

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS AND EMERGENCE OF RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS IN PLATEAU AND BAUCHI STATES, NIGERIA

Aliyu Mustapha

Department of Criminology and Security Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences, Federal University of Kashere,
Gombe State, Nigeria.
Email: aliyumust@gmail.com, aliyumustapha@fukashere.edu.ng

Ewhrudjakpor, Christian

Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences
Delta State University Abraka, Nigeria
Email: acadchris@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper examines ethno-religious conflicts and the emergence of residential patterns in Jos North, Jos South (Plateau State), Toro and Tafawa Balewa (Bauchi State) Local Government Areas in Nigeria. The Intractable Conflict Theory and Territorial Imperative Theory provided the lenses through which issues relating to the uncovering of remote causes of the protracted ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau and Bauchi States, and how these protracted ethno-religious conflicts impact on the socio-economic development of Plateau and Bauchi States were examined. The survey research design was adopted for this study which involves the use of multi stage and purposive sampling techniques where 382 respondents emerged as the study sample. Quantitative data that emerged in the study were analyzed through the use of frequency counts, percentages, mean and standard deviation. Regression statistical technique was employed to test the study's hypotheses. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS Version 26) was used to run the statistical techniques adopted. The study's results indicate that a major cause of the ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau and Bauchi States, Nigeria, which necessitates residential segregation patterns, is religion intolerance. Results also established that protracted ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau and Bauchi States significantly impact on livestock production in these States. The paper recommends that governments at all levels in Plateau and Bauchi States should initiate and implement programmes that create good relationships between Muslims and Christians on bases of informed appreciation and unbiased judgment of one another's foundational beliefs.

Keywords: Ethnic, Religion, Beliefs, Conflict Resolution, Residential Pattern

Introduction

Ethnicity, political bigotry fueled by religious narrow-mindedness has caused a lot of damage to the once enjoyed unity in diversity of the Africa peoples and culture (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021). Nigeria has become an absolute case study given her ethnic and religious pluralism that has created an atmosphere of violent ethno-religious crises that paved way for the present day segregated residential patterns. Diverse communities in Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria alike, have long histories of peacefully sharing resources, intermarrying, and resolving disputes, this democratic and tranquil atmosphere was truncated by several factors (Tsega, 2009). Corroborating this assertion, Madueke (2018) states that apart from large-scale armed struggles that fall under the rubric of civil war, Africa is home to numerous violent conflicts involving rival ethnic categories. Highlighting on the Jos ethno-religious conflict, Esiri and Aliyu (2021) gave a brief chronicle of incidents in Plateau and Bauchi States as shown in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Selected Cases of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Plateau and Bauchi States 2008-2021

Date	Place	Incident	Outcome
28 Nov. 2008	Plateau	Religious violence between Muslims and Christians in the city of Jos.	The crisis which was triggered by the controversial results of a local election later turned religious. Over 700 people killed and thousands internally displaced.
21 Feb. 2009	Bauchi	Ethno-religious conflict at the Makama New Extension.	Over 11 people were killed, more than 400 houses burnt, and over 1 600 families displaced.
29 Dec. 2009	Bauchi	Religious violence unleashed by the KalaKato sect on Christians	Over 38 persons killed; about 20 suspected members of the sect arrested; and over 1000 people internally displaced.
17–20 Jan. 2009	Plateau	Resurgence of religious crisis in Jos.	Police announced at least 320 killed, but aid workers and local leaders place death toll at over 550. Over 40, 000 persons displaced.

7 Mar. 2010	Plateau	Attacks by Fulani Moslems on Christian dominated villages of Dogo Nahawa, Shen and Fan in Jos.	Over 500 people – mainly women and children – were killed.
14 Aug. 2021	Plateau	Outbreak of fresh violence along Rukuba road axis of the city	Not fewer than 18 persons are feared dead
24 Aug. 2021	Plateau	Attackers claimed to be Hausa neighbours in Yelwa Zangam	The attackers broke into a compound and killed a family of seven.

