According to Diamond (2005), poverty is a breeding ground for all forms of extremism including banditry, armed robbery and kidnapping. Poverty fueled alienation is more pronounced in Nigeria with attendant effect on criminal violence.

Also crucial to the causes of insecurity is the issue of fanaticism. Fanaticism is captured by Balogun (1988) as violent and increasing religious enthusiasm as well as the inability of religious adherents to harmonize between the theories and the practical aspects of religion. It is therefore logical to say that religious fanaticism has been the major motivational factor for frequent eruption of religious violence in Nigeria, most especially the activities of Boko Haram, ISWAP, Ansaru and other Jihadist in the Northeast, Nigeria.

Supporting the above view, in the nation of 17<sup>th</sup> September, 2021, Femi Ajayi posited that “of all the causes of human restlessness and, even war, none is as dangerous as religious”. This is because religion is mostly fixation of mind with little room for flexibility. The danger often engendered by religion when religion is commercialized and tied to materialism as in the case of Nigeria where competition, especially between Islam and Christianity has virtually become a symbol of enmity.

Historically and today, many crucial activities causing insecurity in Nigeria has been argued to be caused by rising population, increased poverty, rapid urbanization, declining traditional authority and globalization (Kelechi & Eugene, 2014; Pilet, 2007). He identified factors such as political discontent, marginalization, and alienation to be associated with insecurity. Also included are; ethnic and nationalistic grievances, religious fanaticism, structural inequalities on the national and international levels. The most obvious factors encouraging insecurity in Nigeria presently is corruption; fraud and political influence (Yusuf & Abdullahi, 2020). The trio factors make it difficult for the military and other agencies of social control to prosecute war against banditry and kidnapping decisively. Cases abound of allegations of stealing and diversion of money and materials meant for military by their leaders and betrayal on the side of the military men due to monetary incentives. There is glaring cases of impurity as many terrorists and bandits who were arrested and set free by the authority. This ineptitude on the part of government is affecting the morale of the officers who are genuinely fighting the banditry and terrorism across the country (Transparent International, 2014; Odey, 2000).

### **Causes of Insecurity and Banditry in Nigeria**

Why are there so many cases of kidnapping and banditry in Nigeria? This is the most frequent question been asked by local and internal observers. A cursory look into the issue of insecurity in the country arising from the unending activities of kidnappers and bandits revealed that factors responsible for the ugly scenario are complex and multi-dimensional, social, political, economic and cultural realities of a globalized world from which they seek to retreat but cannot. Okoli (2019) posited that factors that drive banditry in Nigeria such as cattle rustling, illicit act and gold mining, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), youth unemployment,

inequality and poverty indicates a weak governance and security capacities across the states. The situation is further complicated by the existence of large areas between Nigeria and neighbouring countries. The porosity of these boarder and cross-boarder criminality, he argued.

Since insecurity is a phenomenon that is complex and diverse, with the underlying conditions or factors favourable for its occurrence ranging from increase in poverty, urbanization globalization, political discontents, cultural imperialism, structural inequality etc. it is noteworthy that the causes to which banditry and kidnapping appeal are often not always known in specific cases. Hence, zeroing it down on a particular cause is always an uphill task (Hassan and Horner, 2007). Insecurity and banditry is a multi-causation social phenomenon (Transparent Internation, 2019; Dodo, 2010; Ugwuoke, 2011; Caleb, 2021). Odama Samuel (2014) has identified some causes of insecurity and banditry as bad leadership, corruption and endemic poverty, weak correctional agencies, lack of synergy among agencies of social control and failure to arrest and punish offenders. Supporting this assertion Yusuf & Abdullahi (2020); Odey (2000); Umezi (2000) opined that corruption, fraud, political influence, joblessness, lack of capital punishment by the government, the societal changing value system, and quick-money syndrome are the major causes of insecurity in Nigeria.

Another cause of insecurity is the consumption of drugs by the youth (Yusuf, 2022). According to him, bandits are mainly kids between the ages of 10-12 years who have completely hooked to hard drugs, but reverence clerics so deeply as 'Men of God'. Behold, these are the days of choice for these bandits; codeine, tramadol, pentazocine, intravenous drugs, Sudrex which is paracetamol and hydro-caffeine, boska and marijuana. Drugs are fueling the insecurity witnessed across the country (Yusuf, 2020).

Furthermore, experts say most of the mass kidnapping in the country have been motivated by ransom money and other rewards often offered to "repentant" gang members by the government (Nneoma, 2021). It has been observed that kidnapping and banditry are the most illegal lucrative business in Nigeria today, government and families of the victims are spending.

### **Consequences of Insecurity in Nigeria**

The consequences of insecurity in Nigeria can not be adequately measured. The evil effect of insecurity manifests in egregious termination of human lives and colossal destruction of property. Bandits, kidnapers, terrorists and jihadists have destroyed properties belonging to both the public, private individuals with billions of naira (Duru, 2004; Ojo Moyela, 2004; Danul & Ujah, 2024). The problem of insecurity also makes Nigeria unity more elusive. The growing agitation for self determination among major ethnic groups – Afenfero, IPOB, PANDEF had been linked to the unabated security challenges resulting into the death of many prominent members of the ethnic groups where there is frequent and mass killings of innocent citizens, the call for national integration becomes a mirage (Fajana, Alo & Kareem)

With prevalence of banditry, kidnapping and religious violence, social lives of the people are to a very high rate been disturbed, there are disruptions in family life, husbands becomes widowers and wives turn to widows and most children turned orphan. In all cases, the loss, damages and the psychological trauma experienced by all Nigerians compounded by the problems of stability and development which have been central to the crisis of Nigerian state.

Ayinla *et al.* (2010) argued that the preponderance and unchecked criminality and disturbances were a critical and potent force for democratic instability, they portrayed the gross inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the state security. Security of life and property

could not be guaranteed. The occasional provision of relief materials by government for the victims of religious disturbances is usually a drain on the public treasury and the nation economy.

Posited that public safety presupposes preservation or protection of the populace from risks, harm, danger, vulnerabilities, or emergencies. The prevalence or occurrence of violence, disaster, conflict or crime in a society poses a threat to its public peace and safety. So does the spate of armed robbery, banditry, kidnapping and terrorism indicates in Nigeria, he argued.

Violence has also had far reaching humanitarian and economic impact on the regions and created a domino effect of security problems. Over the last decade, more than 8,000 people have been killed mainly in Zamfara state with over 200,000 internally displaced and about 60,000 fleeing into Niger. It has often led to livelihood crisis or individuals and households as a result of liquidation of business capital etc.

In the light of the foregoing, it is evident that insecurity poses threat to public safety in a country. This observation may sound somewhat 'common-sensical, yet it holds a lot of implications for national security strategies in Nigeria. one of such strategic significance is the need to acknowledge the import of violent crimes, such as banditry, armed robbery as crucial impediments to realization of sustainable national security in Nigeria.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Insecurity and banditry are complex phenomenon threatening the corporate existence of the Nigerian state in the few decades. They include physical violence, terrorism, lack of capital, religious violence, kidnapping, financial victimization, murder, raping, armed robbery, farmer-herders conflict and inter and intra-tribal conflicts. The prevalence and intensity of these phenomena had been attributed to increasing poverty,

unemployment, religious intolerance, nepotism, unbridled corruption, political exploitation and perceived political domination of a particular section of the country. The general level of insecurity in the country is manifested in capital flight, stoppage of foreign investors, self-determination agitation, shortage of food supply arising from the farmer/herders conflicts, school closure and high level of inflation in the country.

There is general agreement among the social commentators and scholars, and stakeholders that Nigeria is fast moving towards distingration if urgent measures are not taken to forestall the impending calamity. in order to achieve the much needed peace, socio-political and economic sustainability.

Strategic alliance refers to collaborative efforts by the state actors, government and its agencies, traditional leaders and private individuals attempt to find lasting solution to the incidence of insecurity and banditry in the country. It is based on the "Collective Philosophy" that no single approach is adequate to solve the problem of insecurity in the country. Strategic alliance presupposes that every suggestion to solve the problem of insecurity and banditry must complement each other to achieve the desire results. The following strategic alliance measures are put forward.

Government at all levels should come up with credible and implementable people-oriented policies and programmes to address the basic livelihood problems of poverty, unemployment and the like. The criminal justice system of Nigeria should be exposed to the globally tenable best practices and know-how of counter-banditry to boost their operational efficiency in combating violent crimes. There is urgent need to strengthen private-public partnership (PPP) framework, involving area vigilantes and public security agents, to effectively combat the problem of insecurity in the country. Both the federal and state governments should facilitate settlements between farmers and herder-easing friction by reforming livestock production. The federal government should

cooperate with neighbouring states to stem cross-boarder flows of weapons and jihadist, as well as to better police lawless forests and gold mining areas. There is no doubt that the growing army of unemployed youths is contributing to the menace of insecurity in the country. There is urgent need in the part of the federal, state and non-government actions to embark on job creation programmes that will reduce the level of employment among the youths. It has been observed that the rising agitation for self-determination among the ethnic component of the country. There is need for convocation of Assembly of all stakeholders of Nigeria project to come to the round table discussion to proffer permanent solutions to the myriads of problems confronting the country.

The federal government and its agencies should adapt “Cosmopolitan Approach” to the problem associated with terrorism-a major cause of insecurity in Nigeria. cosmopolitan thinkers argues that all individual should ideally be treated in equal ways regardless where they live in the world. Dialoguing with bandits – the need to adopt “peace building” by engaging the terrorists/bandits and their spinsters to embrace peace while exploring other non-violent mechanisms for resolving such differences that trigger kidnapping/ banditry in Nigeria state. There is need for adequate public information process, as behavioural/change messages and actions that return mindsets of kidnappers/bandits to the life of rule of law and peaceful co-existence, eliminates the network of organized crime used by kidnapper/bandits to carry out their nefarious activities.

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## IMPACT OF RURAL BANDITRY ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN LAFIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, NASARAWA STATE, NIGERIA

Durowaiye Babatunde Emmanuel<sup>1</sup>

Akor-Abagi Mnzughurga<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Sociology

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

<sup>2</sup>Department of Sociology

Wisdom City Institute, (Kwararafa University Wukari Affiliate), Makurrdi, Nigeria



### Abstract

The youths are the reason society hopes for continuity. Development is appealing when it embraces future generations. It is appealing to note that sustainable development is unthinkable in a society engulfed by banditry activities. This paper examines the nexus between rural banditry and sustainable development in Lafia Local Government Area, Nasarawa State. Previous research emphasised banditry and economic development. This paper delved into the socio-economic development of rural banditry. The paper used primary data, and Questionnaires were distributed to the 399 respondents however, 380 were duly filled and returned. The study adopted the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 27, to analyse data. Two hypotheses were formulated and tested; the nexus between Fulani/Herders and farmers conflict was tested using linear regression, while the relationship between kidnapping for ransom and social development was tested using multiple regression coefficients, and all the results showed a positive impact. The findings of this study revealed that destruction of crops, displacement of farmlands, disruption of local markets and food aid dependency were associated with Fulani/herders and farmers crises, migration, decreases revenue, and loss of human capital were associated with militia household attack and economic development. While, the breakdown of trust, mental health issues, social stigma and gender-based violence such as rape were related to kidnapping for ransom in the area. The paper recommends that the Federal Government should invest in security to ameliorate rural banditry in the area; community stakeholders should collaborate with security agencies to prevent the reoccurrence of banditry activities in the area

**Keywords:** Sustainable development, kidnapping, rural banditry, rape

### Introduction

Banditry refers to the use of violence or intimidation for personal gain, often by individuals or groups who operate outside the law. This may include criminal activities such as robbery, kidnapping, and cattle rustling. These activities impact both individuals and businesses, and have a significant effect on the economic and social stability of the affected areas. According to Adibe (2017), banditry involves the use of violence or threat of violence to extort money, resources, or services from individuals or groups for

personal gain. On the other hand Sustainable development means balancing economic growth, social development, and environmental protection (Raworth, 2017). The goal of sustainable development is to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Sustainable development is often divided into three main pillars: economic, social, and environmental sustainability. King (2015) contends that banditry as a phenomenon can

be traced back to the early modern period, which started around 1500 and lasted until 1800. During this time, changes in Europe's economic and political landscape led to the emergence of a large class of marginalized people who were often forced into criminal activity to survive.

The association between banditry and sustainable development is felt globally. Gambetta and Daniele (2018) argue that, in Europe, banditry is linked to the rise of capitalism and the development of a large, mobile population of landless peasants. These peasants, also known as vagrants or vagabonds, posed a threat to social order and were frequently criminalized. They turned to banditry as a way to survive. In Southern Italy, the most common type of banditry is known as "Ndrangheta," which is a form of organized crime linked to the Calabrian mafia. This form of banditry has a detrimental effect on economic development in the region, leading to corruption and making it difficult for the region to attract foreign investment and develop new industries.

Americas have not been exempted from banditry attacks. They have been affected by banditry, including Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Centre for International Cooperation and Security, (2019) reported that in Brazil, the main type of banditry is known as "latrocínio," or organized crime. This form of banditry has led to economic instability and social unrest in the country. The violence and instability associated with these conflicts might have been a reason for the loss of food security, as people have left the countries in search of safety and better opportunities. In addition, the destruction of infrastructure and property caused by banditry might have been a decline in economic development.

In Africa, banditry might have left marks as well. According to Menkhaus (2019), banditry in Kenya is commonly associated with cattle rustling, which has a long history in the country. It usually occurs in remote areas where security is lacking and is often carried

out by armed groups who are motivated by financial gain. Apart from cattle rustling, banditry in Kenya also includes kidnapping, carjacking, and looting of shops. It is therefore imperative to say there maybe relationship between these banditry activities and food security, economic development, as well as social development. According to Botchway and Ahmed (2021), banditry is a significant issue in Nigeria, particularly in the north-western region. These bandit groups, commonly referred to as "bandits," typically include young men who come from marginalized groups. They carry out various activities such as cattle rustling, kidnapping, and armed robbery. Banditry has had a significant impact on economic development in Nigeria, leading to a decline in agricultural productivity and disrupting. For Ibrahim and Ndagi (2020), the conflict between Fulani herders and farmers in Nigeria has had a significant impact on human capital and development with direct and indirect consequences for food security and economic development. The conflict has resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, causing a loss of human capital. Additionally, it has disrupted farming activities as farmers are afraid to work in their fields, leading to a decline in agricultural production and food security. The conflict has also had a negative impact on the economy, causing a decrease in economic activity and investment, as businesses are hesitant to operate in the affected areas.

Folarin and Koleoso (2021) argue that kidnapping for ransom has a devastating impact on social development in Nigeria. Abducted individuals are often held for prolonged periods, hinders their ability to attend school or work, and as a result, their chance to acquire knowledge and skills is limited, their chances for attending other social events and socialize are hampered. Besides, being held hostage can inflict psychological trauma on victims, which can have long-term effects and make it challenging

for them to function normally even after their release.

Communities, societies, and nations all strive for development in various aspects of life, be it social, political, or economic. Lafia Local Government is no different. However, the constant attacks by bandits on communities in the area might have hindered its economic, social, and political development. According to Mohammed (2021), the rise of banditry has destabilized the country Nigeria, causing significant damage to its social cohesion, political stability, and economic growth. Banditry can have numerous negative effects on sustainable development. Socially, it can increase poverty, unemployment, displacement of people, as well as fear and distrust. The impact of banditry activities, such as herder/farmers conflict, kidnapping may also negatively impact sustainable development including lack of access to essential resources like water and pasture, destruction of properties, and damage to social cohesion.

According to Akilu (2020), efforts have been made in the past to reduce banditry activities in Nigeria. Economic development programs such as the National Social Investment Programme, establishment of microfinance institutions, and agricultural assistance to rural communities were implemented to create employment opportunities. Similarly, community-based approaches like community policing programs, youth empowerment programs, and peace and reconciliation committees were initiated to build trust and cooperation between local communities and the government. However, these efforts have not been able to tackle the issue of banditry in Nigeria.

Many studies have been conducted on banditry and sustainable development in Nigeria. For instance Umar and Bunza corroborated with the findings of Shuaibu, Hassan, and Mohammed (2022) that banditry has had a detrimental effect on community development in terms of infrastructure,

economic activities, education, and health. However have neglected the nexus between Fulani/Herders Farmers Conflict food security in Lafia Local Government Area. The research of Kazeem and Okunola (2018) concentrated on banditry and insecurity and discovered that insecurity is a significant obstacle to human capital development in Nigeria. Terrorist attacks can cause a drain of skilled labourers, as well as a decrease in investment in education and healthcare, their study among other researches did not consider the association between militia household attack and economic development in Lafia Local Government Area. The relationship between kidnapping for ransom and Social development in Lafia Local Government Area has not been examined by other researchers. It is based on this that this study was designed to assess the relationship between rural banditry and sustainable development in Lafia Local Government Area of Nasarwa State Nigeria.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The conflict theory was developed by Karl Marx in the 19th century. However, it was later expanded upon by other sociologists such as Max Weber, Lewis Coser, and Ralf Dahrendorf (Coser, 1956). This theory suggests that conflict is inevitable in society and that it is often caused by inequality and competition for scarce resources (Marx, Engels, & Jones, 2008). In the context of banditry and sustainable development, this theory could explain how the unequal distribution of resources, such as education and healthcare, can lead to conflict and violence. The basic premise of the conflict theory is that society is constantly in a state of conflict due to competing interests and needs. According to this theory, conflict is not only normal, but it is also necessary for social change and progress. The conflict theory posits that the distribution of resources, such as wealth, power, and prestige, is a major source of conflict in society. This inequality can lead to groups feeling



marginalized and oppressed, which can result in violence and crime.

For instance the conflict theory can be used to explain the Fulani/herders and farmers conflict in Nigeria. In this case, the conflict is caused by the unequal distribution of resources, such as land and water. The herders need access to grazing land for their cattle, while the farmers need access to water for their crops. This competition for resources can lead to violent conflict, which can disrupt community development and progress. This conflict can also lead to negative consequences for both groups, such as loss of life and property, displacement, and loss of livelihoods. The conflict theory suggests that banditry, such as Fulani/herders and farmers conflict, is caused by the unequal distribution of resources, such as land and water. This inequality can lead to marginalization and oppression, resulting in violence and crime (Umar & Usman, 2022).

The conflict theory is relevant to a study on banditry and community development because it provides a framework for understanding the causes of banditry and how it can disrupt community development. The theory suggests that the unequal distribution of resources is a major cause of banditry, which can prevent communities from developing by disrupting access to education, healthcare, and other social services. This theory can help researchers understand the dynamics of banditry and community development and develop solutions to address the problem

### Research Methodology

The survey method was adopted in this study. A simple random sampling procedure was used to draw a sample of 399 from the total population of citizens of Lafia Local Government. Respondents were selected from all council wards in the local Government. From each of these council wards, the researchers administered questionnaires to any adult encountered within these areas. A

combination of structured and semi-structured questionnaires was used for the collection of data for this study. The questionnaires were structured with closed-ended questions, eliciting information concerning corruption and sustainable development. The population projection for Lafia is 509, 300 based on 2022 population projection (National Bureau of statistics, 2024). Yamane (1967) provides a reliable yardstick for sample size determination. The source suggests that for a known population, the sample size should be obtained using the following formula:

Where:

n = Sample size

N = Universe = 509, 300.

1 = Constant

e = Level of significance = 0.05

$$n = \frac{509,300}{1 + 509,300(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{509,300}{1 + 1273.25}$$

$$n = \frac{509,300}{1274.25}$$

$$n = 399$$

Based on this formula, we have drawn a sample of 399 respondents. Corruption is a serious social issue, thus the researchers administered questionnaires in all areas within the local Government, for the non-literates, we had to ask them questions while we filled in their responses to the questionnaire. This was done to reduce the non-response rate and was carried out for two weeks. Data collected from the fieldwork were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 27 and regression. The data were analysed for 380 respondents; this is because only 380 questionnaires were duly retrieved out of the total administered questionnaires. The data were analysed about the research objectives, and research findings were discussed in narrative form.

**Table 1: Socio-Demographic characteristics of the Respondents**

| Variable                            | Frequency  | Percentage   |
|-------------------------------------|------------|--------------|
| <b>Age Range of the Respondents</b> |            |              |
| 15-19                               | 41         | 10.8         |
| 20-25                               | 69         | 18.2         |
| 26-30                               | 40         | 10.5         |
| 35-40                               | 71         | 18.7         |
| 41-45                               | 109        | 28.7         |
| 46-50                               | 50         | 13.2         |
| <b>Total</b>                        | <b>380</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| <b>Sex</b>                          |            |              |
| Male                                | 160        | 42.1         |
| Female                              | 220        | 57.9         |
| <b>Total</b>                        | <b>380</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| <b>Marital Status</b>               |            |              |
| Single                              | 76         | 20.0         |
| Married                             | 90         | 23.7         |
| Separated                           | 68         | 17.9         |
| Divorced                            | 70         | 18.4         |
| Widowed                             | 76         | 20.0         |
| <b>Total</b>                        | <b>380</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| <b>Educational Level</b>            |            |              |
| None Formal                         | 90         | 23.7         |
| Primary                             | 152        | 40.0         |
| Secondary                           | 76         | 20.0         |
| Tertiary                            | 62         | 16.3         |
| <b>Total</b>                        | <b>380</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| <b>Occupation</b>                   |            |              |
| Traders                             | 136        | 35.7         |
| Civil Servants                      | 115        | 30.2         |
| Students                            | 74         | 19.4         |
| Farmer                              | 55         | 14.4         |
| <b>Total</b>                        | <b>380</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

**Source: Field Survey 2024**

The table above shows age range of respondents that participated in the study. 10.8% of them fall within the range of 15-19 years of age; 18.2% are of the of 25-25 years, 26-30 years constitute 10.5%, 35-40 years from 18.7%, while 28% ranges between 41-45; lastly,32.2% falls within 46-50. From the descriptive analysis of the age of respondents, it shows that the higher percentages of the study population are from 41-45 years of age. For the gender of the respondents 42.1% constitute male while 57.1% represented females in the study. Descriptive analysis

shows that the higher percentages of sex of the study is 57.1%, making females the highest participants.

Frequency distribution according to the percentage of the marital status of the respondents as shown in the table above, revealed that 20.0% of the respondents are single, 23.7% of the respondents are married, 17.9% respondents are separated, 18.4% are divorced, while 20.0% of the respondents are widowed. The implication is that majority of the respondents base on marital status are married.

The demographic information of respondents as shown above in relation to the religious practice of the respondents, revealed that 84.2% of the respondents are Christian, 9.1% of the respondents are Muslim while 6.1% are from African Traditional Religion. This information showed that majority of the respondents are Christians.

Frequency distribution according to the percentage of educational level of the respondents as shown on the diagram above, revealed that 23.7% of the respondents are from none formal education, 40.0% of the respondents have primary education, 20.0% respondents have secondary school

qualification, while 16.3% of the respondents have tertiary educational qualification. The table further revealed that majority of the respondents' base on educational level are Primary.

The available data on occupation of the respondents as shown in the table above revealed that traders constitute 35.7% of the respondents, civil servants constitute 30.2% of the respondents while students constitute 19.4% of the sampled respondents, in the same vein farmers constitute 14.4% of the respondents. This implies that traders dominated the study.

**Table 2 Fulani/Herders Farmers Conflict and Food Security in Lafia Local Government Area**

| Variable                       | Frequency  | Percentage |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Destruction of crops           | 81         | 21.3       |
| Displacement                   | 100        | 26.3       |
| Damage storage                 | 72         | 18.9       |
| Decreased livestock Production | 127        | 33.4       |
| <b>Total</b>                   | <b>380</b> | <b>100</b> |

Source: Field Survey 2024

The data in Table 2 above is on the impact of farmers and herders conflict and food security in Lafia local Government Area. The data revealed that 21% of the respondents the conflict has resulted to destruction of crops.

26.3% of the respondents agreed the conflict has caused displacement of farmers, 18.9% of the respondents said the conflict has damaged storages, while 33.4% of the respondents said it decreased livestock.

**Table 3 Militia Household Attack and Economic Development in Lafia Local Government Area**

| Variable                  | Frequency  | Percentage |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|
| Damage Trade and commerce | 130        | 34.2       |
| Undermine investment      | 201        | 52.8       |
| Damage assert             | 49         | 12.8       |
| <b>Total</b>              | <b>380</b> | <b>100</b> |

Source: Field Survey 2024

The data presented above is on the effects of militia on household attacks on economic development in Lafia local Government. 34.2% of the respondents agreed that militia attack on household damages

trade and commerce, 52.8% of the respondents said militia attack on household undermines investment. While 12.8% of the respondents were of the view that it damages asserts.

**Table 4: Kidnapping For Ransom and Social Development in Lafia Local Government Area**

| Variable                          | Frequency  | Percentage |
|-----------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Creates Fear                      | 89         | 23.4       |
| Psychological Trauma              | 190        | 50         |
| Stigmatization                    | 78         | 20.5       |
| Disruption of social Institutions | 23         | 6.0        |
| <b>Total</b>                      | <b>380</b> | <b>100</b> |

Source: Field Survey 2024

The data presented above is on impact of kidnapping for ransom on social development in Lafia Local Government Area. The data shows that 23.4% of the respondents said kidnapping creates fear, 50% of the respondents said it result to psychological

trauma while 20.5% of the sampled respondents said kidnapping leads to stigmatization while 6.0% of the sampled respondents agreed that it result to description of social institutions.

**Table 5: Ways people can be Prevented from Banditry Attacks in Lafia Local Government Area**

| Variable                                      | Frequency  | Percentage |
|---|------------|------------|
| Target Hardening                              | 113        | 29.7       |
| Community policing                            | 180        | 47.3       |
| Government to improve Security Infrastructure | 87         | 22.8       |
| <b>Total</b>                                  | <b>380</b> | <b>100</b> |

Source: Field Survey 2024

The table 5 above present data on ways people can be prevented from banditry attacks in Lafia Local Government. The available data indicates that 29.7% of the respondents said target hardening is a good approach. 47. % of

the respondents said there is need for community policing in the area. While 22.8% of the respondents said government should improve security infrastructure.

**Table 6: There is no significant relationship between Fulani/Herders and Farmers Conflict and Food Security in Lafia Local Government Area**

| Variables                          | N   | Means | S.D  | Df | R-table | P-value |
|------------------------------------|-----|-------|------|----|---------|---------|
| Fulani Herders and Farmer conflict | 380 | 1.29  | .455 | 1  | .528    | .000    |
| Food Security                      | 380 | 1.18  | .384 | 1  | .528    | .000    |

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Result Inter-presentation: Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  $r = .528$ ;  $df = 1$ ;  $P > 0.05$ .

The result of the statistical analysis in the table above shows Pearson Movement Correlation run for 380 respondents shows that  $r = .528$ ;  $Df =$

$1$ ;  $P > 0.05$  (2-tailed) which is greater than the significant value of .000. In view of this, the alternative hypothesis accepted and the null hypothesis is rejected. We therefore conclude that Fulani/herders and farmers conflict affect food security in Lafia local Government.

**Table 7 There is no significant relationship between Militia Household Attack and Economic Development in Lafia Local Government Area**

| Variables                | N   | Means | S.D  | Df | R-table | P-value |
|--------------------------|-----|-------|------|----|---------|---------|
| Militia household attack | 380 | 1.18  | .382 | 1  | .528    | .000    |
| Economic development     | 380 | 1.18  | .384 | 1  | .528    | .000    |

**Source: Field Survey, 2023**

Result Interpretation: Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  $r = .528$ ;  $df = 1$ ;  $P > 0.05$ .

