DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE EDUCATION IN A MILITARIZED DEMOCRACY



Godwin Etta Odok

Department of Sociology Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria godwinodok2000@yahoo.com

Abstract

Peace education pertinently seeks to instill values, knowledge, attitudes, skills, and behaviours that ensure harmony with oneself, others and the natural environment. In this way, peace education is critical in creating a democratic culture that prevents violence and ensures development within society. Across the different regions of Nigeria, there are recurrences of extreme violence with the rise of ethnic militia groups that enjoy the support of kinfolks. Drawing from interviewed-based case studies in Benue, Taraba, and Katsina States, Nigeria, this paper discusses failures of national security strategies in prioritizing peace-building within contexts of local participation and indigenous systems of power and development. Findings culminate to establish that the absence of indigenous peace-building priorities in Nigeria's national security and development strategies reinforce violent worldviews and orientations in Nigerian politics and development efforts. Consequently, peace education remains the preferable option for mobilizing for effective security and peace-building in Nigeria's post-1999 democracy as peace education holds potentials in entrenching a peace-based worldview and culture. Thus, peace education contents and development planning in a democratic Nigeria should integrate and pay equal attention to all aspects and dimensions of the moral, psychological, social, economic, political and transcendent spiritual foundations of development and peace without devaluing, ignoring local experiences of peace and development.

Keywords: Culture of peace, violence, kin networks, democracy, security, education

Introduction

In recent times, there are heighten concerns about horrific violence in forms of banditry, terrorism, ethnic hatred, sexual abuse and domestic violence in Nigeria. Violence has become a veritable tool to exert political power, rally supporters, destabilize opponents, and derail the prospect of the government in order to gain total control of the machinery of government (Wild, Jok & Patel, 2018). According to the Small Arms Survey Group (Ajodo-

Adebanjoko, 2020; Iyekekpolo, 2020), one in every five persons in Nigeria rural communities owns a weapon, while one in every 10 persons in the urban areas owns a weapon. The commonly owned weapons include muzzle-loading Dane guns, 9mm semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles and sub-machine guns as well as shotguns (Okoli & Ugwu, 2020). In offsetting the culture of violence in human society, peace education has evolved since the last six decades as a body of knowledge that studies violence in all its manifestations with intents of counteracting the war system for the creation of a peace system at the structural and international levels (Harris & Morrison, 2012; Ardizzone, 2001). This paper argues that democracy in Nigeria does not only involve frequent elections and representative government, but it is entrenched in the domination of social relations among ethnic groups where democracy confers on majority ethnic groups the freedom from labour and the power to use the labour of minority ethnic groups (Obamamove, 2019). This domination of the majority ethnic groups and the power to use the labour of minority ethnic groups form the bases of the social inequalities and violent culture in post-colonial Nigeria. Regrettably, federal security systems in Nigeria are believed to be structured in manners that guarantee the protection of majority ethnic groups over and against minority ethnic groups (Obamamoye, 2019; Okenyodo, 2016).

The paper is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the evolution and prerequisites of peace education by iterating that peace education has a dynamic relationship with peace practice which occurs in five forms as: international education, human rights education, development education, environmental education and conflict resolution education. This part of the paper also examines the various national security reforms since Nigeria's political independence in 1960. Sections of this part of the paper highlight how the Nigerian government's primary focus of national security had been the safeguard against external and internal attacks. With this, national security reforms over the years have largely concentrated on the military as the core security sector, thereby neglecting other important national security sectors. The second part of the paper consists of the methodological approach wherein data for the paper emerged. This involves interviewedbased case studies in Benue, Taraba, and Katsina States, Nigeria; and this was complemented by a systematic review of Nigeria's national security policies and programmes. The third part of the paper discusses empirical evidences that culminate to assert that democracy in Nigeria can best be described in terms of tragedy of the commons. This represents a condition where individual ethnic groups act independently to preserve themselves at the expense of other ethnic groups. The paper in this part traces that prolonged years of military rule constitutes the main reason why the Nigeria democratic culture is militarized. Thus, with the erosion of a civic democratic culture in Nigeria, orders, combats, disregard of court orders and violation of human rights have become the dominant culture of Nigeria's democracy (Obamamoye, 2019). With these values and norms, democracy in Nigeria has become superficial, wrecked by multiple forms of bad governance which manifest in the brutality of police and other security forces.

The paper ended with a conclusion that reiterates that peace education remains the preferable option for mobilizing for effective security and peace building in Nigeria's post-1999 democracy. This is because peace education holds potentials in entrenching a peace-based worldview and culture. In broad term, this paper addresses the all-important issue of human relationships in ways that produces a transition from self-centred and anxiety-ridden insecurities of survival instincts and the quarrelsome, dichotomous tensions of the identity-formation processes among Nigerian ethnic groups to a universal and all-inclusive state of awareness of their fundamental oneness and connectedness with one another as humans. In this way, peace education becomes a problem-solving strategy that holds enormous potentials in producing suitable security solutions for an ethnically and religiously diverse Nigerian democracy.

Evolution and Prerequisites of Peace Education and Development

As a sustainable response to the devastating carnage as evident in the nuclear bombs, genocide, holocausts, which the world has experienced since after the First and Second World Wars, progressive educators have developed a body of peace education in attempts to provide information about the destructive nature of violent conflicts and strategies for peacemaking and peace-building (Harris & Morrison, 2012; Ardizzone, 2001; Harris, 2004). Thus, peace education is basically focus at pointing out problems of violence and instructing on strategies that address problems associated with violence, thereby empowering communities in addressing circumstances that lead to violent conflict and underdevelopment (Danesh, 2006). In this way peace education imparts values of environmental stewardship, global citizenship and humane relations (Harris & Morrison, 2012).