Source: Esiri and Aliyu (2021)

Madueke (2018) further argued that the case of Jos has contributed meaningfully to local and global discussions about the intersection between spatiality and collective violence. This situation has created the “we” and “them” relationship between the indigenes and settlers especially from the religious point of view, hence the new residential arrangement of “mixed” and “segregated” patterns in Jos and its environs (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021). Alozie (2020) in his work argues that that the policy of segregation is undoubtedly a resented feature of colonial rule in Africa, while residential segregation policies were justified along policies related to health, sanitation, and disease prevention, the motive also derived from the demonstration of racial supremacy and civilization which was the ideological justification for empires in Africa. However, prior to the intractable conflicts in Jos and Bauchi, there existed a convivial coexistence among the diverse ethnic and religious groups. However, in Jos today we have such areas as Angwan Rogo, Bauchi road and Sabon Pegi purely dominated by the Muslims. Similarly, Tafawa Balewa town in Bauchi state is a community exclusively for the Christians.

With the introduction of religion into the struggle for right of indigeneship, especially by the settler groups, changed the narrative, hence, the phrase “ethno-religious conflict (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021). It has been the tactics of some politicians especially in Northern Nigeria to use religion as fuel to magnify what could have been a manageable communal conflict (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021). This has led to intermittent pogrom, spatial polarization, residential segregation, political and social division and the emergence of fast-growing cities in Jos North, Jos South Toro and Tafawa Balewa local government areas of Plateau and Bauchi States. These Local

Government Areas are important to this study because of the persistent and intractable nature of ethno-religious conflicts therein. In Jos North and Jos South Local Government Areas of Plateau state, ethno-religious crisis has been a recurring decimal since 2001 to date (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021). Similarly, Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area of Bauchi State has witnessed series of conflicts from 2008 to date without a permanent solution (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021).

Thus, this paper aims to investigate the remote causes of residential patterns and the impact of ethnic-religious conflicts on the economic development in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas of Plateau and Bauchi States respectively. The paper is divided into three major parts. The first part is the literature review where themes relating to dynamics of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria and impacts of ethnic-religious conflict in Northern Nigeria were reviewed. There is a section in this part of the paper that reviewed related theories upon which analyses in this paper were anchored. The second part of the paper is the methodological approach adopted for the study upon which data for this paper emerged. The last part of this paper is the presentation and discussion of results, including conclusions and recommendations.

Dynamics of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

There are myriad of empirical studies by Scholars with divergent views on the causes and of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria and by extension, in Jos North, Jos south, Toro and Tafawa Balewa Local government areas of Plateau and Bauchi States and the subsequent emergence of new settlements and residential arrangements. A range of issues have been identified as the major sources of conflicts in Jos between the Hausa/Fulani and the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta. Overviews of some of the issues are linked to indigeneship, politics, economy, religion and unemployment. A wealth of relevant literature (Mgbachu and Okechukwu, 2014; Esiri and Aliyu, 2021; Bodi, Abbare and Leawat, 2021 and Madueke, 2018) have lent credence to issues relating to causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria and by extension Jos North, Jos south, Toro and Tafawa Balewa Local Government Areas of Plateau and Bauchi States.

Mgbachu and Okechukwu (2014) examined the causes of religious violence in Nigeria and their investigation revealed that many factors are responsible for religious violence in Nigeria which includes; religious fundamentalism, fanaticism, local rivalries, and religious intolerance. Religious fundamentalism as postulated by Mgbachu and Okechukwu (2014) refers to any sect or movement within a religion that emphasizes a rigid adherence to what it conceives of as the fundamental principles of its faith, usually resulting in a denouncement of alternative practices and

interpretations. Highlighting on religious fundamentalism as a cause of religious conflicts, Mgbachu and Okechukwu (2014) argued that fundamentalist sects are found in almost all of the World's major religions, particularly Christianity and Islam. In Christianity, fundamentalists are "Born Again and Bible believing Protestants, as opposed to mainline, modernist, Protestants, who from a fundamentalist perspective, represent Churchianity. In Islam they are Jama'at (Arabic religious enclaves: with connotations of close fellowship) self-consciously engaged in Jihad (struggle) against western culture that suppress authentic Islam submission) and the God-given (Sharia) way of life (Mgbachu & Okechukwu, 2014). They further argued that religious intolerance is another major source of religious violence. Intolerant according to Hornby (Mgbachu & Okechukwu, 2014), means disapproving or not willing to accept ideas or ways of behaving that are different from your own.