The result of the statistical analysis in the table above shows Pearson Movement Correlation run for 380 respondents shows that  $r = .528$ ;  $Df = 1$ ;  $P > 0.05$  (2-tailed) which is greater than the significant value of .000. In view of this, the alternative hypothesis accepted and the null hypothesis is rejected. Based on the result we concludes that militia attack on household affect economic development.

**Discussion of Findings**

The findings of this study are presented based on the research objectives of the study.

**Fulani/Herders Farmers Conflict Food Security in Lafia Local Government Area**

The study on Fulani/herders and farmers conflict in Lafia Local Government has revealed that crops are getting destroyed due to the movement of cattle through farmlands. This has caused significant damage to crops, resulting in reduced yields and decreased food production. Cattle trample crops, eat them, or damage them through their droppings. As a result, farmers who lose their crops struggle to feed themselves and their families, leading to food insecurity. Moreover, the destruction of crops has had a broader impact on the food system, as it has reduced the availability of produce in local markets, driving up food prices and reducing access to food for other members of the community. Furthermore, the conflict has disrupted agricultural supply chains as farmers are forced to abandon their crops due to conflict, resulting in the disruption of local and regional agricultural supply chains. This has caused shortages of certain food items, driving up prices and

making it difficult for people to access nutritious food. This can negatively affect agricultural productivity and food security in the long term. These findings are consistent with Nwajiuba's (2020) research on the herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria, which suggests that the conflict has reduced crop production and livestock rearing, leading to food insecurity, hunger, and malnutrition among the affected communities. The destruction of farmlands and grazing fields, combined with ongoing insecurity, has discouraged farmers from planting crops and investing in their farms, resulting in reduced agricultural output.

Furthermore, Fulani/herders conflict has caused damage to the storage system, which has had a negative impact on food security. The conflict has resulted in storage facilities becoming targets and being destroyed by the Fulani herdsmen. This is a major concern as these facilities are crucial for preserving food and maintaining food security. The destruction of storage facilities can disrupt the entire food production cycle, leading to loss of harvest and inability to store excess food for use during lean periods. As a result, affected communities in Lafia has experienced a reduction in food availability and increased vulnerability to food insecurity.

It has been discovered that the conflict between Fulani herders and farmers in Lafia local Government has led to the disruption of livestock. This conflict affects livestock and results in food insecurity because when Fulani herdsmen clash with farmers over grazing lands, livestock, especially cattle, can be killed or stolen, resulting in a loss of wealth and livelihood for the affected Fulani herders. Additionally, some Fulani herders are displaced as a result of the conflict, which force

them to leave their animals behind or sell them for a fraction of their worth. The conflict has also resulted in the disruption of livestock markets as farmers are reluctant to sell their animals to Fulani herders for fear of reprisal attacks. This has led to a shortage of livestock, which in turn leads to higher prices and reduced access to meat and dairy products, which are important sources of nutrition and income for many communities. The conflict also diverts resources away from livestock production as farmers may prioritize rebuilding destroyed infrastructure or securing their lands instead of investing in the health and productivity of their animals. The stress of conflict, animal diseases, and the disruption of normal grazing patterns can increase the risk of animal diseases, which can reduce livestock productivity and further exacerbate food insecurity. This finding corresponds with that of Nelson, Shefiu, and Ibrahim, (2021). Their study found that the conflict has had a significant impact on livestock, with cattle being stolen, slaughtered, or sold at a loss by Fulani herders.

#### **Militia Household Attack and Economic Development in Lafia Local Government Area**

Militia attacks on households have significantly impacted on trade and investments, which ultimately hindered economic development. The destruction of businesses, such as shops and markets, has disrupted trade and economic activity. This has made investors hesitant to invest in affected areas due to perceived instability and unsafe conditions. Such attacks can also reduce foreign direct investment, as investors tend to avoid high-risk factors. As a result, economic growth and development may slow down. In addition to this, governments may need to allocate resources towards security measures, such as hiring additional security forces, which can take resources away from crucial economic development projects such as infrastructure and education. Attacks on transportation networks, such as roads and

railways, have further disrupted the flow of goods and services, causing additional damage to the economy. Furthermore, critical infrastructure such as power plants, water treatment facilities, and telecommunications networks were destroyed by militia attacks, hindering economic development and making it difficult for businesses to operate.

This study has found that attacks by militias on households can harm the economy by undermining investment. Such attacks can create a sense of insecurity and instability in a country, making it less attractive to potential investors. As a result, foreign direct investment (FDI), which is crucial for economic growth, can decrease. In addition, existing investors may decide to leave or relocate their operations to safer areas due to the attacks. Moreover, financial institutions may become hesitant to lend to local businesses, reducing the availability of credit and financing and impeding economic growth. Furthermore, foreign investors may be discouraged from investing in a country that is plagued by militia attacks, as it can be difficult for them to assess the risks and returns of their investments. Such uncertainty can lead to a decline in foreign trade investment. These findings are similar to those of Nwajiuba and Amos (2022), who found that kidnapping and militancy have significantly impacted business operations in Nigeria. Businesses have had to limit their activities, hire security, and incur additional costs to protect their staff and operations, diverting resources that would otherwise be invested in capital projects and growth to security measures. This is negatively affecting economic growth.

#### **Kidnapping for Ransom and Social Development in Lafia Local Government Area**

Kidnapping for ransom in Lafia has had a significant impact on social development. It has created fear among people, which has eroded trust among community members. This loss of trust can lead to the breakdown of social networks and institutions, and hinder

social development. Fear of kidnapping has led to people limiting their movements, such as not attending social gatherings or sending their children to school. This has negatively impacted social development by reducing participation in community life. Furthermore, psychological trauma is a significant impact of kidnapping for ransom on social security. Kidnapping victims often experience severe psychological distress, such as anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This has increased the demand for mental health services, which are limited in capacity and availability, straining the existing social security system. Kidnapping can cause significant disruption in family life as well. The effects of psychological trauma on kidnapping victims has had a negative impact on their family members, causing stress and interpersonal conflict that may require social services

Kidnapping has been found to negatively impact social development, leading to stigmatization in affected individuals and their families. This worsens the issue and impacted the ability of families and friends of kidnap victims to access social services and opportunities. Women and girls who are kidnapped for sexual exploitation face gender-based stigma and discrimination, being seen as "damaged goods" and rejected by their communities. Additionally, cultural beliefs and superstitions subject people to stigmatize kidnapping victims, viewing them as cursed or responsible for bringing bad luck upon themselves and their communities.

Kidnapping in the area has caused a lot of problems. It has affected the trust and cooperation between people, disrupted social services and institutions, and created fear and distrust among different groups of people. As a result, the social structure of the community has been compromised, leading to increased insecurity, poverty, and marginalization. This can have long-term consequences for the community, affecting civic engagement and participation in local government. People are

now less likely to participate in community meetings, vote, or engage in other forms of civic activism for fear of being targeted by kidnappers. These findings are consistent with those of Sallah (2021), who also found that kidnapping damages the fabric of social cohesion in society.

### **Ways People Could be prevented from Banditry Attacks in Lafia Local Government Area**

According to our findings, target hardening is a crucial strategy for preventing banditry. Creating physical barriers, such as walls, fences, or moats, can make it more difficult for bandits to access potential targets. This is particularly effective in securing homes, businesses, and other assets. Installing security measures such as CCTV cameras, motion-activated lights, and alarms can also help deter bandits and make it more difficult for them to operate undetected. Target hardening can be more effective when implemented as part of a layered defence strategy, which combines physical barriers with security measures and community watch programs. It is important to properly maintain these measures, by regularly checking and repairing fences, testing alarms and cameras, and ensuring that community watch programs are well-coordinated and resourced. This research aligns with the findings of Adekunle, Olagunju, and Arowolo (2021), who suggest that ICT tools (Information and Communication Technology) can be used to enhance security and reduce the impact of banditry in Nigeria. Specifically, they recommend using ICT to improve target hardening measures such as CCTV cameras, drones, and facial recognition technology.

It has been discovered that community policing can play a crucial role in preventing banditry attacks. By promoting a shared sense of responsibility for community safety, community policing can help discourage potential bandits. When community members are aware that their neighbours and law

enforcement are working collaboratively to prevent banditry, potential attackers may be deterred from targeting the community. Community policing can also help law enforcement collect valuable local intelligence on potential bandit activity and patterns, such as the routes bandits use or the locations they target. This information can help develop more effective strategies for preventing attacks. Moreover, by working closely with communities, law enforcement can identify and address local vulnerabilities that may make a community more susceptible to bandit attacks, such as poor lighting or lack of security infrastructure. All of these efforts can make communities more resilient to banditry.

Furthermore, the government has a crucial role to play in improving security infrastructure to prevent people from being attacked by bandits. By investing in security infrastructure such as police stations, surveillance cameras, and checkpoints, the government can increase the physical presence of law enforcement in communities, which can deter potential bandits from targeting those areas. Upgrading communication systems, such as radio networks, can help law enforcement agencies coordinate and respond more quickly to bandit attacks, which can reduce their impact and potentially prevent further attacks. Finally, improving border security and cooperation with neighbouring countries can help prevent bandits from crossing borders and launching attacks. This can include increased patrols, improved fencing, and the use of biometric identification systems.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

After this study, we have found that food security is associated with Fulani/herders and conflict in Lafia Local Government Area. The crises in this area damage crops, food storage, and livestock, resulting in a decrease in food security. The activities of militia groups also damage trade and investment, discouraging assertiveness and contributing to the nexus between militia attacks and economic

development in Lafia Local Government. Furthermore, we have concluded that kidnapping is an act of banditry that has a significant impact on social development in Lafia Local Government. The psychology of people in the area suffers, and there is stigmatization associated with being a victim of banditry. Additionally, banditry attacks create fear and disrupt social institutions such as social clubs, schools, and other socially related activities in the area. The impact of banditry activities on sustainable development is significant, and it is therefore important to find ways to reduce banditry activities. The study suggests that target hardening could go a long way in achieving this, and that community policing and government efforts are required to prevent people in the Lafia metropolis from falling victim to banditry attacks. The study recommends that there is need to develop community policing as this can help prevent the recurrence of banditry attack in Lafia local Government Area. The Nasarawa State Government should improve in security infrastructure to curb the reoccurrence of banditry attacks. Individuals, groups and institutions, should employ target hardening to prevent the area from been prey of bandits. Modern technologies such as CCTV cameras should be employed to detect suspect and bandits in the area.

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**PART XV:**  
**NATIONALISM, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SUSTAINABLE  
DEVELOPMENT**

**Magaji Ibrahim Yakubu**  
**Samson Adeniyi Aladejare**

Department of Economics

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *ymagaji1976@gmail.com, aladejare4reel2000@gmail.com*



### Abstract

This study assessed the effect of economic growth on poverty and inequality in Nigeria between 1990 and 2022. The research applied the ARDL technique in its empirical analysis. Findings from the study indicated that economic growth does not have significant long-run impact on poverty and inequality. However, the short-run relationship showed that economic growth increases inequality in Nigeria. External debt was revealed to further aggravate poverty and inequality in the long-run. Also, while government effectiveness demonstrated an enhancing effect on poverty in the short and long-run periods, its long-run impact on inequality is significantly decelerating. Thus, based on the aforesaid conclusions the study recommends the strengthening of small and medium enterprises through access to finance at lower interest rates and equitable distribution of national wealth through the payment of a living wage, provision of social and economic infrastructure. Also, the agricultural sector should be made more attractive to the youths through encouraging export promotion policies. Leveraging financial technology, and encouraging start-up firms can further reduce the poverty and the inequality level in the country.

**Keywords:** Poverty, income inequality, economic growth, external debt, Nigeria

### Introduction

Poverty has been a serious concern for most developing economies, including Nigeria since the turn of the 21st century. Nigeria is blessed with abundant natural resources and human capital, but many of its population live below the poverty line and survive on less than \$1.9 per day. Poverty in Nigeria is rising with almost 85 million of its population living in less than 1.9 per day (Aladejare, 2021; Aladejare, 2023). The number of poor Nigerians increased by 24 million between 2018 and 2023, despite its strong economic growth in Africa largest economy (NBS, 2023). The percentage of Nigerians living in absolute poverty increase each day, that is, those who cannot afford the basic essential foods, shelter and clothing is 40 percent of the total population, or almost 83 million (NBS, 2019). Nigeria is ranked 61st in the world on the United Nations human development index (UN, 2019) and this might

have been due to the growing incidence of poverty which is pervasive in the countrymen.

Income inequality affects the pace at which economic growth enables poverty reduction (Ravallion, 2004). Reducing inequality within countries has been the objective number 10 of the sustainable development goal in recent years because it is believed that reducing it will assist in curbing some problems (World Bank, 2016). The gap between the rich and the people living in poverty began to be wider; this created what is referred to as income inequality. Higher levels of poverty and income inequality are detrimental to people's opportunity, quality of growth, and security (Ravallion, 2009). This has caught the attention of the world in recent years. Income inequality globally and within many countries has decreased but in some countries it has risen (World Bank, 2016). The sustainable

development goal 10 is to reduce inequality within and among countries. Baumol & Blinder (2010) states that the causes of income inequality could be differences in abilities because people have different capabilities. Hence it should not be surprising that some people are more adept at earning income. It is clear that some types of inventiveness are richly rewarded by the market. The same is true of the elusive characteristic called entrepreneurial ability and differences in the intensity of work. Some people work longer hours than others or labour more intensely when they are on the job. Ability in risk-taking, luck, inherited wealth, schooling, and other types of training has also resulted in certain income differences that are largely voluntary.

### **Empirical review**

Failed economic growth of many countries which lead to reduce income and human poverty: It needs to be pointed out however, that while economic growth does contribute to poverty reduction there are still losers from the adjustments that growth requires. Moreover, economic growth explains only about half of poverty reduction. The rest depends on good policy to harness the growth poverty reduction. In many countries growth failed to reduce poverty, either because growth had been too slow or stagnant or because its quality and structure has been insufficiently pro-poor. (Misra and Puri 2006)

Bridging the gap between people living in poverty and the rich is very essential to the growth of the society by encouraging the people living in poverty to participate in pro-poor activities which will help them to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor (Baumol, 2010). One of the effects of unequal distribution of income and wealth in the country is that it will result in poverty, which is reflected in low consumption levels, low per capita income, and low standard of living of the mass of the people, despite more than two decades of development planning, hunger, malnourishment and suffering from the

chronic and debilitating disease are still the bane of the majority of the population in India (Jhingan, 2005). the elimination of widespread poverty and even high growing income inequality are the core of all development problems and define for many people the principal objective of development policy. Inequality is a challenge to the eradication of extreme poverty and tends to reduce the pace and durability of growth (UNICEF et al., 2014; Ostry et al., 2014). Inequalities have also been found to hinder social cohesion and increase the risk of violent conflict (UNDP, 2013; Stewart, 2010). Inequality undermines social justice and human rights. Inequalities have resulted in the poorest people—including many women, young and older people, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, and rural populations making less progress towards development goals (Kabeer, 2010; World Bank, 2013). Economic, political, and social inequalities tend to reproduce themselves over time and across generations (World Bank, 2006). There is some overlap between those affected by poverty and those negatively affected by inequality, although it is important to note that certain groups and individuals are disproportionately affected. Deprivation or inequality in one dimension can influence other dimensions: for example, social inequality can lead to economic inequality (Sumner, 2013; Kabeer, 2010). It is important to understand the drivers of poverty and inequality to combat them effectively. Drivers of poverty include shocks; lack of inclusive economic growth and jobs; insecure jobs and low wages; limited opportunities; low capabilities; inequality; poor governance; weak civil society; lack of respect for human rights; climate change; the global recession; violent conflict and displacement; and an individual's human capital, physical and social assets, and behaviour.

Drivers of all forms of inequality include globalization processes; domestic policies; returns on capital; income inequality; discriminatory attitudes; and structural drivers

and barriers. Poverty and inequality reduction policies need to be tailored to specific contexts. Poverty reduction measures include pro-poor economic growth; well-designed social transfers; support for human capabilities; action to tackle exclusion and inequality; strategic urbanization and migration; and good governance. Responses to inequality need to match the complexity and many dimensions of its drivers and require strong consensus at all levels. Inequality reduction measures include inclusive growth; support for education and job creation to benefit all; effective and fair redistribution; fiscal policies that promote equality; open and responsive governments; action to challenge prejudices and cultural norms that underpin discrimination; the realization of human rights for all; universal, good quality essential services; well-designed social protection; and investment in all children.

High levels of poverty and inequality are detrimental to people's quality of life and life opportunities and to countries' growth and security (Ravallion, 2009; Hulme, 2010). Inequality refers to disparities and discrepancies in areas such as social identity, income, education, health, nutrition, space, politics, outcomes, and opportunities. As with poverty, measurement of inequality has tended to focus on income, Progress on inequalities is uneven. In recent years' income inequality globally and within many countries has decreased, but in some countries, it has risen (World Bank, 2016). Some success in reducing income inequality has come with the expansion of education and public transfers to the poor (UNDESA, 2013). Inequalities between marginalized groups and the rest of the population have persisted (UNDP, 2015). Sustainable Development Goal 10 is to reduce inequality within and among countries.

In the study of (Seher, 2022) aims to determine whether the effect of income inequality on economic growth is realized through transmission channel theoretically expressed. The analysis used panel data

econometrics techniques the countries are divided into two groups by considering their income levels which 143 are examined for period between 1980 and 2017 through positive and negative channels. The study found out that high inequality and adversely affect economic growth. Inequality in the absence of poverty does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on economic growth. As poverty increase, the effect of poverty inequality on economic growth become negative and statistically significant. Poverty alleviation policies might therefore be more effective in producing economic growth than redistribution.

Robert et al. (2014) in their research they used panel data for 152 countries for which have income inequality and gross domestic product data, only 5 years from 1956-2011 was sample with simplest growth regression on inequality, poverty and economic growth has highlighted a negative impact of inequality in economic growth especially countries with high poverty.

Chinonye (2019) empirically examined the relationship between poverty income inequality and economic growth in Nigeria the study used time series data from national bureau of statistics. The Central bank of Nigeria (CBN) statistical Bulletin between the period from 1981 to 2019. The study employed the use of Augmented Dickey fuller test co integration test and Error correction techniques. The unit root test results indicate that confirmed a long run relationship among the variable. The error correction model show that about 96 percent of the discrepancy between the actual and the equilibrium value of economic growth is corrected or eliminated each year from the study, the findings revealed that income inequality has a negative relationship with economic growth. Similarly, the finding also revealed that poverty and income inequality has an insignificant effect on economic growth in Nigeria. Based on the findings, it can be concluded that poverty and income inequality has not significant

relationship with economic growth in Nigeria. Thus, the study concluded that there is need for government of the country to come up with an all-inclusive policy and programme that will be targeted to the poor and give them ample opportunities to improve their welfare.

Ben (2008) used trends tables and graphical illustrations to analyse the growth inequality and poverty in Nigeria from (1982-2006) to empirically test for the growth inequality poverty nexus in the Nigeria context two level of analysis was done. first is a simple correlation analysis in which the correlation between growth and poverty second in estimation of growth elasticity of poverty. Find out that despite this strong growth performance poverty incidence has remained high and income inequality.

Okafor (2016) examined the existing relationship among economic growth, poverty and income inequality in Nigeria. Using the Vector Auto-regressive (VAR) model and the Engle-Granger technique to test for the causality existing among the variables, the results revealed that economic growth had no impact on poverty reduction and income distribution in Nigeria due its non-inclusive nature. There was, however, evidence of a unidirectional causality, running from income inequality to increased poverty. This implied that inequality would lead to increase in poverty in Nigeria. Therefore, the paper recommended that government should develop stronger economic institutions that are capable of reorganizing the productive base and reward system in the economy so as to promote and guarantee economic efficiency, equity and macroeconomic stability and inclusive growth.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This work will be based on Keynesian/neoliberal theory, the school led by the New-Keynesians also adopts a money-center and that individual stands towards poverty, hence it need government intervention. Therefore, excessive inflation,

high sovereign debt and asset bubbles are other macro-economic factors, besides weak aggregate demand believed to cause poverty (Davis and Sanchez-Martinez, 2004).

Even though the neoliberal school led by the New-Keynesians also adopts a money-centered, individual stance towards poverty, the importance assigned to the functions of the government allows for a greater focus on public goods and inequality. For instance, a more equal income distribution can facilitate the participation of disadvantaged groups of society in the type of activities that are deemed essential under broader notions of poverty. On the other hand, New-Keynesians are in line with neoclassical economists in their belief that overall growth in income is ultimately the most effective element in poverty removal.

Publicly provided capital (including education) has an important role to play, with physical and human capital believed to be the foundation for economic prosperity. Unlike the classical approach, unemployment, viewed as a major cause of poverty, is largely seen as involuntary and in need of government intervention to combat it. Excessive inflation, high sovereign debt and asset bubbles are other macroeconomic factors, besides weak aggregate demand, believed to cause poverty (Davis and Sanchez-Martinez, 2015). Keynesian/Neo liberal theory stresses on the role of government in stimulating macro level variable such as aggregate investment, unemployment, inflation, debt and assets market bubbles to enhance growth and address issues of Poverty (Jung and Smith, 2007), Moreover according to this theorist, poor capital (human and physical) poor infrastructure, lack of suitable institution and considered as the main source of underdevelopment lead to poverty (Sachs, 2005, Jung and Smith, 2007)

### **Research Methodology**

Represented in Table 1 is the list of variables, and their measurement used for

empirical analysis in the study. This data consisted of annual series sourced from 1990 to 2022 for Nigeria. Two dependent variables comprising poverty and inequality were used in the study. To measure for economic growth, the study applied the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita measure. This measure is preferred to conventional GDP indicator since it captures the individual contribution of the population to the growth of the economy (Aladejare, 2020; Ebi and Aladejare, 2022). Furthermore, two control variables were

incorporated into the list of independent variables. The first is external debt, which is a crucial economic variable often used by the Nigerian government on an annual basis to tackle poverty and inequality. Second is institutional control, and its significance to reducing the level of poverty and inequality cannot be overemphasized. A weak institution is believed could promote the growth of inequality and widen the poverty gap in any society.

**Table 1:** Variable description

| Variable              | Measurement                         | Sources   | Symbol       |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|---|--------------|
| Poverty               | Poverty gap index                   | World Bank Poverty and Inequality Platform (2023) | <i>PGI</i>   |
| Inequality            | Gini coefficient                    | WDI (2023)  | <i>INQ</i>   |
| Economic growth       | GDP per capita growth rate          | WDI (2023)  | <i>GDP</i>   |
| External debt         | Total external debt in US\$ million | WDI (2023)  | <i>EDGDP</i> |
| Institutional control | Government effectiveness            | WGI (2023)  | <i>GOVEF</i> |

**Source:** Authors' computation

In order to specifically fulfill the objective of this research, the response of poverty and inequality to economic growth is disengaged into two equations:

$$PGI_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 GDP_t + \alpha_2 EDGDP_t + \alpha_3 GOVEF_t + \mu_{t1} \quad (Equ. 1)$$

$$INQ_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP_t + \beta_2 EDGDP_t + \beta_3 GOVEF_t + \mu_{t2} \quad (Equ. 2)$$

In the event that the Equations 1 and 2 are estimated directly by means of Ordinary Least Square (OLS), the likelihood of a bias or spurious estimates is very significant given that the variables were specified in their non-stationary form (Aladejare and Musa, 2023; Aladejare and Musa, 2024). Thus, pretesting for unit root or stationarity to determine the order of integration of variables is imperative. In light of the above, this research adopted the Auto Regressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) bounds technique developed by Pesaran et al. (2001). The justification for the selection of this approach is based on its certain

econometric advantages in comparison to other single cointegration procedures. Furthermore, the technique permits testing for the presence of a long-run association between variables, irrespective of their order of integration; which could either be purely I(0) or purely I(1), or a combination of both, but definitely not I(2). Likewise, endogeneity problems and inability to test hypotheses on the estimated coefficients in the long run associated with the Engle-Granger (1987) method are prevented. Therefore, the ARDL specifications for Equation 1 and 2 is given as:



$$\Delta PGI_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PGI_{t-1} + \alpha_2 GDP_{t-1} + \alpha_3 EDGDP_{t-1} + \alpha_4 GOVEF_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^p \pi_{i1} \Delta PGI_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^p \sigma_{i1} \Delta GDP_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^p \tau_{i1} \Delta EDGDP_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^p \delta_{i1} \Delta GOVEF_{t-j} + \phi_1 ecm_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t1} \tag{Equ. 3}$$

$$\Delta INQ_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 INQ_{t-1} + \beta_2 GDP_{t-1} + \beta_3 EDGDP_{t-1} + \beta_4 GOVEF_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^p \pi_{i2} \Delta INQ_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^p \sigma_{i2} \Delta GDP_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^p \tau_{i2} \Delta EDGDP_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^p \delta_{i2} \Delta GOVEF_{t-j} + \phi_2 ecm_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t2} \tag{Equ. 4}$$

where the error correction mechanism (ECM) is the speed of adjustment coefficient, showing the time it takes the economy to correct from short-term distortion to long-term equilibrium.

## Results and Discussions

### Descriptive and correlation analyses

Contained in Table 2 is the descriptive statistics for the study variables. The mean PGI for the study is revealed as 17.7, indicating that the prevalence of poverty between 1990 and 2022 has not been severe. However, the inequality measure (Gini coefficient) shows an average of 40.1, suggesting a high level of income inequality in the country.

Furthermore, the growth rate of GDP per capita has a negative mean of -1.3% approximately. This result indicates that average productivity growth for the economy has been retrogressing between 1990 and 2022. External debt to GDP ratio averaged 32.2% and is below the 40% benchmark for emerging and developing countries (Aladejare, 2023). Governance effectiveness for the country has been weak as captured by the mean value of -0.98 for the study period. This weakness suggest that the citizens may not have been benefiting from the dividends of good governance, which could further worsen the poverty and inequality situation in the country.

**Table 2:** Descriptive summary statistics.

| Variables    | Mean   | Max.    | Min.    | Std. Dev. |
|--------------|--------|---------|---------|-----------|
| <i>PGI</i>   | 17.721 | 27.900  | 9.000   | 7.488     |
| <i>INQ</i>   | 40.139 | 51.900  | 35.100  | 3.997     |
| <i>GDP</i>   | -1.295 | 7.242   | -12.889 | 4.942     |
| <i>EDGDP</i> | 32.246 | 110.619 | 4.713   | 29.572    |
| <i>GOVEF</i> | -0.984 | -0.485  | -1.210  | 0.173     |
| Obs.         | 33     | 33      | 33      | 33        |

**Source:** Authors' computation

Represented in Table 3 is the correlation matrix for the study variables. Evidences from the table demonstrates weak correlation between the study regressors (GDP, EDGDP,

GOVEF). Hence, implying the presence of weak multi-collinearity between the variables and reliability of deduced inferences from the study's model.