Danesh (2006) believes that peace education has a dynamic relationship with peace practice which culminates to sustainable development. He identified the various forms of peace education that have emerged over the years with the aim of addressing the different forms of violence and underdevelopment at the global, ecological, community and personal levels. He also identified five postulates of peace education that are in line with the contents of the five different types of peace education. In their distinct character, Danesh (2006) believes that the five types of peace education

include: international education, human rights education, development education, environmental education and conflict resolution education. According to him, these different types of peace education are actually interrelated and they commonly seek to explain different forms of violence and provide information about alternatives to violence. Danesh (2006) further argues that the content covered in peace education classes usually varies according to the contexts in which those activities are practiced. In explaining the contexts of peace education, this section of the paper examines the historical roots and goals of different approaches to peace education, describing assumptions underlying the various educational strategies that have been designed to achieve peace.

Bajaj (2015) has argued that in its broad sense, peace education is primarily concerned with the concept of peace. It is concerned with what peace is, why peace does not naturally exist and how to achieve peace (Kester, 2008; Page, 2008; Zembylas, 2018). Peace education is also interested in teaching about the challenges of achieving peace in terms of developing non-violent skills and promoting peaceful attitudes (Danesh, 2006). According to Harris (2004, p.6), the five postulates that define peace education hinge on the following principles and aspirations: to explain the roots of violence; to teach alternatives to violence; to uncover different forms of violence; recognizing that peace is a process that depend on contexts; and acknowledging that conflict is omnipresent in social interactions. In achieving the first aspiration of peace education which has to do with explaining the roots of violence, contents of peace education are designed to expose learners to the notion of the 'other', this is with intent of deconstructing imaginaries of the notion of the 'enemy' (Danesh, 2006). The educational contents that address the second aspiration of peace education focus at exposing learners to the different peace processes and strategies that can be used to address the problems of violence (Danesh, 2006). These peace processes and strategies include negotiation, reconciliation, nonviolent struggle and the use of treaties and laws. Peace educational contents for achieving the third aspiration of uncovering different forms of violence focus on the dynamic nature of peace education as it shifts its emphasis according to the type of violence it addresses. Educational contents for achieving the fourth aspiration recognize that the theories and practice of peace education are embedded within specific cultural norms. Whilst educational contents for achieving aspiration five acknowledge that peace education cannot completely eliminate conflict but peace education provides learners with valuable skills in managing conflicts in their everyday social interactions (Clarke-Habibi, 2005; Danesh, 2006; Tchombe, 2006).

Omeje (2015) showed that the concept of 'peace' has different meanings within different cultures. Peace education according to him has taken

different shapes as peace educators attempt to address different forms of violence in different social contexts. Danesh (2006) argues that peace education has different names because of the controversial meaning of the word 'peace'. In its literal meaning, the concept of 'peace' has come to connote a withdrawal from the world into a space of peace and quiet (Danesh, 2006). Thus, peace education is usually not attractive to social activists who want to confront structural inequalities with some violence (Harris, 2004). Peace education has severally been also referred to as conflict resolution education (Danesh, 2006). This is because conflict resolution education is believed to be encompassing enough that it does not undermine ways of reducing the threat of war and does not at the same time take for granted interpersonal and cultural conflicts. According to Danesh (2006), at the beginning of the twenty-first century, controversies surrounding the word 'peace' in conjunction with concerns about a multitude of different forms of violence led to five separate types of peace education: international education, human rights education, development education, environmental education and conflict resolution education. Each of these genres of peace education has its distinct theoretical assumptions regarding the nature and impact of violence and appropriate peace strategies in achieving peace in society (Bar-Tal & Yigal, 2009; Brantmeier, 2013).

On his part, Harris (2004) identified ten different goals or objectives that ensure the delivery of an effective peace education curriculum. These goals or objectives include: an appreciation of the richness of the concept of peace; addressing the notion of fear; provision of information about security systems; understanding of violent behaviour; developing intercultural understanding (Harris, 2004). Other goals or objectives are: encouraging commitment to future studies; teaching peace as a process rather than an event; promoting the concept of peace as a concept embedded in social justice; stimulating a culture that respects human life; commitment to end all forms of violence. These objectives aligns with the broad definition of development which implies a movement from a set of conditions (social, economic, political, cultural) deemed to be undesirable or the cause of adverse effects to another set of conditions deemed necessary for promoting improved standards of living or well-being.

Harris (2004) also highlighted four basic prerequisites that are essential for achieving effective peace education. He argues that these prerequisites constitute the main components of peace education, and it is these prerequisites and components of effective peace education that give peace education a self-regenerative and organic quality. According to Harris (2004), the first prerequisite condition for effective peace education posits that effective peace education only takes place in contexts of a unity-based worldview. This implies that peace education thrives in environments where

the prevailing civilization and culture recognize that viable pathways to real human progress and development are both peaceful and peace creating. This is usually contrary to popular conflict-based worldviews, pedagogies and philosophies that have always laid emphasis on conflicts, violence and wars (Kurian & Kester, 2019). With their culture and contents of 'otherness', 'conflict', 'competition', 'aggression', 'bullying' and 'violence', conflictbased worldviews, pedagogies and philosophies entrench, validate and justify violence in human society (Kurian & Kester, 2019). For instance, prominent history textbooks contain accounts of rivalries, conflicts, wars, conquests and defeats, with men as main actors on the stage of social life (Armstrong & Tennenhouse, 2014). Even literary works are often charged with dramatic and emotionally renditions that justify and validate the use of violence as a winning and survival strategy for the crises of life (Armstrong & Tennenhouse, 2014). These popular pedagogies, educational programmes and philosophies do not sufficiently promote issues of 'co-existence', 'interdependence' and 'co-operation', core existential issues that guarantee peace and the maintenance of human life (Kurian & Kester, 2019; Alimba, 2013).