Esiri and Aliyu (2021) in their study states that the major causes of the Jos ethno-religious conflicts are; the claim and counter claim of ownership of Jos by the three major ethnic groups of Jos (Afizere, Anaguta and Berom), indigene/settler dichotomy, political and government insensitivity. Claim and counter claims of ownership of Jos is another major factor that precipitates the intermittent violent conflicts in Jos. According to Esiri and Aliyu (2021) in support of this argument, one of the community leaders and a retired public servant in Nasarawa Gwom, Jos North local government Area of Plateau State in an interview session, stated that because of the hatred among the Berom, Afizere and the Anaguta people; this marks the beginning of this whole crisis that has taken a lot of life of innocent people. Our people have a proverb that only when the wall cracks that lizard can penetrate (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021). It is argued that all the land from Kasuwan nama to Bukuru low-cost housing estate in Jos South today, belonged to the Afizere people (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021). That the Afizere people accommodated the Beroms, Anagutas and even the Hausas, that is the claim and counter claim by these other ethnic groups (the Beroms and Anagutas) that paved way for the Hausa settlers to also lay claim to ownership of the land (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021). This has impacted negatively on the communal ties that bind members of the community together through kinship, descent and or marriage (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021). Ethnicity is one major course of the conflicts while religious intolerance is a recent factor (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021).

In the same vein, explaining further on ethnicity as a cause of the intermittent ethno-religious conflicts that has affected the residential patterns in the study areas as the findings of this study revealed. Isuwa, a Youth leader in Tafawa Balewa town in an interview session aligns with the findings as he concurs to the question on ethnicity as a cause of the incessant

ethno-religious conflicts that has resulted in the segregated residential patterns witnessed today. He recounts that:

We the Sayawa have lived peacefully with the Fulani and Hausa people for many years. The problem started when the Fulani ethnic group start to show superiority and try to claim our ancestral land. My brother, we have to fight for our inheritance you understand what I mean, our land. Where do they want us to go? As I speak to you, my heart is bleeding as I remember what the Fulani people did to my people. See, this place is our father's land and we are ready to protect it with all that is available to us. It was this ethnic marginalization and claim of one ethnic group being superior to the other that sparks off the conflict.

Relying on the findings of their study, Esiri and Aliyu made some recommendations geared towards bringing a permanent and sustainable solution to the lingering Jos ethno-religious crisis. The study therefore recommended that the two major religious bodies jointly establish forum where their youths can always come together to share ideas and have better understanding of each other's faith. Federal and state governments should build low-cost houses to resettle most of the displaced victims of the Jos crises. This will help in resolving similar crises like the Hausa versus Katab in Kaduna state, Ife/ Modakeke in Osun state and the Agulere / Umulere in Anambra state. Bodi, Abbare and Leawat (2021) in their work revealed that generally, ethno-religious conflicts are caused by class identification, unemployment, poverty and illiteracy. In the forgoing study by Bodi, Abbare and Leawat (2021), their findings revealed that Jos metropolis and its environs have experienced ethno-religious conflicts at the following periods – 1991, 1994, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2009 and 2010. Source of these conflicts as stated by the researchers are political and religious intolerance.

Similarly, Suleiman (2019) highlighted on some of the factors that led to the violent conflicts in Tafawa Balewa, Bauchi state. Amongst these factors according to Suleiman (2019) are; mutual suspicion, a lack of trust among the people, marginalization, manipulation of elites, struggle over chieftaincy affairs, power struggle, ethnicity and tribalism, Sharia issues, religious rivalry and the question of indigene/ settlers. These causes have influenced both negatively and positively on the residential patterns in the study areas. The negative influence is vivid with the destruction of the Jos ultra-modern market that used to be a major source of revenue to the state. Social life of the people in these segregated residential areas is also affected as Muslims and Christians can no longer move or do business freely in areas not occupied by people of their faith. On the other hand, the influx of forced migrants into Tilde, Narabi and Magama towns of Toro Local Government Area of Bauchi state has increased the revenue generation of the state.

Impacts of Ethnic-Religious Conflict in Northern Nigeria

The prevalent ethno-religious conflicts and the resultant residential patterns has adversely impacted on all sectors of the economy (livestock, commerce, transportation and shelter) in Plateau, Bauchi States and Nigeria in general. Fatuga, (2003) in his study notes that one major aspect of the economy that is badly affected by the Jos violent conflict is livestock production. Livestock plays a very important role in the national economy and given the friendly geographical nature of Jos, the establishment of that the prestigious Institute of Veterinary Research in Vom near Jos, is not accidental rather, a well-articulated decision. More significantly, the livestock sector provides a source of employment and income for a large proportion of the rural population, as well as an important source of protein in the local diet. The livestock sub-sector as further revealed in the forgoing study by Fatuga (2003), generates revenue through its many diverse upstream and downstream enterprises e.g., Livestock trade tax, slaughter fee paid in government-owned abattoirs, hides and skins buyers license fees, and clinical treatment for livestock at government veterinary clinics. The study also revealed that, livestock production has consistently contributed 5-6% of the national GDP and 15-20% of the total agricultural GDP over the years. Fatuga (2003), states that with the persistent ethno-religious conflicts that have bedeviled Jos North and south, these and many other benefits from the livestock sector have gone down the drain and remain historic.