**Table 3:** Correlation test result

|              |            |            |            |              |              |
|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------|
|              | <i>PGI</i> | <i>INQ</i> | <i>GDP</i> | <i>EDGDP</i> | <i>GOVEF</i> |
| <i>PGI</i>   | 1          |            |            |              |              |
| <i>INQ</i>   | 0.121      | 1          |            |              |              |
| <i>GDP</i>   | 0.257      | 0.065      | 1          |              |              |
| <i>EDGDP</i> | 0.708      | 0.229      | 0.003      | 1            |              |
| <i>GOVEF</i> | 0.590      | -0.037     | 0.299      | 0.376        | 1            |

**Source:** Authors' computation

**Unit Root test**

Captured in Table 4 is the test for unit root conducted on each series used in the study. The stationarity of the series was determined through the Philips-Perron (PP) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests methods. Ascertaining the stationarity status of the variables can eliminate the potential impact from spurious regression output. Thus, as demonstrated in Table 4, while the poverty

gap index, inequality, and external debt measures attained stationary at first difference, the GDP indicator attained stationarity at level. in contrast, government effectiveness was a mixture of level and first difference stationarity. Nevertheless, the combination of both level and first difference stationarity of the study series further lend credence to the adoption of the ARDL methodology for the study.

**Table 4:** Unit root tests output

|              | PP Unit Root Test |                       |                          | ADF Unit Root Test |                       |                          |
|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
|              | With Constant     | With Constant & Trend | Without Constant & Trend | With Constant      | With Constant & Trend | Without Constant & Trend |
| <i>PGI</i>   | -5.462***b        | -5.557***b            | -5.477***b               | -5.462***b         | -5.556***b            | -5.477***b               |
| <i>INQ</i>   | -15.536***b       | -16.746***b           | -15.579***b              | -6.847***b         | -7.097***b            | -6.985***b               |
| <i>GDP</i>   | -4.497***a        | -4.606***a            | -4.311***a               | -4.477***a         | -4.590***a            | -4.293***a               |
| <i>EDGDP</i> | -5.812***b        | -6.033***b            | -5.656***b               | -5.655***b         | -5.615***b            | -5.623***b               |
| <i>GOVEF</i> | -5.337***a        | -6.558***a            | -21.121***b              | -16.462***b        | -16.176***b           | -16.723***b              |

Where \*\*\* indicate significance at 1%, "a" and "b" represent stationarity at level and first difference.

**Source:** Authors' estimated output

**Cointegration test**

After ascertaining the stationarity of the variables, the following step entailed determining the presence of long-run association between the variables through the bounds approach. Table 5 shows the long-run nexus between the variables. The F-statistic of the bounds test was compared to the upper bounds critical values I(1) as a yardstick to reject the null of no cointegration.

Conventionally, having the bounds I(1) critical value falls below the F-statistic will indicate the presence of cointegration. Thus, considering the F-statistic for Equation 1 (3.929) which is higher than the upper bounds at 5% significance level suggest a long-run relationship. Likewise, the F-statistic for Equation 2 (5.218) is higher than the upper bounds at 5% significance level, and indicates long-run nexus between the variables.

**Table 5:** ARDL test result for long-run relationship

| Equation                     | Test statistic       | Value of F-Statistic | K | Sign. | I(0) | I(1) |
|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|-------|------|------|
| $PGI = f(GDP, EDGDP, GOVEF)$ | Sample size (n) = 32 | 3.929                | 3 | 10%   | 2.37 | 3.2  |
|                              |                      |                      |   | 5%    | 2.79 | 3.67 |
| $INQ = f(GDP, EDGDP, GOVEF)$ | Sample size (n) = 31 | 5.218                | 3 | 2.5%  | 3.15 | 4.08 |
|                              |                      |                      |   | 1%    | 3.65 | 4.66 |

**Source:** Authors' estimated output.

Captured in Table 6 is the effect of economic growth on poverty. Results in the first row represents the long-term output, revealing that although economic growth has a positive impact on poverty, the effect is insignificant. This result suggests that economic prosperity has not been effective in reducing the level of poverty in the country. In contrast, external debt shows a significant positive effect on poverty levels; indicating that higher sovereign borrowings have significantly translated to higher poverty levels in the country. In essence, this behaviour infers that a significant amount of funds often borrowed are expended on projects that seldom improves the quality of life of the people (Aladejare et al., 2022). Similarly, higher level of government effectiveness has an overwhelming level of positive impact on poverty levels. Thus, indicating that increasing the number of government agencies to tackle

poverty in the country has not reduced but further aggravated poverty. The inefficiency of these government bodies at reducing poverty may be due to the increase bureaucracies that their operations are embedded in, as well as the overlapping of duties which can make response to poverty issues challenging.

In the second panel, the short-run outcomes are presented. Unlike the long-run output, external debt has an insignificant positive effect on poverty levels; implying that it takes the long-term for external debt to impact on poverty in the country. However, similar to the long-term output, government effectiveness increases the level of poverty in the short-term. The speed of adjustment parameter is rightly signed and significant. Its value suggests that in the event of short-run disequilibrium, about 41% distortion will be corrected for annually.

**Table 6:** Effect of economic growth on poverty levels in Nigeria

| Long run Output: dependent variable (PGI) |             |            |               |          |
|---|-------------|------------|---------------|----------|
| Variables                                 | Coefficient | Std. Error | t- statistics | Prob.    |
| <i>GDP</i>                                | 0.062       | 0.205      | 0.305         | 0.763    |
| <i>EDGDP</i>                              | 0.140       | 0.039      | 3.596         | 0.001*** |
| <i>GOVEF</i>                              | 36.743      | 8.926      | 4.117         | 0.000*   |
| Intercept                                 | 48.958      | 9.447      | 5.182         | 0.000*** |
| Short run output                          |             |            |               |          |
| $\Delta(EDGDP)$                           | 0.003       | 0.031      | 0.104         | 0.918    |
| $\Delta(GOVEF)$                           | 6.175       | 2.089      | 2.956         | 0.007*** |
| $ECM(-1)$                                 | -0.412      | 0.086      | -4.774        | 0.000*** |
| Diagnostic test                           |             |            |               |          |
| Normality                                 | 0.895       |            | $R^2$         | 0.44     |
| Serial-correlation                        | 0.559       |            | $Adj. R^2$    | 0.40     |
| Heteroscedasticity                        | 10.787      |            |               |          |

**Source:** Authors' estimated output

Presented in Table 7 is the effect of economic growth on inequality. Results in the first row represents the long-term output and shows that although economic growth has an adverse impact on inequality, the effect is insignificant. This result suggests that although economic growth has the potential to reduce inequality, it has not been effective in achieving this purpose in the country. In contrast, external debt demonstrates a significant positive impact on inequality levels; indicating that higher sovereign borrowings have significantly translated to higher divide between the rich and the poor, instead of bridging the gap in the country. However, higher level of government effectiveness is shown to have a substantial negative impact on inequality in the country. Thus, indicating that as the level of government effectiveness increases, inequality declines.

In the second panel, the short-run results are captured, and the lagged inequality has a significant positive effect on current inequality

levels. This result implies that previous levels of inequality further aggravates the current level of inequality in the country. Similarly, economic growth was revealed to have a significant enhancing effect on inequality in the short-run. The result indicates that the growth of the economy can significantly and further broaden inequality in the short-run. Unlike the long-run output, current sovereign debt has an insignificant negative effect on inequality. However, its lagged value has a substantial and negative effect on inequality. Thus, the implication of this outcome is that even though external debt takes a long while to significantly impact inequality, previous debt levels have a reducing effect on inequality in the short-run for the country. The speed of adjustment parameter is rightly signed and significant. Its value suggests that it takes less than a year, in the event of short-run disequilibrium for long-run equilibrium path to be restored.

**Table 7:** Effect of economic growth on income inequality levels in Nigeria

| <b>Long run Output: dependent variable (INQ)</b> |                    |                   |                      |              |
|--|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| <b>Variables</b>                                 | <b>Coefficient</b> | <b>Std. Error</b> | <b>t- statistics</b> | <b>Prob.</b> |
| <i>GDP</i>                                       | -0.085             | 0.150             | -0.568               | 0.576        |
| <i>EDGDP</i>                                     | 0.057              | 0.022             | 2.640                | 0.015***     |
| <i>GOVEF</i>                                     | -8.417             | 4.105             | -2.051               | 0.052*       |
| Intercept  | 29.607             | 4.529             | 6.537                | 0.000***     |
| <b>Short run output</b>                          |                    |                   |                      |              |
| $\Delta(INQ_{-1})$                               | 0.415              | 0.206             | 2.016                | 0.056*       |
| $\Delta(GDP)$                                    | 0.192              | 0.108             | 1.782                | 0.089*       |
| $\Delta(EDGDP)$                                  | -0.002             | 0.058             | -0.041               | 0.967        |
| $\Delta(EDGDP_{-1})$                             | -0.109             | 0.060             | -1.819               | 0.083*       |
| $ECM(-1)$  | -1.335             | 0.240             | -5.553               | 0.000***     |
| <b>Diagnostic test</b>                           |                    |                   |                      |              |
| Normality  | 4.735              |                   | $R^2$                | 0.64         |
| Serial-correlation                               | 4.811              |                   | $Adj. R^2$           | 0.59         |
| Heteroscedasticity                               | 11.304             |                   |                      |              |


**Source:** Authors' estimated output

The last rows in Table 6 and 7 are the diagnostic tests including normality, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity. These test were conducted to ensure the validity and robustness of the study model's estimates for


policy formulation. Based on the outputs in Tables 6 and 7, the study residuals are normally distributed, and free from serial correlation and heteroscedasticity issues. Furthermore, stability tests were conducted

on the model's residuals. The essence of determining the stability of the ARDL model cannot be overemphasized because it aid in the assertion of the estimate's reliability. Hence, the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and CUSUM of square plots are revealed in Figure

1 to be well within the critical bounds at 5% level of statistically significance; thus, justifying the ARDL estimate robustness and their reliability and consistency for policy recommendations.



**Figure 1A:** CUSUM and CUMSQ for equation 1



**Figure 1B:** CUSUM and CUMSQ for equation 2

**Figure 1:** CUSUM and CUSUMSQ residual stability tests.

**Conclusion and Recommendation**

This study assessed the effect of economic growth on poverty and inequality in Nigeria between 1990 and 2022. The research applied the ARDL technique in its empirical analysis. Findings from the study indicated that economic growth does not have significant long-run impact on poverty and inequality.

However, the short-run relationship showed that economic growth increases inequality in Nigeria. External debt was revealed to further aggravate poverty and inequality in the long-run. Also, while government effectiveness demonstrated an enhancing effect on poverty in the short and long-run periods, its long-run impact on inequality is significantly decelerating.

Thus, based on the aforesaid conclusions the study recommends the strengthening of small and medium enterprises through access to finance at lower interest rates and equitable distribution of national wealth through the payment of a living wage, provision of social and economic infrastructure, etc. Also, the agricultural sector should be made more attractive to the youths through encouraging export promotion policies. Leveraging financial technology, and encouraging start-up firms can further reduce the poverty and the inequality level in the country.

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## INTERROGATING EFFICACY OF MONETARY POLICY ON PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT DRIVE IN NIGERIA USING ARDL BOUND TEST APPROACH AND THRESHOLD REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Mamaman Andekujwo Baajon

Adamu Samuel Mbah

Vyonku Danazumi Katswen

Department of Economics

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria



### Abstract

Monetary policy remains a viable policy measures employed by every government to achieve economic stabilization goals. Recent developments in the Nigerian economy particularly as it's relate to constant increase inflation, dollar scarcity and high lending rates are worrisome, considering the attendance consequences to the private sector performance. Against the backdrop, this study examined the efficacy of monetary policy on private sector investment focusing on interest rate threshold consistent with private sector investment. Secondary data sourced from NBS and CBN bulletins covering the period from 1981 to 2023 were used for the study. The data set were first tested for stationarity properties using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF). In addition, the study employed Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) Bound test technique to examine long-run relationship and impact analysis while threshold regression was used to ascertain optimal lending interest rate threshold consistent with private sector investment in Nigeria. The ARDL Bound testing confirmed that, there is long-run relationship between monetary policy and private domestic investment in Nigeria. This was further confirmed by the ARDL long-run coefficients which indicated that; M2 has a significant positive impact on PSINV, as 1% increase in M2 increases PSINV in Nigeria by 77% in the long-run. On the other hand, the study confirmed that, exchange rate and inflation have negative long-run significant impact on private sector investment in Nigeria. A unit increase in EXR and INF decrease PSINV by 39% and 29% respectively. The threshold regression revealed that, the optimal lending interest rate threshold beyond which lending rate is dangerous to investment in Nigeria is 28.11%. In line with the study's conclusions, the monetary authority and pertinent government agencies should lower the cost of credit to the private sector, maintain an expansionary monetary policy, stop their ongoing, ineffective devaluation policy, and adopt more diverse commitments to acquire more foreign exchange and bridge its shortage. They should also improve the provision of basic infrastructure, particularly power supply, to lower operating costs and halt Nigeria's trend toward inflation.

**Keywords:** Monetary policy, private sector investment, ARDL, Threshold Regression

### Introduction

Developing nations have made enhancing the performance of the private sector a top goal in recent times. This dedication has been linked to the reality that in the majority of emerging economies, the private sector has continued to be a reliable source of economic growth and development. Due to its production and distribution of products and services that

satisfy the economy's total demand, the private sector is the engine of economic growth and development. Nigeria has implemented a number of monetary policy frameworks over the years to support the expansion and development of the economy driven by the private sector. The performance



of the private sector could be used to evaluate the efficacy of monetary policies.

Nigeria's private sector credit to GDP dropped sharply from 13.5% in the third quarter of 2022 to 11.1% in the second quarter of 2023, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2023). Compared to the GDP of ₦146.69 trillion, the total amount of loans from the private sector was ₦19.86 trillion. Of this amount, the oil and gas industry received 25.8%, whereas the real estate, education, and information and communication industries received 3.4%, 0.4%, and 8.4% of the total. The sharp decline above was caused by the Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) strict monetary policy measures, such as raising the minimum loan to deposit ratio (LDR) of deposit money banks from 58.5% to 60% in order to force them to increase lending to the private sector. It also reflected the decline in lending by deposit banks during the pandemic and the decline in crude oil prices.

Nevertheless, at the 292nd meeting of the MPC, which took place on July 24 and 25, 2023, the CBN's Monetary Policy Committee resolved to: increase the MPR from 18.5 percent to 18.75 percent; modify the asymmetric corridor to lie between +100 and -300 basis points around the MPR; maintain the CRR at 32.5 percent; and maintain the Liquidity Ratio at 30 percent. CBN (2023) announced in a bank circular that it will commence enforcing the LDR policy with effect from July 31, 2023. The action came after the CBN ordered banks to keep the LDR at least 65%, after the top bank's October 2019 increase from 60%. The commercial banks have thus been compelled by all of these policies to expand their lending to the private sector. At the conclusion of the second quarter of 2023, lending had grown, as mentioned above, although it was still less than the 13.7% recorded in 2015 and the 15.7% in 2016. The ratios' cyclical nature demonstrated how there was no relationship between lending to the private sector and the nation's primary economic growth. Without a doubt, private sector investment contributes

significantly to long-term economic growth via raising capital formation. Monetary authorities directly and indirectly control the demand for money, money supply, or availability of money and thereby affect output and private sector investment through the control of monetary policy targets, such as the price of money (interest rates both short- and long-term), the quantity of money, and reserve money, among others. Therefore, loose monetary policy that limits credit to companies discourages the growth of the private sector, whereas tight monetary policy that allows credit to the private sector promotes the growth of private investment.

Nonetheless, it is noted that the Nigerian economy is marked by inconsistent government policies, unstable politics, ineffectual policy declarations, and a deficit conceptual framework, all of which have an impact on the performance of the private sector. The goal of monetary policy is to guarantee that the economy has a sufficient amount of money to support desired and sustainable economic growth without creating inflationary pressure. However, the fact that Nigeria's inflation rate has been rising steadily is concerning. Likewise, exchange rates continue to be a crucial factor influencing prices in any economy, serving as both a nominal anchor for domestic investment and a means of preserving competitiveness on the global stage. The economy had been negatively impacted by the intricate network of currency rates and ongoing government interference, which resulted in serious distortions including dollar scarcity, hindered foreign investment, and caused large current account imbalances. Comparably, changes in interest rates over the past ten years in the economy suggest that a major obstacle to financial intermediation is the issue of high lending rates in the face of falling deposit rates. The Monetary Policy Committee has noted the issue's persistence in multiple communiqués, especially in the wake of Nigeria's economic slump amid raging inflation

and the steps taken to resolve the banking system's liquidity issues. Lending rates have stayed positive in real terms over the years. The maximum loan rate has often remained between 24 and 30 percent. Likewise, the prime lending rate varied from sixteen to nineteen percent (CBN, 2022). Hence, this study examines the efficacy of monetary policy on private sector investment, focusing on the optimal lending interest rate threshold consistent with private sector investment in Nigeria.

### **Conceptual Clarifications**

Here, the researcher identifies different schools of thought about the notion of private sector investment and monetary policy that are held by academics, writers, and organizations.

### **Monetary Policy**

For proponents of the monetary economy, the concept of monetary policy is essential. However, it is prone to ambiguity in public discourse because it may mean different things to different individuals. As the demand side of economic policy, monetary policy, according to Thomas (2020), refers to the steps taken by a country's central bank to manage the money supply and accomplish macroeconomic objectives that support long-term, sustainable economic growth. The process of creating, announcing, and carrying out a plan of action by a nation's central bank, currency board, or other capable monetary body that regulates the amount of money in an economy and the channels through which new money is provided is known as monetary policy. The administration of interest rates and the money supply constitute monetary policy, which aims to achieve macroeconomic goals such limiting growth, inflation, inflationary pressures, and liquidity. Kimberly (2020) attempted to define monetary policy and stated that it is the acts and statements of a central bank that control the money supply. Credit in various forms, cash, cheques, and

money market mutual funds are all part of the money supply. Credit is the most significant of these payment methods. Credit is comprised of mortgages, bonds, and loans. Liquidity is increased by monetary policy to support economic expansion. Liquidity is decreased in order to stop inflation. Interest rates, bank reserve requirements, and the quantity of mandatory government bonds held by banks are all used by central banks. These tools all have an impact on bank lending capacity. The amount of loans has an impact on the money supply.

It follows that shifts in the availability of credit and money are the focus of monetary policy. It describes the policy actions taken by the government or central bank to employ monetary tactics to achieve certain goals by influencing the availability, cost, and use of credit and money. The primary tools used by monetary policy to affect economic activity in the economy are the money or credit supply and the interest rate.

### **Private Sector Investment**

Different schools of thought interpret the concept of private sector investment differently at different levels. Scholars have given several definitions to the idea of private sector investment. Nwankwo and Allison (2021) defined the private sector as the portion of the economy that is not controlled by the state and is managed for profit by individuals and businesses. As such, it includes all for-profit companies that the government does not control or run. It is important to remember that government-run businesses and corporations belong to the voluntary sector, whereas charities and other non-profit organizations are part of the public sector. In addition, Keith (2023) described private sector investment as the act of purchasing a good that is not offered for public sale. Although there are numerous other situations that can be described with this term, it is commonly used to refer to a private company with a small number of stockholders. This would also apply,

for instance, if an investor bought a collection of assets from someone else. In order to raise a region's level of living, investments are also frequently made in the healthcare, regulatory, and educational sectors. In a similar spirit, Ben (2023) defined the private sector as the segment of an economy that is managed by people and businesses as opposed to a government agency. Profit is the primary goal of the majority of private sector businesses. The public sector is the portion of the economy that is governed by the government. NGOs, nonprofits, and charities comprise a third sector of the economy that is referred to as the volunteer sector or voluntary sector. However, because they usually function free from governmental regulation or inspection, these groups are more frequently regarded as belonging to the private sector.

### **Empirical Review**

Scholars worldwide have utilized diverse approaches at distinct points in time to explore the relationship between monetary policy and private sector investment, yielding varying conclusions about it. Olonila, Amassoma, and Babatunde (2023) looked into how Nigerian bank lending and investment were affected by monetary policy between 1981 and 2020. The data used in this study came from the statistics bulletin published by the Central Bank of Nigeria. The study employed Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) using the collected data. The study's conclusions show a long-term relationship between monetary policy and bank loans and investments. Furthermore, it was noted that the cash reserve ratio, monetary policy, money supply, and inflation rate had long-term beneficial effects on investment, whereas bank loans to the private sector and the liquidity ratio had short-term negative effects. The study's conclusions indicate that monetary policy has a major positive impact on bank loans and investment in Nigeria.

Furthermore, Oyakegha and Arepo (2022) looked at how Nigeria's private sector

performed from 1995 to 2019 in relation to monetary policy. The Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin was the source of secondary data that was gathered. Time series econometric methods were used to generate and test hypotheses. According to the report, Nigeria's private sector output is significantly impacted by the credit ratio. In Nigeria, the production of the private sector was significantly impacted by the liquidity ratio. Nigeria's private sector output was significantly impacted by the country's broad money supply. Therefore, monetary policy and the private sector economy in Nigeria are subject to a long-run equilibrium effect. Kabir (2022) looks into how Nigeria's private sector performs in relation to monetary policy. The Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) approach is used in this investigation. There is a long-term relationship between the variables, as demonstrated by the ARDL Bounds test. The study makes use of yearly time-series data on four variables: real interest rate, broad money supply, credit to the private sector as a percentage of economic growth, and real exchange rate. The data spans the years 1981 to 2021. The outcome demonstrates that the broad money supply significantly improves the performance of the private sector over the long and short terms. Both in the short and long terms, the real interest rate and real exchange rate have a major detrimental effect on the performance of the private sector.

Lubo and Bigbo (2021) conducted an empirical investigation on the impact of monetary policy on domestic private investment in Nigeria between the years 1981 and 2018. Data from annual time series were gathered from secondary sources such as WDI and the CBN Statistical Bulletin. The Vector Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) technique of analysis was used to examine the data. The analysis's findings showed that, while interest rates are significant at 5%, government domestic debt (GDD) has a positive and insignificant effect on domestic private investment (DPI) in the long run in Nigeria within the period. The money supply

(MS), government domestic savings (GDS), interest rate (INT), and consumer price index (CPI) all have a negative and insignificant effect on domestic private investment in the long run.

Meanwhile, Leonard (2021) examined the impact of exchange rate on foreign private investment using quarterly time series data from Nigeria for the period 2007 to 2017. Foreign private investment in the study was disaggregated into foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment in order to ascertain their separate reactions to changes in the exchange rate of the naira against the US dollars. The empirical analysis was based on the VAR estimation procedure using three lagged periods adopted on the basis of various lag order selection criteria. The empirical result revealed that devaluation/depreciation of the naira adversely affects foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment in Nigeria. Increased in the size of the domestic market and development of the financial sector were found to stimulate foreign private investment while high inflation rate in the domestic economy discourages foreign private investment in Nigeria.

Solomon and Kofi (2020), taking a more focused approach, look into how interest rates affect private investment and establish the point at which they start to hurt private investment in Ghana. Annual time series data from 1986 to 2016 were used in the study. The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model was utilized in the study, and the interest rate threshold was estimated using the quadratic function and conditional least squares approaches. According to the ARDL model's results, interest rates have a positive long- and short-term impact on private investment, supporting the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis in Ghana. However, the conditional least square model and quadratic function results indicated a threshold of 23.59% and 24%, respectively, beyond which the interest rate has a detrimental influence on private investment in Ghana.

Dang, Pham, and Tran (2020) use a generalized method of moment (GMM)

framework and provincial data from Vietnam to provide insights into the relationship between monetary policy and private investment. The study discovered that while there is no reliable evidence to support the idea that the exchange rate has an impact on private investment, it is positively impacted by corresponding monetary policies through the channels of wide money, domestic credit, and interest rates. which revealed an unexpected correlation between real interest rates and private investment by examining the unique features of the economy over its two developmental phases (pre- and post-2012). The potential for economic growth in a community, which draws significant interest and fierce rivalry from both domestic and foreign investors, seems to be a significant factor influencing private companies' investment choices.

Conversely, Evans (2019) determines if the impact of interest rates on investment and economic growth varies above a certain level. For Nigeria from 2006 to 2017, the threshold estimation method developed by Hansen (2000) is applied. The results indicate that the data has successfully identified two thresholds. For GDP growth and investment growth, respectively, the predicted values of the interest rate thresholds are 21.1% and 22.6%. In other words, an interest rate below 21.1% boosts economic growth, but over that point, it becomes a serious problem. Comparably, when the interest rate is below 22.6%, it positively influences the growth of investments; nevertheless, when it above this threshold, it becomes a significant problem.

Lorna (2018) looks into the impact of inflation volatility on the expansion of credit in the private sector. The findings show a positive relationship between the rise in private sector credit and the volatility of inflation that is one period behind time. The study also discovers that while financial innovation, interest rates, and GDP growth do not seem to be significant predictors of private sector credit growth, lagged private sector credit growth, nominal

exchange rate, and inflation do have a statistically significant impact on private sector credit growth.

In the same vein, Aizenman, Cheung and Ito (2017) using data on 135 countries from 1995 to 2014, shows that a low-interest rate environment can yield different effects on private saving across country groups under different economic environments. Among developing countries, when the nominal interest rate is not too low, it detects the substitution effect of the real interest rate on private saving. However, among industrial and emerging economies, the substitution effect is detected only when the nominal interest rate is lower than 2.5%. In contrast, emerging-market Asian countries are found to have the income effect when the nominal interest rate is below 2.5%. When it examine the interactive effects between the real interest rate and the variables for economic conditions and policies, it find that the real interest rate has a negative impact, income effect on private saving if any output volatility, old dependency, or financial development is above a certain threshold. Further, when the real interest rate is below 1.5%, greater output volatility would lead to higher private saving in developing countries.

In a related study, Moses, Tule, Audu, Oji, Oboh and Ajayi (2015) investigated factors responsible for high lending rates. It also identifies the floor and threshold for lending rate beyond which it becomes detrimental to growth and investment in the Nigerian economy. The study employed quarterly data set covering the period 2000-2013 using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method to investigate the key determinants of maximum lending rate. The quadratic function and the iterative model were employed for determining the threshold lending rate in Nigeria. The study followed the works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) for the threshold model which suggested the likelihood of positive effect of interest rate on private investment particularly in developing economies. The study found more credible

support for these Authors' work. The Results of the "quadratic model" estimated to determine the threshold found the threshold lending rate of 21.46% while the "iterative threshold method" identified 21% as the threshold lending rate. The study therefore, suggests a threshold lending rate band of between 21% - 21.5%.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The foundation of the study was the Keynesian monetary theory, which links the theory of interest into monetary theory and unifies monetary theory with value theory. The English economist John Maynard Keynes created the "demand-side" theory of monetary policy in 1936 in an effort to explain the Great Depression. It is centered on short-term changes in the economy. The study of individual incentives-based markets and economic behavior was initially distinguished from the study of general national economic aggregate variables and constructs by Keynes's theory. A shift from a monetary theory of pricing to a monetary theory of production was brought about by the theory's reformulated quantity theory of money. By doing this, Keynes attempted to bring the theory of interest into monetary theory and to combine monetary theory with value theory. However, "value theory and monetary theory are brought into just a position with each other through the theory of output." Under these presumptions, the rate of interest serves as an intermediary in the Keynesian chain of causation linking changes in the amount of money in circulation and changes in prices. As a result, the rate of interest tends to decrease when the amount of money increases. A decrease in the interest rate will lead to more investment because of the marginal efficiency of capital (Jhngan, 2009). A theoretical link between the monetary policy rate (interest), which is the fundamental weapon employed by the monetary authority to control economic activity with the aim of accomplishing macroeconomic goals, including sustainable

economic growth, and the Keynesian theory was made possible. The study's variables and, thus, the foundation upon which it was built, had to be included, according to the theoretical nexus.