Even disciplines of the social sciences and humanities have had subjectmatters that validate and justify violence in everyday social interactions (Armstrong & Tennenhouse, 2014). Mainstream sociology for instance emphasizes in-group and out-group dynamics which bring to the fore ideals of 'foreignness' and 'otherness' (Olwan, 2013). Political science with its focus on power relations entrenches violence through its interest in partisan politics which encompasses 'competition', 'winning' and 'losing' (Valentino, 2014). Economics ensconces violence with their interest in the notion of the 'survival of the fittest' (Miller, Chiang & Hollis, 2018). Educational disciplines, programmes, pedagogies and philosophies in this regard expose learners to sensibilities where the world is perceived to be a jungle and power is the quintessential tool to emerge victorious in a highly conflicted and violent world (Olwan, 2013). Danesh (2006) reveals that this explains why every new generation tends to be more familiar with the ways of conflict, competition and violence than ways of harmony, co-operation and peace. Thus, the first prerequisite for peace education stresses that effective peace education occurs when conflict-based worldviews are replaced with unity-based or peace-based worldviews (Harris, 2004).

This stands in line with the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) peace principles that recognize education as the key means to spearhead the movement towards a culture of peace in the world (Dasli, 2019). The connection between education and peace is obvious (Dasli, 2019). This is because it is through education that our worldviews are profoundly influenced and shaped, and it is through the

lenses of our worldviews that we become 'suspicious' or 'trusting', 'conflicted' or 'united', 'peaceful' or 'violent' (Danesh, 2006, p.55).

The second prerequisite condition for effective peace education according to Danesh (2006) affirms that peace education is required to take place within a culture that promotes and cherish peace. Harris and Morrison (2012) added to conclude that peace education is indeed a difficult task even in relatively more peaceful communities and that although studies of children's conceptions of war and peace are very important for the realization of a balanced peace education strategy; however, peace research alone cannot sufficiently explain peace education. This is because peace research has only provided clarity on what should not be done, rather than what needs to be done in order to create peace (Gleditsch, Nils, Nordkvelle & Strand, 2014). In this way, it is evident that learners cannot be effectively educated about peace in an environment of conflict and violence. According to UNESCO, a culture of peace hinges on the following principles: respect for human rights, democracy and tolerance, the promotion of development, education for peace, the free flow of information and the wider participation of women as an integral approach to preventing violence and conflicts, efforts aimed at the creation of conditions for peace and its consolidation (Dasli, 2019). These principles also recognized that effective peace education and peace-building can only take place within a culture of peace where opportunities are provided for the healing of conflict-inflicted injuries (Murithi, 2009).

Hence, the third prerequisite for effective peace education resides in the insistence that peace education needs to take place in contexts that promote and support a culture of healing. Danesh (2006) has noted that without true healing, survivors of violence remain vulnerable as they continue to see the world as dangerous with the need to defend themselves from threats and dangers. He argues that as survivors of violence engage in what they may view as self-defense, they become perpetrators of violence themselves. It is in this light that Danesh (2006) described the relationship between the culture of healing and the culture of peace by pointing that the process of reconciliation is an important aspect of healing. This summarily explains why most countries that have suffered conflicts do set up Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (Danesh, 2006). Mhandara (2020) identifies three stages in the process of reconciliation, these include: replacing fear with non-violent coexistence; creating conditions in which fear no longer rules and confidence and trust are built; and socializing affected communities toward values of empathy.

Danesh (2006) stressed that all steps in the reconciliation process should include the reconciling of not just individuals, but also groups and communities as well. This involves the recognition that the creating of a

culture of healing includes the awareness that 'healing is inevitably a lengthy and culturally-bound process' (Danesh, 2006, p.60).

The fourth prerequisite for effective peace education demands that peace education should occur within the context of a peace-based curriculum that incorporates all educational frameworks and activities. This requires a total reorientation and transformation of the curriculum with the ultimate aim of creating a civilization of peace, which connotes a political, social, ethical and spiritual state (Bowden, 2004). Historically, the political and social dimensions of peace have received considerable attention (Danesh, 2006). In the past few decades, the moral and ethical aspects of peace have been incorporated in human development agenda through national and international declarations of human rights and the focus on the notion of nonviolence (Dasli, 2019). This is based on the fact that peace in its essence is a spiritual state with political, social and ethical expressions (Bowden, 2004). Implying that the human spirit must be civilized first before a progressive material, social and political civilization can be created. In this wise, peace is expected to first of all take place in the human mind (consciousness), that is their thoughts, and this is made possible through education (Danesh, 2006). Thus, peace education curriculum needs to integrate and pay equal attention to all aspects and dimensions of peace, which include its psychological roots; social, economic and political causes; moral and ethical dimensions; and transcendent spiritual foundations (Murithi, 2009). Without integrating and paying attention to all these aspects and dimensions of peace, the attainment of peace in human society according to Danesh (2006) remains an aspiration rather than an established reality.

Danesh (2009) observes that one of the main functions of education is its considerable contribution to the formulation of a worldview, which in turn provides the necessary framework for all other life processes, including thoughts, feelings, choices and actions. Worldview construction is therefore an inevitable and essential aspect of development for both individuals and societies. Olowo (2016); Okolie-Osemene (2012); Ardizzone (2001) have all reiterated that education plays a key role in the formation and transfer of worldview in human society. Moscovici (1993, p.160) refers to a worldview as a 'social representation', while Clarke-Habibi (2005) refers to worldview as a 'cultural fabric'. Both Moscovici (1993) and Clarke-Habibi (2005) argue that worldviews constitute the foundation of all human cultures, consisting of discursive complexes of norms, values, beliefs, and knowledge, and are usually expressed at a subconscious level. Clarke-Habibi (2005) and Danesh (2006) added to divulge that most worldviews are conflict-oriented worldviews. Also worldviews are at the core of basic peace-related concepts and processes such as storytelling (Kester, 2007),

contact theory (Farmaki, 2017), collective narrative (Salomon, 2004) and dialogue (Danesh, 2006).