Esiri and Aliyu, (2021) asserts that livestock is just one of the numerous sub-sectors of the economy, other sectors adversely affected by the Jos crises include commerce, transport and shelter. Jos occupies a strategic position in the Kano-Kaduna-Jos Industrial triangle because of its road, rail and air transport network, and agricultural products. Aliyu (2014) in his study stated how viable Jos was economically, and how adversely it was affected by the persistent ethno-religious conflicts and residential patterns of the area. The study reveals how for example, the NASCO Group of Companies based in Jos produces a wide range of products which include carpets, biscuits, cornflakes, detergents, packaging materials et cetera. Though not in any way destroyed physically, but the exodus of people from Jos for safety has adversely affected its workforce hence low productivity. The influx of people from Kano after the 1980 Maitatsine religious crisis and the completion of the Jos “Terminus Market” also facilitated the commercial activities of Jos thereby elevating Jos from its “vacation and retirement” status to a commercial city (Esiri & Aliyu, 2021).

The most significant symbol of the commercial importance of the city is the Jos international ultra-modern market popularly known as the “Terminus Market”. According to Eke (2005) this monumental edifice was built in the late 70s and commissioned in 1985 at a cost of ₦20 million naira. It has a

capacity of 4,290 stalls of various sizes, parking space that can accommodate over 300 cars, 200 buses and 60 trailers at a time. This ultra-modern market as revealed by the forgoing study, was gutted by fire on the 12th February 2, 2002, a few months after the 7th September, 2001 major ethno-religious conflict in Jos. The study further revealed that before the inferno that reduced the Terminus market to nothing, the Plateau state government use to realize a monthly revenue of over N12 million naira, but after the fire incident, it hardly makes N5 million naira as revenue from the market. This according to findings of the study has also contributed to the strain industrial relation between the state government and its labour force, because of its failure to pay worker's salaries as at when due.

Mohammed (2004) in his work argued that the impact of the Jos ethno-religious conflicts affected the transport sector and estate in various ways. Transportation according to Mohammed, is very vital to any sustainable economic development especially in the movement of people and goods within and outside a given geographical location. He argued that the existence of motor parks in Jos is indeed a revenue source to the state government. The National Union of Road Transport Workers, National Association of Transport Owners, Plateau Riders and Federal Mass Assisted Transport assists in organizing the transport sector effectively. The study revealed that a large number of passenger vehicles and goods trailers were destroyed during the numerous conflicts in the state. The study also revealed that the prevalence of conflicts in Jos and its environs, sometimes makes certain roads impassable. This in effect means long detour have to be made to reach nearby destinations. The majority of those who bear the brunt are most likely the poor. Most transporters have decided to switch routes instead of risking their lives and their vehicles. This has impacted negatively on the revenue generation of the state as most of the motor marks are no more functional and toll collection dropped drastically.

Ukwayi, Okpa and Dike (2018) in their study examined the implication of ethnic and religious conflicts on human existence and business activities to residents of Jos. From the forgoing study by Ukwayi, Okpa and Dike (2018), results of the tested hypotheses upon which their findings are based and recommendations suggested, revealed that ethnic crisis has significant negative effect on human existence and business activities among residents of Jos metropolis, Plateau state Nigeria. On the other hand, Yusuf (2009) argued that the influx of forced emigrants from Plateau State into Bauchi State has resulted in rapid social and economic development of Narabi, Tilden-Fulani and Magama in Toro Local Government Area of Bauchi State. The weekly market of Tilden-Fulani and Magama now attracts businessmen and women from within and outside the state. This has also increased the

revenue generation of Toro Local Government Area and by extension that of Bauchi State.