**Research Methodology**

The study used methodology that examines how independent variables with specific qualities that already exist prior to the study as its affects a dependent variable in order to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between monetary policy and private sector investment in Nigeria, hence the research design for the study was ex-post facto research design. The data used in this study came from secondary sources, primarily the periodic publications of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) published between 1981 and 2023. The data presentation and analysis in this study were conducted using econometric approaches including; the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) for unit root testing, the

Autoregressive Distributed Lag Bound Test (ARDL) for both long- and short-term study and a threshold regression model was employed to ascertain the ideal lending interest rate threshold that is consistent with private sector investment..

The study used the Kabir (2022) model, which is in line with the monetary policy tools of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the IS-LM model, and the theoretical foundations of Keynesian monetary economics. The IS-LM model provides a clear explanation of how an increase in interest rates would inhibit investment and, in turn, lower performance in the private sector, and vice versa. It also describes how changes in the money supply impact output and aggregate demand, which in turn impacts the performance of the private sector as a whole. In a similar vein, it describes how the amount of money spent by the government influences interest rate investments and the general performance of the private sector. The mathematical function of the model is as thus:

$$Y = (Q, Z) \dots\dots\dots (3.1)$$

Where: *Y* = Private sector Investment

*Q* = Vector of monetary policy instruments *Z* = Vector of other control variables

Based on the above function, *Q* represents the broad money supply and real interest rate, while *Z* represents the exchange rate and inflation rate

Thus, the functional relationship of the model becomes;

$$PSINV = f(M2, LNDR, EXR, INF)\dots\dots\dots (3.2)$$

The stochastic form of the model specified in accordance to ARDL model specification is as thus;

$$PSINV_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{j=1}^p \alpha_1 PSINV_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^q \alpha_2 M2_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^q \alpha_3 LNDR_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^q \alpha_4 EXR_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^q \alpha_5 INF + \epsilon_t \dots\dots\dots (3.3)$$

Where;

PSINV = Private Sector Investment

M2 = Broad Money Supply

LNDR = Lending Interest Rate

EXR = Real Exchange Rate

INF = Inflation Rate

$\beta_0$  = intercept or constant term;

$\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4$  and  $\beta_5$ = coefficients to be estimated

$\epsilon_t$  = Error term with the assumption of zero mean and constant variance.

To determine the optimal lending interest rate threshold consistent with private sector investment in Nigeria, the study adopted Moses, Audu, Oji, Oboh, Imam and Ajayi (2015) threshold model. The threshold lending interest rate was estimated using the equation below;

$$PSINV_{it} = \beta_1 + \sum_{j=1}^n \beta_2 LNDR_{it(-1)it} + \sum_{j=1}^n \beta_3 (LNDR_{it}[-1]it) D^*(LNDR_{it} > \pi a) + \sum_{j=1}^n \beta_4 X_{it} + U_{it} \dots \dots \dots (3.4)$$

$$(LNDR_{it} > \pi a) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } LNDR_{it} > \pi a \\ 0 & \text{if } LNDR_{it} < \pi a \end{cases} \dots \dots \dots (3.5)$$

Where;

PSINV<sub>it</sub> is the logarithm of Private domestic investment;

B1 is the fixed effect;

LNDR<sub>it</sub> (-1)<sub>it</sub> is the lagged value of maximum lending rate;

πa is the lending rate threshold;

D\*( LNDR<sub>it</sub> > πa) is a dummy variable that assumes a value of one for observed lending rate greater than πa and zero otherwise;

X<sub>it</sub> is a vector of control variables which includes lagged values of exchange rate (EXR (-1)) and inflation (INF (-1)) lagged value private domestic investment (PSINV(-1)) and lagged of money supply (M2(-1)) while U<sub>t</sub> is the error term.

The parameter “πa” represents the threshold lending rate whose relationship between lending rate and private investment is expressed as: (i) B<sub>2</sub> measures the low lending

rate; (ii) B<sub>3</sub> measures the incremental effect of lending rate on investment when it is greater than the arbitrary lending rate, that is, high lending rate. In other words, B<sub>3</sub> indicates the difference in the effect of lending rate on investment between the two sides of the structural break. By estimating regressions with different values of πa, the optimal value of πa is ascertained by obtaining the value that minimizes the sum of squared residuals and maximizes the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> from the respective regressions.

**Results and Discussions**

**Unit Root Test**

The variables of the study were subjected to unit root tests using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to determine the stationarity levels of the series. The results of the tests are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1: ADF Unit Root Test Result**

| Variables | ADF Test Statistic | 1% Critical Value | 5% Critical Value | 10% Critical Value | Prob.  | Order of Integration |
|-----------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------|----------------------|
| PSINV     | -5.098035          | -4.219126         | -3.533083         | 3.198312           | 0.0010 | I(1)                 |
| M2        | -5.755455          | -4.205004         | -3.526609         | -3.194611          | 0.0001 | I(1)                 |
| LNDR      | -7.110696          | -4.211868         | -3.529758         | -3.196411          | 0.0000 | I(1)                 |
| EXR       | -6.699111          | -4.211868         | -3.529758         | -3.196411          | 0.0000 | I(1)                 |
| INF       | -3.955203          | -3.205004         | -3.526609         | -3.194611          | 0.0186 | I(0)                 |

**Source: E-Views 9.0 Version (2024)**

Table 1 indicates that all the variables are integrated at order one with exception of inflation rate which happens to be stationary at level. This condition warrants the application of ARDL methods which accommodates series that are either I(1) or I(0) process or the mixture of both. The stationarity tests are necessary to guard against spurious regression and to ensure no


variable is integrated of order two. The test was based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) which was selected automatically

**ARDL Results**

**ARDL Optimal Lag Selection**

The Akaike information Criterion was used to select the optimal lag for the models. The

graph of the optimal model selection summary is presented in figure 1



Source: Extraction from E-Views (2024)

Figure 1: AIC Graph Showing Optimal Model Selection Summary

Figure 1 shows that, top 20 ARDL model specifications were considered. Although an ARDL (4,2,0,2,0) was finally selected. However, it can also be seen how well some other specifications performed in terms of minimizing AIC.

Table 2: ARDL Bound Test to Cointegration

| Test Statistic               | Value    | K        |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|
| F-statistic                  | 4.734230 | 4        |
| <b>Critical Value Bounds</b> |          |          |
| Significance                 | I0 Bound | I1 Bound |
| 10%                          | 2.45     | 3.52     |
| 5%                           | 2.86     | 4.01     |
| 2.5%                         | 3.25     | 4.49     |
| 1%                           | 3.74     | 4.66     |

Source: E-Views 9.0 Version (2024)

Table 2 shows that long-run relationships exist among the variables of the study because the F-Statistic (4.734230) is greater than the lower I(0) and upper I(1) bounds of the critical values at 5% critical value.

### ARDL Bounds Test

The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bounds test approach to cointegration was employed to investigate if the variables used for the study converge in the long-run. The ARDL Bound test result is presented in Table 2

### ARDL Long Run Coefficients

The ARDL long-run coefficients were estimated to examine the long-run impact of the independent variables on the endogenous variable having established that, long run relationship exist among the variables. The estimated result of the ARDL long-run coefficients are presented in Table 3.



**Table 3: ARDL Long-Run Coefficients**

| Variable | Coefficient | Std. Error | t-Statistic | Prob.  |
|----------|-------------|------------|-------------|--------|
| M2       | 0.774304    | 0.021250   | 36.437296   | 0.0000 |
| LNDR     | -0.181303   | 1.7556408  | -0.103267   | 0.0186 |
| EXR      | -0.385256   | 0.188385   | -2.045040   | 0.0415 |
| INF      | -0.294550   | 5.192898   | -0.056722   | 0.0352 |
| C        | 0.825284    | 3.807101   | 0.216775    | 0.0129 |

**Source: E-Views 9.0 Version (2024)**

Table 3 above shows that in the long run, if all other things were held constant, the broad money supply (M2) has a significant positive impact on the private sector investment. A unit increase in broad money supply (M2) would increase the private sector investment by about 77%. Given the decision criteria to reject null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) if the probability value is  $< 0.05$ , it shows that probability values for money supply (M2) (0.0000) is statistically significant to reject the null hypothesis that, money supply has significant impact on private sector investment in Nigeria. Hence, we conclude that, money supply (M2) has long-run positive impact on private sector investment in Nigeria for the period of the study.

On the contrary, everything been equal, lending interest rate (LNDR) has a significant negative long-run impact on the private sector investment for the period of the study. This means that a unit increases in the lending interest rate (LNDR) would decrease the private sector investment in Nigeria by about 18%. Given the decision criteria to reject null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) if the probability value is  $< 0.05$ , the result indicated that, the probability value for lending interest rate (LNDR) (0.0186) is statistically significant to reject the null hypothesis that, lending interest has a significant impact on private sector investment in Nigeria. Hence we conclude that, lending interest rate has a significant negative impact on private sector investment in Nigeria for the period of the study. Similarly, the result indicated that, real exchange rate (EXR) has an significant long-run negative impact on the

private sector investment in Nigeria. A unit increase in the exchange rate would decrease the private sector investment by 39% approximately. Given the decision criteria to reject null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) if the probability value is  $< 0.05$ , the result indicated that, the probability value for exchange rate (EXR) (0.0415) is statistically significant to reject the null hypothesis that; exchange rate has no significant impact on private sector investment in Nigeria. Hence, we conclude that, exchange rate has a significant negative impact on private sector investment in Nigeria for the period of the study.

In the vein, *ceteris paribus*, inflation rate has a significant negative impact on the private sector investment. A unit increase in the inflation rate would decrease the private sector investment in Nigeria by 29% approximately. Given the decision criteria to reject null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) if the probability value is  $< 0.05$ , the result indicated that, the probability value for inflation rate (INF) (0.0352) is statistically significant to reject the null hypothesis that; inflation rate has no significant impact on private sector investment in Nigeria. Hence we conclude that, inflation rate has a significant long-run impact on private sector investment in Nigeria.

#### **ARDL Short-Run Coefficients**

ARDL short-run coefficients were further examined to establish the short-run dynamics and to ascertain the speed of converges to the long-run equilibrium. The result of ARDL short-run dynamics is presented in Table 4.

**Table 4: ARDL Short-Run Dynamics**

| Variable     | Coefficient | Std. Error | t-Statistic | Prob.  |
|--------------|-------------|------------|-------------|--------|
| D(PSINV(-1)) | 0.834807    | 0.241837   | 3.451937    | 0.0020 |
| D(PSINV(-2)) | 0.549632    | 0.178723   | 3.075330    | 0.0050 |
| D(PSINV(-3)) | 0.301633    | 0.172777   | 1.745796    | 0.0931 |
| D(M2)        | 0.900338    | 0.081414   | 11.058821   | 0.0000 |
| D(M2(-1))    | -0.402433   | 0.229259   | -1.755370   | 0.0314 |
| D(LNDR)      | 0.277608    | 27.016206  | 0.102756    | 0.0190 |
| D(EXR)       | -0.409200   | 4.892958   | -0.836305   | 0.0109 |
| D(EXR(-1))   | 0.714263    | 3.885931   | 1.838076    | 0.0780 |
| D(INF)       | -0.451016   | 7.957382   | -0.056679   | 0.0253 |
| ECM(-1)      | -0.153120   | 0.326730   | -4.686449   | 0.0001 |

**Source: E-Views 9.0 Version (2024)**

The short-run coefficients of the ARDL estimated model presented in Table 4 showed that, the short-run coefficient for 1 year lag, 2 year lag and 3 year lag PSINIV were positive and statistically significant. Hence, we conclude that 1, 2 and 3 year lags PSINV has positive short-run significant impact on current year PSINV in Nigeria for the period of the study. Moreover, the short-run coefficients of the ARDL estimated model shown in Table 4 revealed that, current year M2 exhibit positive short-run impact on PSINV while 1 year lag M2 exhibit negative short-run impact on the current year PSINV in Nigeria. The probability value (0.0000) for the current year M2 was found to be statistically significant to conclude that, current year M2 has significant short-run positive impact on PSINV. Similarly, the probability value (0.0314) for the 1 year lag M2 was found to be statistically significant to conclude that, 1 year lag M2 has significant short-run negative impact on PSINV in Nigeria for the period of the study. Furthermore, ARDL estimated model presented in Table 4 indicated that current year lending rate (LNDR) has exhibited short-run positive impact on PSINV in Nigeria. The probability value (0.0190) has shows that, the current year LNDR is statistically significant to conclude that, LNDR has positive significant

short-run impact on PSINV in Nigeria for the period.

It was also revealed that current year exchange rate (EXR) indicated negative impact on PSINV in the short-run. The probability value (0.0109) for the current year EXR has shown to be statistically significant to conclude that, EXR has short-run negative impact on PSINV in Nigeria. On the contrary, 1 year lag EXR indicated positive impact on PSINV in the short-run. However, the probability value (0.0780) for the 1 year lag EXR has shown to be statistically insignificant to conclude that 1 year lag has a significant positive impact on PSINV in the short-run for Nigeria within the period of the study. In the meantime, current year inflation rate (INF) indicated a negative and statistically significant short-run impact on PSINV in Nigeria for the period of the study. The estimated co-integrating error correction term (ECT) is negative and statistically significant indicating that, the speed of adjustment at which the previous year's shock of the explanatory variables converging back to the long-run equilibrium in the current year is approximately 15%.

#### **Threshold Regression Estimate**

To examine the optimal lending interest rate threshold consistent with private sector investment in Nigeria, a threshold regression model was estimated and the result of the estimated model is presented in Table 5.

**Table 5: Threshold Regression**

| Variable  | Coefficient | Std. Error | t-Statistic | Prob.  |
|---|-------------|------------|-------------|--------|
| <b>LNDR &lt; 28.119999 -- 33 obs</b>  |             |            |             |        |
| PSINV   | 0.656150    | 2.399307   | 2.734749    | 0.0093 |
| C   | -0.925190   | 5.022790   | -1.841986   | 0.0731 |
| <b>28.119999 &lt;= LNDR -- 10 obs</b>   |             |            |             |        |
| PSINV   | -0.409187   | 9.409220   | -4.348794   | 0.0001 |
| C   | 0.142623    | 2.842879   | 5.016864    | 0.0000 |
| <b>R<sup>2</sup> = 0.60. F-Statistic = 22.05 F (Prob.) = 0.0000. Durbin-Watson = 1.46</b> |             |            |             |        |

**Source: E-Views 9.0 Version (2024)**

Table 5 revealed that, the optimal lending interest rate threshold beyond which lending rate is dangerous to investment is 28.11%. Thus other things being equal, a lending interest rate of 28.11 or lower is a signal that investment is expected to thrive in the Nigerian economy. The result further revealed that, lending interest rate of 28.11% or lower will increase private sector investment in Nigeria by 66%. However, an increase in lending interest rate beyond the optimal threshold will cause investment to decrease by 41% approximately in the following year. The

adjusted R<sup>2</sup> value of 60%, the F. Statistic value with P-value of 0.0000 and Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.46 indicate that the estimates are significant.

**Diagnostic Test Results**

The study employed post-estimation test to diagnose the residuals of the estimated model for valid and reliable outcomes. The test of serial correlation, Heteroskedasticity, Stability and normality test were conducted and the results presented in Table 6

**Table 6: Diagnostic Test Results**

| Test                                      | Null Hypothesis                           | F-statistics | Prob. Value |
|---|---|--------------|-------------|
| Beusch Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test | No Serial Autocorrelation                 | 4.311608     | 0.0657      |
| Breusch-Pagan Godfrey                     | No Heteroscedasticity                     | 1.856188     | 0.0930      |
| Jarque-Bera                               | series residuals are normally distributed | 0.562393     | 0.7548      |
| Ramsey Reset                              | No Misspecification                       | 6.566609     | 0.0571      |

**Source: E-Views 9.0 Version (2024)**

From Table 6 above, to confirm the validity or the opposite of the estimates, the model is subjected to serial correlation test. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation in the residuals up to a specified lag order. The above results show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected because the probability value F-statistics is greater than the 5% significance level. Thus, the model does not suffer from serial correlation. To test whether the variance of the disturbance term is not the same for all the observations, the heteroscedasticity test has been conducted. The null hypothesis of this test is that there is no heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected since the p-value

of the F-statistics is greater than 5% significance value. Hence, the model is homoscedastic. Ramsey reset test holds that the F-statistic test the hypothesis that the coefficients on the powers of the fitted values from the regression are jointly zero. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected since the probability value of F-statistics is greater than 5% significant level. This implies that the model used in this study is well-specified. The JB statistic reveals that, the null hypothesis that the series residuals are normally distribution is accepted because the p-values is greater than 5% significant level.

The discussion of the findings of the study is based on the estimated ARDL Bound test and

threshold regression model. The estimated ARDL model revealed that money supply (M2) has a significant positive impact on private sector investment as a unit increase in money supply (M2) indicated correspondent increase in the private sector investment by about 77%. The probability value for the estimated coefficient of the money supply (M2) was found to be statistically significant to reject the null hypothesis that; money supply has no significant impact on private sector investment in Nigeria. The implication of this finding is that; expansionary monetary policy via money supply instrument will thrive private sector investment for the Nigerian economy. The findings aligned with some of the empirical studies reviewed as it is in consistent with the findings of Kabir (2022), Olanrewaju (2015), Olonila, Amassoma and Babatunde (2023), as well as Oyakegha and Arepo (2022) who found that broad money supply has a significant positive impact on the private sector performance both in the short run and long run. The finding is however at variance with empirical evidence provided by Lubo and Bigbo (2021) who found that money supply (MS) has a negative and insignificant effect on domestic private investment in Nigeria.

The long-run coefficient of the estimated ARDL model further revealed that; real exchange rate (EXR) has long-run negative impact on the private sector investment in Nigeria. The probability value for the estimated coefficient of the real exchange rate (EXR) was found to be statistically significant to reject the null hypothesis that; exchange rate has no significant impact on private sector investment in Nigeria. It was further confirmed by the ARDL short-run estimated model as both current and 1 year lag indicated negative and positive significant impact respectively on private sector investment in Nigeria. This suggests that, continuous depreciation in the value of naira, the disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market and the external imbalances experience in Nigeria over the years discourage private sector investment as investors lost

confidence in the local currency to bring in more investment portfolio for the economy. In addition, Nigeria being an import dependent nation, the continuous depreciation of the naira increases prices for imported raw materials needed by the private sector which in turn affect private sector performance in Nigeria. The result is in consonance with Leonard (2021) whose empirical result revealed that devaluation/ depreciation of the naira adversely affects foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment in Nigeria. It is also in tune with Kabir (2022) who found that, real exchange rate has a significant negative impact on private sector performance both in the short run and long run. it also in agreement with similar study by Dang, Pham and Tran (2020) for the Vietnam economy who established that private investment is positively affected by respective monetary policies through broad money, domestic credit and interest rate channels, yet no credible evidence regarding the exchange rate's effect.

In addition, The long-run estimated coefficients of the ARDL model indicated that, inflation rate has negative impact on the private sector investment. The test statistic probability for the estimate coefficient of inflation has shown a significant value to reject the null hypothesis correspondence to the objective three hence rejecting the null hypothesis that, inflation has no significant impact on private sector investment in Nigeria. The estimated short-run coefficient for the inflation rate also confirmed a negative and insignificant value, implying that, inflation rate has negative and significant impact on private sector investment in Nigeria both in the long and short-run period.

The findings aligned with similar studies by Lubo and Bigbo (2021) who revealed that consumer price index (CPI) has proxied for inflation has a negative and insignificant effect on domestic private investment. The finding also supported the empirical report of Fashagba, Atsanan, Yadok and Adebayo (2022) who found that rate of inflation is significantly high and reduces real return on investment to negative value. The finding is however at variance with Olonila, Amassoma and Babatunde (2023) who

found that inflation rate had long-term positive effects on investment in Nigeria. It is also conflicting with similar study carried out by Lorna (2018) in Uganda who established that, there is a positive response of private sector growth to past inflation volatility. Though, the positive response of private sector growth to inflation volatility was attributed to credible monetary policy regime in Uganda, which has led to a reduction in the level of macroeconomic uncertainty and the restoration of favorable economic conditions and prospects, thus increasing the demand for credit and private sector growth for the economy.

To ascertain the optimal lending interest rate threshold consistent with private sector investment in Nigeria, threshold estimated model suggests that, the optimal lending interest rate threshold beyond which lending rate is dangerous to investment is 28.11%. The implication of this finding is that, lending interest rate of 28.11% or lower will increase private sector investment in Nigeria while an increase in lending interest rate beyond the optimal threshold will be detrimental to the private sector investment. The finding however contradict with similar study by Evans (2019) which established that, interest rate contributes positively to investment growth when it is below 22.6%, but becomes a major concern beyond the 22.6% level. The finding is also at variance with the result obtained by Moses, Tule, Audu, Oji, Oboh and Ajayi (2015) who established with a "quadratic model" the threshold lending rate of 21.46% and identified with an "iterative threshold method" 21% as the threshold lending rate. With reference to other economy, the finding is at variance with similar study by Solomon and Kofi (2020) which found the threshold of 23.59% and 24% respectively, beyond which interest rate impacts negatively on private investment in Ghana. Among the industrial and emerging economies, Aizenman, Cheung and Ito (2017) established that, the substitution effect is detected only when the nominal interest rate is lower than 2.5%. In contrast, emerging-market Asian countries are found to have the income effect when the nominal interest rate is below 2.5%. Though

there could be inconsistency regarding the optimal lending interest rate threshold consistent with private sector investment in Nigeria as established by previous empirical studies for the economy, all the lending interest rate threshold found are within the threshold established by this study. The inconsistency could be attributed to differences in the scope of the studies.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

In line with findings of the study, the study concluded that, continuous depreciation in the value of naira, the disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market, the external imbalances and uncertainty in price movement experience in Nigeria over the years discourage private sector investment, hence had adversely impacted on private sector investment in Nigeria over the period of the study. It was further concluded that, persistence increase in the price for goods and services is detrimental to private sector investment in Nigeria while lending interest rate above 28.11% will also be detrimental to private sector investment in Nigeria.

In line with the study findings, it is recommended that the Central Bank of Nigeria has to make an effort to comprehend how lending to the private sector boosts investment in that sector and devise monetary policies that support credit to the private sector as a means of boosting performance in that sector. Reducing the cost of financing to the private sectors is one of these initiatives. This will happen when the level of lending interest rates is lowered to a single digit as a tool of monetary policy to facilitate investors' access to low-cost capital for investments. Private sector investment in Nigeria would suffer from a rise in lending interest rates over the ideal level of 28.11%. To improve the value of the Naira relative to other currencies, the government should abandon its ongoing, less effective devaluation policy and adopt more diversification pledges in order to acquire more foreign exchange and bridge its shortage. In

order to establish consistency in foreign exchange regulations and eliminate some market backlogs, structural reforms are also urgently needed. These measures will bring clarity, boost confidence in our economy, and draw in more private sector investment. To lower operating costs and, thus, the economy's propensity toward inflation, the government must enhance the provision of essential infrastructure, particularly power supply. This will significantly boost real income, purchasing power, and consumer spending on goods and services, as well as enhance returns on investments for the private sector.

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## GREEN ECONOMY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA

Ishaku Rimamtanung N.<sup>1</sup>

Josephine Japheth Wubon<sup>2</sup>

Ibiang Omini Ebri<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Economics

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State

Email: [nyiputen@fuwukari.edu.ng](mailto:nyiputen@fuwukari.edu.ng)

<sup>2</sup>Department of Economics

Taraba State University, Jalingo, Nigeria

Email: [joybt.2014@gmail.com](mailto:joybt.2014@gmail.com)

<sup>3</sup>Department of Economics

University of Calabar, Calabar Cross River State, Nigeria

Email: [ibiangomini28@gmail.com](mailto:ibiangomini28@gmail.com)



### Abstract

This paper examines the green economy framework and its challenges to sustainable growth and development of the Nigerian economy. Adopting the political economy approach, the study explores relevant concepts, identifying the core meaning of the concept of sustainable development and green economy. Few sectors were analysed in terms of green growth policies to see what economic benefits Nigeria stands to gain if transiting into the green economy. The study revealed that the green economy holds a lots of opportunities especially for those sectors studied. Recommendations to enable Nigeria transit into green economy includes that institutional capacity is needed to integrate environmental policies with economic policies among others will help Nigeria transit into green economy.

**Key words:** Green economy, sustainable development, environment, institutional capacity

### Introduction

The notion of a "green economy" has garnered substantial interest in the recent past due to its ability to mitigate the current overuse of the environment while taking economic growth into account. According to the 2005 report on the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, excessive human use has caused the degradation of 60% of the world's main ecosystems, including both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, in the last few years. The agreement among scientists is that any increase in Earth's average temperature over 2°C is likely to have unanticipated and perhaps catastrophic consequences, such the global rainforests' extinction, a notable rise in sea

levels, and eventually the extinction of all species. The green economy is a unique notion that presents a possible solution to lessen current environmental exploitation while taking economic development into account.

Two distinct economic models that support environmental preservation and sustainable growth are the "green economy" and the "blue economy." An economic paradigm known as the "green economy" emphasizes using renewable resources and cutting carbon emissions. The term "blue economy" pertains to an economic framework that prioritizes the sustainable utilization and administration of marine resources. The blue economy consists

of industries like fishing, tourism, maritime transportation, and so on, whereas the green economy consists of industries like renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and waste management. Both want to lessen their influence on the environment while generating jobs and economic progress.

The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) estimates that by 2050, the transition to a green economy may provide millions of jobs worldwide and up to \$10 trillion in yearly economic possibilities. In a similar vein, research from the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2022 indicates that the blue economy might provide over \$3 trillion in economic value annually by 2030 and support millions of jobs worldwide. The main benefits of both green and blue economies are the creation of jobs, the reduction of carbon emissions, and economic growth. The main drawbacks are that they are highly dependent on government policies and subsidies, which are vulnerable to change based on political goals.

Shifting the focus to the sustainable consumption and production (SCP) program will safeguard the environment and open up new avenues for investment and commerce. This would help Nigeria's green economic framework by encouraging green growth and sustainable development.

The main objective of this article is to examine whether Nigeria's shift to a green economy is necessary, taking into account both the benefits and challenges it poses for sustainable development.

## **Conceptual Clarifications**

### **Green Growth**

Sustainable development has been closely linked to the idea of economic growth that also satisfies environmental objectives. In many nations, national environmental planning and the formulation of international environmental policies are still based on the fundamental idea of sustainable development.

In fact, the governmental organizations that are currently pushing green growth assert that it is a means of attaining sustainable development rather than a replacement for it (Michael Jacobs 2012). "In a classical definition, a development path is sustainable if and only if the stock of overall capital assets remain constant or rise over time," state Todaro and Smith (2011). Noting that manufactured capital (machines, factories, roads, human capital, knowledge, experience, and skills) and environmental capital (forests, soil quality, range land) are intended to be included in the total capital assets. According to this concept, sustainable development calls for the preservation of these total capital assets and the determination of the appropriate level of sustainable net national income (NNI)—that is, the amount that may be spent without reducing the capital stock—through continuous improvement. Therefore, sustainable development is that pattern of growth that, generally speaking, requires at least a minimal level of environmental preservation and allows future generations to live at least as well as the current generation.