Peace-Building Interventions in Nigeria's National Security Reforms

There have been various attempts at security sector reforms in Nigeria since the nation's political independence in 1960. At independence, government's primary focus was to safeguard the young nation against external and internal attacks; thus, this led to the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Agreement, where the Sir Abubakar Balewa regime signed a pact with the British government for the training of Nigeria's security forces, although protests by Nigerian students led to the abrogation of the agreement in 1962 (Fayemi & Olonisakin, 2008).

Adams and Ogbonnaya (2014) points that despite reform efforts in the Nigerian security sector, security crises are recurrent, showing that the reforms have not been able to address security challenges in the country. Adams and Ogbonnaya (2014) further argue that the weaknesses of the reforms have been largely due to their concentration on only the core security sector at the neglect of other important sectors of national security. Danesh (2009) opines that a fundamental approach to successful security reforms is to adopt an all-encompassing and holistic approach in ways that peace education becomes the driving force of these reforms. In contributing to peace-building in Africa, Isima (2007) argues that the creation of stronger states in the continent is central to the success of conceiving, designing and implementing agenda that seek to enhance peace and human security. He points that security sector reform (SSR) as a tool for peace-building and human security in Africa must be part of a wider effort to address the problem of state weakness as well as respond to the crucial insecurity that is presented by informal actors such as militias and vigilante groups. Essentially, national security in this context relates to the presence of peace, safety and the protection of human and physical resources from crises, threats and injuries (McKay, 2004).

In explicating peace-building in the context of security sector reforms, Otto and Ukpere (2012) argue that there are four main components of liberal peace-building models. The first component of peace-building is focused at security sector reform which has to do with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes. This component also deals with issues around the professionalization of the military and the strengthening of law and order. The second component of peace-building in the context of security sector reforms is focused on economic reform which has to do with market reforms and the liberalization of the economy. The third component of peace-building is focused at political reform which has to do with the enactment of political participation and competition, national elections and

constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties and freedoms. The fourth component of peace-building as outlined by Otto and Ukpere (2012) is focused on social reconciliation which occurs in forms of truth commissions, amnesties or other transitional justice mechanisms. Accordingly, Otto and Ukpere (2012) termed peace-building models that reflect these components as liberal peace-building models, which according to them are principally focus on achieving liberal democratic reforms, neoliberal economic reforms and state-building objectives.

In assessing the potency of liberal peace-building models in achieving sustainable peace in human society, Jackson (2018) bemoans that liberal peace-building models are deeply flaw and problematic. This is because these models have largely failed in preventing structural and cultural violence in human society, especially in societies of developing countries. Liberal peace-building models have also been criticized for operating according to a standardized blueprint which does not take into account the unique historical and cultural settings in which they are applied (Danesh, 2009; Omeje, 2015). This is as they do not give space for alternative approaches. This straight-jacketed approach of liberal peace-building often fails to take account of local actors and their preferences and contextual knowledge (Isima, 2007; Momodu, 2013; Nwafor, 2012).

Oliver (2009) added to point that in many ways, liberal peace-building models are probably more accurately conceived as state-building models, rather than peace-building models. This is because state-building is far more focus on security and market institutions rather than on representative, democratic norms and human rights. In this light, liberal peace-building models rest on coercion in manners that there is always the prioritization of elites' interests over and above the interests of the majority population (Danesh, 2006). Thus, liberal peace-building models are a continuation of historical processes of imperialism, neo-colonialism and Westernization (Zembylas, 2018; Kurian & Kester, 2019; Ezeoba, 2012; Omeje, 2015). Oliver (2009) stresses that liberal peace-building models have followed liberal imperialism in asserting a superior moral order, knowledge systems, while devaluing, ignoring local experiences of peace and politics in particularly societies of developing countries. Consequently, local participation, ownership, identity, norms and historical systems of power, social organization and peace-making, peace-building are tactically excluded in liberal peace-building models (Kurian & Kester 2019). Emphatically, liberal peace-building models represent the concerns and priorities of developed countries and their representatives, instead of local or indigenous concerns and priorities (Enaigbe & Igbinoghene, 2016).

Fundamentally, liberal peace-building is based on the assumption that conflict is caused by macro-level structural factors, which primarily has to do with dysfunctional state institutions (Kurian & Kester 2019). This assumption ignores the role play by collective beliefs, public narratives, everyday social and cultural practices, history, conflict discourses and other meta-structures in socially constructing violence and conflict across all levels of society (Oliver, 2009). Liberal peace-building categorically reinforces the instrumental use of violence as a means of attaining political objectives. Jackson (2018) reiterates the liberal peace-building doctrine of 'just war' as a means to legitimize the Weberian notion of the monopoly of violence and the accompanying myths of Westphalian statehood. Consequently, under liberal peace-building models, Jackson (2018) argues that macro-level variables such as institutional reform, economic underdevelopment, security sector reform are domains that receive much of the state's attention and resources. This is as state-building and state-reform remain the primary interests of liberal peace-building models.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopts the peace education theory of Ian Harris and John Synott (Harris, 2004). Ian Harris and John Synott describe peace education as a series of teaching encounters that draw from people's desire for peace; non-violent alternatives for managing conflicts; and skills for critical analysis of structural arrangements that produce and legitimize injustice and inequality. The theory hinges on assumptions that peace is a psychological, social, political, ethical and spiritual state with expressions in intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, international, and global spheres of human existence. The theory recognizes that violence affects people's lives, a country's development and well-being, and it often results in longstanding grievances among communities. Thus, education for peace includes training, skills and information directed towards cultivating a culture of peace based on human right principles. The theory postulates that education does not only provide knowledge about a culture of peace, but it also imparts essential skills and attitudes needed to defuse and recognize potential conflicts, skills and attitudes needed to actively promote and establish a culture of peace and non-violence. Theorists here argue that developing capabilities for peace through broad based education involves behavioural, cognitive, spiritual and attitudinal components, which must include instructional practices that respect developmental, cognitive and intellectual capacities. The peace education theory of Ian Harris and John Synott (Harris, 2004) lay emphasis on critical thinking, problem solving, language and life skills as well as open mindedness, expressiveness, peacefulness, flexibility and sensitivity towards various global issues as essential ingredients in peace-building and enshrining a culture of peace in human society.