Theoretical Framework

It will be inappropriate to adopt a mono factor-based explanation of ethno-religious conflict and residential patterns. Oberschall (2010) argued that no single theoretical framework can be expected to encompass conflict. It is against this backdrop that this study adopts the 'Intractable conflict theory' and 'Territorial Imperative theory' to explain the ethno-religious conflicts and residential patterns in Jos and Toro local government areas of Plateau and Bauchi states. Intractable conflict theory and Territorial imperative theory are situated within conflict paradigm or perspective.

1. Intractable Conflict Theory

Intractable conflicts according to its major proponent, Northrup (1989), are conflicts that challenges and resist every resolution attempt, even when the best techniques are applied. The basic assumptions of intractable conflict theory as outlined by Northrup (1989) are protracted, destructive, resolution resistant, grid locked, identity based, need based and complex. Lederach (1997) in shedding light on the basic premises of Northrup's intractable conflicts, writes that such conflicts are driven by social-psychological perceptions, emotions, humiliations and subjective experiences, which can be wholly independent of substantive or originating issues. The concept of intractable conflict was later broadened into three overarching characteristics by Putman and Wondolleck (2003). First, intractable conflicts are characterized by long standing conflict that manifests itself in cyclical patterns, with frequent bursts of violence juxtaposed with periods of relative quiet as conflict brew beneath the surface. Second, they are waged in ways that the adversaries themselves or third parties perceive to be destructive, such as by bearing devastating financial costs as well as extremely traumatic physical and emotional consequences. Third, they continue despite repeated attempts by third parties to resolve or transform them.

In Plateau and Bauchi States, recent political events have shown how intense emotional experiences of humiliation, rage and anger has led to cycle of reprisals that motivate violent and terrorist activities. From the above exposition therefore, ethno-religious conflicts in the study areas has persisted since 1994 to date, hence protracted and intractable.

2. Territorial imperative theory adopted, tends to explain the residential patterns in the study areas of this study. Ardrey (1967) the major proponent of territorial imperative theory, believe that men like animals, have an impulse to define a territory belonging to them, within which space they gratify their basic needs of existence. Though Ardrey developed his theory

to explain animal behaviour, he extends it to apply to man, based on the feelings that man is much a traditional animal than any other animal. The territory according to Ardrey, is defined as an area of space, of water, earth, or air, which an animal or groups of animals defend as an exclusive preserve. He further asserts that owners of territory stake out property, chase out trespassers and defend what they perceive as theirs. Territorial conflicts also coincide with conflicts over land, natural resources and the environment. This is because a definition of territory and territorial conflict will either start from, or be fueled by competition for and access to land.

The Plateau and Bauchi ethno-religious violent conflicts are essentially resource conflict between divergent groups and interests. The land in contention here are the Jos North, Jos South and Tafawa Balewa Local Government Areas. It is within this defined territory that other goals like political, economic, religion and prestige are vigorously and violently pursued.

Methodology

As the blue print that addresses the problem of scientific inquiries, this study adopts the cross-sectional design in order to actualize its purposes. A cross-sectional study is an observational study that often describes a “snapshot” of a population in a certain point in time, because exposure and outcome are determined simultaneously for each subject of the population (Hemed, 2015). For objectivity and true sampling of opinion among respondents, survey method was used. The study was conducted in some purposively selected areas in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa Balewa Local Government Areas of Plateau and Bauchi States. Below is the distribution of the population for the four local government areas of study.

Table 1: Distribution of the population of the selected areas in Jos North, Jos South Toro and Tafawa-Balewa local government areas of Plateau and Bauchi States:

S/N	Jos North L.G.A. (Gwong and Kabong Districts)		Jos South L.G.A. (Du District)		Toro L.G.A. (Toro District)		Tafawa-Balewa L.G.A (Lere and Bula Districts)		Total
	Comm.	Pop.	Comm.	Pop.	Comm.	Pop.	Comm.	Pop.	
1	Angwan-Rogo	3,854	Dadin-Kowa	3,470	Magama	2,621	Tafawa-Balewa	3,286	
2	Angwan-Rukuba	1,966	Kerana	2,096	Tilden-Fulani	3,007	Lere	2,019	
3	Nasarawa-Gwom	4,371	Gyel	3,984	Narabi	2,162	Yamgan	1,891	
4	Kabong	2,176							
Total		12,367		9,550		7,790		7,196	36,903

Source: Local Government Area Population Offices; Plateau and Bauchi States, 2022

Based on the population of thirty-six thousand, nine hundred and three (36,903) as stated above, the sample size was calculated using Taro Yamane (1967) sample size determination formula. The sample size arrived at is 399.978, approximated to be 400.