To put it simply, green growth is defined as economic expansion (gross domestic product, or GDP growth) that also significantly protects the environment. There are many who question whether economic expansion and potential environmental enhancements can coexist. In the words of the World Bank (2012), it is "growth that is resilient in that it accounts for national hazards and the role of environmental management and natural capital in preventing physical disasters, clean in that it minimizes pollution and environmental impacts, and efficient in its use of natural resources." According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011), "green growth" refers to promoting development and expansion of the economy while making sure that natural resources continue to offer the resources and environmental services that are essential to human survival.



The words "green growth" and "sustainable development" have the same meanings; the only differences arise from governments' perceived lack of commitment to sustainable development and the ongoing deterioration of the state of the environment worldwide. However, policy makers also realized that in a world where GDP growth and the jobs it creates continue to be the primary concerns of businesses and voters, as well as the primary goal of government policy, an environmental discourse that emphasizes costs, limits, and the need to restrain growth in order to assess them would not likely garner political support. This is particularly true in the context of climate change, where the focus of international discussions has been on how to divide the global "burden," with the prevailing rhetoric being around the economic cost of mitigation Stern (2007). As a result, the rhetoric around green growth now serves a more constructive function rather than its original, politically unappealing one. But unlike sustainable development, it takes a direct approach to the problem of growth. By rephrasing the economic goal as development and avoiding the underlying question of whether growth and environmental preservation are compatible, sustainable development was a purposeful attempt to maintain a broad coalition of political support. In addition to requiring this compatibility, green growth asserts that stronger growth might result from environmental protection. This illustrates its distinct provenance. Green growth has arisen from the more mainstream and pragmatic group of environmental economic policy makers, whereas the notion of sustainable development originated in the environmental movement, where ideological dispute about the limitations to growth was prevalent (Michael Jacobs: 2012).

### **Green Economy**

A green economy is described as "one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing

environmental risks and ecological scarcities" in the UNEP study "Towards a green economy." Three main pillars support the green economy: (1) low-carbon technology; (2) resource efficiency; and (3) growth that is inclusive of society. A structure like this is very crucial for Nigeria. In many respects, Nigeria's extreme poverty in the midst of abundance and the widespread environmental degradation found throughout the country are related to the country's heavy reliance on the unproductive exploitation of natural resources for livelihood purposes, which feeds the vicious cycle of underdevelopment. Nigeria might have enormous chances to capitalize on her abundant natural resource endowments as it works toward sustainable development if it adopts a green economy paradigm. However, in order to reap the rewards of a green economy, the Nigerian government must establish the institutional framework, central to which would be a dynamic and well-functioning national council of sustainable development (NCSD).

Nigeria has to make the most of the findings from the UNEP's Trade Policy and Planning Unit if it is to make a seamless and successful transition to a green economy.

A crucial part of the Trade Opportunities and Green Economy Project (GE – TOP) is this study. According to the research, commerce in environmentally friendly products and services, standards and certification, and the greening of international supply chains are the main opportunities brought about by the shift. Subsequently, the paper included an extensive sectoral analysis. Growing prospects for additional value and market attractiveness support the need for greener goods and processes. Productive growth in sustainable farming practices is possible, and business-to-business commerce in the certification and verification of products and production processes is expected to rise. Furthermore, emerging economies are becoming major actors in the trade of environmental goods and services, and the green energy sector

represents a rising and potentially substantial business. The study lists the following five enabling criteria.

*Strategic expenditure and investment:* access to renewable energy, specialized education programs, technical support, and economic infrastructure should all be seen as essential.

*Market-based tools:* Price policies should take social and environmental costs into account and modify subsidies to unsustainable products. Enhancing country-specific regulatory structures accountability, and transparency

*International frameworks:* These are essential for the transfer and diffusion of technical skills and resources.

*Improving communication and developing capacity:* Promote and assist emerging trade prospects, especially those involving access to export markets.

### **Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP)**

This mechanism makes it easier for those who are skeptical of environmental protection to see that green growth, which is facilitated by the green economy, not only supports but also accelerates economic growth by creating job opportunities and improving food security, well-being, and poverty alleviation, among other benefits. Policies designed to ensure sustainable patterns of consumption and production, along with technologies that will support economic expansion while the ecosystem continues to supply resources and services, are known as the SCP effort.

The following presumption is essential to sustainable consumption:

1. Resource efficiency combined with a reduction in waste and pollution. The adoption of environmentally benign technology, the utilization of renewable resources to the fullest extent of their ability for renewal, longer product life cycles, and justice between and among generations are imperatives.

Without a doubt, businesses in Nigeria would prosper more under the sustainable production approach, which offers a plethora of chances for growth, profit, and job creation.

Beyond this, though, negative externalities will be freed from sustainable production. It is becoming more and more advantageous for companies to take sustainability into account early in the product creation process as the market for goods grows and environmental issues like climate change have a greater impact on laws and enterprises.

### **Challenges**

**Green Economy:** One of the major challenges of green economy in the world especially in Nigeria is the lack of political will to implement sustainable policies and practices. Despite Nigeria government's commitment to achieving sustainable development goals, there are several instances where environmental policies are disregarded or not enforced properly. Another challenge of green economy in Nigeria is limited access to finance and high transition cost, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Green businesses require significant investments in research and development, technology, and infrastructure, which SMEs may not be able to afford. Furthermore, access to green finance is limited, and the cost of capital is high, making it difficult for businesses to make the transition to a green economy.

Inadequate infrastructure is another challenge that hinders the development of a green economy in Nigeria. The country lacks the necessary infrastructure, such as public transport systems, waste management facilities, and renewable energy infrastructure, to support sustainable development. This lack of infrastructure makes it difficult to transition toward a green economy.

### **Opportunities**

**Green Economy:** Nigeria as a Nation should take a significant steps toward building a green economy by investing in renewable energy sources like solar, wind, and hydropower and schemes like Green Hydrogen Mission, Energy Transition, Energy Storage Projects, Renewable Energy Evacuation. If Nigeria will

set an ambitious Target of achieving over 200 Gigawatt (GW) of renewable energy capacity by 2030 which may includes 100 GW of solar power, 60 GW of wind, 10 GW of small hydro, 30 GW of Bioenergy. This target is expected to create several employment opportunities in the renewable energy sector.

Apart from renewable energy, Nigeria can also benefit from green economy opportunities in the agriculture and forestry sectors. Sustainable agriculture practices such as organic farming can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and protect soil health. Similarly, sustainable forestry practices can help conserve biodiversity and reduce deforestation. In addition, there are opportunities in the manufacturing sector to produce eco-friendly products that are biodegradable, recyclable, and made from sustainable materials.

### **Empirical Literature**

The idea of a "green economy" is presented by Hellena Pavese (2011) in her paper "Towards a green economy: pathway to sustainable development and poverty eradication," which makes evident how severely ecosystem services are being degraded. The author discusses the green economy project, which was started with the goal of determining the costs and hazards to society and economy associated with the existing practice of excessive use of natural resources, as well as the prospects for a shift to more sustainable practices.

The UNEP study was critically evaluated by Alexandre P'Avigon and Luiz Anthonia (2011).

They declare that the introduction of values beyond utility maximization in the report is a qualitative leap. They highlight the need to approach the shift to a green economy from a systemic perspective, in which human activity is only one component of civil society, which is a subsystem of the biosphere and all of its inanimate and biological components.

The link between the notions of sustainable development and the green economy was

examined by Donald Sawyer (2011). The author warned against the possibility that the green economy might take on purely commercial characteristics, favoring market mechanisms and resource pricing over alternative policies. He claims that additional aspects, including social, ethical, cultural, political, and judicial ones, are pertinent to the green economy. According to him, in order for the green economy to be implemented in a way that is complementary to and connected with the more abstract, diplomatic, and governmental concept of sustainable development, policies that uphold the rights of all people and preserve the interconnected functions of ecosystems are necessary.

Renato Roseberg, Ernani Kuhn, and Francisco Gaetani gave a summary on the state of the green economy in Brazil. They said that Brazil is a leader in environmental energy because of its wealth of national resources and its numerous environmental conservation laws and regulations. The country has some of the greatest greenhouse gas emissions in the world, according to the authors, but it is changing this by setting voluntary objectives for emissions reduction. They provide an overview of the primary steps Brazil has been taking to develop a green economy in areas like water resources, solid waste management, and forestry, among others. Maria Cecilia J. Lustosa examined the significance of environmental innovations as a way to shift the existing technological paradigm—which is heavily reliant on fossil fuels for energy and raw materials—into one that is more environmentally responsible. She discussed how environmental challenges have emerged historically and how they relate to economic activity. Next, with an emphasis on environmentally sound technologies, the author presents the circumstances in which and in which directions such changes might occur, highlighting the significance of the inventive process in technological transformation and paradigm shift. The key characteristics of the innovations related to

environmental challenges in Brazilian enterprises were discovered by the author through additional investigation. The author comes to the following conclusions: creating a green economy requires environmental advances, and expanding company capacity is essential and, where appropriate, linked to state-sponsored incentives. She also concluded that poor innovation investment in the productive sector is undoubtedly a contributing cause to the further inhibition of environmental innovation in Brazil.

### Theoretical Framework

Understanding the economy through the lens of technology as a tool for social change in human societies is made easier by the neo-Schumpeterian idea. In order to facilitate a smooth transition to a green economy, this strategy takes into account other, adaptable, locally relevant alternatives.

According to Pollin et al. (2008), enhancing the environment can play a part in reviving economies that had been severely hit by recession and encouraging growth, especially in the area of employment. Simple Keynesian theory, which maintained that governments should replace lost private sector demand with public expenditure during a downturn, served as the main defense of government spending. Further income and employment growth are subsequently produced by this multiplier impact. Spending of this kind need not be environmentally friendly, but a green stimulus package has distinct advantages due to the scope of environmental options and the added benefits to health and amenities they provide.

These claims are somewhat supported by estimates of the effects of the green stimulus programs implemented in 2008–2010. The US stimulus package's environmental components were predicted to have generated about 500,000 net new employment (Barbier 2010a), while comparable measures implemented in South Korea were expected to have produced up to 960,000 jobs (OECD 2010). According to some estimates, green measures in the US created 20% more jobs than traditional infrastructure

spending, indicating that the green stimulus measures may have been more successful in creating jobs than their proponents had predicted.

### Analysis

Economic growth is achieved through the combination of labor, physical capital, human capital, and technology, according to mainstream economic theory. When these variables raise overall productivity, economic development follows. It is anticipated that productivity will only rise in this way if a specific percentage of output is reinvested in better technology, higher wages and salaries, and other fringe benefits intended to encourage labor for higher productivity as well as better healthcare and education for the workforce. The pace of economic growth is determined by the rate of investment in these elements of production. The core of the green economy is the comparison between the environment and other industrial parameters. Actually, the natural environment is a component of production; it functions as capital in three ways: it supplies resources, absorbs waste, and offers a variety of environmental services necessary for living, such as maintaining ecosystem health and regulating climate. Because of this complete disregard, natural resources are overused, resulting in reduced fisheries, overabstraction of water, erosion of soil, and depletion of forests. We allow ecosystems that offer important functions, like forests and wetlands, to deteriorate. These arise from the inability of the market to determine the proper prices, if any, for our natural resources. The market fails when it fails to account for the entire value of the activities that take place inside it. Therefore, the green growth paradigm holds that the existing rates of economic development are unsatisfactory and inefficient.

This implies that, in the case of Nigeria, the government must intervene at this point, when there is undeniable proof of market

failure, and provide the infrastructure and take-off initiative to draw in private investment. In addition to creating new market possibilities and increasing market rivalry, this will significantly lower the high rates of environmental deterioration.

This means for Nigeria that, just as she did in the power sector, the government must now intervene to provide the initiative and take-off infrastructure to attract private participation, given that the country's environmental capital is fundamentally underpriced and, consequently, a victim of market failure. In addition to creating new market possibilities and fostering competition in the market for environmental products and services, this will significantly lower the high rate of environmental deterioration.

#### **Analysis of Selected sectors in Nigeria:**

##### **Agricultural Sector:**

A number of detrimental environmental effects, such as the ongoing loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services, the depletion and erosion of top soil nutrients, the growing scarcity of freshwater, the worsening of water pollution due to inadequate nutrient management, the release, disposal, emissions, and waste of hazardous chemicals, and trade that is carried out on a business-as-usual basis, pose a threat to Nigerian agriculture's future. In the medium and long term, sustainable agriculture may either maintain or boost agricultural output while lowering resource use, protecting the environment, and enhancing food safety.

The use of sustainable farming techniques can boost output, make it easier to enter global supply chains, and meet the need for more organic and sustainable products worldwide. Growers of cocoa, rubber, rice, cassava, groundnuts, and other crops will see increases in output as well as an improvement in their general well-being and a secure and successful future.

Put another way, improving the environment via investment will lead to an

enhanced ecosystem, and the only way to maintain this improvement in the environment is to participate in the SCP project. This will stop the environment from getting worse while leading to an increase in organic goods and services. In the end, this will improve the overall well-being of over half of the country's rural residents, as well as their access to income and production.

##### **Fisheries:**

The Niger-Delta zone's aquatic culture is in almost complete collapse and deterioration. The reason behind the incapacity of these prominent fishermen to catch fish is not overfishing, but rather the unsustainable use of fossil fuels in the area. However, Nigeria imports fish and other fish products worth millions of dollars every year. This can be changed by practicing sustainable exploitation, and by certifying fish products for sustainability, Nigeria's fisheries management systems can be strengthened overall.

Climate change is sending most of these species farther into the Atlantic, increasing the difficulty and cost of fishing. The sea level is also rising as a result. It is also possible to argue that, although non-sustainable fishing practices in coastal areas have severely damaged the environment and negatively impacted aquatic life, the increasing prevalence of unsustainable fishing methods, particularly in Oguta Lake, has severely aggravated the declining fishing conditions. These unsustainable fishing methods, which included the use of dynamite and gamaline 20 underwater explosive, had abruptly gained popularity among young men in Oguta Lake. Either way, aquatic life suffers a fatal blow with the destruction of additional aquatic habitat in addition to eggs and fingerlings.

Even if there may be a way to turn things around, it will need sincere and dedicated efforts from all parties involved, particularly the government, which has to put more pressure on regulations. Better aquatic life will translate into more income opportunities and

a better quality of life for the rural residents of the Escravos River and the entire southern riverine region.

#### **Forestry:**

Nigeria's forest reserves in the states of Edo, Delta, Taraba, Buichi, and Ondo are currently seriously threatened by the rise of illicit logging. This trend is made worse by the acts of local government officials, who have integrated themselves into the illegal trade. On the other hand, traceability and transparency in the forestry sector may be greatly enhanced by sustainable commerce in wood and non-timber forest products, especially through certificate systems.

#### **Renewable Energy:**

Numerous issues confronting Nigeria's energy industry today can be resolved by the use of renewable energy resources. The Nigerian power industry is in a dire state; not even the reforms implemented over the years, which have seen public investments transferred to politicians and their allies, have helped the industry in any way. Instead, consumers are still required to pay high rates for energy that is not used through monthly estimated billing, even in the event of a blackout. Nigeria's electricity output plummeted to 2,887.8 megawatts by June 2014 (Business July 2014).

With the right laws governing low-carbon emissions and energy-efficient renewable energy-based technology, this trend may also be reversed. Nigeria has abundant wind and solar resources that, if used, may propel the country into the enviable status of sustainable energy self-sufficiency, output growth, and job creation.

#### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

In Nigeria, the green economy through green growth is both desirable and realistic as it can combine the creation of jobs and revenue with the fight against poverty and the preservation

of natural resources. Naturally, accomplishing this is essential to fulfilling Millennium Development Goal No. 7. Consequently, the economy that generates a steady rise in the natural capital stock is known as the "green economy."

The following suggestions are made in order for Nigeria to effectively transition into the green economy, reap the benefits, and meet Millennium Development Goal 7. Integrating environmental and economic policy requires the development of institutional capability. The indispensability of institutional capacity to develop an environmental indicator system capable of quantifying and tracking the returns on investments in natural capital. The green economy must be viewed by Nigeria as a means of achieving its goals of economic growth. Nigeria's economy is still in its early stages of development and does not have the lock-in effect of the more developed countries, therefore implementing some green growth strategies may be simpler for her. Nigeria shall profit economically and socially from environmental rules rather than viewing them as a problem that has to be solved.

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## IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES

**Abdulahadi Haruna Aliyara<sup>1</sup>**

**Ahmed Rufai Mohammed<sup>2</sup>**

Department of Economics

Taraba State University Jalingo, Nigeria

E-mail: [abdulaliyara@gmail.com](mailto:abdulaliyara@gmail.com)

Department of Economics

Jigawa State College of Education Gumel, Nigeria

E-mail: [elrufai18@gmail.com](mailto:elrufai18@gmail.com)



### Abstract

The paper examines the influence of trade liberalization on economic growth of ten Sub-Saharan African (SSA) Countries spanning over 1999 to 2022. The study employed the second-generation estimation techniques such Pesaran 20007 Unit Root Test, Westerlund Co-integration and as the modified version of Driscoll and Kraay's (1998) by Daniel Hoehle (2007), which allows disturbance  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  to be cross-sectionally dependent, autocorrelated and heteroscedastic. Evidence indicates that trade liberalization significantly enhances economic growth in the SSA countries. Similarly, the outcome suggests a significant influence of labour force total and foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth. However, the study indicates a negative influence of capital stock on economic growth. Therefore, the study recommends that countries of SSA countries should as matter fact encourage policies towards full trade liberalization.

**Keywords:** Trade liberalization, economic growth, Sub-Saharan African countries

### Introduction

The significance of trade openness has been increasingly recognized since the onset of globalization. Every nation is now prioritizing innovative approaches to integrate its domestic economy with the global market by opening up trade through various avenues. Trade openness consistently plays a pivotal role in fostering economic growth, whether in developing or developed nations, to varying degrees. Against this backdrop, theoretical models demonstrate that trade openness enables the efficient allocation of resources based on comparative advantage, thereby boosting income levels (Mallick & Behera, 2020). Yet, according to the endogenous growth model, the impact of trade on economic growth varies depending on whether comparative advantage channels resources towards activities that spur growth

or diverts them away from such endeavors. Theories propose that less developed countries might face challenges in adopting technologies from advanced economies due to technological or financial limitations. Consequently, despite its potential for positive growth effects, some theoretical studies argue that trade openness could hinder economic growth, particularly in scenarios where technological innovation or learning by doing reaches saturation, or where selective protection fosters faster technological advancements (Lucas Jr, 1988; Seyfullayev, 2023).

The concept of trade liberalization, aimed at fostering economic growth, emerged as a response to a history of trade restrictions. Initially, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established in 1947, advocated



for free trade as its primary objective, with allowances for protective measures for domestic industries in their early stages. This approach was believed to promote economic growth and enable poorer nations to develop industries with added value. However, by the 1980s, this strategy, known as the infant-industry approach, was perceived to have faltered (Hunter, 2003; Read & Parton, 2009). Consequently, nearly complete economic deregulation and trade liberalization gained acceptance as the preferred means to stimulate economic growth and development. The principle of the "law of one price" posits that, in a free-trade environment devoid of distortions, identical goods would command uniform prices worldwide, fostering economic efficiency and growth. Trade liberalization and economic deregulation aim toward this ideal, allowing market forces to determine exchange rates and prices. This process involves reducing or eliminating import and export duties, eliminating non-quantitative barriers to international trade, implementing tariff reforms, and relaxing regulations on foreign direct investment (Santos-Paulino, 2002).

Theoretical arguments, such as those found in the classical theory of trade, suggest that trade openness fosters economic growth. This is because trade openness prompts the reallocation of resources, with participating countries often gaining a comparative advantage through specialization in production and exporting to their trade partners, thus enhancing economic growth. However, despite the efforts of many developing nations, including Ghana, to embrace trade with the global community, doubts persist regarding the benefits of trade liberalization on economic growth and development (Haddad, Lim, Pancaro, & Saborowski, 2013; Mireku, Animah Agyei, & Domeher, 2017). This has sparked a debate among economists and researchers regarding the extent to which trade openness, or trade liberalization, genuinely promotes economic growth.

Historically, SSA has been characterized by limited integration into the global economy due to colonial legacies, protectionist policies, and geographic isolation. However, in the post-independence era, there has been a gradual shift towards trade liberalization and economic reforms. The adoption of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s, under the guidance of international financial institutions, marked a significant turning point in the region's trade policies, leading to increased openness to international trade (African Development Bank Group, 2020). Despite progress in trade liberalization, SSA countries face numerous challenges in fully realizing the benefits of trade openness: Inadequate infrastructure, including transportation networks, ports, and energy facilities, hinders the region's ability to engage in global trade efficiently. Poor infrastructure increases transaction costs, reduces competitiveness, and limits market access. Weak governance, corruption, and institutional inefficiencies pose significant barriers to trade facilitation and hinder the implementation of trade agreements. Limited institutional capacity undermines the enforcement of trade regulations, intellectual property rights, and contract enforcement, deterring foreign investment and trade partnerships. Persistent trade deficits, exacerbated by low-value exports and high import dependency, pose challenges to sustainable economic growth and development. Limited export diversification and overreliance on a few export commodities expose countries to external market fluctuations and terms of trade shocks (UNCTAD, 2021; World Bank, 2021).

Recent trends indicate a mixed picture of trade openness in SSA. While some countries have made significant strides in liberalizing trade and attracting foreign investment, others continue to grapple with structural constraints and policy challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has further underscored the importance of resilient trade policies, supply chain diversification, and digital transformation in enhancing trade resilience and recovery. There is no study available, which

has broadly investigated the impact of trade openness on economic growth in SSA countries using a second-generation estimation technique (Driscoll and Kraay's technique) which takes into consideration the effect of cross-sectional dependence that is as a result of economic integration and globalization.

### **Literature Review**

**Theoretical Literature** - Endogenous growth theory suggests that trade openness can lead to long-term economic growth by promoting technological innovation and knowledge spillovers. According to this theory, trade allows countries to access new technologies and ideas from abroad, leading to productivity gains and increased output (Acemoglu & Ventura, 2002; Aghion & Howitt, 1990). New trade theory emphasizes the role of economies of scale, product differentiation, and imperfect competition in driving trade and economic growth. By opening up to international trade, countries can specialize in the production of goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage, leading to efficiency gains and increased output (Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein, 2008; Melitz, 2003).

### **Empirical Literature**

Mallick and Behera (2020) examines the long-run association between trade openness and economic growth spanning over 1960 to 2018 in India. the study utilized the Engle-Granger and asymmetric error correction model, the study categorizes the periods into pre-trade reforms of 1960 to 1990 and post-trade reforms of 1991 to 2018. Evidence indicates the existence of asymmetric cointegration between trade openness and economic growth. Similarly, in the same line Banday, Murugan, and Maryam (2021) utilizes the Granger Causality test and Auto-regressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) in analyzing influence of foreign direct investment (FDI), trade openness on economic

growth spanning over 1990 to 2018 in BRICS nations. Evidence reveals that trade openness and FDI encourage economic growth, also results indicate a bidirectional causality from FDI to growth, trade openness to FDI. Also, Duodu and Baidoo (2020) analyze the impact of trade openness on economic growth and examines the influence of institutions on the trade openness - growth nexus in Ghana over the period of 1984 to 2018. The study utilizes the ARDL technique and conducted an interaction effect of institutional quality. Evidence suggests that trade openness and institutional quality positively influence growth in both short and long-run. However, the interaction term coefficient suggests an insignificant result. while analyzing the impact of trade openness on economic growth and examining the role of total factor productivity (TFP) in 82 countries for over 35 years spanning over 1980 to 2014, Ramzan, Sheng, Shahbaz, Song, and Jiao (2019) utilizes the system general moment method estimator for a dynamic panel data. Evidence indicates when TFP is used as an intervening variable, trade openness boosts economic growth in countries with minimum threshold of TFP and trade openness negatively influences growth in countries with low-TFP.

Furthermore, Keho (2017) examine the relationship between trade openness and economic growth in Cote d'Ivoire spanning over 1965 to 2014. The study used the ARDL technique, and Toda Yamamoto Granger causality tests, results indicates that in the both short and long-run trade openness positively influence economic growth. Also, the evidence shows a complementary relationship between trade openness and capital formation in encouraging growth. Similarly, in the same line, Emilienne Wati Yameogo and Ayoola Omojolaibi (2021) explores association trade openness, economic growth and poverty in 40 SSA countries spanning over 1990 to 2017. The study utilizes the system GMM technique and ARDL was used for robustness test. Evidence

indicates trade openness, institutional quality and FDI stimulates economic growth while institutional quality retards growth in the short run. Similarly, Kong, Peng, Ni, Jiang, and Wang (2021) utilized the ARDL approach in analyzing the influence of trade openness on economic growth quality of China over the period of 1994. Evidence indicates a stable cointegration between the periods of opening-up the economy and the quality of economic growth. Also, result suggests that opening-up economy stimulates economic growth. Similarly, in analyzing the effect of trade openness on the macroeconomic outlook of Africa's regional economic communities the ECOWAS and SADC, Oloyede, Osabuohien, and Ejemeyovwi (2021) utilizes pooled OLS, Random and Fixed effect techniques. Evidence indicates a positive however, insignificant.

### Theoretical framework and model specification

When assessing the influence of trade openness on economic growth, this study aligns with the AK endogenous growth model. The theoretical framework employed utilizes the Cobb-Douglas production function (CDPF), expressed as Equation (1).

$$Y = AK^\alpha L^\beta \quad (1)$$

In Equation (1), Y, A, K, and L denote economic output (termed economic growth in this study), technological advancement, capital accumulation, and the labor force, respectively. The parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  represent the elasticities or the shares of capital accumulation and the labor force, respectively. Dividing both sides of Equation (1) by the labor force yields the per capita output specified in Equation (2).

$$y = AK^\alpha \quad (2)$$

In Equation (2), y and k represent economic output per capita and capital stock per capita, respectively. Furthermore, obtaining the natural logarithm of Equation (2) results in the log form of Equation (2).

$$\ln y = \ln A + \alpha \ln K \quad (3)$$

In Equation (3),  $\alpha$  represents the elasticity of economic output concerning capital stock. It's crucial to highlight that A encapsulates the growth in economic output (total factor productivity), which doesn't stem from increases in either the labor force or capital stock. The study posits that economic factor such as trade openness, capital stock, total labor force, and foreign direct investment influence technological progress in ten Sub-Saharan African countries. The study adapts the Duodu and Baidoo (2020) with some modifications. Hence, Equation (3) can be reformulated as:

$$\log GDP_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 L_{it} + \beta_2 K_{it} + \beta_3 TO_{it} + \beta_4 FDI_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where Y and K are explained earlier, and TO and FDI, denote trade openness, gross domestic product respectively. The  $\beta_0$  and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  denote the constant term and the stochastic error term respectively, such that the stochastic error term has a mean of zero and constant variance. Also, log and t represent the natural logarithm and time trend respectively.

### Estimation Techniques

#### Panel Unit Root

Checking the order of the series is highly imperative to determine the appropriate panel model. The literature has employed many tests in checking stationarity. In situation where cross-sectional dependence is present, the Pesaran (2007) is utilized to test for unit root. the observation as  $Y_{it}$ , cross-section as  $i$ th and using the dynamic linear heterogeneous model simple form to generate time t,

$$Y_{it} = (1 - \varphi_i) \varepsilon_{it} + \varphi_i Y_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, N; \quad t = 1, 2, 3, \dots, T,$$

Y denote GDP, L, K, TO and FDI each,  $Y_{it}$  is an individual-specific error term, the unobserved common effect is  $f_t$  in a single-factor structure of  $\varepsilon_{it}$ ,  $Y_{i0}$  early value has a density function embedded with finite variance and means:

$$\varepsilon_{it} = \text{dif}_t + Y_{it}$$

The stationarity hypothesis  $f_i$  is derived by combining equation (4) and (5):

$$\Delta Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i Y_{i,t-1} + \delta f_i + u_{it}$$

For the panel unit root consistency necessary condition, the null hypothesis is tested against the alternative hypothesis ( $H_0: \beta_i = 0$  for the cross-sections). The fixed value  $\delta$  is  $0 < \delta \leq 1$  as  $N \rightarrow \infty$ .