Methodological Approach

The research strategy wherein data for this paper emerged involves nine (9) interviewed-based case studies in Benue (3), Taraba (3), and Katsina (3) States, Nigeria that probed ethnic origins and how kin or ethnic groups in post-1999 Nigeria are motivated by self-interest to act contrary to the common good of other kin or ethnic groups thereby undermining national solidarity and collective action. Throughout the period of the interviews (November 2019 to October 2020), the researcher visited Zaki-biam (Benue); Wukari (Taraba); and Dutsin-Ma (Katsina), communities where ethnic-based militia groups operate. The data analysis took an inductive approach. This approach allows for the descriptive and detailed analysis of collections of stories, which enables the researcher to constitute a logical account based on a comparison of different accounts (Ritchie, Spencer & O'Connor, 2003). The approach of data analysis recognizes interrelationships between the interpreter and the interpretation. Participation in the study was voluntary. Pseudonyms were used for all participants.

Tragedy of the Commons and Survival-Based Worldview of Nigeria's Democracy

Mutual assertions among participants culminate to contend that democracy in Nigeria can best be described in terms of tragedy of the commons. This represents a condition in a shared-resource system where individual users, acting independently according to their own self-interest behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting or spoiling the shared resource through their collective actions (Campbell, Bush, Brunell & Shelton, 2005). Participants affirm the universal values of democracy by acknowledging that democracy advances unity, development, creativity in human society. Although there was uncertainty among participants if fundamental values of democracy cut across cultural, linguistic, religious and ideological boundaries. Nonetheless, there was a unanimous assertion that the attitude of Nigerians toward democracy is influenced by the survival-based worldview. As every ethnic nationality in Nigeria is only looking for 'democratic dividends' that can salvage them from conditions of poverty, injustice, nepotism, anarchy, physical threat, ethnic rivalry and war. Conditions that have predispose ethnic groups in Nigeria to seek political power in order to ensure security and survival for members of respective ethnic groups. Participants acknowledged that since the distribution of political power among the over 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria (Cornelius & Esheya, 2013) cannot be equal, there is heightened suspicion among Nigeria's ethnic groups especially as it seems is only one major ethnic group that is believed to hold the wheels of political power and assumes a position of authority in Nigeria since the country's independence

in 1960. Thus, in order to survive, other ethnic groups in Nigeria have either become appearing conformists, withdrawn pessimists, or at best, subversive activists to the dominant political ethnic group that holds the wheels of political power and has assumed a position of authority in Nigeria.

A participant recounted this pessimism in the following words:

The issue in present day Nigeria is that it is very difficult to become anything at the federal level if you are not a northerner or you befriend a northerner. The north have hijacked Nigeria, they are the only ones who still talk about the idea that the entity called Nigeria is non-negotiable and indivisible...The truth of the matter is that the central government can no longer protect us anymore. This is why tribal militia groups are emerging all over Nigeria to protect their people. Whether these militia groups fall back to primitive methods of self-protection, this has become necessary in today's Nigeria.

(Male, 61 years, Wukari, March 18, 2020)

Another participant alluded:

At this time, we are not asking the government to give us food. We did not grow up hoping for any help from the government. But the only thing we expect from government is that the government should protect us from these Fulani bandits. The government should give us peace... We can fend for ourselves once there is peace in our communities. Since the government is failing in this responsibility of protecting us, we have to look out for ways to defend and protect ourselves from bandits... There is a popular local charm commonly known as *odieshi*, it comes in a powdery form. We believe that the charm can make us indestructible in the face of attacks from material weapons... At present, thousands of disenchanted youths are finding strength in this charm, some of them have received this charm and have gone back to retake their communities. It is a good and tested charm. I have taken it. If you have gun, shoot me in the head, and the bullet will not enter.

(Male, 32 years, Dutsin-Ma, May 19, 2020)

These testimonies insist the position that kin or ethnic militia groups are wielding power in post-1999 Nigeria in ways that it is these groups that are trusted as reliable armies of tribal or ethnic groups. Participants were resolute that the emergence of tribal or ethnic militia groups is all about survival of members of ethnic groups. This is as the dominant mindset among Nigerians is the mindset that views the world as a dangerous place, operating on principles of force and control, with the twin ultimate aims of survival and security for oneself and one's ethnic group. Under this mindset, authoritarian and dictatorial practices are common and justified. Oliver (2009) argues that this kind of mindset or worldview cannot create peace in any society. Participants unequivocally affirm that this mindset or

worldview has never been effective in creating peace in the context of Nigeria's democracy enmeshed in attaining the national objective of 'unity in diversity'. This dominant mindset or worldview demands conformity, blind obedience and passive resignation of other ethnic groups to the major ruling ethnic group. It systematically puts the non-ruling ethnic groups in a condition of disadvantage, neglect and abuse. Oliver (2009) believes that all aspects of human culture such as science, religion, governance, technology, marriage, family and business practices are subject to abuse and misuse under the survival-based worldview.