Sample Size Determinant

TARO YAMANE SAMPLE SIZE DERIVATION FOR THE STUDY

$$\text{Formula: } n = \frac{N}{1 + (Ne^2)}$$

Where

n = sample size

N = population

1 = constant

e² = error margin (0.05) otherwise known as alpha level

$$n = \frac{36902}{1 + (36902 \times 0.05^2)}$$

$$n = \frac{36902}{92.26}$$

$$n = 399.978$$

Approximated to be 400

Sample size therefore is 400 (Taro, 1967).

The study used structured questionnaire and In-depth interview tools for data collection. 400 questionnaires were administered and 382 were properly filled and adequate for analysis. Data gathered from the field were appropriately coded and analyzed using necessary statistical tools. The participants interviewed include community leaders, youth leaders, women leaders and religious leaders. It provided a cooperative atmosphere to elicit information not only from the educated research participants, also the uneducated research participants. Regression and analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical techniques were employed to test the stated hypotheses. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 26) was used to run the adopted statistical techniques.

Results and Discussions

Table 2: Distribution of Respondents on Socio-Demographic Characteristics

		Frequency	Percentage
Sex of Respondent	Male	265	69.4%
	Female	117	30.6%
	Total	382	100.0%
Age of Respondents	18-28	78	20.4%
	29-39	153	40.1%
	40 and above	151	39.5%
	Total	382	100.0%
Religion	Christianity	216	56.5%
	Islam	164	42.9%
	Africa Traditional Religion	2	0.5%
	Total	382	100.0%
Ethnic Group	Afizere	41	10.7%
	Anaguta	47	12.3%
	Berom	71	18.6%
	Hausa	85	22.3%
	Fulani	45	11.8%
	Sayawa	52	13.6%
	Others	41	10.7%
	Total	382	100.0%
Marital Status	Single	100	26.2%
	Married	249	65.2%
	Divorced	33	8.6%
	Total	382	100.0%
Educational Qualification	Primary Education	16	4.2%
	Secondary Education	130	34.0%
	Tertiary Education	236	61.8%
	Total	382	100.0%
Occupation	Trader	48	12.6%
	Farmer	71	18.6%
	Civil Servant	143	37.4%
	Religion Leader	65	17.0%
	Unemployed	55	14.4%
	Total	382	100.0%
Location	Angwan –Rogo	39	10.2%
	Nasarawa-Gwom	42	11.0%
	Angwan- Rukuba	24	6.3%
	Kabong	23	6.0%
	Gyel	41	10.7%
	Kerana	21	5.5%
	Dadin-Kowa	38	9.9%

	Toro	20	5.2%
	Tilden-Fulani	32	8.4%
	Magama	28	7.3%
	Tafawa-Balewa	36	9.4%
	Lere	21	5.5%
	Yamgan	17	4.5%
	Total	382	100.0%
Pattern of Residence	Segregated	158	41.4%
	Mixed	224	58.6%
	Total	382	100.0%

Source: Fieldwork, 2022

A cursory look at table 2 show the sex distribution of respondents from the study areas in Plateau and Bauchi States, of Nigeria. Out of the 382 respondents, 265 were males while 117 were females representing 69.40% and 30.60% of the total respondents respectively. This reveals that there was more accessibility to and willingness among male than the female respondents. The table revealed reveals that 78 (20.40%) of the total respondents fall between the age bracket of 18-28 years, 152 (40.10%) of the sampled population fall between the age bracket of 29-39 years, while respondents within the age bracket of 40 years and above were 151 (39.50%) of the total respondents. Respondents who are Christians are more in number with a population of 216 (56.50%), while Muslim respondents are 164 (42.90%). Respondents who practice African Traditional Religion form the least population constituting 2 (0.50%) of the total respondents from the study areas. A close look at the table shows that the Hausa ethnic group were more with 85 (22.30%) respondents, closely followed by the Berom ethnic group with 71 (18.60%). The Seyawa ethnic group constitutes 52 (13.60%) of the sampled population, while the Anaguta group were 47 (12.30%), Fulani ethnic group were 45 (11.80%), Afizere group were 41 (10.70%) and other ethnic groups from the study areas also constituted 41 (10.70%) of the sampled population of the study. The marital status of Respondents of this study as shown in the table revealed that married respondents are more in number with 249 representing 65.20% of the total respondents. Respondents who are single are 100 (26.20%) while 33(8.60%) of the research participants formed the divorced category.