### Panel Cointegration Test

The paper adopts the Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) test, which permits for structural breaks in both slope and intercept, cross-sectional dependence (CSD), and it also allows for cross unit-specific time trends, serially correlated errors and heteroskedasticity. The test solves CD with bootstrapping. The residuals are conceded to an AR ( $\infty$ ) description. Utilizing stationary component  $u_{i,t}$  and the regressors first differences,  $\Delta x_{i,t}$ , that is by definition stationary, defined vector as  $w = (u_{i,t}, \Delta x_{i,t})$  and the infinite autoregressive representation as:

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \varphi_{i,t} \omega_{i,t-j} = e_{i,t}$$

$e_{i,t}$  denotes the stationary process, the above equation is approximated with an autoregressive model of finite order  $p$ , we

utilized a sieve bootstrap scheme. Another  $y_{i,t}$ , and  $x_{i,t}$  as new bootstrap value are obtained.

### Driscoll and Kraay's Model

This study utilized the modified version of Driscoll and Kraay's (1998) by Daniel Hoechle (2007), which allows disturbance  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  to be cross-sectionally dependent, autocorrelated and heteroscedastic. Presuming that  $\theta$  can reliably be estimated with OLS, that will result in:

Where  $\hat{S}_T$  is defined as Newey and west (1987):

$$\hat{S}_T = \hat{\Omega}_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{m(T)} w(j, m) [\hat{\Omega}_j + \hat{\Omega}'_j]$$

In the above equation,  $m(T)$  represents the lag length to the level that the residual can be auto-correlated, the modified Bartlett weights  $W(j, m(T)) = 1 - j / (m(T) + 1)$  ensure smooth the sample auto-covariance function and positive semi-definiteness of  $\hat{S}_T$ . Such that higher-order lags receive fewer weights. The  $(K + 1) * (K + 1)$  matrix  $\hat{\Omega}_j$  is

$$\hat{\Omega}_j = \sum_{t=j+1}^T h_t(\hat{\theta}) h_{t-j}(\hat{\theta})' \text{ with } h_t(\hat{\theta}) = \sum_{i=1}^{N(t)} h_{it}(\hat{\theta})$$

Where  $h_{it}(\hat{\theta})$  denote the sum of particular time  $t$  moment conditions, which runs from 1 to  $N(t)$  where  $N$  is allowed to vary with  $t$ .

Table 1  
 Descriptive Statistics

| Variable | Obs | Mean     | Std. Dev. | Min       | Max      |
|----------|-----|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| GDP      | 240 | 1.37E+10 | 1.56E+10  | 6.58E+08  | 6.84E+10 |
| L        | 240 | 5068671  | 3187440   | 439447    | 1.45E+07 |
| K        | 224 | 17.98787 | 158.618   | -94.8206  | 2357.675 |
| FDI      | 240 | 4.39E+08 | 7.49E+08  | -2.27E+08 | 3.88E+09 |
| TO       | 240 | 56.65409 | 15.01133  | 30.36824  | 116.0484 |

Note: GDP denotes gross domestic product. L stands for labour force total. K denotes capital stock. FDI stands for foreign direct investment. TO denotes trade openness.

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes the level of significance at 1%, 5% & 10% respectively.

Source: Author's computation (2024)

As observed in Table 1, GDP as the dependent variable has a mean average at 1.37E+10, indicating the typical level of economic output. The standard deviation of GDP is 1.56E+10, suggesting considerable variability or dispersion in GDP values around the mean.

The L indicate a mean average of 5,068,671, indicating the typical size of the labor force. The standard deviation of the labor force is 3,187,440, suggesting considerable variability in labor force sizes across the observations. Similarly, K suggests a mean average of 17.99,

suggesting the typical level of capital accumulation. The standard deviation of capital stock is 158.62, indicating variability in capital stock levels across the observations. The variable FDI indicate a mean average of 439,000,000, indicating the typical level of foreign direct investment. The standard deviation of FDI is 749,000,000, suggesting variability in FDI levels across the observations. Also, the variable TO has a mean average of

56.65, indicating the typical level of trade openness. The standard deviation of trade openness is 15.01, suggesting variability in trade openness levels across the observations.

### Correlation Test

The correlation analysis provides insights into the relationships between pairs of variables. Table 2

### Correlation Analysis

| Variable   | GDP     | L       | K       | FDI    | TO |
|------------|---------|---------|---------|--------|----|
| <b>GDP</b> | 1       |         |         |        |    |
| <b>L</b>   | -0.2552 | 1       |         |        |    |
| <b>K</b>   | -0.0448 | -0.0801 | 1       |        |    |
| <b>FDI</b> | -0.2206 | 0.6572  | -0.0407 | 1      |    |
| <b>TO</b>  | -0.2303 | 0.2079  | 0.0122  | 0.2984 | 1  |

Source: Author's computation (2024)

As observed in Table 2, the variable L having a moderate positive correlation with FDI at 0.6572 and weak positive correlation with TO at 0.2079. The variable K having a lower correlation coefficient and negative with L and FDI. Also, the variable FDI is having a strong positive correlation with L at 0.6572 and weak positive correlation with TO at 0.2984. Finally, the variable TO is having a weak positive correlation with L at 0.2079 and FDI at 0.2984. Labor exhibits a positive correlation with FDI, suggesting that as the labor force grows, foreign direct investment tends to increase. FDI has a positive correlation with both Labor and Trade Openness, indicating that as foreign

direct investment increases, so does labor force participation and trade openness. Trade Openness shows weak correlations with other variables, suggesting that it has less direct association with GDP, Labor, and FDI. Overall, these correlations provide valuable insights into the relationships between variables, which can inform further analysis and decision-making processes.

### Unit Root Test

The interpretation of Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test results indicate the stationarity properties of the variables examined.

Table 3: Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root Test

| Variable | Level  |         | First Difference |         | Order of Integration<br>0 or 1 |
|----------|--------|---------|------------------|---------|--------------------------------|
|          | Zt-bar | P-value | Zt-bar           | P-value |                                |
| logGDP   | -1.450 | 0.074   | -3.319           | 0.000   | I(1)                           |
| TO       | 1.708  | 0.956   | -5.893           | 0.000   | I(1)                           |
| L        | 1.226  | 0.890   | -1.605           | 0.045   | I(1)                           |
| K        | -6.350 | 0.000   | -10.891          | 0.000   | I(0)                           |
| FDI      | -3.646 | 0.000   | -3.639           | 0.000   | I(0)                           |

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes the level of significance at 1%, 5% & 10% respectively.

Source: Author's computation (2024)

As presented in Table 3, the variables logGDP, TO, and L are all non-stationary at level having a p-value less than 0.05 but becomes stationary after taking first differences (P-value < 0.05). Therefore, logGDP, TO and L are integrated of order 1, or I(1), indicating it exhibits a unit root but becomes stationary after differencing once. While variables of K and FDI are stationary at both in levels and after taking first differences (P-value < 0.05 in both cases). Therefore, K and FDI are

integrated of order 0, or I(0), indicating it is stationary without difference. This result indicates that the model is mix with both level and first difference.

**Co-integration Test**

The Westerlund test for cointegration examines whether there is a long-term relationship between variables in a panel dataset.

Table 4: *Westerlund test for cointegration*

| Statistic      | Statistic | P-value |
|----------------|-----------|---------|
| Variance ratio | -1.5377   | 0.0421  |

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes the level of significance at 1%, 5% & 10% respectively.

Source: *Author’s computation (2024)*

The obtained statistic and its associated p-value suggest evidence against the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the variables. With a p-value of 0.0421, which is less than the typical significance level of 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is evidence of cointegration among the variables in the panel dataset. This implies the presence of a long-term relationship among the variables, indicating that they move together over time, even if there may be short-

term fluctuations or deviations from this relationship.

**Driscoll and Kraay’s Estimation Results**

The Driscoll and Kraay’s estimation results provide insights into the relationships between the dependent variable (DV) logGDP and the independent variables TO (Trade Openness), L (Labor), K (Capital), logFDI (logarithm of Foreign Direct Investment), and the constant term (cons).

Table 4: *Driscoll and Kraay’s Estimation Results*

| Variable                                    | Coefficient       | Drisc/Kraay Std. Err. | t-Statistics | Prob-Value |
|---|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------|------------|
| DV = logGDP                                 |                   |                       |              |            |
| TO  | 0.00493           | 1.87e-08              | 9.90         | 0.001      |
| L   | 1.85e-07          | 0.000023              | -8.90        | 0.000      |
| K   | -0.00020          | 0.022836              | 2.86         | 0.000      |
| logFDI                                      | 0.06524           | 0.001278              | 3.86         | 0.009      |
| cons  | 20.2592           | 0.301451              | 67.21        | 0.000      |
| <i>R-squared</i>                            | <i>0.7752</i>     |                       |              |            |
| <i>Mean value</i>                           | <i>1.58</i>       |                       |              |            |
| <i>Breusch-Pagan CSD Test</i>               | <i>231.996***</i> |                       |              |            |
| <i>Breusch-Pagan for heteroscedasticity</i> | <i>1.39</i>       | <i>0.2380</i>         |              |            |

Note: GDP denotes gross domestic product. L stands for labour force total. K denotes capital stock. FDI stands for foreign direct investment. TO denotes trade openness.

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes the level of significance at 1%, 5% & 10% respectively.

Source: *Author’s computation (2024)*

As observed in Table 5, the estimation results of TO suggest a positive and significant coefficient. This means that a one percentage

increase in TO leads to 0.49 increase in economic growth in the SSA nations. This implies that TO stimulates economic growth in

SSA countries. The result lend support to Mallick and Behera (2020), Kong et al. (2021), and Duodu and Baidoo (2020) who reported positive enhance of trade openness on economic growth. The result is also supported by the endogenous growth theory, which posits that trade openness can foster sustained economic growth by fostering technological innovation and facilitating the diffusion of knowledge. Similarly, the result of L indicates a significant and positive coefficient. This means that a unit increase in L leads to 0.02 percentage increase in economic growth. This implies that L encourages economic growth in SSA countries. The result is consistent with Naveed and Mahmood (2019) and Owusu and Odhiambo (2015) who found positive impact of labour on economic growth. Also, the variable K suggests a negative and significant coefficient at one percent level of significance. This means that a one percentage increase in K results to - 0.00020 decrease in economic growth. This implies that capital stock retards economic growth. The negative coefficient for capital indicates a shortage of capital necessary to fuel growth in the surveyed countries. This suggests that the level of capital in the sampled Sub-Saharan African countries is insufficient to stimulate the required investment. The result is in agreement with Haruna and Abu Bakar (2021a).

The variable FDI suggests a significant and positive coefficient. This means a unit increase in FDI leads to 0.065 increase in economic growth in SSA countries. This implies that FDI enhances economic growth in SSA countries. The result lend support to studies by Haruna and Abu Bakar (2021b) and Opoku, Ibrahim, and Sare (2019). The R-squared value of 0.7752 indicates that approximately 77.52% of the variation in logGDP is explained by the independent variables in the model.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

The study examines the influence of trade liberalization on economic growth in SSA countries using the endogenous growth model and utilized the modified version of Driscoll and Kraay's estimation which robust to cross-sectionally dependent, autocorrelated and heteroscedastic. The concludes that trade liberalization plays critical role in achieving economic growth through trade allowing countries to access new technologies and ideas from abroad, leading to productivity gains and increased output. The study, therefore, recommends that countries of SSA countries should as matter fact encourage policies towards full trade liberalization.

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**Daniel Wununyatu**

**Paul Solomon**

**Murtala Mohammed**

**Tukura Daudu Fwaje**

**Ishaya Samaila Atobauka**

Department of Political Science

Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

Email: *dawunny2@gmail.com*, *danieln@fuwukari.edu.ng*, *solomopaul74@gmail.com*,  
*murtalamohammed72@gmail.com*, *fwajetukura@gmail.com*, *ishayas@fuwukari.edu.ng*



### **Abstract**

Nigeria and Chad Republic exhibited a fragile border security framework, especially in the densely populated areas of Northern Nigeria and Southern Chad Republic. The emergence of Boko Haram insurgency has become a collective security threat to Nigeria and Chad which necessitated the need for the two countries to join forces. This study examined the link between the Boko Haram Insurgency and the Nigeria-Chad security cooperation. This study adopted a survey design and the collective security theory was adopted for this work because it best explains the activities of the insurgents and corporate security network. Data were generated from both primary and secondary sources. An interview was used to collect primary data. The collected data were analysed using the content method of analysis. The study finds that Nigeria and Chad have a history of bilateral relations dating from the pre-colonial era till the present. The study also revealed that Nigeria and Chad's republic had a weak security framework at their borders which heightens the spread of Boko Haram activities. The findings further revealed that the relationship between the two countries is strengthened because of the cooperation to curtail Boko Haram through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight the insurgency. The study recommended among others Nigeria and the Chad Republic should work out bilateral military cooperation as a perpetual framework not just a means to deter the Boko Haram insurgence.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, Insurgency, Nigeria-Chad, and Security Cooperation

### **Introduction**

Boko Haram originally known as Jama'atu Alhissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad (Followers of the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad for Propagation of Islam and Jihad) (Adamu, 2012) or the Yusuffiya Movement came into limelight in July 2009 during the administration of the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua following a deadly clash which erupted between the movement and the security forces over the violation of the law on the use of crash helmet by the movement in Maiduguri, Borno State. The deadly clash left several of the Boko Haram members dead. Before that incident, Boko Haram had existed

peacefully in Borno State preaching against Western values that contradicted their belief.

The virtual destruction of the Yusuffiya Movement by the Nigerian security forces in July 2009 and the death of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, drove the movement underground for almost six months (Hajeej, 2011). The killing of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram's leader, perceived as an injustice by the movement was believed to have radicalised and emboldened them to carry out more deadly attacks in the country. In 2010, they began a systematic insurgency against security forces- the police and the army as well

as those who collaborated with the security forces leading either to their capture, or shooting (Hajeej, 2011). Officially, the group is known as Jama'atul Ahalul Sunna Waljama'a Lidda a' wati Wal Jihadi (the group of the people of the Sunnah for preaching and Jihad). Its core and popular ideology is that Western education is forbidden; hence they are commonly referred to in Hausa as yan Boko haram. "Boko" in the Hausa language simply means western education and "Haram" in Arabic means forbidden.

The operation of Boko Haram has moved from the sphere of domestic or internal politics to the international domain. Onuoha (2014) observed that the violent upsurge of Boko Haram not only poses a serious threat to internal security in Nigeria but also threatens stability in West Africa. The foregoing demonstrates that Boko Haram has grown to become the biggest security challenge facing Nigeria, its neighbours and the entire West African sub-region. In the West African region, there were several violent attacks by Boko Haram members on army patrol (Onouha, 2014). These cross-border attacks reveal a web of an originally Nigerian-based insurgency and how it has become a vector of insecurity in the neighbouring countries, especially Niger (Onouha, 2014).

Boko Haram eventually extended their activities to the neighbouring states of Nigeria and Chad Republic. The capability of Boko Haram to attack the neighbouring states of Nigeria in the Lake Chad region became a serious concern to the West and Central African Sub-regions and Africa in general (Blanchard, 2016). It is worthy of note that in the contemporary world, insurgency is not restricted to a country. Apart from the spillover effects it could have on other countries, it could also influence the behaviour of a state towards another state which may cause a diplomatic row between them.

Nigeria and Chad over the years have a history of inter-state relations that pre-dates the coming of colonial masters. However, at

the end of colonial rule, both states engaged in multi-dimensional forms of bilateral relations. It is evident that these two nations share the same economic history and that both belong to the Chadic language group, a sub-group of the larger Afro-Asiatic language family (Ani, 2018). Hence, these two nations are one intertwined neighbour. The two countries share a common border in the Lake Chad Basin where the Boko Haram activities are pre-eminent. It is against this backdrop that this study is set to examine the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the Nigeria-Chad security cooperation.

### **Conceptual Clarifications**

#### **Boko Haram**

Boko Haram derives its name from one of Nigeria's major languages Hausa and literally, it means 'Western education is forbidden'. It is generally now used as a name for an Islamic religious sect known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad which is an Arabic word for "people who are committed to the propagation of the teachings of prophet Mohammad (Peace and Blessing of Allah be upon him) and Jihad". The term is specifically employed to describe the basic contention of the group which is that Western civilization as represented by its secular education is a sin and therefore forbidden to adherents of the Islamic religion. Onuoha (2014) opined that Boko Haram (BH), meaning Western education is forbidden, an Islamist militant insurgent group based in north-eastern Nigeria, has been carrying out armed attacks on civilian populations since 2011. This perspective sees Boko Haram as a religious militant insurgent group. Aghedo, Iro, and Oarhe (2014) see Boko Haram as an unofficial name for the radical Islamic sect that began its activities in Nigeria in 2009, although its origin can be traced to the formation of a group called Sahaba in 1995 headed by Abubakar Lawan. However, they seem to agree that religious connotation is embedded in Boko Haram. Thus, this affirms the status of Boko Haram as a sect.

Mohammed (2014) further unravels that the official name of Boko Haram is Jama'atuAhl as SunnahLidda'awatihwa-Jihad (in Arabic) and translated to means people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teaching and Jihad. It is apt to note that the ideology of the sect is opposed to Western education and culture which they see as a threat to traditional values, beliefs and customs among Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria.

### **Insurgency**

African society today is described as the home of insurgency, and the sanctuary of insurgents. Despite this conclusion, little is known about the true meaning and unique attributes of the concept by its users. In the view of the US Government (2012) insurgency is a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources. In the view of Moore (2007; p.87), the term insurgency is used interchangeably and imprecisely with "irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare and even terrorism". For him, an insurgency is a protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in a state or region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, social disruption, and political action. For Nnatu (2023) insurgency can be defined as the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of regions. Insurgents seek to subvert or displace the government, and completely or partially control the resources and population of a given territory. It is apt to note that insurgencies are domestic affairs--unless in

some cases the role of one or both sides is co-opted by an intervening power.

### **Security cooperation**

Fulvio (2005) posited that security cooperation is the security arrangement of an international region that originates from inter-governmental consensus to cooperate on dealing with security threats and the enhancement of stability and peace in the region by making use of different types of agreements, instruments and mechanisms such as formal security treaties, international organizations, joint action agreements, trade and other economic agreements, multilateral dialogue processes, peace and stability pacts including confidence-building measures, measures of preventive diplomacy, and measures dealing with the domestic environment. For Atlantic Council (2024) beyond traditional military alliances, countries around the world form important security relationships with other international partners. These arrangements include joint training, weapons acquisitions, missions, and exercises that build trust and reinforce global military and security norms.

### **Literature Review**

Bokeriya and Omo-Ogbebor (2016) observed that Boko Haram has become the second most dreaded terrorist group in the world after the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. The group's tactics shifted and diversified from attacks on government installations to more damning quest through bombings, robberies, kidnappings, and assaults on churches and mainstream Muslim targets, leading to the occupation of villages and towns, indicating greater confidence and capacity to form a territory within the territory of Nigeria and declare an "Islamic Caliphate" in Nigeria which is their utmost objective. The study reviews the activities of the Boko Haram Islamic Militant terror group operating in the northern region of Nigeria, as a result of its frequent attacks in the region, governance

activities have been brought to a halt. The study further points out that the continuous attacks of Boko Haram if unchecked will threaten the relative peace and security in the West Africa region. Odo (2015) posited that to achieve a lasting solution to the security challenges thrown up by the nefarious activities of the Boko Haram sect, the government must revitalize and consolidate the socio-economic and political structures of the Nigerian state and the north in particular. More fundamentally, the government should make conscious efforts towards building a genuine integration of the various ethnic nationalities within the Nigerian nation through instituting the cultures of true democracy and good governance anchored on fairness, equity, accountability, and transparency in the polity. On the foregoing, Isaac (2017) takes a critical look at the challenges in the functioning of the security regimen. The most critical of the problems is that, though the countries need to work collaboratively at dealing with a common enemy, they are suspicious of each other over border issues. Nigeria is suspicious of Cameroon and Chad, which are in turn suspicious of Nigeria. This factor has reduced the effectiveness of this security community. Therefore, African states need to work on their relations timeously to enable them to have smooth working relationships when they have to face a common enemy and other African states need to take an interest in the MNJTF because of the emerging security issues emanating from it. Beatrice (2015) assessed the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the development of Nigeria. From the study, it was discovered that the Boko Haram insurgency has compounded the developmental challenges of Nigeria through the destruction of lives and properties, the destruction of schools which has led to the closure of so many schools in the North-east geopolitical zone, disruption of businesses, reduction in government revenue, fear of foreign investors to live and do business in

Nigeria, political instability, among others. Hilary (2012) posited that hopes were initially high for a regional force to defeat Boko Haram, but the MNJTF has not lived up to these expectations. The international community may be well advised to increase its focus on improving the effectiveness of the coalition's military efforts. It may be necessary to rethink the broad mandate of the MNJTF, narrowing its scope of activities to more achievable goals—e.g., focusing on cross-border surveillance and intelligence sharing rather than more ambitious military objectives—that could complement the activities of the national forces of the participating countries. Similarly, like most of the preceding scholars, the work has no methodology to define neither the population nor a theory to explain the problem under investigation.

Faith, Oluwafunke and Sheriff (2017) opine that sovereignty accords the state's unquestionable but legitimate control over the nation and polity, and gives it the latitude to preserve and protect its territorial domain from both internal and external threats. However, aside from the fact that globalisation and the internationalization of the globe have reduced the primacy of these dual principles, there has also been the problem of ideological and terrorist networks that have taken advantage of the instruments of globalization to emerge and threaten state sovereignty and its preservation. The security and sovereignty of the Nigerian State have been under threat as a result of the emergence and activities of insurgent groups, such as Boko Haram in the Northeast and other militant groups in other parts of the country.

### **Theoretical Framework**

In discussing and analysing Nigeria-Chad security cooperation, it will be most appropriate to use the Theory of Collective Security. The theory of collective security sprouted out of Liberal institutionalism that views the international system as one based on a community of states with the potential to

cooperate to overcome mutual problems (Goldstein and Pevernhouse, 2011 & Galadima, 2006). Collective security theory is a liberal theory of international relations in that it emphasizes venues of cooperation and mutual obligation. States enter multilateral agreements to refrain from attacking one another and also for economic relations, but within an overarching organization to which they owe allegiance. According to the theory, pledging to an international organization will create a more stable commitment than a large, confusing set of bilateral treaties. Collective security refers to the formation of a broad alliance of most major actors in an international system to jointly oppose aggression by an actor (Goldstein and Pevenhouse, 2011). Collective security is also seen as a formal commitment among groups of countries to protect the security interest of the individual members within their joint spheres of interest (Aleksovski, et al, 2014). It is also explained to mean an arrangement by which all member states agree, as a collective, to reverse any threat posed by an outsider against any of its member states (Gebresilassie, 2012).

Galadima (2006) identified three models of collective security; the first is the Kantian or Wistonian collective security model which is seen as an arrangement among states for effective actions against any aggressor from within that community of states. The second is the intervention usually undertaken by a coalition of states, against international aggression or internal conflict or disorder with the explicit or implicit approval of the United Nations. The third model is collective security which concerns an intervention by a single state or a coalition of states against international aggression internal conflict or disorder without the approval of the United Nations Security Council.

Under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, bond together to stop aggression (Kupchan & Kupchan,

1995), this stems from the realization that the security threats confronting nations in contemporary times are such that may not be solved by states acting alone, hence the need for synergy of capacity and strategy (Bolaji, 2010). It is believed that stability (of any region) is the product of cooperation (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995) the essence of collective security is to combat present threats to peace and stability. In a system of collective security, an enemy that is the aggressor is a threat to regional or international peace and security and would be isolated and would have to face the organized power of the whole international community (Aleksovski et al, 2014, Andretta, 1996). We can perfectly understand collective security as a security arrangement, either regional or global in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to peace and security.

Kupchan and Kupchan (1995) gave the advantages of collective security to fall under two categories. It provides for more effective balancing against aggression, and it also promotes trust and cooperation. Collective security provides for more effective balancing against aggressors because it confronts aggressors with preponderant force as opposed to merely equal force. The preponderance is a result of the coalition entered by states who have made either explicit or implicit commitments to oppose any threat to the community, do so because they have interests in protecting an international order that they see as beneficial to their security. Collective security is advantageous not only because it provides better balancing against aggressors, but also because it fosters an environment in which aggression is less likely to take place or to succeed against the collective will of the majority (deterrence).

Collective security ameliorates the security dilemma, thereby enhancing stability and reducing the likelihood of unintended spirals of hostility, this is done by building confidence

among member states about each other's intentions, collective security thus mitigates the constraints imposed on cooperation by relative-gains consideration. Boko Haram insurgency emanated in Nigeria but its activities spread to Chad, thereby posing a great security threat to the two countries. To effectively curb the menace of the sect, collective action is needed. Therefore, this research on the Boko Haram insurgency and Nigeria-Chad security cooperation can be best analysed using the collective security Theory.

The study adopted a descriptive survey design which focused on finding, describing and interpreting existing social phenomena through a systematic survey of the opinions of people. The justification for this design is based on the fact that while descriptive studies yield rich data that can lead to important recommendations, survey analysis entails selecting knowledgeable respondents from the population of the study. The population of this study comprised the organizations in Table 1.

### Research Methodology

**Table 1. Spatial Spread of the population of the study and Sample Size**

| Organisation  | Population of the Study | Sample Size | Position/status   |
|---|-------------------------|-------------|---|
| West African Affairs Department (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) | 26                      | 3           | Director West African Affairs Division, First Secretary West African Affairs Division, & Counsellor Officer West African Affairs Division |
| Nigerian Immigration Service (Maiduguri Border)               | 84                      | 1           | Comptroller   |
| Chad Immigration Service Border Unit                          | 16                      | 1           | Comptroller   |
| Chad Embassy in Nigeria                                       | 14                      | 3           | First Secretary Chad Embassy, Educational Attaché & Military Attaché  |
| Border Unit Abuja, Nigeria Immigration Service                | 47                      | 2           | Deputy Comptroller General & Assistant Deputy Comptroller General   |
| Nigeria Custom Service Border Unit                            | 53                      | 1           | Deputy Comptroller General  |
| Multi-National Joint Task Force Maiduguri Command             | 114                     | 2           | Unit Commander & Theatre Commander  |
| Political Science Department University of Maiduguri          | 32                      | 1           | The Head of Department  |
| Total   | 386                     | 14          |   |

**Source:** Field Survey (2023)

Primary data were collected mainly through unstructured interviews. The unstructured interview was preferred because it provided a wide range of responses from the respondent which allowed for more questions and answers

that added value to the study. Secondary data were collected via documentary method, from relevant documents, textbooks and journals on Nigeria-Chad Republic relations, the Boko Haram insurgency and its security implications

for the diplomatic ties between the two countries.

The study relied on the qualitative content analysis method of data analysis which allows one to reduce and make sense of vast amounts of information from different sources. The raw data obtained from the interview and the secondary sources were sorted, processed, and organized thematically, thus interpretations and inferences were made based on its content.