According to Oliver (2009), this worldview has only delivered a negative rather than a positive or transformative version of peace. He believes that the survival-based worldview is rooted in a realist and Hobbesian perspective. The worldview prioritizes security and distributive communalist politics over integrative, cosmopolitan or agonistic politics (Oliver, 2009). Thus, a direct outlook of this worldview is the acceptance of grudging inter-communal co-existence rather than ability to effect genuinely transformative peace (Oliver, 2009). In this way, 'pacification' rather than 'peace' is the aim of peace-building models rooted in this worldview. The survival-based worldview hinges on the often unacknowledged view that military violence, broadly constructed as 'security' or 'law and order', forms the foundational basis of political organization and politics. This is why peace-building models of this worldview prefer a centralized monopoly of violence which according to them provides the necessary framework for dealing with difference and radical disagreement or threats. Regrettably, this retains a permanent place for violence in the polity (Oliver, 2009). Participants reiterate that peace-building and national security efforts, particularly in post-1999 Nigeria, have only been focused at re-securitization of the polity, where politics is assumed to begin with security institutions, rather than with individual agency, social justice, community and everyday life. The study participants' conceptions of conditions that would guarantee peace in Nigeria include: a) balance of political power among the various ethnic groups; b) legitimacy for decision makers within ethnic groups, as well as external parties, duly supported through transparency and accountability; c) recognized and valued interdependent relationships among ethnic groups in manners that ensure long-term cooperation during periods of agreement, disagreement, normality, and crisis; d) reliable and trusted institutions for resolving conflicts; and e) mutual understanding of rights, interests, and intents.

Trajectory of Nigeria's Militarized Democracy

Participants widely attest that there are heightened ethnic tensions in post-1999 Nigeria as each of the over 250 ethnic groups in the country

increasingly pushes for its own layers of authority and loyalty structures. Historically, the current political dispensation which started from 1999 is Nigeria's third serious attempt since 1960 to establish a lasting democratic system (Otto & Ukpere, 2012). The first and second brief phases of democratic government where between 1960-1966 and 1979-1983 respectively. Otto and Ukpere (2012) argue that prolonged years of military rule has militarized the political culture in Nigeria in manners that a civic democratic culture is eroded. Consequently, values and norms unknown to democracy, such as disregard of court orders and violation of human rights, rather than dialogue and the rule of law, have become the dominant culture in Nigeria (Frank & Ukpere, 2012). Participants confirmed that these values and norms truly characterized Nigeria's democracy thereby making the nation's democracy superficial and wrecked by multiple forms of bad governance which manifest in police brutality, domineering local oligarchies, incompetent and indifferent state bureaucracies, corrupt and inaccessible judiciaries, corrupt ruling elites who are contemptuous of the rule of law and accountable to no one but themselves. In this way, democracy in Nigeria has not met the expectations of the people for better improvement in living standards as well as to guarantee justice, equity, fairness, economic and political rights (Egharevba & Chiazor, 2012; Okenyodo, 2016).

Felbab-Brown and Forest (2012) corroborated this position to emphasize that the most common and salient grievances of most Nigerians include grievances that range from corruption among political and economic elites, economic disparity in the population, barriers to social and educational opportunity, energy poverty, environmental destruction, human insecurity and injustice. They argue that all these grievances culminate to best portray Nigeria as a predatory society. A predatory society according to them is a society that cannot sustain democracy. This is because sustainable democracy requires constitutionalism and respect for law. A predatory society cannot generate sustainable economic growth, as this requires actors with financial capital to invest in productive activities. In a predatory society, people do not get rich through productive activities and honest risktaking activities; instead, they get rich by manipulating power and privilege, by stealing from the state, exploiting the weak, and shirking the law (Frank & Ukpere, 2012). The powerful prey on the weak and deprive majority of the population of public goods. Felbab-Brown and Forest (2012) added to say that government in a predatory society is not a public enterprise but a criminal conspiracy, where the line between the police and the criminals is thin, or may not exist at all.

Since 2017 for instance, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a notorious unit of the Nigerian Police with a long record of abuses, had been accused of several human rights violations. Participants alluded to tales of

kidnapping, murder, theft, rape, torture, unlawful arrests, humiliation, unlawful detention, extrajudicial killings and extortions perpetuated by members of SARS. Participants acknowledged that the return to democratic government in 1999 has not really kept the Nigerian military out of political power. They showed awareness that the constitutional role of the Nigerian military is not only to maintain territorial integrity and defend the country against external aggression, but to also suppress insurrection and aid civil authorities in restoring order when called upon to do so by the National Assembly (legislature). Participants reminisced that post-1999 democracy in Nigeria has featured several incidents that have necessitated military intervention to defend the country's territorial integrity, assist civil authorities, and even act as agents of state hegemony and control in manners that are similar to previous military regimes.

Participants widely aligned to describe Nigeria's democracy as a 'sham' as this lacks the three basic ingredients of the democratization process that Cheeseman (2015) outlined as: the transition to multi-partyism; the reconstitution of a new political order; and the consolidation of democratic gains. Participants argue that Nigeria's inability to consolidate its democratic experiences since 1999 has resulted in a trapped democratization phase that allows the different ethnic groups that make up Nigeria to violently contest for their share of the "national cake" (Male, 46 years, Dutsin-Ma, April 8, 2020). A trapped democracy was described as one that fails to improve its democratic qualities in terms of democratic procedures, contents, and results. This caged democratic transition mode is believed to not only have created a weak Nigerian state, but this has equally paved way for the emergence of ethnic militias and insurgent groups in different parts of the country. Sklar (1988) earlier noted that democracy in Nigeria is with many reservations, especially as the prominent section of the 'securitized' elite class thrives on crony capitalism and patron-client deals in violation of the rule of law.

In describing the upsurge of violence in Nigeria's democratic experience, participants assert that terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, ISIWAP and Ansaru in northern Nigeria are believed to be getting support from some 'securitized' elites, even from government institutions. According to a participant:

The reason why we still have so much insecurity in Nigeria is because military weapons are in the hands of Boko Haram fighters, kidnappers, bandits and other criminals. These criminals have powerful and latest weapons like rocket-launchers, even AK-49, not even AK-47. The worst of it is that there is a tribal and religious coloration to the insecurity in Nigeria, and the government is begging to negotiate with these criminals, a thing that has not been done anywhere in the world... Hence, every tribe or ethnic group in Nigeria has to defend itself...