A close examination of the table shows that the respondents with tertiary educational qualification are more among the respondents with 236 (61.80%). Followed by those with secondary education constituting 130 (23%) and respondents with primary education are 16 (4.20%). This indicates that the literacy level of respondents in the study areas is very high. Query on the occupation of respondents shows that civil servants were more among the respondents with 143 (37.40%), followed by farmers with 71

(18.60%), religious leaders form 65 (17%), respondents who are traders constituted 48 (12.60%) while 55 (14.40%) respondents of the sampled population were unemployed. Respondents who are residents of Nasarawa Gwom are more in the population with 42 (11%) of the sampled population, this is closely followed by respondents from Gyel community with 41(10.70%), Angwan Rogo with 39 (10.20%), respondents from Dadin Kowa are 38 (9.90%) and Tafawa Balewa 36 (9.40%). Respondents from Tilden Fulani are 32 (8.40%), Magama 28 (7.30%), Angwan Rukuba 24 (6.30%), Kabong 23 (6%), Lere 21 (5.50%), Narabi 20 (5.20%) while Yamgan had the least number of respondents with 17 (4.50%) of the total sampled population of 382 respondents from the study areas. The table shows 224 (58.60%) of the respondents are residents of mixed residential areas while 158 (41.40%) of the total respondents resides in segregated residential enclaves of the study areas. This implies that due to the forced migration from the crisis prone areas of Jos North and Jos South in Plateau state, there is more concentration of people in a mixed residential pattern in Toro and Tafawa Balewa Local Government Areas of Bauchi State

Table 3: Regression Analysis of the relationship between the causes of ethno-religious conflicts and residential patterns in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.336 ^a	.113	.110	.46513

a. Predictors: (Constant), causes of ethnic-religious conflict

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	10.439	1	10.439	48.253	.000 ^b
	Residual	82.210	380	.216		
	Total	92.649	381			

a. Dependent Variable: Residential Pattern

b. Predictors: (Constant), causes of ethnic-religious conflict

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
-------	-----------------------------	---------------------------	---	------

	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.885	.188		15.308	.000
1 causes of ethnic-religious conflict	-.355	.051	-.336	-6.946	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Residential Pattern

Table 3 shows a test of regression analysis on whether the causes of ethno-religious conflict has no significant influence on residential pattern in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas. The result shows an R^2 value of .110 explaining that 11% of the changes in the residential pattern residents chooses in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas is significantly attributed to the changes in the causes of ethno-religious conflicts. The F-statistics model fit of 48.253 was significant at 0.01 and suitable for us to further test the model. The statistical effect was significant for all respondents ($\beta = -.355$, $t = -6.946$, $p < 0.001$) in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa Balewa Local Government Areas and shows that there was a negative and significant relationship between the causes of ethno-religious conflicts and residential pattern in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas. Thus, this implies that the stated hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, the test concludes that the causes of ethno-religious conflict has significantly negatively influence the pattern of residents in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas.

Table 4: Regression Analysis of the relationship between ethno-religious conflicts and socio-economic impact on residential patterns in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas
Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.052 ^a	.003	.000	.39973

a. Predictors: (Constant), ethnic-religious conflict

ANOVA^a

Model	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	.167	1	.167	1.044	.308 ^b
1 Residual	60.719	380	.160		
Total	60.886	381			

a. Dependent Variable: Socio-economic Development of residential patterns

b. Predictors: (Constant), ethnic-religious conflict

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	3.195	.162		19.724	.000
ethnic-religious conflict	-.045	.044	-.052	-1.022	.308

a. Dependent Variable: Socio-economic Development of residential patterns
 Table 4 shows a test of regression analysis whether the ethno-religious conflict has no significant influence on socio-economic development of residential patterns in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas. The result shows an R^2 value of .000 explaining that 0% of the changes in the socio-economic development of residential patterns in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas is significantly attributed to the changes in the ethno-religious conflicts. The F-statistics model fit of 1.044 with an insignificant value of .0308 shows that the mode, is not suitable for us to further test. Supporting the non-significant model fitness, the statistical effect was also not significant for all respondents ($\beta = -.045$, $t = -1.022$, $p < 0.308$) in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa Balewa Local Government Areas and shows that there was a non-significant relationship between the ethno-religious conflicts and socio-economic development of residential patterns in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas. Thus, this implies that the stated null hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, the test concludes that the ethno-religious conflict has no significant influence on the socio-economic development of residential patterns in Jos North, Jos South, Toro and Tafawa-Balewa Local Government Areas.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Evidence abound that amongst other factors such as ethnic diversity that are the causes of ethno-religious conflict in the study areas, religious difference stands out to be a major influencing cause of residential segregation in Plateau and Bauchi States, Nigeria. Segregated residential areas like Angwan Rogo, Kerana and Bauchi road that are habited by Muslims accommodate other ethnic groups who are Muslims. Similarly, Christians of diverse ethnic groups cohabit peacefully in such areas as Kabong, Angwan Rukuba, Gyel and Tafawa Balewa. The intractable ethno-religious conflict and its consequential residential patterns has adversely affected the socio-