## **Findings and Discussions**

### **Nigeria and Chad's bilateral relations**

Nigeria and Chad have a history of bilateral relations dating from the pre-colonial era till the present. The dynamics of contemporary Nigeria-Chad bilateral relations were systematically shaped by colonialism. These people (Nigeria and Chad), who traditionally lived together in pre-colonial times, before migrating into clustered settlements across the border communities of Nigeria and Chad saw themselves cut off by the international boundaries of the newly independent states (of Nigeria and Chad) somewhere within the Lake Chad area (Ani, 2012). The colonial masters (Britain for Nigeria and France for Chad) landed on the shores of West Africa in their popular race for the scramble for Africa; they forcefully divided the people that made up the area across their imperial colonial government. Britain and France used gunboat diplomacy as well as treaties to outsmart the traditional kings of these African communities. Soon, the local people became separated by international border treaties that were signed by Britain and France without the consent or knowledge of the indigenous people. Unfortunately, while Britain and France have carved the sovereign borders of what we know today as Nigeria and Chad, the local ethnic people continued to perceive their kits and kiln on both sides of the sovereign political divide as one. They freely perceived, visited and met their brothers on both sides of the divide as their own without much regard for the

sovereign borders (Ani, 2021). Since the independence of the two countries, their diplomatic relations, which are championed by the Nigeria-Chad Bilateral Commission, have continued to centre on discussing ways to improve Nigeria-Chad relations. The two states have agreed at one time or the other to cooperate in the area of economic development, socio-cultural exchange, political, scientific and technological agreements as well as agricultural and educational exchange programmes (Ani, 2012).

A new turn in the bilateral relations of both countries came with the introduction of the Nigeria-Chad Joint Commission. At the inaugural meeting held in Ndjamena in 1987, a new pattern of economic diplomacy was introduced in the Nigeria-Chad bilateral relations. The Chadians requested for an "exclusive zone" with a bounded warehouse in the Nigerian ports. Thus, the brief of the first Nigeria-Chad Joint Commission recorded Chad's request for assistance from Nigeria in her house reconstruction programme. One would recall that many public and private materials as well as immaterial structures in Ndjamena were destroyed during the Chadian Civil War. Therefore, during the visit of President Babangida to Ndjamena in 1988, Nigeria donated bitumen, drugs, petroleum products, cereals, vegetable oil and vehicles to Chad (Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987) (Ani, 2021).

On the foregoing, the first Nigeria-Chad Joint Commission Protocol documented that Nigeria offered free resident permits to ECOWAS member states and other neighbouring countries like Chad, who were not to pay to obtain necessary immigration documents from the Nigerian Immigration Services before coming into Nigeria. On the contrary, Chad imposed a fee of 10,000 CFA for entry visas and 11,000 CFA for residential permits valid for three years, to Nigerians, Nigeria requested that Chad should waive the fees based on reciprocity which was later granted (Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987).

The Second Nigeria-Chad Joint Commission meeting took place from 22<sup>nd</sup> to 24th October 1996 in Abuja. During the session, the two countries laid down a mechanism that would strengthen financial exchanges among both countries. The mechanism would regulate financial exchanges between Nigeria and Chad. This was followed by the request from the Chadian Government for concessions on transactions in the Lagos Ports. Yet more, during the Third Nigerian-Chad Joint Commission meeting held from February 28th to March 2<sup>nd</sup> 2000 in Ndjamena, the two countries expressed their wish to collaborate in industrial cooperation. Before this time, Nigeria had signed several agreements with Chad that had some economic implications. In the fourth Nigerian-Chad Joint Commission meeting held in Abuja in 2008; "the Tchadians agreed to enter into co-operation in the area of Technical Aid Corps (TAC) Programme (with Nigeria) and take advantage of its services" (Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The Tchadian party expressed satisfaction with the establishment of its Consulate-General in Maiduguri. Relating to this, Nigeria expressed the desire to establish its own Consulate-General in the Tchadian territory as a measure of reciprocity (Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The Nigerian government also established the Chadian Consulate in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, to allow thousands of Chadians settling in the state to properly document themselves. This is still ongoing as there as still many undocumented Chadians who are increasingly been assimilated into different Borno groups (Attah, 2008). However, it is apt to note that over the years, Nigeria and Chad have experienced both peaceful and violent relations.

### **The nature of Nigeria and Chad borders**

The Nigeria-Chad boundary stretches over a hundred islands around the lake. It is the fluid nature of migration as well as the changing islands that has affected the process of border demarcation in the international boundary area. From the colonial era to the post-independence period, many of the islands consist of floating rafts of vegetation, which are constantly reproducing through vegetation growth and subsequent fragmentation, making boundary demarcation difficult. It has been estimated that the islands floating or submerged are between 1,000 and 2,000 in number (Sikes, 2014).

Nigeria has international Land borders of about 4,470 kilometres (2,513 miles) with Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Niger and the Coastline of 774 kilometres (480 miles), which are largely unmanned (Afolayan, 2000). In an interview with the key informant that out of the 1,500 identified land border crossings into Nigeria only 114 covering about 4,000 square kilometres had approved control posts manned by immigration officials and other security agencies. In his words;

There are over 1,400 illegal routes, which are not manned this has grave security implications for the Country, National Immigrations' approximately 23,000 staff strength was grossly inadequate for the task of policing Nigeria's vast borders (Field survey, 2023).

The porous nature of these borders heightens the potential spread of terrorist activities into the neighbouring countries. The border with Chad, for example, stretches along Borno and Adamawa states. This proximity to northern Nigeria is therefore a particular threat to Chad's already fragile security, given the relative ease with which Boko Haram elements can cross into the country (Institute for Security Studies, 2012). Thus, the porous nature of Nigeria's borders was responsible for the infiltration of Boko Haram. Nigeria had all



along not placed special emphasis on boundaries, which are normally regarded as the peripheral organ of the state and as such it is evidenced in its growth or decline, strength or weakness (Addoh, 2013).

Corroborating the foregoing view, another key informant posited that the vast nature of the border areas which Nigeria shares with Chad creates nation-building challenges. Hence, the Nigerian government is continuously being chided for either not doing enough to secure the country's border or not effectively responding to the provocations of neighbouring countries (Field survey, 2023). Therefore, border porosity often aggravates criminal activities in the Sahel especially border porosity between Nigeria and its neighbours, particularly Chad, which often leads to the Chadian armed incursions into the North-eastern parts of Nigeria which has become so rife that lots of lives and property were lost to criminal activities of the bandits. The nature of the porosity of the Nigerian border with its neighbours coupled with the lack of decisive defence policies is major factors which enhance external encroachments on Nigeria's territorial integrity (Omede, 2006). Thus, one could assert that the Nigerian border appears to be the most vulnerable spot and the nation's "arc hill sheep" to Nigeria's complacent attitude toward her security, based on the false premise that Nigeria is bordered by smaller and relatively weaker but friendly states which do not constitute any real threat to Nigeria's national security. Border crime and terrorism-border partnership have become a major event in Africa manifested in the widespread identification of borders and borderlands in the continent as notoriously 'porous', 'ungoverned' and 'ungovernable' locations and spaces (Ani, 2014).

### **Nigeria and Chad security cooperation in the rising spate of Boko Haram insurgency**

Boko Haram is distinct from other modern jihadist movements, such as Al-Shabaab, the Taliban and ISIS, in that it developed first as a

mass-religious movement before transitioning into a violent jihadist insurgency (Thurston, 2017). The group first came into direct conflict with the Nigerian state when a contingent of around 200 followers established an Islamic community in Kanama, Yobe State from 2003 to 2004. Inspired by the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, they called themselves the "Nigerian Taliban (Abdulbasit & Michael, 2018).

Over several years, Boko Haram transitioned from intermittent conflict with Nigeria's security forces to outright rebellion. This state of semi-conflict changed with the launch of "Operation FLUSH" in 2008, a joint military and police operation in Borno State. In July 2009, Boko Haram executed a coordinated bombing and attack campaign on police stations and churches across the northeast. The police and the army responded with force, killing roughly a thousand Boko Haram members, capturing Yusuf, and executing him while in police custody. Security forces effectively put down the uprising, and the remaining followers of Boko Haram went into hiding and began to rebuild the movement under a new leader (Daniel, 2014).

Boko Haram's rancorous return from hiding in 2010 brought with it a campaign of bombings, assassinations, and attacks on security forces that spread violence and destruction across northeast Nigeria. The Nigerian military's forceful response and the group's use of porous borders to move militants and materials between the countries of the Lake Chad Basin established itself in the safe havens of the Sambisa Forest, the Mandara Mountains and later on the islands of Lake Chad. During this phase, they began seizing towns and small cities (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Beginning in 2012, Boko Haram's presence in Nigeria began to spread from Borno State in the Northeast to neighbouring countries of the Lake Chad Basin, including Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The expansion of Boko Haram compelled these countries to respond to the insurgent group's

growing threat to the region's stability. Initially, each country created its own independent counter-Boko Haram strategy. However, after two years of limited success, five countries of the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin) turned to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a pre-existing collective organization that the countries had formed to combat smuggling and crime on Lake Chad, as a resource for countering Boko Haram. The new mission of the MNJTF focused on sharing intelligence, synchronizing operations and de-conflicting each nation's counter-Boko Haram operations (Tchioffo, 2018). Though, before the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) created the Multinational Joint Security Force on March 21, 1994, and mandated it to combat cross-border crime in the region. In 1998, a Multinational Joint Security Force was put into operation; however, it remained limited to infrequent and insignificant patrols on the shores of Lake Chad. Overall, the joint security force was ineffective in achieving a genuine improvement in the overall security situation because Cameroon did not participate, given a border conflict with Nigeria since 1993 over the Bakassi peninsula.

In an interview with a key informant that the security cooperation between the two countries is strengthened because there is political will and cooperation to curtail Boko Haram through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight the insurgency, (Field survey, 2023). He added that the scope of the Nigeria-Chad Joint Commission for Cooperation (NCJCC) has been modified to accommodate security matters in the wake of Boko Haram violent attacks (Field survey, 2023). In the course of the negotiations, both countries took a detailed investigation of the factors that led to the breach of peace in their diplomatic relations and they agreed to establish security forces made up of the police, customs and immigration officials that will monitor the actions of criminal dissidents and

other forms of dysfunctional behaviour within the border areas and beyond. Therefore, Nigeria and Chad see that the current security challenge transcended boundaries and thus reaffirmed their countries' commitment to join forces in the fight against the insurgency at bilateral and sub-regional levels (Haliru, 2016; Daniel, 2023).

In reality, the security cooperation between Nigeria and Chad was very weak until the Paris summit of 2014, when key countries agreed to security issues of regional interest and the MNJTF appeared as the only instrument available to support these goals (Tchioffo, 2018). Thus, under the influence of the MNJTF, a key informant posited that Chad had also deployed troops to work together with Nigerian forces on the borders and would cross into Nigeria and fight Boko Haram in collaboration with Nigerian forces (Field survey, 2023). Corroborating the foregoing, Chad began to take military action against Boko Haram beginning in 2015. Chad's most successful military operation against Boko Haram began on January 17, 2015, when a 2,500-man infantry brigade, commanded by General Mahamat Idriss Deby, passed through Cameroon territory and moved toward Gambaru in Borno State, Nigeria. On February 3, they launched a ground offensive and faced Boko Haram in Nigerian territory, taking over the border town of Gambaru, which had been under the influence of Boko Haram for several months and after weeks of heavy fighting and a significant bombing campaign, Gambaru together with the cities of Fotokol, Marte, and Dikwa were freed from Boko Haram (Patrick & Stans, 2018).

Nigeria and Chad as they are today, retrospectively lived together in the pre-colonial times but have been separated by the phenomenon of colonialism championed by Britain and the French colonial masters. The colonial masters (Britain for Nigeria and France for Chad) landed on the shores of West Africa in their popular race for the scramble for Africa; they forcefully divided the people that

made up the area across their imperial colonial government. Thus, the local people became separated by international border treaties that were signed by Britain and France without the consent or knowledge of the indigenous people. Unfortunately, while Britain and France have carved the sovereign borders of what we know today as Nigeria and Chad, the local ethnic people continued to perceive their kits and kiln on both sides of the sovereign political divide as one. They freely perceived, visited and met their brothers on both sides of the divide as their own without much regard for the sovereign borders (Ani, 2021). Therefore, since the independence of the two countries, their diplomatic relations, which are championed by the Nigeria-Chad Bilateral Commission, have continued to centre on discussing ways to improve Nigeria-Chad relations. The two states have agreed at one time or the other to cooperate in the area of economic development, socio-cultural exchange, political, scientific and technological agreements as well as agricultural and educational exchange programmes (Ani, 2012). Nigeria and Chad's bilateral relations have witnessed a series of treaties that cement their relations. Notably is the Nigeria-Chad Joint Commission Protocol.

Nigeria-Chad boundary stretches over a hundred islands around the lake. It is the fluid nature of migration as well as the changing islands that has affected the process of border demarcation in the international boundary area. Nigeria has international Land borders of about 4,470 kilometres (2,513 miles) with Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Niger and the Coastline of 774 kilometres (480 miles), which are largely unmanned (Afolayan, 2000). There are over 1,400 illegal routes, which are not manned this has grave security implications for the Country, National Immigrations' approximately 23,000 staff strength was grossly inadequate for the task of policing Nigeria's vast borders. The foregoing pointed out the porosity nature of these borders which often aggravates criminal activities in the Sahel

especially border porosity between Nigeria and its neighbours, particularly Chad, which often leads to the Chadian armed incursions into the North-eastern parts of Nigeria which has become so rife that lots of lives and property were lost to criminal activities of the bandits. The nature of the porosity of the Nigerian border with its neighbours coupled with the lack of decisive defence policies is major factors which enhance external encroachments on Nigeria's territorial integrity (Omede, 2006).

Nigeria and the Chad Republic are caught up in a web of Boko Haram insurgency- an act which has its roots in Nigeria. It developed first as a mass-religious movement before transitioning into a violent jihadist insurgency. In July 2009, Boko Haram executed a coordinated bombing and attack campaign on police stations and churches across the northeast. The police and the army responded with force, killing roughly a thousand Boko Haram members, capturing Yusuf, and executing him while in police custody. Security forces effectively put down the uprising, and the remaining followers of Boko Haram went into hiding and began to rebuild the movement under a new leader (Daniel, 2014). Boko Haram's acrimonious return from hiding in 2010 brought with it a campaign of bombings, assassinations, and attacks on security forces that spread violence and destruction across northeast Nigeria. The Nigerian military's forceful response and the group's use of porous borders to move militants and materials between the countries of the Lake Chad Basin established itself in the safe havens of the Sambisa Forest, the Mandara Mountains and later on the islands of Lake Chad. During this phase, they began seizing towns and small cities (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Boko Haram's presence in Nigeria began to spread from Borno State in the Northeast to neighbouring countries of the Lake Chad Basin, including Chad. The expansion of Boko Haram compelled Nigeria and Chad to respond to the

insurgent group's growing threat to the countries' stability. The scourge of the Boko Haram insurgency fostered security cooperation between the two countries, it strengthened their political will and cooperation to curtail Boko Haram through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight the insurgency and the scope of the Nigeria-Chad Joint Commission for Cooperation (NCJCC) has been modified to accommodate security matters in the wake of Boko Haram violent attacks. In the course of the negotiations, both countries took a detailed investigation of the factors that led to the breach of peace in their diplomatic relations and they agreed to establish security forces made up of the police, customs and immigration officials that will monitor the actions of criminal dissidents and other forms of dysfunctional behaviour within the border areas and beyond. Therefore, Nigeria and Chad see that the current security challenge transcended boundaries and thus reaffirmed their countries' commitment to join forces in the fight against the insurgency at the bilateral and sub-regional levels (Haliru, 2016).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Boko Haram originally known as Jama'atu Alhissunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad or the Yusuffiya Movement came into the limelight in July 2009 during the administration of the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua following a deadly clash which erupted between the movement and the security forces over the violation of the law on the use of crash helmet by the movement in Maiduguri, Borno State. The deadly clash left several of the Boko Haram members dead. The virtual destruction of the Yusuffiya Movement by the Nigerian security forces in July 2009 and the death of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, drove the movement underground for almost six months. In 2010, they began a systematic insurgency against security forces- the police and the army as well as those who

collaborated with the security forces leading either to their capture, or shooting. The operation of Boko Haram has moved from the sphere of domestic or internal politics to the international domain and poses a serious threat also to Chad, Nigeria's immediate neighbour. Retrospectively, the people of Nigeria and Chad lived together in the pre-colonial times but were separated by the phenomenon of colonialism championed by Britain and the French colonial masters. Thus, the local people became separated by international border treaties that were signed by Britain and France without the consent or knowledge of the indigenous people. Nigeria has international Land borders of about 4,470 kilometres (2,513 miles) with Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Niger and the Coastline of 774 kilometres (480 miles), which are largely unmanned. There are over 1,400 illegal routes, which are not manned this has grave security implications for the Country, National Immigrations' approximately 23,000 staff strength was grossly inadequate for the task of policing Nigeria's vast borders. The scourge of the Boko Haram insurgency fostered security cooperation between the two countries, it strengthened their political will and cooperation to curtail Boko Haram through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to fight the insurgency and the scope of the Nigeria-Chad Joint Commission for Cooperation (NCJCC) has been modified to accommodate security matters in the wake of Boko Haram violent attacks.

Nigeria and Chad should modify their foreign policy to accommodate the ancient relationship that colonialism has put asunder. The porous borders along Nigeria and Chad territory should be properly managed to ensure government presence. The security network between Nigeria and Chad due to Boko Haram activities should become a perpetual framework not just a means to an end.

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**PREY-PREDATORY DIALECTICS AND THE POETICS OF RESISTANCE IN NIYI OSUNDARE'S  
THE STATE VISIT**

**Toyin Shittu<sup>1</sup>**

**Sangodare Ayinla<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Languages (English Unit)

Al – Hikmah University, Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria

Email: *olountoyin2012@gmail.com, toyinshittu@alhikmah.edu.ng*

<sup>2</sup>Kwara State Ministry of Communications, Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria

Email: *sango.poetics@gmail.com*



**Abstract**

Neocolonial ego in Africa upholds a hegemonic structure that perpetrates unsavoury predation, with the ruling class relishing the anguish of the masses. This social reality evokes despair and plague and can be imaged as the lion and his cubs devouring the innocent, oppressed citizens economically and politically. Playwrights like Femi Osofisan, Olu Obafemi, Bode Sowande, Esiaba Irobi, etc, in their various dramatic pieces, have featured and lampooned this man's inhumanity-to-man paradigm; and charted a way or canvassed a humanist alternative model via the revolutionary course. Niyi Osundare, though renowned in the poetic genre, shares such aversion to neo-colonial scourge in *The State Visit*. This study therefore examines prey-predatory dialectics and the poetics of resistance in the play. The researchers adopt Dialectical Materialism as a theoretical approach for analysis in the study. The finding of the paper is that leadership is the cause of the proletariats' misery in African countries, and that the neo-colonial order enables the predatory leaders to use the native hegemonic sticks to batter the masses. The paper then concludes that unless the proletarians collectively confront the leader-predators as recommended by Dialectic Materialism, the man-made suffering they encounter will continue unabated.

**Key words:** Oppression, victimization, exploitation, bourgeoisie, proletariat, Africa, people

**Introduction**

The elite in a number of African countries exploit the political landscape to unleash unprecedented havoc on the teeming masses through massive abuse of privileges, mindless plundering of the public resources and denial of amenities to the people. This conduct has attracted the attention of writers through exposure, ridicule of the elite and sensitisation of the disadvantaged masses. The writer, by the virtue of his profession, has to demonstrate his responsibility as the conscience of society through timely intervention. (Ngugi 1978:47). States that, "A writer responds, with his total personality, to a social environment which changes all the time. Being a kind of sensitive needle, he registers,

with varying degrees of accuracy and success, the conflicts and tensions in his changing society."

The post-colonial experience of Africans only replays to the people the rape of humanity and depravity which the colonial actors unleashed on the natives. Neo-colonialism is a scourge which encourages connivance between the natives at the helm of leadership and the foreign oppressors. This collaboration informed and enhanced by the capitalist greed and hegemonic ostentation, leads to plunder escapade in the continent. By this, the natives continue to re-live the colonial torture even in the period (Adewoye 1999:34) describes as the time of "we on us". This

malady that ravages the masses through the raid of exploitation dominates the works of the dramatists like Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, Kole Omotosho, Femi Osofisan, Joe De Graft, Esiaba Irobi and Olu Obafemi and others in this category of ideological inclination. The emergence of these artists gave birth to the radical theatre, the dramatic canon which queries and rejects the established tradition but fashions out a path for the humanist alternative. (Bhadmus 2008:238) writes that “Writers of radical persuasions focus attention on the important question of welfare, justice, and more importantly, on functional and progressive literature...”

With the same socialist view, Niyi Osundare adopts the poetic genre to expose and derive the scourge of socio-economic inadequacies which becomes the order in the post-independence Africa. Osundare is a prominent voice in the radical poetic movement in Africa. His *The State Visit* proves his versatility and literary dynamism in the quest to stand with the masses and disintegrate the evil perpetrated through the hegemonic and neocolonial craze.

The artist in *The State Visit* reveals the segmentisation of society along the bourgeoisie-proletariat social structure with its attendant lopsided distribution of resources and power play which dehumanises the mass of the people. Osundare identifies parasitic instinct in the ruling class through their exploitation of the complacency of the people to unleash unprecedented havoc on the latter. The play can therefore be seen as a chronicle of the socio-political situation in neocolonial African states with a clarion call from the playwright to the people to rise against the spurious hegemonic assault on their psyche. (Osundare 2007:12) opines that writers play significant role birthing revolution in different part of the world. He submits:

...A revolution is never an accident, hardly ever a cataclysm. It builds up, like the waves , gathering force in the middle of the ocean, undulating beachwards before exploding on the apron of the shore, sending earth-

shaking, regenerative vibrations into the hinterland. It is an event of manifold inputs, remote and immediate. The writer contributes to this input by the strength and clarity of his vision, his power of perpetual projection, his social apprehension of reality. That vision enables him to chart the terrain of the future with a compass sensitive to both present reality and their past antecedents, a future of possibilities and alternatives. This visionary perception, this heightened sensibility often idealized into vatic power in days gone by are what make writers so vital in the massive conscientisation and heightening of awareness that often herald any important revolution...

*The State Visit* is not just meant to entertain the audience rather it is a play designed to molest the ideology of unfair power relation, bemoan the manipulatory tool of *interpellation* employed by the ruling class and which deceives the proletariat to accepting the hell reinforced by the former. In other words, the elite entrench and control the bastion of imbalance in order to sustain their gluttonous impulse. This is relevant with (Gbilekaa 1997:201)’s observation that “... drama transcends mere entertainment and becomes a tool for class struggle ...” hence the class struggle in the text reiterates the social stratification in the African society which pitches the lower class against the predatory bourgeoisie.

Osundare is of the opinion, in the play, that corruption, graft and maladministration are the bane of the postcolonial regimes in the developing countries and that these evils are responsible for the lopsided human and material developments witnessed in the nations in contemporary time. The play portrays pauperisation of the people on account of barefaced avarice of the ruling class, their tyrannical instinct in order to entrench and sustain the class divide which puts them at the top echelon and banishes the downtrodden in the society to eternal slavish existence at the bottom of the ladder. Through



this intervention, Osundare exploits the stage to address societal issues as (Fashina 2013:473) notes that:

... African dramatic literature, as in other Post-colonial cultures, engages history and interprets it via its aesthetic and ideological instruments as a means of educating the people by opening them up to the realities of social abnormalities in society.

Identification of the class divide in the play as constituting hindrance to societal progress makes it expedient for the researchers to adopt Dialectic Marxism as the theoretical framework for this study.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study attempts to look at pre-predatory dialectics and the poetics of resistance in Niyi Osundare's *The State Visit*. It critiques the dramatic text from the socialist or materialist perspective. Hence, it will adopt Dialectic Materialism as the theoretical approach. In the theory known as Scientific Socialism or Marxism are three component parts including Dialectic Materialism, Historical Materialism and Marxist Economics. Because this research work is based on Marxist exploration, the researchers will dwell on Dialectic Materialism, being one of the tributaries of Marxism. Stalin (1) says its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and understanding is dialectical, while its conception of these phenomena is materialistic. Dialectics is the term used to explain the logic of change; it asserts that there are no absolute or fixed categories in nature or society. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels attribute the formulation of the major features of dialectics to Hegel. But the dialectics of the duo is not identical with the Hegelian dialectics. Marx and Engels only adopt the 'rational kernel' of Hegel's dialectics, but they cast aside the Hegelian idealistic shell. The pattern borrowed from Hegel is further developed to make it entail a modern scientific form.

Dialectic Materialism is the heart of the Marxist doctrine; it interrogates the contradictions along the social line. It is a philosophy of Marxism. Since philosophy is a way of looking at the world, Dialectic Materialism can be said to be the scientific way of looking at the world with the evolutionary outlook. It is in the theory that one finds an explanation or revelation as to the mystery embedded in the world because through the theoretical approach, people locate their bearings in the tempest of events and comprehend the underlying processes influencing the world or the complexity of social interrelations. This theory offers us the privilege to examine how socio-economic classes are related, and how we can analyse the superstructure with a view to getting insight into ourselves and our society. There is a periscope through which man can view Marxism's tenets and their usefulness for proletarians in interpreting the realities they wake to see on daily basis. The base, which is the economic system, and the social classes it has produced will appear at the heart of the analysis of Dialectic Materialism.

Capitalism emerges and prevails to subdue the voice of the working class, as the base and the superstructure are under the sway of the dominant class. The worldview of the people may not be true; this method then exposes the oppression and consequent alienation already covered. Marx and Engels are of the conviction that without this scientific method of social dissection, the world will erroneously admit and adopt the dominant philosophy of the ruling class and the prejudices of the society where we find ourselves. Out of greed, the oppressor, the capitalist is determined to sell to the world that his exploitative system is a natural culture, and it is bound to be permanent. In other words, apologists of capitalism are resolute to convincing that their culture is an eternal natural form of society. Hence the promotion of the ideas that express the futility of transformation that things will remain the same; history is bound to repeat

itself etc, is upheld. People's views are controlled by the dominant class. It is on this ground that Althusser identifies the term *interpellation* as the process through which the working class is manipulated to accept the ideology of the dominant class. In ensuring this objective, the dominant class wields monopoly control of the mass media, press, school, pulpit and the other institutions to popularise and sustain its repressive system.

Dialectic Materialism is opposed to this aristocratic notion, arguing that nothing is permanent and everything will perish in time. It intervenes to demystify this conservative ideology, revolts against the slavish notion and frowns at the old feudal aristocracy. The theory serves as a guide to ignite consciousness in the working class to fight for a new society free of the dominant outlook. The forces of production engender conflict between the two social classes. This is class struggle as the driving force behind history, the theory thereby anticipates that such "would lead to revolution in which workers would overturn the capitalists, take control of economic production, and abolish private property by turning it over to the government to be distributed fairly." (Ann 2009:87) The emphasis of the theory is on this friction. That is why it is seen as a revolutionary philosophy, profoundly threatening the capitalist culture.