(Male, 48 years, Dutsin-Ma, February 27, 2020)

Participants agreed with Obamamoye (2019) that Nigeria's national security system is weak because attempted reforms of the national security sector have only been focused at achieving:

- i) De-politicization and subordination of the military to civil authority;
- ii) Constitutionalizing and redefining the role and mission of the military;
- iii) Reorientation and re-professionalization of the core security sector; and
- iv) Demilitarization of public order and increasing relevance of civil policing.

Participants affirm that although a significant number of these reforms address issues as human rights, democracy, tolerance and equality, satisfaction with the effectiveness of these reforms to enthrone a culture of peace in the Nigerian society is low. The following reasons were identified for this dissatisfaction:

- in each core security sector, only a small number of personnel in this sector do receive training in peace-building for a short period;
- at the psychological level, the participating personnel from the security sector are not usually ready to deal with such issues as tolerance, democracy and human rights;
- at the social level, the necessary degree of trust and confidence has not been developed between participating security personnel and the public. The necessary interface, communication, dialogue and joint activities, essential for removing the stereotypes, misconceptions and flawed information that Nigerians have about security personnel in the country had not yet taken place. In the absence of such close encounters between the Nigerian public and security personnel, the drive towards a culture of peace in the Nigerian society can be perceived as being either unrealistic or not applicable to the realities of life:
- the fact that the subjects of human rights, tolerance, democracy, equality, freedom, and peacebuilding which security personnel do learn are not directed to change mindsets.

This discrepancy between theory and practice was identified by participants as the main reason why there are complications in executing peace education in Nigeria. Participants conceived a culture of peace in terms of a community's efforts in changing how community members think and act in order to promote peace and development. They aver that a change of mindset and behaviour toward peace is not only a social and political

necessity, but also a religious necessity. This is because religion has always played, and will continue to play a major role in shaping the worldview and behaviour of its followers. Participants acknowledged that the task of worldview transformation in Nigeria is difficult. It was explained that under conditions of conflict and violence, it is actually difficult to change 'how people think'. This is because conflict and violence afflict and damage all aspect of human life. That conflict and violence do not only destroy the physical habitat of people, they also inflict physical and psychological injuries on people, causing social dislocation, poverty and disease and weaken the moral and spiritual fabric of individual and community life. Consequently, the injuries of conflicts and violence have made the task of the creation of a culture of peace and development in post-1999 Nigeria's democratic era very difficult.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper reiterates that peace education remains the preferable option for mobilizing for effective security and development in Nigeria's post-1999 democracy. This is because peace education holds potentials in entrenching a peace-based worldview and culture that is fundamental to sustainable development. The paper addresses the all-important issue of human relationships in ways that produce a transition from self-centered and anxiety-ridden insecurities of survival instincts that instill dichotomous tensions of identity-formation among Nigerian ethnic groups to a universal and all-inclusive state of awareness of their fundamental oneness and connectedness with one another as human beings. A survival-based worldview rooted in liberal peace-building models has produced a democracy that is characterized by violence and political instability, widespread human rights abuses, and the absence of democratic consolidation in post-1999 Nigeria. However, peace education offers a bottom-up approach to the creation of a culture of peace embedded in nonviolent 'everyday peace' practices that relies on local critical agency. Hence, peace researchers and educators in Nigeria need to shape the content and pedagogy of peace education by incorporating issues of human security, justice, equity and intercultural understanding in ways that integrate both western and African perspectives.

References

Ajodo-Adebanjoko, Angela. (2020). Rural Banditry in Northwest Nigeria Amidst a Global Pandemic: A Gender Perspective. *Political Crossroads*, 24(1): 59-78.

- Alimba, N. Chinyere. (2013). Peace education, transformation of higher education and youths empowerment for peace in Africa. *International Journal of Scientific and Technological Research*, 2(12): 338-347.
- Ardizzone, Leonisa. (2001). Towards global understanding: The transformative role of peace education. *Current issues in comparative education*, 4(1): 1-10.
- Armstrong, Nancy, and Leonard Tennenhouse. (2014). *The Violence of Representation: Literature and the History of Violence*. London: Routledge.
- Bajaj, Monisha. (2015). 'Pedagogies of resistance' and critical peace education praxis. *Journal of Peace Education*, 12(2): 154-166.
- Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Yigal Rosen. (2009). Peace education in societies involved in intractable conflicts: Direct and indirect models. *Review of Educational Research*, 79(2): 557-575.
- Bowden, Brett. (2004). In the name of progress and peace: the standard of civilization and the universalizing project. *Alternatives*, 29(1): 43-68.
- Brantmeier, Edward J. (2013). Toward a critical peace education for sustainability. *Journal of peace education*, 10(3): 242-258.
- Campbell, W. Keith, Carrie Pierce Bush, Amy B. Brunell, and Jeremy Shelton. (2005). Understanding the social costs of narcissism: The case of the tragedy of the commons. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(10): 1358-1368.
- Cheeseman, Nic. (2015). No bourgeoisie, no democracy? The political attitudes of the Kenyan middle class. *Journal of International Development*, 27(5): 647-664.
- Clarke-Habibi, Sara. (2005). Transforming worldviews: The case of education for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of Transformative Education*, 3(1): 33-56.
- Clarke-Habibi, Sara. (2005). Transforming worldviews: The case of education for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Journal of Transformative Education*, 3(1): 33-56.
- Cornelius, O., and Esheya Greg. (2013). Federal character principles, nation building and national integration in Nigeria: Issues and options. *Mediterranean journal of social sciences*, 4(16): 33-33.
- Danesh, H. B. (2006) Towards an integrative theory of peace education, *Journal of Peace Education*, 3(1), 55-78.
- Dasli, Maria. (2019). UNESCO guidelines on intercultural education: a deconstructive reading. *Pedagogy, Culture & Society*, 27(2): 215-232.
- Enaigbe, Patrick, and Igbinoghene Nicholas. (2016). Challenges of managing and planning peace education and peace culture in Nigeria. *African research review*, 10(4): 83-92.
- Ezeoba, Kate Oge. (2012). Strategies for integrating peace education into social studies curriculum for junior secondary (Basic 7-9) schools in Nigeria. *African Research Review*, 6(3): 218-231.
- Farmaki, Anna. (2017). The tourism and peace nexus. *Tourism Management*. 59: 528-540.
- Felbab-Brown, Vanda, and James JF Forest. (2012). Political violence and the illicit economies of West Africa. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(5): 787-806.

- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Jonas Nordkvelle, and Havard Strand. (2014). Peace research–Just the study of war?. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(2): 145-158.
- Harris, Ian M. (2004). Peace education theory. *Journal of peace education*, 1(1): 5-20.
- Harris, Ian M., and Mary Lee Morrison. (2012). *Peace education*. California, USA: McFarland.
- Isima, Jeffrey O. (2007). The Privatisation of Violence and Security Sector Reform in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa Examined. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 3: 2, : 24-37.
- Iyekekpolo, Wisdom Oghosa. (2020). Political elites and the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 32(4): 749-767.
- Jackson Richard. (2018). Post-liberal peacebuilding and the pacifist state, *Peacebuilding*, 6:1, 1-16.
- Kester, Kevin. (2007). Peace education: Experience and storytelling as living education. *Peace and Conflict Review*, 2(2): 1-14.
- Kester, Kevin. (2008). Developing peace education programs: Beyond ethnocentrism and violence. *Peace Prints: Journal of South Asian Peacebuilding*, 1(1): 37-64.
- Kurian, Nomisha, and Kester Kevin. (2019). Southern voices in peace education: interrogating race, marginalisation and cultural violence in the field. *Journal of peace education*, 16(1): 21-48.
- McKay, Susan. (2004). Women, human security, and peace-building: A feminist analysis. *Conflict and human security: A search for new approaches of peace-building*, 19: 152-170.
- Mhandara, Lawrence. (2020). Community-based reconciliation in practice and lessons for the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission of Zimbabwe. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 20(1): 35-58.
- Miller, Gabrielle F., Laura Chiang, and NaTasha Hollis. (2018). Economics and violence against children, findings from the Violence Against Children Survey in Nigeria. *Child abuse & neglect*, 85: 9-16.
- Momodu, Abdulkareem Jude. (2013). Mainstreaming peace education in secondary school curricula in Nigeria. *Inter-national Journal of English and Education*, 2(2): 535-546.
- Moscovici, Serge. (1993). Introductory address to the International Conference on Social Representations, Ravello, 1992. *Papers on social representations*, 2: 160-170.
- Murithi, Tim. (2009). An African perspective on peace education: Ubuntu lessons in reconciliation. *International review of education*, 55(2-3): 221-233.
- Nwafor, Naboth HA. (2012). Peace education and national development: A critical appraisal. *Journal of economics and sustainable development*, 3(11): 132-135.
- Obamamoye, Babatunde F. (2019). State Weakness and Regional Security Instability: Evidence from Africa's Lake Chad Region. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)*, 13: a639-a639.
- Okenyodo, Oluwakemi. (2016). Governance, accountability, and security in Nigeria. *Africa Security Briefs*, 3(1).

- Okoli, Al Chukwuma, and Anthony Chinedu Ugwu. (2020). Of Marauders and Brigands: Scoping the Threat of Rural Banditry in Nigeria's North West. *Brazilian Journal*, 4(8): 201-222.
- Okolie-Osemene, James. (2012). Towards utilizing new digital media technologies for the promotion of peace education in Nigeria. *African Journal of Teacher Education*, 2(1): 1-9.
- Oliver Richmond, 'A. (2009). Post-liberal Peace: Eirenism and the everyday', *Review of International Studies*, 35: 557.
- Olowo, Oluwatoyin Olusegun. (2016). Effects of Integrating Peace Education in the Nigeria Education System. *Journal of Education and Practice*, 7(18): 9-14.
- Olwan, Dana M. (2013). Gendered violence, cultural otherness, and honour crimes in Canadian national logics. *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 38(4): 533-556.
- Omeje, Kenneth. (2015). Strengthening peace research and peace education in African universities. *African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de Sociologie*, 19(1): 16-33.
- Otto Godly and Ukpere Wilfred. (2012). National security and development in Nigeria. *African Journal of Business Management* Vol.6 (23), pp. 6765-6770.
- Page, James S. (2008). The United Nations and peace education. Encyclopedia of peace education, 75-84.
- Ritchie, Jane, Liz Spencer, and William O'Connor. (2003). Carrying out qualitative analysis. *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers*. London: Sage, 219-62.
- Salomon, Gavriel. (2004). Comment: what is peace education?. *Journal of Peace Education*, 1(1): 123-127.
- Sklar, Richard L. (1988). Beyond capitalism and socialism in Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 26(1): 1-21.
- Tchombe, Therese. (2006). Education, violence, conflict and prospect for peace in Africa: An evaluation of research endeavours for peace education. *Colloque International*, 5(23): 1-25.
- Valentino, Benjamin A. (2014). Why we kill: The political science of political violence against civilians. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17: 89-103.
- Wild, Hannah, Jok Madut Jok, and Patel Ronak. (2018). The militarization of cattle raiding in South Sudan: how a traditional practice became a tool for political violence. *Journal of International Humanitarian Action*, 3(1): 2-11.
- Zembylas, Michalinos. (2018). Con-/divergences between postcolonial and critical peace education: towards pedagogies of decolonization in peace education. *Journal of Peace Education*, 15(1): 1-23.