economic development of Jos North, Jos South and Tafawa Balewa Local Government Areas of Plateau and Bauchi States respectively. On the other hand, Toro Local Government Area stands out to be the only area that benefit positively from the conflict and residential patterns.

Based on the foregoing it is recommended the leaders of the two faiths should imbibe the spirit of cooperation; tolerance and respect for human right and recognize the authority of secular powers in its totality as belonging to God. Government should initiate programmes that will create good relationships between Muslims and Christians on the ground of informed appreciation and unbiased judgment of one another's basic beliefs. Also, there is need for the State and Local government Areas to look inwards and redress their sources of revenue generation. The State can partner with other stakeholders to reconstruct the Jos Ultra-modern market and revitalize the motor parks which have been a major source of internally generated revenue rather than relying on the meager revenue allocation from the federal government.

References

- Ardrey, R. (1967). *The Territorial imperative: A personal inquiry into the animal origins of property and nations*. New York: Athenaeum.
- Bodi, S. F., Abbare, H. B. & Leawat, J. J. (2021). Empirical case studies of religious conflicts in Nigeria and possible solutions. *International Journal of Management, Social Sciences, peace and conflict studies (IJMSSPCS)*, 4(2), 491-500.
- Esiri, M. & Aliyu, M. (2021). The political economy of ethno-religious violence in Jos, Nigeria 2001-2011. *Edo Journal of Arts, Management and Social Sciences*. 3(1), 199-215
- Fatuga, B. I. A (2003). Harnessing Nigeria's Animal Resources for food security. *Tropical Veterinarian*. 21(4) 168-181.
- Hemed, M. (2015). *Cross-sectional studies: training course in sexual and reproductive health research*. Tanzania: GFMER.
- Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Madueke, K. L. (2018). The emergence and development of ethnic strongholds and frontiers of collective violence in Jos, Nigeria. *African Studies Review*, 62(4), 6-30.
- Mgbachu, B. and Okechukwu, O.J. (2014). Religious violence: Implications for nation building. *Journal of Religion and Human relations* 1(6) 101-116
- Mohammed, A. O. (2004), *The Economy and ethno-religious conflicts*. Ibadan: Heinemann.
- Northrup, T. (1989); *The dynamic of identity in personal and social conflict*. In L Kriesberg, T. Northrup, & S. Thorson (eds.), *Intractable conflicts and their transformation*: 55-82. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

- Oberschall, A. (2010). *Conflict theory: peacemaking in divided societies. A handbook of politics*. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/10.1007/978-0-387-68930-2-10>
- Putman, L.L. & Wondolleck, J. M. (2003). *Intractability: Definitions, dimensions distinctions*. In Lewicki, R. J., Grey, B. & Elliot, M. (Eds.), *Making sense of intractable environmental conflicts: Concept and cases*. Washington: Island Press
- Suleiman, I. (2019). Ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria: A case study of Tafawa Balewa L.G.A. *International Journal of Political Science and Governance*. 1(2): 30-37
- Tsega, E. (2009). *The origin of ethnic conflict in Africa: Politics and violence in Darfur, Oromia and the Tana Delta*. Switzerland: Springer Nature.
- Ukwai, J. K., Okpa, J. T. & Dike, E. (2018). Ethnic and religious conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria: A dangerous threat to human existence and business activities. *Journal of Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*. 8(8): 31-37
- Yamane, T. (1967). *Statistics: An introductory analysis*. 2nd Ed. New York: Harper and Row.
- Yusuf, M.S. (2009). *Jos, a city in peril: An overview of ethnicity and the origin & sources of conflicts in Jos North*. Jos: Sardauna Printers.