Expressed in the literature that is Dialectic Materialism-inclined is an ideology opposed to the privileged class in which there comes the fall of the bourgeoisie as a classless society emanates. By this, the superstructure will be used to alter the base; the proletarians will need to promote their own culture by creating a new superstructure. Marx and Engel opine that some aspects of superstructure are relatively autonomous, so the working class can deploy them to change ideologies. The process is suggestive of revolution. This is perceivable in Marx's assertion as he charges members of the proletariat to rise to the course of liberation in *The Communist Manifesto*, "Let the ruling classes tremble at a

Communitic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!"

Dialectic Materialism describes man as a product of social realities; he is not made by spirituality. Man, therefore, should look into the social realities around him in addressing his challenges. Understanding himself demands him to look to the concrete, observable world. Marx links reality with materialism. Reality exists in the material world. In this theory, it is revealed that people live in social groups; their actions are interrelated and premised on socio-economic relationships. Dobie's words depict the above, "...It is not our philosophical or religious beliefs that make us who we are, for we are not spiritual beings but socially constructed ones. We are not products of divine design but creations of our own cultural and social circumstances. (92)" According to *The New World Encyclopedia*, the two materialists (Marx and Engels) foreground the supremacy of the material world; this is to say that matter antecedes thought.

In essence, Dialectic Materialism, to echo the Russian Marxist Plekhanov, is more than an outlook; it is a "philosophy of action." Having revealed the awkward relationships existing under capitalism, it then arms the working class with an understanding of how its emancipation can materialise.

The tenets of Dialectic Materialism are expressed below:

- One, nature is a state of continuous motion and change, it is not a state of rest, mobility, stagnation and immutability, but it is a state of continuous movement and change. This is why Engels says, "All nature, from the smallest thing to the biggest, from grains of sand to suns, from Protista (the primary living cells – J. St.) to man, has its existence in eternal coming into being and going out of being, in a

ceaseless flux, in unresting motion and change” (484)

- Dialectic Materialism believes that contradictions are inherent in nature. To substantiate this, Lenin opines that “dialectics is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things” (301)
- That everything that exists is material and is derived from matter.
- That all matter is interconnected and interdependent.
- That man is a product of social realities.

In this study, the issues in focus revolve around class struggle which can be seen as the friction the means of production generate. The researchers tend to identify the text under discussion as literature of materialist canon which examines the playwright’s world on the ground of social realities and how have-nots respond to take control of their fate.

### **Hegemonic Structure and Neo-colonial Plunder in Niyi Osundare’s *The State Visit***

Hegemonic structure and its concomitant malevolent and ravaging inclination in the socio-political life of many African countries in the post-colonial time is, on one part, a crucial subject in Niyi Osundare’s *The State Visit*. The state, inferring from the thesis of the dramatic piece, has become a toy and ingredients of experiment in the hands of the bourgeoisie or ruling elite. This characteristic finds expression in neo-colonial plunder. The imperialist ego was a serious threat to the natives during the colonial rule in Africa. Unfortunately, the neo-colonial sequel poses a more ruinous invasion through the oppressive imperialist arrangement sustained by the indigenous power-wielders. (Olorode 2016: x) pictures this in the assertion below:

With state power in the hands of indigenous collaborators of the departed colonialists, private and primitive accumulation became the preoccupation of the ruling circles in the succeeding post-colonial governments. These collaborators were driven constantly by the illusion of becoming effective

partners and even competitors of the international plunderers...

In Osundare’s *The State Visit*, the reader comes across a land of bumper resources but, paradoxically, denies its citizens the benefit of enjoying the ample opportunities oozing from the land. Instead, with the mechanism of power, the impetus and narrow-mindedness, the masses swim in abject poverty, while the native plunderers, in collaboration with international raiders, have no other serious deliberation than to siphon the public fund and reduce the proletariat to unrepentant wretched in their own country. Olu Obafemi symbolically dramatized this status-quo of exploitative-imperialist tendency in *Nights of a Mystical Beast*. The artist, in *Nights of a Mystical Beast*, demonstrates the woes brought upon Africans during colonial and post-colonial eras through the hands of foreigners and the hegemonic natives respectively. Colonialism is over, the state’s captains, according to Osundare, are more terrible exploiters.

Osundare profoundly reveals both perpetration of economic abuse, self-centeredness, avarice and unaltruistic idiosyncrasies on the part of the unscrupulous leaders and the adverse effects of leadership inadequacy reflected in squalor, hunger, unemployment, underemployment homelessness, begging, unreasonable inflation and paucity of basic infrastructure as the daily experiences of the masses. This socio-economic discomfort is what Festus Iyayi captures as “Violence” those in authority constituted or, to use (Olorode 2016: p.x) expression, “the violators of our peoples”.

Like a repeated sound of slaps on the cheek of a victim, the poor citizens face the agony of power misuse, political myopia and economic exploitation from the time of foreign rule. Economic plunder of the neo-colonial terror is fathomless and its sabotage is grossly overwhelming. Leadership in Africa of post-independence is obsessed with the opium of hegemony, strengthened by the bourgeoisie

tendency and abetment of foreign exploiters to plunder and molest the continent. This is the thrust of the speech of the students' representative. The character identifies a sort of connivance between indigenes and foreigners to drain the resources of the nations." Down with "natives" who collude with foreign vultures to eat our flesh. Down with those whose wealth beggars the rest of humanity. Down with those who see starvation and pass it off as abstinence, and who tell the poor to eat grass like the cows of the field..." (61)

Osundare exposes the artificial divisions created as a result of greed on the part of the leaders. This, he symbolically shows in the image of a land that breaks up into two rivers to connote a segmented society along status. The plunderers of the land's resources – honey, milk etc. choose to stay in the river of absolute comfort while plundering activities carried out are felt deep in the occupants of the second river. The plights faced by the masses in the land are not natural; it is greed and cruelty of the power-holders that makes life a hell for the less-privileged citizens. With this, the play admits that the system is the making of the ruling class, not a natural, not the creation of any supernatural force.

Adopting the pattern of folkloric narration practice, Osundare engages the knack of a narrator who satirically hints the audience on the plethora of antics and depravity the lion and his cubs perpetrate in Yankeland. The narrator comes forward intimating the audience on the haphazard social schism in the country as he poeticises like the oral artist:

NARRATOR: There is a Land of Two Rivers, a land blessed with milk and honey, the softest of soil and the healthiest of sunshine. But a few men fouled up the milk, and mixed the honey with cow-dug. Men who have power to act and not be questioned: men who measure their own height by the genuflection of others.

How many, oh how many shall we  
 count  
 Of the teeth of Adepele:  
 There are twenty incisors, fifty  
 canines,  
 While uncountable molars lie buried  
 In the caves of the jaw (9-10)

'*The State Visit* exposes an example of irony of life or social paradox as citizens live in plenty but experience paucity of good conditions. The land is the symbolic national bird with its feathers plucked, thereby unable to fly. The state is endowed with richness but poverty lurks among the people like dispersing bees. Who hoard the wealth of the land are the patricians, they plunder the river of honey and milk for their personal use. The few kings and queens taking sway of the land's wealth, pauperising the nation and justifying that "p-o-v-e-r-t-y is a seven-letter word, a sacred number that God-fearing nation can ever afford to miss..." (10) The bourgeois obstinately insist on the permanence of power and opulence lop-sidedness and promotes imbalance in society. Dialectic Materialism is opposed to the above credo of the grandees. Therefore, Dialectic Materialism questions the notion of eternity of power, which the capitalists adored.

The heart of plunder through the hegemonic machine is the wastage or/and siphoning of nation's already drained monetary purse for the sake of an unnecessary occasion i.e. the planned reception for the visit of 'a brother head of state from the Republic of Wilama, the Leopard of Wilama, Father of the Nation, God-chosen President-for-Life. The citizens grow wretched while the state's treasury becomes a toy in the hands of stealers. The proposal is to make the unreasonable fund left lavished on the approaching visit. Definitely, this equals a gimmick to share the fund among members of the cabinet. To illustrate this, one finds it unspeakable to know that the Head withdraws the state's fund even without the knowledge

of the Finance Minister. This information can be accessed in the dialogue below:

HEAD: Finance, how much do we have for this visit?

FINANCE: I don't know... but I know we have two hundred million arina altogether in the Treasury.

AGRIC: (*On warpath again*) Aaaah ha! How do you count your own money – forward or backward? I thought it was five hundred million arina last week.

FINANCE: Ask the Head. He drew three hundred million three days ago without my knowledge. (*All eyes turn to Head*)

HEAD: Yes, yes, yes... it is true. We used it to buy a jet fighter from a friendly country. (15)

The cabinet keeps borrowing from foreign countries and the rate of inflation at home skyrockets. The prices of commodities like yam, plantain, doctor's needle, pancake etc. increase for the proletariat to anguish. The Head's suggestion of borrowing extra two hundred million Arina to host a head of state comes as a knavery and irrational gesture which reasonable minds will decline.

FINANCE: How do we come about the extra amount?

HEAD: Borrow it from a friendly nation. Take it from America (*pronounced "Amorika"*).

America will give you anything as long as you promise to have nothing to do with the Russians. (17)

The only conscience of the cabinet is the Minister of Finance. He is averse to the sordid practices of the other members of the cabinet. The reader hears him enlighten his colleagues on the grave implication of borrowing, justifying that, "Our masters! Debtors and creditors are never equals. Debts, debts. Debts eat away our freedom. Debts enslave our future." (18) The myopic attitude of his colleagues is disgusting. The response of the Minister of Agriculture should suffice this atmosphere of myopia:

AGRIC: You can pour as much *ewi* as your throat will allow. What future are you talking about?

The future is not the problem now. When it comes it will take care of itself. Let us eat and be merry today. Why should we bother about tomorrow? You can only grab what you see.

The Head exhibits the climax of leadership ineptitude and avarice when he instructs the Minister of finance to appropriate the six hundred million Arina "saved for the Maize Project" to "the Welcome Project" (18-19) The Minister of Finance seems to be radical; he argues his case to protect the welfare of the citizens. Hence he is loath to the gross display of hegemonic structure cum neo-colonial plunder where resources are stolen only to favour the aristocrats and render common people hungry and destitute. He can no longer condone this; he then decides to quit the job, and a replacement that is ready to cooperate with the trends of malevolent perpetration committed against the poor citizens in Yanke surfaces.

Through the grievances of the beggars, the motif of plunder is voiced in the play. Sule's example can be cited. His aggression to the policeman reiterates the idea of hegemonic structure and neo-colonial plunder in *The State Visit*. Sule is part of the populace feeling the brunt of the leaders' exploitation or wasteful living and lack of vision that continue to shatter the lives of the poor masses.

SULE: You call us wretched? So we must be if your masters are to keep on riding fat cars and living in stolen mansions. Their tyres drench us in sewer water; that's why we are dirty; their greed ravages the land, that's why we are hungry.(38)

Exploitation of the citizens in African countries comes through the ride of hegemony, and this is a product of the post-colonial malady in which the natives connive with foreign exploiters. Their partnership exists as a

predatory image that is resolute to drain the citizens' river of honey and milk. This is the war faced by Africans as time progresses in the modern era.

### **Predation Metaphor in *The State Visit***

Any society that social status or acquisition of wealth polarises will definitely brew predatory practices. The rationale follows the plutocrats' marginalisation, victimisation or persecution of the have-nots. It is the struggle for wealth or material survival on one hand, and the inordinate craving for power by the haves, on the other hand, that inform and sustain oppression and other marks of evil perpetration. In such a situation, the victims are mainly members of the poor class. In other words, it is the ruling class that designs the measures for pauperising and harassing the proletariat.

Question of predation becomes so conspicuous in the dramatic frame of Niyi Osundare's *The State Visit*. African writers are conscious of the fallout of capitalism and its attendant predation. The subject grows out of leaders' cruel attitude and indiscriminate bestial inclination. Olu Obafemi profusely shows and decries prey-predatory culture in his *Scapegoats and Sacred Cows*. Obafemi's piece is distasteful to the narrative of the juxtaposed world of torturers and victims.

Osundare is not subtle about the subject, as it is easy for the reader/audience to perceive the image of predation symbolically expressed on the cover page in the image of a lion holding tenaciously in his mouth a prey. In the opening stage direction, the playwright brings this to the notice of his audience: "The national armorial bearing, placed on the back of wall behind and above the Head, depicts a running lion with a prey in its mouth." (9) The leaders' flair for brutality or bestiality is emblematised in the image of a lion with its cannibalistic prowess which indicates leaders' obsession with creating terror and fear for the people in the country. What the background of the

cabinet portends is barbaric consumption of what makes value for the citizens.

Reference to the expression like "Land of the Lion with Powerful claws" (2) heralds an atmosphere of overwhelming brutality, oppression and victimisation of citizens by the state, or of a state that is fond of intimidating its citizens with all machineries, both economically and politically. Likewise, one will be struck by the number of appellations the Head answers. Such epithets are pointers to egoistic and hegemonic desperation. "Our Head, Father of the Nation, our most beloved, God-fearing, God-chosen to rule..." (14). The same situation goes for the visiting head of Wilama. The Head categorically highlights for him these predatory phrases: "Son of the Leopard, Descendant of the Towering Giraffe, Offshoot of a warrior family, his father fought the Arobela, killing thousands and enslaving twice as many..." (13). It should also be noted that it is the impression the Head evokes that makes the Journalist echo some appellations while explaining the number of shots he (Journalist) has taken, "My Head, my Leader, my Lord, Lion of Yanke..." (20)

Earlier, some journalists have been victims of incarceration by the consciousness cabinet. References to a series of victimisation, persecution or inimical treatment of the press in the land can be cited in the play. Discussions of the cabinet members reflect that uncompromising journalists have it bitter with the Head because they refuse to obey his bidding and reject gifts or any form of remuneration or honorarium from him. Such reporters risk imprisonment, dehumanisation, torture, arson etc. Obstinate journalists or belligerent reporters have tasted bitterness for being uncompromising. The Agriculture Minister, for example, categorically brings some of the predatory exploits the government has made to cow the press, "We put them in jail, burn their press" (44) Equally, the Head discloses how he tames stubborn journalists, "... You see, for me and heroes like me, the easiest horse to train is the

stubbornness one. Increase its dose of whips..."

The disposition of the Head-led cabinet to the press and its intolerance to criticism marks the administration as a despotic one. The Head does not hide the blood of absolutism in him, the Caesarism in his government, elitism in his cabinet; and the truculence and brutality the system epitomises. Very repugnant, he, likewise, boasts of his readiness and passion to waste the lives of the students whosoever stage any protest. The government of the Head is resolute to achieve its objectives regardless of the woes it unleashes on the innocent people. It does not value citizens' lives. The masses are worthless articles to the said government. That is why the Head wields power anyhow. He denies citizens freedom. Let us consider this conversation:

JOURNALIST: But... but Lion of Yanke, the people will know. The... the ... market women ... the students ... the ... the ...

HEAD: Di di di what? Who are the people when we talk about government? What are they? By the Grace of God, we are the government today ... The people ... the people, well the people may do what they like. Afterall they didn't vote us into power, and we are never going to ask them for votes. God in His infinite wisdom has put this crown on our head... *abi*? We are in power today!

ALL MINISTERS: (*In a strident chorus*) And all days!

HEAD: (*Happy, reassured*) Thank you. We have the people in our hand. We decide what they eat, where they sleep, when they live, when they die. We may banish them, dissolve them if we choose. Our government owes nothing, absolutely nothing to their existence. (*Laughs hysterically*) Yes ... and those students again! Why are you so scared of them? We are not (*facing the Cabinet*) *abi*? Just pluck a dozen (*snaps fingers*) from the crowd and the rest will not need to be told what to do...(22)

Exposure of tyranny in *The State Visit* is broad when attention is focused on the encounter of Painter with the cabinet. He is a non-conformist and radical. He has an undaunted voice, and courageous to vent his anger, which is representative of the grievances of the masses in Yanke. Brutality of Yankee authority; and anger cum defiance of the Painter are visibly expressed in this stage direction: "... *Two of these men are soldiers, the third the Painter, a frail-looking man with shaggy hair and beard matted with pain, the two soldiers drag him in, booting him ferociously, a violation whose brutality increases as they come in full view of the Head.*"(51)

The Painter, who is accused of the refusal to paint the picture of the Head and his visiting friend, confesses that his "brush wrinkles the face of tyrants." (51) He further metaphorically thrashes that the pulse of his brush "only responds to the feelings of humans..." and that "...monsters need a witch's broom for their self-image." He has cryptically captured the cabinet's predatory attribute through the image of monsters. This is opposed to the people of innocence and tender-heartedness that the Painter can serve. This implies that the Painter only identifies with the citizens that go around with empty stomachs. He comes clear here: "... My allegiance is to the suffering legion with no roofs over their heads and no food in their stomachs. My allegiance is to those lean bones which fatten the paunch of the rich." (54)

The Head's long furious diatribe to the Painter proves that he is the personification of a devouring beast:

THE HEAD: (*Furious, a little strange*) Oh hell with a million fires! Oh whirlwind! Oh curses from the mouth of nights! (*Pause*) Strange times! The Lion has allowed this rat's menace for too long. But as if a joke, the hunter's apron is becoming a permanent robe ... (*Becoming almost demonic, rushing*)

*towards the Painter as if preparing to attack him)*

Who are you? You one-penny bread, you leftover from the leopard's meal, you rag for trampling horses, you dwarf without testicles, you toadstool, you hunchback ... You have opened your mouth wide; (*demonstrating*) we shall widen it till it reaches your ears. (*To the soldiers who brought the Painter*) Take him to Chamber 40 and (*throwing a thick, long noose at the soldiers*) let him know what it means to be the victim of our wrath.(54)

The "Powerful claws" of the Lion of Yanke also pounce on the beggars. In both physical and spiritual ways, beggars in Yanke experience torture from the powerful. They are victims of assault and harassment by security operatives and rapists, they are preys to money ritual activities of some wicked rich people, they suffer starvation, and the government also designs policies that are draconian to them. Obi and Abeke, some of the beggars, illustrate the condition of beggars with their horrible examples. For instance, Obi laments how "easily the weak crumble under the weight of the powerful." (32) Likewise, Abeke narrates how the owls in human's skin kidnap and rape her. The beggars are homeless, the government, however, orders them to leave the street, the only place where they find solace. This is what informs the presence of the Policeman in their midst.

The wiry old man still feels the anguish of his son's death. His eldest son, who was the manager of the Central Bank, is diplomatically executed by the state because he refuses to help in protecting "the secret account of the Lion of Yanke in foreign banks" (60) This suggests that the government of the Lion of Yanke is notorious for secret murder. The old man pictures the cabinet as an owl that frightens and devotes self to terminating the lives of promising citizens. He notes that, "There is an owl in this land; and it has hooted thirty years, forcing the sun of many of our youth to set at noon. (*Emphatically*) This land

reeks with suffocating stench of a lion which hungers for its own blood."

### **Collectivism and Resistance Strategy in *The State Visit***

Collectivist approach in resolving conflict is a distinctive characteristic of the socialist artists. What the dramatist in *The State Visit* deals with is experimenting through the principles of social change. The ethos of collectivism, inherent in the radical school of drama, is inextricably executed with characterisation to soft pedal the culture of individualism, which defines the perception of the Aristotelian or bourgeois ideology. In the latter, "suffering is individual-centred with the rest of mankind as sympathizers and emotionally tied up passive accomplices..." (90) Reversely, the radical conception considers suffering to be groupal, collective and social. It hinges on the rationality of collective action for solution to emerge. The collectivist facility oils and organises a resistance cause to dare and bring down the symbol of oppression or predation. This is a cause that offers the downtrodden or the prey of incarceration a ride to changing the status-quo.

The principle of collectivism is enhanced in the postulation of Dialectic Materialism. This is a theoretical norm that upholds dynamism or mutability of social conditions. With this logic or conviction at the heart of the oppressed, the tendency to re-situate the status-quo is on course. In other words, this typifies an expression of the impermanence of every hegemonic constitution. The mobilisation of different categories of the impoverished to shout together and confront their exploiters reinstates the order of Marx that "Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!"

Niyi Osundare's *The State Visit* gives a sense of an exploration of the postulation of Dialectic Materialism. How the playwright resolves the



conflict in the piece through the mobilisation of the folks swimming in poverty and fear despite the fact that, there is plenty in their land. The discontented proletariat, the impoverished in Yanke (“Land of the Lion with Powerful claws”) are conscious of the fact that their aspirations can only materialise through their convergence, identifying with the cause of ending the war of poverty, the threat of dehumanisation; and cowering tyranny. So, both the spirit of collectivism and the courage of resistance or confrontation come together as a means of forging for the destitute and the other categories of the second class citizens in Yanke. With the ritual of understanding to speak in one voice, in a harmonious hymn of anger to communicate the language of revolution to the lion-incarnates in the play. It is, therefore, noteworthy to state that the entire programme of the drama piece is a tale of oppression and revolution. It is the malady constituted by the predatory cabinet that ignites masses’ rage.

The reader begins to sense resistance aesthetics in *The State Visit* with the appearance of the beggars, each of whom is with one deformity or another. Collectivism for struggle towards the path of freedom in the work takes a serious shape. To show its wide coverage, Osundare imbues the weaklings the dosage of courage and reasoning. The characters, though have-nots and physically incapacitated are ideologically enlightened, bold and dogged in the course of liberation. They know the significance of uniting for a purpose. They are not ignorant, they are fully aware that the architects of their problem are the Head-led cabinet and the capitalists in the country. It is in their consciousness that the extravagant life style, uncontrolled avarice and gross cold heartedness of the ‘natives’ in power define their (beggars’) penury. One of the beggars, Sule, discusses with his colleagues the importance of unity among the poor and the need to stop the hellish phenomenon called injustice before policeman who is on the mission to harass the beggars:

SULE: We beggars must unite against these injustices. Just consider this: the rich steal your food and then punish you for being hungry. Our rulers cast us on the streets and then jail us for homelessness...(38)

Sule’s sensitisation on collectivism and revolt to decide for the wretches’ condition and liberty is sustained in his subsequent speech. His insistence on this cause points to the writer’s commitment to the same cause in his country because the masses in the author’s country are equally beggars. What the reader can also deduce from his speech is the generality or universality of indigence across a continent.

SULE: (*Somewhat pensively*) Yes, we should unite – all the beggars in this country. I understand that in Ganisel, a country just a few miles from us, beggars have a trade union...(39)

In the same scene, a female beggar, Abeke, tries to convince the policeman by educating him on the source of their tragedy – poverty and squalor-, using rhetoric. She also calls the security man’s attention to his own unfortunate condition. “(*Moving closer to the policeman, while the latter begins to back away*) Look at your stomach. Oga poliisi, does it look like those of your masters?”

The relationship between the wretched and the cabinet in this play is an area of interest for Dialectic Materialism to dissect. The bourgeoisie and oppressors are desperate to tenaciously and eternally hold on to power. It is this tool, in the image of the superstructure, which the power holders use to threaten, subjugate and devour their followers. These are two forces juxtaposed by their social means and degree of material acquisition and working against each other, one trying to retain power, the other finding a means to devitalise the organ of hegemony through which the oppressors survive and thrive. This is seen as the friction emphasised by Dialectic Materialism. Apart from the earlier

remark by the Head that “This throne is ours and so shall it remain until we die and pass it on to our children and children’s children. We are living in the era of life presidents and presidents-for-life... ” (29), the security body builds an impression of un-freedom that suggests the worthlessness of the wretched citizens. One finds this attitude in the body language of the government communicated through the order issued to the protesters by a policeman as the state prepares to receive the Leopard of Wilama, “I hereby put it to you that your gathering here is a contravention of the state of emergency of Yanke, and of Decree Number Nine thousand six hundred and eight-five banning all demonstrations, processions, gatherings...”(62) But the determined crowd are not enervated by the order. The order rather infuriates and invigorates the crowd. And the protesters begin to chant. Their chants and songs depict collectiveness, commitment, readiness for confrontation and insurrection. The song combines collectivism with the will power to control their fate. The protest is bloody as lives of some protesters and two policemen are lost.

The Policeman’s order only serves to infuriate the crowd who break into chants and songs.

How many people police go kill o?  
 How many people soldier go kill?  
 Them go shoot us tire  
 Them go kill us tire o  
 How many people soldier go kill?

How many people soldier go shoot o?  
 How many people police go shoot  
 We go show them fire  
 We go show them fire  
 How many people soldier go kill?  
*(Deified, the Inspector orders his men on stage. They fan out and take arm. A moment later, six bodies including those of two policemen lie silent on the stage. Old man is one of them. Shouts and wails. Lights fade to black.)* (62-63).

Angry citizens in *The State Visit* seem to understand what is required to stage a revolution because the face off comprises different categories of exploited citizens. And they are aware that revolution is social and collective. Osofisan’s submission that, “...revolution itself is a mass of people always doing things together.” (29) comes to play-out here. To confront the Lion of Yankeland, the downtrodden converge, and the composition is inclusive. It really entails a group of the impoverished and exploited as those concerned troop into the venue from many places. The below stage direction illustrates the collective sense of revolution irrespective of diversity in age and occupation. They form an assembly where they lament their appalling condition and deride the atrocities the wicked or unfeeling authority committes:

*Open street or arena; a motley crowd throngs on stage from all directions (including the auditorium); workers, students, market women, beggars, the young, the old, and the aged; displaying different placards, some well-uttered and fancy, others merely but legibly scrawled: GIVE US FOOD, NOT WHIPS; WHERE HAS THE MAIZE FUND GONE?; MONKEY DEY WORK, BABOON DEY CHOP; WHERE ARE OUR DISAPPEARED COMRADES?; DOWN WITH THE SECRET POLICE; DOWN WITH DICTATORSHIP!; WE ARE ALL BORN EQUAL; BURN THE LION’S CLAWS! BURN, BURN!; then they burst into song... (59)*

The position of the hegemonic praxis tends to contravene the rationale of Dialectic Materialism which discourages eternal hold of resources. The proletariat’s planned challenge and confrontation of the callous elite reflects revolutionary impetus associated with Marxism which emphasises struggle between the oppressed proletariat and the oppressor bourgeoisie with the former wresting power from the latter. Osundare uses *The State Visit* to satirically depict political happening in a number of African countries and the developing world where corruption, mal-administration and nepotism mar human, capital and material developments. (Gbilekaa 1997:50) avers that:

African society today is witnessing severe tremors. Where she is not choking under the firm grip of colonialism, she is sweating profusely under the drillings of colonialism. If she is not wallowing in abject poverty, illiteracy and backwardness, she is choking under the tyrannical leadership of a demented demagogue. Africa is undergoing a cycle of instability as coup succeeds coup. Every day we hear of students and industrial revolts because of the land-grabbing habit of the garrulous comprador bourgeois in collaboration with international businessmen. These are obvious signs of class struggle. Thus, for the committed writer, if the application of Marxist literary aesthetics can bring about a change of this bizarre and obnoxious situation ...

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The researchers examine prey-predatory dialectics and the poetics of resistance in Niyi Osundare's *The State Visit* as regards hegemonic structure and neo-colonial plunder as it has constituted a menace to the life of post-independent Africa. The play presents an example of a world of social divisions, with its lop-sided distribution of wealth. As the ruling class deploys the superstructure to sustain the exploitative system which, in effect, deepens the suffering of the proletarians, it is left to the impoverished to stage an action of reflex. Using Dialectic Materialism, the researchers are able to explore issues of inter-connectedness of the characters' social relationships and the resultant effect of the base invented by the capitalists. It is revealed that the indigenous hegemony is in active collaboration with the foreign exploiters to plunder the nations in the continent. It is the conclusion of the researchers that the working class has to come to its rescue through the action of revolution.

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